Translational Issues in Psychological Science © 2017 American Psychological Association 2017, Vol. 3, No. 2, 153–166 2332-2136/17/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/tps0000108 Rape Perpetrator Gender Shapes Liability Judgments: Implications for Disgust and Moral Outrage

Evan W. McCracken Margaret C. Stevenson University of Nebraska-Lincoln University of Evansville

We explored the impact of defendant and plaintiff gender in a sexual assault civil trial as well as the possible mediating role of emotion (i.e., disgust and moral outrage) on liability outcomes. Participants were 229 community members (61% women; M age ϭ 36) who read a civil trial depicting an alleged prison rape in which an inmate was allegedly sexually assaulted by a prison guard. Plaintiff and defendant gender were manipulated in a fully crossed between-subjects design, resulting in 4 conditions. Specifically, participants read about either a male or female plaintiff (i.e., Mr./Ms. Roberson) and about either a male or female defendant (i.e., Mr./Ms. Shaw). Partici- pants subsequently rendered liability outcomes and completed a series of case judg- ments (i.e., perceived disgust toward the defendant, moral outrage toward the defen- dant, and the belief that the crime is common). A series of path analyses supported our theoretically derived hypotheses regarding defendant gender. Participants were more disgusted by a male versus female defendant, which, in turn, predicted greater moral outrage toward the male defendant, which, in turn, predicted defendant liability. Although there were fewer effects or interactions involving plaintiff gender, partici- pants were more morally outraged and more likely to believe the crime was common when the plaintiff was female than male. Finally, when the defendant was female, participants were less likely to believe the crime was common when the plaintiff was male than female.

What is the significance of this article for the general public? Although jurors are required to remain emotionally neutral, this study suggests that emotions, disgust and moral outrage, influence the relationship between defendant gender and liability outcomes in a civil sexual assault case.

Keywords: emotion, disgust, moral outrage, rape Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/tps0000108.supp

Sexual assault is an unfortunate reality that al., 2011). Within the prison system, however, persists within the United States (Black et al., experiencing sexual assault is more common, 2011). Approximately 18.3% of American particularly for men (Struckman-Johnson,

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. women and 1.4% of American men in the gen- Struckman-Johnson, Rucker, Bumby, & Don-

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individualeral user and is not to be disseminatedpopulation broadly. are victims of attempted or com- aldson, 1996). For instance, 22% of men report pleted rape at some point in their lives (Black et being sexually assaulted while imprisoned, with prison staff perpetrating 18% of the time (Struckman-Johnson et al., 1996). Still, it is Evan W. McCracken, Department of Psychology, Uni- exceptionally difficult to determine the exact versity of Nebraska-Lincoln; Margaret C. Stevenson, De- number of adult victims, particularly adult male partment of Psychology, University of Evansville. victims, because of low disclosure rates Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- (Walker, Archer, & Davies, 2005). Some theo- dressed to Evan W. McCracken, Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1400 R Street, Lincoln, rize that current estimates are conservative, es- NE 68588. E-mail: [email protected] pecially among men (e.g., Walker et al., 2005).

153 154 MCCRACKEN AND STEVENSON

Indeed, much like female victims, men tend not al., 1988). Prevalent, long-standing cultural ex- to report sex crime victimization because of the pectations about gender and sexuality (e.g., social stigma associated with being labeled as a Allgeier & McCormick, 1983) likely result in a rape victim (Walker et al., 2005). That is, men reluctance to categorize men as victims or are stereotypically considered to be sexually dom- women as rapists. Indeed, in a study in which inant, whereas women are stereotyped as submis- perpetrator and victim gender were fully manip- sive and passive (e.g., Hosoda & Stone, 2000). In ulated, participants believed that all gender turn, people have difficulty accepting the idea that combinations constituted rape, except when the someone could coerce an unwilling man to engage perpetrator was female and the victim was male in sexual activity or to attempt or completely rape (Hannon, Hall, Nash, Formati, & Hopson, a man (e.g., Chapleau, Oswald, & Russell, 2008). 2000). In addition, people have traditionally It is possible that the rape of a woman is perceived believed that men are sexually dominant, as more plausible and more morally outrageous whereas women should be sexually submissive and disgusting than the rape of a man. Yet women (e.g., Hosoda & Stone, 2000). Furthermore, do perpetrate rape: 35.8% of male rape victims men are stereotyped as sex driven, such that any were raped by women (e.g., Thoennes & Tjaden, sexual encounter is perceived to have been de- 2000). sired and enjoyed by the men involved (e.g., Although it is clear that adult men are victims Hosoda & Stone, 2000). Stereotypic beliefs of rape and adult women perpetrate rape, rela- about the gendered nature of rape are so prev- tively little research has explored the role of per- alent in society that it was not until 2013 that the petrator and victim gender on mock jurors’ deci- Department of Justice implemented a new def- sions in sexual assault cases (e.g., Smith, Pine, & inition of rape for the Uniform Crime Report, Hawley, 1988). No research to date has explored officially allowing for the inclusion of men as the possibility that the emotions of disgust and victims and women as perpetrators (Federal Bu- moral outrage mediate effects of perpetrator and reau of Investigation, 2013). Although there is victim gender on case judgments in a rape context. tentative support for the notion that perpetrator This is a legally relevant question because jurors and victim gender might affect case outcomes, are required by law to base their case decisions on existing research has largely neglected the pos- fact and be uninfluenced by emotion, prejudice, sible underlying emotional determinants of and sympathy. Can emotionally compelling case these effects (see Chapleau & Oswald, 2014). decisions, such as sexual assault, be unaffected by We explore disgust and moral outrage as poten- emotion? Do extralegal characteristics of the per- tial underlying psychological determinants of petrators and victims involved (e.g., gender) pre- perpetrator and victim gender on case out- dict the extent to which case decisions are influ- comes. enced by prejudicial emotions? We explore these possibilities within the context of a civil trial be- Understanding Main Effects of Perpetrator cause mock jury research appears to emphasize and Victim Gender criminal cases while neglecting civil cases. Yet civil case filings far outnumber criminal filings Some research suggests that participants re- (United States Courts, 2013). Next, we review act more punitively toward male than female research related to the effects of perpetrator and perpetrators and are more likely to render guilty victim gender on case judgments, followed by a verdicts in sexual assault cases when the perpe- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. review of research and theory exploring the rela- trator is male than female (e.g., Russell, Os- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. tionship between emotion (i.e., disgust, moral out- wald, & Kraus, 2011). For instance, Smith et al. rage) and rape-related case judgments. (1988) fully manipulated perpetrator and victim gender in a rape case in which two perpetrators Research Exploring Effects of Perpetrator (both male or both female) raped a single victim and Victim Gender (either male or female). Although the unambig- uous nature of the case produced a ceiling effect Although the body of literature remains such that, regardless of the perpetrators’ gen- small, emerging research suggests that perpetra- ders, participants almost always voted guilty tor and victim gender affect how people per- and prescribed longer sentences to male than ceive the circumstances of a rape (e.g., Smith et female rapists. Furthermore, participants be- DISGUST DRIVES LIABILITY OUTCOMES 155

