D a n i s h

A s s i s

t Evaluation a

2 Asiatisk Plads n c e

DK-1448 Copenhagen K t o

I n

Denmark t e r n

Phone: +45 33 92 00 00 a l l y Danish Assistance to Fax: +45 32 54 05 33 D i s

E-mail: [email protected] p l a c

Internet: www.um.dk e

d Internally Displaced Persons in Angola

P e o p l e

i n 1999-2003

A n g o l a

1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 3 2 0 0

ISBN (report): 87-7964-986-6 3 / ISSN: 1399-4972 9 2003/9 Evaluation

Danish Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Angola 1999 - 2003

File No. 104.A.1.39-1 March 2004 © Ministry of Foreign Affairs March 2004

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cover photo: John Cosgrave Graphic production: Phoenix-Print A/S, Aarhus, Denmark

ISBN (report): 87-7964-986-6 e-ISBN (report): 87-7964-987-4 ISSN: 1399-4972

This report can be obtained free of charge by contacting:

Danish State Information Centre Phone + 45 7010 1881 http://danida.netboghandel.dk/

The report can also be downloaded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ homepage www.um.dk or directly from the Evaluation Department’s homepage www.evaluation.dk

The cover photograph shows roof beams being placed on Alberto Jeje and Rebecca Clara’s house in Samosambo Nova in Moxico. They returned to Samosambo Nova in May or June 2003. Alberto says it will take 2 months to finish the house. Rebecca makes the local brew and has maize germinating for it. When they left Luena after the ceasefire in 2002 they went first to Camanongue where they stayed for one year. It took three days to walk from Camanongue. They have 5 children of which the eldest 2 are in school in the next village.

This report was prepared by independent consultants with no previous involvement in the activities mentioned. Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the evaluation team.

The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the recipient governments, or the implementing organisations.

The report is printed on Multi Fine and the cover is printed on Invercote. Preface

Responding to a request by EU’s Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) a group of donors initially consisting of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and ECHO decided to conduct a number of evaluations of humanitarian assistance with special focus on inter- nally displaced persons (IDPs). The overall plan is to conduct a range of evaluations, some in cooperation and some done individually by each organisation.

In order to synthesize the results of these and possibly more evaluations a common framework was established. (Attached in Appendix 3.)

The following agencies are currently participating in this exercise: Danida (Denmark), DGIS (the Netherlands), DCI (Ireland), Sida (Sweden), USAID, ECHO, WFP, OCHA and UNHCR.

The Angola evaluation is part of this joint effort. The fieldwork was carried out in July – August 2003, in parallel with ECHO’s evaluation of its activities in Angola.

Evaluation Department March 2004

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Preface 3 Table of Contents 5 Abbrevations 7 Map of Angola 8

Executive Summary 9

1 Methodology 15 1.1 Method 15 1.2 Acknowledgements 17 1.3 Layout of the report 18

2 Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs 19 2.1 What are IDPs? 19 2.2 How many IDPs are there? 21 2.3 IDPs and other displaced 25 2.4 The life of the displaced in Angola 27 2.5 Minimum Conditions for Return 38 2.6 Coordination of the IDP response 41 2.7 Conclusions and recommendations 42

3 Relevance 45 3.1 Danida’s partners 45 3.2 Before and after the ceasefire 47 3.3 Conclusions and recommendations 49

4 Effectiveness 51 4.1 Prerequisites for assessing effectiveness 51 4.2 Lack of assessment and analysis 52 4.3 Lack of gender analysis 52 4.4 Lack of beneficiary consultation 54 4.5 Lack of competence 55 4.6 Timeliness 55 4.7 Conclusions and recommendations 56

5 Efficiency 59 5.1 Difficult to measure 59 5.2 Constraint on efficiency 59 5.3 Efficiency issues 59 5.4 Conclusions and recommendations 63

5 Table of Contents

6 Impact 65 6.1 Measuring impact 65 6.2 Positive impacts 65 6.3 Negative impacts 65 6.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 66

7 Connectedness or Sustainability 67 7.1 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development 67 7.2 Social case: a forgotten caseload 67 7.3 A model for meeting the minimum conditions 68 7.4 Is rehabilitation humanitarian assistance? 68 7.5 Conclusions and recommendations 69

8 Lessons for learning 71

9 Critical issues 77 9.1 When does displacement end? 77 9.2 Lack of beneficiary consultation 78 9.3 Continuing difference in service levels to IDPs and Refugees 78 9.4 Assistance to IDPs displaced with combatants 79 9.5 Protection is a broad mandate 79 9.6 Shelter, land rights and livelihoods 80 9.7 When does the need for assistance end? 81

10 Conclusion 83

Appendices 85 1 Terms of Reference 86 2 Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs 89 3 Bibliography 102 4 Persons met 105 5 Consultant’s itinerary 111 6 Chronology 112 7 Initial brief desk study 116 8 Detailed technical comments 118 9 The legal instruments: The norms 127 10 The legal instruments: The regulations 131 11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards 144

6 Abbreviations

Abbreviations

CAP Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (UN) Danida Danish International Development Assistance DCA DanChurchAid, in Danish Folkekirkens Nødhjælp (FKN) DFID Department for International Development. The UK government’s Overseas Development Assistance department DKK Danish Krone DRC Danish Refugee Council, in Danish Dansk Flygtningehjælp (DF) ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office ERF Emergency Response Fund, a quick response funding mechanism managed by OCHA EU European Union FAA Angolan Armed Forces FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, The National Front for Angola’s Liberation GIDPP Global IDP Project HALO HALO Trust, a UK mine action NGO ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IERA The Evangelical Reformed Church of Angola INAROEE Instituto Nacional de Angola da Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos, Angolan national institute for the removal of ordnance and explosives IRSEM National Institute for the Socio-Professional Re-integration of Ex-military Personnel LWF Lutheran World Federation MINARS Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration MPLA Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) MSF Médecins Sans Frontières, the leading medical relief NGO NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NPA Norwegian People’s Aid OCHA UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODI Overseas Development Institute. London based aid think tank. QERF Quartering Area Emergency Response Fund, a fund managed by RB Save the Children Denmark (Red Barnet) SC-UK Save the Children United Kingdom Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency UCAH Unidade de Coordenacão para Asistancia Humanitária UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNITA União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola, the former Angolan armed opposition movement USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollar UXO Unexploded Ordnance WFP World Food Programme

7 Map of Angola

Map of Angola

The map shows the travel undertaken within Angola by the evaluator as well as the site visits made by him.

8 Executive Summary

Executive Summary

The situation of internally displaced persons

The restarting of the Civil War in Angola in 1998 led to a huge increase in internal dis- placement. Over 40% of the population of Angola were displaced by March 2002 when the ceasefire agreement was signed. Displacement in Angola has taken a wide variety of forms, with internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and UNITA non-combatants all being displaced from their homes.

The majority of the displaced in Angola have now returned to their places of origin. The exact number is not clear but it seems that between two and two and a half million have returned to their places of origin. Between one and two million displaced have not returned. The majority have stayed put because they are unable to return without assis- tance. Others have stayed because of the economic opportunities open to them where they are. A minority appear to have stayed because they were not yet fully confident the war would not restart.

Some of those who have not returned because they need assistance are likely to return in the coming two years as a growing economy in the areas of return provides livelihood opportunities for them. IDPs who have taken refuge with families in Luanda are not expected to return in large numbers.

OCHA (The UN’s Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) has played an effective role in leading the response to the IDP crisis. OCHA’s fast disbursing Emergency Response Fund was a significant factor in ensuring an adequate response to the rapidly changing situation since 1997. The OCHA provincial representatives played a key role in the coordination of humanitarian assistance.

OCHA’s role in publishing IDP numbers was not helpful as the OCHA numbers excluded those IDPs who were considered to be no longer in need of material assistance. Worse, the use of the term “confirmed IDPs” by OCHA made it seem that the OCHA number was the real number of IDPs rather than indicating the number being assisted. As a result of this the OCHA figures only covered about 40% of the total number of IDPs.

While the inclusion of the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into Angolan Law is a very positive step, the law is not being implemented in the majority of cases. Relatively few returnees are benefiting from the minimum conditions of return mandated under the Angolan IDP decrees. Most of the displaced have returned to areas without services and it will be some considerable time before they will be self-sufficient. They are receiving relatively little assistance from the international community.

NGOs do not have the resources to meet all of the needs of those returning. The best approach in the short term is to promote intermediate solutions while waiting for the government to execute permanent solutions. The Government is apparently limited both by a lack of will and a lack of capacity to meet the enormous needs of returnees in rural areas. The humanitarian community has limited scope for influencing the Angolan

9 Executive Summary

Government’s policy towards returning IDPs. The government is not susceptible to financial pressure from donors but is sensitive about its international image. Danida funded activities

The evaluation focused on projects by the Danish Refugee Council, DanChurchAid’s partner, the Lutheran World Federation and the ICRC. The activities of the partners were based on support of the internally displaced and on returnees. The rapid return of many IDP meant that partners concentrated on communities in the areas of return. Their current operations concern: education, shelter, water, health, livelihoods, protec- tion and general social support.

All of Danida’s partners made a real difference to the beneficiary population. Although some negative impacts were seen, they were far outweighed by the positive impacts of the assistance. The partners reduced suffering and prevented premature death among the displaced in Angola and they continue to reduce suffering among those returning to their areas of origin.

Most of Danida’s partners are among the most effective agencies at linking relief to development in Angola. They have done this either through a basic developmental approach or through carefully thought out handover arrangements.

The evaluation took place more than a year after the ceasefire, and therefore it is not possible for the evaluator to comment categorically on the relevance of the Danida fund- ed interventions prior to the ceasefire. However, every indication, both from documents and from beneficiary comments, indicates that these interventions were appropriate and relevant to the needs of the beneficiary population.

The current projects seen by the evaluator were relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries and reflected good humanitarian practice. There were a small number of legacy projects that were no longer so relevant1 in the changed circumstances after the ceasefire, but these represented only a small proportion of the overall project portfolio.

Overall, the programmes of Danida’s partners were relatively effective. Despite some areas of weakness, Danida’s partners delivered assistance to large numbers of IDPs, and are continuing to deliver assistance to returnees.

The biggest area of weakness was in project design and planning. The logical frame- works prepared by Danida’s partners do not allow a clear identification of what was planned. Assessment and strategic planning based on beneficiary needs were lacking. Beneficiaries were rarely consulted about projects, or if consulted, the consultation was limited to traditional leaders. They had no real means of raising their concerns about projects with agencies other than through the occasional visits of project staff. Gender analysis was almost non-existent, and apart from a few individual agency staff there was little awareness of its importance.

Agencies still appear to be dominated by a relief mentality, with too little emphasis on de- velopmental or commercial approaches that might be more appropriate for the rehabilita-

1) Projects such as DRC’s horticultural project had been appropriate and relevant when the population was constrained to the area immediately around the town, but are far less appropriate now that the war is over.

10 Executive Summary

tion phase, but there has been a change in attitude, for example LWF claims that the orga- nisation now has moved from working for the displaced populations to working for the communities, displaced, refugees and demobilised soldiers based on need not on category. Agencies sometimes implemented projects for which they did not have the technical capacity, such as the procurement of non-food-items2) by the Lutheran World Federation (DanChurchAid’s partner) or water projects undertaken by the Danish Refugee Council

There were problems with the timely delivery of assistance. This was a particular pro- blem for non-food-items and for seeds and tools projects. Much of this was funded by the general humanitarian community rather than by Danida. It is often very difficult in the field to establish what work has been paid for from what budget.

Angola is a difficult and expensive environment in which to operate. The lack of data prevents any categorical statement about the efficiency of Danida partners. However, the examples of inefficiency seen were relatively limited, suggesting that overall Danida’s partners were reasonably efficient in their operations. Danida partners expanded their operations significantly to meet the needs of those returning to their places of origin. However, although justified in the short term on humanitarian grounds, this expansion threatens longer term efficiency.

Non-food-items have been widely issued but there are still many families left without. Many of the non-food-items distributed were of an inappropriately low quality and can be expected to have a short life in rural conditions.

The only way in which the majority of communities can hope to achieve the minimum conditions for return is through their own efforts. They will need assistance to do this. The evaluation suggests that the role for NGOs in Angola should not be to provide permanent schools and other social infrastructure in rural areas, but rather to support communities in the construction of community level infrastructure while they await definitive solutions from the government.

Even though the acute relief phase is largely over in Angola, there is a continuing need for humanitarian assistance to bring people to the level where they have sufficient social capital to be no longer “potentially vulnerable”. The “social cases” that are unable to return unaided to their areas of origin are a forgotten caseload that should be targeted by the humanitarian community. The continuing needs in the areas of return and the stag- gered returns mean that humanitarian assistance will probably be needed for another three years.

The lessons to be learnt from the Angola case include the following:

• Change can happen faster than agencies can effectively respond. • NGOs have very real limits on their capacity to scale-up even in areas where they are well established. • Assistance needs to be based on needs and not on IDP status and vice versa. • OCHA provincial coordination model and rapid response funding mechanism were very useful. • The need for protection for the IDPs and returnees, while real, was not much differ- ent from that of the resident community.

2) Relief items such as blankets, cooking sets, and other items needed for basic survival.

11 Executive Summary

The evaluation identified a number of critical issues for further study:

• When does displacement end? Many IDPs in Angola were no longer considered as IDPs because they had no acute humanitarian needs, but lived the same marginal existence as the rest of the population. • Why was there so little effective beneficiary consultation by agencies? Although DanChurchAid note that this is improving with the move to more developmental types of programming, there were missed opportunities during the relief phase. • Are the administrative arrangements for IDPS adequate? Returning refugees (in organised returns) were clearly far better served than returning IDPs. • How can the international framework for protection be improved to protect com- munities from abuses by combatants? In Angola, communities needed protection from abuses by UNITA as well as by the Government.

Main recommendations

Danida should

• Continue to assist its NGO partners to provide services to the returned IDP’s, espe- cially agencies with a longer term rehabilitation perspective and a developmental outlook more suited to rehabilitation than a straight relief approach. • Insist on a better quality of Logical Frameworks from its partners. • Ensure that project proposals and reporting indicate expected and achieved differen- tial impact on men and women. • Look for evidence of beneficiary consultation in funding applications and reporting. • Immediately view activities, after major changes in the humanitarian situation of a country. • Consider supporting quick funding mechanisms filling the same role as the OCHA Emergency Response Fund did in Angola. • Phase out its support for ICRC operations in Angola other than ICRC’s core protec- tion mandate where it provides a comparative advantage over other partners. • Consider that humanitarian assistance probably will be needed for another three years in Angola.

Partners should

• Improve the quality of their planning so that their logical frameworks can be used as an active management tool. • Project proposals and reporting should indicate the activities’ expected and achieved differential impact on men and women and beneficiary consultation. • Place a higher emphasis on beneficiary consultation. • Investigate how many IDP’s wish to return and develop models for supporting com- munities that will enable them to achieve the minimum conditions for return largely through their own efforts. • Consider the limits of their own capacity and limit their operations to a few geo- graphical areas to establish models for rehabilitation that they can advocate for adop- tion by the government. • Not undertake technical work unless they have the technical competence to supervise it and should follow internationally accepted standards for purchase of relief items.

12 Executive Summary

• Evaluate their project portfolio and drop those projects that are no longer so relevant in the changed circumstances.

The humanitarian community should

• Avoid declassification of IDP’s unless it is certain that they no longer wish to return. IDP’s in old sites should be prioritised for assistance. • Limit free distributions to situations of immediate vulnerability and assistance should be delivered according to need not according to affiliation with a particular grouping. • Establish mechanisms for feedback from the beneficiaries on completed projects. • Ensure that a survey of compliance with minimum conditions is carried out in each commune across the nation. • Adopt the policy that long term infrastructures are the responsibility of the govern- ment. They should focus on short term projects supporting community initiatives associated with a more basic level of social infrastructure. They should integrate their projects into national plans in a transparent fashion to curtail corruption. • Plan for a continuing, but declining, return to rural areas. Improve market access to increase income in these areas and use the government’s sensitivity of its interna- tional image to press for better government service to rural areas. • Promote the approach taken in Angola with the incorporation of the Guiding Principles and minimum conditions into national legislation for countries with large IDP populations. • Be encouraged to learn from transitional programmes elsewhere to facilitate the necessary envisaging of future needs.

The Angolan Government should

• Permit remaining food in Gathering Areas to be distributed immediately. • Prioritise the transport of the demobilised to their areas of origin. • Consider a method to monitor the creation of the minimum conditions of return consider a method

13

1. Methodology

1. Methodology

1.1 Method

The consultant undertook an initial desk study to identify the chief areas of concern in the situation of IDPs in Angola, as well as an initial review of reports from Danida’s partners.

The desk study was followed by four weeks of field work in Angola visiting beneficiaries in three provinces and viewing a range of work executed with Danida funding. This fieldwork was carried out concurrently with an ECHO evaluation of ECHO funded projects in Angola.

The third phase included some research on issues arising during the field work, as well as preparing a draft report. The draft report was presented to Danida in Copenhagen and was presented together with the work of the ECHO evaluation team to ECHO in Brussels.

Methodology generally

The evaluation was carried out by Mr John Cosgrave, Channel Research Ltd for Danida in July and August 2003.

The main information gathering tools were:

• Interviews with key informants. • Interviews with beneficiaries. • Document research. • Direct observation. • Discussion with the ECHO evaluation team

The evaluator placed a great deal of emphasis on beneficiary interviews and direct obser- vation. Because:

• The history of previous evaluations for which security issues constrained field work. • There can be a lag between developments occurring on the ground and national offices being aware of them in a rapidly changing situation like Angola. • Information from key informants was found on occasion to be less reliable than information from beneficiaries that was verified through direct observation.

15 1. Methodology

The field work was supported by document research with over one thousand files in the electronic reference set for the evaluation. This evaluation set was a mixture of documents:

• Provided in the reference set supplied by the ECHO evaluation unit to the ECHO evaluation team. • Obtained directly from key informants in Angola, • Obtained by searches on Relief-Web and the internet generally. • Research included searches for general background material before the field work and searches on specific topics to triangulate information from interviews when writing the report.

The ECHO evaluation team that was conducting a concurrent evaluation on ECHO funded assistance to Angola with an emphasis on IDPs. The primary focus of the ECHO evaluation was on ECHO funded assistance for the period 2002-2003. Direct reference has not been made to the ECHO report in the text, as the ECHO report was not yet finalised at the time of writing of this report.

Triangulation

Triangulation took a number of forms. While all information was triangulated by the range of methods and informants, where there were conflicts between different sources, the evaluator took steps to determine which source to place more weight on. The means of triangulation included:

• Direct observations and interviewee statements were in some cases triangulated by later questions to officials3. • Conflicts between dates provided by interviewees that were not resolved by further interviews and questions were generally triangulated by reference to written sources via web searches.

Generally the greatest weight was given to direct observation.

Interviews

Interviews were the principal means of information gathering. The consultant met with over 200 people. Almost half of those met were beneficiaries.

Among the beneficiaries, vulnerable individuals such as the elderly and infirm, landmine victims, children, and widows were interviewed. 54% of the beneficiaries interviewed were female. The proportion of women interviewed was less for the other groups, reflecting gender imbalances in the staff available for interview.

3) The Sambo quartering area was an example of this. Interviewees said that they had not received maize for nearly three months. However, the evaluator observed that many families still had maize. Farm labour would normally be paid in Cassava rather than maize, and the families were not allowed to plant their own. The lack of distributions was confirmed by ICRC staff. The mystery was solved by a document show- ing that three months food was distributed at one of the last distributions to compensate families for all the distributions that had been cancelled during the wet season following a landmine incident. (WFP does not compensate beneficiaries for missed distributions, but ICRC has a different policy).

16 1. Methodology

Table 1: Distribution of interviews

Function No % of total Of which women

Agency 69 30% 23 33%

Beneficiary 113 48% 61 54%

Donor 17 7% 7 41%

Government 34 15% 6 18%

Total 233 100% 97 42%

Interviews were generally carried out using one of a series of question lists4 to structure the interview. Interviews ranged from formal interviews of over an hour to interviews of only a few minutes’ duration during transect walks through areas of resettlement or IDP camps. Shorter interviews were normally focused on a single topic of interest, usually to check if the experience reported by someone else was typical5.

Interviews were conducted directly by the evaluator in Portuguese and in English. Only a minority of beneficiary interviews were conducted in Bantu languages. Typically, either agency staff members or other beneficiaries served as the translators for these. These lat- ter interviews were often carried out with groups of people present who would correct the translator if there was any disagreement with the translation.

1.2 Acknowledgements

The evaluator wishes to express his gratitude to all those who took the trouble to answer his questions. In particular the evaluator would like to thank all of those whose work made this mission possible including Dona Gloria at the ECHO Delegation, and the ECHO Delegates, Maria Olsen and Gunter Dietz. ECHO very kindly facilitated much of the travel arrangements as well as providing working space, transport and telephone access in Luanda.

