JFQ 11 ▼JFQ FORUM Become Customer-Oriented Purveyors of Narrow NOTES Capabilities Rather Than Combat-Oriented Or- 1 Ganizations with a Broad Focus and an Under- U.S

Warfare today is a thing of swift movement—of rapid concentrations. It requires the building up of enormous fire power against successive objectives with breathtaking speed. It is not a game for the unimaginative plodder. ...the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to be overcome. — General George C. Marshall Fort Benning, Georgia September 18, 1941 Inaugural Issue JFQ CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by Colin L. Powell

Introducing the Inaugural Issue 6 by the Editor-in-Chief

JFQ FORUM JFQ Inaugural Issue

The Services and Joint Warfare: 7 Four Views from the Top

Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power 8 by Gordon R. Sullivan

The Wave of the Future 13 by Frank B. Kelso II

Complementary Capabilities from the Sea 17 by Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

Ideas Count by Merrill A. McPeak JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 22 JFQ

Reforming Joint Doctrine Coalition Warfare What’s Ahead for the Armed Forces? by David E. Jeremiah Joint Warfare— Views from the Top 25

United Nations Peacekeeping

The Limits of Jointness

The Gulf War Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capability? Revisited

Joint Air Summer Operations 93 by Stephen Peter Rosen Inaugural Issue 36 Service Redundancy— Waste or Capability?

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

ABOUT THE COVER Reforming Joint Doctrine The cover shows USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, 40 by Robert A. Doughty passing through the Suez Canal during Opera- tion Desert Shield, a U.S. Navy photo by Frank A. Marquart. Photo credits for insets, from top United Nations Peacekeeping: Ends versus Means to bottom, are Schulzinger and Lombard (for 48 by William H. Lewis and John O.B. Sewall Lockheed), DOD, and the U.S. Army.

2 JFQ / Summer 1993 SUMMER 1993 / NUMBER 1

Principles for Coalition Warfare 58 by Robert W. RisCassi Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Editor-in-Chief Alvin H. Bernstein Executive Editor Patrick M. Cronin OUT OF JOINT Managing Editor Robert A. Silano The Limits of Jointness Associate Editors 72 by Seth Cropsey Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley Production Manager George C. Maerz A New Mission for Photo Editor 80 Atlantic Command Chris H. Reynard by Paul David Miller Editorial Assistant Florence P. Williams

Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf Joint Force Quarterly is published by the 88 by James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employ- Operation Weserübung and the Origins of ment of land, sea, air, space, and special 100 Joint Warfare operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, con- by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and tingency planning, combat operations Christopher Coglianese conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development. The editors invite articles and other THE JOINT WORLD contributions on joint warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, 112 Professional Notes: and topics of common interest to the Armed Forces. Please direct manuscripts, Doctrine, Education, and letters, and other communications to: Documentation Managing Editor Joint Force Quarterly ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ OFF THE SHELF National Defense University Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 118 Revisiting the Gulf War: Commercial Telephone: (202) 475–1013 A Review Essay Defense Switched Network: 335–1013 by Harry G. Summers, Jr. FAX: (202) 475–1012/ DSN 335–1012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 123 The Military Cost of Discrimination: A Review Essay those of the contributors and do not by Alan L. Gropman necessarily reflect the views of the De- partment of Defense or any other 125 On the Other Side of the Interwar Years: A Book Review agency of the Federal Government. Por- tions of this journal are protected by by Brian R. Sullivan copyright and may not be reproduced or extracted without the permission of the 127 Books Noted copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever material is quoted from POSTSCRIPT or based on its contents. This publication has been approved by 128 A Note To Readers and Future Contributors the Secretary of Defense.

ISSN 1070–0692

Summer 1993 / JFQ 3 Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Publisher GEN Colin L. Powell, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Advisory Committee LTG Paul G. Cerjan, USA National Defense University Members of the Advisory Committee Maj Gen John C. Fryer, Jr., USAF National War College BG Randolph W. House, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Col Valentino L. Lendaro, USMC Marine Corps War College VADM R.C. Macke, USN The Joint Staff Col Andrew Nichols Pratt, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF Air War College Brig Gen Monroe S. Sams, Jr., USAF Armed Forces Staff College RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces MG William A. Stofft, USA U.S. Army War College RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF Air Command and Staff College BrigGen Michael J. Williams, USMC The Joint Staff Chairman of the Editorial Board Alvin H. Bernstein National Defense University Members of the Editorial Board Richard K. Betts Columbia University Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University COL Robert A. Doughty, USA U.S. Military Academy LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC Marine Corps War College Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University COL Robert A. Gimbert, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces COL Peter F. Herrly, USA National War College Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF Naval War College William T. Hodson Information Resources Management College we train as a team,

COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA Courtesy of the U.S. Army Art Collection U.S. Army War College fight as a team, Col George R. Jackson, USAF Portrait of the Chairman Armed Forces Staff College by SFC Peter G. Varisano, USA. Mark H. Jacobsen and win as a team Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher The Brookings Institution John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF Air Command and Staff College LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute Stephen Peter Rosen Harvard University James H. Toner Air War College LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) RKK, Limited

4 JFQ / Summer 1993 jointness, a goal that we have been seeking since America took up arms in December 1941 at a time when warfare was clearly undergoing a dramatic change. Today we have achieved that goal; today all men and A Word from women in uniform, each service, and every one of our great civilian employees understand that we must fight as a team. Our soldiers know that they are the best the Chairman on the battlefield; our sailors know that they are the best at sea; our airmen know that they are the finest in the skies; our Marines he world is a very different place know that no one better ever hit the beach. today than it was when I assumed But every one of these men and women also my duties as Chairman of the Joint knows that they play on a team. They are of Chiefs of Staff in October 1989. In the team and for the team; “one for all and the intervening years, walls have all for one,” as Alexandre Dumas put it in Tcome down, empires have crumbled, new The Three Musketeers. We train as a team, nations have been born, and more people fight as a team, and win as a team. have sought freedom than at any other pe- JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly—or simply riod in history. Many of them have found it, JFQ—is the most recent addition to this ef- some are still reaching, and others have a fort. Its purpose is to spread the word about long way to go. But I believe the momentum our team, to provide for a free give-and-take that freedom and democracy have gained is of ideas among a wide range of people from an unstoppable force. every corner of the military. We want the Much of that momentum was generated pages of JFQ to be filled with the latest word by the dedication and devotion to duty of on joint issues—from warfighting to educa- millions of Americans—together with their tion, from training to logistics. We want the steadfast allies—who refused to surrender to discussion of these joint issues to get a thor- the scourge of communism and so, finally, ough airing, to stir debate and counter-argu- brought about its defeat, both strategically ment, to stimulate the thinking of American and morally. Foremost among those proud men and women serving on land, at sea, and Americans are the members of the U.S. in the air. We want JFQ to be the voice of the Armed Forces. Their service has helped cre- joint warfighter. ate the new era of hope and promise that we Don’t read the pages that follow if you are now entering. are looking for the establishment point of Their service also has made possible the view or the conventional wisdom. Pick up kind of military that we have as a Nation. JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, and Today’s Armed Forces are the finest in the fresh insights—for the cool yet lively inter- world. Hard work, lessons learned from past play among some of the finest minds com- mistakes, matchless training, and first-class mitted to the profession of arms. weapons and equipment enable us to take Read JFQ. Study it. Mark it up—under- the best and the brightest young Ameri- line and write in the margins. Get mad. cans—volunteers all—and mold them into Then contribute your own views. We want an exquisite fighting force that can be de- to hear from you. We need to hear from you. ployed at any time or place in the world, For it is only you and your buddies who can with blinding speed and awesome power. make JFQ one of the most thoroughly read There is another and influential journals in our profession. major factor that contributes to the high qual- COLIN L. POWELL General Colin L. Powell, USA, is the Chairman ity of our Armed Force— twelfth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of of the Staff. He was previously Commander less tangible than training Joint Chiefs of Staff in Chief, Forces Command, and also or weaponry but nonethe- has served as Assistant to the less crucial. We call it President for National Security Affairs.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 5 Introducing the Inaugural Issue the field—this competition of ideas should make for lively reading. The success of this or any journal in- variably depends on such liveliness. In the inaugural issue of JFQ, for example, Admiral From Desert One David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, observes that “We desperately need to streamline our de- to Desert Storm fense acquisition system.” So strong an assertion from so senior and thoughtful an officer should be a starting point for debate on what kinds of changes need to be n a society such as ours, overwhelmed with infor- made in our approach to building weapons in a period mation but deeply dependent upon clear—I do of ambiguous threats and constrained budgets. not say simple—ideas, journals can play a critical The articles by senior officers emphasize coopera- role. The best of them synthesize facts in order to tion while retaining the distinctive skills of each ser- I vice. But Seth Cropsey insists that such cooperation formulate useful ideas. Joint Force Quarterly aims to do precisely this. At the same time, its appearance marks a must not silence the proper debate about the future milestone in the history of the American military’s roles of the individual services, while Stephen Rosen progress from a force that first won a young nation its uses historical examples to argue that structured com- independence, then served as the successful defender petition between the services is vital to the health of of its fundamental values, and finally became what it is the Armed Forces. today—the most powerful protector of liberty that the On the operational level, General Robert RisCassi, world has ever known, whether reckoned relatively or who commands U.N. and U.S. forces in Korea, writes absolutely. that reliance on coalition warfare will increase in the This historic milestone not only marks an extraor- future, and offers an intriguing argument about the dinary political success. It bears witness to the devel- universality of military doctrine that is certain to send opment of an American military whose skills and a legion of military historians to their reference equipment have arrived at a degree of excellence as works—and then to their word processors—to approve unachievable as it was unimaginable just a decade or dispute his arguments. ago. In the dozen years between Desert One and Putting ideas into action, Admiral Paul David Desert Storm, our Armed Forces have reached a water- Miller, the commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command, shed in their operational quality. JFQ aims to chart offers a working plan to preserve military power as and analyze that course, so that the understanding U.S. forces decrease in size. Controversial his plans thus gained will enable us to build upon this remark- may be; but as virtually every author in this issue rec- able achievement and assure its continuation. Here, ognizes, the comfort of the old, familiar ways is gone. then, is a forum where wisdom from the past can These are but a few of the articles from JFQ’s first serve us in the future. issue. Readers will inevitably notice that a hefty num- The journal’s specific interest is in the ideas that ber of authors wear several stars on their shoulders. will improve our ability to work together. Hence, it fo- They have been gracious enough to lend their stature cuses on three related areas: joint and combined oper- to the launching of Joint Force Quarterly. Future con- ations; interservice and multiservice interests that bear tributors should not be intimidated by the rank of this directly on jointness; and unique service concerns distinguished group. This journal is dedicated to pro- that influence the culture of the U.S. Armed Forces. viding a forum for every officer—irrespective of rank The ultimate purpose is to ensure that our military re- or position—with interest in the issues raised by the mains able to deter or defeat any future enemy, jointness and unity of the services. Jointness is as should storm clouds again gather on the strategic much a bottom-up as it is a top-down enterprise. As horizon and hostile forces threaten our interests or the Chairman urged, I too hope that you will read those of our allies. JFQ, write letters in response to its contents, and con- In his introductory remarks, the Chairman writes tribute your own articles. Despite the high rank of the that such an enterprise demands a competition of authors in this inaugural issue, “Don’t let the stars get ideas on the subjects where the interests of the ser- in your eyes.” vices converge. General Powell reminds us that, just as ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN there is no substitute in combat for trial by fire, so the Editor-in-Chief best ideas can only emerge after they too have under- gone the appropriate trial by debate. In the world of military thought—which needs to precede action in

6 JFQ / Summer 1993 ▼JFQ FORUM THE SERVICES AND JOINT WARFARE: Four Views from the Top The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act elevated the notion of jointness to new heights. Operation Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the ability of the Armed Forces to operate together as a cohesive joint team. But as the services reorganize and reorient to meet the demands of an uncertain future, they must continually examine their contributions to the Nation’s defense and ensure they are prepared for the challenges ahead. Future success in battle depends on maintaining a system of joint warfare that draws upon the unique capabilities of each service while effectively integrating them in order to realize their full combat potential. How the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are working to achieve that goal is the theme on which the service chiefs were asked to focus in this inaugural issue of Joint Force Quarterly.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 7 ▼JFQ FORUM Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power By GORDON R. SULLIVAN

Twenty-nine thousand tanks, thirty-nine thousand infantry fighting vehicles, over four thousand tactical aircraft, seven hundred bombers, six carriers and guided missile aviation cruisers, one hundred and five principal surface combatants, one hundred and twenty ballistic and attack submarines, and thirteen hundred naval aircraft. 1

he relevance of those statistics— with the other services—to ensure that our found in the last edition of Soviet Nation’s enduring interests remain secure Military Power—has altered dra- well into the 21st century. matically. A wide variety of politi- T A Changing World cal, military, social, and economic events il- Soviet military capabilities shaped the lustrates the changes in the global strategic Army’s perspective on joint warfare through- situation over the last four years. The Army out the Cold War. From 1945 to 1990 we understands the scope and depth of these faced a numerically superior, disciplined, of- changes and their implications for the future fensively oriented political and military ad- of U.S. national security. It is taking advan- versary. The tremendous quantity of Soviet tage of, and responding to, international equipment, coupled with Moscow’s drive to and domestic realities which condition the achieve technological parity with the West, development and use of force. As an institu- threatened our interests around the globe, tion, the Army is innovating—in concert with the primary focus on Central Europe. Euphemistically characterized as a “target- rich environment,” massed-armor warfare preoccupied American military thought and action for much of the last forty-five years— two generations of military leaders. Infantry, tank, and artillery units along with battalions, brigades, and divisions rightly had their minds and hands occupied with the job of defeating superior numbers of similar equipment arrayed in a dense combat area. With the notable exception of tactical air support, thoroughly integrated on the World War II pattern established by Pete Quesada and George Patton,2 joint operations and considerations were, in the minds of many Army commanders, consigned to echelons

U.S. Army photo by William U. Rosenmund above corps. Members of the 2d Armored Division The demise of the Soviet Union has inside an infantry fighting vehicle. presented challenges that the Army is overcoming, and opportunities that it is seizing.

8 JFQ / Summer 1993 International issues require a broader appre- Second, future threats require that joint op- ciation of the threat—from the unitary and erations be the norm at every level of com- relatively predictable adversary we knew in mand. Relegating the expertise and ability to the Cold War, to the diverse, ambiguous, conduct joint operations to only “higher” and dynamic threats that we confront today. levels is a recipe for missed opportunities, Ethnic and religious conflict, weapons pro- longer and more difficult operations, riskier liferation, thrusts for regional hegemony, ir- outcomes, greater numbers of casualties, and redentism, terrorism, and drug trafficking increased expenditures of resources. are the most prominent elements of this Joint capabilities provide decisive over- dangerous new world. To successfully meet match on every level of warfare from the the challenges which these trends indicate, strategic, where national objectives are de- we are retaining and developing capabilities termined, priorities assigned, and resources to secure our national interests. We continue allocated, through the operational level, to base these capabilities on the sound foun- where campaigns are constructed to achieve dation of the American people and leverag- national objectives, to the tactical, where ening U.S. technological advantages in train- gagements and battles cumulate in victory. ing, developing, deploying, and employing The U.S. Army demonstrates an ability to the force.3 dominate land combat. Working with the The Army also faces the challenges Air Force, Navy, and posed by a national agenda with a priority Marine Corps will the Army’s view on domestic rebuilding of the physical and ensure victory and of service to the intellectual assets of the country. While the success in any con- Army will shrink to its smallest end strength flict environment. Nation is broad since just before World War II, and as the Operations Just and embraces Nation devotes resources to other programs, Cause and Desert the concept of the Army budget will approach that of the Shield/Desert Storm post-World War II service in percentage of are clear examples of joint operations gross domestic product. The challenge is to the benefits of joint as a cardinal seize opportunities to apply our limited re- operations. Just Cause tenet sources in a manner that best serves the illustrated the im- country. In the past some observers may mense power gener- have portrayed a “circle the wagons” picture ated by a simultaneous application of unique, in which the Army attempts to preserve its complementary service capabilities. By land, capabilities at the expense of working with sea, and air the Armed Forces assaulted and the other services. Today, the world situation secured 27 objectives between midnight and and expectations of the American people sunrise on the first day. That complex, syn- will not tolerate such short-sightedness. The chronized application of combat power, pro- Army’s view of service to the Nation is broad jected from the continental United States, its and embraces the concept of joint opera- coastal waters, and within the region, elimi- tions as a cardinal tenet of defending the nated resistance by the Panamanian Defense United States now and in the 21st century. Force. We neutralized assets that could have Our recent experience bears this out. been used to continue the struggle—communications, ready forces, logistics, and reserves. The Joint Experience Precise power projection and joint principles The last four years have taught us two applied in a compressed timeframe illustrate things. First, joint operations work and they the need for rapid response forces trained in work more efficiently than single-service op- joint operations. Forces participating in Just erations. There is unmatched power in the Cause led the way in expanding the joint per- synergistic capabilities of joint operations. spective on warfare. Seven months later, America received another decisive return on its investment in forces that can operate to- General Gordon R. Sullivan is the thirty-second Chief of gether in any environment and against any Staff, U.S. Army. An armor officer, he has commanded at the adversary while elevating warfare to a level platoon through division levels, and was Vice Chief of Staff unmatched in the world today. Operations prior to assuming his current position. Desert Shield/Desert Storm required an imme-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 9 ▼JFQ FORUM diate defense and a show of force which ma- that are tailorable, more versatile, and more tured and evolved into a potent offensive ca- precise than even those that we employed in pability. Throughout the fall and winter of Southwest Asia or Panama. The range of em- 1990–91 the services conducted joint and ployment scenarios has burgeoned recently, combined training at all levels. The heavy and we can see evidence of this trend in force that defeated Iraq’s Republican Guards joint operations in Somalia, Bosnia-Herze- was comprised of units that had stood watch govina, Guantanamo, Southwest Asia, and in Central Europe for four decades, trained domestically in disaster relief and the coun- and ready to meet an armored thrust that ternarcotics missions. Because such contin- never came. Within days of taking up posi- gencies may not require application of force tions in the desert these units were conduct- in the same magnitude or manner as Just ing joint and combined operations at battal- Cause or Desert Storm, commanders of units ion and brigade level. This of all types and sizes must work and succeed disaster relief and cooperation, based on sound in the joint environment. The 212th Mobile overseas humanitarian principles and doctrine, paid Army Surgical Hospital in Zagreb and the huge dividends and gave us a 10th Mountain Division in Florida, and sub- operations have window into the future of sequently in Somalia, are prime examples. reinforced the necessity warfare. Additionally, our recent domestic disas- to work with civilian For example, during one ter relief and overseas humanitarian opera- phase of the VII Corps operations have reinforced the necessity to work agencies tion, a SAM–2 site in the vi- with civilian agencies. Even before Opera- cinity of Basra activated its tion Desert Storm was over, Army elements radar and began to paint coalition aircraft. were coordinating reconstruction efforts Since the only asset in striking distance due with the host government and U.S. agencies to the pace of operations was an artillery in Kuwait. In Los Angeles, Florida, Louisiana, brigade operating with the 1st Armored Divi- Hawaii, and Guam, Total Army units worked sion, VII Corps relied on an Air Force closely with private relief organizations and EC–130H, Airborne Battle Command and state and Federal agencies to restore order Control Center, to relay the fire mission to and assist civil authorities in restoring ser- the artillery unit and clear the airspace. vices to devastated neighborhoods.5 That Within three hours of the SAM–2 site acti- pattern of support to civil authority contin- vating its radar two Army tactical missiles ued in Somalia. fired from a multiple-launch rocket system In the future the Army’s forward pres- were on the way to destroy the target.4 Air ence and crisis response capabilities will be Force operations continued without threat needed and integrated into every phase of of SAM interruption, and VII Corps bene- operations. The breadth and scope of single- fited from continued air strikes against Iraqi service capabilities militate against making a reserves and command and control targets. solitary transition from forward presence, Replicated across the battlefield, from through crisis response, to conflict resolu- varied service platforms operating on and tion. The capabilities of the Army to domi- above the desert floor and positions at sea, nate maneuver, conduct precision strikes, such actions decimated the Iraqi military, re- sustain land combat power, and protect the solved the conflict on the ground in 100 force are essential and necessary for the pros- hours, and kept our casualties to a mini- ecution of successful campaigns, but only a mum. Conduct of joint warfare at that level combination of multiservice capabilities will has become the unique province of the ensure success. Armed Forces, and one that we are striving The Army recognizes this need for forces to maintain in order to overmatch any po- trained and ready to operate with other ser- tential adversary. vices and ad hoc coalitions, at all unit and command levels. We are on the right path, The Future of Joint Operations both conceptually and materially, to achieve The strategic landscape that the Nation our goals of integration, synergy, and over- faces will require power projection forces whelming effectiveness. The Army has revised its doctrine to reflect changing circumstances that surround

10 JFQ / Summer 1993 ground combat. Our doctrinal capstone, FM replace a sister battalion on U.N. peacekeep- 100–5 (Operations), was published this ing duty in Cambodia. The scenario used spring. The concepts and tenets in this man- real-time intelligence reports from satellite ual are the result of serious study of lessons links with Cambodia to structure daily situa- learned and future possibilities, and the ex- tional training exercises. The technological change of a range of ideas among military capabilities exist to link command posts professionals, scholars, and policy analysts. with subordinates performing a wide range It will guide our efforts of simultaneous missions—search, combat, to reshape the Army for check point, surveillance, crowd control, the world in which we etc.—through real-time intelligence files will be operating.6 drawn from central and remote data banks. We are working This ability to process and exploit informa- closely with the Navy tion is the next step in producing a truly in- and Air Force on imple- tegrated battlefield. menting the recommen- The thrust of Army exploitation of the dations of the Mobility microchip is to improve battlefield aware- Requirements Study.7 The ness through horizontal integration and in- U.S. Army photo General Sullivan in study requires the Army sertion of digital technology. We have begun Somalia. to be able to close a three division force (two to link individual weapons systems (both heavy and one light) to a theater 7,500 miles fielded and future platforms) through auto- away in 30 days, and to close a five division mated communications channels to provide corps with its associated components and instantaneous updates on operational and support within 75 days. This is true power logistical status and enemy information. projection, beginning on the first day of a This will provide commanders and their crisis, and it is not possible to accomplish teams with the precise knowledge needed to these objectives without close cooperation wage warfare at the decisive level on which from the other services. America expects to fight. Map displays and Of course, getting to a crisis theater is not operational graphics can be updated to give enough. We must be prepared to fight from subordinate units complete knowledge of day one in conjunction with other services, the enemy situation and the commander’s and the Army is prepared to do that, through intent, allowing units to take advantage of a rigorous training program that builds on fleeting enemy weaknesses and to bring de- our mature Combat Training Centers. Forced cisive combat power to bear. Other services entry and contingency operations combining are exploiting similar capabilities. The next heavy deployments and airborne insertions logical step is to take the groundwork laid by are the norm. Operations combining heavy, such systems as J–STARS and work toward a light, Air Force, and Marine units take place truly integrated battlefield. The Army looks at Fort Irwin in California. forward to exploiting this advantage with The Joint Readiness Training Center at the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, has a long record of Additionally, within the context of joint innovation when integrating the services. operations, there is room for achieving Navy SEALs routinely operate in local rivers. economies of scale and consolidating func- The threat can be varied and includes refugees tions. Some training and many logistics and and terrorists as well as a world-class opposing support functions are already consolidated, force. Recently, joint operations demonstrated and we are looking for ways to expand such the ability of the 24th Infantry Division’s programs. However, not all redundancy con- ready company team and the 82d Airborne sists of unnecessary overlap. Centralization Division to deploy rapidly and engage in of some functions into single service capabil- combat operations within hours. This effort ities can provide economies and efficiencies, will continue when the Joint Readiness Train- but carried to an extreme can unravel proven ing Center is moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana. jointness. America does not need a military Recently, the Combat Maneuver Train- establishment of eaches, wherein the services ing Center at Hohenfels, Germany, trained a Royal Dutch Marine unit that was enroute to

Summer 1993 / JFQ 11 ▼JFQ FORUM become customer-oriented purveyors of narrow NOTES capabilities rather than combat-oriented or- 1 ganizations with a broad focus and an under- U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 9th edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, standing of all the facets of war. 1990). Figures compiled from theater of military opera- The U.S. Army has a tions (TVD) and major subordinate command weapons proud record of working systems totals. with the other services in 2 Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, in The joint operations. Indeed, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 208, 231–40, almost every conflict in 333–34. Also, Headquarters, Department of the Army, American military his- FM 100–5, Operations, 1986, pp. 25, 47–53, 161–72. tory is replete with exam- 3 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Confirmation Hear- ples of the services inte- ings, Committee on Armed Services, United States Sen- grating their capabilities ate, Washington, January 7, 1993. 4 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Loui- to defend our national siana Maneuvers: First Board of Directors Meeting,” Octo- DOD photo interests. From the Amer- ber 27, 1992 [“Jayhawk Thunder” sequence], videotape ican Revolution, through presentation produced by the Training and Doctrine Scott’s march on Mexico City, the Vicksburg Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1992. 5 campaign of Grant and Porter, the Spanish- The Total Army response is described by the author in “Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report” which American War, World Wars I and II, and the appeared in Army Magazine, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 1993). long list of conflicts that punctuated the 6 For a discussion of the Army’s doctrinal base, and Cold War and its aftermath, the services have how doctrine serves as the foundation for innovation in had much more in common than that which personnel recruitment and retention, training, leader- separates them. Americans should be confi- ship development, organizational design, and modern- ization requirements, see Paul H. Herbert, “Deciding dent that the Army will be a full partner in What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and joint operations in the future. the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations,” Combat The next chapter in our history will Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers no. 16 (Fort Leav- record an even greater degree of integration, enworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff as we respond to a new range of threats with College, 1988). The joint approach to warfare in Army doctrine flows directly from the Joint Staff doctrine tailored, multiservice force packages both found in Joint Pubs 1 and 3.0. oriented on and trained for crisis response 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Mobility Requirements Study,” and power projection, and as we employ the vol. 1, Joint Staff Publication (1992). This study was manpower that comes from simultaneous appli- dated by Congress to determine airlift and sealift assets cation of unique, complementary capabili- necessary to support the national military strategy. ties. We will seize those opportunities provided by technology and the support of the American people to protect the enduring, global security interests of the Nation. JFQ

12 JFQ / Summer 1993 The Wave of the Future By FRANK B. KELSO II

...From the Sea U.S Navy photo

he Cold War is over, but in its wake shifted to littoral warfare and direct support we are left with an uncertain of ground operations. world. Although the risk of global Operation Desert Storm reemphasized Twar is greatly reduced, the United the need for the Armed Forces to operate ef- States and its allies still face threats. As we fectively together and to acquire equipment have just begun to realize, these new threats which is compatible. Because joint opera- are often difficult to predict. In response to tions involving all the services provide the this challenge, our national security policy is greatest range of capabilities for the smallest shifting from deterrence of global conflict to- investment, the Navy and Marine Corps ward regional, littoral contingencies and con- launched an extensive, year-long study of flicts, often in coalition with other nations. future naval roles and capabilities, in terms With no credible, global naval threat, of their relevance to the 21st century and a today’s strategic environment has a very dif- joint warfare environment. The results of ferent meaning for our maritime forces. The that study are known as “. . . From the Sea.” need for separate, independent naval opera- The Navy’s new strategy represents a tions at sea for indirect support of the land fundamental shift away from emphasis on war has been greatly reduced, and as a result open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward our maritime operational focus has now joint operations conducted from the sea. By exploiting naval access to littoral regions, military planners can realize the power pro- Admiral Frank B. Kelso II is the twenty-fourth Chief of jection strength of naval forces while com- Naval Operations. Previously he served as Supreme Allied plementary capabilities of other services Commander Atlantic; much of his early career was spent punctuate their impact and effectiveness. on board nuclear-powered submarines.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 13 ▼JFQ FORUM Naval operations in littoral regions airborne assaults. The joint task force staff transform the classic AirLand battle into a embarked in the Third Fleet flagship to main- unified sea-air-land-space engagement, but tain overall control of the exercise as the dominance over an enemy in the littoral en- Joint Force Air Component Commander vironment cannot be assumed. Likely adver- (JFACC) coordinated all air operations re- saries enjoy the advantage of concentrating motely from the continental United States. and layering defenses. Mines, diesel sub- Model for Joint Interoperability marines, high-speed tactical aircraft, fast pa- U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) op- trol boats, sea-skimming missiles, and tacti- erations have attained new levels of joint cal ballistic missiles launched from shore understanding, cooperation, efficiency, and batteries are typical littoral threats. Such combat effectiveness. In the Persian Gulf an complex challenges demand specialized Air Force composite wing operates on a daily skills that only are provided by a completely basis with its Navy and Marine Corps coun- integrated joint force. terparts to enforce no-fly zones. Army, Ma- Joint Forces rine Corps, and special operations forces ex- In the brief time since “. . . From the ercise together routinely. Navy ships enforce Sea” appeared efforts to implement this new U.N.-imposed sanctions with the assistance strategic direction have accelerated and ex- of maritime surveillance provided by Air panded to all levels in the sea services with Force Airborne Warning and Control System special emphasis on the issues of joint inte- (AWACS) aircraft. The CENTCOM environ- gration and interoperability. The Navy and ment is ideal for developing joint concepts Marine Corps are aggressively redefining and conducting joint training. In a recent naval roles in joint exercises. exercise also in the Persian Gulf, for exam- In 1992 U.S. Atlantic Command (LANT- ple, an afloat JFACC successfully developed, COM) demonstrated improved integration planned, and executed a mini-air campaign of joint forces and naval doctrinal changes including a simulated strike mission with in Exercise Ocean Venture. For the first time over 70 Navy and Air Force aircraft. the Navy de- In the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, ployed a flexi- Navy-led counterdrug joint task forces offer the Navy’s new strategy represents ble and robust another example of joint operations. They a fundamental shift away from em- command and exploit naval air and open-ocean surveil- phasis on open-ocean warfighting control facility lance capabilities as well as command, con- ashore permit- trol, communications and intelligence (C3I). on the sea toward joint operations ting the naval Navy ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and air- conducted from the sea force comman- borne radar aircraft operate with assets from der to collocate the other services and Federal agencies. A with the joint Coast Guard squadron commander and staff force commander and other component embark aboard the Navy task group com- commanders. mander’s flagship to monitor and control Last year in Exercise Ellipse Bravo, U.S. surface activity. Coast Guard law enforce- European Command (EUCOM) tested the ment detachments operate from Navy ships ability of the services to assemble a joint task to board, search, and if necessary seize ves- force to conduct a rapid emergency evacua- sels smuggling narcotics. tion operation. Established within 48 hours, Joint Communications a 22,000-strong Army, Navy, Marine Corps, During the past decade significant and Air Force task force demonstrated effec- progress has been made in standardizing tive continuity of command as its headquar- procedures and procurement of interopera- ters was relocated from land to sea. ble systems for joint communications. During Exercise Tandem Thrust, Nonetheless problems still occur, especially mounted by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in highly specialized communications sys- in 1992, a 15,000-man joint force consisting tems. One example was the format and of land, sea, and air forces concluded its medium used to send Air Tasking Orders training with amphibious landings and Army (ATOs) during Operation Desert Storm. They were incompatible with naval communica-

14 JFQ / Summer 1993 tions systems and as a re- mary authority for developing both Navy sult carrier-based aircraft and naval doctrine, it will provide a coordi- were dispatched daily to nated, integrated sea service voice in joint pick up one-hundred and combined doctrine. Priority will be given page documents from to doctrine development that addresses the Riyadh for delivery to new geostrategic environment and its chang- ships in the Persian Gulf ing threat, and to enhancing the integration and Red Sea. Converting of naval forces in joint and combined opera- the ATO into mission as- tions. This is fundamental to naval contribu- signments was very time- tions to joint warfighting in the future. U.S. Navy photo Admiral Kelso with the consuming. In a significant departure from tradi- fleet. Finding the permanent solution to this tional single-service deployments, the Navy problem became a joint, post-war priority and Marine Corps are working closely with project that is now well in hand. In recent the Joint Staff to improve ways to organize, joint exercises ships at sea have received and train, and deploy joint forces. The goal is to transmitted Desert Storm-sized ATOs elec- provide unified commanders with forces tronically in less than five minutes. All de- specifically tailored, trained, and deployed ployed aircraft carriers have this capability to satisfy regional operational requirements. while other carriers have been partially mod- Interservice boards such as the Navy-Air ified to allow complete installation in less Force-Marine Corps Board and the Army- than 24 hours. Procurement plans have been Navy-Marine Corps Board have been estab- altered to ensure that all amphibious assault lished to encourage formal cooperation and ships and aircraft carriers are permanently increase efficiency among forces across a equipped with this vital capability. broad range of areas. These boards have succeeded in transforming several single-service Navy Organizational Changes air-to-ground weapons programs into one Since Operation Desert Storm the Navy joint program and expanding interservice has taken additional steps to improve its cooperation in land-based refueling for ability to work in the joint arena in opera- naval aircraft. Progress can also be noted in tions, planning, procurement, and admin- both the Joint Tactical Information Display istration and to improve communications System and the Global Positioning System between the staff of the Chief of Naval Oper- acquisition programs. ations (OPNAV) and the Joint Staff and between the Navy Department and Depart- Redirecting Spending ment of Defense. Funding represents the ultimate organi- In July 1992, the OPNAV staff was reor- zational indicator of priorities and a measur- ganized to mirror the structure and functions able sign of change. The redirection of of the Joint Staff. As part of this change, the spending has already been discussed, new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for namely, in modifying systems and ships to Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assess- accommodate joint staffs and operations ments established six joint mission assess- and in expanding cooperation in joint ac- ment areas: joint strike, joint littoral, joint quisition programs. The Navy and Marine surveillance, joint space and electronic war- Corps have also instituted a deliberate orga- fare/intelligence, strategic sealift and its pro- nizational process to redirect funding priori- tection, and strategic deterrence. Under this ties to enhance naval contributions to joint system, Navy procurement programs are warfighting capabilities. scrutinized and evaluated against their spe- Furthermore, with the publication of cific contributions to joint warfighting. If “. . . From the Sea” in September 1992, the they fail this test, they are not included in Department of the Navy dissected and ex- the Navy budget. amined its budget line-by-line against the In March 1993 the Naval Doctrine Com- guiding principles of our new strategic direc- mand was formally established. As the pri- tion. This process examined how well the overall budget supported that new direction. As a result some investment plans were

Summer 1993 / JFQ 15 ▼JFQ FORUM redirected to strengthen joint littoral warfare In the past year Military Sealift Com- including the following changes: mand ships proved their value in joint ▼ increasing procurement of precision-guided peacetime operations almost as dramatically munitions to support the joint land campaign; as they did during the Gulf War. Navy ships ▼ accelerating enhancements in joint com- carried relief supplies to Florida, Guam, the mand, control, and communications systems to Baltic nations, and Russia for distribution by support a JTF commander and his staff afloat; and U.S. units ashore. Marine Prepositioning ▼ renewing the commitment to satisfy the Squadron ships were the first to arrive in So- Marine Corps requirement for sufficient medium malia, and by January 14, 1993, nearly thirty lift capability to permit rapid movement ashore were operating in direct support of Opera- in support of an amphibious ground campaign. tion Restore Hope. Overall, the Navy and Marine Corps Our operating forces are on the cutting redirected $1.2 billion within their budgets edge of joint warfighting. All naval staffs to support the new naval strategy and joint and shore support establishments are com- warfighting operations. mitted to the concept of jointness. The Recognizing the value of well-equipped, Naval Doctrine Command will ensure that highly mobile forces to meet various chal- our focus remains on finding ways to im- lenges, unified commanders regard sealift as prove the efficiency of joint warfare. The a critical ingredient of warfighting success. Navy-Marine Corps team is committed to As we reduce manpower and material over- joint operations and the pursuit of innova- seas, strategic sealift will be more vital to tive means for employing our forces in sup- providing required heavy equipment and port of joint warfighting. JFQ sustainment to forces in all parts of the world. Consequently, we have raised the priority of sealift in procurement planning, conveying to Congress its importance to our Nation’s defense capabilities.

16 JFQ / Summer 1993 Complementary Capabilities from the Sea By CARL E. MUNDY, JR.

Since the enactment of the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- tion Act of 1986 the services have taken joint warfare to a new level. The brilliant performance of U.S. forces during Desert Storm is a reflection of our ability to operate together as a cohesive joint team. But as we reorganize and reorient the Armed Forces to meet the demands of an uncertain future, we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. Today we have the rare opportunity to adapt and apply ourselves to a new security environment. To capitalize on this opportunity the services must continually examine their contributions to the Nation’s defense and ensure they are prepared to meet the challenges that lie ahead. Future military success U.S. Marine Corps photo will also depend on maintaining a system of joint warfare that draws upon the unique strengths of each service, while providing he success of our Armed Forces in the means for effectively integrating them to recent years is well documented. achieve the full combat potential of the In addition to dealing swiftly and Armed Forces. decisively with numerous crises T Focusing on Capabilities and major contingencies throughout the globe, the services have demonstrated on Each service—consistent with its role various occasions their utility to the Nation and assigned functions—contributes to what in situations short of war. Our efforts have General Powell describes as a toolbox of ca- significantly contributed to the radical trans- pabilities. The combatant commanders in formation of the world over the last four chief (CINCs) draw from this toolbox to years, and to the improved strategic position meet requirements in their respective areas of the United States. of responsibility. As we continue to make Without doubt each service has played a drastic cuts in the size of the Armed Forces, unique and invaluable role in the victories it is extremely important to retain a balance that we have achieved. Moreover, there is no of carefully developed, complementary capa- doubt that developments in joint warfare bilities in that toolbox. While fiscal realities have been instrumental in our triumphs on demand that we reduce redundancies, his- the battlefield and success in promoting U.S. tory warns us of the risks incurred when we interests in assorted ways and under a vari- allow gaps to exist in our capabilities. Suc- ety of circumstances. cessful joint warfare demands that we understand, maintain, and properly employ the unique capabilities of all the services. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., is Commandant of the Marine Corps. His previous assignment was Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and II Marine Expeditionary Force.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 17 ▼JFQ FORUM But achieving success in the face of fu- that were self-sustained and primarily sea- ture challenges will require more than just based. Thus, it was largely a Navy-Marine maintaining comple- Corps operation in which a Marine Air- mentary capabilities. Ground Task Force (MAGTF) formed the nu- It also calls for inte- cleus of the joint task force. grating service capa- Joint warfare does mean that the capabilities and making bilities of each service must be both interop- efforts to achieve erable and complementary. This must be the joint synergy on the case on all levels of war: strategic, opera- battlefield. This de- tional, and tactical. In addition to a commands continuing to mon understanding of doctrinal matters, develop and refine joint warfare requires that the services pos- joint warfare to keep sess compatible communications equipment pace with changes in to exchange information and standardized Combat Camera Center photo by Perry Heimer defense strategy, ad- consumables to facilitate service support. In Col Charles Russell, USAF, Deployed vances in technology, and other variables. It the past decade, the Armed Forces have Base Commander, also means that prospective joint force com- greatly improved the ability to fight together explains air manders (JFCs) and their staffs must under- by making strides in these and other areas. operations to the stand joint doctrine and have an apprecia- One can gain an appreciation for how Commandant tion of the capabilities that each service far we have come by comparing the post during a visit to Somalia. brings to the joint family of capabilities. mortem on Operation Urgent Fury with that Joint warfare does not mean that each of Operation Desert Storm. Much has been service will be equally represented each time written about the poor coordination among a CINC conducts an operation. In selecting the services in 1983 during Operation Ur- the right tools for the job the CINC consid- gent Fury in Grenada. After-action reports ers the particulars of highlighted numerous problems including the Marine Corps has recently the mission and the the inability of the services to communicate conditions under with each other, unclear command relation- conducted a no-holds barred which it must be ac- ships, counterproductive interservice rival- reassessment of its role in the complished. It is the ries, and significant deficiencies in planning Nation’s defense responsibility of the and coordinating supporting arms. While services to identify the mission was accomplished, it is generally packages of forces or agreed that we failed miserably in achieving force modules from which the CINC can se- unity of effort and were not as effective as lect the right mix of capabilities to satisfy his we should have been. requirements. In Desert Storm, which was conducted Some of the factors that influence the eight years after Urgent Fury, the overall process of selecting the right tools for the story was much different. Although some job can be illustrated by comparing two re- deficiencies in jointness were identified, the cent operations. In 1989 the requirements services understood joint warfare and fought and nature of Operation Just Cause in as a team. Command relationships were Panama made it predominantly an Army-Air clearly understood and the major shortfalls Force show. It was a land-force operation in identified during Urgent Fury were rectified. which the United States enjoyed ready ac- In the title V report to Congress, the Army, cess to airfield facilities and had a large Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force were de- number of Army forces in theater before the scribed as having “demonstrated a quantum outbreak of hostilities. Conversely, when advance in joint interaction.” Operation Sea Angel was conducted in Today, as Armed Forces adapt to a new Bangladesh in 1991, no permanently based strategic landscape and severe budgetary U.S. forces were situated nearby and the constraints, it is important that we build local infrastructure had been decimated. upon the success of Desert Storm and other These conditions and other factors dictated recent operations. We must engage in a con- that the operation be conducted by forces tinuous process of evaluation to identify and maintain the capabilities we will need to deal with future challenges. As we do we

18 JFQ / Summer 1993 must continue to focus on improving our tionary Units (MEUs). These 2,000 man Ma- ability to fully integrate those capabilities rine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), em- whenever the formation of a joint task force barked in amphibious ready groups of three is required. This is the proper focus and the to five ships, are extremely flexible and over driving force behind the development of the the years have proven to be most useful. The capabilities which the Marine Corps cur- specific size, organization, and equipment of rently provides to the CINCs. these units have evolved over four decades through continuous development and use in Supporting National Military Strategy a forward presence role; in short, the MEU is Although the Nation is in the midst of tailored to provide the CINC with the capa- drastically reducing the number of forces per- bilities he is most likely to need. manently based overseas, our national secu- While deployed, MEUs frequently con- rity strategy continues to demand that we re- duct port visits, military-to-military contacts, main proactive in shaping an international and combined exercises. These activities security environment that promotes U.S. in- complement diplomatic efforts throughout terests and influence. Thus our national mili- the globe, help to maintain our system of tary strategy emphasizes the need for forward collective security, and often provide the deployed forces to deter aggression, demon- foundation of friendship and trust necessary strate commitment, foster regional stability, for building coalitions in time of crisis. lend credibility to alliances, and when necessary enhance crisis response capabilities. Crisis Response The Marine Corps, with the require- A forward deployed MEU also provides ments of the national military strategy the CINC with a force that directly links his clearly in focus, and in close cooperation forward presence and crisis response capabil- with the Navy, has recently conducted a no- ities. As a combined arms force, the MEU holds barred reassessment of its role in the provides the CINC with credible combat Nation’s defense. This study validated the power which can be rapidly dispatched to an traditional Marine Corps role as a naval expe- area in which a crisis is developing. The abil- ditionary force in readiness, and confirmed ity of these forces to linger on station in a the continued relevance of the forward pres- crisis area for extended periods is a signifi- ence and crisis response capabilities that the cant advantage for decisionmakers as they Marine Corps provides to the CINCs. As a re- monitor the situation and determine when, sult of this internal audit and recent opera- how, or whether to respond. Often, the very tional experience, we have also undertaken a presence of the MEU can prevent a crisis number of initiatives to enhance our capabil- from escalating to a higher level of violence. ities to support joint operations. If a situation calls for more than presence, MEUs can swiftly make the transition from Forward Presence projecting influence for deterrence to pro- The Marine Corps, as a key component jecting combat power to halt aggression. of naval expeditionary forces, is unique in its MEUs are capable of acting indepen- ability to support the CINCs in fulfilling the dently in many instances, and conducting a requirements for forward presence in the lit- wide range of missions to include amphibi- toral areas of the world. The characteristics of ous raids, humanitarian assistance opera- forward deployed Marines, embarked aboard tions, and the evacuation of noncombat- naval ships, make them an invaluable asset ants. In situations where a crisis cannot be for projecting influence. As a seabased force suppressed and armed conflict erupts, the they are unrestricted by basing or overflight MEU provides the CINC with a force that requirements, self-sustained, and extremely can be employed to facilitate the introduc- mobile. tion of a larger MAGTF or joint force. The To meet the day-to-day requirements of flexibility of forward deployed MEUs was the CINCs for forward presence in regions clearly demonstrated during Operation vital to our national interests, the Marine Sharp Edge in 1990. During that operation, Corps routinely deploys Marine Expedi- elements of a MEU remained off the coast of war-torn Liberia for seven months as the situation was monitored. When develop-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 19 ▼JFQ FORUM ments pointed to American lives being in In addition to providing forward pres- jeopardy, Marines were quickly deployed to ence and crisis response options with MEUs, provide security for the U.S. Embassy and, the Marine Corps provides CINCs with other subsequently, to assist in the evacuation of flexible force options. They offer the CINC over 2,000 noncombatants. the ability to quickly transition from rela- Operation Provide Comfort offers an- tively small forces within forward-presence other example of how a forward deployed forces to heavier, more capable contingency MEU can give CINCs the ability to quickly forces needed to respond to a large crisis or respond to crises in vital regions of the major regional conflict. The true value of the world. On April 9, 1991, the 24th MEU (Spe- CAMs is their ability to give the CINC a cial Operations Capable) was midway rapidly deployable, integrated, self-sustained, through a scheduled six-month Mediter- combined arms capability early in a crisis. ranean deployment when ordered to re- MAGTFs have great flexibility; they pro- spond to a rapidly deteriorating situation in vide CINCs with a force that has sufficient Northern Iraq. Hundreds of Kurdish refugees combat power which can be used, as the sit- fleeing the forces of Saddam Hussein were uation dictates, to resolve a conflict and re- dying of malnutrition, exposure, and disease store stability, or to enable the arrival of a each day; thousands had fled to neighboring larger joint force. If necessary, MAGTFs can Turkey, creating a further threat to regional conduct forcible entry from amphibious stability. The 24th MEU, in the midst of a ships or be deployed together with maritime routine training exercise in Italy, arrived on prepositioning ships. Although Marine the scene within four days. Because of its forces can deploy by a single means, CAMs command and control capabilities, the MEU have been developed so that MAGTFs can served as the nucleus integrate all mobility assets in both building we are aggressively working of a joint task force and deploying forces. Thus a MAGTF can de- formed to resolve the ploy by combining elements of strategic air- on our joint warfare capa- growing crisis. In the lift, amphibious ships, and maritime prepo- bilities and thus our usefulness next three months, sitioning forces. This inherent deployment th to the CINCs the 24 MEU was a and employment flexibility, combined with key component in a other characteristics of a MAGTF, provide massive relief effort CINCs with unique capabilities for rapidly for an estimated 500,000 beleaguered building up combat power in littoral crises refugees. The tasks assigned to the MEU in- or conflicts. cluded providing security, delivering tons of Operation Desert Shield is a classic ex- supplies, establishing resettlement camps, ample of force sequencing and the role and providing water, dental, and medical Marines can play as an enabling force for fol- care to refugees. low-on joint forces. Five days after the Presi- dent gave the order to deploy, a Marine ex- The Stabilizing/Enabling Capability peditionary force began to arrive at airfields To respond to larger crises or contingen- in Saudi Arabia to link up with its equip- cies, the Nation requires a broad spectrum of ment loaded aboard a maritime preposition- military options. This requirement demands ing squadron. The force provided the com- that the CINCs have the ability to rapidly mander in chief, U.S. Central Command, and flexibly sequence the deployment and with his first significant mechanized forces employment of a wide range of capabilities. with which to defend Saudi Arabia. The The CINCs meet this requirement through rapid deployment of this credible Marine air- the process of adaptive planning. Adaptive ground force, which arrived with 30 days of planning provides the CINCs with a menu of sustainability, helped stabilize the situation preplanned options with which to respond and enabled the buildup of heavier forces. to a crisis or contingency. The Marine Corps, The recent operation in Somalia, Restore to support adaptive planning, has developed Hope, is also illustrative of Marine Corps en- crisis action modules (CAMs), which provide abling capabilities. The initial force commit- the CINCs with a menu of Marine Corps ca- ted was a MEU; this unit was in the midst of a pabilities to choose for a particular mission. scheduled deployment and stood poised off the Somali coast for weeks as the National

20 JFQ / Summer 1993 Command Authorities weighed their options. ▼ Establishment of the Naval Doctrine Com- When a decision was made to intervene, the mand to ensure the smooth integration of the force was immediately available. Despite the Navy and the Marine Corps into joint operations. extremely limited infrastructure of Somalia, ▼ Active participation in DOD modeling Marines were able to land, establish secure air and simulation initiatives designed to enhance joint force training and exercises. and port facilities, and begin engineering work to enable more troops and equipment These and other steps will ensure that to join in the relief effort. Once again, Marine Expeditionary Forces retain their Marines were able to do all this in a matter of unique capabilities in the years ahead and days because they are sea-based, self-sus- continue to complement the capabilities of tained, able to operate in an austere environ- the other services. Most importantly, Marine ment, and positioned and prepared to re- forces will continue to provide what the spond instantaneously to a crisis. CINCs need to accomplish their missions. Relevant Capabilities for the Future Staying the Course This is not to say that Marines are satis- The Armed Forces have significantly im- fied with the status quo. We recognize that proved their joint interoperability in the last today’s capabilities exist only because our decade. Combat effectiveness has greatly im- predecessors were innovative and forward proved because of emphasis on initiatives thinking. No less an effort is needed to pre- such as compatible communications equip- pare for the future. ment and logistics requirements. We have The conceptual underpinning for to- also benefitted from the effort to make ser- morrow is articulated in the Navy and the vice doctrine consistent with joint doctrine. Marine Corps white paper entitled “. . . From This has been accomplished without sacrific- The Sea.” This document states that the fu- ing the flexibility which joint force com- ture direction of the Navy and Marines is to manders require in order to employ their as- focus on operating forward in the littoral signed forces in the manner best suited to areas of the world, and to provide naval ex- accomplishing the mission. peditionary forces shaped for joint opera- Recent successes in developing joint tions and tailored for the Nation’s needs. For warfare and, more critically, on the battle- the Marine Corps, this entails building on field can be attributed to the ability to move the capabilities we have traditionally pro- forward and make needed, beneficial vided. We are aggressively working on a changes without losing focus on what is number of internal initiatives and participat- most important—our capabilities. As we pro- ing in some multi-service ventures that will ceed to make adjustments in joint warfare, enhance our joint warfare capabilities and the continued focus on maintaining the thus our usefulness to the CINCs: right balance of carefully developed, com- ▼ Appointment of a two-star Marine Corps plementary capabilities will ensure our fu- general to the Navy staff to facilitate integration ture success. JFQ of Navy and Marine Corps planning and pro- gramming, enhance joint interoperability, and better support the unified commanders in chief and their naval component commanders. ▼ Implementation of a restructuring plan which includes allocation of additional personnel to the Marine Expeditionary Force’s command element to fulfill the requirements of joint task force operations. This plan also will increase the communications capability of the Fleet Marine Force headquarters to enhance connectivity associated with componency obligations.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 21 ▼JFQ FORUM Ideas Count By MERRILL A. MC PEAK DOD photo Jordanian and U.S. aircraft.

elcome to Joint Force Quar- cles offered both sides a potential war win- terly. I look forward to think- ner in World War I, but many of the best ing about the ideas that will minds in Europe gave their time not to W appear in these pages. imagining how the internal combustion en- Ideas count. Someone once said that the gine could be combined with a gun and Cold War was a contest of ideas, and in the armor plating, but to developing gas masks end the idea of freedom won out. Armed for horses. So, ideas must be iterated, argued, conflicts are also often contests between discussed, debated, experimented with, and ideas, between concepts of what will and finally put into practice. will not work on the battlefield. The most We have sometimes been lucky in this memorable victories have featured the intro- regard. In the 1930s George Marshall chose duction, on one side or the other, of a new, to spend precious Army dollars on profes- better, winning idea. sional military education. Shortchanging Of course, we all understand that ideas other “must have” requirements, he kept the alone are not enough. Early armored vehi- schools at Leavenworth and Maxwell alive and so laid the intellectual foundations for victory in World War II. It is in this spirit that General Merrill A. McPeak is Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I invite all comers to sharpen their pencils A command pilot with over 5,800 hours, he previously and their thoughts, and to use this journal to served as Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces.