lieved that the male victim was less likely to Understanding Interactions Between have been coerced than the female victim, and Perpetrator and Victim Gender participants were significantly more likely to believe that the victim encouraged the rape Participants might be more punitive when the when he was male and the perpetrators were perpetrators are portrayed as gay versus straight female than in any other perpetrator-victim gen- or lesbian because some research has revealed der condition. Moreover, more enjoyment and in contexts involving alleged child abuse or less stress were attributed to male victims of relatively trivial forms of juvenile sex offenses female rape than to victims in all other condi- (e.g., Wiley & Bottoms, 2009). More directly tions. More recently, Oswald and Russell relevant research, concerning child sexual (2006) manipulated perpetrator gender in a het- abuse, suggests that participants, especially men, might hold more negative attitudes toward erosexual sexually coercive context, finding that male than female victims—especially when the participants rated a male perpetrator as aggres- perpetrator was female (Rogers & Davies, sive but a female perpetrator as promiscuous— 2007). A similar pattern occurs for adult vic- illustrating beliefs that women cannot cause tims: People are most punitive when the perpe- harm. Similarly, Russell, Oswald, and Kraus trator is male and the victim is female than any (2011) manipulated perpetrator gender (in a het- other perpetrator-victim gender combination erosexual context) and sexual strategy used to (e.g., Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Indeed, obtain sex (i.e., consensual, verbal coercion, Smith et al. (1988) found that when manipulat- alcohol, or physical aggression). Guilt ratings ing perpetrator and victim gender, participants were highest in the physical assault condition, recommended longer sentences to male perpe- followed by the use of alcohol, verbal coercion, trators than female perpetrators (see also Han- and, lastly, consensual sex. Although they did non et al., 2000). Furthermore, participants held not find an interaction between perpetrator gen- fewer negative beliefs toward the female victim der and coercion strategy, the female was rated (e.g., that she enjoyed and encouraged the as- less guilty than the male perpetrator, likely re- sault less) than the male victim. Importantly, flecting a belief that a woman cannot inflict when the victim was male and the perpetrators harm. were female, participants believed that the vic- With regard to victim gender, people, es- tim encouraged the sex, enjoyed it, and was less pecially men, tend to endorse rape myths (see stressed by it than any other perpetrator-victim Chapleau et al., 2008), have sexist attitudes gender combination (Smith et al., 1988). Thus, toward women victims (Aosved & Long, the alternative hypothesis, which we favor, is 2006), and hold women responsible for their that participants will be most punitive when the own sexual victimization (for review see Fer- perpetrator and victim gender is rape stereotyp- rão & Gonçalves, 2015). Still, because ical (male perpetrator and female victim), an effect stemming from beliefs that this type of women are stereotypical rape victims, people assault is most plausible. render more punitive case judgments when the victim is female than male (e.g., Russell, Disgust and Moral Outrage as Predictors of Oswald, & Kraus, 2011). In support, evidence suggests that many people endorse male rape Rape Case Judgments This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. myths such as “real men can defend them- Jurors are required to remain emotionally This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. selves against rape” or “men are not affected neutral with respect to the law (Wiener, Born- by rape (or not as much as women)” (e.g., stein, & Voss, 2006). Of course, the legal sys- Anderson, 2007). These results are consistent tem evolved to punish those who violate moral with the limited body of research suggesting codes (Rousseau, 1920), setting the framework that people, especially men, blame male vic- for moral emotions to shape legal decision mak- tims more than female victims (Davies, Pol- ing. Some research suggests that logical reason- lard, & Archer, 2001), believe that men enjoy ing (important for legal decision making) is being sexually assaulted more than women, inhibited by emotions (e.g., Blanchette & Rich- and that men experience less stress from sex- ards, 2004), whereas other research suggests ual assault than women (Smith et al., 1988). emotions might facilitate legal decision making 156 MCCRACKEN AND STEVENSON