The staff of the Danish Refugee Council facilitated the Evaluator’s Visit to Uige. Especial thanks are due to Yvonne Cappi, Anders Engberg and all their staff. Thanks are also due to Red Barnet for their assistance.

Special thanks are also due to the ICRC who hosted the field visit to Huambo. In par- ticular the evaluator would like to thank Louise Montgrain-Boivin and Mila Negrera Espa-Sanoin of ICRC for their input.

4) Separate but similar question lists were prepared for Beneficiaries, Agency staff and other key informants. 5) One example of this was the case of one detailed interview where a family stated that they had only received 10kg of maize in total. Other persons in the village were asked how much they had received to confirm that the interviewed family’s experience was not an exceptional case.

17 1. Methodology

The Lutheran World Federation facilitated the visit of the consultant to Luena. The evaluator appreciated the efforts of Gerrit ten Velde, and of the LWF staff on the ground including Higino Marques and Fernando Rafael.

The evaluator would also like to thank the members of the ECHO evaluation team (Aart van der Heide, Robert Smith, and Petra Scheuermann) for sharing their data and impressions with the evaluator and allowing him to take advantage of the transport and other arrangements made.

Finally the evaluator would like to thank the Danida staff who offered their comments on the evaluation including Danida’s consultant Ole Stage. The evaluator is also grateful to Peter Cavendish and Martine Vanackere of the ECHO evaluation unit who facilitated the simultaneous ECHO and Danida evaluations.

1.3 Layout of the report

The report has five main sections:

• Chapter 1 contains details of the methodology and the approach used in the research for this report.

• Chapter 2 examines the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Angola and forms the bulk of the report.

• Chapter 3 to 7 briefly examine Danish funded humanitarian interventions from 1999 to 2003 in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and their con- nectedness and sustainability.

• Chapters 8 and 9 look at the Lessons for Learning and the Critical Issues arising from the evaluation.

• Chapter 10 presents conclusions.

• The Appendices present the Terms of Reference, a Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs, a bibliography, a full list of persons met, the consultant’s itinerary, a chronology, the results of the initial desk study, some detailed technical comments on projects visited, translations of the Angolan legislation, and a comparison of the criteria specified in the Angolan legislation with humanitarian standards.

18 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

2.1 What are IDPs?

Internally Displaced Persons will be referred to as IDPs throughout this report. The UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide a definition of IDPs:

• Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of general- ized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

This definition is clear enough, and it is used in Decree No 79/02 of the Angolan Government which presents the norms for dealing with the internally displaced. Principle 6.2(C) of the Guiding Principles also refers to persons displaced “In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests”. This could be an issue in Angola as there is already concern about dis- placement of populations by powerful interests in Angola6.

IDPs and Refugees

At the same time as there were four million internally displaced Angolans, there were four hundred thousand Angolan refugees in the adjoining countries. Refugees come under the protection of the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 protocol, as well as the OAU convention of 1969.

It is interesting to compare the definition of IDPs given above with that given for Refugees in Article 1 of the OAU convention7:

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “refugee” shall mean every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual resi- dence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

2. The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occu- pation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual res- idence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

6) In Mavinga, the Authorities forced 10,000 people from their homes to make way for a compound for a large diamond-mining corporation. What was worse was that this was done just after the HALO trust had de-mined the area for the use of the population. In Negage the evaluator saw fertile state land that had been used by IDPs but which was now forbidden to them as it has been “privatised” by powerful individuals. In Moxico the evaluator was told that the food security of resettled IDPs is threatened by com- mercial interest in the fertile land alongside which they are resettled. 7) Section 1 of Article 1 of the OAU convention conforms to the 1951 Refugee Convention as amended by the 1967 protocol. Section 2 of the OAU convention specifically included those fleeing all sorts of serious disturbances of public order.

19 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

The main differences between IDPs and refugees would therefore seem to be the following:

Table 2: Main Differences between Refugees and IDPs

Refugee IDP

Reason for flight “Well founded fear of Any cause of involuntary persecution” (1951) or “events displacement seriously disturbing public order” (OAU).

Economic Migration Excluded Excluded

International Crossed Not crossed Boundary

International Specific protection under the Generic human rights Instruments 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967 under the UN Charter, Protocol, 1969 OAU convention Universal Declaration of (for refugees in Africa) etc. Human Rights etc. Responsibility Host country Country of residence

International UNHCR Varies. OCHA in Angola Agency with one UNHCR Responsibility programme

Numbers in 2002 10.5 Million (UNHCR) 25 Million (GIDPP)

Angola Numbers in 410,000 Angolans refugees 4.2 Million IDPs in Angola 2002 12,000 (mainly Congolese) (Provincial Governors in refugees in Angola June 2002).

Durable Solutions Return Return Settlement and naturalisation Settlement 3rd country settlement Alternative settlement 8

It can be seen that the difference between IDPs and refugees is not only that IDPs have not crossed an international boundary, but also in the reasons for displacement. The fact that Refugees have a UN organisation dedicated to their protection does make a difference. In Moxico, IDPs returning to their areas of origin were not getting food assistance, allegedly because the food assistance was being kept in reserve for refugees returning in the organised repatriation.

Also refugees had the advantage that UNHCR had carried out a detailed assessment in the areas to which refugees intended to return to determine if the minimum conditions for return were met there.

The comparison of IDPs with refugees is particularly relevant in Angola as UNHCR ran an IDP project from 2000 to 2002. This project was seen by many within UNHCR as

8) Alternative settlement here refers to settlement in a location other than the locations of refuge or origin.

20 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

politically driven9 and not directly relevant to the core UNHCR mandate for refugee protection. The project ended when donor funding for it ended in early 2002.

UNHCR’s apparent lack of interest in IDPs is surprising given that:

• The number of refugees continues to fall while the number of IDPs continues to rise. • Refugees and IDPs in refugee-like situations are equally victims. • IDP populations often need the same sort of support (physical support and protec- tions) as refugee populations need. • OCHA in Luanda were very clear that OCHA rather than UNHCR had the key role in dealing with IDPs in Angola, and were even dismissive of the idea of any UNHCR role with IDPs.

2.2 How many IDPs are there?

The Global IDP Project’s “league table” of the top ten internally displaced populations placed Angola at the top in May 2002 with 4.1 million IDPs.

Figure 1: Top Ten IDP countries - May 2002, (GIDPP)

yp p ( ) Millions -1 2 3 4 5

Angola Sudan DRC Colombia Indonesia and East Timor Afghanistan Turkey Burma Sri Lanka Iraq

Types of IDP

Given that there were so many IDPs it was only natural that the overall category of IDPs was broken down into sub-categories. Unfortunately, these sub-categories are not always well defined and definition may even change over time. While a detailed analysis of the numbers shows some inconsistencies over time, the underlying trends are clear.

9) Richard Holbrooke, then the US Permanent Representative at the United Nations, visited Luanda at the beginning of December 1999. He was appalled at the condition of the IDPs that he saw in the “Malange” Camp on the outskirts of Luanda. The US took over the presidency of the Security Council the following month and Holbrooke used this position to make the point that the bureaucratic distinction between refugees and IDPs was negatively affecting the lives of millions. He also proposed that the UN should place responsibility for responding to IDP crises in one agency. Holbrooke preferred UNHCR for this role. The Holbrooke agenda was accompanied by funding from the US government for UNHCR to experiment with such a role in Angola. Fuller details on the genesis of this issue can be found in Jamal and Stage (2001).

21 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

The IDP categories used by OCHA (the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) included:

• Reported IDPs: This is the phrase used by the UN to refer to the estimates of internally displaced provided by the Government of Angola. UN interviewees noted that these figures were always substantially in excess of the OCHA figures for confirmed IDPs because of exaggeration, the inclusion of “old” IDPs, and the fact that the government never subtracted those returning, and the inclusion of temporary IDPs (IDPs fleeing to municipal or provincial capitals for a few weeks after an attack in their area.). The UN generally only used the figure of confirmed IDPs except in the CAP and other humanitarian statements where the larger government figures were preferred. • New IDPs: Originally (1998) referred to those displaced since the restart of fighting in 1998. January 1st 1998 was used as the cut off date. Later, the cut-off date for this category seems to have shifted for OCHA to the January 1st two years prior to the year in question (e.g. January 1st 2001 for 2003). Other cut-off dates were also used. • Old IDPs: Originally referred to those displaced before January 1st 1998, but later came to mean those not classified as New IDPs. Between 1,300,000 and 2,000,000 people were dis- placed during the “war of the cities” from 1992 to 1994. Many of these returned to their areas of origin between 1994 and 1998, but there were still 1,045,000 IDPs (about half of whom were registered in camps) at the beginning of 1998. • Confirmed IDPs: Originally (1999) referred to IDPs whose number was confirmed by humanitarian agencies. However, this was later redefined to mean IDPs whose number was con- firmed by humanitarian partners for assistance10. Typically IDPs who had been in place for two years were regarded as being self-sufficient. Similarly, IDPs who melted into family networks were not counted as confirmed IDPs. It was this narrow definition of confirmed IDPs that led to such a large difference with the Government’s figures. • Assisted IDPs: This category was used in 1998 and 1999 to refer to that proportion of internally displaced population being assisted by the humanitarian community. The OCHA statistics show that in 1998, on average, only 44% of the confirmed IDPs received humanitarian assistance.

The same terms were not used consistently over the years, making it very difficult to establish how IDP numbers have developed.

Numbers did not agree

A further complication was that even for the Government there were different numbers. Numbers from the Central Government did not agree with numbers for the provinces. Some of these differences appear to be related to policy issues, whereas others may simply be related to administrative issues. The best figures for the government appear to be the figures from the Provincial Governors in June 2002.

10) This precise form of words first seems to have been used in OCHA’s Humanitarian situation in Angola: monthly analysis: Feb 2002, but was clearly applied earlier so that only IDPs considered by the Humanitarian Agencies to be in need of assistance were regarded as “Confirmed IDPs”.

22 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Table 3: Number of IDPs estimated by Provencial Governors and OCHA, 2002.

Province Provincial OCHA OCHA Provincial Provincial Governors Reported Confirmed as % of as % of June 2002 Sep 2002 Sep 2002 reported confirmed Bengo 179,413 120,070 21,418 149% 838% 1) Benguela 453,331 435,013 92,194 96% 492% 1) Bie 208,952 523,016 202,740 250% 103% Cabinda 11,877 11,877 - 100% Cunene 69,278 71,908 10,050 104% 689% Huambo 435,000 435,053 140,402 100% 310% Huila 229,170 218,073 190,564 95% 120% Kuando Kubango 156,445 621,044 76,031 397% 206% Kwanza Norte 109,587 109,585 24,915 100% 440% Kwanza Sul 413,341 413,034 113,760 100% 363% Luanda 673,526 84,301 17,500 13% 3849% 2) Lunda Norte 438,203 438,013 13,040 100% 3360% 3) Lunda Sul 184,919 184,091 81,240 100% 228% Malange 288,536 288,686 70,125 100% 411% Moxico 206,297 550,220 80,930 267% 255% Namibe 24,812 22,275 18,454 90% 134% Uige 64,832 186,960 113,058 288% 57% Zaire 38,054 23,127 2,126 61% 1790% Total 4,185,573 4,736,346 1,268,547 113% 330%

1) In Bengo as in other locations, part of the difference between Reported and Confirmed figures may stem from IDPs who have been in place for long periods. 2) The difference between national and provincial figures for Luanda may be related to the reluctance of the Government to acknowledge the large number of displaced in Luanda. 3) Lunda Norte is an area where there is a large amount of diamond mining. Agencies believe that many of those registered as displaced are in fact diamond miners.

Data from “Sustaining the Peace in Angola” (Porto and Parsons, 2003) (incorrect additions in the original are corrected in this table)

There are significant differences between the numbers. For the four years from April 1998 to April 2002 the number of reported IDPs was on average 260% of the number of confirmed IDPs. The reasons for the difference in numbers include:

• The inclusion of the 1,045,000 old IDPs existing on 31 December 1998 in the Government total. • The reclassification of IDPs no longer seen as needing humanitarian assistance by OCHA (typically reclassified as settled IDPs). • Technical competence. The non-inclusion of IDPs staying with friends or family in the confirmed IDP figures.

Using the confirmed IDP numbers published in the OCHA humanitarian situation reports from 1998 to 2003 the following developments can be seen:

• A very rapid rise in IDPs from mid 1998 to mid 1999 (about 800,000). • Nearly another 1,200,000 IDPs over the next thirty months.

23 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Figure 2: Confirmed New IDPs in Angola

2,000,000

1, 500,000

1, 000,000

500,000

0 Jan Apr Ju l Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Dec Apr Jul Sep Dec 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 02 02 02 02

Confirmed No Reclassification (Data from various UNOCHA reports)

• However, the number of confirmed IDPs only includes those IDPs who were passing through vulnerability11. Careful analysis of the number of confirmed IDPs show sudden falls in the numbers in periods when there were no substantial returns. The clue to what was happening was provided by the OCHA use of cut off dates to indi- cate confirmed IDP status. It appears that IDPs who had been in place for more than two years were effectively declassified at the start of the year12, at least for 2000 and 2001.

The graph above shows the effect of “reclassification” on the numbers of “confirmed” IDPs. The numbers of confirmed new IDPs drops at times suggesting that some of the IDPs have been reclassified as “resettled” or as some other category.

The use of the adjective confirmed for the group of IDPs passing through vulnerability was unfortunate as it suggests at first glance that the number of confirmed IDPs is the real number of IDPs as opposed to the number of reported IDPs provided by the go- vernment. The Government figures are a far better estimation of the IDP population than the OCHA numbers.

When does IDP status end?

At the heart of this difference is the definition of IDPs and particularly of when people cease to be IDPs. There is no requirement in the definition of IDPs for only those persons passing through vulnerability to be considered as IDPs.

11) Interview with OCHA, Luanda. 12) Sometimes other dates are quoted, such as July/August 1998 for “New IDPs” (in Waves of displacement in Angola have resulted in categorization of “old” and “new” IDPs (2001) from the Global IDP project. (http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/2603D287369B2316C1256A3E004C BBF4)

24 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Issue 17 of the Forced Migration Review13 considers the question of when displacement ends. Erin Moony (2003) suggests three alternative criteria for the ending of the Internal Displacement status:

• Cause-based criteria, when the case for the displacement no longer continues. • Solution-based criteria, i.e. through the opportunity to return or resettle. • Needs-based criteria, when needs and vulnerabilities directly related to displacement no longer apply.

In Angola, the first of these criteria has been generally met and the second is widely met. However, while the third criteria, that of needs, only refers to needs in addition to those of the non-displaced population. While the whole population has been effected by the war and the non-displaced population also have large needs, IDPs in Angola suffered through the loss of their assets. Most are still in need of support to try and rebuild these assets so the needs-based criteria are not met.

The criteria for declassifying IDPs in Angola did not clearly fit under any of these criteria, but fall somewhere between the solution-based (resettled) and needs-based (no longer displacement inspired vulnerability) criteria.

It may be more correct to consider displacement as ending when people are either able (economically as well as physically) to return without fear to, and sustain them selves in their area of origin, or freely opt to settle permanently elsewhere. This definition encom- passes elements of all three criteria given above.

Part of the issue over the cessation of internal displacement comes from the intermin- gling of IDP status and the right to humanitarian assistance. Refugees do not necessarily lose their status when their physical needs are met. Similarly IDPs may be in the situa- tion where they do not need humanitarian assistance, but are still displaced.14

2.3 IDPs and other displaced

Taking the total population of Angola as being twelve million15, it is instructive to look at what the total number of displaced is in Angola. As well as the 4.2 Million recorded as internally displaced by the provincial government there were another 0.4 Million Angolan refugees outside the country and 0.5 Million people moving with UNITA.

This suggests that 5.1 Million out of the notional population of 12 Million were dis- placed in June 2002 (Nearly 42% of the population). As with all population numbers in such complex emergencies, the numbers have to be regarded as an indicative estimate rather than an exact account of the situation.

13) Forced Migration Review: No 17, May 2003. Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford. 14) This criteria should be fairly obvious. Poverty is not a prerequisite for refugee or IDP status. 15) Estimates of the population of Angola range from 10,766,471 (July 2003 est. – CIA World Factbook 2003) to 13.5 million (World Bank World Development Indicator Database for 2001). Twelve million is widely quoted as an estimate of the current population.

25 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Figure 3: Angolan Population by Category - June 2002

Data from various OCHA reports

Pre 1998 IDPs Luanda IDPs Reclassified IDPs 8.7% 5.5% 4.0% Other IDPs Confirmed IDPs 4.6% 11.6% Refugees 3.4% UNITA and families 4.1%

Resident 58.1%

In June 2002 34.4% of the Angolan population were IDPs and another 7.5% were either in refuges abroad or moving with UNITA. The death of Savimbi and the subse- quent ceasefire have dramatically changed the situation of the displaced in Angola. The situation of the displaced in Luanda is discussed below on page 28. All of those with UNITA were displaced, and this displacement was involuntary, either because people were pressed into UNITA or through the destruction of their bases in military action by the Government.

Figure 4: Angolan Population by Category - June 2003

Data from various OCHA reports

Returned IDPs etc Other IDPs 21.0% 6.8% Luanda IDPs 4.9% Returned refugees 1.1% Confirmed IDPs Refugees 5.0% 2.3% UNITA and families 0.7%

Resident 58.1%

The figure for Luanda IDPs in June 2003 reflects not the “unconfirmed” IDPs as was the case in the first chart, but the number of IDPs in Luanda that were not included in the Central Government’s figures. It may be that some of these had returned to their place of origin by June 2003, giving a total number of persons returned to their areas of origin or resettled in excess of the 2.6 Million figure suggested here.

26 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

2.4 The life of the displaced in Angola

There are many different types of displaced and former displaced in Angola. It is more useful to consider the situation of all the displaced rather than just those meeting the strict IDP definition.

Figure 5: The Life Cycle of the Displaced in Angola

Trigger Flight

Return IDP Camp

Resettlement “Settled” by 2 years

When one considers the “life cycle” of an IDP in Angola, it becomes clear that the “IDP” experience is only part of the overall situation. This report considers the situation of settled, resettled, and returned IDPs in addition to those still in IDP camps.

The “life cycle” shown above greatly simplifies matters. Many of the displaced did not go through one such cycle but through several cycles of flight and return. Some of these cycles may have been of only a few weeks duration initially, but others may have lasted many years.

Figure 6: Multiple Cycles of Displacement

Return Flight

Another complicating factor was cascading displacement, where people fled from their villages to a municipal capital, and then later had to flee from the municipal capital when it came under attack. Sometimes IDPs passed through a whole series of temporary refuges before reaching the destination that they were in at the ceasefire in April 2002.

27 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

For some IDPs living in border areas, displacement may have included movement across the border into Zambia or DR Congo. The numbers given above for displacement are likely to understate the extent of displacement as only a minority of the Angolan popu- lation were not displaced at some stage since 1961.

Refugees in Angola

There are only about 12,000 refugees in Angola. These are largely Congolese refugees16, including some dating from the suppression of the Katanga Secession. Many of these refugees were displaced from their camps during the conflict in the same way as the gen- eral population.

Refugees returning to Angola in organised movements

The first organised return took place during the evaluator’s visit. UNHCR registered about 150,000 refugees wishing to return with UNHCR in 2003. However, the opera- tion is under-funded17 and has started relatively late.

UNHCR has made a careful assessment of the areas of return and has found that in many cases the minimum conditions for return have not been met, and that a large part of the organised return will not be possible. UNHCR are only organising return to those areas where there is humanitarian access (i.e. access for humanitarian relief agen- cies) and where minimum conditions can be met.

UNHCR note that those registering for return include a large proportion of elderly and of female headed households.

Table 4: Refugees Returning to Angola, 2002

County Angolan Refugees

Zambia 190,000 150,000 Congo Brazzaville 30,000 Namibia 25,000 South Africa 5,000 Botswana 2,000 Western Countries 7,000

Total 409,000

Refugees returning to Angola spontaneously

The Government estimates that some 130,000 refugees have returned from the 395,000 or so refugees in the neighbouring countries. These returnees find themselves in the same situation as returning internally displaced. What assistance they receive depends on where they go to and what the policy is in that province.

16) There are also small numbers of largely urban refugees from Rwanda, Sudan, and Congo Brazzaville. 17) Partners complain that UNHCR is slow to sign sub-agreements. Donor reluctance may stem from the fact that previous efforts to return refugees to Angola have failed because of the internal situation in Angola.

28 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

In the sites visited, the evaluator found that the situation of spontaneously returned refugees was the same as that of returned IDPs.

Displaced in Luanda

The displaced in Luanda are a special case. Agency interviewees reported that the central government has always discouraged agencies from assisting IDPs in Luanda for fear of encouraging further movement towards the overcrowded city18.

