2014 Moody Simon 1063185

This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ The Surreal Mission Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the British Army, and the Defence of the Central Front, 1945-1957 Moody, Simon John Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 01. Oct. 2021 The Surreal Mission: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the British Army, and the Defence of the Central Front, 1945- 1957 Simon J. Moody Doctor of Philosophy in Defence Studies Abstract This thesis analyses the impact that tactical nuclear weapons had across the full spectrum of British defence policy-making between the years 1945-1957. It assesses the interactions between British defence policy and strategic planning; the roles of the British Army in national and alliance strategy; and Army preparations for nuclear combat. By making connections between these distinct, yet interrelated, elements of British defence planning the thesis provides new perspectives on British thinking about tactical nuclear weapons. The overarching thesis of this study is that the reluctance of British civilian defence policy-makers to engage in meaningful debate about the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons affected negatively the ability of the British Army to adapt to meet the new challenges of nuclear land combat. It is argued that for political and economic reasons the British government invested its resources into developing the strategic nuclear deterrent over all other military capabilities and that consequently the British Army was denied the political and financial support it needed to innovate in the tactical nuclear field. In the alliance context it is posited that civilian leaders acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues and accepted a policy of first use of tactical nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe in order to enhance political cohesion within NATO, despite evidence that this was a flawed operational concept and without understanding the true ramifications of such a posture. It is maintained that a corollary of this was that the Army was forced to confront the challenges of preparing for nuclear land combat with little guidance or support from its political masters. 1 Contents Acknowledgements 3 Abbreviations 4 Introduction 5 Section One: The Politics of British Defence Policy, 1945-1957 Chapter I: Bureaucratic Politics and the Decision-Making Process 33 Chapter II: British Defence Policy and Tactical Nuclear Weapons 78 Section Two: The British Army in National and Alliance Strategy Chapter III: The Army and the Changing Strategic Environment 110 Chapter IV: BAOR and the European Central Front 139 Section Three: The British Army and the Nuclear Battlefield Chapter V: Theories of Tactical Nuclear War 174 Chapter VI: Preparing for Nuclear Land Combat 212 Conclusions 249 Bibliography 264 2 Acknowledgements The research and writing of a project of this nature is reliant on the help and support of a great number of people and institutions. The staffs of the National Archives, the Imperial War Museum, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives have given me every bit of assistance in the preparation of this thesis. I would like to offer my particular thanks to Eudes Nouvelot and Johannes Geurts, two archivists at NATO who made my research trip to Brussels both productive and enjoyable. The Beresford MA Scholarship and the Arts and Humanities Research Council PhD Studentship were both instrumental in allowing me to conduct my graduate studies. I have been in the privileged position to have studied under the tutelage of some inspiring scholars. Dr Alaric Searle gave me a firm grounding in my field as an undergraduate at the University of Salford and instilled in me the confidence to pursue a career in academia. For this I am eternally grateful. At the University of Leeds, Prof Holger Afflerbach not only listened patiently to my ramblings about tactical nuclear weapons but actively encouraged me to develop my ideas further. The early critiques of my work by my erstwhile secondary supervisor, Prof Michael Hughes, prepared me well for the rest of the doctoral process. Finally, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my primary supervisor Dr Robert Foley. His relentless enthusiasm for this project since its inception has been a source of great motivation. He has often gone above and beyond what is expected from an academic mentor and has been instrumental in my development as a scholar. As always, the support from my friends and family has been priceless. My friends, Matt Gough, Chris Gough, Alex Apfel, Peter Szymkowiak, Angel-Luke O’Donnell, Lucy Williams, Emily Trafford, and Harry Wood have taught me how to think, laugh, and be. I would like to offer my gratitude to my brother and sister-in-law, who generously provided me with board and keep during my many research trips to London. As always, my wonderful sister has been a source of great personal inspiration and entertainment. Two people who deserve special attention are my parents, who have always believed in me. Without their unconditional love and support, the writing of this thesis would not have been possible. There is an oft quoted maxim that behind every successful man stands a great woman. Although my success is yet to be defined there can be no doubting the great qualities that grace my partner, Jessica, who is an amazing woman, loving mother, and irreplaceable friend. 3 Abbreviations AORG – Army Operational Research Group APC – Armoured Personnel Carrier APWPC – Army Post-War Plans Committee BAOR – British Army of the Rhine CAS – Chief of the Air Staff CDC – Cabinet Defence Committee CIGS – Chief of the Imperial General Staff COS – Chiefs of Staff COSC – Chiefs of Staff Committee CPX – Command Post Exercise DCIGS – Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff DSACEUR – Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe JIC – Joint Intelligence Committee JPS – Joint Planning Staff LTDP – Long Term Defence Programme NAG – New Approach Group NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NORTHAG – Northern Army Group PRC – Policy Review Committee RUSI – Royal United Services Institute SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT – Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SEATO – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 4 Introduction Instituting change in military organisations is extremely difficult, yet usually highly important. To remain effective, military forces have to identify, and adapt to, changes in the strategic environment in which they operate. Such changes may be brought about by technological innovations, political and social upheaval, or economic instability. In the years following the end of the Second World War, all of these factors played a role in transforming the strategic landscape in Britain: the advent of nuclear weapons presented a new and feared threat to British security; the ascendancy of a powerful Soviet Union marked the dawn of an uncertain bi-polar world; and British economic decline made the nation’s position as an imperial power untenable, accelerating her retreat from Empire. For the British Army, these developments had ominous implications. Not only did the service have to manage its already substantial global security commitments, but it had to face the grim reality of a potential military confrontation with the Soviet Union, the armies of which were already, by the 1950s, firmly entrenched in Eastern Europe. To further complicate matters, Army planners were forced to assess the likely effects that the advent of nuclear weapons might have on operational planning. All the while, the Army had to maintain its political effectiveness in a hostile bureaucratic environment that challenged its institutional interests as it tried desperately to find a new modus operandi in an uncertain strategic environment. Perhaps the most immediate concern confronting the British Army after 1945 was how the advent of nuclear weapons would affect the conduct of operations in a future land war. With a lack of precedent on which to base operational planning, the arrival of the atomic bomb into the armouries of the United States, and later the Soviet Union, presented something of a conundrum for Army leaders. Although relatively little was known on the detailed technical characteristics of the atomic bomb, it was clear that these new

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