by making morally relevant evaluative informa- gust (i.e., their individual proneness to be dis- tion salient (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, gusted) and presented them with a vignette de- 2009). Regardless, jurors’ decisions are often picting a consensual, yet technically illegal, influenced by their own emotions (Georges, sexual offense against a minor. As participants’ Wiener, & Keller, 2013) as well as the emotion- disgust sensitivity increased, their empathy for ally charged nature of a case (e.g., crime type; the perpetrator decreased, their belief that the Capestany & Harris, 2014), which can bias their perpetrator was a superpredator increased, and decisions in important ways. For instance, grue- their likelihood to support sex offender regis- some black-and-white photographic evidence of tration increased. In a related study, Salerno and a crime elicited more disgust than photographic Peter-Hagene (2013) asked participants to read evidence presented in color. In a separate con- about either a sexual assault or a nonsexual dition in which participants were instructed to moral violation (funeral picketing). Reading either suppress their emotion or not—participants about these moral violations elicited disgust who did not suppress their emotion rated the among many participants, and when disgust co- crime as more punishable than those who sup- occurred with at least moderate levels of anger, pressed their emotion (Blokker & Social, 2015). it predicted feelings of moral outrage. Indeed, Furthermore, evidence suggests that crimes per- disgust predicted moral outrage even better than ceived as low, as compared with high, in disgust anger. receive significantly less punishment than U.S. To our knowledge, there is no research that federal sentencing guidelines recommend has directly explored disgust as an emotional (Capestany & Harris, 2014). determinant of legal outcomes in a rape case. Importantly, sexual offenses are known to Yet sexual assault is a clear moral violation that evoke powerful and influential emotions that seems likely to elicit disgust reactions. More- have the potential to drive case outcomes (e.g., over, we expect that disgust will be greatest Lynch, 2002), such as disgust and moral outrage when defendant and plaintiff gender is rape (Lynch, 2002; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). stereotypical (male defendant and female plain- In this study, we include disgust and moral tiff). In support, existing research suggests that outrage as potential mediators of the effects of sexual assault is perceived to be less serious and defendant and plaintiff gender on rape case out- less psychologically damaging when the perpe- comes. We test a theoretical model designed to trators are female and the victim is male than provide some tentative evidence regarding the any other perpetrator-victim gender combina- relationship between defendant and plaintiff tion (Smith et al., 1988), beliefs that seem likely gender, emotions (i.e., disgust and moral out- to translate into reduced moral outrage, an emo- rage), and verdicts. tion that has been linked with disgust (e.g., Disgust is considered to be a moral emotion Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993) reflecting a Indeed, we also expect that disgust will pre- gut feeling (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, dict elevated levels of moral outrage in the 2008) that results from purity violations present research. Moral outrage is a negative (Horberg et al., 2009). It is believed to have emotion experienced as a reaction to a per- served an adaptive function during the course of ceived moral violation (Skitka, Baurman, & human evolution, such that disgusting stimuli Mullen, 2004). Moral outrage motivates people were avoided, and, thus, unnecessary exposure to correct the perceived moral violation by tak- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. to potentially pathogenic contaminants (e.g., ing punitive action to restore a sense of moral This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. rotting flesh, human waste) was minimized (Ro- equilibrium (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, zin et al., 1993). However, disgust is elicited not 2004), specifically by targeting the perpetrator only by exposure to potentially dangerous stim- who violated the system (e.g., Darley & Pitt- uli but also by the mere mention of disgusting man, 2003). However, system-justifying beliefs things (Rozin et al., 1993). Surprisingly, little (perceiving existing social inequality as fair and research has explored disgust as a predictor of legitimate) prevent restorative actions stem- reactions toward sexual offenses. Indeed, we are ming from moral outrage (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, aware of only two studies to have done so. & Chen, 2007), particularly in the context of First, Stevenson, Malik, Totton, and Reeves rape (Chapleau & Oswald, 2014). Specifically, (2014) measured participants’ sensitivity to dis- endorsement of gender-specific system justifi- DISGUST DRIVES LIABILITY OUTCOMES 157

cation (e.g., believing that women are subordi- duced simply by measuring one’s attitudes. We nate to men) was associated with less moral test this empirical question directly in the pres- outrage toward rape and greater rape myth ac- ent research. To the extent that our measures of ceptance (Chapleau & Oswald, 2014). Given emotion induce emotion awareness among par- the association between moral outrage and mo- ticipants, we expect that self-reports regarding tivation to restore moral order, it is likely that the impact of emotion on case outcomes will be moral outrage will influence case outcomes, relatively accurate and conform to the same perhaps because the goal of correcting a moral pattern of hypothesized main effects and inter- violation is made salient in the courtroom. In actions. support, in the context of a mock homicide trial, participants who felt disgust, and moderate lev- Study Overview els of anger, experienced moral outrage and were more confident in their verdicts when they Participants read a vignette depicting an al- voted guilty (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). leged rape perpetrated by a prison guard against Thus, we further predict that greater disgust a restrained inmate. Next, participants rendered toward a perpetrator will be associated with liability outcomes (judgments of defendant re- increased moral outrage, which, in turn, will sponsibility), completed items assessing their predict increased defendant liability outcomes. disgust, moral outrage, their ability to render We predict that disgust and moral outrage will outcomes based on fact versus emotion, and the mediate our hypothesized main effects of de- extent to which they believed this type of crime fendant and plaintiff gender as well as our hy- is common. Consistent with previous research, pothesized interaction between defendant and we expect that participants will render more plaintiff gender on liability. That is, although punitive case outcomes (i.e., defendant liabil- jurors are legally required to base their decision ity), believe the crime is more common, and be solely on facts and not on emotion, we expect more influenced by emotion versus case fact that extralegal factors such as defendant and (i.e., disgust, moral outrage) when the defen- plaintiff gender will predict jurors’ ability to dant is male than female and when the plaintiff make case decisions unaffected by prejudice is female than male. We anticipate an interac- and emotion. tion between defendant and plaintiff gender Finally, we include measures designed to as- such that participants will be most punitive sess the extent to which participants are aware when defendant and plaintiff gender is rape of the influence of emotion on their case deci- stereotypical (male defendant and female plain- sions. Indeed, awareness of an emotion is the- tiff) than when it is not (any other gender con- orized to be psychologically distinct from, but dition). Finally, we expect emotions of disgust related to, the experience of the emotion itself and moral outrage to serially mediate the hy- (Lambie, 2009). Emotion awareness is theo- pothesized effects of defendant and plaintiff rized to promote self-knowledge because it pro- gender on liability outcomes. vides information about our biases (Lambie, 2009). Because we measure emotion in the Method present research, we presumably induce some degree of emotion awareness among partici- Participants pants, which may in turn provide information to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. participants regarding the influence of those Participants were 229 jury-eligible (U.S. cit- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. emotions on their judgments. Supporting our izens, 18 years old or older; 61% women; logic, classic research has shown that attitudes Mage ϭ 36, SD ϭ 11.12) community members predict behavior only when those attitudes are recruited from Mechanical Turk, an online accessible (e.g., Houston & Fazio, 1989). That workforce of people who complete tasks in ex- is, reminding people about their attitudes brings change for monetary compensation (Buhrm- their attitudes more in line with their behavior ester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Data produced (i.e., assimilation). Indeed, Houston and Fazio by the Mechanical Turk workforce indicates (1989) increased accessibility of attitudes by that samples are more representative than typi- measuring them repeatedly, suggesting some cal college samples and at least equally reliable evidence that attitude awareness might be in- (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Eighty-two percent of 158 MCCRACKEN AND STEVENSON

