The Emotional Basis of Democratic Backsliding in Hungary

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The Emotional Basis of Democratic Backsliding in Hungary Turning Outrage into Disgust: The Emotional Basis of Democratic Backsliding in Hungary Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Paul Armstrong DeBell, B.A., M.A Graduate Program in Political Science The Ohio State University 2016 Dissertation Committee: Goldie A. Shabad, Advisor Irfan Nooruddin, Co-Advisor Anthony Mughan Kathleen McGraw c Copyright by Paul Armstrong DeBell 2016 Abstract Once a frontrunner of democratization in post-communist Europe, Hungary is backsliding. The 2010 election left the country with an unstable and polarized party system, and the population is quiescent as the Fidesz government dismantles the institutions of liberal democracy. Indeed, support for the very idea of democracy is weaker today in Hungary than it was at the transition. Democracy, it turns out, is not seen to be the only game in town for many Hungarians. Why would experience with democracy fail to yield support for the ideals and norms of democracy? Why do party systems in the young democracies of East Central Europe (ECE) remain highly volatile? Answering these questions requires attending to voters experiences with and feelings towards their democratic systems. This dissertation examines the emotional dynamics of political behavior in Hungary, revealing high levels of popular disgust towards politics driving an active rejection of competitive multiparty politics and engendering democratic backsliding. I show that policy constraint from the European Union limits the ability of main- stream political parties in post-communist Europe to differentiate themselves from one another concerning many of the key policy issues most important to voters. This leaves elites with little maneuvering room to make programmatic appeals, increasing the likelihood that they will leverage the power of populist outrage { a discourse of ii alleging real or imagined moral transgressions by political competitors { to differen- tiate themselves from competitors and inspire political action. Where this vitriolic discourse elicits anger it causes participation in the form of protest voting, thus ex- plaining persistent party system volatility. However, this constant stream of vitriol often elicits disgust. This powerful emotion causes a visceral avoidance of politics that undermines the accountability mechanism at the heart of democracy and ex- plains rising disaffection from democracy in Hungary and around the world. I test this argument with multiple methods and sources of original data. A combi- nation of Comparative Manifestos data and an original data set of Hungarian political coverage shows a rise in the use of populist outrage in political communications in the wake of increased EU constraint and new media technologies. Data from nine months of fieldwork document the effects of this populist outrage upon the public. An online experiment and a lab-in-the-field experiment demonstrate the reactions of both anger and disgust to populist outrage and show that partisanship is the key determinant of who becomes angry instead of merely disgusted. An original survey of 1,000 Hungarian adults reveals very high levels of political anger and disgust among the populace and shows that disgusted citizens are less likely to view democracy as a good system of government for their country. Finally, interviews and focus groups conducted during the 2014 Hungarian national election show an over-time evolution of anger at political vitriol into disgust, demonstrating that where multiparty com- petition is equated to a war between immoral, self-interested factions, the popular response will be a rejection of the system. iii This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother, Mildred Keller DeBell. You instilled in me the love of politics that inspired this dissertation and exemplify the persistence that made it possible. Thank you. iv Acknowledgments So many people deserve my gratitude for making this dissertation a reality. First and foremost, I would have never made it through (or even to) graduate school without the unwavering support of my family and friends. My parents Brenda and Stuart, my sister Sarah, and my Aunt Connie and Uncle John have always encouraged me to pursue my passions, even when that took me to strange places and involved enigmatic career choices. My amazing group of friends from home and from William & Mary were a constant source of joy and inspiration throughout. Last but not least, my boys, Alex and Reggie, provided constant inspiration, solace, and companionship through the highs and the lows. Alex, you kept me grounded and laughing every day. Thank you for that. Professionally, the outstanding guidance and friendship of my committee members has had the single greatest effect upon this document and the political scientist that I am today. Goldie Shabad guided me from the very beginning of this idea to its current realization, providing steady encouragement at every point along the way as well as