22 JFQ / Summer 1993 propose, develop, and debate military con- dustrial conglomerates, we need to shed the cepts, the inventory of ideas the Nation must parts of our enterprise that have taken us have to win in the next century. away from our core business—warfighting. As we do this, let me suggest some dis- We need, like successful businesses, to “stick cussion topics that seem to deserve special to our knitting.” attention. The first involves the concept of A second fruitful area for discussion is divestiture. We all the division of labor within DOD, between we ought to be asking our- understand that we the services and other elements of the de- are going through a partment. In this regard, a recent trend has selves, what are the core period in which we been to centralize common support activi- activities of the Armed Forces? must stop doing ties under defense agencies. These agencies what must we keep doing? some things. We and associated field activities have become ought to be asking one of our very few growth sectors. They ourselves, what are employ close to 200,000 people; together the core activities of the Armed Forces? they are bigger than the Marine Corps. In What must we keep doing? prospect, the centralized approach always For instance, we might ask why we are in promises economies of scale. In retrospect, some businesses that more naturally seem to the economies almost always evaporate and be civilian enterprises. Some of our activities we pay a high price when people lose a sense are vestiges of an earlier time when no com- of mission identification. petent civilian alternative existed. I am In the Air Force, one of our quality thrusts thinking here of things like the CONUS com- has been in the exact opposite direction. We missary system or much of the domestic ac- have been working hard to decentralize, to tivity of the Corps of Engineers. Until re- push power down, to give our people a stake cently, the Air Force ran a small contract in the outcome. This has worked well for us cargo airline called LOGAIR. We started it in and I suggest it is time to review the bidding 1952 as a way to move time-critical parts on the growth of defense agencies. among Air Force bases. It may have been a However, the system we now use to ac- good idea at the time, but it lingered on long quire new weapons may need more rather after its economic justification disappeared. than less centralization. Some adjustment Last year, we did away with LOGAIR. We seems to be needed; no one I know argues now use commercial air courier services to do that the system is working well now. For me, the same job. Performance has improved, an important question is what acquisition costs are way down, and to those who worry functions must the services control and what about our ability to surge when needed, I functions might they give up. For what it is suggest a look at how these same companies perform during the Christmas season. There are surely many activities we can divest and at the same time improve performance. Some of us are now involved in a dialogue about how to drawdown the Nation’s excess aviation depot repair capacity. Maybe the right question is whether we need government operated aviation depots (or government operated shipyards) at all. And what about, say, military communications systems? In other words, I would like to see a lot more discussion about whether and

where we could rely on the civilian sector to DOD photo a much greater extent to perform support functions now done in-house. One advantage of such an approach would be to free us to concentrate on the more strictly military aspects of our profession. That’s our niche. Perhaps like many of the (mostly failed) in-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 23 ▼JFQ FORUM worth, my view is that the services should lated combat capabilities. I believe, for ex- own both the beginning and the end of the ac- ample, that the Air Force should consolidate quisition process. At the beginning the ser- all U.S. military operations in space. It is also vices must define military require- my view that the Air Force should own and anyone resisting ments, and at the end they must operate integrated theater air and ballistic change in the acqui- control the operational test and missile defenses. These are tough questions, evaluation process that determines about which honest people can disagree, but sition process must whether requirements have been it is clear to me that what once appeared to explain why we do met. But much of what goes on in be laudable redundancy will be seen more not field opera- between could be managed differ- and more to be needless duplication as the ently than it is today, with the ser- budget heads south. tionally significant vices giving up much of the clout Some say that the roles and missions de- amounts of usable they now enjoy. Anyone resisting bate comes down to an issue of trust. I do hardware change in the acquisition process not believe that is entirely, or even mostly, must explain why we often spend true. In the Goldwater-Nichols era the uni- lots of money and lots of time on fied CINCs exercise the full range of com- programs that do not field operationally sig- mand prerogatives—what we call “combat- nificant amounts of usable hardware. ant command.” So the system used for force Finally, I would welcome more discus- employment need not rely on trust alone. sion of the division of roles and functions Still, there is something in the concern among the services. The Chairman recently about trust, a nagging element of doubt (“If completed a review of this sensitive subject, I don’t control it myself, will the other guy but I’m convinced that smaller defense bud- be there when I need him?”) that applies as gets will soon force us back to the table for much to theater missile defense or space another look at the question of unnecessary support as it does to search and rescue or duplication of capa- close air support. Thorough and rigorous de- bilities. I am not re- bate in the pages of this journal can go a ferring here to the long way toward getting our thinking possession by the ser- straight—and building the spirit of trust we vices of complemen- will need for the future. tary capabilities, but These are the kinds of questions I would to true overlap or il- ask. logical arrangement Ideas do count. I welcome the arrival of of air and space re- this journal as a way to share ideas that will produce a better understanding of ourselves, our profession, and our path to future victory. JFQ DOD photo General McPeak visiting the field.

24 JFQ / Summer 1993 What’s Ahead for the Armed Forces By DAVID E. JEREMIAH

ate each December the su- of the tabloid mavens, and probably permarket tabloids run for good reason. Foretelling the fu- New Year’s predictions of ture can be a dicey enterprise. famous astrologers and This does not mean that the future psychics. These forecast ce-?is entirely opaque. While it may not Llebrity marriages, divorces, and dal- be possible to predict specific events liances, alien encounters, disasters-to- or outcomes, one can draw useful be, and the latest message from Elvis. conclusions and take prudent actions To my knowledge, no one ever goes based on major trends and alternative back a year later to tally the accuracy scenarios.

Summary

The security architecture of the Cold War and the doctrine of containment are fading away. But without a formal mechanism to redraw disputed international boundaries, we seem to be in for a prolonged period of regional conflict. Challenges will proliferate as the world population grows, ethnic and religious antagonisms are unleashed by the end of communism, and political and military institutions undergo change. Who will be our adversaries and how can the Armed Forces prepare for the warfare of the future? Moreover, how can we plan sensibly in the face of declining budgets and technological developments? What should be scrapped, what must be procured, and how can rivers of information be reduced to usable products and directed to where they are needed? Looking ahead like the great military visionaries of the past, and with the benefit of sound analysis, we can begin to discern trends that have import for our national interests and the joint capabilities which the services will need to defend them.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 25 WHAT’S AHEAD

Since becoming Vice Chairman of the been left to establish an independent politi- Joint Chiefs of Staff, I’ve been deeply inter- cal identity by their own devices. Some, ested in the tremendous change our world is such as united Germany, Slovakia, and many undergoing. The national security paradigm new republics of the former Soviet Union, of the past half-century, an architecture built have done this through a more or less on containment of communism and compe- smooth political transition. Other aspirants tition with the Soviet Union, has given way. such as Bosnia, Armenia, and Georgia found What will take its place? What are the the path to statehood slippery with blood. implications for the Armed Forces? And Many Americans hope that the quarrels what should we be doing now to prepare for and feuds around the world are merely a future demands? Following are some Cold War hangover. They assure themselves thoughts on how our world is changing and that things will “quiet down” once lingering what those changes portend for the future of Cold War toxins are finally metabolized. the American military and our overall na- Sadly, that seems highly unlikely. The prob- tional security posture. lems simmering in so many parts of the world show no signs of abating. On the con- Elements of Change trary, we may be in for a prolonged period of Great wars leave turbulence in their conflict and crisis in the international arena. wake. World War I left a civil war in Russia, a And the Armed Forces are in for some very sullen Germany wracked by internal strife, dangerous years as they stand ready to pro- and flotsam adrift in what had once been tect our Nation’s interests through these Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman volatile times. Empire. Similarly, the defeat of the As it faces the future, our military is Axis powers in World War II un- being buffeted by winds of change from leashed forces that changed the three different compass points: changes in face of Europe, Asia, and Africa. the international community, changes in The passing of the Cold War now the way our forces are organized and em- has map-makers scrambling for ployed, and changes in the realm of technol- pens and fresh ink, while territorial ogy. Each of these is gusting with such force squabbles, civil wars, and humani- that any one alone would make our future tarian tragedies are popping up like extremely demanding. poisonous mushrooms.

Joint Combat Camera Center photo by H.H. Deffner After earlier wars, nations com- New World Disorder A soldier standing monly held grand conclaves to re- The world is going through an incredi- guard outside the store order. Delegates to the Versailles Peace ble metamorphosis. Some changes are di- village of Belet Uen, Conference after World War I tinkered with rectly related to the end of the Cold War; Somalia, during Oper- international boundaries and devised new others have no connection with the late ation Restore Hope. states, mandates, and protectorates. As World East-West conflict. The sum total of these War II drew to a close, Allied leaders solemnly changes, whatever their source, is a world brokered territorial adjustments and other- teeming with nascent crises. A new adminis- wise laid the framework for a changed post- tration took office earlier this year deter- war world. They also agreed to create the mined to make domestic issues its first prior- United Nations, hoping its lofty councils ity, but vexing international problems would find peaceful, rational ways to resolve demand its attention with the persistence of (or at least referee) international problems. a salesman with his foot in the door. What But when the Cold War finally shud- does this portend? dered to a halt, no epoch-making summit The end of the Cold War invalidated all gathered to pore over the old strategic postulates of the past four maps, pencil in new decades. The most obvious changes rippled boundaries, or for- along the old East-West fault lines, where mally induct new, former antagonists have become friends and Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN, is the odd-sounding states partners. The ease with which we negotiated second Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into the fraternity of the START II treaty with the Russians is a of Staff. He has been Commander in Chief, nations. Would-be U.S. Pacific Fleet, and served on destroyers new members have earlier in his naval career.

26 JFQ / Summer 1993 A computer screen in the Navy Space Command Operations Center dis- playing satellite tracks and coverage areas.

measure of that change: both nations

recognize that, in a U.S. Navy photo by Chuck Mussi changed world, we have much more to gain from reducing stockpiles than from clinging to the overlarge nuclear arsenals that were once the The end of the Cold War has brought tokens of superpower manhood. change in less obvious ways as well. It The spectacular collapse of the Soviet caused the bottom to fall out of the market Union and its empire raises hopes that the for strategic real estate and leverage in the last Communist holdouts—namely, China, Third World. Nonaligned states can no North Korea, and Cuba—will longer panhandle the United States or the we must know, decide, succumb as well. Looking at Soviet Union for aid, arms, and political pa- the likes of Fidel Castro and tronage by playing one superpower against and act faster than our Kim Il Sung, one can scarcely the other. On the other hand, the United enemy at every turn avoid the conclusion that Nations has finally been released from the communism is increasingly rack that once painfully stretched it between an ideology of embittered Washington and Moscow. Still pale, trem- old men and that it may very well die out bling, and rubbing its wrists, it has begun to when they do. But the turmoil attending the grapple with the substantive role first envi- dismantling of communism in the former sioned for it nearly fifty years ago—and to Soviet Union warns us of the difficulty of suffer new agonies from the real work of in- going from a police-state dictatorship to ternational problem solving. democracy and from a state-run to a market The focus of our multilateral and bilat- economy. While the demise of communism eral security treaties is also shifting. Origi- in its few remaining strongholds would be a nally intended to contain Communist ex- joyous triumph (especially for the people liv- pansion, their value has outlasted the Soviet ing in those benighted lands), it is not at all Union and the Warsaw Pact. In Europe, the certain that this will happen without strife and bloodshed.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 27 WHAT’S AHEAD

Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific, our secu- be chronically unable to meet their people’s rity ties and forward presence are the corner- most basic needs. We may have already seen stones of regional stability. As we saw in the this future in Somalia. Even among fairly Persian Gulf, existing security arrangements well-to-do nations, we can expect fierce form the hard nucleus around which wider competition for natural resources, including partnerships can quickly coalesce during energy, unpolluted water, and perhaps even major crises. And in the future, regional al- fresh air. liances such as NATO may yet become execu- There is great potential for huge migra- tive agents for the United Na- tions as people flee conflict or search for bet- tions, deputized to act on ter economic conditions. In many areas, behalf of the entire interna- these new pressures will rub salt in festering tional community to resolve ethnic, religious, or political wounds. Right neighborhood disputes. now Europe has more refugees and displaced For the United States it- persons than at any time since the end of self, the end of the East-West World War II, with more than three million conflict profoundly changed generated by the fighting in the Balkans our entire strategic outlook. A alone. Germany’s problems with refugees DOD photo A GDU–27 prototype few years ago we threw away and foreign residents—plus the chillingly fa- laser guided bomb the old strategy focused on the Soviet threat miliar antagonisms they have aroused—con- being dropped from an and replaced it with a new one. We calcu- stitute the most explosive domestic issue A–117 stealth fighter lated that regional crises were the most there since the end of the Third Reich. Stir during weapons likely threats, so instead of a global capability into this soup the proliferation of modern separation testing. for global war we now have a strategy aimed armaments, including ballistic missiles and at a global capability for regional crises. weapons of mass destruction, and the result This new strategy recognizes that we no is a real witch’s brew. longer have a single great adversary. It ac- All this adds up to a strong likelihood knowledges new realities in international af- of international crisis and conflict. But re- fairs. It recognizes the practical limits to our cent events remind us that, in a world vil- own resources and relies on a smaller force lage increasingly linked by modern commu- structure. But it also recognizes that the nications, even intra-national problems can United States still needs strong, capable mili- sometimes rouse the international commu- tary forces to defend its interests. And it rec- nity to collective action, either in anger or ognizes that, even with the end of the Cold in sympathy. War, the world is still unstable and danger- More collective action is likely in the fu- ous. This perception is extremely important ture. Traditionally, no matter how outra- because, independent of the changes arising geous or despicable their conduct, tyrants from the end of the Cold War, there is a from Idi Amin and Pol Pot to Saddam Hus- high probability we will see a general wors- sein had little to fear so long as they con- ening of international conditions over the fined their cruelty to their own territory. next twenty or thirty years. Their immunity sprang from the idea that A few years ago I commissioned a study national sovereignty supersedes any com- that looks ahead to the year 2025. That plaint about a nation’s internal behavior, an study, Project 2025, found some very dis- axiom particularly dear to thugs and turbing trends. Perhaps the most powerful despots. Out of respect for this rule, the fam- trend is demography: the world population ily of nations has repeatedly averted its eyes will balloon to nearly ten billion people over from even the most monstrous atrocities. the next few decades, with most of that in- This inertia is disappearing as the inter- crease coming in lesser developed countries. national community slowly recognizes a For them, population growth is like a giant moral imperative to step in to halt genocidal millstone crushing their hopes for eco- crimes even when they are committed under nomic, social, and political progress. With- the claim of national sovereignty. But getting out an international effort to get population from the theoretical acceptance of this idea to growth under control, perhaps one-quarter of the Earth’s population will be hungry every day in 2025. Many governments will

28 JFQ / Summer 1993 Jeremiah

the practical how’s, why’s, and wherefore’s is human rights, democracy, free enterprise, and another matter. So far, the United Nations has the rule of law in international affairs. Other not found a formula that would allow last-re- nations trust and respect us not just because sort intervention while at the same time safe- we are powerful, but because we represent hu- guarding against abuse of manity’s moral conscience. We do not always instead of a global capa- this power. (And abuse is do this perfectly, but on the whole we do it bility for global war we not an unrealistic worry. well enough and often enough that we have a The U.N. General Assem- unique stature in the international commu- have a global capability for bly is not that far removed nity. General Sir Peter de la Billière, who com- regional crises from the days when it manded British forces during the Persian Gulf gleefully endorsed almost War, expressed this very clearly when he said any anti-Western or anti-Israeli screed, the recently that “the one stabilizing influence in more venomous the better.) the world today is the power and the com- In times to come, the international mon sense of America.” community may close the loophole that Consider Somalia. When I was there last today allows tyrants to abuse their own peo- fall, Somalia looked like hell’s waiting room. ple as they please. I But despite a lot of media exposure and inter- do not advocate a national hand wringing, nothing much hap- diminution of na- pened to help the relief agencies until the tional sovereignty, United States stepped forward. Then other nor would I want to nations followed our lead, and today Somalia incite international has been saved from starvation and banditry lynch mobs. But by a remarkable international effort. For bet- genocidal crimes ter or worse, no other country, not even the such as those com- United Nations, can mobilize international mitted by the Khmer energies the way the United States can. We Rouge in Cambodia, cannot abdicate that responsibility now just by Saddam Hussein because we have other things on our plate. against Iraq’s Kurds We cannot be the world’s policeman— and Shi’as, and by but we are obliged to be its most civic-minded Bosnian Serbs—who citizen. To carry out this role we will need have made “ethnic well-trained, well-armed, and highly mobile cleansing” a syn- forces. But these forces may be configured dif- onym for wholesale ferently than in years past and find them- rape and massacre— selves performing tasks other than the tradi- should not be toler- tional missions of “deter and defend.” ated. The right to na- The Future of American Forces tional sovereignty A few years ago we designed a new ought not to be abso- structure for the Armed Forces. Our principal lute in cases of geno-

Joint Combat Camera Center photo concern in doing this was to tailor them to cide any more than th the demands of a post-Cold War world of re- A unit of the 10 child abuse carried gional crises rather than global conflict. This Mountain Division out in a private home should be beyond the coordinating with has already meant large cuts in forces and reach of criminal law. Perhaps the commu- Canadian forces in programs, especially those (strategic and tac- nity of nations will find a way to address Somalia. tical nuclear weapons, forward-deployed this need. If so, this will become another forces in Europe, attack submarines, and so new element in the international security forth) that were geared chiefly toward a environment. showdown with the Soviet Union. Today De- Amid these changes, there is one impor- fense Secretary Les Aspin is overseeing a tant constant that remains true in spite of the “bottom-up” review to identify where more end of the Cold War, and in spite of all the streamlining or restructuring can be done. fretful problems on the horizon: the unique The final result will be smaller, lighter, more leadership role of the United States in world affairs. We are not just the world’s only superpower; we are also a leader in promoting

Summer 1993 / JFQ 29 WHAT’S AHEAD

flexible, and more lethal forces than ever. demonstrated. We need to resist attempts to More of these forces will be based in the speed up our cuts lest we wind up once again United States. We are making large invest- with hollow forces unready for combat. ments in strategic mobility—the C–17 air- Our forces were meat-axed after World craft and fast sealift—that will strengthen our War II because our government naively ability to hurry forces and their supporting thought atomic weapons and strategic bomb- logistics to distant trouble spots. ing made other elements of military power An important part of this downsizing obsolete. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and realignment is a stronger-than-ever eventually complained to Congress that pos- commitment to joint operations. No matter session of the atomic bomb had “engendered where we fight in the future, and no matter [a]...mistaken sense of security and compla- what the circumstances, we will fight as a cency” in the country. It took the debacle of joint team. The Armed Forces of the United Task Force Smith in the first days of the Ko- States will never again poke as individual rean War to shake us out of this complacency fingers; rather they will always strike as a and to remind us of the need for broad- closed fist. As we learned in Vietnam, when based, balanced forces. Every military situa- you go into combat, you go after a clearly tion is different, and each requires a force defined objective and you go to win. We will specially tailored to its unique conditions. gang up with every joint resource at our dis- The forces we sent to Somalia, for example, posal whenever summoned to battle. are unlike those that fought their way into The transition to a smaller force tailored Kuwait and Iraq. America’s future is best for regional crises is served by a force mix that does not place too going very well, but many eggs in any one basket, but which in- it could still be lured stead draws on the synergy of balanced, flexi- onto the rocks unless ble joint forces. we are careful. Siren Another proposal suggests we replace ac- voices are already tive forces with cheaper Reserve component calling for faster cuts, ones. To fulfill our new strategy, we need for narrowing current strong, tough, capable forces that can go broad-based capabili- quickly—within days or even hours—to the ties, or for sacrificing scene of a smoldering crisis. For this to be day-to-day readiness done by Reserve units, they would have to to retain structure or maintain a level of day-to-day readiness Joint Combat Camera Center photo by Janel Schroeder programs. identical to that of active forces. Such a high U.S. and Spanish aircraft used in support We are already cutting our forces as standard of readiness costs about the same of Operation Restore quickly as we can without compromising whether in the Reserve, the Guard, or active Hope in Somalia line readiness. The importance of caution was forces. Reserve combat forces with the readi- the runway at Moron burned into our memory after World War II, ness necessary for tomorrow’s problems Air Base in Spain. when our demobilization looked like a mass would have to be active units in all but jail break. Just five months after Japan’s sur- name. A better choice is for us to maintain render, Admiral Chester Nimitz complained active fire brigades backed up by appropriate that the United States itself had “done what elements of the Reserve components, espe- no enemy could do, and that is reduce its cially in the areas of combat support and Navy almost to impotency....[Today] your combat service support. Navy has not the strength in ships and per- This will require a downsizing and sonnel to carry on a major military opera- reshuffling of our Reserve components com- tion.” The Army suffered a similar fate. At parable to that taking place in the active war’s end, it had six million men under arms; forces. We greatly expanded our Reserve and by March 1948, that number had shriveled National Guard forces in the 1980s to coun- to barely 530,000, most of whom were new terbalance the Warsaw Pact’s huge numeri- conscripts. General Omar Bradley wrote that cal superiority in ground troops. Today it as a result the Army “could not fight its way makes no sense to keep that enlarged Cold out of a paper bag.” He was very nearly right, War-era force. Consequently, we have laid as the opening of the Korean war sadly out cuts that will align our Reserve components to new strategic needs—cuts that will

30 JFQ / Summer 1993 Jeremiah still leave them larger than before their expansion in the last decade. But most importantly, this will leave the Armed Forces overall in a stronger, more robust, more capable posture than could be achieved by schemes that would skew us away from a balanced structure. The third temptation is to create false savings by plundering our operations and maintenance accounts. The superb forces we have today—qualitatively our best ever— would be betrayed by such a policy. Combat readiness is more than the sum of ships, planes, and divisions. It demands soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who are well trained and well led. Readiness cannot be achieved or sustained on the cheap. But since readiness is hard to quantify, sometimes our operations and maintenance accounts are viewed as piggy banks we can break into for spare change. The absolute importance of good training and sound maintenance shows up only on battlefield ledgers, where the red ink entries are written in blood. In addition to the challenges posed by downsizing and restructuring, our forces will A computer-guided also have to adapt to changing missions. We Tomahawk Cruise have already seen a substantial expansion of missile is launched their roles in just the past few years, every- from a Navy ship toward an Iraqi target thing from counterdrug operations to relief during Operation efforts in Iraq, Russia, Somalia, and elsewhere. Desert Storm.

There is nothing inherently wrong with DOD photo such departures from traditional roles provided we remember that the first purpose of military forces is to fight, not sniff out traditional sense—like Operation Restore drugs or deliver food baskets. The reason Hope in Somalia. we are good at other things is because, rela- This does not mean the old roles are tive to other law enforcement or relief going away. We reminded Saddam Hussein agencies, we are big, have ample trained of that two years ago. We used overt military manpower and capable leaders, and can call power to force his withdrawal from Kuwait, on marvelous resources—including a logis- and later we successfully used the threat of tical system that surpasses the wildest military force to create a safe haven for dreams of any civilian agency. But all these Kurds in northern Iraq. advantages are, in one way or another, But there are also situations in which byproducts of combat readiness. military force alone can do very little. Yugo- The future may widen the gap between slavia is a good example. We all wish the car- the role of military force in the old sense and nage would stop; but injecting U.S. ground the modern utility of military forces. Those forces into Bosnia without a workable peace of us in uniform have been trained to see agreement among all parties would be no the two as being almost inextricably inter- more successful than in Beirut ten years ago. twined, as Clausewitz and Mahan contend. The killing would go on, the horror would But today and in the future our forces may continue, and Americans would be among be assigned missions that have little or noth- the dead. A noble desire to “do something” is ing to do with coercive military force in the not an adequate basis for risking our service men and women. There are limits to what

Summer 1993 / JFQ 31 WHAT’S AHEAD

force can do, and we need to remember that may not be the central position they have our military power is not the only—or often held for the past half century or more. It is even the best—way to promote peace and not yet time to kill all the sacred cows, but stability abroad. they should be put into a very selective By themselves these two big trends— breeding program. continuing changes in the international We cannot be too beholden to any out- community and restructuring our forces to dated or obsolete system because technologi- address those changes—would be amply cal change makes our day-to-day grip on techno- challenging. But they are not the only logical superiority all the more fragile. Our agents of change on the horizon. Right now position is similar to that of the Royal Navy a we are surfing just below the crest of a fabu- century ago when the British introduced a lous revolution in technology, and that crest new class of large, fast, heavily armed war- is about to crash down on us. ship. Overnight, the dreadnought (essentially the first modern battleship) made every The Challenges of New Technology other type of surface combatant obsolete. Superior weaponry has been a character- The irony for the British was that this made istic of the U.S. Armed Forces for a long time the rest of the Royal Navy, the strongest navy and will remain so. But to fully exploit daz- in the world, obsolete as well. The British zling new opportunities, we need to stream- had to start over like everybody else, and this line our procurement system. We also need meant competitors could take a short cut. to pay attention to how we adapt new tech- Nations like Germany, which had never nologies to military use, and to how we will dreamed of challenging the Royal Navy be- command and control our future forces. fore, could become formidable sea powers Like the tabloid astrologers, we cannot simply by building fleets of dreadnoughts. predict for certain which new technologies Today we are in an analogous position. will prove most useful. But we can make out Although we are by far the strongest military some ways they will reshape our forces, and power in the world, our superiority no because of this R&D is already shifting. We longer depends on outproducing our ene- are moving away from systems that cannot mies as we did when we were “The Arsenal be easily adapted to exploit new technolo- of Democracy” in World War II, nor even on gies that do not have a high degree of strate- superior design in aircraft, ships, and tanks gic or tactical mobility, or that are so highly like we had during the Cold War. Increas- specialized they can only ingly, our superiority depends on having the be used against a narrow latest microchip, the latest superminiature no matter where we fight, threat or in a unique en- sensor, or the most advanced information- vironment. We do not no matter what the processing software. But right now, we have want systems that lack circumstances, we will fight an acquisition system that is not designed to low-observable or stealth assure our superiority in those areas. as a joint team technologies. We intend Our current acquisition system is a to get away from systems product of the Cold War. It was designed to that need large, vulnerable logistical tails. give us large numbers of advanced systems And we may very well move away from ex- as rapidly as possible. This was costly, but it pensive, highly sophisticated platforms in served us well when we faced great national favor of cheaper trucks or barges based on danger. Over time, however, that acquisition commercial vehicles but crammed with system also become risk-averse. We got so state-of-the-art long-range weapons, sensors, concerned about scandals that we loaded it and communications gear. down with checks and audits. These helped This does not mean we are about to us avoid procurement scandals but at the sound the death knell for the major capital price of driving up costs and impeding rapid systems of our services—the main battle technological progress. As a result, we have tank, the manned aircraft, and the large sur- lost our technological agility. face combatant. These will have their place in the Armed Forces of the future, although—and this is important—that place

32 JFQ / Summer 1993 Jeremiah

We desperately need to streamline our dustrial base while holding down overall ac- defense acquisition system. We need a broad quisition costs. Instead of insisting on a uni- front R&D strategy so we will not be surprised form force structure made up, say, of a single by breakthroughs in areas where our technol- type of air superiority aircraft, we may se- ogy lags behind. We also need to compress quence new acquisitions through the force. the time from concept to final product so the While overall this would produce a heteroge- acquisition cycle can keep up with state-of- neous force, we could draw from it the right the-art technology. And we need to do all mixture of sophistication and mass appropri- this within the constraints of future defense ate to any particular crisis. The result may be spending. To get there from here, we need to more programs like the F–117 rather than the strip away some of the legislative and regula- F–16, with our most highly advanced systems tory barnacles that encrust the acquisition deployed in only a few selected units. Technological superiority is not just a measure of hard- American forces used portable satellite ware; it is also a measure of or- dishes and laptop ganizational adaptability. One computers to transmit aspect of this might be called vital information dur- learning curve dominance. It ing Operation Restore refers to the ability to develop Hope. the tactics, organizations, training programs, and warfighting doctrines to exploit new technology effectively. A good example is the Germans at the beginning of World War II. They had fewer tanks than the British or French, and the tanks they had were technically inferior. But because they had new tactics and organizations which allowed them to use their technology more effec-

Joint Combat Camera Center photo tively, the German Blitzkrieg crushed the French and British cycle. We need to exploit shortcuts such as armies in a matter of weeks. We should heed hardware-in-the-loop testing and computer- such lessons and aggressively seek the new aided design, manufacturing, and logistical applications that get the most out of our new support. We may need to reverse the histori- systems. cal relationship between defense and com- With longer range, greater precision, and mercial technologies. In the past, commercial horizontal integration of real-time intelli- applications were often the spin-off byprod- gence and targeting, future weapons will be ucts of defense R&D; in the future, we will able to strike enemy forces at great distances. probably rely more on adapting the latest In mid- or high-intensity combat, it may not commercial technologies for military use—a always be necessary to physically occupy key change that promises to yield new military terrain on the ground, vital airspace, or criti- applications faster, cheaper, and better than cal chokepoints at sea in order to control the old Cold War process. them. While wars will still be won only We also need to open our minds to new when soldiers occupy the enemy’s territory, it ideas about how we can separate technologi- may not be necessary in every case to “close cal progress from costly full-scale deploy- with” the enemy in order to destroy him. We ment. Our new regional-crisis strategy frees us may even reach a point at which fire and from the need to keep large, homogeneously maneuver become essentially the same thing equipped forces. Instead, we can now tolerate under some circumstances. Such elements as more unique units as a way to quickly integrate new technology and keep a warm in-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 33 WHAT’S AHEAD

that instrument and how to control it. This is where C4I comes in. The end of the Cold War presents us with a whole new set of C4I problems. When the Soviets were our primary worry, we needed expensive systems to meet specialized needs. We bought whole networks of hardened, redundant, focused systems to give us strategic warning or to enable us to fight a global war against a nuclear adversary. These assets have not become irrelevant; but in shifting from a global strategy for global war to a global strategy for regional crises, we now have a new menu of C4I requirements. Strategic warning now takes on new meaning. The theater, the adversary, even the nature of the problem—whether it is a military conflict or a humanitarian crisis— can change rapidly and may be much tougher to sort out than in the days of the old East-West rivalry. Many of our current systems are not designed for that kind of work. For example, satellites cannot tell whether a crowd is going to a soccer match or a civil war—admittedly sometimes the same thing in many parts of the world. To act quickly and effectively in future regional crises (and especially with our smaller force structure, more of which will be based in the United States), we need a global C4I capability that can alert us very early to a potential problem, focus on a trouble spot as events develop, surge in capacity when needed, and respond to the pe- culiar operational needs of the joint or combined task force commander. No one else does this as well as we can.

U.S. Navy photo by Jeff Wood Our experiences in Grenada, Panama, and Missile launcher the Persian Gulf taught us a lot, and the ad- on the deck of vances we have made in just the past two USS McClusky. traditional unit organization, tactics, and years are eyewatering. But technology is modes of thinking may not be appropriate to spawning a new problem: an information such a future. We need to find out what is explosion that threatens to choke our C4I appropriate and acquire it before our adver- systems with more data than we can ana- saries do. Otherwise, it will be like hitching a lyze. We need to make sure that our future Corvette behind a draft horse: we will not be efforts give us not only more, but also better, using our new hardware in a way that truly more usable information when and where exploits its capabilities. we most need it. The future also demands superior com- We also must understand that such sys- mand, control, communications, computers tems fundamentally change the way we com- and intelligence (C4I). Good weapons, ad- mand and control forces. Our traditional vanced tactics, and flexible, efficient organi- methods have emphasized the flow of infor- zations will give us a superb military instrument. But we need to know where to point

34 JFQ / Summer 1993 Jeremiah

mation along vertical A Marine Corps paths: information up, F–4 fighter launching orders and instructions a missile. down. But increasingly we have architectures in which information flows laterally as well. As a result, knowledge is more pervasive and control functions more decen- U.S. Navy photo tralized. We have not yet come to grips with 1930s we developed a modern, capable car- what that means organizationally, but we rier force that later turned the tide against need to soon. the Japanese in the Pacific. In 1945, General We also need to work on end-to-end in- Hap Arnold made a controversial decision to tegration of our C4I systems. We must be able push research and development of guided to know, decide, and act faster than our missiles when many in the Air Force howled enemy at every turn. The data our reconnais- that this would make manned aircraft obso- sance systems gather must be transmitted in lete. Despite this resistance and the slim bud- real time to command centers, where target- gets of the late ’40s and ’50s, Arnold’s vision ing decisions can be made in a matter of mo- eventually became reality in our ICBM forces. ments. Then we need to send targeting in- After Vietnam left the Nation with a foul structions to loitering cruise missiles or other taste for military investments, General weapons that hit their targets with specially Creighton Abrams started the Army on a tailored munitions packages—possibly with spiritual and doctrinal renewal that paid off terminal guidance from overhead systems. spectacularly in the deserts of Iraq and And all this must happen rapidly, since fu- Kuwait. In every case, the keys to success ture combat may resemble a game of elec- have been a vision of the future and the de- tronic cat and mouse between the enemy’s termination to make it become reality. hiders and our finders. (Project 2025 gives a In this respect the U.S. Armed Forces sobering assessment of so-called pop up war- have always been lucky, not just because fare and its implications for U.S. security.) they produced visionaries like Hap Arnold, We need to harness this exciting new Creighton Abrams, George Marshall, and Ar- technology to our emerging requirements. leigh Burke, but because so many service Superior military power in the future will de- men and women at every level joined them pend on superior C4I. Since our adversaries in making their visions come to life. Times of may have access to some of the same sophis- change have a way of placing a premium not ticated weapons technologies we do, our ulti- on narrow, specialized knowledge, but on mate trump card will be our ability to know, breadth of understanding and clear thinking. decide, and act more quickly than they can. For this, our military education system is the best in the world. We produce officers who, Some Final Thoughts while well trained in their technical special- It will not be easy for us to tackle these ties, can also calmly gaze into the eye of the challenges in the years ahead. Many see our tiger when it comes to problems of interna- declining defense budgets as just another ob- tional politics, grand strategy, force modern- stacle, one that makes the others insur- ization and restructuring, or the complex mountable. I disagree with this view. In fact, consequences of future technology. I think the next few decades will be some of I place my faith in them. They are in for the most exciting and successful our Armed some exciting times. JFQ Forces have ever experienced. Historically, many of our most important transformations have come during periods of constrained defense spending. In the

Summer 1993 / JFQ 35 Summary

With the Cold War now history the Armed Forces could face the kind of stagnation major corporations have suffered in an uncompetitive marketplace. Although redundant roles and missions, and the interservice rivalry they encourage, may seem wasteful to taxpayers and Congress in search of their peace dividend, competition among the services has often improved our military capabilities. When the Army and the Navy had a similar strategic mission, the Army built a long-range fighter for continental air defense while the Navy developed carrier air. When the Army and the Marine Corps had analogous infantry roles, the Marines perfected amphibious warfare. The defense establishment should not turn a blind eye to the warp in which creative competition among the services can encourage the development of new capabilities in even a period of fiscal constraint. Consideration should also be given to creating a few competing, theater-oriented commands which may offer a variety of joint capabilities to choose from in the future. SERVICE REDUNDANCY:REDUNDANCY:REDUNDANCY: WASTE OR HIDDEN CAPABILITY? By STEPHEN PETER ROSEN

fforts underway to restructure the Creative competition can exist if a common Armed Forces should provide for strategic mission is clearly established, com- healthy competition among the ser- mon criteria for success are identified and Evices to stimulate technological in- understood, and no one service is allowed to novation in an era when the Nation no rig the game by establishing a little empire longer faces a foreign threat that is its mili- within which it is autonomous and invulner- tary equal. Interservice rivalry is frequently able and thus able to achieve parochial goals thought of as costly and wasteful, as an irra- (otherwise known as service log-rolling). tional duplication of functions resulting “The Last Thing Needed Is Interservice from the services attempting to protect or Rivalry” expand bureaucratic turf at the expense of As the defense budget declined abso- efficiency. Yet interservice competition has lutely in response to decreases in major its creative aspects. Every organization tends threats to the territory of the United States, to stagnate when it becomes the only game the first, least divisive, and most obvious rein town or when competition is rigged, from sponse was to reduce the services in a the big three auto makers to IBM and the roughly proportional manner. Balancing the Postal Service. Without competitive pressure, force structure with lower end strengths pro- the need to respond quickly to changing cir- vided the Nation with the full range of capa- cumstances or opportunities is reduced. bilities that had contained the global Soviet Properly structured service competition threat and regional military aggression. This does not waste money and actually promotes higher levels of efficiency and innovation.

36 JFQ / Summer 1993 Rosen

process of proportional downsizing yielded several types of fighter aircraft in World War the base force. II, and both forces suffered from squandered At the same time, Congress mandated resources and inability to communicate the creation of a joint culture in place of in- among the services. Which leads us to ask: dividual service cultures by emphasizing a what point is there in service competition more centralized Joint Staff, training, acquisi- anyway? tion, and so forth. Pressures to reduce de- A brief look at American military history fense spending below the levels that can sus- shows that interservice rivalry spurred inno- tain the base force have already produced vation in several important cases by forcing recommendations to eliminate overlapping a service to do something better or faster, or functions and redundancies to find the by leading to the creation of a critical mili- money to keep the base force intact. The gen- tary capability. uine need to promote jointness and to cope In the 1920s many members of Con- with declining budgets may combine to progress wanted to take aviation away from the duce a military where there is one, and only Army and Navy and put all aircraft into a one, capability for each identifiable function: single air arm. Why should two services intelligence, tactical aviation, ground combat, power projection, and so on. As the Congress daily hammers on the services to economize and rationalize, it will become easy to lose sight of the fact that redundancy—which has a decidedly negative ring in the ears of most Americans—can also be thought of as competition, which strikes a far more positive note. An analogy from the business world may be useful. A company that faces hard times can argue there is production overca- pacity or redundancy in its sector and try to solve the problem by eliminating the over- capacity: getting rid of its competitors by tariff protection, quotas, or mergers. Unfor-

tunately, once companies have a market sec- DOD photo tor to themselves, they often revert to sloth- ful ways. Companies that respond to hard compete in developing fighters and times by squarely facing up to their competi- bombers? The main mission facing the tion do much better, provided they can sur- Armed Forces at that time was protecting the vive in the short run. continental United States from attack. Why not give the job to one service and avoid “What’s True for Business Isn’t True for waste? This did not occur for various rea- the Military” sons, and as a result each service was spurred In the marketplace, where many firms to improve its aviation branch, fully aware do the same thing, we can buy from the sup- that the other service was eager to take over plier we like best and let the weaker ones go aviation for continental defense. Both the broke. The Nation, however, cannot afford Army and Navy had the same strategic mis- multiple defense establishments, and we cer- sion, but they developed alternative ways of tainly do not want to see the military equiv- pursuing it. The Army developed the P–38 alent of going broke—that is, losing a war. long-range fighter for continental air defense Besides, the services must work together in and B–17 bomber to attack enemy invasion wartime, not compete. The Japanese navy fleets and foreign air bases within range of and air force the United States. The Navy developed car- each had more rier aviation to defend against threats to the Stephen Peter Rosen is the associate director of than fifty kinds United States and the Panama Canal. Each the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at of radios and Harvard University and author of Winning the of these redundant air forces had its charac- Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. teristics, and each was extremely useful in

Summer 1993 / JFQ 37 SERVICE REDUNDANCY

World War II. If aviation had been rational- Force. Partly as a result of this competition, ized in the interwar years of the 1920s and the first generation of strategic ballistic mis- 1930s, one or the other of these essential in- siles was fielded in a fraction of the time gredients for victory that it now takes for the introduction of rad- would have been lost. ically new military technology. Marines were em- “Now Everything Is More Expensive and ployed as regular in- Complex” fantry during World War Is the notion of creative competition I in exactly the same valid in today’s economic climate? Weapons ways as Army infantry- systems have increased in cost and complex- men. In the 1920s the ity faster than the U.S. GNP, and we buy and Marine Corps had such use fewer arms than fifty or sixty years ago. unglamorous, strategi- Redundancy of systems and capabilities is cally peripheral jobs as Lockheed photo by Schulzinger and Lombard therefore more expensive. Yet it is also help- providing military guards Technological innova- ful to recall that we afforded redundant Air and fighting rebels overseas. This redundant tion: the F–117 cockpit Forces and a redundant Marine Corps during features a video moni- force, however, identified a capability that the 1930s when defense spending as a whole tor with infrared im- was needed but that the Army made little ef- was, at most, 1.5 percent of GNP, or only agery from onboard fort to develop: amphibious assault. By 1936 sensors, full color half the figure of even the more Draconian the Marine Corps had developed a “Tenta- moving-maps, and five-year projections tive Manual for Amphibious Warfare” that a 4–D flight control today. If the utility of the United States system. was not only the basis for operations in the creative competition Pacific during World War II, but also became needs fewer is understood, we the Army manual for amphibious landings may well opt for it forces in being in Europe. Had the Marines been absorbed within the fiscal con- and a wider into the Army, the invention of amphibious straints that are assault would not have come about until menu of poten- emerging. In addi- World War II broke out—inevitably at con- tion, the idea of re- tial military ca- siderable strategic and human cost. dundant force struc- pabilities from Immediately after World War II, the tures is consistent chief scientist in charge of the development which to choose with the prototypical of military technology, Vannevar Bush, re- research and devel- viewed all guided missile programs then un- opment strategy ad- derway. He discovered what he thought was vocated by the Department of Defense in incredible waste and redundancy of pro- the past as well as by the new Secretary of grams and tried to cut them back. He was Defense. The point is that today the United unsuccessful. Ten years later, the Assistant States needs fewer forces in being and a Secretary of Defense for Research and Devel- wider menu of potential military capabilities opment attempted to do the same thing by from which to choose, precisely because we placing all missile programs under the Air do not know what the threat will be or how Force. Again, it was not done. Every history it will fight. of the development of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinen- “How Do You Get Creative tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs) notes the ex- Competition?” tremely rapid and successful development of An examination of the historical exam- those systems was related to the existence of ples of good and bad interservice rivalry re- competition. The Air Force knew that if it veals that Japan’s experience was bad be- failed in the Atlas or Minuteman programs, cause the army’s strategic mission before the Army would happily take the money for Pearl Harbor—defeating China and the So- its IRBM programs. The Navy knew that if it viet Union—was entirely different from that did not do its best with the Polaris program, of the navy—defeating the British and Amer- it would lose any role in the primary strate- ican fleets. Not until June 1941 did the army gic mission of that generation to the Air and navy agree that the United States was the principal enemy. It was a wonder they could work together at all. In the case of

38 JFQ / Summer 1993 Rosen

competition in the U.S. military over avia- upon: for example, projecting a strategically tion capabilities, there was at least some significant amount of power from the conti- agreement about the main task; so that nental United States to the periphery of while there was competition, it was not Asia. Instead of the present arrangement of about what to do but rather how to do it. theater-oriented commands, two or three This agreement on a strategic mission “Strategic Expeditionary Corps” or SECs was even clearer in the 1950s when the ob- could be created. Each would be a joint com- jective was understood by all to be putting mand and have one-half or one-third of the megatons on Soviet targets. Agreement on Army and Marine Corps divisions and Air the strategic mission is essential because it Force wings that Congress decides to fund, a ensures that all the services will work in the joint training center, and its own operations same direction, and that each will develop a and maintenance budget. Each SEC would capability that should help achieve what the be told how much strategic airlift and sealift Nation needs in wartime. It also makes it dif- it could call upon and given the same planning scenarios. Each would Army and Marine then be told to come up with Corps patrols in the concept of operations it Humvees with roof- mounted M–60s. thought best, to be measured along dimensions identified by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each could identify preferred research and develop-

DOD photos ment and procurement priorities for the short- and ficult for a service to identify its own mili- long-term. The Chairman could then judge tary niche and say, “What the other services the concept of operations, war plans, train- do is fine but it isn’t relevant to us—let them ing activities, and exercises developed by do what they want, but let us do what we each SEC and see what different technologi- want.” Agreement on mission makes it pos- cal opportunities they identified for funding. sible for both the Commander in Chief or This differs from the current system of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to super- unified commands where each command is vise by saying to the services in effect, “You the only supplier of military services in its are each trying to do X, and one of you functional or regional domain. Not only do seems to be doing it much better—show me commands not face competition, they are why I am wrong.” restricted to their own turf until such time, Establishing criteria for success in ac- for instance, that Atlantic forces are needed complishing a mission enables the Joint in the Pacific, or the other way around. Staff to track service progress on a routine SECs, in contrast, would not only compete basis. Creative competition among the ser- among themselves but they would be geo- vices in peacetime can’t be tracked the way graphically fungible. it would be in war, by seeing who wins the The notional approach of Strategic Ex- battles most easily. Competition in peace- peditionary Corps satisfies the need for com- time must be structured and appropriate petition while also pursuing jointness at standards set for the services to meet. And force levels below that envisaged in the base competition cannot be completely open- force. There are certainly better ways to ac- ended, exist for its own sake, and be funded complish this same goal, and professional indefinitely. Establishing hard, quantitative officers will be more apt to come up with bottom lines is an extremely useful way for them than an academic. But we should keeping competition honest and focused. never lose sight of the fact that a little competition never hurt anyone. After all, it was “Can We Foster Creative Competition the principle that won the Cold War. JFQ Today?” One notional idea is to identify a strategic mission that each of the services agrees

Summer 1993 / JFQ 39 REFORMING Joint Doctrine By R OBERT A. DOUGHTY

Summary

Professional Military Education at both intermediate and senior levels now places greater emphasis on joint and combined warfare, especially since the establishment of the National De- fense University and enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. Yet it is command authority and doctrine—not just education—that enable the services to operate together effectively. This is why the appearance of Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces was a watershed. A Center for Joint Excellence to promote doctrinal development as well as a Joint Advanced Warfare School to further education would significantly contribute to the creation of a joint culture. These and other efforts should be ac- companied by actively encouraging more military historians to study and write about joint operations. Nevertheless, while jointness must permeate the curricula of the intermediate and senior service colleges, it should not do so at the expense of ignoring instruction on individual service perspectives which will remain fundamental to understanding joint warfare. DOD photo by R.D. Ware

This article is reprinted from Parameters, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992).