Luanda has a number of special features including:

• A very rapid increase in the population. • The movement of Bakongo people from the north of Angola to Luanda. • Displacement to Luanda during the war. • Economic migration to Luanda because of the economic impact of the war.

The population of Luanda has grown from half a million prior to independence to over three million now.

Figure 7: Estimated Population of Luanda Figure 8: IDP numbers in Luanda according to OCHA, Central and Millions Provincial government 4

3 OCHA

2 Central Govt

1 Provincial Govt

0 250,000 500,000 750,000 1,000,000 0 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997

The movement of Bakongo people to Luanda is complex. It appears to be due in part to the urbanisation of the Bakongo while taking refuge in DR Congo after the 1961 upris- ing. Whatever the reason, Luanda now boasts a large Bakongo population, many of whom live by petty trading. Interviewees reported that many refugees returning from DR Congo in the organised repatriation asked for transport to Luanda despite having registered their place of origin as lying in the Northern provinces. Refugees justified their request by saying that their whole extended family was now in Luanda. UNHCR would only transport them to their place of origin in the provinces with the result, inter- viewees reported, that many returnees were only spending a few nights in the transit camp before moving on to Luanda.

During the war, some populations moved to Luanda in response to the difficulty of making a living in provincial capitals or in rural areas. These can be regarded as econom- ic migrants. It is difficult to distinguish between these and the IDPs who flocked to

18) In June 2002 there were nearly 600,000 persons in Luanda registered as IDPs by the provincial govern- ment who were not included in the central government’s figures

29 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Luanda at various stages. Some IDPs such as the families of functionaries or of the mili- tary were evacuated to Luanda during the war and these became relatively privileged IDPs.

Many less privileged IDPs seem to have built a life for themselves in Luanda and do not contemplate returning to the provinces. There is again a special issue with the Bakongo who live by trading. Normally trade links are within the family with goods being sourced by one family member and passed to another family member for marketing. Families that are broadly spread, with members in a number of locations have a trading advantage. Interviewees therefore expected that for this population, some family mem- bers would be sent to the provinces, but the bulk of the family would remain in Luanda. Overall those interviewed regarded IDPs in Luanda as being unlikely to return in large numbers to the countryside given the investment they will already have made to survive in Luanda. Those that might consider returning are unlikely to receive any assistance to do so as they are not so much a forgotten caseload as an invisible one.

“Hard-Core” IDPs

In July 2003, one UN source referred to the remaining IDPs as “hard-core” IDPs. There are still some 600,000 confirmed IDPs who are receiving assistance from the interna- tional community in July 2003. While one UN interviewee dismissed this number as “nothing” and said that there are effectively no IDPs now in Angola, it still represents 5% of the national population.

The Government estimates that at the end of May 2003 there were 1.4 million IDPs in total. OCHA appears to have moved towards accepting that the government estimate is realistic and was planning, in mid-July to carry out a study to investigate why there were still so many IDPs who had not returned. However, the central government number ignores 600,000 of those per- sons registered as IDPs by the provincial Government in Luanda. However, as noted above, many of these can be expected to remain in Luanda.

The evaluator, in discussion with IDPs who had not returned to their area of origin noted that there were several reasons why IDPs had not returned.

• Concern over the peace process. • Economic interest in remaining. • Inaccessibility of area of origin. • Vulnerability/inability to move. Adriano earns a living as a metal worker in • “Failed” returnees, who have abandoned Moxico, He does not plan to return to his attempts to resettle in their areas of origin. area of origin.

Doubts about the peace process

This might not seem like a soundly based concern but the 2002 cease fire is the fourth since 1989. While it looks now that any new outbreak of civil war is extremely unlikely, many displaced have gone through previous cycles of displacement and resettlement and want to be sure before placing themselves in peril again.

30 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Interviewees tended to refer indirectly to this cause of concern rather than directly stating it. The concern was reflected in statements such as “we suffered a lot when we had to flee” etc. Interviewees stated that they would “return after…” without specifying what exactly they were waiting for.

Economic interest in remaining

Some of those remaining in the former IDP camps have settled there and were earning a living either through paid employment, petty trading, or craft work. Such interviewees normally stated their clear intention to remain where they were.

Inaccessible areas

Some displaced populations continue in place, such as in Mavinga, because their areas of origin are still inaccessible, either because of mines or the lack of roads. There is also a limit to the distance that a peasant family can travel on foot, while carrying food, water and whatever they will need to restart life in their area of origin. This category of “stuck” IDPs is limited to those from certain specific areas of origin.

Vulnerables / unable to move

In the old IDP camps, the most common reason for not moving was the simple inability to do so. This was particularly the case with female headed households.

The elderly also have problems with returning. Most of the returnees interviewed were receiving little or no assistance to return. Returnees have to organise their own transport (most simply walk) to their areas of origin. Some of those interviewed had walked for 7 days to reach their areas of origin. For others it is even further.

When walking to their area of origin people have to carry food not only for the journey, but also for the first month after arrival. In some cases families have to carry sufficient water to get past areas with no surface water sources or wells.

On arrival they have to clear a small plot and Anita has stayed on at Enama Camp in arrange a simple shelter. The families interviewed Moxico. She fled from Luacano in September 1998 with her husband and stated that they relied on casual labour or petty trad- seven children. Her husband died leaving ing for their income. Casual farm labouring was her with the children, the youngest of whom is two years old. done on the farms of those who have remained in place or had returned earlier. She lives by working as a washerwomen and the children earn money by carrying water from the well to peoples’ homes. Other interviewees indicated that families generally returned only after one family member had first vis- Returning to Luacano is not an option for ited the area of origin to see what the possibilities her. were.

Such vulnerable IDPs are being overlooked at present and form part of the “forgotten caseload” of the displaced in Angola.

31 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

“Failed” returnees

The difficulties of re-establishing life in the areas of return should not be underestimat- ed. Oxfam reported that in Bie and Malange, small numbers of families, in the tens rather than in hundreds so far, are returning to IDP camps having abandoned their attempt to restart their lives in the areas of origin. Oxfam stated that food distributions were still being made in the IDP camps in Bie and Malange. In Moxico no food distri- butions were being made in the IDP camps.

Temporarily resettled IDPs

A number of returnees were met who had not returned directly to their place of origin in 2003, but had first moved to some intermediate point in 2002. This makes sense if one considers that returns to nearby locations were assisted in some areas in 2002. IDPs took advantage of these to begin their journey.

Spending an agricultural season at an intermediate point may have given access to food distributions, resettlement kits, or to agricultural labour. Access to labouring opportunities may be an important con- sideration for those returning to areas where there was no humanitarian access.

Resettled IDPs

During the war there were a number of attempts to resettle IDPs in areas where they could be agricultur- ally self –sufficient. Visiting these sites, the evaluator found that some families had left to return to their areas of origin, while others who had no reason to return, intended to stay put.

Interviewees intending to resettle typically gave their reason as “it’s Angola here too” or even “it’s the same province here also”. Paulina was taken by UNITA together with her mother and two sisters in 1997. She had three children by “friends” in Unita. Her In some cases those staying had bought houses from family plans to stay in the Luchazes resettle- those departing. In other cases, IDPs leaving resettle- ment site. ment sites had sold their houses to local residents.

UNITA Ex-combatant displaced

The worst population seen, in terms of resources and general condition, were the UNITA ex-combatants and their families in Sambo. The total number of UNITA ex- combatants and their families displaced is not clear. Some 50,000 were expected to demobilise but in the event, some 87,763 UNITA soldiers were demobilised and anoth- er 5,007 were incorporated into the Angolan armed forces (GoA, 2003).

The Government’s own figures are contradictory, with more than 7,000 more combat- ants demobilised or transferred than were registered in the first place (GoA, 2003). Combatants and their families entered the Gathering Areas19 rapidly in April to May,

32 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Figure 9: Figure 10: Estimates of UNITA combatants and families UNITA arrivals in gathering areas in 2002 Total in ‘000 by date and source Source: Joint Military Commision press releases

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 400,000 27 Jul '02 - Joint Military Commission 300,000 04 Nov '02 - US Committee for Refugees Civilians 200,000 09 May '03 - USAID 100 ,000 05 Jun '03 - Angola Peace exCombatants Monitor 0 19 Jun '03 - IRN quoting UNDP 06 Jul 13 Jul 20 Jul 27 Jul 20 Apr 27 Apr 01 Jun 08 Jun 15 Jun 22 Jun 29 Jun 19 June '03 - Government of 04 May 11 May 18 May 25 May Angola and the numbers continued to grow until the end of the year. It is not clear if this con- tinued rise happened because of the delay in communicating with some units, or the desire of some who had “demobilised” themselves to gain the benefit of official demobil- isation.

Agency estimates of the numbers still left in the gathering areas or transit centres range as high as 212,250 (Angola Peace Monitor No 9. Vol IX). OCHA reported that there were still 49,300 people in 7 of the “closed” gathering areas in June 2003, plus another 39,800 in 30 transit areas throughout Angola.

Ex-combatants interviewed at Sambo said that they had not received any ration since April. WFP got special permission to do a distribution after the offi- cial closing date in late March 2003.

However, there was still some maize in the camp during the visit by the evaluation team in June, but this was probably due to the distribution of a three month ration in February as the gathering area received no food from November to February due to the access road being closed after a landmine inci- dents on the road from Huambo on November 14th. Adelina with her surviving children (3 and 6 years old). Her new baby died last month, within a few weeks of being born. Her hus- The population at the Sambo Gathering Area cur- band is a UNITA combatant who lost a leg rently receives no food as the Government has for- in a mine incident. bidden assistance to the Gathering Area as it is offi- cially closed.

19) The Gathering Areas were the areas specified for the collection of UNITA forces and their families prior to demobilisation.

33 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

The Government also forbade the supply of seeds and tools to the populations in the Gathering Areas in order to discourage them from settling there instead of returning to their areas of origin. Interviewees suggested that the government policy was driven by the government’s wish to avoid having places under UNITA authority which could form the nuclei of future armed opposition.

The population in this camp showed signs of chronic malnutrition with children being small for their age. Signs of poverty were also evident in the state of the clothing being worn.

One sign of poverty was the lack of mortars for pounding maize. Maize was instead pounded on a rock outcrop with wooden hand hammers. While such hammers are normally used by mobile popula- tions, one would expect that once the population were in an area for a few months, families would make or buy wooden mortars as these take less work to grind maize than beating it on a rock.

At Sambo some 613 ex-combatants are waiting for Eight year old Florinda pounding maize on a rock for her widowed mother at Sambo. their documents and demobilisation allowance Like most of the children here she was small (probably 3,000 people in all including their fami- for her age, reflecting a history of inadequate lies). Another five to seven thousand are waiting for nutrition. transport to their areas of origin.

The ex-Combatants are currently surviving by working as labourers on neighbouring farms, and by making and trading in charcoal. There must be some concern about the security implications in having large numbers of trained military with no obvious means of earning a living, and who presumably know where arms have been cached.

The UNITA ex-combatants waiting for assistance and transportation are part of a larger group of “forgotten displaced” in Angola. There is a broader question about the UNITA displaced. Many of these did not opt for displacement with UNITA but had it forced upon them20. The two groups have not been treated in the same way.

Even despite these flaws, the World Bank note that this is the most successful demobili- sation ever held. The Government certainly performed better than expected when faced with nearly twice the original estimate of UNITA combatants to be demobilised21.

Resettled ex combatants

Outside of the Gathering Area none of those interviewed would acknowledge that they had been with UNITA even where it was clear from the context. It was the same story for civil- ians who had been with UNITA. They were generally very reluctant to acknowledge this, although sometimes reference was made to family members who had been taken by UNITA.

20) Service with UNITA was not optional either. Although some UNITA interviewees said that they had joined to fight for Angolan freedom, the majority acknowledged that they had been taken from their vil- lages by UNITA. Some former government soldiers interviewed had had the same experience. 21) The evaluator asked one interviewee what the difference was between those who took refuge in the govern- ment controlled town and those who remained with UNITA in one district. The interviewee explained that those who were too late to cross the rising river between the district and the town remained with UNITA. Many of these were later displaced with them.

34 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Government soldiers have remained with their units and have not been quartered for demobilisation. However, those who are staying in the army are being allowed to transfer to their provinces of origin. This occasionally causes some family problems as the soldiers may have wives and children in the province of origin as well as in their current posting.

Returned IDPs

Returned IDPs were visited at a number of locations. It was clear from these visits that what returnees received depended both on the province they returned to (overall policy and the presence of humanitarian agencies), and on the part of the province that they returned to (humanitarian access, the presence of humanitarian agencies and the policies pursued).

Several OCHA reports suggest that 220,000 IDPs had assistance to return to their places of origin (UN, 2003). Given the Government’s estimate of approximately 2.4 million returnees, this suggests Returnees building houses in Moxico. The that only 9% of returned IDPs got assistance with families will shelter for two to three months their transport. behind the grass screens while they build their new houses. These returnees, profiting from trading in fish, plan to build their In late 2002 the government’s priority switched from houses with sun-dried blocks. moving IDPs to clearing the Gathering Areas. Transport of IDPs to their areas of origin effectively stopped. The rains interrupted the return of the ex-combatants to their areas of origin and it never really resumed on a large scale in 2003. Neither was there any resumption of assisted transport for IDPs.

The current situation of the returned IDPs depends on a wide range of factors including:

• The province they are returning to and the policies being applied by the government and humanitarian actors in that province. • The level of access to where they return to. (Access may be constrained by poor roads, damaged bridges or concerns about mine contamination). • The cropping system (some root crops require nearly two seasons to be fully productive). • The access to land. There is a concern that UNITA ex-combatants may have their access to land restricted by traditional rulers in response to popular discontent with the behaviour of UNITA in the last few years. In other areas spontaneously retur- ning refugees found that ex-combatants had occupied their land. • The opportunities for petty trading or other economic activity in the area. This is closely related to the existing population of an area. As the population increases in the areas of return, the opportunities for paid labour or petty trading increase.

The last factor partly explains one of the features seen, that of a staged return, with some families returning at the first opportunity and the others returning when things were somewhat more developed. The lack of access to some areas also favours a staged return. The following map from OCHA for May 2003 illustrated the continuing access problems.

35 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Map 2: Accessibility May 2003 (OCHA)

Accessibility Good Difficult Isolated Areas No Information

When people flee their homes, they bear almost all the cost, the cost of abandoning their assets and livelihoods, of transporting themselves to a place of safety. If they are lucky they will get some assistance to establish and maintain themselves in their place of refuge. However, when they return, not only do they need maintenance support, but they also need assistance to re-establish their livelihoods and assets22. The fact that there was no huge surge in donor spending in Angola since the ceasefire illustrates that the low level of services seen in the provinces visited is indicative of the situation in the whole country.

Categorisation

All interviewees used categorisation to identify different types of beneficiary23. Even the World Food Programme’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit took care to distin- guish between resident, settled, resettled, and displaced beneficiaries.

22) This need to pay for things like transport and to try and re-establish shelter and livelihoods (whose cost was originally borne by the refugees) is what makes refugee repatriation programmes so expensive. 23) Examples of categories are New IDP, Old IDP, Refugee, Returned Refugee, Settled, Resettled, etc.

36 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Categories are used widely in Angola, not only by aid agencies and government but also by displaced communities themselves24. Angolan interviewees were generally of the view that, where communities consisted of different categories of beneficiaries, providing assistance to one category only could lead to communal tension. Interviewees gave examples of where there was tension between old and new displaced, between returning refugees and residents, or between those who had been displaced with UNITA and other displaced.

However, interviewees noted that in some cases, the categories reflected very real differ- ences in needs between populations.

IDP food security

The most recent Vulnerability Analysis for Angola (released in June 2003) shows 79% of those in the food-insecure or highly vulnerable category25 are internally displaced, reset- tled, or returned. Comparing both populations shows that while only 6% of the resident population is highly vulnerable or food-insecure, 30% of the displaced, settled, or returned population is.

The WFP figures (which may understate the problem because of the lack of access to some areas) suggest that those who are, or have recently been, displaced are more than five times as likely to be in the food-insecure or highly vulnerable category.

Figure 11: Vulnerability for Resident, IDPs, Resettled and Returned (June 2003).

Resident IDP, Resettled or Returned

Highly Highly Vulnerable Vulnerable

Not Highly Not Highly Vulnerable Vulnerable

24) Birkeland and Gomes (2001) refer to multiple axes of identity used by IDPs in Angola. They note that the term deslocado (dislocated) in Angola has the connotation of forcible displacement. 25) The Food Insecure vulnerability category means that people need food assistance now, the Highly Vulnerable category means that they will need it before the next harvest. The Moderately Vulnerable cate- gory are those who may need food before the next harvest.

37 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

2.5 Minimum Conditions for Return

The legal instruments

Angola shares with Columbia the distinction of having the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement written into national law26. The Angolan legislation is particularly interesting in that it goes beyond the Guiding Principles to establish minimum conditions for return.

The legislation was established on foot of a long process of advocacy and consultancy by OCHA. UNHCR also played a role in this.27

The two Angolan decrees, Number 1 of 2001 and Number 79 of 2002 are Relief Standards so interesting they are presented in For many years the standards for relief work translation in Appendix 9 The legal were effectively set by the field handbooks instruments: The Norms and of such agencies as the United Nations High Appendix 10 The legal instruments: Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) or The Regulations. A comparison of the the United States Agency for International standards with those of Sphere and Development (USAID). UNHCR is presented in Appendix 11 The Angolan Regulations compared In 1997, NGOs and the Red Cross began with the indicators for other stan- the Sphere Project to develop a set of uni- dards. Some aspects of the Angolan versal minimum standards in core areas of standards are more detailed than in humanitarian assistance. One outcome of Sphere, but in other cases the stan- this process was the Sphere Handbook in dards are less demanding than those 2000. presented in Sphere.

Practical situation

Despite the excellence of the legislations, almost all persons interviewed agreed that they were not being implemented. Interviewees made comments like “In Angola laws only exist on paper and never in reality”.

OCHA have estimated that 30% of those returning returned to places where the mini- mum conditions were met. The evaluator considers that it is very unlikely that as many as 30% are returning to locations which meet the minimum conditions. It is probably of the order of ten to fifteen percent at most. Even many settled villages do not meet the minimum conditions in terms of access to health services or water.

Angola has the second worst ranking in the UNDP’s Human Development Index for Southern Africa. Only one other country in Southern Africa spends less on Health and Education combined than Angola. This reflects a low level of service provision of basic services by the government.

The regulations place a very large load on the provincial government, especially for the construction of infrastructure for health and education. However, only very limited con- struction of social infrastructure is underway in a few limited provinces.

26) Law 387 in Columbia. 27) Personal communication from Ole Stage.

38 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Figure 11: HDI Ranking and Social spending - Southern Africa

6

Lesotho 5 5

Namibia 2 4 Zambia 9 South Africa 1 Botswana 3 Malawi 8 Zimbabw e 7 3 Swaziland 4 Mozambique 11

2 Angola 10 Congo 6 1

Percentage of GDP Spend on Education 0 024681012 Percentage of GDP spend on Health

Interviewees were divided into two broad classes:

• Those who believed that there had been so little progress because the government cared nothing for the people in the rural areas (or for those in the low income and virtually un-serviced musseques28 on the periphery of Luanda). • Those who believed that while the government was far from perfect, it had made an effort and the situation was complex.

The Government and the rural areas

Several interviewees made the point that the government is very corrupt and quoted the example of the leaked World Bank report that highlighted that four billion US dollars had gone missing from the national accounts over the previous five years. Many other instances of corruption were quoted by interviewees.

A second factor cited by interviewees was that whatever services the government pro- vides are focused on the urban elite, especially in Luanda. One interviewee gave the example of the Government bringing a foreign entertainer to sing in Angola at enor- mous cost when there are so many unmet social needs in Angola.

When one looks at the few schools that are being built by the government, almost all are in municipal or provincial capitals. It appears to be only NGOs that are building schools in rural areas.

Some interviewees stated that the Government position was that the crisis in Angola was a result of Cold War politics and that dealing with the problems arising was the respon- sibility of the international community rather than the government.

28) Musseques are the unplanned and unserviced suburbs surrounding Luanda. They are named for the easily eroded red soil in the area.

39 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

One interviewee described what is happening in the Angolan countryside as a form of internal colonisation with a government only interested in economic exploitation of whatever resources are there without demonstrating any care for the people. Several examples, where communities have been moved off good land that is wanted by senior figures, were quoted in support of this.

Limits of capacity

The government has only a limited capacity. Civil servants in Angola are poorly paid and many treat their jobs in the style of a medieval fief, using it to extract what money they can to compensate for their low pay. Even teachers were found to be charging chil- dren for starting school, even though education is notionally free.

Angola maintains a very bureaucratic system in spite of the limited capacity to manage it. One of the forms seen in Municipal Offices was an application for a permit for people to repair their own houses. Informants said that all such permits are usually only processed if some gasosa (Portuguese for a soda – in this context meaning a small bribe) is given.

