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Afghanistan – Baghlan Province Operational Coordination Team (OCT) Meeting ACTED Pul-E-Khumri Meeting Room on Wednesday 29 August 2018 at 09:00 Hrs

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Afghanistan – Baghlan Province Operational Coordination Team (OCT) Meeting ACTED Pul-E-Khumri Meeting Room on Wednesday 29 August 2018 at 09:00 Hrs Afghanistan – Baghlan Province Operational Coordination Team (OCT) Meeting ACTED Pul-e-Khumri meeting room on Wednesday 29 August 2018 at 09:00 hrs Participants: UNICEF, ACTED, DACAAR, CTG/WFP, ORCD, AKF, FOCUS/AKAH, ANDMA, BDN, OCHA, DoRRD, DoRR # Agenda Issues Action Points Items 1 Welcome OCHA welcomed participants and appreciated humanitarian partners particularly Joint Assessment speech & Teams for their hard works and cooperation in ongoing assessment of vulnerable IDPs of Dand-e- opening Ghuri area of Pul-e-Khumri district. Afterwards each humanitarian agency shared their updates on remarks the recent humanitarian situation in Baghlan Province. 2 Update on ACTED: nowadays we have security problems in 6 districts such as (Pul-e-Khumri, Baghlan Jadid, ACTED was tasked to humanitarian Burka, Tala-wa-Barfak, Dahana-e-Ghuri and Doshi) districts and as usual the people are refer those rejected situation in displacing from their origin areas to different locations and they settle in rental and relative houses. petitions to UNHCR that Baghlan ACTED: recently on 06 Aug 2018, Baghlan IDPs Screening Committee Meeting took place and it their displacement are Province was agreed to assess all Dand-e-Ghuri IDP petitions. From 07-29 Aug, inter-agency assessment more than three months teams assessed 386 families and ERM partners verified only 50 families as eligible IDPs for in Pul-e-Khumri city. humanitarian assistance. Out of 50 families only 14 families are eligible for ERM criteria and other 36 families have been referred to WFP for food assistance. The meeting members agreed to refer those rejected petitions to UNHCR that their displacement are more than three months in Pul-e- Khumri city. BDN: according to field health facilities report due to recent military operation in Mangalha Khogyani areas of Baghlan Jadid district some people temporarily have been displaced to Pul-e- Khumri city, Baghlan Jadid district and other unknown locations. DoRR: said so far they didn’t receive any petitions from the mentioned locations. 3 Update on ACTED: drought has affected some districts in Baghlan Province, but there are no any specific The meeting members drought assessments so far. The people are suffering due to lack of animal feeder and some people have agreed to conduct a issues in been shifted their livestock to Panjshir and other Greenland provinces. There is no any drought drought focus group Baghlan displacement so far, if yes we don’t have the exact number of IDPs. Recently the FSAC Cluster meeting with community Province started the sampling drought and food security assessments in all districts of Afghanistan and in DoRRD Office on 30 hopefully their assessment results will be shared soon. Aug 2018 at 02:00 PM. 1 DoRRD: recently there was a drought coordination meeting in Baghlan Provincial Governor Office and some related agencies were tasked to conduct drought assessment in some specific drought affected districts such as (Nahrin, Tala-wa-Barfak, Burka and Baghlan Jadid) districts. The assessment teams have filled some drought formats, but they need to be updated. ANDMA: reported that recently they received 1000 MT animal feeder and 2570 MT wheat from Kabul level for Baghlan Province. The animal feeder already distributed in four districts (Nahrin, Burka, Baghlan Jadid, Pul-e-Khumri), but wheat did not distribute so far and they are in the process of beneficiaries’ selection. Recently the governmental authorities conducted random drought assessment in the mentioned four districts to identify the drought affected people in Baghlan Province and based on that assessment the Baghlan PDMC Meeting members have estimated 45% population as drought affected people in Baghlan Province. When the report shared with Kabul, the Kabul authorities did not accept that figures and they allocated only 2570 MT wheat for 16.5% population of Baghlan province. According to PDMC Meeting they will distribute the allocated wheat to most vulnerable drought affected people through food for work program in all districts. 4 Challenges Lack of UNAMA communication in terms of IDPs with Baghlan local authorities: - OCHA & DoRR will and possible Head of DoRR: on 30 July 2018, the elders from Dand-e-Ghuri area of Pul-e-Khumri district reached have a bilateral solutions to UNAMA and claimed that approximately 800 conflict affected IDP families settled in Pul-e-Khumri meeting with UNAMA city and did not receive any humanitarian assistances since their displacement from the mentioned on 30 Aug 2018. area, neither from the government nor humanitarian agencies. UNAMA without any coordination and communication with Baghlan local authorities directly reported the IDPs problem with their central office. OCHA after receiving such report immediately called DoRR to invite the representatives of IDPs to humanitarian coordination meeting and meeting members agreed to establish assessment teams to identify the displaced families. The representative of the mentioned IDPs could able to submit only 51 families’ petitions to DoRR Office. After joint assessment, the ERM partners verified only 14 eligible families for humanitarian assistance and 36 families have been referred to WFP for food assistance. He stressed that the IDPs caseload earlier reported by community elders to UNAMA was not accurate and majority of them were prolonged IDPs from two- three years before. Possible solution: - OCHA committed to have a bilateral meeting with UNAMA in this regard on 30 Aug 2018. - Head of DoRR requested, if UNAMA faces with such IDPs cases in the future, first of all they should contact DoRR or OCHA for further follow up on provincial level. BDN: recently our two CHC clinics (Mangalha area of Baghlan Jadid and CHC Burka) have been - OCHA will follow up occupied and damaged in the districts and so far we did not receive any compensation from side and report the BDN of conflicts. The mentioned health facilities have been occupied by ANSF and using as clinics issue with 2 strongholds. Even they checking the patients and on other side the mentioned clinics are in high Mazar Civil Military threat of Taliban. Coordination and Possible solution: Baghlan Provincial - OCHA will follow up and report the BDN clinics problem with Mazar Civil Military Coordination Governor Office. Team members and Baghlan Provincial Governor Office. 5 Any other UNICEF: will provide NFIs through ARCS if there is any gap in remote areas of Baghlan Province. business If joint assessment teams find any health problem, please refer the cases with UNICEF extenders. ACTED is referring the IDPs health problem to UNICEF and other health facilities during IDPs assessment. 3 .
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