40 JFQ / Summer 1993 Doughty

he publication of the new Though the past does not always provide manual on joint doctrine, Joint a blueprint for the future, the development of Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. joint doctrine will probably accelerate in the Armed Forces,1 dated November years to come, much as the development of th 1991, signals the opening of a Army doctrine increased in the 20 century. Tnew era in American military history. The possibility of a great expansion in the Though other manuals have been published role and importance of joint doctrine may be in “test” form, this is the first fully approved surprising to some, for during most of the last manual that deals with joint warfare from half century the U.S. Armed Forces have such an authoritative position and is the first placed relatively little emphasis on joint doc- in what is sure to be a long line of joint doctrine. Instead, they have focused their efforts trinal documents. As the new era begins, the on developing a system of joint schooling to issue is not whether joint doctrine is impor- improve the ability of the services to work to- tant; the issue is determining what institu- gether. These efforts began with the establish- tions and procedures for formulating effec- ment of the Army-Navy Staff College on tive joint doctrine are required and when June 1, 1943 and the National War College 8 they will be established. The purpose of this on July 1, 1946. Among the missions of the article is to suggest steps to speed the formu- National War College was preparing “selected lation of joint doctrine in the future and en- personnel of the Armed Forces and the De- sure its effectiveness. partment of State for the exercise of joint In many ways the situation today is sim- high-level policy, command and staff func- ilar to the situation at the end of the 19th tions, and for the performance of strategic century when the U.S. Army began writing planning duties in their respective depart- 9 official field manuals.2 Until the publishing ments.” The creation of other schools, such of official manuals began, the Army de- as the Armed Forces Staff College on August 10 pended on individuals to complete method- 13, 1946 at Norfolk, Virginia, provided new ological treatises about different aspects of opportunities for education in joint matters. military operations. For example, Brigadier And the establishment of the National De- General Silas Casey’s Infantry Tactics 3 was fense University on January 16, 1976 as an adopted in 1863 by the Union Army for use umbrella headquarters over the joint schools by regulars, volunteers, and militia.4 It was provided new means for maintaining “excel- 11 with the publication of the 1891 Infantry lence in military education.” Drill Regulations,5 however, that a more sys- Despite significant changes in the joint tematic approach to writing field manuals schooling system in recent decades, it has be- and formulating doctrine began. Over the come apparent that more than education is next decade the Army’s interest in doctrine required to guarantee that the services work increased, and in 1905 it followed most together effectively. Command authority and other major armies in the Western world by doctrine, not merely education, cause mili- publishing its first Field Service Regulations.6 tary forces to function together. Education is This ancestor of the current FM 100–5, Oper- simply the mechanism for ensuring the ideas ations, signaled the Army’s newly found faith are understood and implemented. To this in centrally formulated doctrine and played a end, the passage of the landmark Goldwater- key role in what has been called “the Army’s Nichols legislation in October 1986 en- Renaissance” 7 before World War I. As the hanced the power of the Chairman at the ex- decades of the 20th century passed, the pense of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff Army’s emphasis on doctrine and its institu- and thereby altered many relationships in tions charged with developing doctrine ex- the joint arena that had existed for more panded considerably, leading eventually to than three decades. The legislation imposed the establishment of the Training and Doc- upon the Chairman responsibility for estab- trine Command in July 1973. lishing policies for joint doctrine, training, and education and gave him sufficient authority over the services to ensure his policies would be followed.12 Colonel Robert A. Doughty, USA, is head of the History De- partment at the U.S. Military Academy. His most recent book One of the earliest changes emerging is The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. from the new authority of the Chairman of

Summer 1993 / JFQ 41 REFORMING JOINT DOCTRINE

the Joint Chiefs was the establishment of a nied the writing of about 75 new joint doc- comprehensive process to discover and ad- trinal documents, the Joint Staff “subcon- dress in a systematic way voids in joint tracted” the writing of documents among doctrine and training. This analysis suggested the services, the Joint Staff, and the unified that something other than and specified commands. Except for the es- the requirement to write JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of Mili- tablishment of a Joint Doctrine Branch tary and Associated Terms,13 within the Operational Plans and Interoper- joint doctrine was and JCS Pub 2, Unified Action ability Directorate (J–7) on the Joint Staff superimposed over Armed Forces,14 was required and the creation of the Joint Doctrine Cen- existing institutions that to furnish the U.S. Armed ter at Norfolk, the requirement to write joint Forces adequate joint doc- doctrine was superimposed over existing in- previously had placed trine. As a consequence, the stitutions that previously had placed little little emphasis on joint Joint Staff and the services emphasis on joint doctrine. Though the doctrine began writing more than 75 quality of the joint doctrinal publications is new joint publications. yet to be determined, the variety of authors, Among these was Joint Pub 1, the press of deadlines, and the complexities Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, which of coordination suggest that revisions in the was intended to articulate an overall philoso- production process may be necessary. phy for the other publications. As steps are taken to improve the formu- Joint Pub 1 provides a comprehensive lation of joint doctrine, a more coherent and discussion of doctrine, defining the term as complete system must be established. follows: Within this system, a major component Military doctrine presents fundamental princi- should be a “Center of Excellence” for joint ples that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is doctrine. Though such a Center may eventu- authoritative but not directive. It provides the distilled ally evolve into something resembling the insights and wisdom gained from our collective expe- Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, rience with warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace the first step is the marshalling of responsi- clear thinking or alter a commander’s obligation to bility and the clarifying of procedures and determine the proper course of action under the cir- relationships. Instead of responsibility being 15 cumstances prevailing at the time of decision. shared or fragmented, the Center should The absence of information about pro- have responsibility for evaluating and writ- cesses and techniques has caused some crit- ing doctrine; researching and writing histori- ics to deride Joint Pub 1 as being little more cal studies on doctrine; conducting simula- than pabulum. Nonetheless, if one reflects tions to test doctrinal concepts; and on the experience of the Army and improve- conducting exercises to ensure common un- ments in the doctrinal arena since the publi- derstanding and application of doctrine. In cation of the landmark 1891 Infantry Drill an ideal world the Center would be located Regulations, the potential for change be- at Norfolk, where it could take advantage of comes obvious. That is, by guiding the em- existing institutions in the Joint Doctrine ployment of the U.S. Armed Forces, joint Center and the Armed Forces Staff College doctrine will play a large role in Professional and could establish day-to-day links with Military Education and in the development service doctrinal offices of the Army at Fort of new organizations and equipment, and it Monroe, the Air Force at Langley Air Force may soon affect the entire American defense Base, the Navy in Norfolk and Virginia establishment in a fundamental way. In Beach, and the Marine Corps at Norfolk and other words, the great value of Joint Pub 1 is Quantico. Existing service activities in these not in what it says but in what it signals locations—such as the Army’s Training and about developments in the future. Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe—would The current system to formulate doc- greatly facilitate and simplify the coordina- trine within the joint community differs tion that is essential in the development of substantially from that used by the Army, joint doctrine. particularly since the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command. In the flurry of activity after 1986 that accompa-

42 JFQ / Summer 1993 Doughty

Armed Forces Staff College students playing a theater-level war game.

As the process for formulating doctrine that are written by the services and joint evolves, some documents can continue to be commands and ensures that they adhere to subcontracted to the services, but a signifi- common formats and are distributed prop- cant portion of the joint publications, par- erly. An important step in improving the for- ticularly the capstone ones, must be written mulation of doctrine is enlarging the focus within the Joint Staff or the Center of Excel- and resources of the Joint Doctrine Center lence. This will ensure their adherence to and slowly expanding its mission to evaluat- common themes and will minimize the ef- ing, revising, and writing new doctrine. Such fects of a fragmented system. In the Army’s a change will make the Joint Doctrine Center experience, for example, FM 100–5 should a vital component of the Center of Excel- not be written by the branches at Fort Ben- lence at Norfolk. ning, Fort Knox, or Fort Sill; the Combined Simulations and exercises should also be Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and the important components within the Center of Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Excellence. The Wargaming and Simulation Monroe have demonstrated a better capacity Center, which was established in May 1982 for rising above parochial concerns and writ- under the National Defense University,16 ing doctrine that applies to broader seg- could make significant contributions to the ments of the Army. development of doctrine if it were linked The Joint Doctrine Center at the Norfolk more directly to a Center of Excellence at Naval Air Station may ultimately be the best Norfolk. The Army has long recognized the place for writing joint doctrine, but it clearly importance of simulations to the doctrinal does not have that capacity today. Created in process, with Arthur Wagner, Eben Swift, and April 1987, the Joint Doctrine Center cur- others playing key roles in their expanded use rently focuses on evaluating rather than writ- at the end of the 19th century.17 With the ing joint doctrine. It analyzes documents

Summer 1993 / JFQ 43 REFORMING JOINT DOCTRINE

arshall Hall— the joint academic center Mof the National Defense University at Fort Lesley J. McNair. NDU is comprised of two senior- level, Professional Military Educa- tion institutions—the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and National War College—and the Armed Forces Staff College, which offers both Phase I and II of the Program for Joint Professional Military Education.

completion of the Army War College’s larger role in the exercising of doctrinal pro- wargaming facility at Carlisle Barracks (the cedures should be nothing more than an ex- Center for Strategic Leadership), the joint pansion of its current activities. Just as exer- community will have the opportunity to use cises within NATO enable extremely diverse interactive war games among the Center of units to speak the same operational language Excellence at Norfolk, the Army War College, and meet common standards, exercises could the Naval War College, and the Air War Col- become an important instrument within the lege to gain important insights and informa- joint community to ensure common under- tion for those who write joint doctrine—as standing and application of doctrine. well as for those who “test” strategic con- As the development of joint doctrine ma- cepts. Additionally, the linking of the Joint tures, the role of Joint Professional Military Warfare Center in Florida to the Center of Ex- Education must be acknowledged and em- cellence would facilitate the development of phasized. In particular, its study must remain useful doctrine. The Joint Warfare Center cur- embedded in all service colleges without de- rently supports exercises conducted by the tracting from preparing officers for duties in combatant commands, and its assuming a their own service. One of the important insights furnished by the 1987 Dougherty

44 JFQ / Summer 1993 Doughty

in Phase II are expected to apply the understanding they acquired in Phase I. This logical and relatively efficient system enables the services to educate their officers in their basic service-specific skills and responsibilities before they enter Phases I and II of the Joint Specialty Officer program. It also guarantees that all intermediate service schools are deeply involved in the study and teaching of joint issues and that the application phase is clearly under the control of the joint community. There are many useful aspects of the new Phase I and Phase II program, but two of the most valuable outcomes are ensuring that no intermediate service school can ignore the requirement to teach Joint Professional Mili- tary Education (JPME) and that no officers are shortchanged in the development of expertise in their own service. Despite the significant improvements that have already been made, steps can be taken to improve the quality of JPME. One of the most important would be the establishment of a joint school similar to the U.S. Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).19 Such a school could be called the “Joint Advanced Warfare School” (JAWS), could become part of the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, and could furnish many of the benefits to all the services that SAMS provides for the Army. Most especially, faculty and students in the school could develop special expertise in the theory and practice of joint operations, and students could be prepared and slated for positions as war planners in joint commands. The establishment of JAWS would provide the joint Board on Senior Military Education was that community greater expertise than the ser- the success of joint operations depends on of- vices in the theory and practice of joint op- ficers in joint commands having solid exper- erations. And its focus on warfighting and tise in the methods and organizations of their its level of sophistication would make it a own service. The program that was estab- dramatically different course than the one lished to prepare individuals as Joint Spe- offered at the Armed Forces Staff College be- cialty Officers (in accord with the Goldwater- fore the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Nichols legislation and the Chairman’s Officers who attend JAWS should be in- “Military Education Policy Document” 18) re- dividuals studying to be Joint Specialty Offi- quires officers to receive Phase I of their Pro- cers. A portion of those officers who have fessional Military Education from an accred- finished Phase I at an intermediate service ited service school and Phase II from the school and who are scheduled to attend Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk. At the Phase II—perhaps 25 to 50 a year—could be end of Phase I, individuals are expected to selected for the more rigorous course of know basic information about joint organiza- study at JAWS. Because of its small size and tions, command relationships, etc., and then purpose, JAWS would not replace Phase I and Phase II instruction for the great majority of Joint Specialty Officers. With a length

Summer 1993 / JFQ 45 REFORMING JOINT DOCTRINE

of about six months, the course at JAWS ical literature that has been written by histori- could include Phase II in a modified format, ans on the Joint Staff pertains to the func- intensive historical studies, analyses of the tioning of the Joint Staff, not to joint opera- operational level of war, and extensive prac- tions or campaigns. Histories about the tical exercises. The course could also include conduct of campaigns and operations have an introduction to national policy and strat- remained the province of the services. Thus, egy as they affect joint operations. As with little is available to provide the “distilled in- the Army’s SAMS, the faculty could be a sights and wisdom” that are extolled in Joint combination of individuals permanently as- Pub 1’s definition of doctrine. signed to the Armed Forces Staff College and If shortcomings in available literature a handful of exceptionally outstanding offi- are to be overcome, significant steps must be cers from all services who would serve as fel- taken to create a more extensive community lows at JAWS in lieu of at- of joint historians. The first step is the ex- one of the few areas tending the National War pansion of the Joint Staff Historical Office. College. Assuming that JAWS The present office has only five people and neglected by the 1986 attains the success of the should be increased significantly. This en- Goldwater-Nichols Army’s SAMS, some of those larged joint history office could complete a legislation was the who attend or teach at JAWS series of “purple” histories of joint and com- could develop joint warfight- bined operations, as well as special studies of history community ing skills to their highest lev- important joint historical issues. The next els and could become the pre- step would be the modest expansion of the mier war planners in joint commands. history offices in the unified and specified Another improvement in the formula- commands. Individuals in these offices tion of joint doctrine could come from asso- should collect and preserve documents, con- ciating the Joint Doctrine Center more duct interviews, and write command histo- closely with the Armed Forces Staff College. ries. Steps also could be taken to have histor- Such an arrangement would make the latest ical detachments accompany joint task thoughts on doctrinal issues available to of- forces on contingency missions such as Ur- ficer students and facilitate the development gent Fury, Sea Angel, or Provide Comfort. of joint doctrine through a more compre- These detachments could be tailored accord- hensive and demanding system than cur- ing to the JTF’s mission, and, though com- rently exists. One of the key lessons of the posed of representatives from all the ser- Army’s experience is that the writing of doc- vices, could parallel the organization of the trine cannot be completely separated from Army’s Military History Detachments. The the teaching of doctrine; a symbiotic rela- detachments should collect documents, con- tionship must exist between the two.20 duct interviews, and write reports that Tightening the links between the Joint Doc- would contribute significantly to the com- trine Center and the Armed Forces Staff Col- pletion of joint histories. lege—particularly if JAWS were also estab- As part of the expansion of the joint his- lished—would give Norfolk unrivaled tory community, a center must be created expertise in joint operations and make it the and given responsibility for conducting his- focal point for understanding and teaching torical research on joint campaigns and op- joint doctrine. erations. One possible name for such an in- Another component of the doctrinal pro- stitute could be the “Joint Campaign Studies cess that is often overlooked pertains to the Institute.” As stated in Joint Pub 1, Joint War- availability of historical literature on joint op- fare of the U.S. Armed Forces, “Campaigns of erations. Ironically, one of the few areas ne- the U.S. Armed Forces are joint; they serve as glected by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legis- the unifying focus for our conduct of lation was the history community. In warfare.” 21 In a similar sense, historical stud- comparison to the wealth of material now ies of joint campaigns could provide much available about military operations by the ser- useful information for the formulation of vices, very little information is available on joint doctrine. If a Joint Campaign Studies the history of joint operations. Worse, little Institute were established, it should be part effort is currently being expended to increase the amount of available literature. The histor-

46 JFQ / Summer 1993 Doughty

of the Armed Forces Staff College and should NOTES be modeled after the Army’s Combat Studies 1 Institute at Fort Leavenworth. Steps would Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: National Defense Uni- have to be taken, however, to ensure that it versity Press, 1991). remains focused on the publication of his- 2 For a history of the field manual, see Virgil Ney, torical literature and does not become com- Evolution of the United States Army Field Manual, Valley pletely absorbed by the demands of daily Forge to Vietnam (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Combat Operations classroom presentations. Research Group, 1966). 3 Silas Casey, Infantry Tactics for the Instruction of the In sum, the development of appropriate Soldier, A Company Line of Skirmishers, Battalion, Brigade joint doctrine in the future could become or Corps d’Armé (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862). more efficient and effective with the estab- 4 William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States lishment of a system with a Center of Excel- Army (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), lence at Norfolk as its head. Without a co- p. 285. 5 U.S. War Department, Infantry Drill Regulations, herent system with precise responsibilities United States Army (Washington: Government Printing and relationships, the efforts of those who Office, 1891). develop joint doctrine will never be as suc- 6 U.S. War Department, Field Service Regulations, cessful as they should be. As the emphasis United States Army (Washington: Government Printing on joint doctrine increases and a more co- Office, 1905). 7 Ganoe, The History of the United States Army, p. 448; herent system emerges, the Center of Excel- Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Wash- lence at Norfolk should initially have links ington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 348, to the Joint Doctrine Center, the Armed 351. Forces Staff College (including the Joint Ad- 8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Di- vanced Warfighting School), the Joint War- vision, Special Historical Study, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Education System, 1943–1986” fighting Center, the Wargaming and Simula- (Washington: typescript, 1988), p. 2. tion Center, and the Joint Campaign Studies 9 Ibid., p. 8. Institute. Over time, the Center of Excel- 10 Ibid., p. 11. lence should evolve from its status as moni- 11 Ibid., pp. 42–43. 12 tor and coordinator of joint doctrinal formu- Ibid., p. 56. 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Asso- lation to having paramount responsibility. ciated Terms, JCS Pub 1 (Washington: Government Ultimately, the Center should become a Printing Office, 1987). Joint Command, probably on the analogy of 14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces the National Defense University. (UNAAF), JCS Pub 2 (Washington: Government Printing Although much work remains to be Office, 1986). 15 Joint Pub 1, p. 5. done to establish a proper system for formu- 16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and lating excellent joint doctrine, the appear- the Joint Education System,” p. 48. ance of Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. 17 Boyd L. Dastrup, The U.S. Army Command and Gen- Armed Forces, clearly signals an acceleration eral Staff College: A Centennial History (Manhattan, Kans.: in its development. As with the publication Sunflower University Press, 1982), p. 35. 18 Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM of the Army’s 1891 Infantry Drill Regulations, 344–90, “Military Education Policy Document,” May 1, the appearance of Joint Pub 1 does not guar- 1990 (Washington: typescript, 1990), passim. antee the importance of joint doctrine will 19 See Ike Skelton, “JPME: Are We There Yet?”, Mil- increase dramatically in the near future. itary Review, vol. 72, no. 5 (May 1992), pp. 2–9. 20 Nonetheless, the first step has been taken, For a more complete discussion of the relationship between education and doctrine, see Robert A. Doughty, and the direction, number, and pace of the “The Command and General Staff College in Transition, next steps must be determined. The path 1946–1976,” Special Study Project, Department of Strat- may be long, but the goal is clear. Those egy, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, who formulate joint doctrine must work May 1976, pp. 109–23. 21 with the best possible chance of success. JFQ Joint Pub 1, p. 45.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 47 0801 Lewis/Sewall 3/3/04 8:05 AM Page 48

United Nations Peacekeeping: Ends versus Means Photo courtesy of the United Nations By WILLIAM H. LEWIS and JOHN O.B. SEWALL

A liaison officer coordinating air support for U.S. and Canadian troops in Somalia.

Summary

The end of the Cold War has seen the United Nations assume a more active role in resolving regional conflicts. In the last four years alone U.N. forces have mounted over a dozen military operations, more than in the previous four decades. Many of today’s operations are greater in scope and complexity than in the past, and their nature is changing from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing. As a result the Secretary-General recom- mends expanding U.N. military capabilities. While Washington officially pledged support for a stronger and more forceful United Nations, the resources to achieve that objective are not available. The most immediate requirement is for a command and control structure for properly employing multinational forces. Moreover, there is a view that divergent U.N. and U.S. military cultures could inhibit American participation in future peacekeeping missions under U.N. control. Even if our military contributions to future combined operations are small, such missions will continue to pose a significant challenge to the way the U.S. Armed Forces currently plan and train for coalition warfare.

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he United Nations has become a or buffer force to the Sinai and an observer significant factor for the United group to the Golan Heights. Later, in 1978, States in developing a coherent another U.N. buffer force was established in strategic focus to guide its foreign southern Lebanon. T The general mission of U.N. field opera- policy during the balance of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw tions was clearly defined: to supervise demar- Treaty Organization has been succeeded by a cation lines or cease-fire agreements, separate widening array of conflict situations and military forces upon agreement of the war- crises which are beyond the ability of any ring parties, and (in limited cases) foster an single nation to resolve. Thus the United Na- environment in which the population could tions is now the primary vehicle for conflict return to normal pursuits. Missions were or- resolution, with the Security Council—under ganized only with the consent of the con- its senior executive agent, the Secretary-Gen- tending parties (including agreement on the eral—searching for allies to share the burden national origin of participating military of promoting peace. The United States has units). For their part U.N. units were ex- pledged support for “a more robust, more pected to avoid the appearance of partiality, muscular” United Nations.1 The issue as yet carry light (nonthreatening) weaponry, and unresolved is the nature and the extent of restrict the use of force to the maximum ex- the American support that is required and, tent possible. In brief, these military units- perhaps crucially, whether divergent U.S. were expected to serve as an instrument of and U.N. military cultures will be impedi- U.N. diplomacy, be militarily nonprovocative, ments to developing common doctrine and and withdraw if the host nation so indicated. command and control arrangements for The end of the Cold War produced an mounting joint and combined operations in even more challenging international security the future as part of a multinational force. environment characterized by the unleash- ing of divisive forces once held in check by Background superpower rivalry and by the transforma- The inability of the U.N. Security Coun- tion of international politics from bipolar to cil to play an effective role in maintaining multilateral relations. This led to a dramatic peace and security after the start of the Cold increase in pressure for international organi- War led the United Nations to turn to peace- zations to engage in preventive diplomacy to keeping in default. This was a “golden age” resolve conflicts at an incipient stage or to for the organization during which it avoided forcibly intervene when conflict threatens superpower rivalry and influence by relying peace and security. Complicating this ex- mainly on smaller nations for military con- panded mandate is the eruption of intrastate tributions to peacekeeping operations. The conflicts that, in turn, displace populations conduct of such missions evolved over four and create humanitarian concerns. Such con- decades although the word peacekeeping does flicts also may cause breakdowns in govern- not appear in the U.N. Charter. In the initial mental authority or, in extremis, lead to harsh phase international observer missions were repression of restive ethnic minorities, in-

Joint Combat Camera Center photo established to monitor cease-fires (1948–56). cluding refusal to permit the distribution of This was followed by the introduction of the emergency foodstuffs and medical supplies. first modern peacekeeping force, the U.N. The impact of these developments on Emergency Force in Egypt (1956), to separate U.N. operations is immense. In terms of de- the military forces of Egypt and Israel. Then, mand the organization launched 13 peace- in 1960, a multinational force was sent to keeping operations since 1988–89, roughly the former Belgian Congo to perform an in- equal to all the missions conducted in the ternal pacification role. The unsettled state previous four decades. The scale and scope of East-West relations inhibited instituting of current operations have necessitated de- peacekeeping initiatives between 1967 and ploying over 54,000 military personnel— 1973. The 1973 more than half the strength of the forces Arab-Israeli war Both William H. Lewis and John O.B. Sewall are that make up the U.N. membership’s exist- resulted in the senior fellows in the Institute for National ing military establishments—at an estimated deployment of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, $3 billion for 1992. Second, these operations a peacekeeping where they analyze regional security issues.

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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

exceed the traditional bounds of peacekeep- Defining Roles and Missions ing and include: Rising demands for the United Nations ▼ supporting victims of war, including pro- to play the part of global crisis manager have vision of safe havens; generated a plethora of proposals to enhance ▼ supervising transfers of power and estab- the organization’s military capabilities. This lishing effective institutions of government; development was foreshadowed in a post- ▼ organizing and monitoring elections; Desert Storm observation by then Secretary- ▼ creating secure environments to ensure General Perez de Cuellar that the war, while the safe delivery of relief supplies. “made legitimate by the Security Council, Peacekeeping and humanitarian assis- was not a U.N. victory” because victory tance have become inextricably linked—as could be claimed only if hostilities were seen in Somalia—and now require the inte- “controlled and directed” from the United gration of military and humanitarian plan- Nations. Boutros-Ghali pursued this issue by ning to meet contingencies.2 recommending that: An added burden not yet fully addressed ▼ the Security Council assume more peace- by the U.N. membership relates to responsi- keeping burdens rather than authorizing mem- bility for reestablishing security and order in ber states to take action on its behalf; failed states, particularly when human rights ▼ agreements be made as foreseen in article violations are blatant and regional stability 43 of the Charter for member states to make mili- is threatened. The tary forces, assistance, and facilities available to demise of viable the Security Council; ▼ governing institu- the Security Council guarantee the permanent availability of such peacekeeping forces tions in Liberia, (and negotiate with member states—assisted by Somalia, and Haiti the hitherto moribund Military Staff Commit- provide striking tee—to create such forces); examples. Many ▼ peace-enforcement forces be on-call and Third World gov- more heavily armed than peacekeeping units, be ernments—most made up of volunteers, and be extensively trained notably the mem- within their national commands; bers of the Group ▼ peacekeeping and peace-enforcement of 77 which today forces be placed under the command of the Secre- 4 numbers over 120 tary-General. countries—resent The distinction between peacekeeping what they believe and peace-enforcement reposes in chapters are threats to their VI and VII of the Charter whose framers saw DOD photo by Perry Heimer Norwegian U.N. peace- national sover- the United Nations as an organization re- keeping forces break eignty. China, one of the five permanent quired to offer assurances of comprehensive down pallets of Ameri- members of the Security Council, has ex- collective security. To meet that need two can rations (MREs) pressed reservations about Western interven- functions were regarded as imperative: the being unloaded from a tion under U.N. auspices in situations where procedures for the “pacific settlement of dis- U.S. Air Force C–141 in Zagreb, Croatia. humanitarian considerations dictate action putes” found in chapter VI (peacekeeping) without the approval of the host govern- and the ability to counter “threats to the ments. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali fa- peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of ag- vors the humanitarian position. In his June gression” in chapter VII (peace-enforcement). 1992 report to the Security Council, An In the so-called golden age of the United Na- Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General ob- tions most disputes and conflict situations served that “the time of absolute and exclu- were dealt with through chapter VI proce- sive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory dures. Chapter VII was invoked to redress was never matched by reality” and then the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and urged “a balance between the needs of good the Korean “police action” is generally con- internal governance and the requirements of sidered to be an example of a chapter VII en- an ever more interdependent world.” 3 forcement action. The challenge to the U.N. leadership today is bridging the gap militarily when addressing threats to international order and stability that fall between the

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chapters (sometimes called chapter VI and ▼ train its forces for “the full range of 1/2 requirements). The accompanying table peacekeeping and humanitarian relief” which seeks to avoid semantical confusion over will be coordinated with the United Nations; these terms by providing generally accept- ▼ inform the United Nations on the available definitions. ability of its unique military resource capabilities and encourage other nations to provide informa- The recommendations U.N. Terminology tion on logistics, equipment, and training which found in An Agenda for Peace can be made available to enhance readiness and peacemaking—generally means using present the U.S. military with interoperability; mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or major questions regarding diplomatic initiatives to peacefully resolve ▼ “promote multilateral peacekeeping . . . a conflict roles and missions in future training exercises, simulations, and leadership peacekeeping—traditionally involves using multilateral peacekeeping ac- development,” and make facilities available for military personnel as monitors/observers tions. For example, in what such purposes. under restricted rules of engagement kind of situations should the President Clinton associated himself once a cease-fire has been negotiated United States become involved peace-enforcing—using military force to with the Bush position during his inaugural complete a cessation of hostilities or to in peacekeeping? In the event address by stating: “When our vital interests terminate acts of aggression by a member of a decision to participate in are challenged or the will or conscience of state peacekeeping operations, what the international community are defied, we peace-building—rebuilding institutions doctrine exists to instruct and and infrastructure within a country to cre- will act—with peaceful diplomacy wherever inform forces? Under what cir- 5 ate conditions conducive to peace, as possible, with force when necessary.” Left used by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali cumstances should members unanswered are questions about the means in his An Agenda for Peace of the Armed Forces be directly of establishing a body of knowledge on protective engagement—using military commanded by officers out- joint and combined peacekeeping within measures, essentially defensive, to pro- side our national chain of the U.N. Security Council and its principal vide safe havens or a secure environment command? Should peacekeep- for humanitarian operations (such actions executive agent, the Secretary-General and tend to fall between chapters VI and VII of ing be integrated as a subset of his Secretariat. the U.N. Charter traditional missions and capabilities? Where should the Basic Points of Divergence budgetary authority for peace- The United Nations is the world’s pri- keeping be lodged: in defense appropriations mary legitimizing agent in matters of peace- or the Foreign Assistance Act? Should the keeping. Resolutions by the Security Council United States support strengthening U.N. provide the framework for diplomatic initia- planning and operational capabilities? tives (or preventive diplomacy), humanitar- Should the United States seek to energize the ian intervention, and military action within U.N. Military Staff Committee? If so, with the framework of chapter VII. Clearly U.S. what mandate and whose participation? and U.N. interests in maintaining interna- While not fully endorsing Boutros- tional peace and security appear inextricably Ghali’s proposals, President Bush, in an ad- linked, but their dress to the U.N. General Assembly on respective histo- the United Nations ries, bureaucratic September 21, 1992, recommended that the is the world’s pri- Security Council consider them on an ur- culture, and deci- gent basis. In outlining his position the Pres- sionmaking pro- mary legitimizing ident indicated the United States will: cedures suggest agent in matters of otherwise. In- ▼ support efforts to strengthen the ability peacekeeping of the United Nations to prevent, contain, and re- deed, unless the solve conflict; obstacles are satis- ▼ support the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- factorily negotiated in the near future, they zation (NATO), the Conference on Security and seem to be on a collision course due to mis- Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western Euro- understanding. As Ambassador James Goodby pean Union (WEU), the Commonwealth of Inde- has observed: “Collective security military op- pendent States (CIS), and other competent re- erations require constant exchanges of views gional organizations to develop peacekeeping among the governments trying to deal with capabilities—enhanced U.N. capabilities being a complex situations.” 6 Moreover, the effective- “necessary complement to these regional efforts”; ness of collective security operations will be ▼ member states, however, must retain the final decision on the use of troops they make available for peacekeeping operations;

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On-Going Peacekeeping Missions

Established before 1988 ONUSAL 1991– MINURSO 1991– UNIPROFOR 1992– Fielded since 1988 United Nations Observer United Nations Mission for United Nations Protection Mission in El Salvador— the Referendum in Force—established in 1992 established in 1991 to Western Sahara— to foster security in three pro- supervise a cease-fire established in 1991 to tected areas of Croatia in order between the Salvadoran supervise a cease-fire and a to facilitate a peace settlement government and the FMLN referendum to determine inde- (strength: 621 civilian police, guerrillas, monitor human pendence or integration into 22,534 troops, and 394 rights, and establish a police Morocco (strength: 110 troops military observers, including force (strength: 286 civilian and 224 military observers, 339 American troops). police, 7 troops, and including 30 American 94 military observers). observers). United Nations photo

Note: The term troops in the lexicon of U.N. peacekeeping refers to infantry, logistics, engineering, aviation, medical, movement control, naval, and staff personnel. A total of 448 Americans—341 troops and 107 observers—were serving in 5 of the 13 on-going United Nations peacekeeping operations listed here on March 31, 1993. Source: Strength figures courtesy of the Office of the Military Advisor, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Headquarters.

U.N. personnel in So- malia have been using advanced communications equipment. Joint Combat Camera Center photo

Unloading a Navy cargo ship under the watchful eyes of U.N. troops. United Nations photo United Nations Secu- Marines in Mogadishu rity Council meeting. counter warring fac- tions during Operation

DOD photo Restore Hope. Joint Combat Camera Center photo

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UNFICYP 1964– UNTSO 1948– UNIFIL 1978– UNDOF 1974– UNIKOM 1991– United Nations Peace- United Nations Truce United Nations Interim United Nations Disen- United Nations Iraq- keeping Force in Cyprus— Supervision Organ- Force in Lebanon— gagement Observer Kuwait Observation established in 1964 to ization—established in 1948 established in 1978 to confirm Force—established in 1974 Mission—established in supervise a cease-fire and to help mediate and observe the withdrawal of Israeli forces to supervise a cease-fire 1991 after the recapture of administer a buffer zone the truce in Palestine; today and assist the Lebanon in between Israel and Syria Kuwait to deter Iraqi border between opposing forces supports UNDOF and UNIFIL, restoring security (strength: (strength: 1,121 troops). violations and observe (strength: 39 civilian police and supervises observer 5,216 troops). potentially hostile action and 1,492 troops). teams which are located in (strength: 71 troops and 247 Beruit, southern Lebanon, military observers, including Sinai, Jordan, Israel, and Syria 14 American observers). (strength: 239 military observers, including 17 Americans).

UNMOGIP 1949– United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan—established in 1949 to supervise a cease- fire in Jammu and Kashmir (strength: 38 military observers).

UNTAC 1992– United Nations Transi- tional Authority in Cam- bodia—established in 1992 to assist in the areas of human rights, elections, public administration, law enforcement, refugees, health and welfare, and demobilization and disarma- ment with a U.N. force that includes observers from the United States and 21 other nations (strength: 3,578 civilian police; 15,023 troops; and 488 military observers; including 2 troops and 46 observers from the United States).

UNUMOZ 1992– UNOSOM 1992– United Nations Operation United Nations Operation UNAVEM II 1991– in Mozambique— in Somalia—established in United Nations Angola established in 1992 to monitor 1992 to monitor a cease-fire Verification Mission II— a cease-fire and protect and protect the delivery of food established in 1991 to verify a delivery of relief aid (strength: and humanitarian aid cease-fire between the 1,082 troops and 153 military (strength: 893 troops). Angolan government and observers). UNITA and monitor the Angolan police (strength: 75 military observers and 30 civilian police).

Summer 1993 / JFQ 53 0801 Lewis/Sewall 3/3/04 8:05 AM Page 54 DOD photo by Marv Lynchard Pakistani troops in “blue helmets” deploying to Somalia in 1992.

U.N. forces load an Air Force C–130 in Djibouti for the flight to Somalia. DOD photo by Marv Lynchard Joint Combat Camera Center photo A U.S. Air Force crew placing the emblem of the U.N. High Commis- determined by the mandate of the Charter, Shape and Functions of the Military Secre- sioner for Refugees on political will, available resources, and per- tariat. The U.N. Headquarters system is still their cargo plane. ceived legitimacy. Recent U.S.–U.N. interac- not up to expanded peacekeeping require- tion reveals that neither a commonality of ments of increased complexity and scope. views nor coordinated action exists across the Hitherto the Secretariat has met emerging full range of peacekeeping operations. In con- requirements with ad hoc approaches, not sequence we are also far removed from estab- infrequently failing to meet challenges on a lishing a joint perspective on the essentials timely, cost-effective basis. The pattern has for a full-bore collective security system been jerrybuilt and does not meet the need under the auspices of the United Nations. for clearly defined mandates covering field The approach of U.N. Headquarters to personnel, concepts of operations, logistical the challenges of the post-Cold War era ap- plans, and multi-year resource requirement pears to be coherent and reasonably well planning. The U.N. leadership must estab- balanced. Indeed, few member states could lish a single chain of command linking the object to the general precepts and guidelines political (crisis-prevention) side of its opera- set forth in An Agenda for Peace, the report of tions with the management and logistical- the Secretary-General. It is sensible on the support side. Concomitantly, the Secre- whole, but the devil is in the details. In par- tariat’s military staff should be enlarged ticular Boutros-Ghali and the Secretariat substantially, with special components es- have yet to come fully to terms with several tablished for crisis early warning, plans and vexing problems which, if not resolved, operations, logistics and communications— would inhibit U.S. military support for none of which exist at present. peacekeeping (in the broadest sense) opera- Fashioning a Doctrinal Foundation. Tradi- tions. Salient among them are issues involv- tionally peacekeeping worked well, and ca- ing organization, doctrine, command and sualties were kept down because peacekeep- control, logistics, and rules of engagement. ers were accepted as neutrals whose stated purpose was to assist in muting conflicts and mediating between the conflicted parties. Chapter VI 1/2 and peace enforcement

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operations require more heavily armed escalating funding requirements (given lim- forces and different operational doctrine. ited U.S. pre-stockage). These problems are Within the framework of traditional peace- compounded by civilian requirements that keeping operations successes came in the tend to piggyback on those of the military. form of ceasefires and negotiated settle- Although standardization is beyond the ca- ments of disputes, whereas the circum- pability of the existing U.N. system, the stances in both Bosnia and Somalia are major powers might wish to consider creat- more ambiguous. The danger in the latter ing set-aside stocks (in areas such as commu- cases arises from breakdowns in Security nications, transportation, and engineering) Council consensus, disagreements among in excess of their national needs that can be lead countries providing troops and the placed at the disposal of the United Nations. Headquarters Secretariat, and muddled or The objective would be to ensure interoper- mismatched aims among the major actors ability of equipment under conditions where involved in organizing field operations. severe security threats confront U.N. forces. Divided Responsibilities in the Field. A sep- Realistic Rules of Engagement. Communal arate civilian chain of command is the bane conflict has altered the nature of peacekeep- of all military field commanders. Under tra- ing assignments conducted under U.N. aus- ditional U.N. practice the field unit’s com- pices. Operations conducted today involve mander is subordinate to a Special Represen- police support, civil administration, civic ac- tative who reports directly to Headquarters tion, and humanitarian relief, all of which and has a predilection to emphasize nonmil- necessitate military support. In intrastate itary subjects. A separate chain also includes warfare traditional rules of engagement may the Chief Administrative Officer of the mis- not suffice. In certain situations U.N. forces sion who reports directly to the field Depart- deployed to protect the distribution of relief ment of Administration and Management at supplies could well become hostages or vic- U.N. Headquarters. He has the potential to tims resulting in heavy casualties. As wit- influence military operations adversely since nessed in Somalia, the initial U.N. contin- he has decisionmaking authority over bud- gent inserted at Mogadishu airport in getary and logistical matters. Tension be- mid-1992 became hostage to the clan chief- tween military field commanders and their tains and local thugs—yet U.N. Headquarters civilian counterparts will inevitably crystal- refused to alter the rules of engagement. The lize since the decisions taken at Headquar- U.N. forces in Bosnia operate under similar ters in New York are not predicated exclu- constraints, occasionally with tragic conse- sively on political-military considerations. quences. Flexibility for field commanders Consensus in New York involves decision by would be desirable, but the bureaucratic cul- committee, diplomatic negotiations, and ture in New York constrains greater delega- desiderata not necessarily relevant to the action or freedom of action to field comman- tual state of affairs in the field. These factors ders regardless of how perilous the situation. frequently override the practical require- Given these constraints some observers ments of military field commanders. conclude that U.S. forces are ill-suited to con- Logistical Mixes and Matches. The stan- duct general peacekeeping operations—short dard guidelines for national units assigned of Korea-like chapter VII threats to the to peacekeeping emphasize that troops peace—for several reasons. The nature of should arrive fully equipped and prepared to U.N. coalition roles and missions are at vari- conduct field operations over several ance with American military character, doc- months without requiring U.N. resupply. trine, traditions, and the concepts of both Several nations—notably the Nordics, Cana- decisive force and victory. For example, a re- dians, and Irish—who have a lengthy his- cent U.S. statement on “Joint Operational tory of training and preparation for such op- Concepts” establishes doctrine which is anti- erations are readily prepared to meet this thetical to U.N. Headquarters concepts and imperative. However, some Third World con- guidelines.7 Issued under the signature of tributors, anxious to participate, must look General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the to the United Nations for matériel support Joint Chiefs of Staff, it sets forth clear guide- prior to unit arrival. The result has been a lines for joint operations of the U.S. Armed mix of equipment, poor interoperability, and

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Forces, including the need to “shock, disrupt, The primary dilemma for members that and defeat opponents.” The emphasis is want centrality of U.N. control over future placed on integrating and synchronizing op- undertakings is the lack of a Headquarters erations to ensure total and complete appli- organization to operate beyond existing ad cation of military force. And, to ensure suc- hoc arrangements. Indeed, the ad hoc ap- cess, commanders are admonished that proach is resulting in system overload since “there are few distinct boundaries between additional military expertise is not available the levels of war.” They must “set the terms for peacekeeping management. To date, ef- for battle” so that “the threat is not able to forts to increase the professionalism and resurrect itself.” 8 To establish control over strengthen the Headquarters staff have been the adversary’s “center of gravity,” they to no avail, and U.N. members themselves are enjoined to emphasize lethality, tempo, disagree on the size and use of military advi- decisiveness, and operational depth in plan- sory staff. ning to shock, demoral- Recently, several member nations have U.N. forces deployed ize, and disrupt oppo- recommended that the Military Staff Com- to protect relief supplies nents and thereby gain mittee be revived to provide military exper- decisive advantage early. tise to the Security Council and Secretary- could well become hostages Such thinking is far re- General. Both the U.S. and several West or victims moved from the doctrine, European governments have greeted this rules of engagement, and proposal with reserve. Moreover, the tradi- operating procedures currently imbued in tional troop-contributing countries have not the bureaucracy of U.N. Headquarters. favored the proposal for fear they will be excluded from decisionmaking processes if the The Command and Control Dilemma Military Staff Committee remains domi- For over forty years the United States has nated by the Security Council “permanent taken the lead in applying chapter VII mili- five” as it is at present. tary sanctions under U.N. authorization. Op- Whatever the final decision taken by erations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the membership, it would be prudent to as- 1990–91 constituted only the second such sume that the Security Council will be American initiative, one which provided a loathe in the future to accord full delegation U.N. license for the use of force without re- of command and control to the United stricting the manner in which the U.S.-led States as in Operations Desert Shield/Desert coalition was to “secure Iraq’s immediate and Storm. Full consideration will have to be unconditional withdrawal of its forces from given in due course to the role of the Mili- Kuwait.” While required to provide periodic tary Staff Committee. Article 46 of the Char- reports to U.N. Headquarters, the coalition ter calls for the Security Council to develop was allowed unfettered planning and opera- plans for applying force with the assistance tional freedom to use “all necessary means” of the Military Staff Committee; article 47 essential for success. The coalition fully met details the Committee’s terms of reference its mandate although at some cost. As Ambas- including advice to the Council on readi- sador Pickering has observed: “Broadly licens- ness, planning and general matters of coming a few countries to use force in the Coun- mand, and strategic direction of forces. cil’s name enables detractors to argue that the There are some significant traps to be ad- action is the project of a few governments dressed in this context as Ambassador Pick- unrepresentative of the world community.” 9 ering has noted: Within the precincts of the United Nations, a number of member states want assurances No state whose troops are engaged in hostilities that in future peacekeeping and peace-en- is likely to allow their direction by a group to which it forcement operations complete command does not belong or whose members have necessarily also contributed troops. [There]...is also the need to and control will repose with U.N. Headquar- ensure that committed troops are not subject to life- ters rather than with a designated lead coun- threatening surprises by change in the political pa- try. Clearly, Boutros-Ghali’s June 1992 report rameters governing their use, or by a breach in secu- was intended to satisfy this desire. rity or by other factors arising from activities which might be implied by the words “strategic direction.” Thirdly, unless the reference to strategic command is

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interpreted in some static sense, the technology of ners involves interoperability in ad hoc modern warfare probably makes it obsolete: it requires coalitions that comprise forces with little or flexible, decentralized decisionmaking and instanta- no history of operating together. Such ar- neous communication—neither is well suited to deci- rangements are likely to resemble interna- 10 sion by U.N. committee. tional versions of a sheriff’s posse. But opera- In cases of chapter VII peace-enforce- tional effectiveness can be directly enhanced ment where the United States is the coalition and in-theater preconflict training mini- leader with full operational control, the re- mized by periodic command-post exercises gional unified commander will either be the (CPXs) for potential coalition leaders and overall commander or establish a Joint Task using the concept of lead-nation responsibil- Force. Such operations, however, have been ity for certain equipment and functional and will remain exceptions. More frequently, support areas such as command, control, individual U.S. observers or small-sized units communications, and intelligence (C3I). This will be integrated into U.N. peacekeeping concept, suggested by President Bush in his commands (with U.N. logistical support) and speech to the General Assembly, will un- the role of the U.S. unified commander may doubtedly contribute to shaping the debate be more circumscribed. In the past the in the coming months. JFQ United States has assigned military observers to a number of peacekeeping missions but NOTES not large military units.11 The experience of 1 “In Somalia, Now It’s the U.N.’s Turn,” The New Operation Desert Storm in terms of chapter York Times, February 1, 1993, p. 18. VII operations is that until multinational 2 Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, “The U.N.: From forces are deployed to one place and com- Peacekeeping to Peacemaking?” Adelphi Paper no. 265 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Stud- mand and control is established, they will ies, 1991), pp. 30–40. lack cohesion and effectiveness. On the other 3 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving hand, when a substantial force is deployed Failed States,” Foreign Policy, no. 89 (Winter 1992/1993), with international agreement, U.S. command pp. 3–20. 4 and control may be neither required nor war- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, a report to the United Nations Security Council (New York: ranted depending on the size of the force United Nations, June 17, 1992). contributed. Experience in the NATO inte- 5 David Newson, “Use of Force to Settle Global Dis- grated military command and the Multina- putes Has Its Limits,” The Christian Science Monitor, Jan- tional Force and Observers (MFO) in the uary 27, 1993, p. 19. 6 Sinai after the conclusion of the 1979 Egyp- James E. Goodby (with Daniel O’Connor), “Collec- tive Security after the Cold War” (Washington: United tian-Israeli Peace Treaty should have estab- States Institute for Peace, March 1993). lished the fact that American troops can op- 7 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, erate under a multinational command “A Doctrinal Statement of Joint Operational Concepts,” unencumbered by military or political con- November 23, 1992. 8 straints. Although the MFO is only one step Ibid., p. 1. 9 Thomas R. Pickering, “The U.N. Contribution to away from a U.N. command, there is an ap- Future International Security” in The Security Roles of the parent reluctance to place U.S. forces under United Nations, edited by William H. Lewis (Washing- foreign command. ton: National Defense University Press, 1993). Today, military planners have a most 10 Ibid., p. 11. 11 challenging assignment. Not only must they U.S. military units participating in peacekeeping operations are under the operational control of the identify future adversaries but also surmise peacekeeping commander. However, the U.S. comman- who will be our friends and coalition part- der retains operational command over his subordinates ners. If we confront a capable adversary— and all attached units. with or without direct U.N. involvement— any arrangement will require unity of command and control. Either a fragmented or multiple chain of command, predicated on loose coordination among national units, would be self-defeating because operational decisions must not be cobbled together by committees once conflict breaks out. Hence, the basic challenge for U.S. strategic plan-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 57 Summary

Past experience and military potentialities destine the United States to lead a disproportionate share of future multilateral coalitions, a challenge that is compounded by the need for doctrine to conduct joint operations in a combined environment. Four tenets go far toward achieving success in a coalition war: agility which calls for maintaining balance and force in shifting situations while striking in fleeting windows of opportunity, initiative which means dominating the terms of battle and thus depriving the enemy of that same option, depth which considers every dimension of war and envelops the entire spectrum of events across time and space, and synchronization which applies combat power both at the optimum moment and in the right place while controlling a myriad of simultaneous actions. But no commonly accepted doctrine for coalition warfare exists today. Any multinational operation will require planning by all the participants, interoperability, shared risks and burdens, emphasis on commonalties, and diffused credit for success.

