The Insurgents of the Afghan North. the Rise of the Taleban, the Self-Abandonment Of

Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter The Insurgents of the Afghan North The rise of the Taleban, the self-abandonment of the Afghan government and the effects of ISAF’s ‘capture-and-kill campaign’ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Until recently, the belief was widespread that Taleban attempts to build up local structures the Greater North was immune from Taleban was in fact a patient effort of systematic infiltration, due mainly to two reasons: infiltration, reflecting a strategy to extend their control beyond their traditional a) The Taleban were perceived as a purely strongholds in the south. The Taleban Pashtun movement by local Western repeated patterns of infiltration that had been analysts and the Afghan government. This utilised elsewhere in Afghanistan: They would limit their potential for recruitment initially allocated material resources and to predominantly Pashtun areas, of which manpower to the Greater North, sent political few exist in the Greater North of agents to recruit sympathetic mullahs and Afghanistan; appeal to disgruntled Pashtuns, and installed b) In practice, the level of Taleban infiltration sympathetic mullahs in local madrassas and from southern Afghanistan and activity of mosques – with visible results from 2008 other insurgent groups remained very low onwards. By early 2010, the Taleban had until 2008, compared to the south and brought the northern half of Baghlan, several east of Afghanistan. Attempts by the districts in the south and north of Kunduz, Taleban to gain support and build cells in most of northern Takhar and parts of Faryab the so-called Pashtun pockets from 2005 and Jowzjan under their military control or onwards did not translate into military influence. They attacked German troops in actions quickly and were rated by Kunduz province and even aggressively NATO/ISAF forces and the Afghan pursued them in retreat. During the Taleban’s government as a failure. build-up phase, ISAF contingents in the The picture changed drastically in 2008 with Greater North had followed a reluctant attacks and roadside bombs and even large- approach: avoid direct conflict, military scale ambushes involving dozens of fighters in escalation and casualties. When the situation 2009. The argument that the Taleban could deteriorated, they had no answer to the only attract Pashtuns became controversial. growing insurgency – mainly because they Obviously, what had looked like failing lacked political backing to pursue a more 2 Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter: The Insurgents of the Afghan North aggressive counter-approach in the Western many conservative mullahs to come into the European capitals. open and take positions against the government and foreign presence, which In the grand debate concerning Taleban incidentally coincided with their interest to strategy, including whether it exists in the first maintain their positions of unquestioned place, the Greater North bears witness that it power in their communities. Where the is indeed real. Taleban do not have extensive community At the same time, the Taleban opened their support, madrassas seem to be the main ranks for non-Pashtuns and managed to form source for grassroots recruitment. According cells in Uzbek and Tajik areas. From 2009 to northern notables and clerics, 70 per cent onwards, the evidence that the Taleban were of the mullahs in the north (of all ethnic recruiting significant numbers of Uzbeks and backgrounds) have been trained in Pakistan. Turkmen and smaller numbers of Tajiks was In at least one predominantly Uzbek district in overwhelming. As of spring 2010, ethnically Takhar province, itinerant tablighi preachers mixed groups of insurgents were reported, from Pakistan became the main drivers of but as exceptions rather than the rule, in the Taleban recruitment in 2009. Greater North. The Taleban leadership in In the areas they controlled and influenced, Pakistan has started to appoint non-Pashtuns the Taleban established their shadow as local commanders in an effort to administration, starting in the fields of justice systematically install deputy district governors and taxation, followed (in some cases) by and district-level military chiefs all over the education and health, with a significant north. This helped them gain strength beyond impact on the lives of sections of the the ‘Pashtun pockets’. While Taleban population. First and most importantly, their recruitment among Pashtuns in the north justice system delivered quick and rather non- often attracts elders and non-clerical partisan justice through their mobile courts, elements, the clerical presence seems to be normally consisting of a mullah and two much stronger among Uzbeks and Turkmen. assistants travelling on motorbikes. All parties Tajiks (apart from Aimaqs) have so far been vigilantly respected their verdicts. Wherever less involved in the insurgency, at least in Taleban had power and the human resources, terms of grassroots recruitment, perhaps they installed these courts, which have been because Tajik strongmen enjoy a greater highly praised by local interviewees in various Islamic legitimacy than Uzbek strongmen provinces. Once the Taleban commanded (linked to the secular Jombesh). In some influence in a certain area and had set up their areas, the Taleban also have used social fault court, even people from adjacent areas would lines – for example, among the Pashtuns of turn to them. Taleban justice lacks Baghlan, they drew the lower strata of society sophistication, but offers institutional towards the insurgency. coherence: Cases are decided quickly and A new trend in the Taleban recruitment without demands for bribes; verdicts are strategy could be observed particularly in respected; an integrated chain of security and provinces dominated by non-Pashtuns, such justice is maintained. The Taleban followed up as Aryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol and Takhar, these justice mechanisms with ‘commissions’ where the Taleban emphasised a religious and for taxation, education and health that ideological approach rather than an ethnic regulated how government-established one in their recruitment drives. institutions in these fields would continue Perhaps the most important source of support working under Taleban control. While in and recruitment for the Taleban, however, is general, the Taleban do not tolerate any the clergy – which, as an institution, employment within the Afghan government, transcends ethnic divisions. Sectors of the health and education staff was explicitly clergy were already openly preaching against exempted from this rule, at least in Kunduz the government and foreign presence well province. In Kunduz, the Taleban’s attitude before the Taleban surfaced in the north. concerning education became clear: while Their appearance seems to have inspired girls’ schools were closed to the greatest AAN Thematic Report 04/2011 Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter: The Insurgnts of the Afghan North 3 extent possible and girls were banned from Taleban as possible. The long-term results of participating in schooling despite occasional this remain unclear, as assessing its effect on protests by village elders, boys’ schools the population is very difficult. In general, remained open. experienced, locally rooted commanders have either been killed or fled to Pakistan. Their The Taleban also do not seem to have a replacements – from southern Afghanistan or coherent anti-NGO agenda. NGOs were asked directly from Pakistan – have no roots in the to register with Taleban authorities in various area of their deployment; are in their mid- northern provinces. Whether attacks on NGOs twenties on average (compared to their occur seems to be related to their source of predecessors who were in their mid-thirties funding: USAID-funded projects were strongly on average); lack the skills, experience, opposed by the Taleban. Their more knowledge and respect from the community; permissive attitude towards NGOs in general are more radical and refuse any tactical is directly linked to pressure from agreements with NGOs, instead killing alleged communities that are interested in NGO spies and blowing up infrastructural projects. services. This may deepen their isolation from society, All of the above indicates that the Taleban not but to negotiate with them one day will be only want to fight the Afghan government but more difficult than with their predecessors. to replace it. Moving north and establishing At the same time, the Afghan government was their shadow structures strengthened the neither providing even the basic services the Taleban’s claims to be the legitimate Taleban was nor filling the vacuum created by government of Afghanistan, a nation-wide the ISAF campaign (carried out by SOF) that movement, and that they are fighting for managed to push the Taleban out of areas more than just a region or a particular ethnic they had recently controlled. Political group (the Pashtuns). calculations and manoeuvres of President Apart from the Taleban, several other Hamed Karzai and his government even insurgent groups operate in Afghanistan’s strengthened the Taleban, at least in Baghlan Greater North. All are linked to the Taleban in province. There, considering Pashtuns in one way or another. Most noteworthy is the general as natural allies, government Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which personalities supported (Pashtun) Hezb-e uses northeastern Afghanistan as a staging Islami cadres in conflict with the Tajik- area to infiltrate Central Asia. The relationship dominated political factions,

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