the participants were White, 5% were Black, that he or she did not assault the plaintiff for 3% were Hispanic, 9% were Asian, and 1% several reasons. First, the defendant claimed that reported other for ethnicity. Approximately [he or she] was in a committed relationship and 92.9% of participants were heterosexual, 1.3% that it would violate [his or her] religious beliefs to were homosexual, and 5.3% bisexual. Four par- act in such a way. The defendant also claimed that ticipants incorrectly identified either the gender the eyewitness testified against him/her because of the defendant or the plaintiff and were ex- they would be promoted if the defendant lost his cluded from the analyses below, reducing our or her job. Although video surveillance showed total sample size from 233 to 229. that both the prison guard and the inmate entered the storage closet simultaneously, there were no Materials obviously apparent physical abnormalities in the plaintiff’s appearance after leaving the storage Case vignette. Participants read a 1.5-page closet. vignette describing a prison inmate who testi- Importantly, the case took place within a prison fied about being sexually assaulted by a prison because 22% of male and 7% of female prison staff member in a staff member–only storage inmates in a Midwestern prison reported ex- closet (see supplemental online document for periencing at least one instance of forced sex- the full case vignette). We experimentally ma- ual contact during their incarcerations nipulated the gender of both the defendant (the (Struckman-Johnson et al., 1996), making alleged perpetrator, a prison guard) and the adult male and female rape in this context plaintiff (the prison inmate) in a fully crossed, relatively ecologically realistic. A practicing between-subjects design. The resulting four ex- civil law attorney reviewed our case vignette perimental conditions were fairly evenly repre- for realism. sented in the study, resulting in the following Jury instructions. Participants received number of participants per experimental condi- civil jury instructions explaining that the plaintiff tion: 60 in the male defendant and male plaintiff (the alleged victim) must prove his or her claim by condition, 62 in the male defendant and female a preponderance of the evidence. More specifi- plaintiff condition, 55 in the female defendant cally, participants were instructed that a prepon- and female plaintiff condition, and 56 in the derance of the evidence means, “. . . that the female defendant and male plaintiff condition. evidence for one side seems more likely true than We manipulated gender by using gender- not true.” In addition, to ensure participants were specific pronouns throughout the vignette (he, aware that they should base their verdicts on the him/she, her) and by manipulating the names of facts and disregard their feelings, the jury instruc- the defendant (either Mr. or Ms. Shaw) and tions included specific language designed to call plaintiff (either Mr. or Ms. Roberson). To in- participants’ attention to the facts of the case. crease ecological realism, this case was mod- Participants read, for instance, “It is your duty as eled after a real-world sexual crime tried in civil a jury member to follow the law as stated in the court in which a male inmate alleged that he instructions of the Court and to apply it to the facts was raped by a female prison guard (Roberson as you find them from the evidence in the case. v. Shaw, 2013). These instructions contain all the law that may by To ensure variance (i.e., to avoid ceiling or applied by you and the rules by which you should floor effects) in participants’ liability judgments

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. weigh the evidence and determine the facts in (the primary dependent variable), the veracity of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. issue” and that their decisions “. . . should not the claims of sexual assault were purposely por- reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any trayed as ambiguous by including conflicting ev- party.” The same practicing attorney reviewed idence. For instance, eyewitness testimony sug- these instructions for ecological realism. gested that the defendant (the prison guard) had made previous inappropriate comments about the Dependent Measures plaintiff (the prison inmate), such as “I always lose track of time when I’m working with [Mr./Ms.] Liability. After reading the jury instruc- Roberson. I can’t keep my eyes off [him/her].” In tions, participants rendered liability outcomes contrast, the defendant (the prison guard) denied by answering yes (1) or no (0) to the following the eyewitness accounts in their entirety, claiming question, “According to the preponderance of DISGUST DRIVES LIABILITY OUTCOMES 159