This article is being published simultaneously in Military Review, vol. 73, no. 6 (June 1993).

PRINCIPLES FOR COALITION global interests and responsibilities of our Nation inevitably dictate that far more often than not our forces will be engaged in al- WA R FAR E liance and coalition activities. This article addresses fundamental tenets that underpin By ROBERT W. RISCASSI our efforts to create a doctrine for joint operations in a combined environment. When we say we no longer intend to be ince the beginning of this century, the world’s policeman, it does not mean we there has been a strong common are going to disengage. It means we want thread in the involvement of Ameri- more policemen to share in the responsibili- can forces in combat. Almost every ties, risks, and costs of settling the world’s S most vexing problems—intrinsically, we are time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of— articulating a condition for wider and more most often to lead—coalition operations. active participation in coalition operations. Rarely have we committed, nor do we intend Even though we consider this a responsible to commit forces unilaterally. Our remaining proposition on its merits alone, the redistri- forward positioned forces are routinely en- bution of global wealth and economic power gaged in coalition operations during peace makes it also essential. In 1945, the American and are committed to do so in war. The

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economy produced around half of the world’s the leaders who led victorious coalitions, as Gross National Product. Today, it comprises if the secrets of success lay in personalities less than a quarter. In any event, coalition op- more than methods. A doctrinal founda- erations are generally key to legitimizing the tion must be based on methods. use of force. Yet, both as a function of our his- Interestingly, and as a testament to their torical experience as a leader of coalition op- value, we have yet to experience an inci- erations and the continuing fact that America dence where a prepared military coalition in brings the most military power to the table, which we are engaged has been attacked. In we should also recognize that American mili- those cases—Western Europe and South tary leaders will almost always be called upon Korea—where the coalition had the will, to lead multilateral coalitions in which we are time, and resources to prepare for alliance participants. The fundamental question warfare, the effects were never tested in bat- becomes one of tle. Thus, we cannot be certain their prepara- “how?” tions were sound. It may have been that the Notwithstand- tranquility they imposed undercut their abil- ing our reoccurring ity to achieve essential concessions from na- historical experi- tions whose priorities were more nationalis- ence, we have at tic than threat-oriented. Every other case we times been remark- scrutinize involved ad hoc coalitions merged ably ill-prepared for hurriedly in crisis or conflict. For obvious coalition opera- reasons, they also may not represent the tions. In truth, we model upon which we should create a doc- have not had, nor trine. Between the two, however, there is do we yet possess, a ample experience to build a doctrine. commonly agreed We know that joint operations, in and of doctrine for forming themselves, represent significantly greater or fighting as part of complexity than single-service operations. military coalitions. Some may argue it is not The Joint Staff is trying to create the doctrinal necessary to have such a foundation; but, architecture to glue joint forces together in under its absence, we will have to address warfare. In a coalition, the difficulties of joint each new coalition on an ad hoc basis. Also operations are still prevalent, but with the in its absence, we have no comprehensive added dimensions and complexity of two or doctrinal base to create the means or tools to improve our ability to notwithstanding historical experience, participate in, or lead, coalition op- we have been remarkably ill-prepared for erations. There is a clear and om- nipresent reason to create such a coalition operations doctrinal consensus. Five of our regional commanders in chief (CINCs) are more national armed forces, all of which coalition or alliance commanders, as is one bring their separate orientations and proclivi- of our specified CINCs. ties to the practice of warfare. Often the ap- There is no cookbook approach to parent intractability of problems has been so coalition warfare. Every coalition will be awesome that any attempts at achieving different in purpose, character, composi- unity have been limited to the strategic and tion, and scope. But there are some basic operational levels. Battlefield responsibilities commonalities that confront any coalition have been divided nationally based on the ca- commander. Obviously, the most valid pabilities each nation brings to the coalition. basis we have to form a doctrine is our own Each national force is given discrete sectors historical experience. Yet, for the most part, and missions. A single leader is appointed to our historic perspectives tend to analyze unify coalition efforts and—based on the numbers of national forces involved—decen- General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, is currently the Commander tralizes operations through national chains of in Chief of the United Nations and the ROK–U.S. Combined command, which become multi-hatted. This Forces Command; the Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea; and is a patchwork approach. Seams are recog- the Commanding General, Eighth Army. nized but stitched together by strategic and

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operational agreement. Sometimes the seams of joint combat power, the warfighting doc- are tight; sometimes they are loose. trine must be common to all arms. In the ab- If we look back at World War I, World sence of a commonly understood doctrine, it War II, Vietnam, or even the Gulf War, we becomes extraordinarily difficult to plan or see variations on this structure and also the execute military operations. problems that resulted. In multiple cases, Yet, approaching a commonly agreed campaigns were disjointed by ruptures in doctrine can be politically frustrating. Past timing, unity of purpose, or tactical disagree- U.S. attempts in Europe and Korea to enjoin ment. Often commanders found themselves allies to embrace AirLand battle were met in positions where mutual support was es- with arguments that it is a distinctly Ameri- sential. Yet, procedures can doctrine whose execution is technology- were nonexistent or inad- dependent—therefore suspected as a Trojan equate and had to be Horse for “buy American” campaigns—or jury-rigged on the spot. that it is terrain-dependent and suitable only Cross use of assets—com- in Europe. Notwithstanding suspicions, hav- bat, combat support (CS), ing a commonly understood doctrine is es- and combat service sup- sential to mutual understanding in battle. port (CSS)—was limited The following four tenets—agility, ini- or foregone because of in- tiative, depth, and synchronization—are the compatibility. In some most firm basis for organizing and conduct- U.S. Navy photo by Gary D. Denman The U.S. Coast Guard cases, vast technological ing coalition operations. They are not char- cutter Chase and differences between forces caused either acteristically American attributes, nor are the Russian Maritime multiple tiering of the battlefield or over-re- they limited to any single service. They are Border Guard frigate liance on the most capable units continu- cross-national intellectual tenets which, Orel in the port of ously to perform the most difficult missions. when physically applied, cause success in Vladivostok. Differences in national doctrines, languages, modern war. Their application may be im- and cultures often meant breaches in under- pacted by the technology available, but the standing, inability to communicate on the tenets are essentially mental, rather than battlefield, fratricide, and disorga- nization. In short, effective opera- a coalition must share a common doctrine to tions were hindered by multiple take advantage of commonalties sources of friction. What are the elements essential to conducting joint operations in a physical. They are a reflection of how tech- combined environment? In other words, nology has evolved modern battle, and may what have we learned and how do we in- grow obsolete over time as the nature of war tend to apply it the next time American continues to mutate. As both mental states forces are asked to lead a multinational of mind and emphasized characteristics in coalition in combat? battle, they allow us to bridge the intellectual gap between “principles of war” and Doctrine practical execution. More particularly, when The first point is that a coalition must closely examined, these tenets strike at the share a common doctrine to take advantage heart of the most difficult, yet crucial aspects of commonalties. Doctrine is more than sim- of joint and coalition operations. ply how we intend to fight. It is also the tech- Agility is compared to that quality found nical language with which we communicate in great boxers who sustain an intuitive grasp commander’s intent, battlefield missions, of their position and motion in the ring—as control measures, combined arms and joint well as their opponent’s—and maintain the procedures, and command relationships. balance and force to move and strike as op- Doctrine is not contained simply at one level portunity permits. In an environment that is of war—strategic, operational, or tactical—it constantly shifting, where the unexpected is embodies all. Campaign execution demands to be expected, agility is essential. Battle is a that these levels of war become inextricably contest where vulnerabilities and opportuni- linked. To achieve the full synergistic effects ties open and close continuously; victory goes most often to the commander and force

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with the balance and insight to strike or shift effect of limiting or restraining initiative. It within these windows. Agility derives from a was the quality exuded by Admiral Chester keen sense of what is happening in battle, Nimitz and his commanders at Midway as the poise to transition rapidly from one situ- they turned the tide of Japanese offensives ation to the next, and a physical and mental through tactical and operational initiative. ability to always have more options than the As Nimitz’s forces closed with the more enemy. It was powerfully displayed by Gen- powerful Japanese fleets, they continuously eral Walker and his coalition command in sought to induce vulnerabilities in their op- the battle for the Pusan perimeter. Relying on ponent, until they were able to execute a interior lines, Republic of Korea (ROK)/U.S. decisive thrust that caught the Japanese forces continuously repo- fleets off-balance. Tactically, the decisive air sitioned and reconfigured attacks that won the battle were not a pre- reserves to parry enemy planned operation; they were a timely re- thrusts, shifted forces sponse applied when the enemy fleet was along the outer perimeter located and deemed vulnerable to and to reduce or accept vul- within reach of an air attack. At the opera- nerabilities, and concen- tional level, Nimitz exceeded his instruc- trated and countercon- tions to remain defensive and protect his centrated combat power precious carriers. But he did so because he more rapidly than North understood the higher intent and was able U.S. Army photo by Al Chang Soldiers of the 25th Korean commanders. It to link both the risks and benefits of his ac- Infantry Division was a liquid defense that succeeded because tions to the larger campaign design. The im- (Light) train for de- it retained its balance to address the unex- pact was a strategic turning point in the Pa- ployment to the Middle pected. Often, North Korean thrusts were re- cific campaign. Had Nimitz adhered to the East to take part in pelled within a hair’s breadth of a decisive letter of his instructions, it is unlikely he Operation Desert Storm. breakthrough. Eliminating any seams be- would have delivered this blow and the tween American and South Korean forces was course of the Pacific campaign would have vital to sustaining agility. All sources of com- been different. bat power were pooled, boundaries and com- Depth requires both mental conceptual- mand relations were shifted as the situation ization and physical reach. It is applied as a required, and there was an absolute merging reference to time, space, and resources. It rec- of joint and binational efforts. The agility of ognizes that modern battle has eliminated a multinational force proved superior to that linearity—and linear thought. War is a con- of a homogenous enemy force. tinuum of events and activities in space and Initiative, again, is a state of mind as time. Both the increased tempo of battle— well as an action-reaction cycle. At its core, whether through faster, more mobile ground it is dictating the terms of battle to an oppo- forces, higher sortie generation rates for air- nent, thus obviating the opponent’s ability craft, or the evolution of fleets no longer tied to exercise initiative. Thus, it is a highly to homeports—and the increased ranges, ac- contested quality whose balance swings on curacies, and lethalities of weapons systems surprise, deception, speed of action, ingenu- have compressed time and space. In all di- ity, and asymmetric comprehension. Initia- mensions of war, the current and future bat- tive requires flexibility in thought and ac- tles must be interrelated. Like a chess player tion, an ability to act and react faster than who views the board as a single, interrelated an opponent, and a derived priority among plane of action—and each move as a prelude subordinates at all levels regarding the link- to a series of further moves—the modern age of their actions to the ultimate intent, commander must extend his hand in time more so than the scheme of higher com- and space to create future vulnerabilities and manders. It has been made all the more crit- opportunities, and reduce future enemy op- ical by the rampant pace or tempo of mod- tions. Coalition commanders at Normandy ern battle. No plan, no matter how detailed, applied this tenet decisively. Recognizing the can foresee every contingency, develop- vulnerability of Allied landing forces to Field ment, vulnerability, or opportunity that will arise in battle. In fact, the more detailed and inhibiting the plan, it may have the reverse

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Marshal Erwin Rommel’s ability to counter- two operations as coordinated hammerblows concentrate heavy armor forces on the Co- to crumble the North Korean offensive and tentin peninsula, they forged and executed a turn what appeared to be a risky operation deep interdiction campaign to slow the into one of history’s most memorable routs. movement of German armored columns and The full series of operations—air, sea, ground, prevent them from arriving at the battlefield and amphibious—were carefully synchro- before the coalition was able to establish de- nized to achieve maximum shock and sur- fensible beachheads. Simultaneous with the prise. Because of the risks, the timing had to initiation of the air campaign, French resis- be precise, with each operation intended to tance and Allied special operations units create conditions for the success of the next executed a daring operation, operation. Coordination between services targeting the concentration ap- and national forces was exacting and thor- paratus of German forces and ough. Once the series of operations began, further inhibiting the flow of they operated in tandem to crush the North German reinforcements from Korean offensive. The landing forces at In- reaching the beachhead in chon moved deftly inland, cutting the North time. The application of air- Korean lines of supply and operation, isolat- power was a unified effort coming and overextending the North Korean bining air forces of several na- forces to the south, and setting the condi-

U.S. Navy photo by D.W. Holmes tions, and the interdiction tions for an audaciously executed breakout, British troops and umbrella covered all of the na- which then converged northward. Air opera- units from other coali- tional ground forces participating in the in- tions were executed to harass and interdict tion countries gather vasion. The invasion succeeded because the withdrawal of North Korean columns. It for review by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia coalition commanders applied nonlinear was a tightly synchronized series of opera- during Operation thought to their operations, striking in depth tions, involving the forces of several nations Desert Storm. in both the air and ground dimensions with in a series of the most difficult, yet success- the full palette of Allied capabilities. ful, joint operations in the history of warfare. Synchronization is perhaps the most dif- The principles of war also offer a way to ficult tenet to apply in coalition operations. intellectually massage the elements of an It is a term often related to the inner work- operation to understand its risks and ings of a watch. In that context, it is the cali- strengths. Almost every nation’s military re- brated movement of hundreds or thousands lies on a list of principles; for the most part of different pieces moving in tandem and op- they are derivatives of one another. As a erating cooperatively to produce the desired whole, the principles focus commanders effect. In war, the desired effect is simply and staffs in their effort to decide whether a combat power at the time and place of the course of action is prudent and to under- commander’s choosing. It is key to achieving stand its risks. When viewed in context with unity and efficiency in action. Yet, in a coali- the tenets, combined commanders have a tion there are great inhibitors to effecting solid intellectual foundation for action. Just synchronization. Differences in language, as important, commonly accepted military technology, doctrine, and training act to principles serve as a point of reference when deter efficiency and increase the potential for organizing the coalition and establishing friction. These problems are not overcome command relations. simply through planning, although thor- The tenets and principles are vital means ough planning is a key factor. Synchroniza- to think about war, but these thoughts must tion must also be fluidly applied as condi- be structured. The layering of military art tions change and the unexpected occurs. It into strategic, operational, and tactical levels relies on common procedures, a shared un- is valid and for the most part universal. Al- derstanding of the language of battle, and though the layers are difficult to separate, smooth linkages between the disparate na- they provide the intellectual linkage between tional entities in a coalition, at all levels. The campaigns, operations, battles, and engage- success of General Douglas MacArthur’s mas- ments in a manner that ensures continuity of terful Inchon landing and breakout of the effort, as well as to describe the contributions Pusan pocket in the Korean War was an example of synchronization. He planned these

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of various echelons to the overall effort. gent edge of international relations and Moreover, as a coalition winds its way diplomacy and must seek congruency with through these levels in planning, it forces the these forms. It addresses issues as weighty as coalition’s leaders to confer on every aspect the endstate to be achieved and as mundane of military efforts. as the rules of engagement to be applied at each stage of operations. In coalition opera- Campaign tions, strategy is the level of war where inter- Agreement on strategy is the foundation national politics and bodies are coalesced for coalition action. It is derived from policy into a unified approach. agreements between participating nations The ability to design an effective military and must be sharp enough to campaign will be a calculus of the military shape the direction of an im- strategy. At the operational level, disagree- plementing campaign, yet ments that occur generally are among mili- broad enough to capture the ef- tary professionals. But, there are of course forts of the various national political ramifications and considerations. forces. The development of an The campaign must be paced or phased by effective military strategy is dif- the availability of combat power as it is gen- ficult even when military ac- erated from multiple national sources. The tion is unilateral; it is far more

U.S. Army photo campaign plan also provides the base for trying in a coalition. Strategy is defining and recommending national contri- An M–1 Abrams main designed to accomplish politi- battle tank moves butions. Unless this is done and provided to cal objectives. Because of its proximity to across the Egyptian the various national authorities, the com- policy, it will be the point of reference for desert during Exercise bined commander will end up with a force Bright Star ’89. gaining consensus between military and po- composition that is not rationalized toward litical leaders. Consequently, it is also most operational requirements. The campaign likely to be the center of controversy in both plan has the integrating effect of serving as political and military spheres. Rarely do na- both the driver for force requirements and tions enter a coalition with identical views the timeclock for generating those assets. on ends to be achieved. As a coalition in- The campaign plan is the tableau for creases in numbers of member nations, con- synchronizing all elements of combat power. flicting objectives and additional political It provides combined commanders with the constraints are added to the pot. The coali- vital understanding to link operations, bat- tion commander must walk a taut line be- tles, and engagements to the coalition’s tween accommodating and compro- strategic objectives. It is the orchestral ar- mising, yet preserve the ability to the campaign must rangement of these various activities in a achieve military decision. At the rational path to achieve the endstate envi- be paced or phased same time, it is important to remem- sioned in the strategy. It must address a vari- ber the old dictum that in coalitions by the availability ety of choices concerning the approach to the will is strongest when the per- of combat power warfare—offensive or defensive, terrain- or ception of threat is greatest. Over force-oriented, direct or indirect approach— as it is generated time, as conditions change, so may and in so doing, becomes the enabling pro- the will and objectives of participat- from multiple cess for actually applying force. ing nations. national sources Tactical operations should be designed Coalition strategic formulation to create a seamless battlefield where fric- is difficult also because of the sheer tion is minimized and the four tenets can be mass involved in the effort. Strategy involves applied freely. This requires cooperation the melding and coordination of nearly from all participating nations. It is at this every element of multinational power to ac- level of war where the combined inhibitors complish military objectives. It may require to efficient operations could have their insights into different national industrial most degrading impact. At higher levels of capabilities, mobilization processes, trans- war, success is mostly a function of plan- portation capabilities, and interagency con- ning and apportioning forces and resources tributions, in addition to military capabili- to various missions. At the tactical level of ties. It must bind all these together with precision and care. It operates on the tan-

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war, forces must actually engage together in lack of support by any coalition force. When battle and function synergistically to defeat it failed, Eisenhower returned to the broad an enemy. All of the differences in training, front approach and it succeeded. The cross- equipment, language, and culture congeal channel invasion was later than initially an- to hinder the application of combat power. ticipated, but did occur and was decisive. Events move rapidly and have a cascading Germany was defeated first and Japan sec- effect. It is for these reasons that many ond. In short, neither nation got exactly coalitions have sought to conduct tactical what it wanted and the agreed strategy was operations, battles, and engagements within not executed with any sense of discipline, national boundaries. However, this ap- but the objectives were obtained. proach cedes an advantage to The use of centers of gravity, phasing or enemy commanders who may sequencing, main and supporting efforts, target precarious seams. It ac- culminating points, setting conditions, and cepts a vulnerability that the other mental tools we use to organize could be costly and reduces and orient operations should be employed collective combat power by in- in planning and operations at every level. crementally separating the They are not uniquely American. They are parts from the whole. neoclassical extrapolations drawn from mili-

DOD photo by Terry C. Mitchell General Dwight Eisen- tary theorists worldwide. By using these Australian troops ar- hower’s experience as Euro- tools, the commander merges the theory rive at a makeshift pean Theater of Operations commander in and practical application of the military art. landing zone on a Ma- World War II amplified the difficulties that Each of these mental tools is a critical point rine CH–53 Sea Stallion to provide security for can arise at all three levels of war. Although for creating broader understanding of the relief supplies being the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff met and underpinnings of how force is to be applied, lifted into Somalia. agreed early in the war to pursue a strategy and for what purpose. When used for men- to defeat Germany first and Japan second, tal reference, they enable subordinate com- and to apply a direct approach against Ger- mands to move beyond robotic execution. many through an early cross-Channel inva- They liberate subordinates to apply ingenu- sion into Europe, this is not what occurred. ity, innovation, or situational adaptability to By late 1943, the United States had more sol- each event because they understand “true diers, ships, airplanes, and landing craft in north” rather than simply the compass vec- the Pacific than in the Atlantic. The British tor provided in the scheme of maneuver. pressured for an indirect approach against Planning Germany and convinced the American Presi- A common planning process is essential. dent to attempt an invasion up the boot of The degree to which allied commanders and Italy before a cross-channel invasion into staffs understand and are able to participate France could be launched. This further de- in planning impacts on the time required to layed the eventual date of the cross-channel plan and the sharing of knowledge of every invasion to the summer of 1944. Once the component of operations. We rely on the In- invasion occurred, Eisenhower faced contin- telligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) uing disagreements between his American as the underlying process to gain commonly and British commanders over whether the understood perceptions of the threat and its campaign should be on a broad front or con- organizations and capabilities, terrain, and centrated on a single axis. He maintained his other environmental factors that may im- broad front approach, but acquiesced on one pact on operations and courses of action occasion to Field Marshal Sir Bernard Mont- available to enemy commanders. Without gomery’s insistence on concentration of re- this foundation, applied as a collective and sources in an attempt to achieve decision trickle down process that occurs from the along the Flanders avenue into Germany. strategic through tactical levels, it is difficult The result, Operation Market Garden, led to if not impossible to shape uniform percep- tactical quarrels between American com- tions of the threat or agree upon the coali- manders, who viewed the operation as too tion’s courses of action. ambitious for the terrain, and Montgomery, who argued that temerity needed to be put aside. Market Garden failed, but not due to

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A key distinction is that the IPB must be Integration a joint process. It must analyze every Implementing a common planning pro- medium of the battle—air, sea, and ground cess is only a small, albeit important, part of —over time. In fact, every service has its bringing unity to coalition operations. The own variation of the IPB process. Naval com- execution of these plans involves far more manders look to sea lines of communica- complex problems. Each nation will bring its tions and enemy bases as the terrain or mo- own forces and capabilities to the coalition. bility routes pertinent to combat operations. Integrating these forces for action depends They consider the enemy fleet’s organiza- upon many variables. There may be, and usu- tion, capabilities, doctrine, and objectives ally are, vast differences in the organizations, and then design operations to deny these capabilities, and cul- objectives. Air commanders analyze enemy tures of military air capabilities, bases, and courses of action forces. As a general before forming a vision of their own opera- rule, differences are tional requirements. What has been lacking most severe in ground is a joint and combined IPB process that forces. Air and naval views the enemy commander’s multidimen- forces, because they sional operations as an entity. In a combined must operate in inter- theater involving joint forces, such an intel- national mediums, lectual template is the only holistic means to are equipped with U.S. Army photo by Al Chang design joint operations. communications gear U.S. Army infantrymen There is an additional value to the IPB and common proto- cross the Bug Han Gang process. We emphasize the importance of cols and procedures River during Exercise Team Spirit, a combined getting inside the decision cycle of the to provide for orga- South Korean/U.S. train- enemy commander. Unless we do so, we nized space manage- ing exercise. cede the initiative of battle; a recipe for de- ment. All of the “ves- feat. Instinctively, this means that all our sels” that operate in processes—planning and execution—must the air or sea can be readily classified for their be swifter than the enemy’s. The cycle of de- strengths and weaknesses to perform the vari- tect, decide, target, and execute becomes all ous missions of air and naval warfare. Ground the more difficult when multinational forces forces come in all shapes and sizes, and their are entered in the equation. As a general equipment may be entirely dissimilar and in- rule, the more organizations, joint and coali- compatible. Technological differentials, par- tion, that must be integrated in an opera- ticularly in this era of revolutionary change, tion, the longer it takes to integrate or syn- can be vast. Therefore, fundamental com- chronize actions. The IPB process, which is monalties become even more important. continuous, is the best means to accomplish At the theater level, integration results this. It creates a degree of predictability from functional design. There can be only which is essential to get and stay ahead of one Air Component Commander (ACC), enemy decision cycles. Ground Component Commander, Naval From this point of departure, the coali- Component Commander, Special Operations tion moves through the remainder of the Forces (SOF), and/or operational Marine planning process—statement of comman- Headquarters. Having two or more of any of der’s intent, estimate of the situation, these functional headquarters invites wargaming and formulation of the concept calamity. Yet, imposing functional integra- of maneuver, and the remaining sections tion requires more than creating headquar- and annexes of the coalition operation plan ters. The interrelationships and synergies be- (OPLAN). The American structures for the tween functional commands stumble in the OPLAN, operations orders, and fragmentary face of many of the same delicate issues that orders are the templates for order formula- our own joint forces find difficult to resolve. tion and communication because they are The command relationship between ground- reasonably complementary with most na- based air defenses and air forces, the appor- tional systems and incorporate all the ele- tionment of responsibilities and roles in ments of the planning process itself. deep operations and the relationship of multidimensional forces such as marines or

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naval air or attack helicopters to various is a function of flexibility. Fleeting targets of component commanders must be addressed. opportunity must be struck, however, by But the magnitude and complexity escalate whoever is available to exploit the opportu- because each national force has its own con- nity. Moreover, enemy dispositions and op- victions on these issues. Moreover, coalitions erations in his rear will be interchangeable may confront the obstacle of nations main- across the front of operations; deep opera- taining strings on various forces, or insisting tions must always be viewed as an opera- upon stovepipe management of various ele- tional requirement because of the enemy’s ments. Concessions to any nation on any of flexibility to shift and move forces not in these issues create precedents that others contact. Just as there can be no blank spaces may insist upon. It may not in linear operations, there can be none be possible to derail all these throughout the depth of the battlefield. But, inhibitors, but proliferation deep operations beyond the control of ma- invites unmanageability. neuver commanders must be under control It is helpful to analyze of a single coordinating headquarters. This is and integrate joint and com- even more critical in coalition than unilat- bined functionality using the eral operations. To do otherwise invites du- battlefield operating systems plication, fratricide, and incoherence.

U.S. Navy photo by Dwight E. Martin and the dynamics of close, On the other hand, close operations F/A–18C Hornets and deep, and rear operations. may be divided into national sectors. But Mirage 2000s flying These provide the bases to organize efforts, there are risks and inefficiencies in this ap- together during Exer- cise Dasix Lafayette, a find the critical nodes where multinational proach. It could critically hinder the ability combined U.S./French integration must occur and ensure balance to mass combat power across national exercise in the and mutual support in battle. But, for the boundaries. Even if this approach is applied, Mediterranean Sea. purposes of joint warfare, the Army’s defini- it must be recognized that it does not allevi- tion of these areas is too narrow. For naval ate the coalition’s need to instill the agility power, an additional point of analysis is sur- to integrate forces in the close battle. Reserve face, subsurface, special operations, and air. formations, air power, and other sources of For air power, the various abilities of na- combat power must have the capability to tional forces to perform traditional air missions must be analyzed. These include close air relinquishing national command and support (CAS), battlefield air inter- control of forces is an act of trust and diction (BAI), strategic bombing, confidence unequalled in relations long-range interdiction, special operations, and counterair. For between nations SOF, it is the means to perform the various functions of reconnaissance, military strikes, and integrating with be applied across the front of operations. the other combat arms. Rear operations must be intermixed but As national force strengths and vulnera- tightly centralized. National lines of com- bilities across each of these functions are as- munication, main supply, and mobility sessed, achieving balance will require a shar- routes will be in a disorganized competition ing and mixing of assets to increase synergy. for priority unless strong central control is Deep operations cannot be inhibited by na- imposed. It is unwise to decentralize rear tional boundaries. Nor should any force be area responsibilities. To do so undermines left without the ability to apply the tenet of the need for integrated air defenses, orga- depth. Because of international differentials nized responses to rear ground threats, and in the ability to see and strike deep, the the organized security of the host popula- coalition must arrange its capabilities and tion and nation. command structures to extend this capabil- Command and Control ity across the entire front of operations. The The ability to integrate rests largely on ability to see and strike deep to desired effect one principle. Unity of command is the most fundamental principle of warfare, the

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single most difficult principle to gain in tasks, as well as the limits to the coalition’s combined warfare. It is a dependent of many flexibility to operate within national influences and considerations. Because of boundaries. the severity and consequences of war, relin- Subordinate or tactical commands quishing national command and control of may be organized as the situation dictates. forces is an act of trust and confidence that A naval commander who comes to the is unequalled in relations between nations. coalition with only surface assets must op- It is a passing of human and material re- erate in the envelope of a three dimen- sources to another nation’s citizens. In a sional naval force and should logically be coalition it is achieved by constructing com- subordinate to the three dimensional command arrangements and task mander. As a rule, the commander with organizing forces to ensure the most complex multidimensional force that responsibilities match possesses the most total understanding of contributions and efforts. how to fight that force. Ground armies or Command relationships be- corps will probably be multinational in tween national commanders configuration. In fact, tactical integration should be carefully considered of ground forces down to the corps level is to ensure that authority virtually essential.

U.S. Air Force photo by H.H. Deffner matches responsibilities. It is Tactical integration—and therefore Saudi infantry take up cardinal that compromises not command and control, C2—of ground position in a training be permitted to outweigh warfighting re- forces is arguably the most difficult to exercise during Opera- tion Desert Shield. quirements. If political frictions inhibit achieve; it will be attained most rapidly by proper assignment of authority, responsibili- early integration of some tactical units. ties and operational design must be altered Fundamental considerations are the fac- to ensure unity of command. tors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, Theater headquarters—the theater com- and time available on the battlefield. This mand and each of the component com- will dictate the alignment and missions of mands—should be both joint and combined variously equipped and talented forces on in configuration and manning. Regardless of the battlefield. Lightly armed forces can the nationality of the commander, the staff perform in military operations on urban- must represent the cross section of units ized terrain, densely foliaged or moun- under command. This practice of combining tainous terrain, heavy forces in more mo- staffs must be followed to whatever depth of bile environments, airmobile or motorized echelon that units are combined in forma- forces in virtually any terrain. While this tion. At the theater level, it may be essential may sound like common sense to an expe- to form combined joint targeting boards to rienced commander, its practice becomes manage the integrated targeting process for quite difficult when vertical boundaries deep operations. Placing this under the ACC and C2 are dictated by the nationality of is often most effective, since the ACC will in forces contained within the boundaries. all likelihood provide the majority of assets. As rapidly as possible, coalition ground The same form of tool may be necessary at forces must overcome any impediments to each cascading level where joint and com- tactically integrated operations. To ignore bined capabilities must be merged. Rear op- this reality leaves vulnerable seams for erations—the communications zone enemy commanders to exploit, or it could (COMMZ)—should be delegated to a single cause placement of forces in unsuitable commander. Most often, the COMMZ com- fighting conditions. Either could be fatal. mander will be an officer of the host nation. There were a number of instances of this In those cases where the rear crosses multi- in the early stages of U.N. operations con- ple nations, as with the United Nations ducted during the Korean War. The virtual Command (UNC) in Korea and UNC (rear) decimation of the Turkish brigade in the in Japan, it is essential to clarify the respon- battle of Kumyangjang-Ni was a tragic in- sibilities and obligations of each nation in stance of a tactical unit moved necessarily addressing or accomplishing the coalition’s into a fluid battlefield that lacked the means to integrate operations with other

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allied ground units. The unit fought fiercely gagement, gleaning the lessons to be applied against overwhelming odds in an attempt to in the future; testing new techniques and stem the North Korean and Chinese coun- keeping them if they worked, discarding teroffensive occurring in its sector. As its them if they did not. When units were not losses mounted and the unit reeled under on the front line engaged in battle opera- unrelenting enemy attacks, it was forced to tions, they were training. When air-ground fight in isolation and remained unable to coordination and the procedures for tying in rely on Allied combat power, which was with Allied units on the flanks proved to be available, or to coordinate its activities with flawed, he invented new, more effective pro- American units on its flanks. During the cedures on the spot. Within a few short early days of this conflict, the weeks, Collins devised the doctrinal founda- need for U.N. forces to be pre- tion that was applied by Allied forces success- pared to integrate tactically in fully throughout the remainder of the Euro- unexpected circumstances was pean campaign—he did so under the most learned again and again. The arduous conditions. need to ensure unity of com- Standing coalitions should not need to mand and to integrate forces rely on inventiveness and adaptability during under this principle became a conflict. Peacetime training should be de- U.S. Navy photo matter of survival. signed to engage coalition forces in the most USS Belleau Wood and difficult and demanding tasks they may be USS Reasoner during Training asked to perform in war and to fathom the Exercise RimPac ’90 The first priority in generating coalition weak points that will cause friction under the which included forces combat power from a conglomeration of na- from Australia, most trying circumstances. The point is to tionally separated units is to train, emphasiz- Canada, Japan, the identify, then eliminate or narrow the seams ing the fundamental commonalties outlined Republic of Korea, and between forces that could reduce synergy the United States. earlier. Only through training will combined and synchronization. Procedures that require units master and sustain collective warfight- multinational forces to operate seamlessly ing skills. As the coalition is brought to- should be practiced routinely. Because of the gether, staffs and commanders must rapidly complexity of joint and combined opera- adapt to the units and processes in the fight- tions, the required skills atrophy quickly. ing organizations being formed. The impedi- Training should be joint and should reoccur ments and sources of friction become clear at cyclically at the operational and tactical lev- once. So do the solutions that must be ap- els. This is essential both to build the basis plied. This assumes, of course, that time is for trust, which will be vital in war, and to available for training before introduction to identify the abilities and limitations of coali- conflict. The situation may dictate otherwise. tion forces. For an ad hoc coalition, the same General Joseph Collins, when he com- methodology applies, but the time available manded VII Corps at Normandy, applied the may be condensed and have to occur during techniques that are vital to ad hoc coalition hostilities. warfare. When VII Corps Simulations are proving to be a means forces hit the beaches at procedures that require to exercise these skills and techniques fre- Normandy, they had been multinational forces to quently and inexpensively. They train com- trained to fight a doctrine manders and staffs on essential planning operate seamlessly should that had been based and execution skills and may be applied largely on earlier World be practiced routinely through the range of strategic, operational, War II experience. It and tactical levels of war. When effectiveness proved woefully inade- is analyzed through the lens of battlefield quate for the battle conditions faced by VII operating systems and the tasks, conditions, Corps. It became apparent that the doctrine and standards of various expected mis- was ill-suited to the hedgerows, flatlands, sions—attack, defend, delay, passage of lines, and built-up areas of France. In the midst of battle-handover, airmobile operations, CAS, battle, Collins began to retrain and reinstruct amphibious assault, and so forth—a host of his units as he constructed new doctrine ap- invaluable lessons may be accumulated. plicable to the enemy and terrain he faced. He and his commanders analyzed every en-

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Even still, simulations cannot be a total sub- must be laboriously translated into the mul- stitute for field training. Small, yet impor- tiple languages included in the coalition. tant problems will escape visibility—na- This steals precious time from the detect-de- tional differences in air-to-ground attack cide-target-execute cycle and is apt to be procedures...cultural differences such as fraught with errors. Although it is common holy days or food restrictions...or even the for coalition headquarters to maintain trans- absence of digital communications capabil- lation cells, their speed will depend on the ity in indirect fire units of some armies may size and complexity of information to be not become apparent. These point to the processed, and the accuracy of translation need for field training at the tactical, com- will vary from translator to translator. More- bined arms level. over, absent a common doctrine, basic mili- Combined commanders tary terms differ from nation to nation. The must provide the focus and di- result, generally, is a severe narrowing in the rection to organize training. amount of information conveyed between They must provide subordinate coalition commanders. Overcoming this, as commanders those mission es- a minimum, requires multilingual software sential tasks that must be con- that ties back to a common operating sys- ducted in combined operations tem. Because of the need to be rapidly em-

DOD photo by Marv Lynchard and the tasks, conditions, and ployable by many national forces, its soft- U.N. peacekeeping standards to be maintained. ware must be user friendly and easy to learn. forces from Pakistan Because time and resources for combined In addition, coalition headquarters should board a U.S. Air Force C–130 Hercules for a training are limited, it is all the more impor- have prepared dictionaries of common mili- flight to Somalia. tant that combined commanders give priori- tary terms and symbols, both as a transla- ties for combined training that focus units tion base for information management sys- on those missions most likely to be per- tems and to reduce the latitude of different formed in combat. translators to portray differing meanings. A final sidenote is that as forces enter a coali- Command, Control, Communications, tion, their capabilities and assets must be en- Computers and Intelligence tered immediately in C4I data bases to en- Applying the tenets of combined doc- able theater command staffs to incorporate trine relies on a command, control, commu- them into the multiple aspects of battle nications, computers and intelligence (C4I) management and planning for the coalition. architecture that is capable of integrating the Because many nations now employ comput- joint forces of all the nations in the coali- ers in managing their forces, it is also impor- tion. It is in the various functions embedded tant that we share common standards in C4I that American forces possess some of within our peacetime alliances which will their greatest advantages on the battlefield. permit a rapid merging of information man- Indeed, as we continue to improve our capa- agement systems. bilities for collecting, analyzing, and dissem- These fixes, however, do not eliminate inating intelligence, managing the vast the problems at tactical levels where deci- amounts of information upon which decisions and orders generally are not processed sions are made and incorporating more and through multilingual systems, and teams of more computer aids to the battlefield deci- translators are not available. Moreover, dif- sion and execution processes, we must exer- ferent forces will bring noninteroperable cise care that these systems do not evolve communications devices, which block lateral into exclusionary processes. Unless the ar- and horizontal relations. Here there is no al- chitecture incorporates the ability to share ternative but to determine where the critical with, and in turn receive from, other na- nodes of multilateral contact occur and posi- tional forces, the battlefield will not be tion translator liaison teams equipped with seamless and significant risks will be present. communications systems that expedite The impediments to achieving inte- cross-communications. It is especially im- grated C4I are several fold. First, of course, is portant to view the requirements for liaison the language barrier. Each order that is pro- cells from a joint perspective. Many land duced, every issue that arises unexpectedly on the battlefield, and every transmission

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forces, for example, do not have alliance liai- host nation support agreements, equipment son officers or do not position them below compatibility, and cultural requirements are division level. but a few. Some coalition forces will enter the The sharing of intelligence and sensitive coalition with the intention and means to technical means will depend on providing provision themselves. In these cases, coali- the interpreted product of battlefield intelli- tion control may be no more than a need to gence to each member of the alliance. The coordinate; or, providing ports of entry, off- United States brings to battle the most so- load capabilities, storage sites, and routes and phisticated and enviable capability to gain means for pushing sustainment forward. deep operations visibility of any nation in Others will arrive with the need for more ex- the world. If it is kept in seclusion, it will tensive support. This may be solvable significantly reduce the combat power through binational agreements from one available for deep operations and force member nation to provide support to another alliance members to fight blindly other, or may require active coalition man- with regard to time. Some nations have agement. As a rule, actual execution of tacti- alternative means and systems, and these cal logistics support to alliance members should also be incorporated into a work- should be decentralized. At the coalition able intelligence collection plan whose headquarters level, the focus should be on products are accessible to others. measuring the requirements of executing the Yet few nations, including the campaign plan, providing advance estimates United States, are willing to share the of these requirements to national units, and

U.S.Navy photo by Norris Jones sensitive sources of intelligence gathering ensuring that proper controls are in place to The destroyer USS or enlighten other nations on the techni- deconflict and permit movement and pro- O’Bannon arriving at Kiel during Exercise cal strengths and weaknesses of various col- cessing of combat power to units. BALTOPS ’92 with the lection means. Military coalitions may in- Its practice is remarkably difficult. Simu- German national en- clude partners whose reliability is stipulated lations, again, can be a tremendously valu- sign flying in the fore- on the threat at hand and will not last be- able tool for finding problem areas before ex- ground astern the de- yond the resolution of the contingency—a ecution. Problems which are unique to stroyer FGS Molders. point wryly observed by Prime Minister coalition warfare continually surface. De- Winston Churchill when he noted he would pending on the infrastructure available in sleep with the devil when survival was at theater, there may be many claimants on stake. As well, our past history with coalition sparse local resources. Potable water, fuel warfare has incorporated nations with pipelines and storage, shelter, and local food whom we were already engaged in other al- production are almost all national infrastruc- liances, such as NATO, where the protocols tures built at the capacity required to sustain and limits of intelligence sharing are already the local population, and nothing more. embedded. Notwithstanding, allies must Some national forces do not have the means share intelligence at the tactical and opera- for bulk delivery over long distances, or even tional levels as a minimum. As new collec- a field ration system with preservable com- tion means are introduced into our force, modities. Unless centralized management is such as Joint Surveillance and Target Attack applied, each national force is likely to con- Radar System or remotely piloted vehicles, tract independently to acquire these essential we must have means to rapidly share their goods. Aside from being inefficient and un- products with coalition partners. Intelli- wieldy, this approach will also ensure instant gence sharing arrangements must be rapidly inflation in the costs of local goods and ser- agreed, even if sources are not shared. In vices, which is harmful to operating budgets fact, the more quickly allied forces become and even more disastrous for local citizens claimants and recipients of pooled assets, who lack the capital to outbid national mili- the variables of agility, initiative, depth, and tary forces. In effect the coalition headquar- synchronization increase accordingly. ters must enter a unique relationship with host nation authorities for contracting goods Logistics and services, to include manpower and labor, Logistics management of coalition forces is a matter ultimately dependent on a wide field of variables. National arrangements,

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and then serve as the intermediary between Where commonalties are required but lack- national force requirements. ing, we move quickly to create them. Often, Just as there may be significant techno- a coalition’s cohesion will depend on the logical differentials in the combat capabilities proportionate sharing of burdens, risks, and of various forces, there could be large differ- credit. All these can be most fairly and satis- ences in the quality and magnitude of sup- factorily apportioned if the total force is able port provided. As CS and CSS are echeloned to operate as a single entity. rearward, various capabilities may have to be The key to achieving this unity is by pooled. American or European field hospitals, promulgating a doctrine for warfighting that for example, may have to be prepared to ac- is commonly understood and applied. Plan- cept allied casualties. Ammuni- ning systems must be collective and partici- tion stocks, if they are compati- patory, yet responsive and unerringly timely. ble with allied systems, may Those areas where the seams are most have to be shared. Each class of prominent, and therefore where friction is supply and form of support most likely to arise—through combined tac- must be considered for each na- tical integration, C4I, training, and logis- tional force in order to identify tics—need to be rapidly analyzed and tested, requirements for mutual depen- then sewn tighter. Obvious differences such dency. If this is not done, it as language, culture, or interoperability can- DOD photo by Terry C. Mitchell U.S. Navy Seabees drill could result in a loss of combat not be eradicated, but they can be mini- for water in support of power or unexpected perturbations in the mized. These dictums hold true for both multinational forces at midst of operations. long-term and ad hoc coalitions. Indeed the an airfield northwest The coalition headquarters is also tools and lessons we develop in our standing of Mogadishu during uniquely situated to apply efficiencies that coalitions must be captured and employed Operation Restore Hope. will minimize the diversion of potential in the formation of ad hoc coalitions to ac- combat power from the battlefield. Arrange- celerate the cohesion of coalition forces. ments for cross-national support, host na- Technology also offers means of improv- tion contracts to shift transportation or ing the unity and effectiveness of joint oper- other functions to local firms, developing ations in a coalition environment. It can be nodal points for transferring supplies and applied to bridge different languages and op- materials, and other means should be em- erating systems. It also can be applied to ployed to reduce independent burdens for share and integrate national resources, moving goods from the ports or airfields to whether in combat systems, logistics man- the forward line. Distribution and local re- agement, or the flow of information to every pair systems should be pooled wherever pos- component in joint and combined warfare. sible to limit the numbers of personnel re- For the foreseeable future, American quired to perform support functions, and military leaders will most often be the lead- reduce the confusion of control- ers of multinational military coalitions. As often, a coalition’s ling rear areas. Combined logisti- the U.S. Armed Forces continue to reshape cians must always be on watch for for the challenges of the post-Cold War era, cohesion will opportunities to find efficiencies it is important that the requirements of depend on the pro- and improvements in the logistics coalition warfare remain a priority effort portionate sharing architecture. They must step above among all services. Every improvement in the paradigms of their own na- coalition operations that we bring to the of burdens, risks, tional doctrines and structures and battlefield will have an impact on the suc- and credit look for ways to combine efforts. cess of operations and reduce the human toll Some would define the pur- for our own forces, as well as every one of pose of military doctrine and leadership as our allies. We have the technology and expe- to achieve order in the chaos of battle. In rience to improve coalition warfare. The un- coalition operations we do this by accentuat- derstanding of joint and combined doctrine ing the commonalties that exist: first, be- is the first step. JFQ tween our national interests; second, between how we intend to deal with threats to mutual interests; and then in how we actually apply our combined forces in battle.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 71 roles and missions. And history, both ancient and modern, testifies of a nearly universal agreement that true jointness demands seamlessly linked operations between dif- The Limits ferent military capabilities. If politicians and senior officers did not use the motley definitions in this strange pail to support of Jointness different policies, the task of defining jointness could safely be left to theoreticians. By SETH CROPSEY Since, however, jointness has attained in the defense arena the buzzword status that jus- tice, equality, and of late empowerment enjoy in the domestic debate, it is important to be as clear as possible about what jointness is and what it is not. Failure to do so is likely ooperation like apple to lead to an erosion of the distinctive abili- pie is rarely if ever ties of the military disciplines from whose questioned as a desir- differences—ironically—the rationale for able thing. Unfortu- jointness originally springs. nately, while everyone The difficulty of defining jointness was knows whatC an apple pie is, fixing a military apparent in the debate over the Goldwater- definition of cooperation is much harder. Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- The easy response is jointness, but trying to tion Act of 1986. Both opponents and sup- define this quality produces surprisingly var- porters of the legislation appealed to this ied answers. By implication, legislation al- elusive term to justify their arguments. The ready written defines jointness as a diminu- former claimed that because of the increased tion of the power of the individual services. powers granted to the Chairman, future Presi- In a more positive vein the Chairman of the dents would lose the joint perspective pro- Joint Chiefs, General Powell, sees jointness vided by the expertise of other service chiefs. as teamwork and cooperation. Congressional The legislation’s proponents responded that ideas as expressed by the Chairman of the an increase in the Chairman’s power was Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator needed to provide the jointness that was Nunn, find jointness in the elimination of redundant weapon systems or overlapping

Summary

Jointness defies consistent definition. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and students of operational art all view jointness differently. What will be the result of divergent, often opposing concepts of jointness? Goldwater-Nichols mandated jointness by structural reforms; General Powell sees jointness as interservice teamwork; Senator Nunn hopes jointness will be a mechanism for eliminating what he considers to be redundant roles and missions. History has shown that unified forces triumph while poorly organized ones perish. Nevertheless, General Schwarzkopf— who is lionized as an operational commander—waged joint warfare with great success, though he served in few joint assignments during his career. The summons to the services to fight as a team will be ignored by commanders at their own peril, and a joint culture may ensure that as the defense budget is slashed the services are diminished proportionately. But jointness must not eliminate the debate on the purposes and utility of the individual services that must now be conducted in the post-containment era.