It would hardly be realistic to expect a government which has not had the capacity to service IDPs when they were concentrated to do so when they are dispersed. Other interviewees argued that it was a matter of will rather than of capacity. In support of this argument is the apparent lack of any attempt to meet the needs of the returnees in many places.

It was clear also that NGOs only have a limited capacity even though they are not always willing to acknowledge this immediately. The change from servicing concentrated groups of people within quite small areas to servicing dispersed populations spread over provinces has been difficult for Danida’s partners. It will not be possible to meet the needs in Angola through NGOs alone, only the government can develop the capacity to do this.

The Government and the donors

Some interviewees were critical of the position taken by the donors. One interviewee said that “for the donors the Government is too corrupt to give aid to, but not too corrupt to buy oil from”. Another quoted the founder of a National NGO as saying “The govern- ment is neither as bad as the donors say, nor as good as the people of Angola deserve.”

Donors generally have only very limited development assistance programmes in Angola and the majority have Humanitarian Assistance programmes only. None of the donors interviewed plan to increase their assistance to Angola. Most expect assistance to decrease significantly over the next three years. The donors have successfully maintained a common front on issues such as the Donor Conference. One of the donor representatives prepared a “crib sheet” of key issues to raise with the government whenever individual donors are meeting the government.

One interviewee noted that donor relationships with the government are complicated by the fact that some countries have substantial business interests in Angola and that these take precedence over Aid.

40 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Donor interviewees acknowledged that the Donors have very little leverage with the Government. Angola has large sums from oil and diamonds and the sums available from Donors are small by comparison. Several interviewees quoted the example of the govern- ment taking an unconditional 1.15Bn USD commercial credit from a consortium of banks at 10% rather than accepting a 1Bn USD credit from the IMF that had trans- parency and governance conditions attached.

The government is susceptible to pressure in one area, that of its image. Angola now holds one of the rotating UN Security Council seats and sees a large role for itself in the region. The government is very unhappy with corruption allegations and negative pub- licity abroad. The apparent order of priority for dealing with different sorts of displaced illustrates this point.

• Demobilised: First priority due to the security implications. • Returning refugees: Next priority because of the impact on Angola’s image in the region as a source of refugees. • Returning IDPs, because these have no impact on the country’s image.

2.6 Coordination of the IDP response

There was no coordinated integrated response to the IDP crisis in Angola. Instead there were a wide variety of different responses for which OCHA provided strong coordina- tion. OCHA played this role by exercising strong leadership for the humanitarian com- munity, including both bilateral and multilateral donors with a presence in Angola.

All agency interviewees agreed that OCHA had worked well in Angola. Donors also expressed regret for the planned closure of the OCHA mission in 2004, and spoke high- ly of the work done by OCHA. The closure was postponed for a further year (to 2005) during the evaluation mission.

It is very clear from reading the humanitarian situation reports that coordination moved in 1999 from a national focus to a provincial one. This was in response to the way in which the war led to different situations in different provinces. The OCHA provincial representatives were key players in responding to the provincial focus. Their importance can be seen by the way in which, for example, the ECHO non-food-items were allocat- ed to agencies. Individual NGOs requested non-food-items from the three NGOs with ECHO contracts to bulk purchase non-food-items. The requests were referred to the OCHA provincial coordinators to see if they considered them reasonable. If they consid- ered the requests reasonable they were granted.

A further example of the influence of OCHA was the inclusion of NGO projects in the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for Angola. NGOs put some work into this and at least two29 got funding through the CAP.

One really excellent initiative of OCHA was the establishment of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF). This fund was established in 1997 and served as a source of emergency funding for NGOs. The Fund (and a much smaller Quartering Area

29) Both the Lutheran World Federation and the Norwegian Refugee Council got funding through the Consolidated Appeal Process.

41 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Figure 13: Donor Support to Emergency Responce Funds (ERF and QERF)

Canada USA

Netherlands ECHO

Private United Norway Kingdom

Italy Sweden

Emergency Response Fund (QERF) in 2002) disbursed nearly 26 million USD from 1997 to 2003.

This fund could disburse 50,000USD for individual projects in 1997, although the amount was later increased to 130,000USD with 200,000USD in exceptional cases. Over 9MUSD was disbursed through this mechanism in 2002.

The major advantage of this fund was that decisions were taken locally and funds could be released in less than a week against relatively simple applications. Many NGOs used this as the immediate sources of funding while waiting for applications to ECHO or other donors to come through.

Danida was not a supporter of this mechanism. However it should be noted that unlike Danida all the other donors (except Canada) who supported the ERF have permanent representation in Angola.

2.7 Conclusions and recommendations

The following are the major conclusions from the consideration of the situation of IDPs in Angola:

• Displacement in Angola has taken a wide variety of forms. Refugees, IDPs and UNITA non-combatants are all examples of displaced groups in Angola.

• The majority of the displaced have now returned to their areas of origin. The exact number is not clear, but it seems that well over two million people have returned and the number may be as high as two and a half million.

• Returnees are still vulnerable, they have largely returned to areas without services and it will be some considerable time before they will be self-sufficient.

• The inclusion of the Guiding Principles in Angolan Law is a very positive step, despite the problems in implementation.

42 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

• Relatively few returnees are benefiting from the minimum conditions of return man- dated under the Angolan IDP decrees.

• NGOs do not have the resources to meet all of the needs, and the Government has established very high standards for facilities such as schools. The best approach in the short term would be to promote lower cost intermediate solutions to a lower stan- dard that could last for up to ten years while waiting for the government to execute permanent solutions to the high standards it has set.

• Involuntary displacement ends when people are either able (economically as well as physically) to return without fear to their area of origin, or freely opt to settle perma- nently elsewhere. Displacement does not end simply because they are able to scratch a living in their area of displacement. Involuntary displacement is what defines IDP status, and not the continuation of whatever vulnerability flows from that displace- ment.30 The fact that nearly one million more than the number of IDPs “confirmed” by OCHA appear to have returned to their place of origin confirms that “declassify- ing” IDPs once they no longer have acute humanitarian needs is inappropriate.

• More than one million (and possibly as many as two million, when those who have taken refuge in Luanda are counted) have not returned to their area of origin. They have good reasons for not returning for the moment. The majority appeared to have stayed put because they are unable to return without assistance, but would return if assisted to do so31. Others have stayed because of the economic opportunities open to them where they are. A minority appear to have stayed because they are not yet fully confident the war will not restart.

• The displaced are likely to continue returning over the coming two years as a gro- wing economy in the areas of return provide opportunities for those with few resources who have stayed put for the moment.

• Categories are useful for identifying groups with greater needs, but care needs to be taken to prevent aid delivery to different categories from fostering community divisions.

• The Government is apparently limited both by a lack of will and a lack of capacity to meet the needs of returnees in rural areas.

• The Government is not susceptible to financial pressure from donors, but is sensitive to its international image.

• OCHA played a leading and effective role in the response.

• The fast-disbursing Emergency Response Fund was a significant factor in ensuring an adequate response to the rapidly changing situation since 1997.

30) A parallel can be taken here with refugees. Refugees are still regarded as refugees even after decades of self- sufficient displacement, unless they opt for naturalisation if that is an option. There is no similar formal process as naturalisation for IDPs so the test must be whether the population has abandoned any though of return to their areas of origin. In Tanzania in the early 90’s very few of the settled Burundi refugees accepted the offer to become Tanzanian citizens, even though the bulk of the population had probably been born in Tanzania. 31) This group not only includes the bulk of Angolan Refugees, the Social Cases who are economically unable to return

43 2. Institutional Framework for meeting IDP needs

Recommendations for Danida

The following recommendations to Danida follow on from the above.

• Danida should continue to assist their NGO partners, in particular, DCA/LWF and DRC to provide services to the returned IDPs.

• In future crises, Danida should consider supporting quick funding mechanisms which fill the same role as the OCHA Emergency Response Fund did in Angola.

Recommendations for the Angolan Government

• The Angolan Government should immediately permit the distribution of food in Gathering Areas where these have not yet been emptied.

• The Angolan Government should prioritise the transport of the demobilised to their areas of origin.

• The Angolan Government should consider some mechanism for monitoring the creation of the minimum conditions of return in the different provinces.

Recommendations for humanitarian actors generally

• The humanitarian community should avoid “declassifying” IDPs unless it is clear that they no longer have any wish to return to their area of origin should they be able to do so.

• The humanitarian community should carry out a survey on the status of the compli- ance with the minimum conditions, commune by commune, on a nationwide basis.

• The humanitarian community should promote the concept that in the Angolan con- text short term solutions are appropriate for NGO implementation but long term solutions are the clear responsibility of the government.

• The humanitarian community should plan for a pattern of continuing but reducing return to the rural areas over the next two years.

• The humanitarian community should use the government sensitivity about its inter- national image to advocate for better government service delivery to the rural areas and to the returnees settling there.

• The humanitarian community should promote the approach taken in Angola, with the incorporation of the Guiding Principles and minimum conditions into national legislation for countries with large IDP populations.

• Assistance should be delivered on the basis of need rather than of membership of a particular grouping.

44 3. Relevance

3. Relevance

By relevance is meant an overall assessment of whether aid interventions are in keeping with donor and partner policies, as well as with local needs and priorities.32

3.1 Danida’s partners

The agencies funded by Danida were extremely active in providing essential services to the population prior to the ceasefire. Danida funded the following partners through the Humanitarian Budget.31

Table 4: Danish Humanitarian Assistance to Angola - 1999 to 29th April 2003 (DKK ‘000) Partner 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total WFP 2,400 11,028 11,003 4,500 - 28,931 Danish Refugee Council 5,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 8,000 36,000 Danish Red Cross/ICRC 4,000 5,000 5,000 9,000 - 23,000 UNICEF 6,000 6,700 3,000 5,000 - 20,700 Save the Children - 4,152 4,203 3,047 - 11,402 DanChurchAid/LWF - 5,600 - 5,000 9,000 19,600 MSF 3,348 - - 7,100 - 10,448 Norwegian People’s Aid 4,000 - - - - 4,000 WHO 1,000 - - - - 1,000 Total 26,248 39,980 30,706 41,147 17,000 155,081 UN Peacekeeping 4,358 416 - - - 4,774

Note: The figures for 2003 do not include grants made after 29 April. The UN Peacekeeping support is separated because this is not normally classified as humanitarian assistance.

In addition, other agencies such as Ibis received funding from the NGO section in Danida, and there were block grants to other UN agencies. UN Peacekeeping operations benefited from grants of 4.3 million DKK, but this, in accordance with the DAC crite- ria, is not included in the total for humanitarian assistance.

In general, Danida’s partners are among the most respected agencies in Angola and some of them are held in very high regard by the rest of the humanitarian community.

Danida’s partners played a key role in meeting needs in their areas of operation. The World Food Programme not only provided food to millions of Angolans but also flew non-food supplies and personnel around the country. WFP has played a key role in the survival of the displaced populations.

32) Danida 1999

45 3. Relevance

UNICEF has played a key role in the promotion of services to the displaced, including vaccination, feeding, and non-food items.

Save the Children Denmark channelled their funds to the Save the Children UK feeding programme in Huambo. This programme was instrumental in saving the lives of many children before it ended earlier this year.

MSF had grants from Danida in 1999 and 2002. MSF has been a key actor in providing medical relief to the displaced throughout Angola.

The grant to Norwegian People’s Aid was related to the purchase of a Danish made mine clearing flail.

In accordance with the wishes of Danida, the evaluator concentrated on three of the Danida Partners, namely: Danish Refugee Council; DanChurchAid with the Lutheran World Federation; and the Danish Red Cross with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The projects of these Danida partners are shown in figure 14.33

Figure 14: Three Principal Danida Partners in Angola (DKK ‘000) Partner

Lutheran World The International The Danish Federation via Committee of the Refugee Council DanChurchAid Red Cross via the (Dansk (Folkekirkens Danish Red Cross Flygtningehjælp ) Nødhjælp) (Dansk Røde Kors) Provinces of Mainly Uige, Countrywide, but Mainly Moxico and operation Malange and chiefly in the Luena Kwanza North central plateau.

Average Danida 7,000 DKK per year 2,650 DKK per year 5,750 DKK per year funding 1999-2002. for Angola projects. for Angola projects. for Angola projects. Danida share Majority (10% to 15%) (about 5% in 2002) Funding for 2003 8,000 DKK 9,000 DKK Nil Key Sectors of Non-food-items Non-food-items Food operation Schools and health Reconstruction Non-food-items posts Primary Health Health Livelihood support Peace-building Protection Mine awareness Livelihood support Mine victims

33) The evaluator also visited the Save the Children Programme in Uige, but this had not been funded by the humanitarian unit for the period under evaluation.

46 3. Relevance

The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) was the leading NGO in Uige Province. It played a key role throughout the war, a role that was acknowledged by the provincial govern- ment. It worked very closely with MINARS (the Ministry responsible for social affairs) in the provision of services to the vulnerable. The DRC was the only Danish partner implementing projects directly with Danida funds rather than passing them on to other partners to implement.

The Danish Red Cross funded the highly regarded programme of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Angola. ICRC not only provided support for the displaced but was also very involved in protection issues such as family tracing and the Red Cross message service. ICRC also played a key role in the rehabilitation of Mine victims.

DanChurchAid’s partner the Lutheran World Federation was for long periods almost the only NGO in the East of Angola and has a justified reputation for service delivery there. LWF assistance covered a very wide range, given the relatively low number of humani- tarian agencies in the difficult conditions in the East of Angola.

3.2 Before and after the ceasefire

The activities of the Danida funded partners before the ceasefire were largely concentrated on serving the needs of displaced communities. This was appropri- ate as these were generally the most vulnerable. The needs of these communities were so many that any assistance provided to them was relevant to their needs. However, while it is clear that the assistance Part of a school in Uige that was renovated provided corresponded to the communities’ needs, by DRC. The school has nearly 3,000 stu- the evaluator is unable to say whether it correspond- dents. It originally served many IDPs and ed to their greatest needs. now serves the resident community. This is a good example of an emergency intervention with a long term impact. The nature of humanitarian needs changed dramati- cally after the ceasefire. It is clear that some of Danida’s partners have had problems in adjusting to the new situation. Some of the projects seen, such as DRC’s horticultural project, were clearly relevant in the circum- stances prior to the ceasefire when large amounts of people were locked into relatively small areas with little access to farming land. After the ceasefire, the broader availability of land made this project less relevant.

While the horticultural project was no longer so relevant, DRC’s general focus on agricultural development was both relevant and appropriate. Agricultural rehabilitation allowed communities to use their own resources to meet their food security needs. The other Danida partners were also active in agricultural rehabilitation.

Other agencies visited had legacy projects (such as ICRC’s composting project) that were no longer very relevant in the changed situation. However, only a small proportion of the total project portfolio falls into the “less relevant” category. The majority of the activities executed in the period after the ceasefire were very relevant to the needs of the population.

47 3. Relevance

All partners adapted fairly well to the changed circumstance. However, some partners, such as DCA/LWF and the DRC are better placed to respond to the changed circum- stances because their relief activities are based on what is fundamentally a development approach34. Such an approach is more relevant to meeting the needs of the resettling communities than the pure relief approach adopted by agencies such as MSF.

Table 5: The Impact of the Ceasefire on Agency Operations

Before Ceasefire After Ceasefire Range of operation In constrained security Province wide zones around provincial capitals and major towns Logistics Typically by air (often free By road over long distances WFP flights) Population served IDPs Resettled, demobilised, IDPs Constraints Lack of land for self- Insufficient capacity, sufficiency, ongoing landmines, access warfare, airlift capacity problems, logistics capacity

Type of assistance Relief Rehabilitation and more developmental type initiatives

Prior to the ceasefire, ICRC supported four health posts in the IDP camps around Huambo. This finally ended in June 2003 and instead ICRC is rehabilitating and sup- porting four health posts in the areas of return. Previously, the ICRC health delegate could visit all four health posts in an afternoon, now it takes two days to visit the fur- thest one of the four posts, and it is the work of a full week to visit them all.

The change in types of operation, in logistics needs, and in the approach needed has been difficult for Danida’s partners. Some partners openly confessed that their own capacity limited their initial response. In other cases, it was clear from beneficiary com- ments that the agency had not been able to keep on top of the demands placed on it by a rapidly expanding programme. DRC’s programme probably expanded further and more rapidly than others, but unlike LWF and ICRC who also saw a similar expansion, DRC did not have the institutional memory of such rapid expansion in 1991 or 1994. Overall, the nature of the projects being carried out by Danida’s partners corresponded fairly closely with the expressed needs of the communities.

Despite some development initiatives, such as DRC’s support for community school construction, agency programmes are still dominated by a relief mentality. DCA/LWF is carrying out a training programme to try and change the relief focus of their staff.

34) LWF noted that they are “presently involved in a complete transformation of the program from e emer- gency to community work” and that LWF now “works for the communities to which displaced, refugees and demobilized soldiers and their families return based on their needs and not by classification” in a par- ticular category.

48 3. Relevance

What was most surprising was that relatively few agencies have sought to learn from the lessons learned during the post-war transition in Mozambique. One agency that had tried to do this is World Vision, and their plans reflect the Mozambican experience.

3.3 Conclusions and recommendations

• Overall the projects seen were relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries and reflected good humanitarian practice.

• Agencies maintained a handful of legacy projects that were no longer relevant in the changed circumstances after the opportunities brought about by the ceasefire, but such projects represented a very small proportion of the overall portfolio.

• Danida’s partners’ focus on agricultural rehabilitation was particularly relevant and appropriate.

• Agencies are still dominated by a relief mentality, with too little emphasis on devel- opmental or commercial approaches that might be more appropriate for the rehabili- tation phase.

Recommendations to Danida

• In cases where there is a major change in the humanitarian situation in countries assisted by Danida, Danida should consider conducting a review immediately after the change so as to learn from what has been done before programmes are closed and personnel dispersed.

Recommendations to Danida partners

• Danida partners should evaluate their project portfolio and drop those projects that are no longer so relevant in the changed circumstances.

Recommendations for the humanitarian community

• The humanitarian community should, when planning projects, make a greater effort to learn from transition programmes elsewhere, especially in Mozambique, where a common language would allow the ready harvesting of the experiences of Mozambican staff for use in Angola.

49

4. Effectiveness

4 Effectiveness

Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which the formally agreed objectives have been achieved, or can be expected to be achieved. It takes the perspective of the users or those formally designated as the beneficiaries of the aid interventions: the target group.35

4.1 Prerequisites for assessing effectiveness

It is only possible to assess effectiveness when there is a clear statement of objectives and when it is clear what has been done.

Clear statement of objectives

The best tool for ensuring a clear statement of project objectives is the Logical Framework. Although much criticized, when properly done it is a very powerful tool for getting project planners to think about what they hope to achieve with their project.

The logical frameworks inspected varied in quality with even the best ones like the DCA/LWF one subject to flaws. One of the indicators for the effectiveness of reducing morbidity and mortality is that the target population should achieve “A level of mortali- ty below 1% among the general population and less than 2% for those under 5 years of age.” This is of course meaningless as there is no reference to the existing mortality rates, nor is there any reference to the term over which the percentage is to be measured. The background mortality rate in rural communities in Africa is of the order of 2% per annum. This is roughly equivalent to a mortality rate of about 0.5/10,000 per day. UNHCR uses a mortality rate of 1/10,000 per day for the general population and 2/10,000/day for the under-five populations as indicators for whether there is a cause for concern or not.

The ICRC logical framework lacks any Objectively Verifiable Indicators at all. Admittedly, it is difficult to craft such indicators for the protection aspects of the ICRC programme, but the outcomes of some aspects of the ICRC programme such as health services, food, and non-food-item distribution can be measured much more easily.

The logical framework does not give clear numerical objectives for many activities; instead progress is to be measured in terms of “percentage of registered IDP children in schools” without any reference to what percentage is being aimed for.

However, the general objectives for the agencies were clear, if lacking in detail. It should be pointed out that in the situation prior to 2003, very large changes in humanitarian conditions took place in response to the changing military situation. This meant that agency activities were of necessity reactive rather than proactive, and very detailed logical frameworks would not have been very useful.

However in the present circumstances (and all of the comments refer to the most recent

35) Danida 1999

51 4. Effectiveness

logical frameworks) one would expect a more planned approach. It is difficult to see how senior staff can manage their projects without clear objectives to work towards.

Clear statement of results

It was often very difficult to establish what exactly had been done with what money. Agency staff were unable to state unit prices for constructed works, nor was it always clear which donors had paid for what. There was no evidence whatsoever of “double dipping” (i.e. different donors being asked to pay for the same work), but it would have been good at the same time to have a clear indication on the ground of who had paid for the different works seen.

While NGOs urge transparency on the government they are not very transparent them- selves in their own activities. It would be good on every rehabilitated structure showing what work was done by whom, who paid for it, and how much it cost. This would not only emphasise the contribution made by different donors, but would also provide the community with information on the cost of the services they are getting. It would also serve as a practical example of transparency which the government could follow if it wished.