the evidence, do you find in favor of the plain- Ms.] Roberson, the plaintiff, is disgusting.” tiff, [Mr./Ms.] Roberson?” In line with jury This item was modified from previous research instructions, a vote in favor of the plaintiff (Salerno et al., 2013). indicates that a participant believes the defen- Manipulation checks. As manipulation dant (Mr./Ms. Shaw) was more likely to have checks, participants were asked, “What was the committed the sexual assault than to have not. gender of the defendant?” as well as “What was Belief that the crime is common. Partici- the gender of the plaintiff?” pants were asked to indicate how common this Demographics. Participants indicated their type of crime was by answering the following age, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. item, “This type of crime is common.” Re- sponse options ranged from 1 (strongly dis- Procedure agree)to5(strongly agree). Influenced by emotion. Using the same re- Community members were recruited from sponse options, we developed two legally rele- Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in vant items designed to measure the extent to this study in exchange for monetary compensa- which participants acknowledge that they fol- tion if they had a hit approval rate of Ն95%. lowed jury instructions by basing their case That is, once a participant completes a hit, their decisions on facts, not emotions. These two work is either accepted or rejected, with rejec- items are as follows: “I based my decision on tions appearing on their permanent record. High the FACTS and disregarded my PERSONAL rejection rates can be used as an indicator of low FEELINGS about the case” and “I based my overall work quality, so participants with ap- decision on my PERSONAL FEELINGS and proval ratings Ն 95% produce higher-quality disregarded the FACTS about the case.” Be- work. Participants were told that their responses cause these two items are the inverse of each were entirely anonymous, that participation was other, we reverse scored one item (i.e., “I completely voluntary, and that they could stop based my decision on the FACTS . . .”) and participating at any time. After participants pro- combined them to form a two-item measure. vided informed consent, they read the vignette This scale was internally reliability (Cron- describing the sexual act. Participants were ran- bach’s alpha ϭ .71). domly assigned to one of four vignette condi- Moral Outrage Scale. Participants com- tions (male defendant and male plaintiff; male pleted a scale including five items designed to defendant and female plaintiff; female defen- measure the extent to which participants felt dant and female plaintiff; and female defendant morally outraged by the defendant. These items and male plaintiff). Next, participants read the were modified from those developed in previ- jury instructions and subsequently completed ous research (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, all case judgments in the following order: de- 2004). Response options again ranged from 1 fendant liability, the belief that the crime is (strongly disagree)to5(strongly agree). The common, two items designed to measure items included, “[Mr./Ms.] Shaw, the defen- whether participants were influenced by fact or dant, is callous and heartless,” “I feel a compel- their emotion, the Moral Outrage Scale, per- ling need to punish [Mr./Ms.] Shaw, the defen- ceived disgust, and demographic information. dant,” “I feel a desire to hurt [Mr./Ms.] Shaw, Finally, participants were thanked for their par- the defendant,” “I believe [Mr./Ms.] Shaw, the ticipation and compensated $2. This study was This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. defendant, is evil to the core,” and “I feel mor- approved by the university’s institutional re- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ally outraged by what [Mr./Ms.] Shaw, the de- view board. fendant, did to [Mr./Ms.] Roberson.” This scale had high internal reliability (Cronbach’s al- Statistical Analysis Plan pha ϭ .91). In addition, all items were subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis, as reported in We first conducted a series of analyses (one the Results section below. logistic regression and several ANOVAs) test- Disgust. Next, perceived disgust was as- ing the main effects and interactions of defen- sessed on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 dant gender and plaintiff gender on all depen- (strongly disagree)to5(strongly agree) with dent variables (liability, disgust, moral outrage, the following item, “What happened to [Mr./ the belief that this type of crime is common, and 160 MCCRACKEN AND STEVENSON

the extent to which decisions were based on was no main effect of plaintiff gender on defen- emotion). A path analysis was conducted to dant liability (Wald ϭ .226), LR ␹2(1, N ϭ 225) ϭ assess disgust and moral outrage as mediators of 3.97, p ϭ .64. See Table 1 for all means. defendant liability outcomes using Analysis of Moment Structures (Arbuckle & Wothke, Belief That the Crime Is Common 1999). To assess model fit, we provide chi- square values for all models. Because model ␹2 Participants were significantly more likely to ␹2 values ( M) are highly sensitive to sample size believe that this type of crime is common when (Kline, 2015), we primarily consider alternative the defendant was male than female, F(1, 221) ϭ 2 measures of model fit. Specifically, root mean 12.78, p ϭ .000, ␩p ϭ .06. Furthermore, partici- square error of approximation (RMSEA) val- pants were significantly more likely to believe this ues Յ.05 indicate a reasonable model fit and type of crime is common when the plaintiff was values Ͼ.10 indicate poor fit (Kline, 2015). In female than male, F(1, 221) ϭ 8.09, p ϭ .005, 2 addition, comparative fit index (CFI) values ␩p ϭ .04. However, this was qualified by a sig- greater than approximately .90 indicate rea- nificant two-way interaction, F(1, 221) ϭ 10.69, 2 sonable model fit (Kline, 2015). Standardized p Ͻ .001, ␩p ϭ .05. Specifically, when the plain- root-mean-square residual (SRMR) values tiff was male, participants were less likely to be- less than .10 indicate reasonable model fit. lieve the crime is common when the defendant Note that the SRMR values reported below was female than male, F(1, 221) ϭ 23.34, p Ͻ 2 reflect the data in which the three participants .001, ␩p ϭ .09. However, when the plaintiff was with missing data were excluded because female, there was no significant effect of defen- SRMR cannot be calculated with missing da- dant gender on the belief the crime was common, 2 ta. The Akaine information criterion (AIC) is F(1, 221) ϭ .05, p ϭ .829, ␩p ϭ .00. typically used to evaluate relative model fit between competing models estimated from Influenced by Emotion the same data set. According to Kline (2015), the model with the lower AIC value should be Participants were more likely to admit that selected as the better fitting model because it they based their decision on personal feelings is most likely to replicate. and disregarded the facts when the defendant was male than female, F(1, 221) ϭ 114.48, p ϭ .000, ␩2 ϭ Results p .34. In addition, participants were more likely to admit that they based their decision on Liability personal feelings (disregarding the facts) when the plaintiff was female than male, F(1, 221) ϭ 2 Supporting the hypotheses, participants were 72.94, p ϭ .000, ␩p ϭ .25. These effects were significantly more likely to find the defendant qualified by a significant two-way interaction, 2 liable when the defendant was male as compared F(1, 221) ϭ 140.74, p ϭ .000, ␩p ϭ .39. Spe- with female (Wald ϭ 3.70), LR ␹2(1, N ϭ 225) ϭ cifically, when the plaintiff was female, partic- 3.97, p ϭ .05. Contrary to our hypotheses, there ipants were more likely to base their decision on