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missing due to the disproportionate influence claims, and sought to raise the Chairman and of the individual services and their chiefs. the Joint Staff so that they could settle disputes and unite the efforts of the unruly ser- Change the Organization vices. So successful was the legislation that Goldwater-Nichols does contain a defi- General Powell, the first Chairman to serve nition of jointness, if only by negation. The his entire tour under the new law, has been legislation suggests what jointness does not able to give jointness a new meaning. mean by identifying interservice rivalry as Powell has defined jointness in more the obstacle to it. Accordingly, the act aims positive terms than the 1986 legislation. His at reducing the power of the services by view is that cooperation means teamwork. changing military education to emphasize Given the increasingly dismal prospects for interservice cooperation, diminishing the defense funding and demands on the Armed control exercised by each service over ca- Forces in a disorderly world, his definition reers, and increasing exposure of officers to a also makes political sense. central staff. The 1986 landmark legislation In the private sector scarcity encourages never offered a positive model of how a thrift, drives prices up, and then usually more joint military would think or perform. seeks out other avenues to satisfy demand. But it did draft very firm guidelines altering In the Government—especially the mili- service college curricula, insisted on speci- tary—dwindling budgets have traditionally fied qualifications for career advancement, stimulated a free-for-all between and among and laid the foundation for shifting effective the services that rewards the bureaucratically responsibility for acquisition of major adept and ends only when resources once weapons systems to the Office of the Secre- again start to flow. The bitter fight over roles tary of Defense. and missions following World War II is the So comprehensive was the congressional most notorious example in American mili- understanding of jointness that the reorga- tary history. Demobilization and postwar nization directly touched military officers budget reductions were the dry tinder; Presi- and senior civilian officials. The legislation dent Truman’s decision to pick that moment drained power from the service secretaries to fundamentally rearrange the services was and gave new, broad authority to the Office the flame that set the pile burning. of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), specifi- Colin Powell has turned out to be more cally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac- skillful at politics than Harry Truman. Con- quisition. Consistent with the 30-year effort templating the defense cuts at the beginning to gather authority within OSD—which does of his tenure in 1989, Powell has consis- not embrace the private sector’s current ef- tently sought to create an atmosphere of co- forts to decentralize—the legislation’s au- operation among the services that fends off thors doubted the ability of the services to divisive issues of basic structural change or manage major programs and preferred in- reordering priorities. A measure of the stead to consolidate control over a $300 bil- stature that the Chairman’s political skills lion budget at the center. have earned is a willingness to disagree with Goldwater-Nichols applied the same ap- both Senator Nunn and President Clinton. proach to the military chain of command. Senator Nunn asked basic questions in Congress regarded the services as quarrelsome July 1992 about the structure of the Armed siblings with single, infinite appetites. It de- Forces, such as whether naval aviation and spaired at arbitrating endless contradictory the Marine Corps were still required. He wondered if a single service should be placed in charge of all electronic warfare aircraft, Seth Cropsey is director of the Asia Studies Center at and whether the responsibility for defending the Heritage Foundation. He has served as Principal troops and installations should be consoli- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special dated under the Air Force. Echoing these dif- Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. ficult queries, but taking them a major step

Summer 1993 / JFQ 73 toward execution, President Clinton in Au- writers could have reached much further gust 1992 told the World Affairs Council in back into history. Los Angeles that: In 425 B.C., the seventh year of their fa- In 1948, then Secretary of Defense James Forre- mous contest, the Athenians and Spartans stal convened a meeting of the military service chiefs fought over the protected harbor of Pylos on in Key West to allocate responsibilities among the the west coast of the Peloponnesian penin- four services. It failed. As President, I will order the sula. The Athenian command concentrated Pentagon to convene a similar meeting to hammer out its efforts on the Spartan garrison which held a new understanding about consolidating and coordi- out on Sphacteria, the island that guards the nating military missions in the 1990s and beyond. western approaches to Pylos. Throughout an In a draft assessment of the future of the operation that lasted over ten weeks the Armed Forces, noted in the press on the last Athenian navy worked smoothly with heavy day of 1992, Powell saw no reason for and light infantry, the former enforcing a sweeping changes. “Yes, we can be said to blockade that hampered resupply of the Spar- have four air forces,” said the Chairman’s re- tan detachment, the latter frontally harassing port, “but each is different, playing a unique the besieged defenders. Eventually hunger and complementary role.” helped break the Spartans’ will to resist and allowed the Athenians to surprise their Change the Spirit enemy in his fortified positions. The image of the military as a powerful Two centuries later, the struggle between organism composed of mutually dependent Rome and Carthage for power in the and cooperative groupings of cell structures Mediterranean spilled over into Spain. As has characterized General Powell’s tenure as Scipio, the joint commander, directed a Chairman. Joint Warfare of bombardment and infantry assault against the U.S. Armed Forces (Joint the need for combined the walled city of New Carthage (today’s Pub 1), which was pub- Cartagena), his naval component comman- operations and harmony lished in November 1991, is der Admiral Caius Laelius launched a simul- the clearest picture of this between the different taneous amphibious attack on the city’s sea- image. Technology, it says, fighting disciplines has ward side. Diverted by these synchronized has made the services in- shocks, the defenders neglected their third been understood—if not creasingly interdependent. flank which lay exposed to a shallow lake Teamwork, trust, and coop- always practiced—since through which a Roman detachment waded eration among the services antiquity and entered New Carthage. After defeating are needed now more than the besieged Carthaginians, Scipio offered a ever to succeed in war. And crown to the man who had first breached as balance is required in the kinds of forces the walls. When both a marine and a centu- fielded, “there is no place for rivalry” among rion of the fourth legion claimed the honor, members of the joint team. Scipio acted with great respect for what we The idea of jointness in Joint Pub 1 is would today call jointness. He awarded two politically attractive because it helps sup- prizes and declared that both warriors had press dissension among the services at a time mounted the wall at the same moment. when straitened budgets are most likely to The need for combined operations and cause such quarrels. Moreover, the need for harmony between the different fighting dis- teamwork between the different military disciplines has been understood—if not always ciplines rests on unassailable operational practiced—since antiquity. But Joint Pub 1 ground. Joint Pub 1 singles out examples in takes this proven operational idea another American history from riverine warfare step by arguing that the teamwork needed along the Mississippi in the Civil War to in battle is just as necessary throughout the Douglas MacArthur’s amphibious attack on military’s other work, using the same lan- the enemy’s rear at Inchon in 1950. But the guage of exhortation to encourage equal harmony throughout the whole military.

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issues arise? Should officers use teamwork and cooperation as a guide, adjusting their opinions to avoid clashes with other experts from different services? This question is particularly relevant to still another current definition of jointness, the one noted above that has been proposed by Senator Nunn and endorsed by President Clinton. In their view the Key West agreements on service roles and missions that Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the chiefs reached in March 1948 have failed to pre-

DOD photo vent wasteful duplications of effort. As can- Senator Nunn during didate Clinton said in his Los Angeles World a visit to the Persian Affairs Council speech: Gulf. Because “the arena of our potential opera- I agree with Senator Sam Nunn that it is time to tions is the entire planet,” the Armed Forces take a fresh look at the basic organization of our require “the ability to project and sustain Armed Forces. We have four separate air forces—one the entire range (emphasis added) of military each for the Marines, Army, Navy, and Air Force. power over vast distances.” 1 There is “no Both the Army and Marines have light infantry divi- place for rivalry that seeks to undercut or sions. The Navy and Air Force have separately devel- denigrate fellow members of the joint oped, but similar, fighter aircraft and tactical mis- team.” 2 And, “the nature of modern warfare siles....While respecting each service’s unique puts a premium on cooperation with each capabilities, we can reduce redundancies, save billions other to compete with the enemy.” 3 of dollars, and get better teamwork. For actual combat, Joint Pub 1’s call to Change the Missions pull together is clear and cannot be dis- Far more radical than either Goldwater- puted. However, in drawing up a concept of Nichols or the Chairman’s calls to join operations to prepare for combat or in draft- hands in battle and out, the Clinton-Nunn ing the doctrine that determines what forces vision sees teamwork as the by-product of ef- will be called upon, or in choosing which ficiency. Rationalizing the missions of the weapons to build or what national military Armed Forces so that no two services per- strategy to follow, the admonition to cooper- form the same job will save money first and ate runs into problems. Reasonable men demand cooperation second. Of the several can—and do—differ about weapons systems, approaches toward establishing a more uni- the appropriateness of certain missions, and fied military, the ideas supporting this one the contributions of the individual services are weakest. Not because Nunn’s proposal to to the Nation’s security. combine such staff functions as the medical, According to Joint Pub 1, “Individual chaplain, and legal corps are baseless. And professional growth, reinforced by military not because his questions about the need for education and varied service and joint assign- separate air and infantry capabilities in his ments, leads to a refined capability to com- Senate speech of July 2, 1992 are unworthy. mand joint forces in peace and war.” 4 But the Nunn’s argument fails to observe its own document does not claim that this combina- standards. Quoting a former Chairman, Admi- tion of education and experience will answer ral William Crowe, Nunn rightly faults the thorny military questions, the ones that pre- customary manner in which America has re- dictably draw bureaucratic blood and leave duced its forces at “the end of a period of mili- trails of nettles from the Pentagon to Capitol tary crisis and the start of an era of relative Hill. What does Joint Pub 1 expect when such peace.” Proceeding backwards, the United States has cut defense first, says Senator Nunn,

Summer 1993 / JFQ 75 and asked second how “to shape a new force fication for cutting defense that may or may in light of the changed circumstances.” not suit the disorderly world and American However, instead of trying to peer into interests. It does not start out by taking de- the years ahead or explain the lessons that liberate aim at these vexing problems. But should have been learned from the struggle whatever the merits of his proposal, it does against the Soviets, Nunn looks to the past. expand the definitions of jointness. For him, the most important challenge in These definitions share a common, sus- America’s change of circumstances is “to picious view of the services and are differen- provide a fighting force...that is not bound tiated by their political content. Goldwater- by the constraints of the roles and missions Nichols is the least political. Knowing the outlined in 1948.” military’s responsiveness to hierarchy and Nunn, of course, is referring to the com- promotion, it seeks harmony through orga- promise by which the Office of the Secretary nizational changes that tinker with power of Defense and the Joint Chiefs were estab- and incentives. The legislation has other ef- lished while maintaining a separate Marine fects, but it had no other end. Corps and naval aviation arm. This compro- General Powell’s emphasis on opera- mise was a political response to an idea de- tional teamwork stands unmovably on the veloped by Secretary of War Henry Stimson firm ground of experience. It is harder to say and Army Chief of Staff General George what the positive effect of his call to repro- Marshall. Deputy Chief of Staff General duce this cooperation at the staff level Joseph McNarney presented the proposal to means except in broad terms of encouraging the House Select Committee on Post-War respect for the views of officers from differ- Military Policy in 1944. Its original justifica- ent services. But Powell’s more distant—and tion had been the lack of sufficient coordi- political—goal is to dampen the rivalry nation between the Army and Navy during among the services that could still be an in- the war, especially just before the Japanese strument of wanton dismemberment in the attack on Pearl Harbor. hands of legislators bent on extracting fur- But interservice co- ther peace dividends from the military. the undesirability of ordination is not Nunn’s Most political are Nunn’s questions on absolute jointness— first goal; he nowhere duplication and redundancy. Wrapped in re- complete absorption of all claims the lack of it as a flections on the changed circumstances of problem. The Nunn- our time and casting back to the political the services into a single Clinton proposal identi- tussles of the late 1940s, the queries by the organization—should be fies the benefit of mov- Chairman of the Senate Armed Services plain since there is no ing beyond the 1948 Committee are linked by the political goal of agreements in terms of reducing defense costs, which accounts for serious proposal to go potential savings. Look- campaigner Clinton’s support. that far ing at air power Nunn The Passion for Purple says, “We spend tens of There is a serious problem with this billions of dollars every year operating tacti- growing chorus of calls for jointness. The cal aircraft squadrons in each of the four ser- sense of purpose and morale, and thus ulti- vices.” Noting that the Navy wants to spend mately the effectiveness of the services, is from $55 billion to $75 billion on a new ver- threatened by a calculus of their diminishing sion of the F–18 while the Air Force plans to identities. The undesirability of absolute replace its F–16 fleet, Nunn asks whether the jointness—complete absorption of all the services could save money by cooperating services into a single organization—should together in the development of a common be plain since there is no serious proposal to multirole fighter. go that far. Somewhere is a view of the ser- These questions are rooted in the desire vices as too big and complicated to be led to save costs, not in changed circumstances. Nunn in the end offers merely another justi-

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easily from the center, and of their skills as early in their careers, the genius of such too diverse to be mixed without weakening other great officers as Ulysses S. Grant re- the final compound. vealed itself later. Is the system’s rational re- Unfortunately, albeit unintentionally, sponse to Goldwater-Nichols denying the this is where we are headed. Ideas have been Nation the talents of late bloomers? Or will legislated, those representing the current the military ultimately find a way to move thinking of the leaders of the Department of officers through joint duty assignments by Defense, and those still in the planning unintentionally hamstringing the Joint Staff stages, are not like a series of proposals on na- and the CINCs with a host of joint billets? tional health from which Neither alternative beckons. For the mo- one must be chosen. In- ment, however, one direction is clear. The stead, these and other current Chairman, General Powell, has used proposals will have a cu- the powers of his office which were enlarged mulative effect. by Goldwater-Nichols, as well as his own ex- The increased time ceptional political talents, to cultivate a that officers spend in staff spirit of cooperation among the services. positions as a result of Balanced reductions in forces reinforced by Goldwater-Nichols as well an inclusive approach to service assets in as the rising quality of of- combat and cushioned by such educational ficers who are assigned to efforts as this journal have been the order of joint billets has improved the day. the strength of personnel But again, the call to jointness has some on combined staffs. Of discordant notes. The need for teamwork this there is no doubt. But when combined operations are required is at what price? When the incontestable. However, do joint assign- system as retooled by ments and education, the powerful message Goldwater-Nichols proof documents such as Joint Pub 1, or even duces its first Chairman the Goldwater-Nichols Act itself promote DOD photo by R.D. Ward General Powell and set of Joint Chiefs, such teamwork where it matters: in combat? appearing before the will they know as much about the capabilities Perhaps. But the evidence is scanty. House Armed Services of their services as those who preceded them? Joint Pub 1 paints General Schwarz- Committee. Will the opinions they give under the most kopf’s victory over Iraq as a jewel in the demanding circumstances to a President who joint crown. It quotes repeatedly and at has no military experience be as operationally length from all his component commanders informed as the advice of a general officer on the virtues of harmony. But Schwarzkopf, such as Norman Schwarzkopf who, until he by his own account, is a straightforward, became a CINC, had only served one tour on old-fashioned Army man with little toler- a joint staff? 5 ance for staff life, and no warm feelings for And what dislocations are being caused joint duty. He speaks of his decision to ac- by the legislatively induced requirement for cept an assignment in the Army Secretariat the Armed Forces to push a large pool of as ticket punching.6 And, the “happiest day” qualified officers through the relatively nar- of Schwarzkopf’s tour on the staff of U.S. Pa- row channel of joint duty billets? Personnel cific Command occurred when he was or- detailers already talk in private both about dered to Germany as assistant division com- the demoralization junior officers sense at mander of the 8th Mechanized Infantry.7 The not earning joint qualifications soon Central Command commander did not trust enough, and the growing pressure to exclude the Joint Staff much either. Referring to from joint assignments any officer who is slides from a briefing on Operation Desert not rated first or second among several peers Storm which President Bush received in in yearly evaluations. Although men like Washington, Schwarzkopf told his chief of George Marshall distinguished themselves

Summer 1993 / JFQ 77 staff, “I want them presented by you person- a court martial. The matter was quickly really, not some officer from the Joint Staff.” 8 solved and the operation proceeded. Nowhere in his popular autobiography Joint tours, revised educational curric- does Schwarzkopf mention Goldwater- ula, exhortations to cooperate, and leg- Nichols or the 1986 law’s supposed multipli- islation did not help—or hurt—General cation of the CINC’s Schwarzkopf in the execution of his joint power which others have duties. When he was called on for advice, he joint tours, revised touted as key to the suc- gave his best which was very good indeed educational curricula, cess of U.S. arms in the because it was based on many years of work exhortations to cooperate, Gulf War. Although he perfecting his skill. And when he required had anxious moments assistance and cooperation of officers from and legislation did not when Washington’s re- other services, he knew how to get it. help—or hurt—General quests for information The balance in the system which pro- Schwarzkopf in the execu- made him fear that the duced Schwarzkopf and such other success- policymakers did not ful unified commanders as General Max tion of his joint duties wholly grasp the true Thurman, who led the U.S. Southern Com- picture, Schwarzkopf at- mand during the invasion of Panama in tributes his success in 1989, was as difficult to achieve as it is easy part to the freedom he was given to operate to upset. In this equilibrium, the need for according to his best judgment and Powell’s competitive ideas at the center where deci- ability to run political interference. sions are made about the size, shape, pur- Schwarzkopf’s appreciation of jointness pose, and mixture of forces serves as equi- lacks the diversity of approaches and harmony of poise to the demand for harmonious action effort tone that characterizes Joint Pub 1, but in battle. the vacuum is filled by practical and effective Such efforts as the increasing emphasis action. When his order to move VII Corps on jointness tip the scales in the direction of into position in control of Safwan airfield was concerted operational effort. However, by ef- not obeyed, the CINC tells his Army compo- fectively putting a damper on conflicting nent commander that unless the original or- ideas, they also suppress debate over such ders are executed, he will give the job to the fundamental issues as the composition and Marines. This threat helps speed action. character of future forces. Backed by a force- It fits neatly into the operational appreci- ful Chairman, Joint Pub 1’s insistence on ation of jointness that Schwarzkopf gained in common perspectives, teamwork, and coopera- 1983 as Army advisor to Vice Admiral Joe tion delivers a strong warning against argu- Metcalf who led the invasion of Grenada. As ments, for example, that support asymmetri- Schwarzkopf tells it, when Metcalf required cal reductions in U.S. forces in response to expertise on ground operations—as he did in world events. Admonitions that “there is no planning the opposed movement of Army place for rivalry” on the joint team, that the and Marine units across the island to free military should “exploit the diversity of ap- American medical students—Metcalf asked proaches that a joint force provides,” help Schwarzkopf to write the orders. establish a standard of political correctness However, when it subsequently became in the Armed Forces that chokes off consid- clear that a helicopter assault to release the eration of ideas which, while troublesome to students at Grand Anse would be quicker the interests of an individual service or a and less costly, Metcalf gave the order. particular weapons system, might be impor- Schwarzkopf explained the plan to the Ma- tant to the Nation. rine colonel whose helicopters were to carry The problem is not jointness but rather Army troops in the hostage rescue. When what is meant by jointness. Unified effort in the colonel balked, Schwarzkopf noted that the field has real meaning, and there is no the order came from Metcalf and threatened serious argument against this. But outside the realms of the unified commanders, the

78 JFQ / Summer 1993 Cropsey

notion becomes unclear or encourages intel- time of falling defense budgets. But the hier- lectual torpor. archy’s forceful message not to squabble also The medical profession’s contemporary helps muffle consideration of such ideas as experience offers clear parallels and a con- the unequal division of budget cuts based on structive direction. Like officers, physicians national requirements or a national security must devote a growing portion of their time strategy that may not rely on balanced to mastering the technical demands of their forces. Unfortunately, such questions are art. Technological advancements in diagnos- precisely the ones to be examined. Insofar as tic and surgical instruments as well as the the pressure for jointness keeps these issues doubling of medical knowledge roughly every at bay, the Nation is deprived of a debate it four years is forcing doctors to concentrate on should conduct. smaller and smaller parts of the human In Federalist 10 James Madison, urging anatomy. The body, however, is a whole, and adoption of the Constitution, reflects on the a pathology of the optic nerve, for example, proposed Union’s ability to control the dan- might be apparent to neurosurgeons where gerous effects of political faction. “The ophthalmologists would overlook it. The cure causes of faction cannot be removed...re- is to balance specific with general knowledge. lief is only to be sought in controlling the ef- In military terms, the solution to the want of fects.” Heading off controversy in the Armed a common perspective is not to exhort offi- Forces over basic questions on the future cers and enlisted personnel to get one, but to could eventually remove the causes of dis- provide one that is based on ideas rooted in agreements among the services by helping experience. to strip them of their pugnacity. This would In other words, one must study history not serve America well either. It would be to understand the causes of military success better to seek jointness off the battlefield in and failure. By noting joint and combined the renewed effort to understand the valu- operations throughout the text, Joint Pub 1 able lessons of warfare through the experi- does acknowledge this need. But its histori- ences of those who have succeeded and cal lessons all teach jointness. And depen- failed at it. JFQ dence on ratios of students from different services to determine whether a service col- NOTES lege course qualifies as joint in the wake of 1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Goldwater-Nichols is an obvious example of Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: National De- the triumph of process over substance. Mili- fense University Press, 1991), p. 2. 2 Ibid., p. 4. tary history is richer and more complicated. 3 Ibid., p. 15. It shows that organizations as well as great 4 Ibid., p. 32. captains can make the difference between 5 Schwarzkopf quotes the reaction of his command- victory and disaster. It teaches the value of ing officer, Major General Richard Cavazos, to the news thinking through tactical and strategic prob- Schwarzkopf had been ordered to the Pacific Command when he was a one-star general: “Whoever made that lems beforehand. It demonstrates the advan- decision is a dumb bastard.” H. Norman Schwarzkopf in tage of being able to swiftly change ideas, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), plans, and operations in the face of the p. 214. unanticipated. 6 Ibid., p. 191. Jointness is not an end in itself. Nor can 7 Ibid., p. 221. 8 Ibid., p. 360. anyone prove that it is. Jointness is a minimal requirement for most of the imaginable situations in which this Nation would use force in the future. Apart from combat, it is a rhetorical whip that maintains a politically useful discipline among the services in a

Summer 1993 / JFQ 79 A New Mission for Atlantic Command By P AUL DAVID MILLER DOD photo

n a February 1993 “Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces,” General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended changing the Unified Command Plan (UCP) by placing certain forces in the continental United States under a single joint commander for the primary purpose of ensuring the Ijoint training and readiness of response forces. The Secretary of Defense approved that rec- ommendation in April and an implementa- Navy SEALs descend tion plan is now under development. The to a submarine. plan will merge Forces Command (FORS- DOD photo COM), Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), Air Combat Command (ACC), and Marine Corps Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) into a single combat command. The services will retain their

Summary

In a recent report to Congress, General Colin Powell raised the issue of creating a joint command to enhance the ability of forces based in the United States to respond quickly in the event of crises. The Chairman concluded it would be advantageous to establish such an organization and recommended that assets of Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet, Air Combat Command, and Marine Corps Forces Atlantic be fused into a single joint command. U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) will become that command with responsibility for joint training, force packaging, and deployments during contingencies, including providing support to U.N. peacekeeping operations and assistance in times of natural disasters. To accomplish this new joint mission LANTCOM must streamline training and exercises, facilitate packaging and adapting forces to meet theater requirements, and enhance readiness through innovations in doctrine.

U.S. Navy photo by Paul Brylewski 80 Miller

statutory responsibilities and the U.S. Atlantic mission for LANTCOM as one of the most Command (LANTCOM) will be responsible for significant aspects of this triannual report. joint training, force packaging, and facilitating The proposal builds on many important joint deployment in crises. training initiatives which have flourished The advantages of the proposed changes, since the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorgani- particularly in the area of joint training, war- zation Act of 1986, particularly in the wake rant a close look. LANTCOM is well-suited to of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. assume this new mission. As a CONUS-based General Powell helped to point the way joint headquarters, it already enjoys strong with the publication of Joint Pub 1, Joint component relationships with FORSCOM, Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, which traces LANTFLT, ACC, and MARFORLANT. Cold the roots of jointness and charts a course for War planning in LANTCOM focused on de- the future. Meeting challenges with a fending the sea lanes and conducting offen- smaller, less costly force depends on realiz- sive naval operations ing the full force-multiplier potential of meeting challenges with against the Soviet Union. jointness. Joint Pub 1 is a focal point for the While the NATO Alliance further refinement of joint doctrine. a smaller, less costly force endures—and LANTCOM Joint Training and Exercises depends on realizing retains a large regional The first cornerstone in realizing the full area of responsibility— the full force-multiplier potential of our Armed Forces is joint train- the threat of war is ing—particularly regularly scheduled, major potential of jointness greatly reduced. Thus joint exercises. Both Exercise Ocean Venture LANTCOM has the capac- in the Atlantic and Exercise Tandem Thrust ity to assume added responsibilities in keep- in the Pacific are examples of joint training ing with the revised military strategy and the being done by the CINCs. In 1992 those ex- proposed changes to the UCP. ercises saw thousands of soldiers, sailors, air- The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic men, and Marines train together on joint Command (CINCLANT) also has responsibili- warfighting tasks. A new spirit of cooperation ties under NATO as Supreme Allied Comman- and enthusiasm was clearly evident. Progress der Atlantic (SACLANT). In the new plan was made on doctrinal and joint command, CINCLANT will likely continue to serve as control, communications, computers and in- SACLANT where he will be well situated to telligence (C4I) issues as raised by Operations integrate and tailor forces to support Supreme Desert Shield/Desert Storm such as proce- Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for dures for the Joint Force Air Component NATO contingencies. Since LANTCOM will Commander (JFACC) and effectively employ- no longer be a predominantly naval coming mobile operations and intelligence cen- mand, CINCLANT will be a nominative posi- ters with joint C4I connectivity. tion filled by an officer from any service. Joint training has a high priority in all LANTCOM will also be assigned additional theaters. The U.S. Pacific Command (PA- missions in support of United Nations peace- COM) has developed an innovative, two-tier keeping and disaster relief missions. The com- Joint Force Commander (JFC) concept to en- mand might also be renamed in order to sure the readiness of JFCs and staffs in re- more accurately reflect this new focus. sponding to contingencies. PACOM has de- Comments on the Chairman’s roles and ployable JFC staff augmentation teams that missions report—both from inside and out- train and exercise regularly with designated side the military—cite the proposed new joint force commanders. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been busily engaged in joint training in Southwest Asia Admiral Paul David Miller, USN, is Supreme Allied since the end of the Gulf War. Regular joint Commander Atlantic, and the Commander in strike and air defense exercises maintain Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. He was previously readiness for rotationally deployed forces Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 81 A TLANTIC COMMAND

from all services. The U.S. cases the requirements were met by using European Command fairly rigid combinations of permanently as- (EUCOM) uses the Air signed forces and standardized deployment Force’s Warrior Prep Cen- groups. This was largely a single or dual ser- ter in Germany to sup- vice approach—as opposed to being truly port aggressive joint joint. The system worked well and supported training efforts. Joint our military strategy. The supported CINCs training in the U.S. dealt directly with the services providing the Southern Command forces, and joint force integration was accom- U.S. Coast Guard photo (SOUTHCOM) supports plished in the field, often on an ad hoc basis. counterdrug and nation The Cold War prescription may now pro- assistance operations. vide more capability than needed in some re- With all the atten- gions. To do the job with a smaller force, we tion that has already been must explore ways to more tightly lace to- directed toward joint gether the full joint military capability of the training, one might ques- United States. We must explore and refine tion the need to assign ways of providing the CINCs with packages overall responsibility for of capabilities more closely tailored to their joint training of CONUS- requirements. Once assigned the joint train- based forces to a single ing mission, LANTCOM will be ideally situ- commander. But there are ated to assist CINCs in designing and train- two reasons to do so. ing the needed joint capabilities packages. First, such a consolida- Joint Force Packaging

U.S. Navy photo by Jack C. Bahm tion will build on, rather The second cornerstone of realizing the than supplant or replace, (Top) A Coast Guard force multiplier potential of jointness is devel- cutter intercepts a ongoing efforts. Unified CINCs will continue oping effective joint force packages. The group of Haitians. to conduct joint training to sharpen the focus Chairman and the unified CINCs are already (Bottom) Carriers seen and maintain the readiness of assigned forces. underway during Exer- evaluating ways to better organize and train Second, as the military grows smaller fewer cise Dragon Hammer forces to support CINCs by making it easier to forces will be positioned forward, either per- ’92, (from foreground) call forward specific capabilities needed in Italy’s Guiseppe manently stationed (as in Europe and Korea) their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). Garibaldi, France’s or rotationally and periodically deployed (as One concept envisions rotationally deployed Foch, and Spain’s CENTCOM). Assigning responsibility for joint Principe de Asturias. forces from all services organized into adaptive training readiness to LANTCOM will help to joint force packages—that is, specific capabili- ensure that deploying forces are ready on ar- ties deployed during a given timeframe and rival for joint operations. It would also be a supported by designated back-up units in means for ensuring that those forces—and CONUS. This concept brings together initia- designated back-up units at the ready—can be tives from various quarters and involves two trained to meet the requirements and stan- elements: packaging forces and adapting those dards of the supported CINC. forces to specific theater requirements. As in the case of joint training, each ser- Forging adaptive joint force packages vice is doing an excellent job of providing does not require major adjustments to exist- basic, intermediate, and advanced training to ing service organizations. Each service will ensure its forces are ready for joint opera- remain responsible for individual unit readi- tions. This traditional stovepipe approach to ness and training. The Atlantic Fleet, for ex- training has served us well. It evolved during ample, has replaced traditional battle group the Cold War to meet each CINC’s require- formations with expanded force packages ments for forward positioned forces. In most more closely aligning responsibilities for tactical training with the operational chain of command. The new organization provides

82 JFQ / Summer 1993 Miller

greater flexibility and adaptability, permit- tioned forces with a smaller force, the partic- ting battle groups, amphibious ready groups, ular full joint force package must be trained or other needed force packages to be config- jointly and structured to support a given ured from a broad range of maritime capabil- CINC’s specific requirements. Training must ities. The Pacific Fleet has been reorganized focus on specific contingencies and opera- along similar lines. In 1991 General Merrill tions that the joint force may be called upon McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, reorganized to execute. As seen in the accompanying il- the basic structure of the air wing. New Air lustration, tailored elements of the full set of Force composite wings are comprised of the joint forces—adaptive joint force packages— range of assets needed to provide a complete can then be positioned forward as needed. capability package. These new organizations As the concept matures, supported CINCs provide more options to the unified CINCs will be able to write a more accurate pre- and make it easier to select needed capabili- scription—based on the situation in the ties from each service force package kit. Sin- AOR—and call forward only the precise ca- gle service force packages can be adapted by pabilities needed. Since the full joint force selecting capabilities to meet specific theater will have trained together, an adaptive joint requirements. We are just beginning to ex- force package—once deployed—becomes the plore ways of doing this. forward element of a trained and ready joint Maritime forces provide a useful exam- force available in CONUS. ple of how force packages can be adapted to In examining the adaptive joint force specific theater requirements. Formerly, to package concept, Navy and Marine Corps counter the global Soviet threat, carrier bat- component commanders of LANTCOM tle groups (CVBGs) comprised a fairly stan- jointly developed concepts for a carrier- dard menu of assets and capabilities. New based Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground naval force packages facilitate breaking Cold Task Force (SPMAGTF). This special task War deployment patterns by making it easier force would provide the supported CINC to structure and train capability-specific with specified, focused capabilities—such as packages. In today’s fast-changing world a noncombatant evacuation, security opera- naval force may not need the same capabili- tions, or tactical recovery of aircraft and per- ties in one region or situation as in another. sonnel. Other maritime force package op- One CINC may desire to augment the offen- tions, including tailored carrier air wings sive firepower of an aircraft carrier by vary- and MARGs with a more capable Air Combat ing the mix of strike aircraft in the embarked Element (ACE), are also being examined. naval air wing. Another CINC may choose Recognizing the largely maritime flavor of to modify the capabilities of the carrier by these efforts, LANTCOM has been working reducing the number of naval aircraft and with Army, Air Force, and SOF components, instead embarking Special Operations Forces as well as the Coast Guard, to explore contri- (SOF) or a special purpose Marine force with butions that those forces could make to de- capabilities tailored to specific theater re- ployable joint capabilities packages. quirements. Circumstances in a third region Tailored joint capability packages, struc- may be such that requirements can be met tured and trained for a variety of require- with a tailored Marine Amphibious Ready ments, will soon prove their value in EUCOM. Group (MARG) supported by Tomahawk Joint Force 93–2, for example, represents an cruise missile-firing ships and submarines. In adaptive joint force package which blends ser- each case the capabilities are tailored to vice capabilities by combining a typical 11- meet CINC requirements. Army and Air ship carrier battle group, 5-ship Marine am- Force capabilities may be similarly tailored. phibious ready group, Special Operations From the vantage point of the supported Forces, land-based Air Force and naval aircraft, CINCs, the ready forces of all services repre- and advanced Army helicopters. Working sent the full set of available capabilities. To meet CINC requirements for forward posi-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 83 A TLANTIC COMMAND

with LANTCOM to develop, integrate, and other CINCs. Assigning LANTCOM the joint jointly train such force packages will help the training mission for CONUS-based forces supported CINCs meet the requirements for will institutionalize this critical role. Orient- continuous and periodic presence. By using ing joint force training toward the supported the full potential of a joint force and calibrat- CINCs’ requirements and training deploying ing forward-positioned capabilities to the forces alongside designated back-up units needs of CINCs, we can maintain a forward will ensure additional forces can be sent for- presence without overcommitting our forces. ward. Surge forces would arrive in theater or- The end of the Cold War enables LANT- ganized, trained, and ready for large scale COM to focus increased attention on tailor- joint operations. ing joint exercises and training to support To efficiently tailor joint training to the requirements of the supported CINCs, we need an effective, widely understood means

Adaptive Joint Force Package Concept

Full Joint Force Package

Joint Command Element

Tailored Forward Element

JTF Command Element Naval Battle Group Naval Task Group

Marine Expeditionary Unit Marine Expeditionary Brigade(s) Army Deployment for Training

Air Force Squadron(s) Army Division Special Operations Forces

Air Force Wing(s)

Ready Response to Special Operations Forces CINC Requirements

84 JFQ / Summer 1993 Miller

to communicate re- ual service schedules will make training more quirements. The Joint efficient, relevant, and interesting. Consider- Staff and the CINCs able improvement can be achieved while are developing a uni- staying within programmed budgets and versal joint task list force structure. Existing service exercises can U.S. Navy photo which will make it be overlaid by joint easier for supported training without service exercises CINCs to state their increased cost. Ser- can be synchro- training requirements vice exercises can in common terminol- be synchronized nized for mutual ogy, prioritize needed for mutual benefit, benefit, and training, and aid and sequenced to sequenced to LANTCOM in struc- yield efficiencies in turing exercises to transportation, yield efficiencies

Lockheed photo by Schulziner and Lombard meet those needs. range utilization, in transportation, and support. Joint Doctrine range utilization, Another area The third cornerstone in realizing the with important po- and support full joint force multiplier potential is ensur- tential payoff is the ing the readiness of JTF commanders and evaluation and staffs to plan and execute contingency oper- testing of joint tactics, techniques, and pro- ations. Each geographic CINC is developing cedures to refine joint doctrine. Being located a JTF training concept, but individual the- in close geographic proximity to the Joint ater approaches are not yet grounded in a Doctrine Center, the Army Training and Doc- common set of JTF staff tasks, conditions, trine Command, and the newly created and proficiency standards. Once the univer- Naval and Air Force doctrine commands, as sal joint task list is finalized, LANTCOM will well as Army and SOF tactical training cen- be able to train deployable JTF and compo- ters at Fort Bragg, LANTCOM is squarely at nent commanders in joint doctrine, tactics, the hub of a number of activities. Assigning techniques, and procedures tailored to the the expanded joint training mission to supported CINC’s requirements from a LANTCOM will facilitate evaluating, testing, menu of common standards that are appli- and sequencing the development of joint cable worldwide. doctrine. Four principles have guided develop- The hub-and-spoke analogy also applies ment of the implementation plan for the to other joint training activities. LANTCOM new joint training mission: is working in cooperation with existing com- ▼ Finding ways to add value without add- ponent commands to establish joint tactical ing cost training and development teams. Each team ▼ Avoiding creating additional bureaucratic focuses on specific joint tactical mission layers areas such as joint air operations and joint ▼ Resisting the pressure to increase the size of the LANTCOM staff air defense. The teams will assist in design- ▼ Making good use of what already exists ing and evaluating realistic, relevant joint exercises and training. They will also de- These principles will help achieve the velop joint tactical standards and assist in full value of the proposed changes to the training joint staff elements. The teams pro- Unified Command Plan. One example is the vide focal points for developing joint tactics, potential payoff to be derived from coordi- techniques, and procedures, and cadres of nating exercise schedules. Aligning individ- joint tactical experts on the CINC and component staffs. Joint tactical training development teams could also provide a vehicle for drawing on the expertise, and integrating

Summer 1993 / JFQ 85 A TLANTIC COMMAND

the efforts, of various service tactical school- COM staff would be minimized and poten- houses and centers of excellence in an effort to tial redundancies would be limited, particu- enhance joint training without infringing larly in the areas of joint publications, dis- on service priorities. tributed simulation, and exercise support. Another useful hub-and-spoke arrange- The Atlantic Command currently has Members of the 82d Airborne secure a ment could be created by establishing an ap- several JTF commanders. One of them, JTF- building during an ex- propriate joint agency to provide a range of 4, is the executive agent in the counterdrug ercise in the Gulf. technical support ser- campaign. Others are established for train- vices to the exercise ing and contingency response. Each service programs of both the component has potential training/contin- CINCs and the ser- gency JTF commander, namely, the Com- vices. This agency manding Generals of the three CONUS- could provide turn- based active Army Corps; Commander key support in tech- Second Fleet; Commander 12 th Air Force nologies and services (soon to be Commander 8 th Air Force); and common to such ef- Commanding General, Second Marine Expe- forts. One example is ditionary Force. The permanently assigned providing the dis- staffs of JTF commanders are oriented pri-

DOD photo tributed simulation marily toward service functions and respon- technology needed sibilities. Each JTF commander is routinely to link existing train- given important responsibilities in joint ex- ing ranges, command ercises, and augmented by personnel from posts, and simulators CINCLANT and other components as neces- to an effective joint sary. Joint training and readiness could be training network. measurably enhanced by permanently as- While the services signing sufficient personnel from each ser- would continue to vice to make the JTF staffs truly joint, but operate and use exist- without diluting the ability to carry out ser- ing facilities, training vice responsibilities or compromising pri- horizons would be mary areas of expertise. This could be ac- U.S. Navy photo by John D. Bivera expanded by sharing complished by exchanging a modest Marines hit the beach data and capabilities number of permanent billets between exist- in Manta, Ecuador, during a combined among users via a distributed simulation ing organizations, though the need for some exercise. network. additional billets cannot be ruled out with- The skills and experience required for out further analysis. such complex technologies are not plentiful. One key to adding value without adding Building exercise support organizations sepa- cost or additional bureaucratic layers is rately for the CINCs, their components, and steadfastly controlling growth of the LANT- service staffs is inefficient and prohibitively COM staff if it assumes new responsibilities. expensive. One option under consideration Ideally, the goal is zero growth. To accom- would merge the Joint Doctrine Center plish the mission without additional person- (JDC) in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Joint nel, LANTCOM would rely on service com- Warfare Center (JWC) at Hurlburt Field, ponents—namely, FORSCOM, ACC, Florida, into a single command located near LANTFLT, and MARFORLANT—to perform LANTCOM headquarters. This new JDC/JWC their current functions. LANTCOM is not agency would be controlled by the Joint able to take over responsibilities or do the Staff and support simulation-based studies. work of the component commands. Rather, By working in partnership with the it will provide a common vision and effi- JDC/JWC the pressure to expand the LANT- ciently coordinate mutual efforts. The component commanders themselves would serve as an executive board, helping to develop

86 JFQ / Summer 1993 Miller

and instill in LANTCOM the customer orien- tomer demand by providing trained and tation needed for success. ready joint force packages to meet a sup- Earlier organizations have had a ported CINC’s particular needs for periodic CONUS-based joint training mission, such as presence forces, forward positioned forces, U.S. Strike Command, established in 1961 and surge forces in times of crisis or conflict. and replaced by U.S. Readiness Command in The Goal of Unification 1971. Because they were perceived to con- Global security and economic reality flict with service Title X responsibilities (that call for a restructuring of our defenses. This is, to organize, train, and equip forces), nei- involves refining the capabilities and roles of ther command succeeded in its mission. the Armed Forces to advance the Nation’s se- LANTCOM would succeed only by comple- curity interests in the future. The definition menting, rather than competing with, ser- of those interests is growing. To do the job vice programs. Success would be measured we must change and adapt. We must find by just how well LANTCOM satisfies cus- new ways to bring our full capabilities to bear on emerging security challenges. We still need a capable military to defend our national interests. But, at the same time, the Armed Forces can be smaller and less costly. Meeting future challenges with a smaller, less costly force, however, will depend both on continued technical and C4I superiority, and on realizing the full force- multiplier potential of jointness. The fourth and final cornerstone in realizing that potential is assigning a single commander the mission of training designated DOD photo CONUS-based forces to fight as a joint team. Giving that mission to LANTCOM, as recommended by the Chairman, would be the next logical step in the evolutionary process of unification which began in 1947. By wisely using the tremendous capability at hand, we can add value without increasing cost or the size of the bureaucracy. And, by so doing, we can ensure effective joint leadership and combat capability on tomorrow’s multidimensional battlefields. JFQ U.S. Navy photo (Top) Air Force A–10 Warthog. (Bottom) Navy A–7 Corsairs.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 87 Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations

in the Gulf N THE ANNALS OF WAR few will By JAMES A. WINNEFELD and deny Operation Desert Storm’s uniqueness. It followed an uninter- DANA J. JOHNSON rupted U.S. force buildup on the Ara- bian peninsula that lasted five and a Ihalf months. The air resources of all services arrived quickly, and most occupied a preex- isting base structure in theater that ensured land-based airpower would play the predom- inant role. The battlefield called Iraq and Kuwait was isolated before a bomb was dropped or a missile fired. Unlike Korea and Vietnam, the enemy had few places to hide. Communication and logistics lines were visi- ble and readily targetable. Most important, the United States held the initiative; it would decide when, how, and where combat operations would begin and how the campaign would unfold. The officers in command were given wide latitude by political authorities over the conduct of the campaign—what targets to attack, when to hit them, and what weapons to use. In short, if the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Com- mand (CINCCENT), and his airmen could have started from scratch and defined circumstances ideally suited to the application of land-based airpower, they would have created a situation much like Iraq’s with its army exposed to air attack in Kuwait.

