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Overview of National Security Agencies in Central Asian Countries Нт Ра Льной Аз И Е

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CH-1211 Geneva1Switzerland DCAF GenevaP.O. Box1360 Tel: +41(22)73094 00 Email: [email protected] Governance for Security Sector Geneva Centre 6 7 Обзор органов обеспечения государственной безопасности в странах Центральной Азии Agencies inCentralAsianCountries Overview ofNationalSecurity Parviz Mullodjanov,RichardSteyne,MukbilToshotar Aida Alymbaeva,RustamBurnashev,ElizavetaChmykh,GrazvydasJ Governance for Security Sector Geneva Centre Ashgabat Tashkent Dushanbe Nur-Sultan Bishkek asutis, About DCAF DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance is dedicated to improving the se- curity of people and the States they live in within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. DCAF contributes to making peace and de- velopment more sustainable by assisting partner states and international actors supporting them to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms. It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity building of both state- and non-state security sector stakeholders. Active in over 70 countries, DCAF is internationally recognized as one of the world’s leading centres of excellence for security sector governance (SSG) and security sector reform (SSR). DCAF is guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, local ownership, inclusive participation, and gender equality. www.dcaf.ch. Publisher DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance P.O.Box 1360 CH-1211 Geneva 1 Switzerland [email protected] +41 (0) 22 730 9400 Authors: Aida Alymbaeva, Rustam Burnashev, Elizaveta Chmykh, Grazvydas Jasutis, Parviz Mullodjanov, Richard Steyne, Mukbil Toshotar Copy-editor: Elizaveta Chmykh, Hine-Wai Loose, Richard Steyne Design & layout: DTP Studio ISBN: 978-92-9222-598-8 Table of contents Overview of State Security Agencies in Kazakhstan ................................................5 Introduction .......................................................................................................5 1. Defining National Security ............................................................................5 2. The System of National Security Agencies in Kazakhstan .........................6 3. Security Sector Reform ............................................................................... 11 4. Transgressions by Security Forces ............................................................17 5. Civic Oversight of National Security Agencies ..........................................18 Findings ...........................................................................................................19 Recommendations...........................................................................................20 Overview of State Security Agencies in Kyrgyzstan ...............................................29 Introduction .....................................................................................................29 1. Security Sector Agencies: Powers and Functions ....................................30 2. Security Sector Reform ...............................................................................39 3. Offences Committed by Security Sector Officers ......................................49 4. Civic Oversight of Security Sector .............................................................51 5. The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Reforming the Security Sector ...............................................................................................................53 Findings ...........................................................................................................55 Recommendations on Advancing Security Sector Reform ...........................55 Tajikistan Security Sector Review: Reforms and Their Results ..............................63 Introduction .....................................................................................................63 1. Security Sector System in the Republic of Tajikistan: Structure, Mandate and Responsibilities ........................................................................64 2. Reform of the Security Sector in Tajikistan ...............................................66 3. Transgressions by Security Forces ............................................................72 4. Security Sector Accountability and Control ..............................................73 5. The Role of Civil Society .............................................................................74 Conclusions and Recommendations for the International Community .......75 3 Security Sector Review of Turkmenistan ...............................................................77 Introduction .....................................................................................................77 1. Statutory State Security Providers: Functions and Mandates ..................81 2. Security Sector Reforms: Historical Developments and Current Trends 91 3. Security Sector Oversight: Mechanisms and Procedures ......................100 4. Transgressions by Security Forces ..........................................................103 Conclusion .....................................................................................................108 Security Sector Reform ....................................................................................... 112 Introduction ................................................................................................... 112 1. Security Agencies of Uzbekistan .............................................................. 113 2. Legal and Conceptual Foundations of Security in Uzbekistan ............... 117 3. Security Agencies under Islam Karimov .................................................. 118 4. Security Apparatus under Shavkat Mirziyoyev ........................................122 5. Legislative and Judicial Systems .............................................................124 6. Institutional Oversight of the Security Sector .........................................125 7. Civil Society and Media .............................................................................128 Conclusion: Security Sector Reform in a State with a Patronal Presidential System ......................................................................................129 4 Overview of State Security Agencies in Kazakhstan Rustam Burnashev Introduction In the Central Asian region, across a range of indices measuring a country’s level of development, Kazakhstan is the standout performer. For example, the Fragile State Index assesses the situation in Kazakhstan as “warning”, while the situation in other Central Asian countries is assessed as “elevated warning” (Fund for Peace, 2019). According to the Global Peace Index, security in Kazakhstan is assessed as “high”, whereas for the same indicator other countries of the region are assessed as being “average” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). However, questions remain as to the effectiveness of the security sector in Kazakhstan and whether it is under suf- ficient civilian control. Systematic studies of national security issues in Kazakhstan began in the late 1990s to early 2000s (Kasenov, 1998; Bakaev, 2000; Tazhin, 2000). For the most part, these studies were descriptive. In the first half of the 2000s and early 2010s, works began to emerge that focused on the functioning of the security sector in Kazakhstan. For example, examinations were undertaken on the regulatory and legal components of the security sector (Nurpeisov, 2003) and ensuring security in regional and interre- gional contexts (Burnashev, 2002; Allison, 2003; Akimbekov, 2003; Burnashev and Chernykh, 2006; Syroezhkin, 2006; Marat, 2009; Peyrouse, 2010a). Eventually, stud- ies emerged that were focused on the security sector in Kazakhstan (McDermott, 2002; McDermott, 2009; Denisentsev, 2020). As a rule, these works are based on the theory of realism, which limits their utility in identifying internal structural factors that determine how development and reform of the security sector is undertaken in Kazakhstan. This chapter provides an assessment of Kazakhstan’s national security system and the security sector reform process. 1. Defining National Security In Kazakhstan, the term “state security” is not used at the official level, instead the key concept is “national security.” The Law titled “On National Security of the Repub- lic of Kazakhstan,” defines national security as “the state of protection of the national interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan from real and potential threats, ensuring the dynamic development of a person and citizen, society and state”.1 The security sector in Kazakhstan encompasses not only the traditional sectors of state security such as the military and political branches, but others including economic, environmental, and societal (Buzan and al., 1998). At the legislative level, the following six forms of security are distinguished: public, military, political, economic, informational, and environmental.2 As a result, the system of security agencies in Kazakhstan extends beyond traditional security institutions such as the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry 1 On National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2012. Article 1. 2 Idem., Article 4. 5 of Internal Affairs, and includes authorized bodies operating in the economic, finan- cial, social, and other such sectors.3 Essentially, the inclusion of these latter bodies in the
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