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. Table 1

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individualMean user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Judgments as a Function of Defendant and Plaintiff Gender

Male defendant Female defendant Variables Male plaintiff Female plaintiff Marginal M Male plaintiff Female plaintiff Marginal M Disgust 3.69 (1.14) 3.78 (1.08) 3.74 (1.11) 3.23 (1.20) 3.43 (1.37) 3.33 (1.29) Moral outrage 2.42 (.92) 2.77 (1.07) 2.60 (1.01) 2.15 (.88) 2.37 (1.03) 2.26 (.96) Common crimea,b,c 3.46 (.95) 3.40 (1.08) 3.43 (1.01) 2.53 (.97) 3.36 (1.06) 2.94 (1.09) Decision on feelingsa,b,c 1.80 (.80) 3.71 (.54) 2.76 (1.18) 1.91 (.77) 1.59 (.67) 1.75 (.73) Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. a Significant main effect of defendant gender, p ϭ .05. b Significant main effect of plaintiff gender, p ϭ .05. c Significant defendant gender ϫ plaintiff gender interaction, p ϭ .05. DISGUST DRIVES LIABILITY OUTCOMES 161

feelings (i.e., disregard the facts) when the de- Tests of normality. Inspection of Ma- fendant was male than female, F(1, 221) ϭ halanobis distance (D) statistics revealed no ev- 2 255.55, p ϭ .001, ␩p ϭ .54. However, when the idence of multivariate outliers, nor were there plaintiff was male, defendant gender did not univariate outliers (scores greater than 3.00 SD influence participants’ tendency to base their beyond the mean). See Table 2 for a matrix decision on feelings (i.e., disregard the facts), correlation. There was no evidence that the data 2 F(1, 221) ϭ .68, p ϭ .412, ␩p ϭ .00. are skewed (see Figure 1). Furthermore, a cor- relation table revealed no evidence of multicol- Moral Outrage linearity, using the criteria r Ͻ .7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012) and variance inflation factors Supporting the hypotheses, participants were Ͻ significantly more morally outraged when the (VIFs) 10 (Kline, 2015). Across all measures, defendant was male than female, F(1, 221) ϭ only three separate and different moral outrage 2 questions were skipped (from three separate 6.72, p ϭ .010, ␩p ϭ .03. Furthermore, partic- ipants were more morally outraged when the participants), and there is no evidence to sug- plaintiff was female than male, F(1, 221) ϭ gest that these missing data are not missing at 2 random (proportion of missing values ranged 4.62, p ϭ .033, ␩p ϭ .02. from 0 to .005%). Therefore, analyses reflect all Disgust data, including the three participants who skipped one item of the Moral Outrage Scale. Participants were significantly more dis- Confirmatory factor analysis. Because gusted when the defendant was male as com- moral outrage is a hypothesized mediator, we pared with female, F(1, 221) ϭ 6.54, p ϭ .011, first had to confirm evidence that it is a latent ␩2 ϭ p .03. However, contrary to the hypotheses, variable. Thus, we conducted a confirmatory there was no main effect of plaintiff gender on factor analysis to test a one-factor model with ϭ ϭ ␩2 ϭ disgust F(1, 221) .856, p .356, p .004. moral outrage as the proposed latent factor, Path Analyses composed of the five items assessing moral out- rage. Results revealed adequate model fit ␹2 ϭ ϭ ϭ ϭ We used Analysis of Moment Structures 21 ( M(5) 12.97, p .000, CFI .99, RMSEA (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) for all path analy- .09, SRMR ϭ .02, AIC ϭ 42.97). All standard- ses, which reflect exploratory analysis for pos- ized factor loadings were Ն.72, indicating that sible indirect effects of defendant gender on all items adequately loaded onto the factor (see defendant liability through possible mediators, Figure 1 for all standardized regression operating serially (disgust and moral outrage), weights). In support, according to Kline (2015), as we have hypothesized. Indeed, although we factor loadings must be Ͼ.4 to reveal evidence 2 have collected our data at one point in time and of adequate loading onto a factor. All Rsmc val- therefore cannot infer direct evidence of causal ues are Ն.63, indicating that the explained vari- mediation (e.g., Kline, 2015), we present the ance of the indicators (i.e., the magnitude of all following analyses as a test of our theorized the indicators) is acceptable. indirect effects, acknowledging that the results Mediation analyses. Next, we tested a se- of such analyses can, at best, provide merely ries of models allowing defendant gender to pre- tentative support for possible mediation. dict both disgust toward the defendant and defen- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Table 2 Correlation Matrix