Summary

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated the effectiveness of modern airpower and joint air operations. The nature of those operations, and the extensive resources at the disposal of both U.S. and coalition forces, however, masked problems in command and control. Unresolved doctrinal issues and some residual controversy over roles and missions did not surface because of the abundant air assets in the theater. Accord- ingly, decisions about allocating resources never became contentious. The adage that one learns more from failure than from success should be applied to the Gulf War. There is still the danger that jointness may be a façade for single-service command structures and procedures, or that its influence may stop with the CINC. A cadre joint air staff that can be rapidly expanded in a contingency is one lesson of Desert Storm, an operation in which there was unity of control, but not command.

Excerpted from Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942–1991 by James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson. Copyright © 1993 by the Rand Corporation. Published by the Naval Institute Press in May 1993 [ISBN 55750 926 3].

88 JFQ / Summer 1993 Winnefeld and Johnson

But it is unfair at best to say that the and the way they were planned, organized, United States should put the experience of controlled, and executed. It was nearly a Desert Storm aside because it was atypical. In textbook application of U.S. Air Force doc- spite of the many unique features of Desert trine, with the other services playing impor- Storm, several characteristics of the campaign tant supporting but not starring roles. The are likely to be common to major contingen- Air Force deserves great credit for bringing to cies in the future. First, the effective and effi- the conflict a paradigm for command and cient application of military force requires strategy that was suited to the circum- “empowerment” of the unified chain of com- stances, while at the same time coordinating mand—to include with the other services to achieve unity of joint commanders if CENTCOM effort and unity of control. For the first time who are subordinate could have de- since World War II all the engaged fixed- to the commander wing tactical air forces of the various services of the unified com- fined circum- were under the tactical control of a single air mand. The author- stances ideally commander. ity delegated to the suited to land- Doctrine and Organization Joint Forces Air Between the Vietnam War and Opera- Component Com- based airpower, tion Desert Shield several developments fos- mander (JFACC) they would tered interest in joint command and control made it possible to have created issues. The most important was the Goldwa- integrate the air ef- ter-Nichols Department of Defense Reorgani- fort. Second, the ef- Iraq’s army zation Act of 1986. This piece of legislation fectiveness demon- gave the commanders in chief (CINCs) of strated by joint air operations in Desert Storm unified commands and the Chairman, Joint will become even more important as total Chiefs of Staff, major new responsibilities in U.S. air resources diminish. Third, Desert resource allocation as well as national secu- Storm made it clear that airpower has devel- rity planning and operations. Such empow- oped vital new dimensions since Vietnam: erment came at the expense of the services, stealthy strike aircraft, large-scale use of preci- whose role was carefully limited to support sion-guided munitions (PGM) including long- of the unified combatant commands—to or- range cruise missiles, and comprehensive bat- ganize, train, and equip forces, but not to tlefield surveillance systems are but a few. employ them. While these changes went far Fourth, the air forces of the three services can beyond joint air operations, their effect was be coordinated in the conduct of joint opera- most keenly felt in that sphere because it is tions—if there is clearly a lead service and if where interaction among service roles and each service component is demonstrably de- missions was the most sensitive. pendent on the others to provide capabilities Along with the subtle but important it cannot supply, quantitatively or qualita- changes in mindset put into motion by tively. Finally, there is a place for air opera- Goldwater-Nichols, there was significant tions, separate from the land and naval opera- movement in the joint doctrinal realm. tions, in theater contingency planning. This Three successive Chairmen pushed the for- is not to argue that air operations are all that mation of joint doctrine, culminating in the will be needed in most cases. But an air-only establishment of an Operational Plans and operation is an option—either as a precursor Interoperability Directorate (J–7) charged or as a stand-alone element of theater strat- DOD photo with developing the doctrinal underpinning egy. Because that option exists, air operations to support truly joint operations, especially concepts must be integrated fully in their joint air operations. planning. But even beyond these factors, the ser- It is against this backdrop of unique fea- vices were gradually learning to operate to- tures and broad lessons that we need to ex- gether and to accept subordinate roles. The amine the air operations of Desert Storm Grenada and Panama interventions as well as joint exercises—though not always in- Rear Admiral James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), is a veteran naval aviator volving joint air operations as defined and Dana J. Johnson is a policy analyst with the Rand Corporation. They here—built up a degree of familiarity that are now collaborating on a book about airpower during the Gulf War.

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had been absent in Korea and Vietnam. In- Both the remaining difficulties and the novative commanders reached out to de- progress are easily overstated. The point is velop joint plans to exploit the aggregate ca- that the Department of Defense embarked pabilities of all the services. For instance, the upon Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm late 1980s saw greatly increased coordina- with some major advantages compared to tion between commanders of the 7th Fleet the situation that existed at the end of the and the 5th Air Force in Japan in developing Vietnam War. But some unresolved problems joint contingency plans for Northeast Asia. were masked by ambiguous compromises Previously, each service had formulated its (for example, the Omnibus Agreement), sim- own contingency plan for striking theater plistic solutions (some of the effects of Gold- targets. water-Nichols), and an abundance of air as- In spite of this progress, problems re- sets (the product of the Reagan defense mained. Notwithstanding the 1986 Omnibus buildup) that allowed commanders to dodge Agreement setting out guidelines for tactical difficult command and control issues. Desert control of Marine air forces, the Marine Corps Storm was to put both the progress that had resisted the idea that there could be circum- been made and the problems that remained stances in which its air assets would not be to a new test. tied to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Initial Planning (MAGTF) role. The Navy for its part saw itself Some observe that planning for Desert as a full-service contingency force. Further- Shield started in August 1990. But for years more, the Air Force demand for unity of com- the staffs of CINCCENT and his Commander mand to wage an air campaign (with much of Air Forces (COMUSCENTAF) had been de- less emphasis on land and maritime cam- veloping and honing plans for a massive paigns) received a sour reception from the movement of airpower to the Gulf region. other services. The Air Force had continuing While the prospective opponent and circum- disagreements not only with the Navy and stances of combat shifted from time to time, Marine Corps but with the Army over providing battlefield support to ground forces.

CENTAF/JFACC Operations and Planning Organization

Campaign Planning

Special Assistant Executive Officer

”Black Hole“ Analysis

Guidance-Apportionment Targeting Air Tasking Order Airborne Command Element Component Liaison (GAT) (ATO) (ACE) (LNO)

Iraqi KTO FRAG TACS Support Team #1 Royal AF NAVLO planning planning

Team #2 French AF MARLO NBC FRAGOS SCUDS Team #3 Italian AF BCE IADS CAS/AI CAFMS AFLDS/AC SAMS TEMPLAR Team #4 Canadian AF SOCLO AAA AETACS EW/GCI Ground TACS Ground Battle Artillery Breeching COMMS LOCs MIL SPT Airspace

Source: USCENTAF Combat Plans Handout, December 31, 1990.

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give the National Command Authorities an air option. It proposed an air offensive, not air defense or support of ground forces. In mid-August this outline plan was taken to Riyadh, and Lieutenant General Horner was briefed. At that point air operations planning shifted to Riyadh; thereafter the Joint Staff and the services played only a supporting role. The focal point of follow-on planning was the development of an Air Tasking Order (ATO) that covered the first 48 to 72 hours of air operations against Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Iraqi targets in occupied Kuwait. U.S. Air Force photo by Jose Lopez, Jr. DOD leadership during Historically, the air tasking order is the the Gulf War: (front means by which Air Force commanders row, from left) GEN a continuing feature of the plans was the key translate campaign and attack plans into Colin L. Powell, USA, role of theater airpower. A major uncertainty battle orders. It specifies which air forces will Chairman, Joint Chiefs be used against which targets, at what time, of Staff; Hon. Richard was the availability of bases in theater, B. Cheney, Secretary which was quickly resolved by mid-August. and under what coordination and deconflic- of Defense; GEN H. Long-standing deployment plans, revised to tion modalities. The ATOs for Operations Norman Schwarzkopf, fit the size of the forces committed and the Desert Shield/Desert Storm were continuous USA, Commander in bases available, were executed. and required time-consuming, meticulous Chief, U.S. Central staff effort to ensure that forces launched Command (CINCCENT); Less attention had been given to force LTG Calvin A.H. Waller, employment plans for committed air forces from different bases at different times (often USA, Deputy CINC- because so much depended on the nature of flying through the same airspace) performed CENT; (back row from U.S. involvement: would it be defending their missions and sup- left) LtGen Walter E. against an invasion of Saudi Arabia, or going ported one another. Be- in Desert Boomer, USMC, COM- fore Desert Shield the Air USMARCENT; Lt Gen on the offensive against an aggressor? Be- Storm, the Air cause Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Force alone used such a Charles A. Horner, Tasking Order USAF, Commander, 9th USAF, Commanding General of the 9th Air document and its associ- Air Force/COMUS- Force and COMUSCENTAF, was in the midst ated software for theater- (ATO) became CENTAF; LTG John J. of deploying forward to Saudi Arabia with wide operations. The joint and was Yeosock, USA, Com- other services, more ac- d additional responsibilities as CINCCENT mander, 3 Army/ the master COMUSARCENT; VADM (Forward), and because an early air offensive customed to smaller op- Stanley R. Arthur, USN, option was needed, CINCCENT, General H. erations and face-to-face document th Commander, 7 Fleet/ Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, asked the Vice coordination from a sin- shaping the COMUSNAVCENT. Chief of Staff of the Air Force to develop an gle base, used less de- air war outline air option. tailed battle order docu- The plan, known as “Instant Thunder,” ments or fragmentary was delivered to Schwarzkopf on August 10, orders. In Desert Storm the ATO became 1990 and tentatively approved as a planning joint and was the master document shaping option by him and later by the Chairman, the air war. General Colin L. Powell, USA. At the Chair- Developing the attack plans and the man’s direction, planning for the air cam- ATO for the first days of the air war was an paign was made a joint effort at that time, immense undertaking because of the chang- and representatives of the other services and ing priorities, target lists, and availability of the Joint Staff were included. air assets. The effort was directed by the The thought process behind “Instant JFACC and carried out by the Guidance- Thunder” called for development of a con- Apportionment-Targeting (GAT) cell on the cept for the air campaign as well as some de- JFACC staff. The Iraqi targeting part of the tails that could be part of an operations GAT was referred to as the “Black Hole” be- order. It was rough, but it was intended to cause access to it was so limited. While manned mainly by Air Force officers, liaison officers from the other services also were

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Command and Control in Operation Desert Storm the “mission direction” supposedly operative in Vietnam. National Command The wording of the 1986 Omnibus Authorities Agreement gave the Marines an opening to Joint Chiefs of Staff bypass this arrangement, but the command Operational control Tactical control of sorties relationships were now clearer and more Joint Force binding. The room for exceptions had been Air Component CINCCENT Commander narrowed, and there were fewer incentives to (JFACC) exploit those exceptions. The Navy played by the new rules, in part because it was dependent on Air Force tanker and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) sup- COMUSCENTAF COMUSNAVCENT COMUSMARCENT COMUSARCENT port and in part because it had to work through the system to hit targets it consid- Source: Interviews with participants. ered important. JFACC and ATO: Engines of Jointness part of the planning effort By centralizing planning and decision- from the very beginning. making the JFACC forced a greater degree of Developing the plan for coordination of joint air operations than was the initial phase of air opera- possible under the more laissez-faire com- tions consumed most JFACC mand environment of Korea and Vietnam. If planning time through the au- a service component wanted tanker support tumn and early winter. Mean- or air defense suppression, if it wanted to time, in the real world of avoid having its aircraft endangered by

U.S. Air Force photo by Joe Coleman Desert Shield, daily ATOs gov- friendly fire, if it wanted certain targets hit, Lieutenant General erned overland air defense, and if it wanted to be a player in the air at- Charles A. Horner, surveillance, and quick-reaction alert opera- tack plan, then it had to participate in the USAF, USCENTAF Com- tions in the theater. These too were JFACC mander, at an airbase functions of JFACC headquarters as well as fly products, developed largely by Air Force offi- in the United Arab the air attack plan as set out incrementally in cers and supplemented by officers from the Emirates. the daily ATOs. As coordinating practices de- other services and coalition air forces. veloped, the services oriented their efforts to- Command Arrangements ward shaping the ATO and negotiating excep- The command arrangements for Opera- tions to this coverage. They could do that tions Desert Shield/Desert Storm were simple only by participating in the JFACC planning compared to the convoluted command struc- and order-writing process in Riyadh. ture in Vietnam. The chain of command The ATO became a “bible”—transmitted went from the National Command Authori- electronically to Air Force and Marine Corps ties in Washington through the Chairman to headquarters and delivered by naval aircraft CINCCENT. Under CINCCENT was a mix of to carriers at sea. This is not to say that service service component commanders, a func- special interests did not attempt to work tional component commander (JFACC), and around the JFACC and ATO; but such at- assorted other support commands. The air tempts became an exception, and the game functional commander (COMUSCENTAF was played by tacitly approved rules.2 The wearing his JFACC hat) was General Horner, JFACC and ATO were flexible in many dimen- who was responsible for “planning, coordi- sions, and the special needs of specific opera- nation, allocation, and tasking based on the tors were for the most part accommodated. joint force commander’s apportionment de- But in one important respect the ATO cision.” 1 Thus, ATOs approved by the JFACC was not flexible: it took 48 hours to build an guided the actions of the relevant service air tasking order for any given flying day. component commanders. This was a mani- While one day’s ATO was being executed an- festation of tactical control of sorties (but not other two were in preparation, and two or service components), an authority much three more were being sketched out concep- more encompassing and rigorous than the tually in the strike planning cell. Changes “coordination control” that defined interservice relationships during the Korean War and

92 JFQ / Summer 1993 Winnefeld and Johnson

CENTAF Command Relationships phy, base infrastructure, and the type of enemy worked to the Air Force advantage, allowing use of its state-of-the-art weapons

CENTAF against an ideal opponent in a nearly ideal JFACC scenario. One need not dwell on the unique nature of the Gulf War to observe that the Air Force was well prepared in its strategic concept, doctrine, and hardware. The Air Force command and control system became 14th 15th 17th 1610th the theater command and control system, Air Division (P) Air Division (P) Air Division (P) Air Lift Division (P) (Fighter Aircraft) (EW and C2 Aircraft) (SAC Aircraft) (MAC Aircraft) and other services had to adjust to match it. A single air commander was designated; that Source: U.S. Department of Defense, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the Congress” position was filled by an Air Force officer (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1992), p. K–12. who was in close proximity to the CINC. Moreover, there was little evidence that the CINC became involved in JFACC decisions could be made in execution, but it was awk- other than those related to apportionment. ward and occasionally risky if communica- However, as the ground campaign ap- tions problems or other mishaps occurred. proached, the CINC did insist on establish- The ATO was particularly suited for use ing a Joint Targeting Board to ensure that against a hunkered-down enemy who had the needs of all service components were lost initiative. But in a rapidly changing situ- more fully addressed. ation, or when there were delays in bomb JFACC was at its core an Air Force Staff. damage assessment, execution problems It was joint (or “purple suited”) only to the could and did occur. The extent that liaison officers from other ser- where joint doctrine ATO meshed well with the vices and the coalition air forces were tem- was lacking, Air Force Air Force command para- porarily assigned to it. The old USCENTAF digm of centralized control— (9th Air Force) staff was expanded with per- doctrine and organiza- but not with Navy and sonnel from commands all over the Air tional practices were Marine practices of decen- Force. Where joint doctrine was lacking, Air used by default if not tralized control and mission Force doctrine and organizational practices vice tasking orders. were used by default if not preference. preference An ATO covering an en- The Air Force was equally well sup- tire theater of operations was ported in hardware and weapons. It had large and unwieldy. In containing all the virtually the only stealth, theater air-to-air needed information for all operators, it nec- refueling, state-of-the-art battlefield air essarily provided a great deal of extraneous surveillance, and deep penetrator bomb ca- information for any particular operator. Fast pabilities in theater. It also had adequate access and an ability to manipulate ATO fighter aircraft. But it did not have enough data into more usable formats required spe- tankers to support both itself and the other cial software and systems support that the services, or enough Suppression of Enemy Navy and Marines lacked. The Air Force had Air Defenses (SEAD), reconnaissance, and a cumbersome but useful Computer-Assisted PGM designator and delivery aircraft. Force Management System (CAFMS) that The Navy could easily pick out data from the ATO and Before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August display it to fit the needs of different eche- 1990, both Navy and Marine Corps forces lons. Moreover, it provided an interactive ca- were considered ideally suited to missions in pability that Air Force users found helpful. the Persian/Arabian Gulf region because of The Air Force the problematic status of base access. More- Desert Storm vindicated the Air Force over, a carrier battle group was rarely far from doctrine of unity of theater air coordination the Gulf, four to six surface escorts were usu- and control and, up to a point, its strategic ally in the region or in adjacent waters, and concept of air operations separate from ground operations. Circumstances of geogra-

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there was equipment for a full Marine expe- ashore deputy COMUSNAVCENT, who re- ditionary brigade aboard a maritime preposi- mained afloat). It was this officer and not tioning squadron moored at Diego Garcia. the commander at sea who coordinated Naval plans were oriented around two daily with the CINCCENT staff and the general scenarios: defense of shipping and JFACC. During initial operations the coordi- maintenance of access to the Gulf (such as nation of naval air operations with theater in Operation Earnest Will, the escort of re- air operations flowed from the JFACC flagged Kuwaiti tankers in 1987), and sup- through the Navy Staff in Riyadh to the port of a less likely air-land campaign. In the commander afloat and then to the Red Sea late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States and Arabian Gulf battle force commanders, feared an incursion by Soviet or Soviet client the individual battle groups, and finally the forces; in the late 1980s the principal threat carrier air wing commanders. This arrange- became Iran’s (and later Iraq’s) potential for ment was too unwieldy for timely coordina- causing trouble locally. In the larger conflict tion, so a streamlined chain evolved in scenarios the Navy and Marine Corps might which the Navy staff in Riyadh worked di- arrive first, but regional geography and the rectly with the commanders afloat, often size of the requisite U.S. force argued for a with the strike cells on individual carriers. In primary Army-Air Force role. effect, the commander at Riyadh and his of- In August 1990 the larger scenario oc- ficers at JFACC became COMUSNAVCENT’s curred; bases were made available, and a strike coordinators. massive, across-the-board U.S. military Consideration was given to moving the buildup began. The Navy’s short-duration commander afloat to Riyadh so he could dis- contingency operations paradigm could not charge his responsibilities as naval compo- prepare it for a new role as part of a large air- nent commander more effectively and meet ground campaign. As the buildup continued daily with the CINC and other component successive battle groups arrived and found commanders. But powerful institutional themselves plugged into a planning and voices within the Navy argued that opera- tasking system and a command structure in tional command of the fleet must be exer- which they had little experience—but some cised by an afloat commander, and that degree of suspicion. The connection to the those responsibilities were more important JFACC and ATO system was not a perfect fit. than daily contact with the CINC and the There were setbacks as the Navy’s new role other component commanders, including as a team player, not team captain, evolved the JFACC. There was only one Navy flag of- and was gradually accepted. ficer in Riyadh aside from the one attached The key officer was the COMUSNAV- to the staff of CINCCENT, while there were CENT representative in Riyadh (in effect the as many as ten afloat. COMUSNAVCENT, Riyadh, was the junior battle group com- U.S. Navy Command Arrangements for Operation Desert Storm mander and (except from August to Novem- ber 1990) a surface warfare officer. Command line The Navy experienced a series of opera- CINCCENT Tactical control of sorties tional deficiencies during Desert Storm. Some were the result of policy and program

decisions made outside the Navy, but others stemmed from service priorities and implicit COMUSCENTAF Other COMUSNAVCENT Components doctrine: JFACC

▼ Initial reluctance to deploy carrier battle

groups in the narrow and shallow Arabian Gulf. The result was delay and difficulty in integrating NAVCENT Arabian Gulf Battle Red Sea Battle Other Naval (RIYADH) Force Commander Force Commander Forces the Gulf carriers with JFACC-controlled operations. ▼ Heavy reliance on Air Force tankers for strikes because the carriers were initially far from most targets. This denied the Navy the indepen- 4 Carrier Battle Groups 2 Carrier Battle Groups dent role it had grown accustomed to and became a basis for conflict with the JFACC when Source: U.S. Department of Defense, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the Congress” theater tanker assets were in short supply. (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1992), p. K–15.

94 JFQ / Summer 1993 U.S. Air Force photo by Rose Reynolds Navy KA–6D and A–7K aircraft from the Red Sea Battle Group re- fuel in flight on their way to engage enemy targets. F/A–18A Hornets, SH–3H Sea Kings, and A–6E Intruders on the flight deck of USS Saratoga in the Red Sea during Operation Desert Storm.

An Air Force KC–135 tanker refuels Navy A–6 Intruders and A–7 Corsair II’s over the Red Sea during Opera- tion Desert Storm. U.S. Navy photo by Ed Bailey

U.S. Air Force photo by Chris Putman

▼ Inadequate target identification systems I–2000). For this reason, Navy aircraft were not on Navy fighters. In the dense air traffic environ- suitable for some important strike missions. ment of Desert Storm, the rules of engagement Balanced against these shortcomings were designed to require dual phenomenological were some Navy advantages: identification of air contacts before engaging. Air Force fighters designed for the similarly restrictive ▼ The land-attack Tomahawk missile was environment of Central Europe had the necessary not only extremely accurate, but could be used in equipment; Navy fighters designed and equipped daylight and bad weather against strongly de- for the less crowded outer air battle in defense of fended targets. The Air Force’s stealth F–117s op- the fleet did not and could not be used in some erated at night, but the only way to keep key tar- critical Combat Air Patrol (CAP) stations. gets under attack the rest of the time without ▼ A bottom-up strike planning system more putting aircrews at risk was to use Tomahawk mis- attuned to short-term contingency operations siles. There were no comparable standoff weapons than to massive, continuous strike operations. in JFACC’s arsenal. Fragmented Navy strike planning worked in sin- ▼ The Navy’s high-speed radiation missile gle carrier operations and deliberately planned (HARM)-shooter team put real teeth into the strikes, but in Desert Storm it caused initial diffi- SEAD mission. For many, Navy F/A–18s, A–6s, and culty in integrating Navy flight operations with EA–6s with HARM were the preferred SEAD pack- other service and coalition forces.3 age in theater. Navy (and Marine) resources were ▼ A shortage (shared with the other services) used to make up for Air Force and coalition SEAD of laser designator platforms and laser-guided deficiencies, thus putting a high premium on pre- bombs. The only designator platform was the ven- strike planning and coordination of tactics. erable A–6. Many other aircraft could drop laser- ▼ The Red Sea carriers provided useful strike guided bombs, but few could guide them.4 More- capability in spite of the long distance to most over, the Navy lacked the equivalent of the Air targets and demonstrated again the comple- Force’s deep penetrator bomb (the laser-guided mentary nature of land and sea-based air operations under competent joint command and control arrangements.

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The Marine Corps bargain initially allocated all Marine A–6 The Marines were early arrivals in Desert and half of all F/A–18 sorties to the JFACC Shield. Advanced elements of the 1st Marine for tasking as he saw fit, while the remainder Expeditionary Force and the 7th Marine Ex- of the F/A–18 and all the AV–8B sorties re- peditionary Brigade arrived in Saudi Arabia mained effectively under Marine control. on August 14, 1990. Ships from Maritime Prepositioned Squadron Two began unload- Sortie Generation Performance in Operation ing equipment the next day. But Marine air units were slow to appear—the first fighter Desert Storm squadrons arrived on August 22—because of a shortage of Air Force tanker support for the Number Percent transit.5 From the start the Marines were Component of sorties of total tasked with defending the Gulf coast of Sorties flown January 17–March 3, 1991 Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, their position was CENTAF 67,285 59 translated into an offensive posture in- MARCENT 10,321 9 tended to retake the coastal route to Kuwait NAVCENT 18,007 16 City. Marine air bases were quickly estab- Allies 18,190 16 lished at Sheikh Isa (Bahrain) and King Total 113,803 Sorties Flown February 23–27, 1991 Abdul Aziz (near Al Jubyal). Some Marine CENTAF 8,133 54 AV–8B Harriers were kept afloat on amphibi- MARCENT 1,854 12 ous units to fly missions against Iraqi forces NAVCENT 2,769 18 in Kuwait and to provide air support for Ma- Allies 2,327 15 rine Corps ground units. Total 15,083 Since Vietnam, Marine fixed-wing tacti- Percent of total flown during ground war: 13% cal air units had been completely reequipped. Percent of days of ground war compared to length of campaign: 11% F/A–18s and AV–8Bs had replaced F–4s and A–4s, and only a few A–6s remained in the in- Source: U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Historical Center, Com- mand and Control in the Vietnam War (Washington: Government Printing ventory. Senior Marine aviators still remem- Office, 1991), p. D–2. The Air Force reports a total of 109,876 sorties bered Vietnam, including what they per- (all services/nations), compared to 113,803 in the corresponding Navy ceived as an Air Force attempt to gain control total. See U.S. Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington: of Marine air at the expense of the MAGTF Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 28. concept. As the Marines saw it, they had responsibility for a specified area in the vicinity The fundamental tension in this bargain of their ground forces. Within that area it was was between the competing demands of a the commander of the MAGTF, not JFACC, strategic air offensive under the JFACC (that who determined missions and priorities. Sur- is, Air Force) direction and eventual tactical plus sorties would be made available to air operations focused on support of ground JFACC. The Marines saw themselves as the forces (including Marines). From the start of only truly combined-arms team, integrated combat air operations on January 17 to the across air-ground lines and not across service offensive push into Kuwait and Iraq on lines in the air medium. The Air Force, on the February 24, the JFACC believed that Marine other hand, focused on utilization of all tacti- air had a role beyond preparing the battle- cal air resources in theater and remained field for Marine ground operations. Marine adamant on the need for centralized alloca- commanders agreed but were concerned that tion and tasking authority. when the time came to prepare the battle- The series of compromises struck be- field and conduct ground operations, their tween the JFACC and Marine Corps com- air units would be diverted to other tasks. It manders put their fixed-wing tactical air was a quarrel over apportionment and tim- under the air tasking order system while the ing. Uneasy compromises were cobbled to- Marines retained control and tasking author- gether, as they had been in Korea and Viet- ity over sorties in specified zones near their nam, but the fundamental doctrinal issue ground formations. This was the old “route was not resolved. package” from Korea and Vietnam in all but In the course of events, the Marines did name, but it did recognize in principle the husband their sortie capabilities during early tasking authority of the JFACC over all air air operations before the start of the ground operations in theater. One element of the offensive, so that adequate air support would be available to Marines on the ground when

96 JFQ / Summer 1993 Winnefeld and Johnson

needed. The Marines’ sortie rate nearly dou- as big a role in the Gulf War as naval air bled while the ground war was in progress. forces. The air forces of the United Kingdom (RAF), France, Italy, Canada, Saudi Arabia, The Strategic Air Command Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, In prior campaigns the effective use of and Qatar were involved to some degree and strategic bomber assets committed to theater were important politically as an expression operations was hampered by awkward com- of international resolve. mand and control arrangements and equip- The allied air forces were under the ment suitability problems. The simple expla- JFACC and air tasking order system of con- nation was that in Korea trol. Since they lacked certain C3 and other and Vietnam those U.S. and coalition air important combat support capabilities, they bomber forces were orga- were critically dependent on U.S. in-flight operations were the most nized, trained, and and mission planning aid. Of interest to this equipped for a global massive and intensive since exploration of command and control issues strategic mission cen- World War II is the fact that they represented one more tered on nuclear weap- layer of complexity; the JFACC tried to bro- onry. The Air Force did ker various national interests and develop not want its strategic bombers, which had a ATOs that fulfilled both his responsibilities global role, placed under the command of a and those external requirements. regional CINC for a regional mission. While bomber forces were made available to a re- Air Operations gional CINC in sufficiently compelling cir- U.S. and coalition air operations were cumstances, command and control re- the most massive and intensive since World mained firmly in the hands of the strategic War II. Sorties were flown from nearly three bomber force commander. dozen airfields, six aircraft carriers, and sev- In the early 1980s, however, Strategic eral amphibious force ships. Major artillery Air Command (SAC) attitudes began to and missile barrages were launched from change, and bombers were increasingly across the battlefield and warships at sea. made available to regional commanders for The most intricate aspects of coordination of exercises and conventional contingency op- operations were: erations. Many explanations have been of- ▼ Deconflicting forces using the same air- fered for this change. But for whatever rea- space or hitting the same targets while protecting son, SAC bombers were included in the them from friendly fire and preventing misidenti- planning for Desert Storm, quickly put fication of friend and foe. under CINCCENT operational control, and ▼ Maintaining airpower flexibility and en- tasked under the centralized ATO.6 SAC liai- suring efficiency and effectiveness in the absence son officers were assigned to the JFACC, and of timely bomb damage assessment. two generations of command and control ▼ Allocating tanker support for thousands problems went away nearly overnight. of tactical fighter sorties each day. ▼ Providing SEAD support to strike aircraft Allied Air Forces from a variety of air forces and operated by per- Insofar as the number of sorties flown sonnel from dissimilar operational and doctrinal B–52 bomber taxis for are concerned, allied air forces played nearly backgrounds. takeoff. These challenges were all met successfully, though not without great difficulty and the occasional mistake. The careful planning facilitated by the long buildup and centralized control provided the basis of this success. The “short poles” in the operations tent were tankers and SEAD aircraft, not tactical fighter aircraft. These shortages prevented service components and coalition partners from opting out of some command and control problems; full participation in effective air operations required coordination. U.S. Air Force photo by Donald McMichael

Summer 1993 / JFQ 97 JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

Once Desert Storm began, the major dif- the results were satisfactory. By mid-February ficulties in planning and operations con- ground targets in Kuwait and southern Iraq cerned locating and destroying Iraqi Scud were a major focus of the overall air effort. By missiles, allocating tankers, and making de- February 24 and the start of the theater cisions about time and level of effort in the ground operations, Iraqi ground forces had transition from strategic air operations to been fixed and pounded to the point of preparation of the battlefield in the Kuwaiti being largely neutralized. Few ground com- theater. The Scuds may not have manders in history have been better served An Air Operations Chronology posed a significant military by their air brethren. threat, but their political implica- Unity of Command August 2, 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait. tions forced the diversion of siz- Desert Storm featured two important el- August 6, 1990: The Independence able amounts of the air effort and ements of unity of command: a single joint arrives in the Gulf of Oman, the the attention of senior air com- first in an eventual buildup of six force air commander and a single air tasking manders. carrier battle groups. order that conveyed his instructions. The Some Navy and Marine offi- August 7, 1990: U.S. forces begin to JFACC exercised tactical control of sorties in cers complained of inadequate arrive in Saudi Arabia including Air that he provided “detailed and, usually, local Force tactical fighter aircraft, the support and a JFACC bias toward direction and control of movements and first of ten fighter wings deployed supporting Air Force units. But to the region. maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions their quarrel was more with the th or tasks assigned.” Historically, this type of August 14, 1990: The 7 Marine ground rules for tanker allocation Expeditionary Brigade arrives in control, combined with the requisite author- than application of those rules. Saudi Arabia. ity, was largely absent in Korea and Vietnam, The Air Force staff officers who August 22, 1990: The first Marine but COMAIRSOLS (the senior aviator in dominated the JFACC staff main- Corps tactical fighter aircraft arrive command of the air units in the Solomons) in Bahrain. tained that their overriding goal certainly exercised it from 1942 to 1944. was to increase the number of Late October and early November But there is an important distinction be- 1990: Massive air forces are quality weapons on Iraqi targets tween tactical control and command author- brought into the region to include regardless of which service pro- SAC tankers and Navy SLCM- ity. The JFACC did not command forces; he vided the strike aircraft. Because shooters which marked the transi- controlled their sorties when unity of effort tion from the defense of Saudi Ara- of geography, Navy aircraft re- was required and set conditions under bia to an offensive strategy for the quired more inorganic tanker sup- liberation of Kuwait. which sorties were flown in his operating port than Air Force aircraft per area. Navy, Marine, and some coalition air January 17, 1991: Combat air oper- ton of ordnance on target. ations start with the targeting of forces helped shape the ATO by designating As the air war progressed enemy centers of gravity, defenses, the sorties that would be made available for battlefield preparation, and support Army and Marine commanders tasking. And they did not always fly the of ground operations. “Proven became concerned that insuffi- Force”—an Air Force composite ATO. Individual commanders and flight cient attention was being paid to wing deployed from Incirlik, crews from the services free-lanced when the Turkey—begins combat sorties shaping and preparing the battle- ATO did not match conditions. against targets in northern Iraq. field for ground operations. Strate- While in some ways this sounds suspi- February 24, 1991: Ground offensive gic targets (such as command and ciously like coordination control and mis- begins after five weeks of continu- control, lines of communication, ous air attack. sion direction, there were subtle differences. and airfields) were being hit, but There was a joint force air commander from February 28, 1991: Cease-fire de- in their view enemy ground forces clared; Iraqi forces have been de- the start, and he had the authority that his in the field were neglected in tar- stroyed or neutralized by a combi- Air Force counterparts in Korea and Vietnam nation of ground- and air-delivered geting. This restiveness resulted in had wanted. There was a focal point for air firepower. the formation of a Joint Targeting planning and employment decisions that Board under the deputy CINC. was neither a committee nor a voluntary or- The job of this board was to play a ganization. Commanders who operated out- more active role in advising on air apportion- side the JFACC/ATO umbrella did so with ment decisions and in targeting Iraqi forces great care and only when they could justify of interest to U.S. ground commanders. This their decisions. Centralized control and de- alleged interference nettled Air Force officers, centralized execution became the norm, and who believed they had sufficient information free-lancing the exception. and staff support from all involved services to arrive at apportionment and targeting decisions. Despite these conflicting viewpoints,

98 JFQ / Summer 1993 Winnefeld and Johnson

But some old practices lived on. In spite possible to avoid some difficult apportion- of rhetoric to the contrary, the route package ment and allocation decisions. Jointness concept (albeit in a new form) still flour- often is used as a facade to cover single- ished in Desert Storm. Many Navy, Marine, service command structures and procedures. and Proven Force target sets were route pack- In many ways jointness still stops at the ages in all but name. Even the system of headquarters of the CINCs: they are the low- time-sharing target sets or “kill boxes” made est level at which joint staffs exist in most a reappearance. Liaison officers between the theaters. Desert Storm points to the useful- JFACC and the various service component ness of cadre joint air staffs and the capacity commanders continued to perform an essen- to fill them out very rapidly. tial function. A service component comman- What Desert Storm achieved was unity der who chose not to release sorties or to fly of control of air operations, not unity of the ATO still had an “out”; various force ele- command. Indeed, unity of control may be ments still complained about lack of support all that is needed. Unity of command for or failure to play by the rules. How can we tactical air forces may be a needlessly abra- account for these lapses or reversions and sive and overarching term to describe what still acknowledge Operation Desert Storm a is actually meant by tactical control. We can success? The answer is that despite the rejoice in the progress that has been made progress made toward since Vietnam in achieving a high degree of few ground commanders achieving real jointness, the jointness in the command and control of air in history have been United States once again operations; but it is too soon to say that we was able to buy its way out have done all or even most of what needs to better served by their air of command and control be done. JFQ brethren problems by the mass of its tactical air forces. It fought NOTES “big” but not always smart. 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Theater A better measure of progress in joint air Counterair Operations,” Joint Pub 3001.2 (Washington: operations is whether the command arrange- Government Printing Office, May 23, 1986). 2 Royal N. Moore, “Marine Air: There When Needed,” ments and doctrine would have worked with U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 117, no. 11 (Novem- only half the airpower. Seldom in the Gulf ber 1991), pp. 63–64. War did General Horner have to make the 3 Steven U. Ramsdell, “Trip Report” (Letter to the Di- kind of decisions that COMAIRSOLS had to rector of the Naval Historical Center), May 14, 1991. face daily—how to use his meager forces 4 Riley D. Mixon, “Where We Must Do Better,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 117, no. 8 (August 1991), against a strong and active enemy. Horner’s p. 38. problems were specialized, and he had time 5 Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC, “Spe- to solve them beforehand. For example, he cial Trust and Confidence among the Trailbreakers,” did not have too few tankers, but rather too U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 117, no. 11 (Novem- many fighter aircraft; he had to squeeze the ber 1991), p. 47. 6 U.S. Department of Defense, “Conduct of the Per- large number into a small area, not spread sian Gulf Conflict: Final Report to the Congress” (Wash- them thinly. His problems were traffic sepa- ington: Government Printing Office, April 1992), p. K–8. ration and mutual support, not hard choices between missions for scarce assets (tankers and SEAD excepted). But the genius of Gen- eral Horner was in gaining and excercising the minimum amount of control he needed to get the job done—and creating conditions that permitted the services to work effectively together. In sum, Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm were a major victory for U.S. and coalition arms. However, there remain important unresolved doctrinal issues as well as controversies over roles and missions. The abundance of resources available made it

Summer 1993 / JFQ 99 OPERATION WESERÜBUNG and the Origins of Joint Warfare By RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR., and CHRISTOPHER COGLIANESE

ilitary history campaign, recorded as an outstanding exam- finds few example of maneuver warfare at the operational ples of nations level, is also the first joint operation that in- M and armed forces volved significant land, sea, and air forces that consistently excel in ma- fighting under unified command. neuver warfare based upon Because it preceded the better-known speed, focus, decentralized exe- Gelb attack on the Low Countries by just one cution, high levels of initiative, month, the invasion of Scandinavia (code- and strong small-unit leader- named Operation Weserübung) has received ship. The German military in World War II scant attention from most historians. Never- was such an organization. It is credited, in theless, it is still worth studying by practi- particular, with mastering the operational tioners of the operational art since it is re- level of war. But one brilliant operation, the plete with examples of successfully invasion of Scandinavia in 1940, has almost implemented tenets of maneuver-based doc- been reduced to a historical footnote. That trine. It also demonstrates the importance of

Summary

The German military genius for maneuver warfare is well illustrated by an often overlooked operation of World War II, the invasion of Scandinavia in 1940. Operation Weserübung also warrants examination because it was joint in execution and demonstrates that the German army, navy, and air force—Wehrmacht, Kriegs- marine, and Luftwaffe—could fight as a team even if rivalry among the headquarters of the services made Hitler the operation’s unified commander by fault. A combination of speed, surprise, and daring enabled the German armed forces to defy the Royal Navy by transporting troops directly to their objectives along the Norwegian coast. Furthermore, quickness and dash baffled the hapless Norwegians and beleaguered Allied forces. The lessons of this operation were not lost on the British for the balance of the war and remain relevant today as a case study in joint warfare and the operational art.

100 Hooker and Coglianese

the linkages between the opera- the first joint operation that involved tional art and strategy and between the various arms and ser- significant land, sea, and air forces vices which typically cooperate in joint campaigns. Although more in May 1940 forced the Allies (British, than five decades have passed, French, and a smattering of Poles) to entirely the problems and challenges in- pull out of Norway in an effort to stave off herent in modern joint opera- disaster on the Western Front. This final ele- tions stand clearly revealed in ment, essentially based on good fortune, Weserübung. saved beleaguered German forces at Narvik In this operation, Germany and permitted the Germans to complete employed a joint force of army, their conquest of Norway. navy, and air force units in a cen- Strategic and Operational Planning trally planned, simultaneous as- The German High Command turned its sault, along multiple avenues of gaze toward Scandinavia soon after the suc- approach and against numerous cessful invasion of Poland. While preferring key objectives. Execution was to keep Scandinavia neutral, German plan- highly decentralized, with a min- ners feared that Britain and France might vi- imal need for excessive com- German troops olate Norwegian neutrality in order to posi- mand and control structures that are the embarking for the tion forces for an attack on Germany’s invasion. hallmark of modern military organizations. northern flank.1 Hitler repeatedly argued Furthermore, the assigned objectives accu- with the Army High Command (Oberkom- rately identified and exploited Allied centers mando des Heeres or OKH) that if he did not of gravity. Pitting strength against weakness, act first, the British would establish them- the Germans crushed the Danes in one day selves in the neutral ports. German naval and destroyed Norwegian resistance in less commanders than two months, despite the arrival of a siz- touted Norway’s able number of British and French troops. suitability as a This stunning success was based on a few staging area for simple factors. First, the Germans had good surface, air, and intelligence that led to accurate appreciations submarine opera- of enemy strengths and weaknesses thereby tions to gain con- enabling them to focus on critical enemy trol over the Nor- vulnerabilities. Second, they applied their wegian Sea and strengths—including airpower, surprise, and support eventual well-led professional forces—against Allied operations against weaknesses such as timid commanders, inef- Britain, which in fective mobilization systems, and a vulnera- turn would facili- ble command and control network. tate access to the General-Admiral Saalwächter, Third, the bold use of German warships the supreme commander North Atlantic.2 to carry troops to their objectives in the teeth of naval forces deployed to An important con- of the Royal Navy led directly to operational Norway. sideration was ac- success in the campaign. Fourth, Norwegian cess to Swedish regular forces were outnumbered, ill- iron ore, which supplied German war indus- equipped, poorly organized and led, and gen- tries and which traveled overland from erally neglected. Simultaneous multiple blows Kiruna in Sweden to Narvik in Norway and aimed at key points throughout the country thence along the Norwegian coastline to paralyzed the Norwegian decisionmaking German ports in the Baltic. structure, thus allowing Hitler, who had exercised supreme mili- early successes against tary command since February 1938, was also unprepared defenders. Major Richard D. Hooker, Jr., USA, is a influenced by the tentative steps taken by Finally, the Ger- member of the National Security Council the French and British to reinforce Finland man invasion of France Staff and Second Lieutenant Christopher during the Winter War (which he inter- Coglianese, USA, is a platoon leader with preted as proof of their malicious intentions the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Summer 1993 / JFQ 101 OPERATION WESERÜBUNG

2000 hours, April 7 1200 hours, April 8

0 200 miles 0 200 miles

NARVIK NARVIK Vestfjord Vestfjord

TRONDHEIM TRONDHEIM

BERGEN BERGEN OSLO OSLO SCAPA FLOW SCAPA FLOW STOCKHOLM STOCKHOLM Stavanger Arendal Stavanger Arendal Kristiansand Kattegat Egersond Egersond KristiansandK atteget

ROSYTH ROSYTH COPENHAGEN COPENHAGEN

KEIL KEIL WILHELMSHAVEN WILHELMSHAVEN German cruisers German cruisers German destroyers THE NETHERLANDS German destroyers THE NETHERLANDS British cruisers LONDON LONDON British cruisers British destroyers FRANCE British destroyers FRANCE Naval bases Naval bases

n April 7 German naval units were sailing at top speed to- y noon on April 8 the Germans had already passed Trond- Oward Trondheim. At the British Admiralty, no one believed Bheim. The British were still northwest and south of Bergen, that Norway was the target: the German ships were expected to whereas further south, unbeknown to the British, German slip into the Atlantic in order to attack Allied convoys. naval groups were fast approaching the southern tip of Norway.

Source. Maps and narrative adapted from Norway 1940 by François Kersaudy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

fast warships of in Scandinavia) and later by the The navy (Kriegsmarine) staff worked out the German fleet Altmark incident when British an expanded version of Studie Nord between sailors boarded a German vessel in January 14 and 19, 1940, that reached two could be used Norwegian territorial waters to free important conclusions. First, surprise would as troop transports 300 British POWs. be absolutely essential to the success of the for part of the On December 14, 1939, Hitler operation. If surprise could be achieved Nor- ordered the Armed Forces High wegian resistance would be negligible, and assault force Command (Oberkommando der the only significant threat would be British Wehrmacht or OKW) to conduct ships on patrol off the coast of Norway, orig- preliminary planning for the invasion of inally believed to be one or two cruisers. Sec- Norway. The plan, known as Studie Nord, in- ond, the planners concluded that fast war- cluded reports submitted by the staffs of ships of the German fleet could be used as each of the services. Given its keen interest troop transports for part of the assault force. in the matter, the navy’s report was the most This use of the surface fleet would overcome exhaustive. The dominance of naval plan- the range limitations on air transport and ning derives in part from the involvement allow for the simultaneous occupation of by the army and air force in the preparations for the upcoming invasion of France and the Low Countries, known as Plan Gelb.