4.2 Lack of assessment and analysis

During the war not much analysis was needed in projects. Needs were basic and assess- ment and analysis could be relatively simple. However the situation is now far more complex.

USAID have carried out a detailed assessment of needs in the agricultural sector and unsurprisingly this has highlighted the issue of rural roads for access to market. Without good access to market, the majority of those returning to the land will be forced into a cycle of poverty with no means of selling their surplus produce to improve their lives. One of the lessons learned from Mozambique’s transition from war to peace was the importance of access to markets.

However, the evaluator found no evidence of detailed analysis of the likely future needs for the population or of strategic thinking in general. Instead, programmes seemed to be founded on past needs such as the distribution of seeds and tools, rather than conside- ring supporting the setting up of commercial mechanisms through which peasants could have access to seeds and tools. Some of those benefiting from DRC’s horticultural pro- gramme said that they could have bought the seeds themselves, but all the varieties they wanted were not on the market, hence they turned to DRC.

4.3 Lack of gender analysis

Gender analysis considers the differential impact of issues and assistance on men and women. All too often agencies substituted a few “women’s programmes” for any proper gender analysis. Gender analysis is important to ensure the programmes effectively target the poorest, and that they do not have a disproportionately negative effect on particular groups. Women tend to be disproportionately poor and special care is needed to ensure that they are not disadvantaged.

52 4. Effectiveness

While some agencies (like UNHCR) invested heavily in undertaking analyses of the dif- ferential needs of women and men, this was not the case for the Danida partners. No evidence of widespread gender analysis was seen or related during the field visits. There is almost no reference to gender in the documents from the Danida funded partners. The exceptions in the documents are:

• The Danish Red Cross’s intention to push Gender as a topic with the ICRC. • DRC’s plan to “advocate for a stronger focus on protection and gender issues” with local authorities. • LWF’s reference to the gender composition of the population in its appeal for funds in Angola.

One very broad example of the lack of Figure 15: Ratio of girls to boys by school year gender analysis was the lack of attention to the question of girls’ education. The data 1. 4 on the right, from Machiavala School in 1. 2 Moxico is typical of all the schools visited. 1. 0 0.8 With every year the number of girls in 0.6 school drops out. The reasons given for 0.4 this ranged from “boys are more interested 0.2 0.0 in education than girls” to “girls are more 0123 useful in the home than boys”. The evalua- tor considers that the second of these reasons is more likely to be the real reason.

Girls’ education is important because, apart from any considerations of justice, the children of literate mothers are far more likely to survive childhood.

Two of the largest Danida Partners, LWF and DRC are supporting education and this is appropriate as access to education is one of the minimum condi- tions of return. Experience with refugee return has shown that families will often wait until the end of the school year before returning. No evidence was found of this in Angola, but some of the IDPs inter- viewed gave access to good quality education as their reason for not returning to rural areas.

However, neither DRC nor LWF seem to have con- sidered the issue of education for girls at all.

Agencies need to take a more holistic approach to the services that they are providing. Building schools on its own is not enough unless the whole education environment is considered. DRC gave a good example of this when they initiated a teacher trai- ning project to complement their school construc- Like many girls in Angola, 12 year old tion project in Uige36. Zinha has never been to school.

36) The project in question was later taken over by Save the Children Denmark, who are members of the DC consortium.

53 4. Effectiveness

Another issue of concern was that some people complained that they did not receive non food items as they were absent in the fields when the distribution was made. DRC staff dismissed these complaints saying that the people in question had probably not yet returned when the list was drawn up. This was probably correct, but there must be a concern that single parent households (which are almost always female headed in Angola) may be more likely to miss out on distributions because it is more difficult for them to be present during distributions.

Despite the overall lack of gender analysis, some sensible policies were seen, such as the distribution of non-food-items by DRC to the senior female member of the household. Danida’s partners often gave priority to assisting women, but what was lacking was any analysis of what the differential impact of projects was on men and women. Unless agencies actively do such analysis there is a danger that assistance may end up improving the situation of men at the cost of women, or vice versa.

4.4 Lack of beneficiary consultation

It was clear from the complaints by some beneficiaries that they were not fully aware of the agencies’ plans or of the conditions attached to their assistance. Consultation appeared to be chiefly with the traditional leaders rather than with the population. There was no attempt to communicate with the general population on the nature of the agreements reached.

One of the problems with beneficiary consultation in Angola is that beneficiaries are very aware of how the international aid system works, and tend to mould their response to “harvest” more aid. There are also some regional differences. The most blatant “aid harvesting” was seen in Uige. In Uige, almost all of those interviewed denied ever having received assistance from the international community. Those who had buckets clearly marked with agency logos asserted that they had bought these in the market. Even teachers, who clearly had been assisted by DRC in Uige, denied getting any assistance.

Despite these issues it would have been better if agencies had put more effort into estab- lishing what beneficiary needs were before intervening. In Uige DRC staff reported that beneficiaries were so uninterested in the sleeping mats that formed part of the non-food- items kits that they did not even taken them in some cases. This shows that the non- food-items kits were drawn up without consulting beneficiaries.

This problem is not unique to Angola or to the Danida’s partners there. Humanitarian relief is generally marked by a lack of the beneficiary consultation and participation that is regarded as normal in development projects.

The evaluator noted that beneficiary consultation appeared to be more likely with longer term projects, than with the relief projects. The construction of social infrastructure by DRC not only had beneficiary consultation, but also participation through community contributions. However, beneficiary participation here seemed be limited to implemen- tation rather than through the whole process from project design through to evaluation.

The evaluator received complaints directly from beneficiaries. While some of this was the usual attempt to take advantage of project visitors to try and get greater assistance for oneself or one’s community, some of the complaints demonstrated that beneficiaries

54 4. Effectiveness

were not able to raise issues with project staff, or at an appropriate level in the agency. The lack of effective feedback mechanisms robs agencies of the ability to improve pro- jects during execution through learning from beneficiaries.

4.5 Lack of competence

A number of examples were seen of low quality work attributable to the lack of technical competence of the agency. This was the case in several DRC projects where roofs were not adequately fixed to walls (to prevent them blowing off). Other examples37 include poorly executed spring protection works where users had to stand in water to fill their containers, or the generally low quality of non-food-items38.

DRC notes that donors tend to be restrictive in allowing expatriate expenses on project budgets. DRC sought technical support for projects from the government, other INGOs and in the communities. However, the impact of the war on the education sy- stem and the lack of practical experience of Government staff mean these are not always able to provide good quality technical support39. The worst quality problems that DRC had were where an international NGO partner has executed work of low quality.

DRC had kept costs low by not investing in expensive expatriate staff40, There is a trade- off between the amount of work that you can do and the costs of the staff needed to maintain the quality of the work. In this case the evaluator considers that DRC erred too far on the side of keeping costs low and not enough on ensuring that work was of an adequate quality. DRC has already recognised this problem but it would have been better if they had abstained from work which they did not have the technical compe- tence to supervise.

It can be tempting for agencies to try to provide the full range of services needed. This can lead to greater efficiency if the agency can deliver fully on the service. However, full delivery may require an investment in specialist staff, capital equipment, or in specific organisational competencies. LWF contracted out specialist tasks like well drilling to Oxfam. However, it should be recognised that in Angola, the difficulties of recruiting qualified staff, and the low number of humanitarian actors in the most difficult provinces (like Uige and Moxico), have limited agencies’ choices.

4.6 Timeliness

Danida funded agencies, along with many other humanitarian actors in Angola, have been constrained by corruption and inefficiency in the ports for the import of seeds and relief goods.

37) See Appendix 8, Detailed Technical Comments on page 118 includes examples of a number of problems that can be traced to a lack of technical competence. 38) The low quality of non-food-items is indicative of a lack of competence in their specification and procurement. The quality of non-food-items is discussed in on page 61. 39) The oil and mining sectors of the economy tend to attract the best staff. 40) Angolan staff with construction qualifications, broad experience, and a willingness to work in provincial locations like Uige are difficult to find.

55 4. Effectiveness

The delays to seeds for the 2002-2003 season were particularly difficult. In Moxico some of those who got seeds laughed when asked by the evaluator about the crop they had had. They said that they only got the seeds in December, too late for planting.

Many agencies have had problems with the importation of non-food-items. LWF tried to source non-food-items locally, but the only aluminium pan factory in Luanda was not interested in the business. Generally, there seems to have been a six month delay in the importation of non-food-items.

For non-Danida funding, the need for funding proposals to be submitted and approved also introduced an element of delay41. This meant that distributions of non-food items were not timely. The evaluator attended one non-food-items distribution in Uige to a population who had already been settled in the location for a year.

Many of the non-food-items distributions were funded by ECHO. Agency interviewees made the point that ECHO’s stringent rules on what it will and won’t fund and limits on overhead costs meant that they could not take on ECHO funded projects if they did not have other funding to cover base costs42. Thus, Danida funding which is more flexible, gives the agencies the ability to undertake projects with ECHO funding that does not cover all the costs.

4.7 Conclusions and recommendations

• Despite the flaws detailed above, Danida’s partners did manage to deliver real and needed assistance to large numbers of IDPs, and are continuing to deliver assistance. The evaluator considered that, overall, the programmes of Danida’s partners were relatively effective.

• The logical frameworks prepared by Danida’s partners do not allow a clear identifica- tion of what is planned.

• It is often very difficult in the field to establish what works have been paid for from what budget.

• There was an overall lack of assessment and analysis and strategic planning that was tied into beneficiary needs.

• Some Danida Partners have undertaken work outside their technical competence.

• Gender analysis was almost non-existent, and apart from a few individual agency staff there was no awareness of its importance.

• Beneficiaries were rarely consulted about projects, or if consulted, consultation was limited to traditional leaders.

41) The average period from initial proposal to contract was four and a half months for ECHO funded projects in 2002 (Source: Echo Evaluation Team). 42) ECHO make the point that ECHO funding is not intended to support NGOs but merely to provide assistance to beneficiaries in accordance with the ECHO mandate.

56 4. Effectiveness

• There were problems with the timely delivery of assistance especially of non-food- items and of seeds & tools. Much of this was funded by the general humanitarian community rather than by Danida.

• Beneficiaries have no real means of raising their concerns about projects with agen- cies other than through the occasional visits of project staff.

Recommendations to Danida

• Danida should consider insisting on a better quality Logical Frameworks from its partners. At the least the frameworks should detail what concrete outcomes the project is expected to achieve and how the progress against these targets is to be objectively measured.

• Danida should look for evidence of beneficiary consultation in funding applications.

• Danida should consider introducing a requirement for project proposals to indicate what differential impact the project is expected to have on men and women, and should also consider requiring reporting on the same.

Recommendations to Danida partners

• Danida partners should improve the quality of their planning so that their logical frameworks can be used as an active management tool.

• Danida partners should place a far higher emphasis on beneficiary consultation.

• Where Danida partners reach agreement with community leaders on a particular piece of work, the details of the agreement should be posted in a public place for all to read. Given the high levels of illiteracy, it would be useful to illustrate graphically the contribution expected from the community.

• Danida partners should not undertake technical work unless they have the technical competence to supervise it.

• Danida partners should clearly sign all new or rehabilitated structures with details of who did the work, when it was done, who paid for it, and what it cost.

Recommendations for the humanitarian community

• The humanitarian community should limit free distributions to situations of imme- diate vulnerability and look for alternative means to meet the needs for access to goods and services.

• The humanitarian community should provide mechanisms for beneficiary feedback on their work. One means of doing this would be to put address details on all project signs and with an invitation to beneficiaries to send their comments.

57

5. Efficiency

5. Efficiency

Efficiency is a measure of the “productivity” of the aid intervention process, i.e. to what degree the outputs achieved derive from efficient use of financial, human and material resources. In principle, then, it means comparing outputs against inputs. It takes the limited operational perspective of the key implementing institutions.43

5.1 Difficult to measure

The efficiency of the Danida funded interventions in Angola is difficult to measure because:

• The overall outputs are not clearly measured. • It is not always clear what inputs contributed to what outputs. • It is unclear how much of the outputs are due to inputs and how much are due to other factors.

5.2 Constraint on efficiency

Agencies operating in Angola are subject to a wide variety of constraints. Angola is a very expensive environment in which to operate. The endemic corruption, bureaucracy, and environment of inefficiency all raise the general level of costs.

Angola is a large country with a very underdeveloped road network. During the wet sea- son large parts of the country are inaccessible, and even short journeys can take three or four times their normal duration.

Landmines have severely constrained NGO operations. In Huambo, a series of mine incidents in the wet season at the end of 2002 virtually halted the delivery of services to rural areas by the humanitarian communities. Service delivery only restarted after roads were cleared at the end of the wet season.

5.3 Efficiency issues

The evaluator noted a number of general issues touching on efficiency.

Costs

Danida’s partners range across the cost spectrum, from DRC which probably has the lowest cost base, to ICRC which probably has the highest outside of the UN.

ICRC has a special mandate for operation in areas of open conflict. ICRC delegates often have to work in very sensitive situations and where fine judgement is called for.

43) Danida 1999

59 5. Efficiency

This requires ICRC to employ relatively experienced (and therefore more expensive) expatriate staff than other agencies. ICRC also uses a lot of expatriate staff and limits their term in any one country to prevent the perception of partiality. While many of the expatriate field staff are not directly concerned with the protection function, their very presence may provide protection.

The end result is that in peacetime ICRC delivers work of a very high quality, but at higher cost than other major NGOs. In conflict the reverse may be the case, where ICRC may be the only agency able to deliver assistance44.

Low cost does not necessarily mean increased efficiency. DRC saved costs by limiting its expatriate staff and not employing a construction specialist. This has probably led to the poor results seen in some of the DRC construction work.

Each agency has its own approach and there are positive and negative aspects with all of them. None of Danida’s humanitarian NGO partners have made much use of local NGO capacity. While this capacity is very limited, it still offers cost effective implemen- tation in specific circumstances.

It is clear that for the future, operating costs will become a bigger issues and Danida’s partners will need to find more cost-effective ways of operating, either through building the capacity of national staff or using the capacity of local NGOs.

Non-food-items

Non-food-items have been a standard part of the response to the crisis in Angola. Danida’s partners were two of the three NGOs chosen by ECHO to purchase non-food-items for distribution by other NGOs in Angola, and Danida partners have also purchased non-food-items directly.

Limits to coverage

Non-food-items were distributed by almost all agen- cies in all corners of Angola. However, the 2000 evaluation of Echo’s Global Plan reports that in that year only about half of the IDPs in need of non- food-items received them. Also, given the policy of regarding IDPs who have been in place for two years and with some access to land as settled, the actual needs were greater.

The quality of some of the non-food-items seen was relatively low and the life of some items in a rural This worn out pot in Samosambo was typi- environment may be less than two years. IDPs who cal of the non-food-items found with were settled at the old IDP camps complained that returnees. This pot could have lasted much longer if it had been of heavier gauge. the land to which they have access was small and

44) One example of this was during the 2003 War in Iraq. ICRC was practically the only agency effectively delivering vital assistance to Iraqi civilians during the fighting.

60 5. Efficiency

poorly yielding. Over the decades of war land near the cities has been extensively culti- vated and the theft or death of cattle and the closure of the roads meant that there was neither animal manure nor artificial fertilizer to renew the soil.

Settled IDPs therefore had relatively limited opportunity to purchase non-food-items from their own resources unless they have an income from paid work or trade. Such households have relatively few non-food-items and those seen were often in poor condition.

Quality issues

Several of the non-food-items seen were of poor quality.

• The blankets seen were of poor quality and unsuitable for use as relief items. Blankets recently distributed by LWF were felted rather than woven. Such blankets rapidly disintegrate in unfavourable conditions, such as when children wet the bed. LWF improved their specification this year, but had operated on inadequate specifi- cations for several years. The previous specification did not even specify that the blankets should be woven. • Kitchen sets were made from very thin aluminium. Thin pots and pans wear out quickly in rural conditions. Again the fault was that the specifications seen for kitchen sets did not specify a minimum thickness or weight for the pans45. • DRC was distributing collapsible jerricans. Collapsible jerricans have the great advantage that they occupy far less volume than regular jerricans and so are much cheaper to transport. Their disadvantage is that they have a relatively short life under typical rural conditions as they are generally of lighter construction than regular jerricans, and the plastic hinges that allow them to fold are a point of weakness.

Supplying items of lower quality may have saved a few percent on the prices, but only at the cost of a far bigger reduction in their useful life with the recipients.

Level of service

Interviewees from local NGOs were very critical of the adobe46 schools whose construction was being supported by DRC in Uige. Interviewees suggested it would be more appropriate for DRC to construct definitive schools with concrete blocks and cement.

The current Government Standard requires schools to have glass windows and corrugated fibre-rein- Adobe blocks drying in the sun in Uige. The forced cement roofs. These add significantly to the blocks are approximately 35cm by 15cm by cost of schools. 15cm.

DRC argued that building a permanent school for one rural community costs the same as supporting five to ten rural communities to build adobe schools.

45) LWF note that their non-food-item projects have been: “subject for several evaluations, particularly by ECHO and been found to be up to standard.” However the items seed were not up to the standard speci- fied by e.g. UNHCR. The specifications which LWF had been using (for blankets) and continue to use (for kitchen sets) were clearly deficient in that they did not fully the quality of the items in objective terms. 46) In Angola, adobe refers to sun-dried clay blocks. The walls are then plastered with a mud mortar.

61 5. Efficiency

Education is in a very poor state in Angola. Teachers are poorly trained and motivated, the curriculum is badly in need of revision, and there is a lack of teaching materials and schoolbooks. The quality of the school can have relatively little impact on the quality of the education given all these other constraints.

Angolan children need good quality education. Good quality schools should be part of this total package. Angola is not a poor country, and only the Government has the resources to intervene effectively on a large scale.

The evaluator considers that the DRC position is correct. Given the current state of education in Angola, it would be nonsense for DRC to concentrate on building one good school instead of five community ones. It is appropriate for NGOs to support communities to meet their immediate needs, whereas providing schools to the Ministry’s high standards is obviously the responsibility of the government.

Range of operations

Danida partners now have to range far wider in order to serve the populations who have flowed to the areas of return. DRC has probably expanded more than any and is now extending into Malange and Kwanza Norte as well as Uige47. DRC, in ranging so widely, was responding to the areas of greatest need. DRC’s policy was wholly appropriate in the emergency context.

LWF and ICRC also expanded their operations widely. Together with DRC, these Danida partners went to some effort to reach the populations most in need. The dedica- tion of the agencies staff was impressive. They travelled long distances on very poor roads and stayed in very poor quality accommodation to effectively reach those most in need.

Extensive operations are very demanding in terms of logistics. In the long term such dis- perse operations would lead to inefficient and shallow operations due respectively to higher overheads and the more limited knowledge of the communities served. While such a wide range was appropriate in the acute emergency phase, a greater concentration becomes more appropriate.

Alternative approaches

Agencies have tended to concentrate on “proven” approaches like free distribution. DRC is experimenting with “micro credit” for horticulture, but this is not really micro-credit at all and the micro-credit trappings are adding to the cost without any consequent benefit.

Agencies need to consider whether facilitating the introduction of commercial sources of supply into communities, and commercial services, might not be a better approach. This could be done through credit schemes for grain purchasers, or schemes to increase the number of rural ox-carts etc.

47) Part of the reason for the expansion has been the ECHO policy of only funding activities in newly accessi- ble areas. While this has the excellent result of encouraging NGOs to service the worst affected communities it also increases the overhead costs of the NGOs through having to operate over longer distances.

62 5. Efficiency

Trying to introduce a more commercial approach in Angola would face a lot of prob- lems, as Angola’s business environment is very far from being friendly to the small enter- prise. Excessive bureaucracy, lack of capacity, and corruption, all make Angola a difficult place for both Angolans and NGOs to do business. However, there is still room for alternative to the straight handout48.

The lack of access to markets, either to buy inputs or to sell surpluses, is one of the greatest constraints on rural development. Without such access, small holders cannot build up reserves, or access other food, to carry them through the bad years. In Mozambique, USAID considered that restoring the rural road network in order to ensure access to markets was one of the most effective means of restoring rural liveli- hoods49.

5.4 Conclusions and recommendations

• The lack of data prevents any categorical statement about the efficiency of Danida partners. However, the examples of inefficiency seen were relatively limited. The evaluator therefore formed that view that the operations of Danida’s partners were reasonably efficient.

• The constraints in Angola make it a difficult and expensive environment in which to operate.

• ICRC has a special role in conflict situations, but the structures that enable it to work in such dangerous environments make it an expensive partner in time of peace, despite the high quality of its work.

• While non-food-items have been widely issued, there are still many families without adequate non-food-items. However, free distribution is probably not an appropriate response.

• Many of the non-food-items distributed were of an inappropriately low quality and can be expected to have a short life in rural conditions.