Variables Common crime Influenced by emotion Moral outrage Disgust ءء582. ءء681. ءء251. ءءLiability .329 ءء532. ءءCommon crime .098 .495 ءء216. ءءInfluenced by emotion .374 ءءMoral outrage .688 Disgust .Significant correlation, p Ͻ .01 ءء 162 MCCRACKEN AND STEVENSON

Perpetrator is Desire to Desire to Hurt Perpetrator Morally heartless Punish Perpetrator is Evil Outraged by Perpetrator Perpetrator .80** .89** .71** .87** .80**

Disgust .56*** Moral Outrage b 1.89*** .41* a c

Defendant Defendant Gender .13* Liability .02 d

Figure 1. Path analysis model depicting the relationship between defendant gender, disgust, moral outrage, and defendant liability. Standardized coefficients are reflected by each path in the mediation model and standardized regression weights are reflected for each of the five paths leading to the latent factor of moral outrage. The value above path d reflects the standardized coefficient without the mediators in the model, and the one below the line reflects the standardized coefficient with the mediators in the model. Disgust (z ϭϪ.538, SE ϭ .17; z ϭϪ.451, SE ϭ .32) and moral outrage (z ϭ .32, SE ϭ .16; z ϭϪ.594, SE ϭ .32) have .p Ͻ .001 ءءء ,p Ͻ .01 ءء ,p Ͻ .05 ء .acceptable levels of skewness and kurtosis, respectively

dant liability (see Figure 1 for full model).1 .000, CFI ϭ .94, RMSEA ϭ .12, SRMR ϭ Because research shows that disgust predicts .05, AIC ϭ 128.67). Participants were signif- moral outrage (Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013), icantly more disgusted toward a male than a we also allowed disgust toward the defendant to female defendant (b ϭ .41, SE ϭ .16, p Ͻ predict moral outrage. Finally, we allowed .01). In addition, greater disgust toward the moral outrage to predict liability. defendant significantly predicted greater In subsequent models, we constrained differ- moral outrage (b ϭ .57, SE ϭ .05, p Ͻ .05). ent paths to zero to determine the specific direct Moreover, greater moral outrage predicted effects of the variables. First, we determined finding the defendant liable (b ϭ .39, SE ϭ whether there was a significant relationship be- tween defendant gender and defendant liability by constraining the following paths to zero: (a) 1 Although unlikely, one could argue that an alternative defendant gender and disgust, (b) disgust and interpretation for our results could be that liability outcomes moral outrage, and (c) moral outrage and defen- drove emotional reactions (rather than vice versa). To test dant liability. Only the path from defendant this possibility, we explored whether defendant liability mediates the effect of perpetrator gender on disgust and on gender to defendant liability (labeled path “d” in moral outrage in a series of two separate mediation analy- Figure 1) was unconstrained. Model fit indices ses. Results revealed no evidence of an indirect effect of for this first model revealed evidence of rela- perpetrator gender on emotion through defendant liability. ␹2 ϭ ϭ Indeed, in line with recommendations from Preacher and tively poor model fit ( M[22] 374.76, p .000, CFI ϭ .68, RMSEA ϭ .27, SRMR ϭ .33, Hayes (2004), for indirect effects to be significant, the 95% This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals for the AIC ϭ 418.76). Even so, just as our previous

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. indirect effects must not include 0. Results based on 5000 regressions revealed, participants found the de- bootstrapped samples revealed that the total effect (TE) of fendant significantly more liable when the de- defendant gender on disgust was significant (TE ϭ .41, ␤ϭ ϭ SE ϭ .16, t ϭ 2.56, p ϭ .011) and the direct effect (DE) was fendant was male than female, .13, SE ϭ ϭ ϭ ϭ ϭ not (DE .23, SE .13, t 1.76, p .081). Importantly, .07, p .05. Thus, we continued testing subse- the indirect effect of defendant liability was not significant, quent models to identify potential indirect ef- 95% confidence intervals [–.01, .36]. Similarly, defendant fects of the relationship between defendant gen- liability did not emerge as a mediator of the relationship der and liability. between perpetrator gender and moral outrage, TE ϭ .34, SE ϭ .13, t ϭ 2.59, p ϭ .010; DE ϭ .17, SE ϭ .10, t ϭ 1.71, Next, we tested a model in which none of p ϭ .088; 95% confidence intervals [–.001, .35]. Thus, our the paths were constrained to zero and found data reveal no evidence that liability outcomes drove disgust 2 adequate model fit (␹M[19] ϭ 78.67, p ϭ and moral outrage (rather than vice versa). DISGUST DRIVES LIABILITY OUTCOMES 163