102 JFQ / Summer 1993 Hooker and Coglianese

1400–1600 hours, April 8

0 200 miles

NARVIK Vestfjord

TRONDHEIM

BERGEN OSLO SCAPA FLOW STOCKHOLM Stavanger Arendal Egersond Kristiansand

ROSYTH

COPENHAGEN

KEIL WILHELMSHAVEN German cruisers THE NETHERLANDS German destroyers LONDON British cruisers FRANCE British destroyers Naval bases German troops successfully land at all locations from Oslo to n mid-afternoon on April 8 the Germans changed courses sev- the junior and untested Narvik, a unique eral times. A British plane spotted the German naval group I service to plan and con- accomplishment in heading west, and radioed the message back to base. As a result, trol. Second, Hitler was the history of naval British ships headed west, thus losing any chance of blocking the warfare. German landings. venting his rage at the air force over an incident earlier in the month when a Luftwaffe major carrying Gelb was forced down in Belgium thereby letting the invasion plan get into Al- lied hands.5 numerous points on the Norwegian coast, On February 5 a joint planning staff was 3 including Narvik. assembled at OKW to prepare detailed plans These two conclusions revealed daring for the invasion. Significantly, the opera- and a “bias for action” which permeated the tions staffs of the services were excluded German armed forces and had already been from the planning process. The principal exhibited in the Polish invasion. The study planner was Captain Theodor Krancke, com- called for landings along the entire Norwe- manding officer of the cruiser Admiral Scheer, gian coast from Oslo to Tromso. On January assisted by a small number of army and air 20, 1940, the report was submitted to Hitler force officers. and the following day he ordered the creation Studie Nord had initially called for only of a special staff within the OKW dedicated to one division of army troops.6 But Krancke’s formulating operational plans for plan established a requirement for a corps of 4 Weserübung. Hitler apparently had at least army troops consisting of an airborne divi- two reasons for bypassing the air force, which sion, a mountain division, a motorized rifle would play the dominant role in the actual brigade, and six reinforced infantry regi- operation, and taking personal control of We- ments. Small parachute units were to seize serübung. First, he probably thought that the selected airfields so that follow-on forces operation was too complex and ambitious for could arrive by air. Krancke identified six operational objectives which, if simultaneously

Summer 1993 / JFQ 103 OPERATION WESERÜBUNG

captured, would cripple the country militar- Denmark should be occupied as a land ily and politically and achieve the strategic bridge to Norway.11 Although the size of the goals established by Hitler, namely:7 landing force was ultimately raised to six di- ▼ Oslo, the capital visions, daring and surprise, not overwhelm- ▼ the populated southern coastal areas ing force, remained the plan’s basis. If resis- ▼ Bergen, a major southern port and likely tance was encountered, landings were to be British landing site in the event of counter-attack forced, beachheads secured, and nearby Nor- ▼ Trondheim, a major rail terminus and the wegian army mobilization centers occu- key to control of central Norway pied.12 The inability of the Norwegians to ▼ Narvik, the chief city in northern Norway mobilize was their Achilles Heel—a critical and the crucial rail link to Swedish ore fields vulnerability and obvious target for German ▼ Tromso and Finnmark (northernmost military action. areas of Norway) The final plan assigned the 3 d Mountain The loss of ports and airfields in those Division and five untested infantry divi- areas was expected not only to crush Norwe- sions—the 69th, 163d, 181st, 196th, and 214th— gian resistance at the outset but also to fore- to the conquest of Norway under command stall intervention by the western powers of XXI Group. Three divisions made up the until it was too late. Seeking security in initial assault echelon while the remainder boldness and enterprise, the Germans in- were scheduled to reinforce thereafter (a sev- tended a large scale coup de main to dislocate enth division, the 2 d Mountain, was added their true opponents, the British and French, later).13 The air force contributed three com- by preempting their intervention in Norway panies of parachute troops to seize airfields through the simultaneous attack and occu- (in the German military the air force, not the pation of all the important points in the army, owned airborne forces). country. The initial landing detachments were To do this, Krancke’s plan called for small, with the bulk of invasion forces slated moving German troops by both air and sea. to arrive by air and transport ship in subse- Only a sudden descent on the Norwegian quent echelons during the first week. In the coast and rapid buildup of forces by airlift south, the 170 th and 198 th Infantry Divi- and sealift (supported primarily by sions, supported by the 11th Motorized tactical aviation) offered the hope of Brigade, formed XXXI Corps for the assault success without interference by the on Denmark. X Air Corps, a very large orga- Royal Navy. Both the large scale use nization of some 1,000 aircraft of all types, of warships as assault troop trans- was tasked to keep the Royal Navy at bay ports and the strategic movement of and supply German forces by air.14 large troop formations by air were innovations in modern warfare. Lightning Strikes The German intent was to in- Hitler’s initial desire to place all We- duce the Danes and Norwegians to serübung forces under a single army com- surrender quickly without a fight. mander was not realized. Despite his status To ensure this Hitler ordered the as Supreme Warlord, and the obvious opera- immediate capture of the kings of tional advantages of unified command, 8 Hitler was unable or unwilling to overrule Generaloberst von Falkenhorst. Denmark and Norway. The Ger- mans believed that seizing both the strong objections of the navy and air monarchs would shatter resistance at the force, which rebelled at the idea of placing outset and lead to a bloodless occupation. large naval and air forces under a land force After the Altmark incident on February officer. The operation remained under 14, 1940, Hitler appointed General Nikolaus Hitler’s personal command (exercised von Falkenhorst to prepare forces for the through the OKW operations staff). Falken- coup de main to take the Norwegian ports.9 horst was designated the senior commander, General der Infanterie von Falkenhorst was a exercising no direct command authority mountain warfare expert who had acquired over naval and air forces. In the official after some experience in Nordic operations as a action report, German commanders noted result of German operations in the Baltic in that the harmonious cooperation achieved 1918.10 Falkenhorst quickly concluded that

104 JFQ / Summer 1993 Hooker and Coglianese

by the engaged forces was a compliment to man landings completely paralyzed civilian the personalities and professionalism of the and military leaders in both Denmark and commanders involved, but not a result of Norway, as well as the Allies. Denmark was command arrangements, which they recog- quickly overrun on the first day, allowing nized as unsatisfactory.15 German close air support operations to be Mindful of signs that the Allies were staged from landing fields in Jutland. Nor- preparing to occupy Scandinavia first (British wegian coastal defenders put up a sharp planning, code-named Wilfred, was far ad- fight in the Oslo Fjord, sinking the cruiser vanced and British forces did indeed lay Blücher (with the staff of 163d Infantry divi- mines in Norwegian waters on April 8), Hitler sion aboard) and delaying conquest of the ordered Weserübung to begin early on the capital by half a day. (Oslo fell that after- morning of April 9, 1940, with landings at noon to a few companies of troops which Oslo, Bergen, Kristiansand, Trondheim, and flew into Fornebu airport.) Except at Narvik, Narvik. Supply ships camouflaged as mer- the remaining landings met only minimal chant vessels actually preceded the assault resistance. After clashing with landbased air- ships and lay in wait in Norwegian harbors. craft and small destroyer units on April 9, Despite some intelligence indicators, British the Royal Navy drew off, permitting the re- surface units were not deployed to detect mainder of the German assault echelons to large-scale German movements. The British land unimpeded. Except for the successful fleet, with troops embarked to conduct their escape by the Norwegian Royal family, the own landings in Norway, did sortie on April 7 day was one of breathtaking success for the from Scapa Flow, but the fleet did not inter- German armed forces. Troop transport cept the fast-moving German ships or inter- The ineptness of the Norwegian army aircraft enroute rupt their landing operations. In a tragic was a significant factor in the planning and to Norway. blunder, the Royal actual success of the campaign.16 General Navy marched off its Laake, Norwegian army commander in soldiers and steamed chief, was selected for the post less for his away in search of military prowess than for a willingness to German battlecruisers deeply cut the military budget.17 On the day reported in the area, of the invasion he was reluctant for many leaving Falkenhorst hours to grasp what was happening. When to carry out his land- he finally did realize that his country was ing operations unop- under attack he returned to headquarters to posed. find it deserted. Among those who had de- The magnitude parted was Laake’s aide who had taken the and speed of the Ger- general’s uniforms with him. Lacking even a personal vehicle, Laake tried to catch up with his headquarters by public transport—a As the first Germans land at Oslo airport at symbol of the debacle that afflicted the Nor- 1000 hours on April 9, wegian army that day.18 a cloud of smoke The mobilization centers were under marks a downed constant assault, and weapons depots and British aircraft in the mobilization lists fell into German hands distance. before Norwegian reservists could assemble. However, hundreds of young men came streaming out of the cities and towns to join General Ruge, who was appointed commander in chief after the invasion. His highly improvised force was untrained and included make-shift battalions and companies with little equipment. The troops were unable to maneuver and deemed useless for of-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 105 OPERATION WESERÜBUNG

0 25 miles ments and complete the occupa-

Allied operation tion of Norway. German defence perimeter The first effective blow by the Allies came on the morning

Sørreissa Grong Namsos of April 13 and was a disaster for Bangsund Hjella Snaasa Lake Snaasa German naval fortunes. Follow- Bardufoss Follafoss Sunnan rd Kirknesvåg Steinkjer sfjo ing a failed air attack from the g Sjøvegan Vist aa Salangen R¿ra V Brettingen Verdal Agdenes Hysnes British carrier Furious against Harstad Assen Trondheimfjord Fossbakken TRONDHEIM Trondheim the previous day, a Vaernes Elnenes Kristiansund Vinje Gratangen Skaanland British destroyer group com- St¿ren y ø Bjerkvik Elvegaard n Bøgen in manded by Admiral Sir Charles H Kugerg

Meby Haugfjell Bjørnfjell Åndalsnes Opdal Forbes encountered German sur- Romsdalen Ofotsfjord Ankenes R¿r¿s Ballangen face units screening landing Beisfjord Hjerkinn Tynset

Dombås forces off Narvik. Supported by Gudbrandsdalen the battleship Warspite, British

German offensive destroyers advanced into the Allied offensive fjords and engaged German Operations in northern Norway until 0 50 miles Østerdalen ships sheltered there. Unable to May 27, 1940 (above). Operations in reach the open sea the Germans central Norway, April 1940 (right). ships fought until their fuel and ammunition were exhausted, and then were beached by their fensive operations. Furthermore, most had commanders or sunk by British gunfire. The never trained with artillery, planes, or tanks. losses, combined with those of the previous Despite barriers blown Some units would eventually get organized days, deprived the German navy of half its from the rock German and fight effectively, but except for brief destroyer force and dealt its surface fleet a soldiers advance northward. clashes here and there, blow from which Germany never recovered. Norwegian opposition at In marked contrast to their earlier indeci- the outset was sporadic sion, the Allies now moved to break the Ger- and ineffectual.19 In man hold on central and northern Norway. agony, Norway could On April 14, a party of Royal Marines landed only hope that the Allies at Namsos, 127 miles north of Trondheim, would arrive soon.20 followed days later by the 146 th Infantry Brigade and the French 5 th Demi-Brigade of The Allies Respond Chasseurs-Alpins (mountain troops). On April Fear of German air- 18, the 148 th Brigade landed at Andalsnes power and the rapidity and, five days later, the 15 th Brigade disem- with which the Germans barked at Gudbrandsdal for the drive to re- manned Norwegian air take Trondheim. Thus, by April 23, four Allied and coastal defenses kept brigades together with naval support were po- the Allies from striking sitioned to the north and south of Trond- back in the south. In heim, assisted by 6,000 Norwegian troops. both central and north- Against these numerically superior ern Norway, however, forces the German commander in Trond- which were farther re- heim, General Kurt Woytasch, could initially moved from German air- deploy only seven infantry battalions. Nev- bases, an Allied riposte ertheless, he responded vigorously by push- seemed more feasible. In ing out strong parties to the north and south a race against time Allied to deny the Allies use of the limited road Field Marshal Milch, planners strove to mount net. Calling for reinforcements and air sup- commander of the a relief expedition before German forces port, Woytasch counterpunched aggressively air fleet deployed to could organize for defense, even as German Norway. at Steinkjer to the north, stopping the cau- units raced north along the valleys and tiously advancing Allied units in their tracks. coastal roads to link up with isolated detach- Assisted by German forces pushing up from the south, which drew off the British threat

106 JFQ / Summer 1993 Hooker and Coglianese

cruisers and destroyers were Allied attack 0 50 miles Bjerkvik German defense perimiter Elvegaard massing off Narvik and the first German counter offensive German offensive Meby Allied offensive Iron ore railway detachments of British troops ar- Troldvik Meråker 0 2 TRONDHEIM Kristiansund rived to join the fleet. Gjelsvik miles St¿ren Bud Molde The German situation in

Herjangsfjord

Andalsnes n Narvik was tenuous from the Seines ale R¿ros Verma Lilleberg Lesjaskog sterd outset. The loss of sea control Hjerkinn Ø ¯yord Tynset Ofotsfijord Geiranger Larvik Rombaksfjord Dombås Alvdal had prevented German rein- Djupviken Forneset Haugfjell Orneset Rendal Taraldsvik Fagerjorden Otta Lillevik Sj¿a forcements from reaching the Kvam Framnes Skole d Kuberg R Larvik area. The 3 Mountain Division, Str¿msnes om Taraldsvikfjell b Tretten Nybergsund Ankenes NARVIK aksb ¯yer otn Lillehammer Åmot under the command of General Rena FagernesNybord th Sildvik Hamar Elverum Eduard Dietl (less its 138 Beisfjord Bergen S¿rma Mountain Infantry Regiment Hundalen Skreia Tangen Brandbu R¿a Eidsvoll which was attacking Trondheim The capture of Narvik, May 28, 1940. Jessheim Kjongsvinger to the south) found itself cut off Kjeller Haugesund from the rest of the country. Days after his successful seizure Stayanger of Narvik, Dietl was only able to muster 2,000 mountain in- Egersund fantrymen together with 2,600 disembarked sailors. Fully 1,200 miles from Germany and cut off Operations in southern Norway during April 1940. from weak German garrisons to the south, Dietl and his mountain troopers waited grimly for the counterblow to fall. The British Imperial General Staff be- to his rear, Woytasch easily dealt lieved that an Allied success at Narvik would with the half-hearted thrusts of go far to restore their flagging fortunes. Aside the French and British. from denying the German war machine the Although their losses were Swedish iron ore it so desperately needed, a General Dietl. light, the combination of a pugna- convincing defeat of the isolated German cious opponent and devastating air attacks forces in north Norway would boost Allied on their bases at Andalsnes and Namsos con- morale and prick the German aura of invinci- vinced the Allied commanders that their sit- bility. Yet the reasoning of the General Staff uation was hopeless. On May 3 the last Al- was fundamentally misplaced. By dissipating lied troops sailed away from Namsos just precious naval and air forces in two separate ahead of the advancing German troops, pre- efforts—the attempts to retake first Trond- cipitating the surrender of 2,000 Norwegian heim and then Narvik—they ensured the troops in the area. Outnumbered by more failure of both, while a resounding success by than six to one, the supremely confident stronger forces at Trondheim would have es- Group Trondheim force and their able com- tablished Allied forces ashore in possession of mander inflicted an embarrassing defeat, fur- a good port, rendering the small German ther eroding Allied confidence. Southern contingent in Narvik irrelevant.21 and central Norway now lay firmly in Allied ground operations in the north Hitler’s grip. began in earnest on April 24 as four Norwe- Epic at Narvik gian battalions attacked Dietl’s outposts at German airpower—demonstrating Gratangen, supported by a French brigade range, speed, and firepower unprecedented which landed four days later. In early May a in modern warfare—had played a key role in second French brigade and a Polish brigade the battles around Trondheim, but range arrived; with the addition of British forces the and weather limitations greatly restricted the Allies built their strength up to 24,500 troops. ability of the Luftwaffe to support German forces at Narvik far to the north. Even as the first troops went ashore at Andalsnes, British

Summer 1993 / JFQ 107 OPERATION WESERÜBUNG

British naval forces were further strengthened troops were too exhausted even to retreat with a battleship and aircraft carrier. southward towards the advancing relief Dietl’s problems columns. He planned to give up the city if throughout the campaign, were mounting quickly. the Allies persisted in their offensive and to planners and commanders The Allies were building hold a bridgehead on the railroad, but this up their forces far faster would depend on speedy reinforcements, ensured that tactical than the Germans (on something the Germans had not anticipated. concerns were subordinated April 18 Hitler ordered Otherwise, there was no alternative except to to strategic and operational that no new forces would cross into Sweden and request internment. be committed to Narvik). Group XXI requested permission for Dietl to requirements The German troops in do so should enemy action necessitate it. Narvik were exposed to Hoping for a miracle, the 3 d Mountain Divi- continuous shelling from destroyers lying sion (actually no more than a weak regiment offshore. Freezing temperatures, fog, and by this time) prepared for the end. snow hampered mobility and sapped the Dietl got his miracle. With pressure morale even of the tough mountain soldiers. from XXI Group and OKW, Hitler approved The naval companies were untrained in land limited reinforcements (Plan Gelb was under- warfare and armed only with captured Nor- way by then and diverting large formations wegian weapons. Moreover, food and am- to Norway would draw strong opposition munition stocks were dangerously low. from his commanders in France). On May Despite these vulnerabilities Dietl re- 14, a token force of 66 paratroopers arrived. sisted stubbornly, aided by a curious lack of Over the next three weeks a parachute bat- energy and aggressiveness by the two British talion and two companies of mountain in- commanders, Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of fantry (hastily trained in parachute opera- Cork and Orrery and General P.J. Mackesy. tions) were dropped into Narvik. Lacking the troops, ar- These forces enabled Dietl to hold on tillery, and air support long enough for the full weight of the inva- needed to conduct major sion of the Low Countries to make itself felt engagements, the Ger- on the Allies. Although finally compelled to mans fought delaying ac- give up Narvik to vastly superior forces on tions to maintain a pre- May 28, the remnants of 3 d Mountain Divi- carious foothold in sion continued to fight astride the Kiruna Narvik as well as control rail line. On June 8, 1940, the Allies secretly over the rail line leading evacuated the Narvik area. The next day the eastward to Sweden. The Norwegian Command signed an armistice Norwegian forces mov- ending the fighting and giving Germany ing down from the north total control of Norway. 23 The German repu- made slow but steady tation as an undefeated force remained in- progress. Although the tact and, in honor of their heroic stand, 2 d Mountain Division Dietl’s mountain troopers were awarded a was pushing hard from sleeve device commemorating their service Narvik harbor. Trondheim to relieve at Narvik during the battle. Dietl (at one point marching 90 miles in The Aftermath four days over terrain determined to be im- The true strategic significance of the passable by British intelligence officers 22), German conquest of Norway and Denmark distance, poor weather, and lack of roads remains in dispute. Possession of the en- were daunting obstacles. trance to the Baltic and effective control On May 13, under attack from both over the Scandinavian peninsula secured north and south and suffering from constant Germany against attack from the north until bombardment from sea and continuous the end of the war. German submarine and threat of landing, Dietl informed OKW air units gained bases for attacks against through XXI Group that the situation at Britain and later Allied resupply convoys Narvik was critical. Dietl reported that his being run into Murmansk. Sweden was cowed into remaining neutral for the rest of

108 JFQ / Summer 1993 Hooker and Coglianese

the war. Germany was Although few of the units employed in also enabled to support the campaign had served in Poland, com- Finland in its second war manders were sure of the tactical superiority against the Soviets from of their leaders, soldiers, and doctrine. They 1941 to 1944 which tied had demonstrated this superiority in virtu- up large numbers of Red ally every engagement with Allied troops. army troops at minimal Where French, British, Polish, and Norwe- cost to the Germans. gian units displayed hesitation, indecision, These gains must be and timidity, the Germans showed dash, ag- weighed against the loss gressiveness, and tenacity under extremely of German surface ship- adverse conditions. Particularly at Trond- ping, the requirement to heim and Narvik, the Germans faced numer- maintain large forces in ous obstacles: bad weather, naval inferiority, Scandinavia, and the rel- unfavorable force ratios, poor roads, and fail- ative ineffectiveness of ing resupply. Their triumph was as much a air and naval operations victory over the hardships of northern war- subsequently launched fare as it was a decisive strategic setback for An armed German against the British Isles the Allies. troop train moving to from Norway. On balance, and given the A key lesson is that resolute leadership link up with forces in the north. fact that U.S. intervention and defeat in Rus- can keep the hope of victory alive when ev- sia lay in an uncertain future, it is difficult to erything else indicates otherwise. Outnum- be too critical of German strategy. Britain bered and outgunned, the Germans continu- would have undoubtedly occupied Norway, ously held because of their superior will. and possibly Denmark, had Germany not Certainly luck played a part in the outcome, done so, with clear implications for the inva- but had Falkenhorst or Dietl succumbed to sion of France and the Low Countries. their fears, the outcome of the Norwegian As an illustration of mastery of the oper- campaign might have been different. Well- ational art, however, Weserübung has few his- trained and well-led troops who were able to torical rivals. Throughout the campaign Ger- improvise when necessary, the effective use man planners and commanders ensured that of sailors in service-support roles, and the ca- tactical concerns were subordinated to strate- pability to fall back smartly and shorten the gic and operational requirements. Early tacti- line when required combined to give the cal engagements, widely separated in space Germans a marked advantage. Lesser com- and in some cases in time, were considered manders, unable to fight when cut off, who in light of the operational plan and not al- had limited reinforcements and whose logis- lowed to take on existences of their own; the tics were always straining, who feared taking decision not to sacrifice the campaign or dis- risks when necessary, and whose lines of rupt Gelb to save a desperate situation in communication were never secured would Narvik is only the most obvious example. have quickly capitulated. In planning and executing the cam- Dietl in particular, a strong product of paign, Krancke and Falkenhorst showed an the German military education, took all impressive ability to distinguish between risk these disadvantages in stride. Even had the and foolhardiness. Where the British dis- Allies not pulled out, significant overland, missed the chances of landing large forma- seaborne, and airborne reinforcements were tions in the teeth of the Royal Navy,24 Ger- on the verge of being committed to the de- man planners correctly surmised that speed, fense of north Norway following the collapse surprise, and airpower combined to give We- of the West if only German commanders serübung a good chance of success. While the could induce their troops to hold out.25 Here, campaign is occasionally interpreted as a a superior attitude and will to win, funda- desperate gamble, the Germans undoubtedly mentals of success in any endeavor, helped saw it as a bold venture with better than overcome a potentially disastrous situation. even odds of victory. They had good reason to be confident.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 109 OPERATION WESERÜBUNG

The Significance of Weserübung In so doing the Germans directed their In what sense did Weserübung demon- strengths—that is, speed, shock, tempo, air- strate maneuver warfare at the operational power, and superior tactical prowess— level of war? First and most importantly, the against the weaknesses of a less resolute ad- Nordic campaign reveals a characteristic pre- versary and crushed its will to fight. occupation with achieving a rapid decision. Falkenhorst and XXI Group neither fought Like Gelb, its more famous sibling, We- nor planned to win a campaign of attrition. serübung shunned a systematic advance Though the casualties on both sides were through the enemy’s territory in favor of a roughly equivalent (with those of the Ger- series of lightning strikes designed to knock man navy and air force significantly the enemy out of the fight at the start. This higher),26 German morale remained steadfast obsession with decisive battle, which obvi- throughout the campaign while the Allies ates the need for protracted and costly cam- showed little heart for the fight. paigning, is perhaps the most defining fea- As a laboratory for future joint opera- ture of maneuver warfare. tions, the German invasion of Scandinavia In comparing German and Allied opera- broke new ground in the history of war. One tional planning and command and control lesson was that cooperation among the ser- during the war, striking differences appear. vices was an absolute precondition for suc- The German decision-action cycle, which cess. Unlike the major land battles of World operated on the basis of brief mission orders, War I and the Polish campaign, Operation was crisper and faster. Whereas the British Weserübung required the full integration of passion for detailed planning and ponderous land, sea, and air forces, with each service re- execution revealed itself at every turn, the sponding aggressively. The Wehrmacht im- Germans emphasized proved on its performance in Poland, the German system granted mobility, speed, and demonstrating tactical superiority over its tempo—or in the words enemies and a willingness to cooperate with, maximum independence to of Confederate General and rely upon, the other services for its very subordinate commanders, re- Nathan Bedford Forrest, survival. The surface fleet of the Kriegsma- quiring only that they remain they consistently got rine, grossly inferior to the British navy, suf- there “first with the fered extraordinary losses but succeeded in faithful to the operational most.” The German sys- getting its assault forces ashore and covering goals of the campaign tem granted maximum their deployment inland. The Luftwaffe con- independence to subor- ducted perhaps the most challenging air op- dinate commanders, re- erations up to that time. Flying at extended quiring only that they remain faithful to the ranges in miserable weather, with primitive operational goals of the campaign. While refueling and ground control, German pilots the Allies advanced cautiously and methodi- provided much of the strategic mobility and cally, the Germans fought with greater fluid- most of the fire support for the army (which ity, focusing more on the enemy and less on lacked heavy artillery). Their contribution retention of specific terrain features. was decisive.27 One difference was the strong preference As previously noted, Operation Weserü- for methodical battle shown by the Allies and bung command arrangements were unsatis- the absence of that approach on the part of factory. Although the principle of unified the Germans. It is almost impossible to imag- operational command was sound, Hitler and ine the British tossing isolated detachments the OKW staff could not effectively exercise along 1,200 miles of coastline, hoping to link command and control over theater opera- them up later, and in the face of a much tions from Germany, and no joint command stronger enemy navy, bad flying weather, and structure existed on the ground in Norway. large amphibious counterattacks. The Ger- German commanders also did not have the man planning relied on a sudden disruption benefit of comprehensive joint doctrine or of Norwegian mobilization and simultane- training prior to the operation. ously seizing all likely landing sites suitable Nevertheless, Operation Weserübung was for Allied reinforcements, with little regard an outstanding success. As capable leaders for secure flanks or a continuous front.

110 JFQ / Summer 1993 Hooker and Coglianese

do, the German commanders worked NOTES together harmoniously to achieve the opera- 1 tional goals that they understood thor- B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970), p. 52. oughly. Individual service prerogatives were 2 B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New in the main consciously subordinated to York: Quill, 1979), p. 37. joint considerations, the only real standard 3 Matthew Cooper, The German Army (Chelsea, that counts. While later in the war Germany Mich.: Scarborough, 1991), p. 191. 4 would pay dearly for lacking organizational François Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 43. and doctrinal frameworks for the conduct of 5 Earl F. Ziemke, “The German Decision to Invade joint warfare, in Norway the efforts to pro- Norway and Denmark” in Command Decisions (Washing- mote jointness among the services con- ton: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1960), p. 58. tributed to a shining victory. 6 Earl F. Ziemke, The German Theater of Northern Opera- Compared to many operations later in tions (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), p. 13. 7 Ibid., p. 15. the war, Weserübung was minor. Despite 8 Kersaudy, Norway 1940, p. 49. Hitler’s expectation that Britain would not 9 Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, p. 37. abandon its strategic aim of cutting off ac- 10 Ziemke, The German Theater of Northern Operations, cess to raw materials,28 German forces in p. 16. 11 Norway were not attacked save for com- John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990), pp. 50-51. mando raids. As an isolated operation, We- 12 Ziemke, Command Decisions, pp. 62–64. serübung was a resounding success for the 13 Christopher Buckley, Norway. The Commandos. German armed forces. The conquest was Dieppe (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951), achieved without a material reduction of p. 10. 14 forces on the Western Front or interference In all the Luftwaffe lifted 29,280 troops and 2,376 tons of supplies during the first weeks of the invasion, with preparations for Gelb. Moreover, the an impressive feat given the bad flying weather and the operation was the first to be carried out small size of transport aircraft at that time. Ziemke, The under a unified command system.28 German Theater of Northern Operations, p. 56. The conquest of Norway and Denmark 15 Ziemke, Ibid., p. 32. 16 is an interesting and worthwhile case for stu- Kersaudy, Norway 1940, p. 68. 17 Ibid. dents of joint warfare and the operational 18 Ibid., pp. 68 and 72. art. Many of the lessons from Weserübung re- 19 Bernard Ash, Norway 1940 (London: Cassell, 1964), main valid today when complex joint opera- p. 44. tions mounted over great distances have be- 20 Ibid., p. 109. 21 come the norm. Although the technology Ash, Norway 1940, p. 98. 22 Ziemke, The German Theater of Northern Operations, base changes rapidly, campaigns and battles p. 97. between comparable adversaries ultimately 23 Ibid., pp. 102–104. are a clash of wills. In that sense Operation 24 J.L. Moulton, The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 Weserübung is still instructive. JFQ (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1967), p. 60. 25 Ziemke, The German Theater of Northern Operations, p. 104. 26 The Germans lost 1,317 dead and 2,374 at sea; the For an appreciation of how the German Luftwaffe had 127 combat aircraft shot down while British attacks on the Kriegsmarine succeeded in the sink- army turned adversity into military ad- ing of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 10 destroyers, and vantage during the interwar years, see the 6 submarines. The British lost 1,896 troops and 2,500 review of The Roots of Blitzkrieg on pages sailors, as well as 1 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser, 7 destroyers, 125–127 in this issue of JFQ. and 4 submarines. The French and Poles combined suffered 530 dead while the Norwegians lost 1,335. A total of 87 Allied airplanes were shot down. See Ziemke, The German Theater of Northern Operations, p. 109. 27 Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1992), p. 154. 28 Cooper, The German Army, pp. 258, 267, 492; Ziemke, Command Decisions, p. 68.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 111 cation Center, and the U.S. Army Doctrine Training and Doctrine Command. JOINT DOCTRINE The synergistic effect of this EYE ON NORFOLK community of doctrine developers in PUBLICATIONS With the establishment of the the Tidewater area of Virginia will be Since the passage of the DOD Navy Doctrine Center at Norfolk further enhanced by the establish- Reorganization Act of 1986 there has Naval Base in March 1993 and the ment of the Joint Warfighting Center been a steady stream of publications stand-up of the Air Force Doctrine in the near future [see insert on the on joint doctrine as well as on joint Center at Langley Air Force Base opposite page]. Moreover, the prox- tactics, techniques, and procedures scheduled for July, Norfolk and envi- imity of U.S. Atlantic Command (JTTP). Taken collectively these pub- rons have become the undisputed with its expanded joint training mis- lications are having a significant im- capital of doctrinal development. sion will facilitate the evaluation, pact that reaches far beyond the This concentration of joint, interser- testing, and sequencing of joint doc- doctrinal development community. vice, and service doctrine activity in- trine [which is described in “A New The joint publication system is com- cludes—in addition to the new Navy Mission for Atlantic Command” on prised of 192 titles, of which about and Air Force centers—the Joint Doc- pages 80–87 of this issue]. JFQ 130 are currently in various stages of trine Center, the Air Land Sea Appli- development or revision. A useful

A Common Perspective Recent and Forthcoming Joint Publications

Number Title Final Approval Taking its name from a phrase in Joint Pub 1—“Joint Reference doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan 1–01.1 Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publication Abstracts Jul 93 and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war”—the Joint Doctrine Center 1–01.2 Joint Electronic Library User’s Handbook Aug 93 (JDC) launched a newsletter in April for the joint doc- 1–03 Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions Sep 93 trine community. A Common Perspective will appear quar- 1–05 Religious Ministry Support to Joint Operations Aug 93 terly and provide informa- 1–07 Doctrine for Public Affairs for Joint Operations Jul 94 tion on doctrine as it relates Intelligence The Air Land Sea to current issues, combatant 2–0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations Aug 93 Bulletin command and service initia- 2–01 JTTP for Intelligence Support to Operations Nov 94 tives, JDC involvement in ex- To spread the word on recent 2–01.1 JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting Oct 94 ercises, status of select publi- 2–01.2 Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support Feb 94 developments in service cations, Joint Electronic 2–02 JTTP for Intelligence Support to JTF Operations Dec 93 interoperability the Air Land Sea Library, and terminology. Operations Application (ALSA) Center Further details on the 3–0 Doctrine for Joint Operations Oct 93 publishes a quarterly newsletter are available by calling: 3–00.1 Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations Sep 93 newsletter, The Air Land Sea (804) 444–1065/ 3–01.4 JTTP for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Sep 93 Bulletin. Additional information DSN 564–1065 3–01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense Aug 93 on the bulletin is available by FAX: (804) 444–3990/ 3–02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations Aug 93 calling: DSN 564–3990 3–02.2 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation Apr 93 (804) 764–5936/ or writing: 3–03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations Aug 93 DSN 574–5934 Joint Doctrine Center 3–04.1 JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations Jul 93 1283 CV Towway (Suite 100) FAX: (804) 764–5935/ 3–05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures Jul 93 Norfolk, Virginia 23511–2491 DSN 574–5935 3–05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures Jun 93 or writing: 3–06 Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations Oct 93 HQ ACC XP–ALSA 3–07 Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict Oct 93 ATTN: The Air Land Sea Bulletin 3–07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense Jun 93 114 Andrews Street (Suite 101) 3–07.2 JTTP for Antiterrorism Jun 93 Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 3–07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations Jul 93 23665–2785 3–07.4 JTTP for Counterdrug Operations Jan 94 3–09.2 JTTP for Radar Beacon Operations Apr 93

112 JFQ / Summer 1993 point of departure for gaining an appreciation of the joint doctrine de- Joint Warfighting Center Announced velopment process is found in Joint The establishment of a Joint the Joint Warfare Center at Hurlburt Field, Pub 1–01, “Joint Publication Sys- Warfighting Center (JWC) has been ap- Florida, and the Joint Doctrine Center in tem,” which defines the process and outlines the steps involved in joint proved by the Chairman of the Joint Norfolk, Virginia; the stand-up of the cen- doctrine projects. Joint Pub 1–01 Chiefs of Staff. The center will be a sepa- ter is expected to take about 15 to 18 provides a hierarchy of joint publica- rate activity functioning under the Direc- months. The JWC will take advantage of tions essential to the functional tor for Operational Plans and Interoper- state-of-the-art technology to enhance order and organization of joint doctrine and JTTP. Publications which ability (J–7), Joint Staff, to assist the joint training, doctrine, tactics, tech- have been recently approved or are Chairman, CINCs, and service chiefs pre- niques, and procedures, and be a cost-ef- scheduled for approval through next pare for joint warfare through exercises fective mechanism for integrating exer- winter are listed below. JFQ and training, and by conceptualizing, de- cises and training, doctrine development, veloping, and assessing doctrine. The and lessons learned among the services. JWC will subsume the activities of both

Recent and Forthcoming Number Title Final Approval ALSA Publications Operations—Continued 3–10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations Feb 93 “Army Air Force Air Base Ground 3–10.1 JTTP for Base Defense Mar 93 Defense Manual” (A–AF ABGD), 3–11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical FM 90–30/AFM 3–3, describes responsibilities and procedures for (NBC) Defense Dec 93 the ground defense of air bases and installations. 3–12 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations Apr 93 3–14 Joint Doctrine and TTP for Space Operations Sep 93 “AWACS Ground Based Air Defense 3–15 Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines Apr 93 Operations” (AWACS–ADO), FM 44–12/FMFRP 5–57/ACCP 50–37/USAFEP 50–37/ 3–50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue Sep 93 PACAFP 50–37, provides an integrated joint air defense network for 3–50.3 Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery Sep 93 situations when standard ground-based systems are not in place. 3–52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone Aug 93 3–53 Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine Jul 93 “Integrated Combat Airspace Command 3–55 Doctrine for Joint Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and and Control” (ICAC2), Target Acquisition Apr 93 FM 100–21/FMFRP 5–61/ACCP 50–38/USAFEP 50–38/ 3–55.1 JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Aug 93 PACAFP 50–38/CINCLANTFLTINST 3320.1, covers responsibilities for multi-service activity within 3–56 Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations Dec 93 specifically defined airspace. 3–57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Dec 93 3–58 Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception Nov 93 “Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint 3–59 JTTP for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support Aug 93 Application of Firepower” (J–FIRE), Logistics FM 90–20/FMFRP 2–72/ACCP 50–28/USAFEP 50–9/ 4–01.3 JTTP for Joint Movement Control Aug 93 PACAFP 50–28/CINCLANTFLTINST 3330.5, contains standard formats for requesting various types of fire 4–01.5 JTTP for Water Terminal Operations Jun 93 support from the services. 4–02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations Aug 93 4–03 Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine Jun 93 4–04 Joint Doctrine for Engineering Support Jul 93 Plans 5–0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations Nov 93 5–00.1 JTTP for Campaign Planning Feb 94 5–03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System: Vol 1., Planning, Policy, and Procedures Jun 93 [JTTP = Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] Source: Joint Doctrine Division (J–7), Joint Staff (May 25, 1993).

Summer 1993 / JFQ 113 DAU anticipates that over Education DEFENSE 27,600 students will take 49 different acquisition courses during FY93. PEACEKEEPING ACQUISITION The 16 institutions participating in CURRICULA UNIVERSITY the DAU consortium are the Air Force Institute of Technology, Army he passage of the Defense Au- o support future U.S. military Logistics Management College, thorization Act of FY91 and commitments to United Na- Army Management Engineering Col- the Defense Acquisition Work- T tions peacekeeping operations, T lege, Defense Contract Audit Insti- force Improvement Act of 1990 led the President has directed the estab- tute, Defense Logistics Civilian to the creation of the Defense Acqui- lishment of peacekeeping curricula Personnel Service Support Office, sition University (DAU), which was at joint and service colleges. Several Defense Systems Management Col- officially dedicated in October 1992. initiatives are underway to define lege, European Command Acquisi- DAU operates as a consortium by the emergency roles of the Armed tion Training Office, Industrial tailoring existing educational pro- Forces in peacekeeping and humani- College of the Armed Forces, Infor- grams at colleges, schools, and other tarian relief operations. The Strategic mation Resources Management activities across DOD to provide for Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5) of College, Lowry Technical Training the professional development of the the Joint Staff has the lead in imple- Center, Navy Acquisition Manage- acquisition workforce, including menting actions under a National ment Training Office, Naval Facili- some 17,000 military personnel. Security Directive entitled “Presi- ties Contracts Training Center, Naval The new university is the ex- dent’s Peacekeeping Initiatives.” The Postgraduate School, Naval Supply ecutive agent for mandatory acquisi- educational and training dimensions Systems Command Regional Con- tion courses offered at the basic, in- are being addressed through an in- tracting Centers, Naval Warfare termediate, and senior levels—from teragency effort with participation Assessment Center, and Office of introductory courses in contract from the Military Education Divi- the Assistant Secretary of the management offered at several insti- sion and the Joint Exercise and Navy for Research, Development, tutions to a senior course presented Training Division of the Operational and Acquisition. at the Industrial College of the Plans and Interoperability Direc- For more details, see DOD Man- Armed Forces. The main objective of torate (J–7), Joint Staff. ual 5000.52M, “Career Develop- the courses is the certification of the Toward that end a survey has ment Program for Acquisition Per- Defense Acquisition Corps in the been conducted by J–7 of the curric- sonnel,” or contact the director of functional areas, and corresponding ula at the joint and service colleges acquisition career management for career fields, shown below. to determine the extent to which your service. JFQ peacekeeping is being taught. The results revealed that peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations are covered to some degree at each institution. The Joint Staff is now in Functional Areas Career Fields the process of facilitating a flow of Acquisition Management Program Management information on this emerging area of study to these colleges. In addi- Communications-Computer Systems tion, the on-going joint education Acquisition Logistics Acquisition Logistics accreditation process will monitor the increased emphasis on peace- Production Manufacturing and Production keeping in curricula. Quality Assurance The corresponding development of joint doctrine for peace- Procurement and Contracting Contracting keeping continues with the Army as lead service. Joint Pub 3–07.3, “Joint Purchasing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Industry Property Management for Peacekeeping Operations,” was recently revised. The current draft of Systems Planning, Research, Systems Planning, Research, Development, that publication can be reviewed Development, Engineering, Engineering through the Joint Electronic Library and Testing [see “Documentation”on the next Test and Evaluation Engineering page]. JFQ Business, Cost Estimating, and Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Financial Management Management

Auditing Auditing

114 JFQ / Summer 1993 JEL is a library of joint and se- material on historical and contem- Documentation lected service publications available porary issues. Consideration is being via computer and modem over both given to developing separate classi- THE JOINT commercial and governmental fied databases while continuing to ELECTRONIC phones to registered users world- expand the unclassified repositories. wide. It contains more than 100,000 Most electronic libraries do not LIBRARY pages of material on doctrine, educa- have full-text databases. Instead they tion, and operations, including all offer only bibliographies and brief unclassified joint doctrine publica- abstracts that attempt to distill the tions approved by the Chairman, contents of documents. These li- Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as many braries normally operate as follows: other doctrinal publications devel- having reviewed a database and oped by the services and allied na- identified abstracts of specific docu- tions, extracts from some intermedi- ments that may contain material rel- ate- and senior-level college evant to the researcher’s needs, the curricula, plus research conducted items must be requested to access by faculty and students at those in- them. Once the request is received, stitutions. In addition, the library in- the host library must determine cludes The Air University Library Index whether the documents are in stock, iccolo Machiavelli, the 16th of Military Periodicals, Department of and then send those that are avail- century “national security Defense Dictionary of Military and able to the requestor—a process that N advisor” to the Florentine Associated Terms, and selected source can take two to three weeks. This ruler Lorenzo the Magnificent, is best system is akin to searching library known to us as the author of The shelves: first the document must be Prince. That repository of the princi- identified and located, then the re- ples of statecraft and the use of force Subscribing to the searcher must peruse the material to was certainly an invaluable gift to determine its utility. Regrettably, present to any ruler, for it offers Joint Electronic items retrieved from the stacks, or sound advice without subjecting through electronic libraries, some- readers to relentless research else- times prove of little value to the where. In the opening dialogue Library researcher. Machiavelli proclaims to Lorenzo, Agencies interested in gaining on-line JEL, however, has the complete “And now I offer the results to Your access to JEL must submit a request on text of every document so that Highness within the compass of a official letterhead indicating the name, within seconds it is able to scan its small volume...that of enabling mailing address, and telephone number collection and identify where the You to understand in a very short of a point of contact to: word or words being searched ap- time all those things which I have pear. Imagine walking into a library Director, Joint Doctrine Center learnt at the cost of privation and and being able to quickly find every- danger, in the course of many years.” 1283 CV Towway (Suite 100) thing on a given subject. Also con- By enabling Lorenzo to quickly re- Norfolk, Virginia 23511–2491 sider leaving fully confident that no trieve and assimilate axioms on con- or call the Joint Doctrine Center at: pertinent information has been temporary statecraft—without hav- overlooked, and that the data gath- ing to distill wisdom from the vast (804) 444–3627/DSN 564–3627 ered had been systematically ar- stores of raw data—Machiavelli prof- FAX: (804) 444–3990/DSN 564–3990 ranged. That largely describes JEL’s fered power and greatness. Imagine In addition to potential DOD users, re- efficiency and effectiveness. Obvi- what such an accomplishment quests for access are accepted from ously there will be cases when specific research requirements cannot would mean today. Consider the re- other Federal agencies, nonprofit orga- be satisfied. The difference lies in in- wards that any advisor could claim nizations, and NATO countries. Once ap- for being able to spontaneously re- stantaneously determining a docu- proved, users are provided with “hook trieve information with effortless ment’s relevance and then proceed- flexibility, categorical systemic accu- up” packages that allow them to access ing without any delay. Experienced racy, and research yields in multiple JEL on a 24-hour a day basis without researchers agree that collecting data formats in the prescribed order of rel- any charge. is tedious and time-consuming: JEL evance. But for readers of Joint Force Orders for CD–ROM supplements must can greatly facilitate this process. The databases are also available Quarterly who may be looking for be placed through service distribution on compact disc-read only memory such a gift, go no farther: your mod- systems. JEL discs conform to ISO 9660 ern-day Prince is at hand in the Joint (CD–ROM) that offers the same full- specifications. Electronic Library (JEL). text, rapid search, and relevance- ranking retrieval capabilities as the on-line modem system. Aside from

Summer 1993 / JFQ 115 an extraordinary capacity to accept ton, D.C., and Norfolk, Virginia. The and store data, the CD–ROM supple- DEFENSE LIBRARY “Pentagon Library ILS Catalog” lists ments eliminate transmission time— books, periodicals, documents, refer- they contain up to 300,000 pages of ON DISC ence works, microfilm, and videos full-text which is equivalent to The holdings of the Pentagon which support the missions of DOD transmitting 26 days with a PC and Library and the National Defense and the services. But the catalog modem—and allow unlimited re- University Library are now available does not include classified material, search activity without either the on a CD–ROM disc. Later this year administrative publications, or expense or priority limitations im- the Staff College Automated Military congressional hearings and reports. posed by system-related telecommu- Periodicals Index (SCAMPI) will be The Pentagon Library only nications. The CD–ROM also con- added to the disc. lends material to personnel assigned tains the graphic images found in These collections of open litera- to the Pentagon or to DOD agencies the documents. This technology sig- ture can be searched together or sep- situated in the National Capitol Re- nificantly augments JEL on-line arately, although access to the mate- gion where library service is unavail- access by serving numerous users rial cited is subject to the respective able. Similarly, the National Defense worldwide in an efficient and policies of each library. The Defense University Library only lends mate- cost-effective manner. Library on Disc contains over rial to faculty members and students The operational requirements 220,000 records including items in attending one of its constituent col- placed on today’s “Magnificent the fields of international security leges. All other users of the Defense Lorenzos”—whether they are action affairs, defense policy, military his- Library on Disc must contact local officers or planners, doctrinal devel- tory, resource management, and the libraries to borrow items identified opers or educators, policymakers or art of war. on the CD–ROM or to request them warfighters—will continue to grow The “National Defense Univer- through interlibrary loan. JFQ at the same rate as rapidly changing sity LS/2000 Catalog” contains crises and global events. Not surpris- records of the holdings found in the ingly, this will call for continued ex- university’s two libraries in Washing- pansion of JEL databases. Future developments are likely to include the coverage of functional areas directly related to or impacting on joint doctrine and warfighting. As Machiavelli’s dialogue with Lorenzo continues, he implores, Defense Library on CD–ROM “May I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will accept this little gift in the spirit in which it is offered; and if Your Highness will deign to peruse it, You will recognize in it my ardent desire that You may attain to that grandeur which fortune and Your own merits presage for you.” Such are the practical riches within the grasp of those who use this modern day Prince. Contributed by More information about the Defense Library on Disc COL Jerry Dunn, USA (Ret.) may be obtained by contacting: JFQ National Defense University Library ATTN: Systems Librarian Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 (202) 287–9474 / DSN 667–9474 or Pentagon Library ATTN: Systems Librarian Room 1A518, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20310–6080 (703) 697–4658 or DSN 227–4658

116 JFQ / Summer 1993 Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces ON VIDEO A ten-and-a-half minute video tape that highlights major concepts and themes found in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, is available on request to military organizations/units by writing: National Military Command Center Visual Reading Facility The Joint Staff (J–3) Room 3C941, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301–7000 or calling: (703) 697–9033/DSN 227–9033

1993 CJCS Essay Competition

The 12th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Strategy Essay Competition was held on May 20–21 at the National Defense University. This competition challenges students at the intermediate and senior colleges to write on some aspect of international security, defense policy, or military affairs, with special emphasis on joint topics. Each institution may submit five individual and five group essays to a panel of judges selected from the joint and service colleges. Winners receive prizes provided by the National Defense University Foundation. Top honors this year were shared by two entries while eight others were cited for distinction:

Co-Winning Essays Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Chiarelli, USA (National War College), “Goldwater-Nichols Revisited: A Proposal for Meaningful Defense Reorganization” Captain Brett D. Barkley, USMCR (Naval War College), “Bosnia: A Question of Intervention”

Distinguished Individual Essays Lieutenant Colonel Jon R. Ball, USAF (Air War College), “Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East” William H. Dunn, Department of the Army (U.S. Army War College), “In Search of Measures of Effectiveness for Counterdrug Operations” Lieutenant Colonel Scott W. Conrad, USA (Industrial College of the Armed Forces), “Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond” Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Keethler, USAF (Air War College), “The Impact of the Soviet Union’s Demise on the U.S. Military Space Program” Joseph McBride, Department of State (National War College), “Coping with Chaos: Promoting Democracy and Regional Stability in the Post-Counterinsurgency Era” Captain Terry J. Pudas, USN (Naval War College), “Coalition Warfare: Preparing the U.S. Commander for the Future” Major Thomas R. Griffith, Jr., USAF (Air Command and Staff College), “Attacking Electrical Power”

Distinguished Group Essay Commander Michael J. Sare, USN; Peggy J. Grantham, National Security Agency; and Gerald A. Lambrecht, Defense Intelligence Agency (National War College), “U.S. Intelligence Support to United Nations Military Operations: Trends and Issues (U)”

Summer 1993 / JFQ 117 REVISITING THE The Commanders GULF WAR: by Bob Woodward New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. A REVIEW ESSAY 398 pp. $24.95. By HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR. [ISBN 0 671 41367 8] It Doesn’t Take A Hero ritical analysis, like theory, by H. Norman Schwarzkopf, observed Carl von Clausewitz with Pete Petre in Von Kriege (On War), can C New York: Linda Grey/Bantam, 1993. become a guide to anyone wanting 530 pp. $30.00. to learn about war from books. [ISBN 0 385 42584 8] While not a recipe for action, “it is meant to educate the mind of a fu- Desert Victory: ture commander, or, more accu- The War For Kuwait rately, to guide him in his self-educa- by Norman Friedman tion.” Critical analysis is “the Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991. application of theoretical truths to 435 pp. $24.95. actual events,” he warned. To be ef- [ISBN 1 55750 254 4] fective “the language of criticism should have the same character as Storm Over Iraq: thinking must have in wars; other-

Air Power and the Gulf War Courtesy of the U.S. Army Art Collection wise it loses its practical value and by Richard P. Hallion “The Man of the Year (The Bear).” [loses] contact with its subject.” Washington: Smithsonian Institution Portrait by SFC Peter G. Varisano, USA. But as in Clausewitz’s day, that Press, 1992. 383 pp. $24.95. is often not the case. Readers of [ISBN 1 56098 190 3] much of what passes for critical than any abstract truth.” When it thinking today from academe and Moving Mountains: comes to critical analysis “if the think-tanks will recognize Clause- Lessons in Leadership and critic wishes to distribute praise or witz’s complaint that “our theoreti- Logistics from the Gulf War blame, he must certainly try to put cal and critical literature, instead of by William G. Pagonis himself exactly in the position of giving plain truths, straightforward and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank the commander; in other words, he arguments in which the author at Boston: Harvard Business School Press, must assemble everything the com- least always knows what he is saying 1992. 248 pp. $24.95. mander knew and all the motives and the reader what he is reading, is [ISBN 0 87584 360 3] that affected his decision.” crammed with jargon, ending at ob- “[A] situation giving rise to an scure crossroads where the author Storm Command: event can never look the same to the loses his readers.” A Personal Account analyst as it did to the participant,” “Sometimes,” he adds, “these of the Gulf War Clausewitz noted. “These can only books are even worse: they are hol- by Peter de la Billière be discovered from the memoirs of low shells. The author himself no London: HarperCollins, 1992. the commanders, or from people longer knows just what he is think- 248 pp. £18.00. very close to them.” ing and soothes himself with obscure [ISBN 0 00 255138 1] Fortunately for anyone explor- ideas which would not satisfy him if ing the theoretical truths of the Gulf expressed in plain speech. . . . The She Went To War: War, such works are at hand. Five of light of day usually reveals them to The Rhonda Cornum Story the eight books reviewed here are be mere trash, with which the author by Rhonda Cornum, from commanders or participants, intends to show off his learning.” with Peter Copeland and the balance from “people very Memoirs Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992. close to them.” Their accounts of ac- “In the art of war,” according to 203 pp. $19.95. tual events provide a basis for exam- Clausewitz, “experience counts more [ISBN 0 89141 463 0] ining such theoretical truths as unity of command, Total Force, joint Hotel Warriors: and combined warfare, women on Covering the Gulf War the battlefield, and the state of Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA (Ret.), is a by John J. Fialka media-military relations. noted writer, lecturer, and distinguished fel- Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Bob Woodward’s The Comman- low of the U.S. Army War College; he is the Press, 1992. 78 pp. $9.75. ders provides insights into the effects author of On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis [ISBN 0 943875 40 4] of the Goldwater-Nichols Depart- of the Gulf War and Gulf War Almanac.