• The role for NGOs in Angola is probably not to supplant the role of government in the provision of permanent schools and other social infrastructure, but to support communities in the construction of community level infrastructure while communi- ties await definitive solutions from the government.

• Danida’s partners and their staff made great efforts to reach the populations most in need.

• The rapid expansion by Danida’s partners, while fully justified in terms of humani- tarian need, could lead to inefficient and shallow operations in the long term.

48) One such alternative is the system used by CARE in Zimbabwe, where inputs are handled by rural busi- ness agents who supply agricultural inputs against vouchers supplied by CARE. This is combined with training for the business agents in such areas as keeping accounts and customer relations. Such a system not only provides the inputs at the convenience of the beneficiary, but also serves to develop the commercial sec- tor. 49) The improvement of rural roads is one of the planks in USAID’s agricultural rehabilitation in Angola.

63 5. Efficiency

• Agencies in Angola have tended to stick too much to established ways of working and there has been too little use of alternative approaches to achieve the same ends.

• Access to markets is one of the keys to ensuring that rural smallholders move away form cycles of dependency.

Recommendations to Danida

• Danida should phase out its support for ICRC operations in Angola other than ICRC’s core protection mandate.

• Danida should continue to support ICRC’s work in situations of conflict where its special mandate gives it a comparative advantage over other partners.

Recommendations to Danida partners

• Danida partners should use internationally accepted standard specifications for the purchase of relief items.

• Danida partners should concentrate on supporting communities’ own efforts to provide social infrastructure for themselves rather than building permanent infra- structure with little or no community involvement.

• Danida partners should plan strategically to limit their operations to a few limited geographical areas where the partners can do in-depth work to establish models for rehabilitation that they can advocate for adoption by the government.

Recommendations for the humanitarian community

• The humanitarian community should adopt the policy that the provision of perma- nent good quality infrastructure is the responsibility of the Angolan Government. The humanitarian community in areas of resettlement should focus on supporting community initiatives associated with a more basic level of social infrastructure.

• The humanitarian community should consider whether enough of an effort is being made to provide market access as this may be one of the most efficient ways of increasing rural incomes.

64 6. Impact

6. Impact

“In assessing impacts, the point of reference is the status of affected parties prior to aid interventions. The question to ask is: Which effects - whether positive or negative, expected or unforeseen - have come about as a result of the aid activities? These may be economic, social, political, technical or environmental effects - locally, regionally, or at the national level. We are now also concerned with effects for other affected par- ties than the target group, directly or indirectly, for men and women, ethnic groups, etc.” 50

6.1 Measuring impact

Unfortunately, there is no base-line data in Angola to measure the impact of the Danida funded interventions. However, based on the interviews, documents studied, and field visits, it is possible to state unequivocally that:

• The work of Danida funded partners has reduced suffering and has prevented pre- mature death among the displaced in Angola. • The work of Danida funded partners is currently reducing suffering among those returning to their areas of origin.

6.2 Positive impacts

During the site visits, the evaluator found many examples of the positive impact of the work of Danida partners. Some of those interviewed had suc- cessfully used the Red Cross Message system to con- tact family members after long periods of separation. Others benefited from non-food-items distributed by Danida partners, or attended schools or health posts assisted by Danida partners.

Many local officials were full of praise for the work that Danida partners like LWF and DRC had done during the war years. This was not just empty praise as these officials also had criticisms of current pro- grammes. However the most common criticism from local officials was that the programmes of Danida partners were not extensive enough. This is surely a ringing endorsement for those agencies. The impact of seed distribution seems uncertain. Some sources indicated that despite widespread distribution of imported varieties, local varieties formed the bulk of the crop, before the surplus was placed in elevated stores like these. Tools were widely regarded as useful.

50) Danida (1999)

65 6. Impact

6.3 Negative impacts

One negative impact that could be seen in some communities was the vice of dependen- cy. Some communities were so used to having services provided to them without cost that they were unwilling to contribute to projects for their own benefit. Only a very few examples of this were seen, with most communities working hard to improve their own situation.

“Aid harvesting” was another negative impact, where interviewees blatantly lied about the assistance they had received in the hope of receiving more.

Another negative impact alleged was that NGO interventions led to an increase in cor- ruption. A number of instances were cited by interviewees in which it was alleged that NGOs had carried out work which had been in Government plans, leading to govern- ment officials pocketing the official funds provided. Other interviewees alleged that the presence of NGOs allowed the government to ignore their responsibilities to their own people.

In many countries, NGOs are seen as having a negative impact in that they compete with Government for the best staff. In Angola it is the oil sector that is accused of taking the best qualified staff.

Positive impacts of the assistance seen far outweighed the negative impacts.

6.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

• The work of Danida funded partners has reduced suffering and has prevented premature death among the displaced in Angola.

• The work of Danida funded partners is currently reducing suffering among those returning to their areas of origin.

• While some negative impacts were seen, the positive impacts of Danida funding activities far outweighed the negative impacts.

Recommendations to Danida partners

• Danida partners should consider the limits of their own capacity and avoid over- extending themselves in response to requests for assistance.

Recommendations for the humanitarian community

• The humanitarian community should seek to have NGO infrastructure projects integrated into national plans in a transparent way so that there are no opportunities for corruption.

66 7. Connectedness or Sustainability

7. Connectedness or Sustainability

“Connectedness is the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.” 51

7.1 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development

Linking, Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development (LRRD) is the European Community’s term for the relief to development continuum.

The way in which different partners operate has a large impact on how easy it is to link their short term activities into longer term initiatives. Danida has probably been lucky in that its partners have generally had a good awareness of the general context and have considered the longer term impact of what they are doing. There are two basic approaches to link relief to longer term development needs. Both can be seen in differ- ent Danida partners.

The development agency approach

Of Danida’s NGO partners in Angola, two, the DRC and LWF both take a develop- mental approach to their relief work. This ensures that relief actions are implemented with the overall context in view.

One example is DRC’s horticultural project. This was originally intended to meet short term micronutrient needs while providing an income for displaced communities. LWF’s planting of trees on the IDP camps was an excellent initiative that will lessen the envi- ronmental impact of the presence of the IDPs.

The planned handover approach

Another Danida partner, ICRC, has taken a different approach. Unlike LWF and DRC, ICRC is not a development agency. It is very much an emergency response actor. ICRC, being very professional in all that it does, knows that some of the projects it has been supporting need to continue after it leaves. To this end ICRC has prepared a very careful handover plan, with a staged handover to local structures.

7.2 Social case: a forgotten caseload

With the return of the majority of those displaced to their areas of origin, many of those remaining in the former IDP camps and settlements are “social cases”. These are people who through their social circumstances are particularly vulnerable. Typical of these cases are female headed households, the elderly without surviving children, and the disabled.

Now that the focus of assistance has moved from IDP camps to the areas of origin these

51) OECD/DAC (1999)

67 7. Connectedness or Sustainability

vulnerable cases may be cast adrift. Many would be interested in going to their areas of origin if they were supported to do so. Such support might need to include:

• Transport • Assistance with house construction • Assistance with integration into the community

The restarting of livelihoods is placing large demands on every family’s resources, so there is re- latively little left to support social cases outside the immediate family. This assistance could range from social mobilisation to providing such cases with the means of earning a living.

Other vulnerable cases might prefer to remain in the cities, where they need to be integrated into the social support mechanisms.

7.3 A model for meeting the minimum conditions

It is clear that the majority of IDPs are returning to Adelina is at least 60. She was luckier than others in that one of her adult children sur- locations where the minimum conditions are not in vived the UNITA attack in which her other place. Neither is there much likelihood that the gov- children were killed. Return is not an option ernment will in the short term be able to provide for her without support, either from her sur- viving child or others. them with these conditions.

The only way in which communities can hope to achieve the minimum conditions for return is if they themselves provide them. Communities will need support to achieve this as the return places very large demands on families already.

7.4 Is rehabilitation humanitarian assistance?

Once relief stops, is the rehabilitation work that follows still humanitarian assistance? The short answer is yes, because rehabilitation can be very stressful for individuals, fami- lies, and communities, and unless they are assisted they can return very quickly to the situation where they need relief assistance.

Families returning to their areas of origin not only have to build their own houses, but also have to clear land, and plant crops, all the while maintaining their families, either through travelling to distribution sites or work or trading.

Even building a simple one- or two-room house is a fairly major investment. It takes many weeks to build an adobe house, and thatched roofs require regular maintenance. A typical mud house may require anything from two to four weeks of maintenance work per year to keep it in good order52.

52) This is why the one item that all of the returnees ask for is corrugated roofing sheets for their houses. Apparently this was the norm before the war.

68 7. Connectedness or Sustainability

All of this places very large loads on the families. A single piece of bad luck or period of illness may create long term problems. Families who are returning to their areas of origin may have little social capital for coping mechanisms52, and are in the words of the WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Monitoring unit “potentially vulnerable”. However, the evalu- ator would apply this term to a far wider segment of the population than WFP does.

Given the slow pace at which reconstruction is underway in Angola, humanitarian assis- tance will probably be needed for at least another three years before returnee communi- ties (and their associated vulnerable cases) are economically secure to a reasonable extent.

7.5 Conclusions and recommendations

• Danida’s partners are linking relief to development relatively effectively.

• The “social cases” that are unable to return unaided to their areas of origin are a forgotten caseload that should be targeted by the humanitarian community.

• The only way in which the majority of communities can hope to achieve the minimum conditions for return is through their own effort. They will need assis- tance to do this.

• Even though the acute relief phase is largely over in Angola, there is a continuing need for humanitarian assistance to bring people to the level where they have suffi- cient social capital to be no longer “potentially vulnerable”.

• Humanitarian assistance will probably be needed for another three years.

Recommendations to Danida

• Danida should consider that humanitarian assistance will probably be needed for another three years in Angola.

Recommendations to Danida partners

• Danida partners should develop models for supporting communities that will enable them to achieve the minimum conditions for return largely through their own efforts.

• Danida partners should investigate the condition of those IDPs who have not returned to determine what proportion want to return and what assistance they would need to do so.

Recommendations for the humanitarian community

• The humanitarian community should target those IDPs who have stayed at the old IDP sites, and where feasible, assist them to return to their areas of origin.

53) Aid workers often talk blithely about coping mechanisms without realising that such “coping mechanisms” may have long term costs that blight a family for years.

69

8. Lessons for learning

8. Lessons for learning

This chapter seeks to identify lessons from the experience in Angola that could be applied elsewhere.

Aid allocation based on class can lead to injustice

Here class refers to the class or category into which people fall rather than social class. Some of the IDPs the evaluator met in Angola were in great need. Others were not, having employment or saleable skills for which there was a ready demand. Even after two years, some IDPs were not self sufficient, and cutting all aid off for IDPs created severe hardship for them.

Similarly, in Moxico, refugees and IDPs were returning to the same site. The refugees, through UNHCR, received a lot more assistance than the IDPs did. Humanitarian assis- tance should be assigned on the basis of need.

Return may only be possible with assistance

Even when peace comes, not all IDPs are able to make their own way back to their places of origin without external assistance. Many families adopt an incremental approach to return with one or two family members checking on the situation in the area of return and starting to clear land or build a shelter there. This allows families to reduce the risk involved in return.

Return appears to be particularly difficult for single parent families54. This is partly because such families are usually poorer, but also because they have only one adult member. The elderly without grown children have similar problems.

Good laws are ineffective without appropriate control mechanisms and resources

While Angola has excellent legislation for IDPs, these laws are not very effective without appropriate control mechanisms to ensure compliance. The promotion of legal protec- tion for IDPs and minimum standards for return must be accompanied by systems to monitor compliance.

High standards can only be met where sufficient resources to meet them are available. It is useful to identify priorities for the use of the available resources in attempting to meet minimum standards.

54) For cultural reasons, male-headed single-parent families are rare.

71 8. Lessons for learning

NGO support should be for Communities and not governments

NGOs have relatively limited resources. Where Governments have set high standards for social infrastructure, NGOs must ask whether it is more appropriate to provide a lower standard service to a larger number of people or a higher standard service to a smaller number.

It is more appropriate for NGOs to support community efforts to meet their own needs than to supplant the role of government by providing services to high standards that significantly limit the number served.

Assistance that focus on just one part of a system may be ineffective

Two of the Danida-funded NGOs in Angola were building schools. While building schools is laudable in itself, it is not enough to ensure education. Danish Refugee Council had a more comprehensive programme, involving the training of teachers, before this aspect was taken over by Red Barnet55. However, education support also requires improvements in the curriculum etc.

In other areas, supplying seeds on its own will no lead to sustained improvements in the lives of small-holders unless there is also a market for the small farmer to sell her or his surplus to. Water projects may be limited by the lack of functioning district pump repair teams. While one agency may not deal with all the principal aspects of a sector, it may help to achieve an impact in the sector by coordinating its impact with other agencies.

Changed contexts bring changed needs

Once the war ended in Angola the needs of the population changed radically. The changes depended on the situation of the displaced. Assistance to return replaced access to land as a key priority. Danida’s partners responded to these changes, but some legacy projects continued.

For Danida, the present evaluation was somewhat late to fully capture what had hap- pened before the peace. The changed context meant that it was difficult to judge how appropriate assistance programmes were prior to the ceasefire.

Similar situations offer occasions for learning

It is sometimes argued that aid programmes, instead of being organised on a geographi- cal basis, should be organised on a thematic base, with the type of change a country is undergoing providing the theme. Such an organisation facilitates learning between coun- tries in similar situations.

55) Red Barnet is a Danish Refugee Council member. At the time, Danish Refugee Council members were free to take over components of the Council’s programme if they wished.

72 8. Lessons for learning

While there are distinct differences between the post war situation in Angola and that of Mozambique a decade earlier, there are also parallels. There are a lot of opportunities for learning from the experience of Mozambique. Agricultural recovery is one area where there may be major lessons for learning. Other post war transition programme may offer other lessons for Angola.

Lack of beneficiary consultation can lead to inefficient use of resources

The lack of beneficiary consultation can lead to wasted money. In Angola the failure to consult beneficiaries about the contents of non-food-items led to inappropriate items like sleeping mats being included.

If LWF had conducted focus group research among beneficiaries it could have identified an appropriate specification for the blankets and pots it was buying56. It is unfortunately very common to find that there is little consultation with beneficiaries at the design stage of projects.

Beneficiary consultation can be expected to increase in Angola as agencies move to more developmental programmes. Beneficiary participation and consultation is normally much stronger in development programmes than in relief programmes.

The demobilised should be given priority

The demobilised have largely been given priority in Angola. This is partly because of the risk that large groups of former rebels living together may become the nucleus of further armed opposition to the government. There is also the risk that former fighters may have hidden arms and turn to armed robbery to survive.

It is the armed robbery risk that makes it wholly appropriate to give priority to the demobilised, because of the risk that they post to rest of society. While in Angola this group had the greatest humanitarian needs this is not always the case. However, even where others may be in a worse humanitarian situation, the needs of the demobilised still need to be prioritised to avoid the risk that they would otherwise become bandits.

Using standard specifications lessens risks

Several non-food items seen were of poor quality. If agencies had used standard specifi- cations such as those published by UNHCR, this issue would not have arisen. Not using standard specifications puts the agency to the cost of developing its own, or of relying on the supplier to put their profit second to the good of the buyer.

Using standard specifications helps to ensure that those with similar needs receive simi- lar assistance and enables staff to check quality.

56) It is not suggested here that beneficiaries could specify the items in objective terms, but they could specify it in subjective terms such as “long life” or “resistant to water” that could later be translated into objective requirements.

73 8. Lessons for learning

Market access is key to rural recovery

The case of Angola again demonstrates the importance of markets for recovery. The IDPs met who were doing best in their areas of return were those who took fish to the market on their bicycles. The bicycles gave them access to markets for fishing or for trading fish and this gave them what was, in rural terms, a fairly good income.

While bicycles are fine for transporting relatively high value items like dried fish over long distances, they are less useful for transport lower-values crops maize over the same distances. Small holders need access to markets to encourage them to try to produce a surplus. Surpluses not only allow small-holders to buy assets to get over the bad year, but planting larger areas can help them survive years in which yields are low.

Needs extend beyond return

It was very clear that re-establishing themselves in their areas of origin would take those returning many years. Some in the first year of return had planted no crops, but lived exclusively from paid labouring. In the longer term they planned to grow crops, but clearing land had to compete with the time taken to build shelter as well as the time for other coping mechanisms.

There was a tendency among some officials interviewed to regard those who had returned as no longer needing assistance or only needing assistance for a short period. Given that those returning are not returning to function communities, but to situations where almost the whole community is returning, the period during which they need assistance may be longer than the two harvest for which returnees are normally assisted.

There are real limits on agency capacity

NGO capacity in Angola was never sufficient to cover all the needs. NGOs also had problems responding to what was a sort of reverse humanitarian emergency where the rates of return per month exceed the worst rates of influx during the war.

NGOs need to be more aware of their limits and of the need to look for mechanisms where the NGO input leverages assistance for a wider group than the NGO can reach.

Change happens faster than agencies can respond

The situation in Angola changed very rapidly and unexpectedly. Some returnees were already in their places of origin when the first assessments of the possibilities of return were made. Agencies need to preserve their flexibility to respond to these changes.

74 8. Lessons for learning

Service supply should be on the basis of need

One very clear lesson is that IDPs should not receive assistance because they are mem- bers of a particular group, but because of their need for such assistance57. While it is often useful to use membership of a particular group as a proxy for vulnerability, it is not membership of the group, but membership of a group or category that is vulnerable that confers the right to assistance. IDPs receiving assistance should do so because their subgroup of IDPs needs such assistance and not just because they are IDPs.

Usefulness of provincial coordination model

In many countries UN coordination is confined to the capital. In Angola OCHA set up a network of provincial coordinators that played a very useful role in the overall response. Establishing provincial coordinators in this way was particularly appropriate in Angola given the very different situations found in the different provinces.

Need for rapid response funding

The OCHA Managed Emergency Response Fund allowed a wide range of humanitarian agencies to respond to a rapidly changing situation. Normally only agencies with exten- sive un-earmarked funding have this facility.

Protection needs of IDPs similar to the general population

Protection of civil rights was less of an issue than expected from the initial desk study. While there are still gross abuses of civil rights in Angola, arbitrary rule by local officials, and a pervasive environment of impunity, most IDPs did not face harsh oppression, but only the same level of petty harassment that all poorer Angolans face.

One group that did face protection problems, and continues to do so, are the UNITA ex-combatants. However, in some cases, the threat came not from the authorities but from the general population. This is probably a result of the unparalleled viciousness of the final years of the war.

57) Principle 2 of the Code of Conduct (SCHR, 1994) makes clear that assistance should be provided on the basis of need alone.

75

9. Critical issues

9. Critical issues

This chapter seeks to identify critical issues from the situation of IDPs in Angola that need further study.

9.1 When does displacement end?

One issue in Angola was the way in which IDPs were “declassified” and turned into settled IDPs who no longer needed assistance. This had led to the ridiculous situation where nearly 2.5 million IDPs have returned out of a “confirmed” IDP population of less than 1.5 million.

Declassification appears to happen for administrative reasons because some have difficul- ty with the idea of unassisted IDPs. There are many millions of refugees in the world who receive little material assistance, but are still regarded as refugees58. There is a need for a clear statement that IDPs remain displaced unless they opt never to return.

There is a broader problem here about when displacement ends. As noted in When does IDP status end? in Chapter 2, three broad criteria have been suggested for determining this.

• Cause-based criteria (e.g. the war is over so people can return). • Solution based criteria, (e.g. the population have been resettled in conditions that will allow them to become self sufficient.) • Need-based criteria (e.g. the displaced population have no special protection needs and are no worse off then the non-displaced population.)

Many of the confusions occur because of the confusion between the status and of the needs that flow from them. There has to be a distinction between:

• People who have been forcibly displaced. • The forcibly displaced who have protection needs in excess of those of the resident population. • The forcibly displaced who have material assistance needs in excess of those of the resident population.

Clearly people cannot be regarded as no longer being IDPs simply because they are in no worse a situation than the resident population. However, in this case, they have no special right to maintenance assistance from the international community beyond that to which the resident community is entitled.

However, they do have a right to assistance to return to their areas of origin when it is possible to do so safely and to rebuild their lives.

58) The Afghan refugees in Pakistan were a clear example of this.

77 9. Critical issues

9.2 Lack of beneficiary consultation

Despite general adhesion to the Sphere Standards (Sphere Project, 2000) and to the Code of Conduct (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, 1994)59, there was relatively little beneficiary consultation.

Beneficiary consultation is difficult in acute emergencies, but in the circumstances of Angola, where the emergency was chronic rather than acute, one would expect a lot more beneficiary consultation. This problem is not confined to Angola, but is a far wider phenomenon. Evaluations of humanitarian assistance have repeatedly found that beneficiary consultation was limited or inadequate.