invaluable insight on every aspect of this research. Our lunches to discuss everything from research to current events to travel plans remain some of my favorite experiences in graduate school. Irfan Nooruddin far surpassed the title of mentor, playing the role of everything from research advisor to real-talk career coach to advocate to close confidant at any given time. Our friendship, and the many friendships he helped me v to form over years of his happy hours and conference dinners, is another great gift of my graduate experience. Tony Mughan provided constant feedback on all aspects of the project, and my thinking on party politics and partisanship in particular are much improved because of his input. Finally, Kathleen McGraw played a particularly important role in helping me sharpen my thinking on the psychological mechanisms that make up the crux of this research. Thank you to all four of you | your advice and friendship are a constant thread throughout this document and my career. More broadly, I am greatly indebted to the support of the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University. I always knew that Department Chair Richard Herrmann and Director of Graduate Studies Bear Braumoeller were in my corner, and Graduate Program Coordinator Courtney Sanders was always available to help with her truly unbelievable ability to deal with any concern with a smile. This work also greatly benefited from the intellectually stimulating environment of the department, and the Comparative Politics Workshop and Psychology Workshop in particular were integral to testing out new ideas and turning them into research. Thank you in particular to Amanda Robinson and Tom Nelson, who lent their time to these respective workshops and went above and beyond their duties to provide constant and invaluable feedback. The most rewarding element of conducting dissertation research was the wonder- ful colleagues I had the opportunity to work with and befriend along the way. Special thanks to Chelsea Ihle, Meri-Ellen Lynott, Caronlina Foresman, Matt Hitt, Vittorio Merola, John Elliott, Lauren Elliott-Dorans, Alex Castillo, Peter Tunkis, Carolyn Morgan, Margaret Hanson, and Calla Hummel. You are my colleagues, comrades in arms, and now, close friends that I am lucky to have. My friend and co-author vi Jason Morgan deserves special recognition for constant conversation and unwavering patience in helping me work through methodological and statistical concerns. Fi- nally, thank you to Jessy Defenderfer, my closest confidant and biggest cheerleader throughout this seven year process. Your friendship is the reason I'm emerging from this process (somewhat) sane. The people of Hungary deserve special thanks. From the specific friends and colleagues that made this work possible, such as the invaluable aide of Kitti and Zoli Fekete-Kovats, N´oraL´antos, and Levente Littvay, to the numerous participants in my various studies, to the critical role of Central European and E otv os Lor´and Universities in hosting me during fieldwork, this research is greatly indebted to you. More fundamentally, it was talking to Hungarians over many years that I learned of the ideas explained below. They came up with the hypotheses, I simply tested them. vii Vita August 5, 1984 . Born | Fairfax, VA, USA 2006 . .B.A. in Government & Philosophy, College of William and Mary 2011 . .M.A. in Political Science, The Ohio State University 2011-present . .Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University Fields of Study Major Field: Political Science Studies in: Comparative Politics, Political Psychology viii Table of Contents Page Abstract . ii Dedication . iv Acknowledgments . v Vita . viii List of Tables . xii List of Figures . xiii Chapter 1: Introduction — The Politics of Outrage . 1 1.1 Playing with Fire: Emotional Entrepreneurship and the Uses and Abuses of Outrage . 4 1.2 Dissertation Overview . 8 1.2.1 Chapter Outline . 8 Chapter 2: Emotions, Anti-Politics, and Democratization as the Third Wave Ebbs . 13 2.1 Post-Communist Political Development . 15 2.2 Populist Outrage in the Political Dialogue . 17 2.2.1 International Constraint . 21 2.2.2 Party Competition in the Information Age . 23 2.3 The Explanatory Power of Emotion . 25 2.4 Anger and Party System Volatility . 27 2.5 Disgust and Dedication to Democratic Institutions . 30 2.6 The Distinctiveness of Disgust . 34 2.7 Disgust or Anger? The Roles of Partisanship and Time . 37 ix 2.8 Hypotheses . 40 2.9 Alternative hypotheses . 43 2.9.1 Economic Strife . 43 2.9.2 Critical citizens and discerning democrats . 45 Chapter 3: The Prevalence of Populist Outrage in East Central Europe . 48 3.1 Media Technology and Attack Politics . 50 3.2 Populist Outrage . 52 3.3 Populist Outrage in ECE . 56 3.4 Analysis: Mapping Populist Outrage . 60 3.4.1 Outrage Dialogue in the Hungarian Political Discourse . 65 3.4.2 Adaptation of the ANEW Dictionary . 69 3.4.3 Populism in Party Appeals . 73 3.5 Discussion . 81 Chapter 4: Immediate Emotional Reactions to Outrage: Anger, Disgust, and the Role of Partisanship .
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