Small Farmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan

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Small Farmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Office of Evaluation Small Farmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan – GCP /AFG/053/GER Final report March 2013 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Office of Evaluation (OED) This report is available in electronic format at: http://www.fao.org/evaluation The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO. © FAO 2013 FAO encourages the use, reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product. Except where otherwise indicated, material may be copied, downloaded and printed for private study, research and teaching purposes, or for use in non-commercial products or services, provided that appropriate acknowledgement of FAO as the source and copyright holder is given and that FAO’s endorsement of users’ views, products or services is not implied in any way. All requests for translation and adaptation rights, and for resale and other commercial use rights should be made via www.fao.org/contact-us/licence-request or addressed to [email protected] . For further information on this report, please contact: Director, OED Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 1, 00153 Rome, Italy Email: [email protected] Evaluation Report of FAO’s BTF Project GCP/AFG/053/GER Smallfarmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province; Afghanistan, April 2012 Table of Contents Table of Contents i Acronyms ii Acknowledgment iv Executive Summary v 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation 1 1.2 Methodology of the evaluation 2 2 Context of the Project 3 3 Concept and Relevance 5 3.1 Design 5 3.2 Relevance 10 4 Implementation 13 4.1 Budget and expenditure 13 4.2 Project management 14 4.3 Technical backstopping 17 4.4 Government Support 19 5 Results and Contribution to Stated Objectives 20 5.1 Outputs and outcomes 20 5.2 Gender issues 34 5.3 Capacity Development 35 5.4 Sustainability 36 5.5 Impact 38 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 41 Annexes 47 i Evaluation Report of FAO’s BTF Project GCP/AFG/053/GER Smallfarmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province; Afghanistan, April 2012 Acronyms AALP FAO’s Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods Program ACD Agricultural Cooperative Department of MAIL AFG Afghanistan AFAOR Assistant FAO Representative AFS Afghani AGK Aga Khan Foundation A.I. Artificial insemination AKF Agha Khan Foundation ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy APP Agricultural Production and Productivity Programme BAP Baghlan Agricultural Project financed by Germany BDS Business Development Service BL Budget Line BMELV German Federal Ministry of Nutrition, Agriculture and Consumer Protection BTF Bilateral Trust Fund of BMELV with FAO BTO Back-to-Office CBO Community-based Organization CDC Community Development Council CAP Community Action Plan CP Counterpart DAIL Provincial Department of MAIL FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations FAOR FAO Representation FAOAF FAO Country Representation in Afghanistan FAO-RAF FAO Regional Office for Asia and Far East FBO Farm-based Organizations FS Food Security GCP Government Cooperative Programme GDPP MAIL’s General Directorate for Extension, Policy and Planning GoA Government of Afghanistan GO Government Organization HQ Headquarters LFA Logical Framework Approach LoA Letter of Agreement LTO Lead Technical Officer LTU Lead Technical Unit (major FAO backstopping unit) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock of Afghanistan NADF National Agricultural Development Framework NBSC New Baghlan Sugar Company NGO Non-Government Organization NPD National Project Director NTS National Technical Specialist PIK Pul-e-Kumrhi PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team SALEH FAO’s Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods in Eastern Hazarajat ii Evaluation Report of FAO’s BTF Project GCP/AFG/053/GER Smallfarmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province; Afghanistan, April 2012 SP Private sector service provider SOO Senior Operations Officer SPOO Senior Project Operations Officer SWG Sector Working Group ToR Terms of Reference ToT Training of Trainers TSS Technical Support Services, i.e. services provided by FAO staff UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan USD United States Dollars iii Evaluation Report of FAO’s BTF Project GCP/AFG/053/GER Smallfarmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province; Afghanistan, April 2012 Acknowledgment The evaluator would like to thank all project stakeholders, in particular the project staff, officials of FAO at headquarters and country representation, and managing staff of the MAIL and the DAIL (Baghlan Province) who contributed to this evaluation. Discussions were always frank, fruitful and stimulating, providing insights to the multi-dimensional issues related to the project and livelihood of people in Baghlan Province. The author of this report is especially grateful to Mr M. Aslam Hamidi, the Technical Officer in charge of the Project in Baghlan Province, and his staff; Mr. Moeen ud Din Siraj and Mr Ahmad Faraz, Operations Officers in the FAO Country Office Afghanistan (FAOAF); Mr David Kahan, AGS Lead Technical Officer (LTO) for the Project, and Mr. Bernd Bueltemeier, Evaluation Officer (FAO Evaluation Office, Rome), for the time and effort put into ensuring that the evaluation could fulfill its function. Finally thanks are due to all people who provided support to the mission in one way or the other. Every cooperative visited gave a warm welcome to the mission, and project staff provided thoughtful and comprehensive accounts of their activities. Evaluator and timing of the exercise The evaluation mission was originally expected to consist of the mission leader, Mr. Matthias Grunewald, Socio-Economist, FAO Consultant, and the Government representative, Mr. Saboor Shirzad, Director General of Alternative Agricultural Livelihoods of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL). The participation of the latter did eventually not materialize, mainly because of the unpredictable schedule of the field trip due to the security situation. Originally the evaluation work in Afghanistan was planned to take place from 12-25 March 2012 (11-26 March, i.e. 16 days including travel; 7 days were reserved for report writing (total duration of employment planned to amount to 23 days). De facto the evaluator’s mission lasted from 11 March (departure from Germany) to 29 March as the field trip to Baghlan had to be delayed by 4 days because of the security clearance (therefore actual duration of employment 27 days). This enabled the author of this report to design two surveys covering the heads of the 30 cooperatives and a sample of the direct beneficiaries. Some of the seven days planned to be spent on evaluation report writing were in reality also used for mission preparation and survey report writing. iv Evaluation Report of FAO’s BTF Project GCP/AFG/053/GER Smallfarmer Livelihoods and Income Enhancement in Baghlan Province; Afghanistan, April 2012 Executive Summary ES1. The FAO Project under evaluation, together with other projects, is financed from a German Trust Fund which supports livelihood development of small farmers in Afghanistan. It is a follow-up to the project Rehabilitation of the Sugar Industry in Baghlan which faced agronomic problems. The 3-year Project under evaluation actually started in January 2009 and is presently scheduled to end in June 2012. Its current total budget is US$ 2,024,636. ES2. The Project is part of the portfolio of the German bilateral trust fund that the donor has set up in FAO. The three major parties, i.e. FAO and the Governments of Afghanistan and Germany promote similar approaches and concepts such as livelihoods, the right to food, farmer-based organizations and market-led agricultural development. ES3. The one-man evaluation mission lasted from 11 March to 29 March 2012 and included a 4-day stay in Baghlan province. With the exception of the donor all major stakeholders could be consulted. A mix of methods and instruments were used including a standardized questionnaire which was tested and administered for heads of cooperatives and members of interest groups. This resulted in an impact survey report that prepared by the evaluation consultant right after his mission. ES4. Baghlan Province covers a total area of 21,112 km², has 15 districts and 1,645 villages with an estimated population of 1,122,350 people. Many people are illiterate and have experienced food insecurity. The majority of the population depends on subsistence farming with some production for the market. The Baghlan river plains are fertile and have a potential for increased diversified production of fruit and vegetables. Pul-e-Kumrhi, the provincial capital, has good road connections with Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. ES5. The design
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