The second aspect of beneficiary consultation was the general lack of formal efforts to get feedback from beneficiaries about the assistance they were receiving. Getting feed- back from beneficiaries can lead to improved project quality. Research is needed on the reasons why agencies do not actively seek to consult with beneficiaries on project design, or seek beneficiary opinions on the assistance provided.

9.3 Continuing difference in service levels to IDPs and refugees

The situation in Angola makes it clear that it is still better to be a refugee than an IDP in terms of assistance from the humanitarian community.

Although it has taken UNHCR some time to get organised, returning refugees enjoy the following advantages over returning IDPs:

• They get transported to their area of origin. • They receive non-food-items on arrival. • They get food rations to assist them to get re-established. • UNHCR facilitates their civil registration. • They have access to medical services. • Their return is registered and monitored. • UNHCR checks that they will find the minimum conditions and contracts partners to create them where they are lacking. • The overall picture is one where the international community leaves IDPs to their own devices, but looks after refugees.60

Part of this difference flows from the legal position of refugees in international law. IDPs enjoy no such special position. Despite the excellent work by OCHA in Angola, it is clear that the international institutional arrangements for IDPs are not yet adequate to ensure that there is a coordinated approach by humanitarian agencies.

Angola was unusual in that there was a specific UNHCR project to provide assistance to

59) The Sphere handbook and the Code of Conduct are regarded as key standards for the quality of NGO operations. Both flowed from agency perception of the response to humanitarian crises in the early 90’s as being of low quality, and particularly in response to dissatisfaction with the behaviour of some humani- tarian actors in the Rwandan Emergency in 1994. 60) Admittedly, the estimated 130,000 spontaneously returning refugees have also been left largely to their own devices.

78 9. Critical issues

IDPs. However, it was clear that this project was not popular within UNHCR apparent- ly because it was seen as detracting from UNHCR’s core mandate of providing protec- tion for refugees.

Many of UNHCR’s staff are lawyers. There is a well established body of refugee law but relatively little IDP law. It is only natural that UNHCR, with so many lawyers on its staff should have relatively little interest in the situation of IDPs, whose humanitarian situation is the same as that of refugees, but whose legal situation is completely different.

Extending UNHCR’s mandate to cover IDPs has a number of attractions:

• UNHCR has practical experience of dealing with many of the practical problems faced by IDPs including the need for protection. • The number of refugees continues to decline worldwide. • Assisting IDPs in one country may reduce the chances of becoming refugees.

It should be noted that several interviewees saw protection as being the most successful aspect of UNHCR’s work with IDPs. One initiative of UNHCR’s that was successful was providing title documents for the houses provided to the IDPs61.

9.4 Assistance to IDPs displaced with combatants

One further issue highlighted in Angola is the treatment of those displaced with UNITA combatants. Here a parallel with the case of refugees is useful. The families of combat- ants who cross a border are entitled to refugee protection. Combatants, once disarmed are also generally accorded refugee status.

Internally displaced families of combatants are in a different situation. If the war has not ended they are regarded as a security risk and may receive special attention from the authorities. There are serious protection issues here. Even after the war has ended, such persons may be viewed as a security risk.

9.5 Protection is a broad mandate

A further factor is that many of the UNITA combatants and their families were with UNITA not out of choice, but because they were pressed into service. Clearly the inter- national community was not effective in protecting communities from the activities of UNITA. Protection concerns often focused on what the Government was doing62. There is a need for protection to be broader and to examine also what all actors in a conflict are doing.

61) A further innovative feature of this project was that UNHCR gave title documents to both the male and female head of household. 62) This is essentially because all of the NGOs were operating in the Government controlled areas, so rights abuses by the government were the most prevalent

79 9. Critical issues

9.6 Shelter, land rights and livelihoods

While displaced in Angola, land rights and livelihoods were one of the continuing prob- lems. Shelter issues tended to be resolved by the displaced themselves, often with agency assistance.

There were two major land rights issues:

• Rights to the house plot. • Rights to land for production. • The second of these is closely tied to the issue of livelihood for the majority of the displaced in Angola.

The House Plot

While some of the displaced enjoyed the use of a house plot, they rarely had any legal title to the plot used. The one exception seems to have been the UNHCR funded hous- ing for IDPs in Uige, where IDPs were provided with title documents.

In Enama Camp in Luena, the displaced were allocated house plots on land belonging to the Department of Agriculture. It appeared to be the intention to let some of the dis- placed remain on the plots that they occupied, but others were told that they should only build wattle and daub houses instead of more permanent adobe block houses. In Mavinga, 10,000 persons, most, if not all of whom were displaced, were moved from their homes to make way for the compound for a diamond mining company.

The house on the left is a wattle and daub house waiting for plastering with mud. The one on the right is an adobe block house under construction.

Providing IDPs with title to the houses they occupy while displaced can aid the process of return as the right to the house is something that can be sold to finance return to the area of origin. This is exactly what happened with some of the UNHCR funded houses in Uige. When returning, the occupants sold their houses to persons from the host com- munity.

Selling houses was also a means of financing return for those leaving IDP camps, but the large ratio of sellers to buyers reduced the prices available.

80 9. Critical issues

Land for production

Land for production was a very large issue in Angola. During much of the war, IDPs were confined to a security cordon around the cities. This limited the land available for production. Danida funded agencies reacted to this by promoting intensive agriculture in the limited land available63.

Interviewees reported that there were disputes over land between the displaced and the host communities and that this sometimes led to conflict. Agencies reported that it was sometimes a major struggle to get permission for IDPs to cultivate land, as some provin- cial officials feared that to do so would lead to permanent settlement.

Since the ceasefire a different issue has arisen. Now the food security of resettled IDPs is threatened by commercial interest in the land around the cities. In Negage fertile state land that had been used by IDPs has now been forbidden to them as it has been “priva- tised” by powerful individuals.

9.7 When does the need for assistance end?

At what stage can the international community regard returned IDPs as no longer need- ing assistance? In many contexts, two harvests are regarded as a sufficient time span for assistance to those recovering form some crisis. However, this may not be appropriate in Angola because of:

• The staggered nature of the return. Those with the resources to do so have returned first. Those with fewer resources will only be able to move when the areas of return are developed enough to provide livelihood opportunities for them. • The sites being returned to are in effect, green-field sites, with no infrastructure. • The whole community returning at once, with limited chance for those returning to benefit from resources held by those already in place.

The test for return should not be one of time, but one of need. One could argue that assistance is no longer needed when:

• All who wish to return have been able to do so. • The minimum conditions for return have been fully met. • Returnee communities are no worse off, in terms of resources and reserves, than non-returnee communities.

63) Danish Refugee Council promoted horticulture. The ICRC promoted composting as a way of improving yields from the small areas available.

81

10. Conclusion

10. Conclusion

This chapter summarises what the evaluator learned about the agencies in response to the format of the fourteen questions put in the Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs 64. As this framework was not available in its final form at the time of the fieldwork, the evaluation did not specifically ask these questions. This limits the depth of some of the comments made, and prevents the evaluator for being able to comment on some of them.

The situation of IDPs in Angola has been a complex one. It still remains complex today because the end of the war, while permitting people to return to their areas of origin, has not automatically provided them with the means to do so.

Danida funded agencies have been effective players in delivering assistance to IDPs and to supporting those returning to their areas of origin. Their activities have been concen- trated on practical assistance rather than on advocacy within Angola. Danida funding has not only directly funded activities, but the contribution to agency core costs has allowed agencies to execute projects with funding from other sources, such as ECHO, which does not cover all core costs. This is particularly the case with those agencies which had the narrowest funding base of the three agencies.

Of the three agencies receiving the bulk of Danida funding, only ICRC places a large emphasis on advocacy in-country. However, ICRC’s advocacy is private rather than pub- lic. The other two agencies engage in advocacy with their constituencies and with the Danish government.

The Danida funded agencies worked very effectively with local authorities. Those local officials met by the evaluator were typically full of praise for Danida’s partners. Danida’s partners worked with the UN and other agencies to provide assistance to IDPs. However cooperation was constrained by the limited number of operational NGOs in the provinces where DRC and LWF were working. ICRC’s careful insistence on neutrality, and on the confidentiality of potentially sensitive information, can also limit coopera- tion.

While OCHA played a leading role in coordination in Angola, it failed to present an accurate picture of the number of IDPs in the country. Numbers of IDPs were under- stated because of OCHA did not include those who had been displaced for more than two years in the number of confirmed displaced.

The evaluator found all of the Danida partners open to discussion about best practice and how their operations might be improved. However, the effective isolation of key staff of the LWF in Uige, Luena, and Lunda Sul limits their ability to engage in dialogue on best practice with other agencies.

All of the Danida partners advocated for the UN Guiding Principle on Internal

64) Buchanan Smith M, Rudge P, and Telford J (2003) Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs, Danida, Copenhagen. (Appendix 2, p. 89.)

83 10. Conclusion

Displacement. ICRC especially has been active in raising the situation of IDPs in inter- national fora under its more general mandate for the protection of civilians affected by conflict under the four Geneva Conventions and their two protocols.

The majority of the beneficiaries of the Danida funded agencies were IDPs. LWF has initiated transition programmes to longer term development and ICRC has begun to hand the continuing parts of its programme to local institutions.

The evaluator is not able to offer any comment on the accuracy or otherwise of the con- flict analysis of the Danida funded agencies, or about the global pattern of the agencies’ funding from the displaced.

Angola has a relatively limited number of effective local NGOs. The evaluator found that, even bearing this in mind, the Danida funded agencies made relatively little use of local NGO partners. All of the three Danida funded partners have favoured direct implementation rather than working with implementing partners.

Little evidence of gender or generational analysis was seen. There were gender and gen- eration-aware components of the programmes seen, but overall the evaluator considered that there was insufficient focus on these dimensions.

All of the Danida agencies worked with local communities and, to varying degrees, with local resources. The evaluator found that there was relatively little emphasis on consulta- tion with beneficiary communities. Neither were there formal systems to monitor pro- gramme quality through feedback from beneficiaries.

The evaluator cannot say whether the agencies had the institutional memory to integrate lessons learned into the planning of future responses. There is a difference here between ICRC and the other two partners. ICRC places a lot of emphasis on its institutional memory through its Planning For Results and takes a formalised approach to having a set policy by using a narrative section in their annual reporting. Such a formal approach is appropriate for ICRC, given its special mandate. The other two Danida partners have a less formal approach.

There seemed to be relatively little lesson learning or evaluation activity carried out by the Danida funded agencies. There were external evaluations by donors, such as regular ECHO evaluations, but evaluations carried out by agencies themselves appear to be more likely to contribute to learning within the organisation65. The evaluator noted that few agencies in Angola seemed to be drawing on lessons from earlier transitions such as the post-conflict transition in Mozambique, and concluded that a lack of focus on past lessons means that it is unlikely that there is a systematic effort to capture lessons for current operations for future use.

Despite the flaws described above, the evaluator was impressed with the work done by Danida’s partners in the very difficult environment in Angola. The three principal part- ners were well-regarded in Angola, and are regarded as being among the better perform- ers in the humanitarian community there.

65) This lesson is drawn from the evaluators own experience. The reason may be because an agency’s own eval- uations concentrate on areas of concern to the agency, but it may also be because management, having paid for an evaluation are more likely to pay attention to its recommendations than to an external donor evaluation.

84 Appendices

Appendices

1 Terms of Reference

2 Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs

3 Bibliography

4 Persons met

5 Consultant’s itinerary

6 Chronology

7 Initial brief desk study

8 Detailed technical comments

9 The legal instruments: The norms

10 The legal instruments: The regulations

11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards

85 Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Internally Displaced People in Humanitarian Assistance in Angola Danida component in cooperation with ECHO, 2003.

Background

Danida seeks to undertake a thematic evaluation of humanitarian assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) towards the end of 2003, in coordination with SIDA and the European Commission. A first joint exercise is foreseen for the month of June, taking advantage of the ECHO evaluation of the Global Humanitarian Plan for the country, which has a particular focus on IDPs. This exercise flows from the desire expressed at the HAC meeting in Copenhagen in October 2003 for more cooperative evaluations between donors. It is foreseen that more major donors will become involved in this thematic review later in 2003.

Danida’s participation in the evaluation will come in the form of providing a consultant who will supplement the work of the ECHO evaluation team. This will be an external consultant with suitable qualifications concerning the country, NGO policy, IDPs, and evaluations of humanitarian aid.

Scope of Work

The terms of reference of this individual are as follows

The consultant will complement the existing tasks in the ECHO commissioned team. He will do so by researching the broader issues of the situation of IDPs in Angola in such a as way as to contribute to the general objectives of the ECHO evaluation: “to obtain the necessary information (1) to allow ECHO to concentrate its efforts and improve its results in emergency assistance in Angola and (2), to review ECHO’s policy of addressing humanitarian needs of affected populations regardless of preconceived categories of IDPs, hidden IDPs, refugees, returnees, local returnees and local population”.

At the same time the consultant will link the issues raised in the ECHO evaluation to the broader concerns of the IDP thematic review as formulated by Danida through the production of an evaluation report that links the issues raised by the Echo evaluation team with the broader review of the IDP theme.

The consultant will review projects targeting (explicitly or implicitly) IDPs and funded by Danida and evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and connected- ness/sustainability. The consultant will also deter the complementarity of these with projects funded by other donors including ECHO to meet the needs of the internally displaced. The ECHO evaluation will cover the period 2001-2003, but the consultant will cover actions by Danida in the period 1999 to 2003.

The consultant will review the institutional framework in Angola for the provision of assistance to the internally displaced, and in particular whether duplication and gaps are avoided in the actions of different actors. The consultant will specifically review the cur- rent policy frameworks as they relate to IDPs, in particular OCHA, UNDP and ICRC.

86 Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

The consultant will provide conclusions and recommendations concerning these two levels of analysis (inter-agency planning and Danish projects) as they relate to (1) the trends in internal displacement in Angola (priority areas, forecasts), (2) the reduction of vulnerability, and (3) building up the responsiveness and capacity of the Government to address needs. Clear indications will be given concerning gaps in the assessment of needs, provision of donor resources, or delivery of assistance.

The consultant will contribute notes on the cross cutting issues for the ECHO evalua- tion with an emphasis on the links between relief, rehabilitation and development, the needs of IDPs, and gender issues.

Outputs

The consultant will provide the following outputs:

1. An initial short desk study report highlighting the issue of IDPs in Angola.

2. Interview notes and drafts for the consideration of the ECHO evaluation team leader on the projects reviewed by the consultant so as to contribute towards the overall ECHO evaluation. In particular the consultant will contribute towards the examination of the following cross cutting themes for the evaluation:

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD);

IDPs needs;

Gender;

3. An evaluation report which:

Reviews the institutional framework for dealing with IDPs in Angola including the mechanisms for guaranteeing minimum conditions for return.

Evaluates the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, connectedness/ sustainability and complementarity of the interventions funded by Danida, ECHO and other donors reviewed by the consultant, and make any specific recommendations that follow from this review.

Identifies lessons for learning from the experience of IDPs in Angola.

Identifies critical issues for investigation in further reviews of assistance to IDPs as part of the overall thematic review.

Methodology

The consultant will carry out the evaluation through:

Research into the background documents, including the document sets provided by Danida and the ECHO evaluation unit.

87 Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

Interviews with Government Departments, UN agencies, Donors, the Red Cross Movement and leading NGOs involved in the provision of assistance to IDPs in Angola.

A review of IDP assistance projects on the ground in at least two Provinces in Angola.

Interviews with community leaders, IDP beneficiaries and members of the host community.

The Consultant will operate together with the ECHO evaluation team. He will however be officially presented as the Danida component of the assessment. The Consultant will enjoy the same travel and accommodation arrangements as the ECHO Evaluation Team when travelling with them, and have access to/share information collected as a result of the evaluation process.

The Consultant will share interview notes and initial findings with the ECHO Evaluation Team and will highlight issues relevant to the ECHO Evaluation that he comes across. The consultant will supply an initial draft of his report to Danida, as well as to ECHO, and the ECHO evaluation team for their comments, if any.

The Consultant will write a free-standing report. This report, or as a minimum its executive summary, will preferably be included as an Annexe to the ECHO Evaluation Report. The findings of the consultant do not however have to be endorsed by the ECHO Evaluation Team Leader, and the document will carry the mention that these are the views of the Consultant, and do not reflect those of the ECHO Evaluation Team, nor those of ECHO or Danida, while acknowledging that it was commissioned by Danida.

Timing

The calendar of the Consultant’s work is made to coincide with that of the Evaluation Team. It is the following:

10 June: Initial meeting and presentation in Brussels 11 June to 13 June: Desk study in Brussels 14 June to 19 June: Preparing Desk Study on IDP’s in Angola 20 June: travel Brussels to collect passport etc. 22 June: travel to Angola 20 July: return Luanda to Brussels 31 July: Initial draft report to Danida, Echo, and Echo Evaluation Team for comments Week beginning 15 August: presentation of revised draft report to Danida 31 August: Report finalised as Addendum to the ECHO evaluation.

Danida will facilitate the obtaining of visas, and letter of introduction.

88 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering

Responding to a request by EU’s Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) a group of donors consisting of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and ECHO decided to conduct a number of evaluations of humanitarian assistance with special focus on internally displaced persons (IDPs). The overall plan is to conduct a range of evaluations, some in cooperation and some done individually by each organisation. In order to synthesize the results of these and possibly more evaluations it was agreed to establish a common framework. Danida therefore commis- sioned Margie Buchanan-Smith, Philip Rudge and John Telford to formulate a framework for a common approach in evaluating humanitarian assistance to IDP’s. Their proposal was slightly revised in view of comments received from Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, ECHO, OCHA and UNCHR. As of October 20 the following agencies are participating in this exercise: Danida (Denmark), DGIS (the Netherlands), DCI (Ireland), USAID, ECHO, OCHA and UNHCR.

PURPOSE OF THE PAPER

1. This paper proposes a framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), specifically around the concept of humanitarian protection. The first part of the paper identifies key issues – at both policy and operational levels – that must be highlighted and prioritised in such an evaluation. It draws on current debates and recent contributions to the literature and thinking on humanitarian assistance. The second part of the paper translates this into relevant questions that need to be addressed in order to evaluate the overall impact and effec- tiveness of assistance to IDPs. Such an evaluation will necessarily include the per- spectives of other actors, NGOs, IGOs, and UN bodies. These evaluative questions are organised according to the key criteria used for evaluating humanitarian assis- tance. This is important to ensure consistency of approach, reinforced by a process of dialogue between actors and hence comparability of the findings of the different evaluations that are to be carried out. This paper presumes that the overall objective of this joint exercise is to draw out key, system-wide lessons and thereby greatly improve the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection to IDPs in the future.

INTRODUCTION

2. Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised vio- lence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border (Definition contained in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998 , hereafter the "Guiding

89 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

Principles"). The focus of this paper is principally on persons displaced by conflict rather than on those displaced by natural disasters or that category of persons dis- placed by inappropriate development strategies.

3. The scale of the IDP issue is large and increasing. It is estimated that currently some 25 million persons are displaced by conflict in some 47 countries, over and above the 12 million refugees identified by UNHCR. As a large proportion of these dis- placed people are women, children and the aged, humanitarian responses face major challenges of gender and generation. International interest in the position of IDPs has intensified in the decade since the appointment of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Dr Francis Deng. In many international fora there is a vigor- ous debate about how to improve the international response to situations of internal displacement. Many UN agencies, national and international NGOs, local authori- ties in countries affected by internal displacement and the aid community have man- dates and support activities that relate to internal displacement. The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is now tasked with improving coordination and ensuring that protection needs of the internally displaced are addressed. Recent initiatives have included the creation of a Senior Inter-agency Network on Internal Displace- ment, who recommended the creation of an Internal Displacement Unit within OCHA and reconstituted itself as the advisory body to the Unit. The trend in assis- tance and protection for IDPs is towards the so-called ‘Collaborative Approach’.

4. IDPs are entitled to benefit from the same human rights as anyone else. These rights belong to him/ her by virtue of their humanity, irrespective of the current situation – in this case internal displacement – that they may face. However, the notion of ‘internally displaced person’ is not a legal concept like ‘refugee’. There is, moreover, no one formally designated international body mandated to protect and assist IDPs as UNHCR does for refugees. Both refugees and IDPs share many of the same char- acteristics associated with flight. The critical difference is that one has crossed an international border and the other has not. Beyond the Guiding Principles (some- times known as the ‘Deng Principles’), which explicitly incorporate established norms of national and international humanitarian and human rights law, there is no great pressure for a separate international legal instrument on IDPs. Furthermore donor states differ in the way they approach protecting and assisting IDPs. Some find it helpful to stress the specificities of the IDP situation; others prefer to focus on what are sometimes called ‘integrated approaches to vulnerability’ in general.