.03, p Ͻ .05). Finally, the direct effect be- et al., 1988) because we have found that they tween defendant gender and liability dropped elicit more disgust and moral outrage than fe- to nonsignificant, supporting evidence of me- male defendants. Our findings support research diation (b ϭ .01, SE ϭ .1, p ϭ .61). (e.g., Anderson, 2007) suggesting that people In a final step, we tested a third model in endorse the rape myth that female perpetrators which only the path between defendant gen- do not inflict actual harm, especially to male der and defendant liability (path “d”) was victims, and consequently believe that male- constrained to zero and found evidence for perpetrated rape is comparatively more heinous ␹2 ϭ ϭ adequate model fit ( M[20] 78.44, p (Chapleau & Oswald, 2014). Moreover, it ap- .000, CFI ϭ .95, and RMSEA ϭ .11, pears that participants might even be aware that SRMR ϭ .05, AIC ϭ 126.72). Supporting the their case decisions are more influenced by evidence of mediation, fit indices revealed emotion (and not by fact) when the perpetrator ␹2 that the M, CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR values is male compared with female. In support, par- for Model 2 and Model 3 were virtually iden- ticipants were significantly more likely to admit tical, indicating no evidence of worse model basing their decision on emotion and not on fact fit of Model 3. Confirming possible evidence when the defendant was male compared with of mediation, a ␹2 difference test revealed female—an effect supported by analyses reveal- that the models were not statistically different ing that participants experienced greater disgust from one another, ␹2(1) ϭ .05, p ϭ ns. Our and moral outrage when the defendant was male third model’s AIC value (126.72) is lower compared with female. Still, both the law and than the AIC value of Model 2 (128.67), and the jury instructions included in the present thus, according to Kline (2015), Model 3 is research specifically require jurors to base their the better-fitting model. Importantly, the in- decision on facts and be uninfluenced by prej- direct effect of defendant gender on defendant udicial emotion. Even so, we found that partic- liability was significant: standardized indirect ipants’ case judgments were not only driven by effect ϭ .084, p ϭ .009, confidence intervals emotion, but also they openly acknowledged [.03, .156]. Thus, participants were more dis- that they were, particularly when the defendant gusted by the male compared with female was male. defendant, which predicted greater moral out- Furthermore, these findings extend the lim- rage and, in turn, greater defendant liability. ited body of research, suggesting that female victims are perceived as less blameworthy than Estimation of an Alternative Model male victims (e.g., Davies et al., 2001). We found that people were (a) more likely to be- We also tested an alternative model in which lieve that a woman can be raped than a man and defendant gender predicted moral outrage, (b) more morally outraged when a woman is which in turn predicted disgust, which in turn raped, as compared with when a man is raped. predicted liability. This alternative model fit the In addition, participants were significantly more ␹2 ϭ ϭ ϭ data worse ( M[19] 135.94, p .000, CFI likely to admit basing their decision on emotion .89, RMSEA ϭ .16, SRMR ϭ .10, AIC ϭ and not on fact when the plaintiff was female 185.94) than our hypothesized model, providing than male. These findings reflect the existing further support for our hypothesized model, rape myth that men can successfully avoid be- which is consistent with research and theory ing raped if they so choose, especially by a This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. (e.g., Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). female perpetrator (e.g., Anderson, 2007). Al- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. though participants were more influenced by Discussion emotion (i.e., more morally outraged) when the plaintiff was female than male, this did not We have provided evidence that greater dis- appear to be driven by disgust, nor did it trans- gust toward a male (vs. female) defendant in a late into more punitive case outcomes. It is rape case predicts moral outrage which, in turn, possible that female victims elicit more moral predicts increased liability outcomes. These re- outrage than male victims because women are sults support and extend existing research sug- perceived as more helpless and vulnerable gesting that male perpetrators are viewed more (Riger, Gordon, & Bailley, 1978), and in turn, negatively than female perpetrators (e.g., Smith violent crimes against them are perceived as 164 MCCRACKEN AND STEVENSON

more egregious. Even though sexual assault Limitations and Future Research perpetrated against women might be perceived as more morally outrageous, sexual crimes With respect to internal validity, we are re- might be perceived as equally disgusting, re- luctant to make causal claims about the relation- gardless of victim gender. Further research is ship between emotions and liability outcomes. needed to explore why victim gender influenced Indeed, cross-sectional mediation analyses of- moral outrage but neither disgust nor case out- ten generate biased parameters estimates (Max- comes. well & Cole, 2007). Moreover, although signif- Although we found few interactions between icant, the effect sizes of disgust and moral defendant gender and plaintiff gender, when outrage are fairly small and may reflect some they did emerge, they support our hypotheses, degree of measurement error inevitably found in illustrating that participants find male perpe- self-reports of emotions. It is also important to trated rape against female plaintiffs to be more consider the possibility that disgust might not common and to elicit more emotional decision be meaningfully distinguishable from moral making than any other defendant-plaintiff gen- outrage. Although the two constructs were tech- nically statistically distinct (r ϭ .68; Tabach- der condition. These results are consistent with nick & Fidell, 2012), the correlation was strong research suggesting that many people believe nonetheless, and future research might reveal that men cannot be victims of rape, especially that the two constructs are indistinguishable. when it is perpetrated by a woman, and that Regarding threats to external validity, mock ju- people generally believe that men (not women) rors in this study read a detailed vignette de- perpetrate rape (e.g., Smith et al., 1988). scribing the alleged sexual offense instead of watching a videotaped mock trial and rendered Theoretical and Legal Implications individual case judgments, as opposed to delib- erating in a group. Future research should in- These findings help advance theory with re- clude videotaped trial evidence as well as a spect to emotion—in particular, disgust and group deliberation component. moral outrage—while simultaneously bearing legal implications. For instance, the otherwise evolutionarily adaptive emotion of disgust ap- Conclusion pears to have the potential to translate into bi- ased verdicts. Our results suggest that female Our study serves an important role in illus- perpetrators elicit less disgust, less moral out- trating that certain emotions—particularly dis- rage, and are convicted less frequently— gust and moral outrage—might drive biased verdicts for male versus female rape perpetra- findings that have significant implications for tors, even though jury instructions explicitly female-perpetrated victims, who might be par- require jurors to render verdicts free of affect ticularly reluctant to disclose victimization or to (Wiener, Bornstein, & Voss, 2006). Our results prosecute. highlight a reality that social scientists have This study offers important practical implica- long touted: Human decision making in emo- tions for attorneys in rape cases. For instance, tion-laden contexts is generally not made in the perhaps attorneys defending male rape perpe- absence of emotion, despite legal admonition to trators should consider including additional

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