118 JFQ / Summer 1993 ment of Defense Reorganization Act tary advisor to the President and in- power over the manpower and ma- of 1986 on unity of command, espe- creased the authority of the CINCs terial assets of all the services. As cially as it impacted on the Chairman of the unified commands. General Pagonis, Schwarzkopf’s lo- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also How did Goldwater-Nichols gistics chief, told Senator Sam Nunn, tells of the President’s decision to mo- work in practice? From the senior he could not have done his job be- bilize the Reserve and seek congres- editor of The Washington Post comes fore Goldwater-Nichols. sional approval for the war. In It an unparalleled inside look at deci- But not everything ran Doesn’t Take a Hero the impact of the sionmaking in the White House and smoothly. In an incident that would Goldwater-Nichols reforms on the Pentagon. Invited into the inner cir- be repeated in the opening days of Commander in Chief of U.S. Central cles of the defense community to re- the Clinton administration, there Command (CINCCENT) in the Gulf count the military’s side of the was a brouhaha when Woodward’s is recounted by the CINC himself. Panama invasion, Woodward, who book was published about his And General Schwarzkopf illuminates served in the Pentagon as a naval revelation that Powell disagreed another truth, the criticality of joint lieutenant in 1969–70, was literally with President Bush’s going to war, operations. Richard Hallion in Storm present at the creation of the Gulf preferring instead to allow more Over Iraq argues the case for airpower. crisis. The result is The Commanders, time for sanctions to work. Norman Friedman’s Desert Victory a book which appeared in 1991 a Asked about this apparent heralds Navy and Marine Corps con- scant three months after the end of “insubordination,” Bush said “as far tributions to the war. In Moving the Gulf War. While not without its as Colin Powell goes, he owes the Mountains General Gus Pagonis de- faults, this account provides an un- Commander in Chief his advice. tails not only the importance of logis- precedented look at how the top- When the Commander in Chief tics, but the enormous contribution level of the chain of command really makes a decision, he salutes and of the Reserve components as well. works. “It is above all a book about marches to the order of the Combined operations is a focus how the United States decides to Commander in Chief. of Schwarzkopf’s book as he discusses fight its wars before shots are fired,” “And if there is anybody that coalition war both in terms of allied says Woodward. Using the Chair- has the integrity and the honor to forces under his direct command and man, General Colin Powell, as pro- tell a President what he feels, it’s through cooperation with the Arab tagonist, he focuses on the machina- Colin Powell....Colin couldn’t coalition commander. That story is tions of the Washington bureaucracy have given me more sound advice reinforced by the account of the rather than the war itself. along the way and couldn’t have British commander, General Sir Peter Among the many insights is the been a better team player and de la Billière, in Storm Command: A role of the President in the decision- couldn’t have been a more sterling Personal Account of the Gulf War. making cycle. Unlike Vietnam, there military commander.” Another major truth to emerge was no dithering about National Senator Nunn, Chairman of the from the Gulf War was the role of Command Authorities, a catch- Senate Armed Services Committee, women in combat. Major Rhonda phrase for whoever it was, if any- took a more jaundiced view. In Cornum’s She Went to War debunks body, who made the critical deci- October 1991, at the confirmation much of the myth about women’s sions in Washington. This time there hearing for his second term as Chair- unique battlefield vulnerability in was no doubt about who was in man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating her experiences as a pris- charge. Another departure from the General Powell was questioned oner. Finally, with Hotel Warriors, Vietnam War was the Chairman’s sharply, as The Washington Post put John Fialka of The Wall Street Journal role. As Goldwater-Nichols had envi- it, “for apparently telling more to provides a scathing indictment of sioned, he proved to be the principal Woodward than [he] told the com- the military and the media as both military advisor to the Secretary of mittee during the Persian Gulf War.” failed to live up to the theoretical Defense and the President. Con- Nevertheless, Senator Nunn, who truth of the importance of keeping versely, as Woodward reports, while had been severely criticized for sup- the American people informed. “Powell had used the service chiefs porting sanctions and opposing quite effectively . . . in fact they Bush’s decision to go to war, allowed Unity of Command played almost no role in the deci- the confirmation to proceed. One of the key principles of war sionmaking. Their influence hovered Woodward’s description of Presi- is unity of command. It has been ar- around zero.” dent Bush at an eleventh-hour meet- gued that the violation of this prin- Not so for General Schwarzkopf. ing to decide whether to get congres- ciple alone was a major factor in the Goldwater-Nichols gave enormous sional approval before taking the loss of the Vietnam War. In the wake new powers to the heads of unified Nation to war is far-reaching in its of that conflict Congress reformed commands and Schwarzkopf was implications. The decision and vote the military chain of command, pri- quick to use it. As his autobiography were both close, but they marked the marily through the Goldwater- recounts, he had total operational return to a constitutional warmaking Nichols Act which gave increased command in Southwest Asia and framework that had been abandoned power to the Chairman of the Joint with disastrous consequences over Chiefs of Staff as the principal mili- Korea and Vietnam.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 119 Total Force headquarters being 6,000 miles from thing, he apologized for a “poor Closely tied to the decision to the battlefield as it was in Vietnam, choice of words.” seek congressional approval for the Schwarzkopf moved U.S. Central In an address at the U.S. Naval war was the mobilization of the Re- Command (CENTCOM) from its Academy in May 1991, Schwarzkopf serves. As Woodward notes, “Certain peacetime location at MacDill Air said that Operations Desert Shield/ critical military specialties such as Force Base in Tampa, Florida, to Desert Storm were certainly “the logistics, transportation, medical ser- Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by late August classic example of a multiservice op- vices, construction, and intelligence 1990 where it was to remain for the eration, a truly joint operation.” But were concentrated in the Reserves.” duration. It Doesn’t Take a Hero focuses on the This was not accidental. “Frustrated While in reality he acted as his ground attack. The Navy gets short by President Johnson’s refusal to own ground force commander, shrift from Schwarzkopf as it did fully mobilize the military during Schwarzkopf had a classic joint from the media. “During Desert Vietnam by calling up the Reserve chain of command. He exercised Storm courageous [Navy] air for any major military action . . . the command of Army forces through crews . . . literally decimated major- Reserve call-up was inevitable. Bush Lieutenant General John Yeosock league targets,” complained Rear Ad- now authorized it.” (commander of 3d Army), Marines miral R.D. Mixon, commander of It was a momentous decision, through Lieutenant General Walter Battle Force Red Sea. “Navy strike for the war could not have been Boomer (commander of I Marine Ex- aircraft flew 23 percent of all the fought without them. “At the peak peditionary Force), air forces through combat missions.” The problem is of Desert Shield,” Schwarzkopf said, Lieutenant General Charles Horner that no one knew it. “We tend to his logistics command “had 94 dif- (commander of 9th Air Force), and avoid the press,” Mixon said, an ferent Reserve and National Guard naval forces through Vice Admiral omission his service paid for dearly. units under [its] command,” some Hank Mauz, and his successor, Vice To compensate for that omission 70-plus percent of its personnel. As Admiral Stanley Arthur (commander we have Norman Friedman’s Desert important as their physical contribu- of 7th Fleet). Victory. While not a participant in tion was to the operation, their psy- “Officially, as a commander in the war, Friedman—a respected de- chological impact was even greater. chief, I reported to Secretary [of De- fense analyst who writes a monthly In 1964 when then Army Chief of fense Dick] Cheney,” Schwarzkopf column for the Naval Institute’s Pro- Staff General Creighton Abrams wrote, “but Colin Powell was virtu- ceedings—is certainly close to those devised the Total Force concept, he ally my sole point of contact with who were there. A chapter in his realized that the Reserve was a the administration. ‘It’s my job to book entitled “The Seaward Flank” bridge between the active force and keep the President and the White and an appendix on “Naval Forces in the public. “When you come to war House and the Secretary of Defense the Embargo and the War” detail the you bring the American people with informed,’ Powell would say. ‘You Navy’s role in the Gulf. Friedman’s you,” General Ed Burba of U.S. worry about your theater and let me analysis is not confined to naval Forces Command remarked to a worry about Washington.’ This ar- operations but covers the air cam- Reserve audience after the Gulf War. rangement was efficient....But I paign as well. He is particularly criti- also found the arrangement unnerv- cal of the rigidity of the Air Force Joint Operations ing at times, because it kept me in computer-driven Air Tasking Order Mobilizing the Reserve and the the dark. Often, after White House (ATO) system. While acknowledging Nation was only one of many ways meetings, Powell would call with the success of air operations, he be- the Gulf War differed from Vietnam. questions that made me wonder lieves that it could never be decisive. Another was organizing for combat. whether our civilian superiors had “Saddam never did decide to surren- “MACV [Military Assistance Com- grasped military realities.” One such der to air attack,” he concludes, “but mand Vietnam] functioned not di- case was the decision to begin the the coalition always had to be aware rectly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff ground war, which Schwarzkopf de- that he had the option of stopping in Washington but through CINCPAC scribes as a shouting match with the attack before its real objective [Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Powell. “You are pressuring me to (the elimination of Iraq as a regional Command in Honolulu],” said put aside my military judgment for threat) had been made.” When it ap- General William Westmoreland in his political expediency,” he said at one peared Saddam Hussein might do memoirs. “What many fail to realize point. Another was the decision on just that with his overtures to the So- was that not I but [CINCPAC] was the ending the war. “Frankly my recom- viet Union for a “peace plan” in theater commander in the sense that mendation had been, you know, February 1991, the decision was General Eisenhower . . . was the the- continue the march,” he commented made to launch the ground attack. ater commander in World War II.” By to television interviewer David Frost In Storm Over Iraq, another re- contrast Schwarzkopf was very much in March 1991. “I mean we had spected analyst, Richard Hallion, in the Eisenhower mode. Instead of them in a rout.” But after White takes a different point of view. The House and Pentagon remonstrances author of a number of books on the that he had recommended no such subject, Hallion believes airpower was decisive in the Gulf. “Simply (if

120 JFQ / Summer 1993 boldly) stated,” he avers, “airpower an effective in-country supply base won the Gulf War.” One may dis- for food, water, and ground trans- agree with his conclusions, but it is port. “Conducting business with the impossible not to be impressed with REFUSING TO Saudis and other Middle Eastern na- the scope of his analysis, which REFIGHT THE tionals was an ongoing educational traces the impact of airpower from experience,” he says, in what is a its beginnings. His arguments were LAST WAR masterpiece of understatement. ...America’s hands were deemed so persuasive that selected no longer tied. Unlike North portions of his book were excerpted Combined Operations Korea’s Kim Il Sung and North by the Air Force and published as Pagonis was not the only one Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh, Sad- part of “Reaching Globally, Reaching dealing with foreign nationals. Op- dam Hussein was not shielded Powerfully: The USAF in the Gulf eration Desert Storm not only repre- by the skirts of China and the War,” that service’s “quick look” at sented a Total Force operation—with Soviet Union. American mili- what the air war had accomplished. both active and Reserve components tary strategy had come full Quoting a comment by Defense Sec- of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, circle, and in many important retary Cheney approvingly, that the Air Force, and Coast Guard—and a respects was back to World War Iraqis “didn’t fight back because the joint operation involving a team ef- II again. Like Adolph Hitler, to air war turned out to be absolutely fort by all the services—but it was whom he has been compared, devastating,” Hallion concludes that also a combined operation involving Saddam Hussein was to feel the “airpower can hold territory by military contingents from some full fury of America’s conven- denying an enemy the ability to forty allied nations. Crucial to prose- tional military might. seize it and by denying an enemy cuting the war was the cooperation Gradualism and stalemate the use of its forces. And it can seize of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. were out the window. “Prior to territory by controlling access to “Without Saudi Arabia—without its ordering our forces into battle,” that territory and movement across harbors and airfields, military bases, said President Bush, “I in- it. It did both in the Gulf War.” housing, transportation systems, structed our military comman- While the debate continues money, fuel, and friendly environ- ders to take every necessary over whether airpower alone can be ment—the war would have been far step to prevail as quickly as decisive, there is no argument with more difficult and dangerous to possible and with the greatest Lieutenant General William (Gus) wage, if it could have been waged at degree of protection possible Pagonis’s account of the decisive all,” said Schwarzkopf’s Saudi coun- for American and allied service- role logistics played during the Gulf terpart, Lieutenant General Prince men and women. War in Moving Mountains. A total of Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud. The son “No President can easily 122 million meals were served, 1.3 of the Saudi Minister of Defense, commit our sons and daughters billion gallons of fuel pumped, 52 Khalid was educated at the Royal to war,” he concluded. “They million miles driven, 32,000 tons of Military Academy, Sandhurst; at- are the Nation’s finest. Ours is mail delivered, 730,000 people proc- tended the Air War College at a volunteer force—magnifi- essed through aerial ports—just Maxwell Air Force Base; and holds a cently trained, highly moti- some of the statistics from the logis- master’s degree from Auburn Univer- vated. The troops know why tics of the war. Making it all possible sity. While Schwarzkopf exercised they’re there.” was Gus Pagonis, Schwarzkopf’s unity of command as sole comman- And that was more than Deputy Commander for Logistics re- der of all U.S. forces, such an ar- just rhetoric. Because of the responsible for “fuel, water, food, vehi- rangement was not politically feasi- naissance in military thinking cles, ammunition, all classes of sup- ble for control of combined forces. in the 1970s and 1980s, our sol- ply (except equipment spare parts) Instead there was a cooperative, dual diers, sailors, airmen, Marines, for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and command: Schwarzkopf com- and coast guardsmen were the the Army.” From a 20-man team, manded the American, British, and best-trained and best-prepared Pagonis’s force grew to some 88,000 French forces, and Khalid com- military force that the United individuals, including 39,925 sol- manded the forces of Saudi Arabia, States had ever committed to diers. “I owe much of the success of Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, and the action. my command to the talents of our other coalition partners. “Schwarz- flexible and well-trained Reserve kopf and I had a successful and From On Strategy II: A Critical component (National Guard and Re- friendly partnership,” Khalid noted, Analysis of the Gulf War serve) units,” he writes. “At the “and I would like to think we both by Harry B. Summers, Jr. height of the Gulf conflict, the 22d acquitted ourselves well.” Unfortu- New York: Dell Publishing, 1992. Support Command drew a full 70- nately this spirit did not survive the [ISBN 0 440 21194 8] plus percent of its personnel from publication of Schwarzkopf’s book. Reserve units; and we’re lucky we “It is not unusual after a war for gen- were able to do so.” As director of erals to magnify their own achieve- host-nation support, Pagonis built ments and belittle those of others,”

Summer 1993 / JFQ 121 Khalid wrote. “I regret to say that... 13 percent of the total—were Re- sional support. But how do you get my comrade in arms during the Per- servists, including 21.3 percent of that support? “A Gallup public opin- sian Gulf War has succumbed to this the Reserve officers. As Defense Sec- ion poll in early 1991 showed 85 per- temptation . . . he gives himself all retary Dick Cheney said on March 2, cent of the public had a high level of the credit for the victory over Iraq 1991, “Women have made a major confidence in the military,” noted while running down just about ev- contribution to this effort. We could Rear Admiral Brent Baker, the Navy’s erybody else.” not have won without them.” And Chief of Information. “Where did More forgiving is Storm Com- Schwarzkopf was equally compli- the public get its perception of the mand: A Personal History of the Gulf mentary. “Discussion with the con- military’s professionalism? They got War by General Sir Peter de la gressional delegation led by Con- it from news media reports.” Billière, commander of British forces gressman Ford,” reads his war diary After the Gulf War there was in the Gulf. An Arabist with 15 years for March 16, 1991. “One issue was much whining and sniveling from experience in the Middle East, Sir women in the military—how did the media, much of it antiwar dia- Peter, Britain’s most decorated serv- they do? The CINC said ‘Great!’ ” tribes cloaked in First Amendment ing soldier, spent most of his career One major fear was the public reac- pieties. But there has been legitimate in the Special Air Service (SAS), the tion to women coming home in criticism as well, and the military ig- British army’s premier special opera- body bags—though some 200 mili- nores it at its peril. Among such criti- tions unit. Accustomed to avoiding tary nurses were killed in World War cisms is Hotel Warriors: Covering the the limelight, de la Billière nonethe- II and eight in Vietnam—and what Gulf War by John J. Fialka, the war less had a major impact on the war. would happen if a woman was taken correspondent of The Wall Street For one thing, he was instrumental prisoner, forgetting that during Journal. Finding fault with both the in increasing British ground contri- World War II 79 Army and Navy media and the military, he argues butions to a full division and then nurses were held as POWs by the that the present system serves neither gaining his 1st Armoured Division an Japanese. journalists nor soldiers. “The basic independent battlefield mission. For She Went to War is Army Major point that John Fialka makes,” says another, his SAS forces operating Rhonda Cornum’s account of her the Library of Congress’s Peter behind enemy lines drove the captivity at the hands of the Iraqis. Braestrup, “is that the Nation and the SCUDs out of range of Israel. Report- A flight surgeon and helicopter Armed Services are best served . . . by edly these efforts led the way to pilot, she was shot down while on a competent firsthand reporting of mil- increased use of U.S. Special Opera- search-and-rescue mission over itary performance, good or bad.” tions Forces in covert operations on southern Iraq. Her matter-of-fact tale Some argue that it is too soon to the battlefield. of what she went through, and her make a critical analysis of the Gulf Unfortunately, there has been subsequent revelation that she had War. Others argue that it was an little written—in English at least— been sexually molested—what she anomaly with no lessons to proffer. on the contributions of the French called “an occupational hazard of But such arguments miss the point. 6th Light Armored Division and the going to war”—does much to refute “The military student does not seek Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian divi- the idea that women are somehow to learn from history the minutiae of sions. Friedman does discuss, how- peculiarly vulnerable in battle and method and technique,” said then ever, the contributions of allied unable to withstand the rigors of Army Chief of Staff General Douglas navies. Likewise, Hallion has a very combat. Be that as it may, while the MacArthur in 1935. “In every age moving section on allied participa- argument continues over assigning these are decisively influenced by the tion in the bombing campaign women to direct combat, there can characteristics of weapons currently where eight Tornado aircraft were no longer be any doubt over available and the means at hand for lost, including six from the Royal Air women’s legitimate role on the bat- maneuvering, supplying, and con- Force, one from the Saudi air force, tlefield. As Cornum says, “The quali- trolling combat forces. and one from the Italian air force. ties that are most important in all “But research does bring to light military jobs—things like integrity, those fundamental principles, and Women on the Battlefield moral courage, and determination— their combinations and applications, Another theoretical truth of the have nothing to do with gender.” which in the past have been produc- Gulf War was the affirmation of the tive of success. These principles role of women on the battlefield. The Media know no limitation of time. Conse- Women had served in past wars, The final theoretical truth is quently the Army extends its mostly as nurses or clerical person- that, like it or not, the news media analytical interest to the dust-buried nel, but for the first time they served are an essential part of the American accounts of war long past as well in large numbers in combat support way of war. In November 1984, in a as those still reeking with the scent and combat service support units. discussion of the necessary precondi- of battle.” JFQ Some 41,000 women served in the tions for going to war, then Defense Gulf. There were 27,000 in the active Secretary Caspar Weinberger said force, but the highest proportion— that there must be some reasonable assurance of public and congres-

122 JFQ / Summer 1993 reminiscences are complemented by served in combat. In fact, until the THE MILITARY COST interviews with white officers who closing years of the last century both trained and commanded the blacks made up a higher percentage OF DISCRIMINATION Golden Thirteen during World War of the naval combat force than their A Review Essay by ALAN L. GROPMAN II. This book is a clear reminder of a share of the national population. Yet long and painful chapter in U.S. mil- by 1932, although they made up itary history in which the combat over 10 percent of the U.S. popula- The Golden Thirteen: potential of black soldiers, sailors, tion, blacks had fallen to less than 1 Recollections of the marines, and airmen was lost to the percent of the Navy’s enlisted force. First Black Naval Officers Armed Forces. (By the end of World War II black edited by Paul Stillwell, sailors made up about 5.5 percent of foreword by Colin L. Powell Recruiting the Thirteen the Navy.) In other words, the perva- Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993. The Golden Thirteen was a suc- sive racism of the early 20th century 304 pp. $21.95. cessful group of enlisted men who influenced attitudes in the Navy to [ISBN 1 55750 779 1] trained for ninety days in early 1944 the extent that the service was de- at Great Lakes Naval Training Station nied the contributions of qualified to provide a token complement of warriors solely on the basis of their commissioned blacks. The group was race. During the 18th and 19th cen- made up of solid performers, better turies, when slavery had been legal educated than many white officers of and racism common, the Navy had the period. Several were exception- overcome prejudice to employ blacks ally well qualified. Samuel Barnes, profitably and in integrated fashion for example, was a college graduate on warships. But by the early 20th and athlete who later earned a doc- century, race rigidity had become so torate; Frank E. Sublett had com- severe that the Navy denied itself pleted three years of college and fighters and humiliated tens of gained a national reputation as a thousands of blacks. football player; Graham E. Martin, The Golden Thirteen, proud of who had excelled both academically being commissioned, suffered their and athletically at Indiana Univer- share of indignities. The commander sity, starred on the Great Lakes foot- at Great Lakes, for instance, ordered ball team which ranked among the the new ensigns not to enter the of- best in the country; and William S. ficers’ club. The Bureau of Naval Per- White had been graduated from the sonnel, moreover, had no plan for University of Chicago Law School using these unique officers, so many and served as an assistant U.S. Attor- of the thirteen served in billets be- ney before his induction into the neath the level of white officers. For Navy. But because they were black, example, two went to the West no assignments other than menial Coast to jointly command a yard jobs were open to White and other oiler, a job previously held by a sin- members of the Golden Thirteen gle enlisted man. when they enlisted. In fact, if they Had it not been for President he Navy commissioned its first joined the Navy on December 7, Franklin Roosevelt the Navy would black officers—twelve ensigns 1941, their only choice of assign- have not permitted blacks to serve and one warrant officer—in ment would have been mess steward. outside the mess, but because of the T The Navy had stopped enlisting April 1944, thereby ending symboli- Commander in Chief’s pressure, the cally and painfully 146 years of blacks in 1919, by which time Afro- Navy permitted blacks to compete racial discrimination. The Golden American sailors were relegated to for general service positions after Thirteen is an oral history recount- duties as stewards and cooks. In 1932 June 1942, though duty was still lim- ing the wartime experiences of eight the Navy opened up enlistment once ited to shore installations and small surviving members of that first co- again, but only to those blacks who local-defense craft. In the fleet blacks hort of black naval officers. Their agreed to wait on tables or work in could serve only in messes. The the kitchen. But assigning blacks to Navy, moreover, barred any serving servile duties had not always been messman from transferring from that the Navy’s practice. From the days of specialty to the general service, John Paul Jones to the Civil War, and claiming that such transfers might Alan L. Gropman is a professor of history at as recently as the Spanish American the Industrial College of the Armed Forces cause a shortage of servants. War (in which a black sailor earned Roosevelt also forced the Navy to and the author of The Air Force Integrates, the Medal of Honor), blacks had 1945–1964. A retired Air Force colonel, he open its naval commissioning pro- flew more than 650 missions in Vietnam. gram known as V–12 to blacks on a

Summer 1993 / JFQ 123 nondiscriminatory basis, but this age of the Army’s combat force than “close association of whites and program was not advertized widely it did of the population, thus the blacks in military organizations in- and many blacks never got the word. fighting and dying burden dispro- imicable to harmony and effi- Assistant Navy Secretary Adlai portionately fell upon whites. The ciency.” Nine subsequent War Col- Stevenson convinced Secretary of General Staff directed the Army War lege reports presented such the Navy Frank Knox that the ser- College to study the underuse of pseudoscientific generalizations vice would be less subject to criti- blacks in combat, and it did on nu- which cost the Army full use of cism by the black press and leader- merous occasions. But each time the black soldiers. Blacks comprise ship if a dozen blacks could question was examined racist myths nearly 30 percent of the Army today, complete an abbreviated officer and stereotyping interfered with the even higher percentages in the com- training course before the first black ability of the War College’s students bat arms, whereas in 1940 black sol- V–12 people were graduated. The and faculty to make useful recom- diers constituted only 1.5 percent of Golden Thirteen thus sprang from mendations. The class of 1925, for the total enlisted force, with none Stevenson’s intervention. Through- example, asserted its racist findings being truly combat soldiers. out the war the Navy commissioned in a report that stated blacks had The war expanded the number only 60 blacks compared with more smaller craniums than whites, and of blacks in the Army exponentially. than a hundred thousand whites. that the black brain weighed 20 per- Some did see combat in segregated Elsewhere in the Department of cent less. The authors also con- units and, by 1945, a few thousand the Navy, the Marine Corps was included that blacks were instinctively were actually fighting beside whites fected by the same racial poison. Be- cowardly. Despite these blatantly in essentially integrated units. The fore World War II the Marines had false conclusions, the students and Army’s racial experience was un- accepted no blacks. In April 1941, as faculty argued that blacks ought to happy, however, because its leaders, his service rapidly expanded, the serve in combat for manpower con- including those in the Army Air Commandant of the Marine Corps siderations, though always under Corps, both civilian and military, re- went on the record as follows: “If it white officers and within segregated mained deeply prejudiced were a question of having a Marine units because social inequality made Corps of 5,000 whites or 250,000 Tuskegee Airmen Go to War Negroes, I would rather have the In 1940 the Army Air Corps had no blacks serving in any capacity and whites.” While many blacks were The Golden Thirteen were qualified for duty in the infantry or wanted to retain that status quo. But not activists. None of them had as in the case of the Navy the Presi- combat aviation, segregation pre- sought to make history. The vented them from being warriors. dent forced the War Department to Navy’s leaders had simply de- change its policy. Consequently, in The Marines actually instructed cided that it was past time to medical examiners to simply dis- 1941, the Army was forced to estab- bring down the barriers to lish a training base for black aviators, qualify black applicants during en- opportunity in the fleet; and as a listment physical exams (the Army and it did so near Tuskegee, Alabama. consequence, these thirteen The graduates of Tuskegee Army Air Air Force acted similarly). The sailors were plucked out of their Marine Corps leadership denied Field, still known as “Tuskegee air- separate lives to learn the ways d blacks combat positions during and men,” were formed into the 332 of officership. Fighter Group and the 477th Medium even after World War II, but today Yet from the very beginning blacks make up more than 20 Bombardment Group. they understood, almost intu- d percent of Marine riflemen. The 332 got into action and itively, that history had dealt built a fine record flying from bases Blacks in the Army them a stern obligation. They in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. The The Navy and the Marine Corps realized that in their hands group flew about 1,500 missions were not the only services that re- rested the chance to help open during the war, more than 15,000 fused to assign blacks to combat dur- the blind moral eye that sorties in all, shot down more than ing the war. Despite a heritage of America had turned on the ques- 100 enemy aircraft in air-to-air com- black service in the Civil War, Indian tion of race. bat, destroyed more than 150 others campaigns, and Spanish American And they recognized that on on the ground, and sank a destroyer War, the Army reacted similarly. In their shoulders would climb with machine gun fire (a unique the interwar years fewer than 2 per- generations of men and women achievement). Most significant of cent of the Army was black, and of America’s future military, all, the 332d never lost an escorted those few black soldiers were rele- including a skinny seven-year- bomber to enemy fighters in 200 es- gated to support duties. old kid in the Bronx named cort missions. Tuskegee airmen flew Although the Army studied Colin Powell. over some of the most heavily de- ways to employ more blacks, bigotry fended enemy targets, among them blocked the beginning of actual re- From the foreword to the Ploesti oil fields in Romania and form. During World War I blacks The Golden Thirteen Berlin itself. The success of the 332d constituted a much smaller percent- by Colin L. Powell in escort missions was also unique.

124 JFQ / Summer 1993 No other unit with a similar number better control over his troops, al- of the trials and triumphs of a fine of missions had comparable success. though in fact they had caused no group of Americans, and let this The triumph of the 332d, how- trouble to that point. The move set latest entry in the record of black ever, while publicized in the black back the training schedule, and military history serve as a painful press, was not advertised widely by since the airfield was poor, he had to reminder for all who wear the uni- the Army; so during the balance of relocate again in March 1945 to form that intolerance is destructive. the war the achievements of the catch up on training. In this current era of constrained Tuskegee airmen did not bring about At the new base, Freeman Field resources, the defense establishment increased opportunities for blacks. In in southern Indiana, he constructed cannot afford to waste any human fact, the unit remained segregated, one officers’ club for his white cadre asset. JFQ its airmen often treated badly and and another for blacks. The action frequently humiliated by prejudiced violated Army regulations and drove leaders. Thus deprived of their right- the black aviators of the 477th to ex- ful due as heroic aviators the men of ercise their rights. When they in- the 332d could not stand as role formed Selway of their intention to ON THE OTHER models for recruitment. By the end enter any club he opened, he threat- SIDE OF THE of the war blacks still formed only ened them with prosecution, issued about .5 percent of the pilot force. an order specifying by name who INTERWAR YEARS Perhaps the most egregious ex- could enter the white club, and fi- A Book Review by BRIAN R. SULLIVAN ample of the damage done to the nally arrested (and manacled) 61 war effort by bigotry—and an in- black aviators who disobeyed his reg- stance of how prejudice can drive of- ulation. These men were shipped The Roots of Blitzkrieg: ficers who were otherwise profes- out, and his outfit, supposedly on its Hans von Seeckt and sional to act against the national way to war, stood appreciably short German Military Reform interest—was the provoked mutiny of aircrews. He then compounded by James S. Corum of officers in the 477th Medium the injustice by ordering the remain- Lawrence, Kansas: University of Bombardment Group. The 477th was ing officers to certify by signature Kansas, 1992. 274 pp. $29.95 a four-squadron B–25 unit formed in that he was not discriminating [ISBN 0 7006 05 41 X] January 1944 at Selfridge Air Force against blacks on the basis of race. Base, Michigan. It was initially ear- All the whites complied and, because marked for the European theater, it was a direct order in time of war, later for the Pacific. However, the about 300 black officers also signed, hose who find themselves dis- group commander, Colonel Robert but 101 blacks refused even under mayed by impending cuts in E. Selway, instigated an uprising that threat of arrest and worse. Selway ar- Tthe Armed Forces can take con- destroyed unit morale, thereby dash- rested these men and shipped them siderable heart from a new study of ing the group’s chances for getting off as well, leaving his outfit short of the German army between 1918 and into combat. 162 pilots, navigators, and navigator- 1933. James Corum, who teaches in Selway selected only whites to bombardiers. The 477th was dead. the School of Advanced Airpower staff his headquarters and command In his actions, Selway was sup- Studies at the Air Command and the flying squadrons. All the other ported by superiors who, in turn, Staff College, has written an engross- aviators as well as the mechanics were backed by general officers in ing history of the Reichswehr that and support specialists were blacks. the Pentagon, including the Deputy serves as an antidote to worries over In the 477th, the policy was that no Commanding General of the Air declining force structures. black could command a white de- Corps. Thus in a time of war, when The Versailles Treaty compelled spite the fact that many black veter- the country was counting on every the Weimar Republic to reduce the ans of the 332d had flown numerous asset, bigotry not only drove senior strength of the German army to combat missions and had volun- officers to violate their oaths, but 100,000 men. (With a German popu- teered for more combat with the also to deprive the Nation of the lation of 63 million in 1925, this was 477th. None of the white officers had combat services of skilled and proportionate to a U.S. Army of combat experience. dedicated aviators. 400,000 today.) Furthermore, the Al- Selway, moreover, himself re- Racial integration and the full lies forbade the Reichswehr to possess fused to associate with blacks by vis- utilization of human resources based aircraft, armor, antiaircraft guns, iting the officers’ club. Because of upon ability rather than race came medium and heavy artillery, and poi- his example the white squadron to all the services within six years of commanders did likewise. Fearing a World War II, sooner in the cases of negative reaction from nearby De- both the Navy and the newly estab- Brian R. Sullivan is a senior fellow in the troit with its large black population, lished Air Force, evidence that the Institute for National Strategic Studies at th Selway moved the 477 south to an costly discrimination of the war the National Defense University. He is the inadequate airfield. He anticipated years could have been abandoned. coauthor of a recent book entitled Il Duce’s that the relocation would offer him Read The Golden Thirteen and learn Other Woman.

Summer 1993 / JFQ 125 son gas, as well as limiting it to 1,926 failed to meet its iron standards. Offi- batteries, and were expected to em- machine guns and 252 mortars. The cer candidates were required to serve ploy combined arms in battle. The force structure was set at seven un- 18 months in the enlisted ranks be- Reichswehr did not use majors as of- derstrength light divisions and three fore undergoing 30 months of pre- fice managers, nor staff sergeants to brigade-size cavalry divisions. The es- commissioning training. And each make coffee. But it was able to ex- tablishment of a General Staff was year scores of candidates were found pand from 100,000 in January 1933 outlawed. But despite these restric- lacking and dismissed. to 3.7 million in September 1939, tions, the author demonstrates that Recruits were subjected to crush- then smash its enemies and overrun the German army soon was “the ing pressure while doing 6 months of Poland, Scandinavia, and Western best-led, best-trained, and arguably infantry training, followed by Europe in ten months. the most modern army in the equally rigorous specialized branch The Reichswehr also laid the world.” In fact, Corum observes, this training. Enlisted men were issued foundation for the later victories of “small, lightly armed Reichswehr be- tactical handbooks and compelled to the Wehrmacht on brilliant tactical came the best trained army . . . in car- study them with the same diligence and operational doctrine, modern rying out large-scale operations.” as medical or law students. Promo- and extremely efficient weapons and The principal credit for this ex- tion even to the rank of lance corpo- equipment, and the development of traordinary achievement goes to ral required demonstrated leadership mechanized and air-ground warfare. General Hans von Seeckt, who capabilities and the successful com- But as Corum notes, Seeckt’s Reich- headed the German army from 1919 pletion of extremely demanding swehr did not propagate doctrine. to 1926. While Seeckt employed a written and oral examinations. “The American term implies a rigid- number of methods, he emphasized The Versailles Treaty permitted ity of tactics, the ‘proper’ way to em- a scrupulous system for selecting Germany to have an officer corps of ploy the principles of war. . . . The both officers and enlisted men plus a only 4,000 but placed no limit on closest equivalent term that the Ger- demanding regimen of formal educa- the number of NCOs. Taking full ad- mans had was concept. Military tac- tion and an uncompromisingly real- vantage of this loophole, Seeckt tics were general guidelines—they istic approach to field training. De- eventually created 19,000 senior were not meant to be literal formu- spite the care with which they were NCOs, while restricting the total las or principles of warfare.” This in- chosen and the size of the manpower number of field grade and general tellectual flexibility, combined with pool (in the late 1920s there were 15 officers to 920. He also limited the Seeckt’s encouragement of dissent, applicants for each enlisted slot and size of division staffs to 32 officers, a allowed the Reichswehr to push very fewer than 200 officer candidate po- level the Wehrmacht retained. Senior far and rapidly beyond the thinking sitions each year), the Reichswehr NCOs commanded platoons, re- of 1918. ruthlessly weeded out those who ceived training to lead companies or

Corps will be found next time in “India-Burma, 2 April 1942–28 WORLD “Off the Shelf.” January 1945.” CMH Pub 72–5. The U.S. Army Center for Mili- Washington: Government WAR II tary History is developing a series of Printing Office, 1992. 26 pp. REMEMBERED brochures for distribution during the [ISBN 0 16 035881 7] HE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF commemorative period entitled “Aleutian Islands, 3 June 1942–24 WORLD WAR II is being com- “The U.S. Army Campaigns of World August 1943.” CMH 72–6. memorated in various ways, War II.” Of those titles in the series Washington: Government T already in print, the following are Printing Office, 1992. 26 pp. including publication by the services of monographs and pamphlets on focused on the war in the Pacific: [ISBN 0 16 035882 5] the European and Pacific theaters as “Philippine Islands, 7 December “Papua, 23 July 1942–23 January well as the homefront. Some titles 1941–10 May 1942.” CMH Pub 1943.” CMH 72–7. Washington: are reprints of works which origi- 72–3. Washington: Government Government Printing Office, 1992. nally appeared during or shortly after Printing Office, 1992. 23 pp. 22 pp. [ISBN 0 16 035883 3] the war and offer contemporary ac- [ISBN 0 16 035879 5] The Center for Air Force History counts of many of the most impor- “Central Pacific, 7 December 1941–6 is reprinting a series entitled “Wings tant joint and combined operations December 1943.” CMH Pub 72–4. at War” which was first issued by in military history. Among the publi- Washington: Government the Army Air Forces. It includes the cations issued by the Army and Air Printing Office, 1992. 23 pp. following titles on air campaigns Force are those listed below; titles [ISBN 0 16 035880 9] in Europe: published by the Navy and Marine “The AAF in the Invasion of Southern France.” Wings at War,

126 JFQ / Summer 1993 Clandestine development and ture leaders of the Luftwaffe came to tageous circumstances enjoyed by testing in foreign countries of pro- the same conclusion as Seeckt and re- the American military. But they are hibited weaponry—particularly trials jected such thinking. Their analysis also available to our less fortunate of tanks, aircraft, artillery, and gas in of strategic bombing concepts con- potential opponents. For anyone Russia—allowed the Reichswehr to vinced them that such attacks would interested in turning adversity validate new concepts of war. (The lead to unacceptable losses. Instead, into advantage, read The Roots of book’s superb illustrations document “the Reichswehr’s air staff...devel- Blitzkrieg. JFQ this story well.) Once Hitler ordered oped a comprehensive air doctrine rearmament in 1933, the German that emphasized the tactical role of army could put prototypes into full- the air force in supporting ground BOOKSNOTED scale production. Describing the pro- forces. Even [when] the Luftwaffe was NEW ARRIVALS cess, Corum explodes some myths established as a separate branch of about Seeckt’s attitudes toward ar- the armed forces, the overwhelming he following list contains some recently published titles on defense studies and mored and air warfare. Contrary to majority of officers had been trained Tmilitary affairs. Beginning with the next Heinz Guderian’s self-promoting to think of airpower in terms of just issue of JFQ, “Off the Shelf” will feature a claims, Seeckt and the Reichwehr’s one element of a combined arms ef- quarterly annotated roundup of books, arti- armored enthusiasts developed ideas fort. . . .” The Luftwaffe failed, how- cles, and monographs dealing exclusively and equipment that made possible ever, to develop strategic bombers with joint and combined warfare. the panzer division. Nor were such and long-range fighters to accom- Thomas A. Cardwell III. Airland Combat: An ideas taken from Liddell Hart or pany them. But the Reichswehr’s air Organization for Joint Warfare. Maxwell Fuller. In fact, German armor experts officers did initiate the air compo- Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, did not learn of Liddell Hart’s bizarre nent of the Blitzkrieg that proved so December 1992. 269 pp. tank warfare concepts until 1945. As successful in 1939–42. Kenneth W. Condit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff for Fuller’s influence Corum says the The Reichswehr’s accomplish- and National Policy, 1955–1956. The His- Reichswehr’s armor theorists “were, in ments are best appreciated by con- tory of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume 6. the main, critical readers who care- trasting them with developments in Washington: Historical Office, Joint Staff, fully chose concepts—Fuller’s and the British and French armies during 1992. 326 pp. others’—that seemed reasonable and the same period. Corum’s work Trevor N. Dupuy et al., editors. practical and discarded the rest.” should be read in conjunction with International Military and Defense Ency- The 180 officers Seeckt ap- Shelford Bidwell and Dominic Gra- clopedia. 6 vols. Washington: Brassey’s pointed to his shadow air force were ham, Fire Power: British Army Weapons (US), 1993. 3,132 pp. [ISBN 0 02 881061 9 (vol. 1)] familiar with the theories of Douhet, and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (Lon- Trenchard, and Mitchell. But the fu- don: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), William Jackson and Edwin Bramall. The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom and Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Chiefs of Staff. London: Brassey’s (UK), Disaster: The Development of French 1992. 508 pp. Army Doctrine, 1919–1939 (Hamden, [ISBN 0 08 040370 0] Conn.: Archon Books, 1985). For the Anthony James Joes. Modern Guerrilla In- no. 1. Washington: Government consequences which resulted from surgency. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Pub- Printing Office, 1992. 60 pp. the impact of the twenty years of lishers, 1992. 248 pp. [ISBN 0 16 038133 9] German military innovation on a [ISBN 0 275 94263 5] “Sunday Punch in Normandy.” generation of French army torpor, see Brian W. McLean. Joint Training for Night Air Wings at War, no. 2. Washington: Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan Warfare. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Government Printing Office, 1992. and the Fall of France (Hamden, University Press, October 1992. 103 pp. 32 pp. [ISBN 0 16 038134 7] Conn.: Archon Books, 1990). Donald M. Snow. “Peacekeeping, Peacemak- “Pacific Counterblow.” Wings at The Roots of Blitzkrieg offers ing, and Peace-Enforcing: The U.S. Role in War, no. 3. Washington: healthy reassurance to those who the New International Order.” Carlisle Bar- Government Printing Office, 1992. may feel desperate over the financial racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 56 pp. [ISBN 0 16 038130 4] stringencies of the 1990s. Seeckt’s Re- Army War College, February 1993. 40 pp. “Airborne Assault on Holland.” ichswehr suffered from a nightmare Ghulam Dastagir Wardak et al., compilers. Wings at War, no. 4. Washington: of restrictions and economies com- Issues of Operational Art. The Voroshilov Government Printing Office, 1992. pared to those that face the U.S. Lectures: Materials from the Soviet Gen- eral Staff Academy. Volume 3. With an 57 pp. [ISBN 0 16 038135 5] Armed Forces today. But the narrow “Air-Ground Teamwork on the introduction by David M. Glantz. Washing- material parameters of 1919–33 of- ton: National Defense University Press, Western Front.” Wings at War, fered no effective barrier to revolu- 1992. 568 pp. JFQ no. 5. Washington: Government tionary Reichswehr advances in Printing Office, 1992. 50 pp. tactics, operations, weapons, and [ISBN 0 16 0381232 0] equipment. Many of the same intellectual and organizational methods of seventy years ago remain applica- ble today, under the far more advan-

Summer 1993 / JFQ 127 POSTSCRIPT

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128 JFQ / Summer 1993 CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions on all aspects of joint and combined warfare from members of the Armed Forces as well as defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including foreign military personnel. While there is no standard length for articles, contributions of 3,500 to 6,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the editor and longer items of commentary on articles published in previous issues are invited. Copies of supporting material (such as charts, maps, and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts citing the full source and indicating applica- ble copyright information if known. To facilitate the editorial review of your contribution, please provide two copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place all personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and avoid identifying yourself in the body of the manuscript. You may follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used; both the manuscript and the endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. If possible, submit your manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version to facilitate editing. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks prepared in various formats can be processed, Wordperfect is preferred. (Disks will be returned if requested.) Additional information on submit- ting contributions is available by either calling: (202) 475–1013/ DSN 335–1013 or addressing your queries to: Managing Editor Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 JFQ DOD photo JOIN ar aste or Capab iews from the iews from Reforming Join Doctrine Coalition Warfa Joint Warfare— V United Nations Peacekeeping The Limits of J The Gulf W Revisited Joint Air Operations Service Redund W

JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY SUMMER 1993 / NUMBER 1 Cov 4 JFQ ashington, D.C. Published by the W National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 1601 C4 2/15/04 11:21 AM Page 1 Page AM 11:21 2/15/04 C4 1601