5. Given the pressures on humanitarian assistance budgets, a greater global awareness of internal displacement and increased international co-operation, a common frame- work for evaluating assistance to IDPs is not only inherently desirable but also con- sistent with the evolving collaborative approach on the international level. Such a common framework however will need to acknowledge these differing policy approaches while aiming to establish greater consistency and coherence.

HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION: A UNIFYING CONCEPT?

6. One creative way to arrive at a more unified analysis and approach towards IDPs is through the lens of overall humanitarian protection. This approach can both draw on evolving common principles and shared understandings, and contribute to strengthening the international regime at all levels of humanitarian action. The key

90 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

proposition here is that the work of all humanitarian organisations should be viewed as the practical and impartial realisation of people’s rightful legal protection in situations of acute or generalised violence where human rights violations occur.1 It should be noted that not all conflict-induced IDPs are in recognized "humanitarian situations/emer- gencies". A large number of IDPs are in situations which are not overt or well recog- nized conflicts (such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, Nepal etc.). 2 The supply of food, water and shelter are clearly critical factors for the survival of all vulnerable persons, including IDPs. Beyond these essential requirements for basic survival, the notion of protection can apply, for example to livelihood programmes like seeds and tools (economic protection), medical and sanitary action (health protection), educa- tion programmes (child protection), detention monitoring programmes (judicial protection), and the protection of women from rape (personal protection from vio- lence).

7. Taking protections as the starting point, IDPs pose immediate and complex chal- lenges to humanitarian intervention. Under international law it is states that have primary responsibility for the security of all of their citizens, including IDPs. However in many cases the state authorities may be the authors of the displacement, or may not have the political will or capacity and resources to assist and protect the affected population. This sovereign responsibility of all states, particularly its protec- tion element, needs to be viewed in the light of recent thinking on the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’: Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (report of the International Commission on Intervention and State sovereignty). The source of this responsibility lies in evolving states’ practice, the responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and in specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law. (ibid).

This responsibility comprises three elements: i) The responsibility to prevent and mitigate: to address both root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man made crises putting populations at risk; ii) The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution and in extreme cases military intervention; iii) The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

8. In the context of overall agency policy towards a given country where IDP issues arise, prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to pro- tect. Since many humanitarian crises arise and endure in the absence of political solutions to conflict, more commitment and resources should be devoted to preven- tative strategies addressing both the root causes for conflict and prevention of human

1) Slim,H., & Eguren, L.E., ‘Humanitarian Protection: An ALNAP Guidance Booklet’, May 2003 (draft in progress) and comments from OCHA, July 2003. 2) Comments from OCHA, July 2003.

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rights violations, from high level political intervention to local initiatives at reconcili- ation. However, that issue is beyond the principal focus of this paper which is main- ly concerned with the second and third of these elements relating to humanitarian, and, to some extent, development assistance. In the event of conflict, civilians face major violations of their civil, political, social and cultural rights, and their protec- tion from personal violence, impoverishment and the vulnerability caused by conflict and displacement becomes critical. The challenge confronting policy makers, there- fore, is how to orientate their humanitarian assistance to address the protection gap caused by the grave violations of humanitarian law and to ensure that millions of internally displaced persons may realise their full rights as civilians in a conflict.

A useful, and widely accepted model of humanitarian protection is the ‘egg model’ that has developed out of the ICRC-led workshops on protection. It has 3 elements: i) Division of all agency work around violations and protection in 3 spheres of pro- gramming: responsive, remedial, environment building ii) Description of all forms of protective practice in 4 modes: denunciation, persuasion, substitution and support to services iii) Endorsement of the principle of inter agency complementarity as central to all pro- tection planning

KEY ISSUES OF POLICY AND DEFINITION

Threats, risks and needs

9. The identification of the affected IDP group is often difficult. This is very much to do with the changing nature of conflicts and displacements and the objective diffi- culty in many field situations of identifying who are internally displaced persons, and for how long they can be so described. Particularly in situations where internal displacement is a very protracted phenomenon, the issue of when humanitarian assistance ends and development assistance starts comes into sharp focus. Linkages with other structural reasons for conflict in the Post Cold War period have emerged in the last decade and add complexity to the IDP issue. These include conflicts over identity and resources, the suppression of the rights of minorities, poverty, bad gov- ernance, human rights violations, and environmental and infrastructural degrada- tion. All this in the light of the proliferation of internal conflicts where often the ethnic cleansing of whole communities and the wider displacement of civilians is not an accidental consequence but the central objective of the conflict.

10. IDPs are a heterogeneous community of vulnerable people often living among other vulnerable people and sharing many of their needs and aspirations. Given this com- plexity humanitarian agencies have raised the following pros and cons in targeting IDPs as a category worthy of specific attention. The arguments usually go as follows:

Advantages of targeting:

• IDPs will not be forgotten or ignored as a result of their political marginalisation; • There can be more effective advocacy for the needs and rights of IDPs and greater pressure on local and national authorities to assume their rightful responsibilities; • A greater focus on durable solutions for IDPs will emerge;

92 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

• Greater assistance and protection can be rendered especially for highly vulnerable child, women and elderly IDPs.

Disadvantages of targeting:

• Camps of IDPs may grow up, relieving states of their fundamental protection responsibilities and prolonging or cementing the IDP status; • The serious needs of local populations may not receive sufficient attention, thereby producing tensions between displaced people and the host community; • ‘Fake’ IDP camps may act as with a pull effect whereby people self- define them- selves as IDPs to receive assistance they would not otherwise receive.

11. The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and some govern- ments and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) support the view against categorising IDPs as a special case group. Some governments, lawyers and policy thinkers take a more assertive view about the specifics of internal displace- ment. A helpful trend discernible in recent thinking about humanitarian interven- tion is the focus on threats and risks rather than simply need, and an approach that seeks to be more specific about kinds of vulnerability.

The point of compromise for donor, operational agency, host communities and IDPs themselves could be this: that the central concern is not to grant the internally dis- placed a privileged status, but to identify as accurately as possible who and where they are, and then to ensure that their needs are not ignored.

The end of displacement

12. When internal displacement can be described as at an end is a matter of intense cur- rent debate. This is partly because of imprecision about the many possible factors that cause displacement, and partly because of a concern that decisions about contin- uing need are too often arbitrary and ad hoc or based on administrative or political convenience. The heart of the matter is the point at which the focus should shift from assisting and protecting IDPs to a more holistic community-based rehabilita- tion and development approach. It is clearly necessary for the IDPs themselves also to know where they stand.

13. The planning of exit strategies needs to avoid mere resource-based considerations and be based on strategies based on needs, risks and threats. Interventions on behalf of IDPs could usefully include analysis of what happens to those who return to their home or resettle elsewhere in the country. Such an analysis should involve a sophisti- cated understanding of what constitutes ‘return’ and ‘home’, and which activities should be undertaken to prevent reoccurrence of displacement and promote durable solutions.

KEY OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Assessment and analysis

14. Conducting an assessment is the critical first step of any humanitarian intervention. Conventionally, most assessments in humanitarian emergencies focus on a popula-

93 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

tion’s lack of access to basic commodities such as food, water, health services and shelter, and the extent to which this is life threatening. This, in turn, is translated into the need for material relief resources which forms the basis of a humanitarian relief operation launched by international humanitarian agencies. Darcy describes this as a ‘supply-driven response’, which may be exacerbated if the assessment is skewed according to the particular sectoral or specialist expertise of the agency undertaking the assessment3. For instance, food relief needs may be prioritised by a food distribution agency over and above more pressing shelter or water requirements. What is often missing from this kind of assessment is an analysis of a population’s vulnerability to the consequences of violent conflict, and the impact on that popula- tion’s rights. In contrast to the first scenario, an approach which takes the denial of rights as its starting point would translate into an assessment of protection require- ments to save human life and to ensure human security. It would necessitate a much more politically informed analysis than is often the case.

15. This second approach to conducting a humanitarian assessment is much more demanding, but it is also more comprehensive and appropriate to situations of vio- lent conflict, not least to addressing the needs of the displaced. It encourages more in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of vulnerability, at macro and micro levels. Two recent contributions to the literature are helpful in developing such an approach:

(i) Collinson on implementing a political economy approach, which is concerned with changing power relationships in society and the processes associated with conflict and vulnerability4 (ii) Slim and Eguren’s framework (2003) for conducting a ‘violation assessment and responsibility analysis’, which comprises an analysis of power relations, an analysis of the nature of violations, of perpetration and threat, and of responsibility for respond- ing to and stopping violations.

A further challenge is how to categorise different groups of vulnerable people within the population, to guide programme design and targeting. This lies at the heart of whether or not to categorise IDPs as a group distinct from other vulnerable people. Darcy makes the useful suggestion that specific vulnerabilities are distinguished according to ‘numbers at risk of…’.

16. There is a very real danger that a long-term humanitarian crisis amongst a displaced population somehow becomes ‘normalised’. Agencies and governments become de- sensitised to consistently high levels of deprivation and suffering, only reacting to indicators that the situation is worsening. This phenomenon has been well-docu- mented in the case of Sudan, in relation to IDPs in the north of the country, and in relation to IDPs and settled populations in the south of the country. It is clearly in violation of the core humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity.

3) Darcy, J., 2003, ‘Measuring humanitarian need. A critical review of needs assessment practice and its influence on resource allocation. Preliminary findings’, Prepared for Montreux VI: Donor retreat on the CAP and coordination on humanitarian emergencies, London: ODI 4) Collinson, S. (ed), 2003, ‘Power, livelihoods and conflict: case studies in political economy analysis for humanitarian action’, HPG Report 13, London: ODI

94 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

Access

17. A major and recurring challenge in providing humanitarian assistance and protection to many IDP populations is one of access. Warring parties may deliberately deny access to humanitarian agencies as part of their conflict strategy. Where civilians are displaced within a war zone, it may be extremely dangerous for humanitarian agen- cies and aid workers to reach them. Or it may be that displaced populations are sim- ply hidden within the host population. Where access is difficult or denied, protec- tion requirements and need may have to be ‘guestimated’. More seriously, this may prevent the effective and timely delivery of assistance.

Shelter, land rights and livelihoods

18. Almost by definition, shelter is one of the principal relief needs of many IDPs. Yet it is one of the areas of least well-documented best practice in humanitarian opera- tions. Many evaluations report highly variable performance, and there are few NGOs with this kind of sectoral expertise. In the case of IDPs, shelter issues are often close- ly linked to issues to do with access to land. In the short term, it may be politically difficult for IDPs to be allocated space for temporary dwellings. This becomes more acute as the displacement becomes longer-term, if IDPs continue to be denied land rights. Operational agencies may be faced not only with the challenge of implement- ing effective shelter programmes, but also with difficult advocacy issues.

19. Similarly, IDPs may be denied access to an income-generating livelihood. This is often a consequence of being denied access to land, and hence to agricultural oppor- tunities. It may extend to lack of access to trading and other economic opportuni- ties.

Return and rehabilitation

20. As explained above, decisions to end aid flows because the problem of displacement has ‘ended’, are often arbitrary and ad hoc. Although it may be deemed that the humanitarian emergency is over, and therefore the humanitarian aid tap should be switched off, there is frequently a gap before the necessary development assistance is made available to re-establish livelihoods and support rehabilitation. In long-running situations of displacement, donors’ political will may begin to evaporate when the high-profile crisis stage is over. Yet the plight of IDPs persists.

Fundamental requirements of an agency: questions to be addressed by the evaluation

21. There are a number of issues which confront all donors and operational NGOs, IGOs and UN bodies in the overall delivery of their humanitarian assistance and protection programmes which equally apply to their support for IDPs. The following questions should be used as a checklist for all evaluations within the IDP framework in order to make crosscutting analysis much easier. i) Does the agency offer policy leadership nationally and internationally through more informed advocacy of the protection issues raised by internal displacement?

95 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

ii) Does the agency have a focal point to draw together the different humanitarian/development strands within the government departments concerned? iii) Does the agency encourage cooperation and complementarity with other agencies, the UN system and local and international NGOs? Do agencies act as a united group to influence policies and actions in the host country, or is there an unhealthy unilateralism impacting negatively on operational partners? iv) How is information regarding the IDP situation being collected and how do agen- cies agree on the size and scope of an IDP problem? Should there be some form of IDP registration? v) Is the agency committed to the collaborative approach involving dialogue about best practice in terms of policy and operations? vi) Does the agency advocate for the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement nationally and internationally through public policy statements, training of government officials and integration of the Principles into program- ming? Does the agency include the treatment of IDP issues in its critical human rights work in international fora? vii) Does the agency give priority to the issue of IDPs in the ongoing debate about when relief gives way to longer-term development assistance? viii) Does the agency ensure that its programming is informed by accurate conflict analysis, particularly so as to avoid exacerbating conflict by inappropriate humani- tarian assistance to IDPs? ix) Does the agency have an evenhanded approach to funding IDP issues around the world to counteract the Euro centric bias evident in the 1990s? x) Do projects involving local NGO partners aim to build long-term in-country capacity? xi) Does the agency operate rigorous selection of operational partners to ensure they have the capacity, probity, political impartiality and experience to deliver? xii) Does the agency focus sufficiently on the gender and generation dimensions of operations? xiii) Does the agency work with local communities and local resources? xiv) Does the agency have an institutional memory so that lessons and experiences gained are integrated into the planning of further responses?

The following section proposes how these questions should be addressed in the evalua- tion.

FROM THE KEY ISSUES TO THE EVALUATION CRITERIA: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING TERMS OF REFERENCE

Just as every country is different from every other; each IDP phenomenon will have its own special characteristics. Nevertheless, the terms of reference for each individual eval- uation should be developed according to the criteria indicated below. Specific questions that are pertinent to the context and case of IDPs have been identified for each criteri- on. Some of these questions relate directly to the policies and operational programming of the agency concerned. Some relate to the programming and performance of its opera- tional partners (whether INGOs, local NGOs or UN agencies). Where possible, this dis- tinction is indicated. A distinction has also been drawn between a review of donor poli- cy and an evaluation of operations on the ground. This distinction between policy and operations should be carried through to the final evaluation reports.

96 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

1. Relevance

This criterion is concerned with assessing whether programming is in line with local needs and priorities. Specifically, is humanitarian assistance being provided impartially, proportionate to need?

Review of agency policy

This part of the evaluation should establish whether there is a clear commitment to humanitarian principles (in particular the principles of impartiality and humanity) in agency policy on humanitarian assistance.

• Does agency policy refer to and/ or incorporate the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement? • What is agency policy towards IDPs? Are they regarded as a special category, distinct from other vulnerable groups? How are IDPs defined? Is policy towards IDPs implic- it or explicit? Are policies consistent between HQ and missions and between multi- lateral and bilateral donors? • To what extent is agency policy on IDPs generic, and to what extent is it flexible and determined by the specific country/ context? How appropriate and relevant is the approach adopted? For example, if internal displacement is a consequence of the vio- lation of minority rights, to what extent is this addressed by agency policy? • Does the agency have IDP a focal point in HQ that monitors application of policy? How does the agency disseminate policy to make sure country offices are aware and understand? • Is agency policy on IDPs sensitive to gender and generational issues? • How are countries and cases being prioritized by agencies? To what extent is there an impartial allocation of agency resources to IDPs at global level, according to need?

Evaluation of operations

• How are the needs and/ or rights of IDPs defined by a) the agency agency in the country concerned, and b) its operational partners in the country concerned? • To what extent is the vulnerability of IDPs understood as a protection issue where rights are violated through violent conflict and consequent displacement, versus an issue of material deprivation which threatens lives and livelihoods? • What are the implications of this understanding for the assessment and provision of programme assistance? How appropriate is this to the context and needs of IDPs in the country/ region of concern? • How have humanitarian needs assessments been carried out by operational • partners (and, where relevant, by the agency)? • To what extent has the assessment explored the underlying causes of vulnerability and displacement? To what extent is it informed by political analysis, including an analysis of the conflict, of power relations and an analysis of how rights are being violated? • What categorizations have been applied to understand the vulnerability of different groups, and how appropriate is that to the specific context? • What level of need is regarded as the ‘trigger’ for the provision of humanitarian assis- tance? Has this remained constant or changed over time? Is there any evidence of the ‘normalisation’ of the humanitarian emergency? Does this respect the humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity?

97 Appendix 2 Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs

• To what extent have IDPs (and other vulnerable people) been consulted about their needs and about an appropriate response? To what extent do they feel that agency assistance has been relevant? • Is the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid proportionate to need? • How is targeting being carried out by operational partners? For example, is it being done according to pre-determined categories of vulnerable people (i.e. separating out IDPs), and/ or is it being done according to a comparative assessment of need? How appropriate and relevant is this approach to targeting? • Have issues of gender and generation been adequately addressed in the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid? • If IDPs are being targeted as a separate category of vulnerable people, is there any evidence that this is at the expense of other vulnerable groups, or is it proportionate to the vulnerability and needs of other vulnerable groups? • Are the programming choices of operational partners appropriate to the needs and rights of IDPs? • To what extent have issues of protection been addressed and met, directly and/ or through advocacy? (see point under coherence). • Does the programme combine an appropriate mix of material assistance and other protective activities, e.g. lobbying, advocacy etc? • Are there any gaps?

2. Effectiveness

Evaluation of operations

This criterion assesses the extent to which programmes achieved their purpose. As far as possible, this should draw on the views of IDPs and vulnerable people themselves.

• How clearly stated are the overall objectives and outcomes of the agency’s strategy/ programme for responding to the needs/ rights of IDPs? How clear is the strategy in terms of finding the best way to achieve these outcomes? Does the agency strategy on IDP’s include an advocacy component? Has advocating for IDP’s with authorities and humanitarian community been effective? • Has progress towards achieving these objectives and outcomes been carefully and consistently monitored, by the agency and by its operational partners, informing subsequent modification of programming? Have appropriate indicators for monitor- ing been used? • How timely has the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs been? • How successfully has access to IDPs been secured, within and outside conflict zones? • To what extent have operational partners demonstrated awareness of ‘Sphere’ and been able to meet Sphere standards? • What lessons about providing assistance to IDPs have been learned and applied between different emergencies, particularly by the agency, but also by its operational partners?

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3. Impact

This criterion assesses the real difference that programmes and projects have made in addressing the needs of IDPs – positive and negative, short and long-term, direct and indirect.

On the international humanitarian system

• How has agency policy towards IDPs impacted on the ability of the international humanitarian system to respond to the specific needs of IDPs? For example: • What has been the impact on institutional mandates to address the protection needs of male and female IDPs, children and aged, in terms of clarity, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the division of responsibility? • What are the implications of the agency’s choice of operational partners for channel- ing its funds to address the needs of various groups of IDPs, both positive and nega- tive?

On IDPs and other vulnerable people

• To what extent have the protection and material relief needs of IDPs been met tak- ing gender, age, and ethnicity into consideration, and what has been the impact? • To what extent have the underlying causes of the various IDP groups’ vulnerability been addressed, and what is the impact? • What impact has the provision of humanitarian assistance had on relations between IDPs and host/ other vulnerable people (positive and negative), for example in terms of exacerbating or reducing conflict? • What has been the overall impact of treating IDPs as a special category, or not – depending on the respective agency policy?

4. Efficiency

Evaluation of operations

• Were financial resources used efficiently by the agency agency (and in turn, by its operational partners), in terms of achieving maximum impact? • Has the agency made well-informed decisions (according to expertise and capacity) about its choice of implementing partners? 5. Coherence

This criterion assesses the coherence between the policies and programming of different agencies, and therefore addresses issue of coordination. For each individual agency, it is concerned with consistency across agency policy, and between policy and operations.

Review of agency policy

• How coherent is the respective agency’s policy towards IDPs with the policies of other agencies? What are the implications? • Has the agency supported a collaborative approach to IDPs, in both policy and oper- ational terms? What have been the implications (positive and negative)?

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• To what extent does the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) encourage a coherent approach amongst agencies to assisting IDPs? Does the agency participate in CAP workshops where strategies are developed, and does it monitor CAP with a view to ensuring gaps do not exist? How effective is this? • How effectively does the agency participate in information sharing – with other agencies, with the host government, and with coordination bodies

Evaluation of operations

• To what extent are operations on the ground consistent with the agency’s policy on IDPs? What are the implications? • To what extent is there coherence between the programming approaches of different agencies and their implementing partners in the country concerned? What are the implications? To what extent have agencies identified and acted upon their particular comparative advantage/ added value in addressing the humanitarian needs and rights of IDPs? • How effective is coordination? How has the agency engaged with coordination mechanisms and processes, and/ or to what extent has it encouraged its operational partners to engage with coordination mechanisms and processes? What are the implications?

6. Connectedness

Evaluation of operations

This criterion assesses the extent to which short-term emergency interventions have been carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account? Specifically:

• Has the agency (or its implementing partners) attempted to address the root causes of displacement and vulnerability, at an operational and/ or political levels? To what extent is short, medium and long-term objectives geared towards creating lasting solutions. • Has responsibility for addressing the needs of various groups of IDPs been appropri- ately identified (i.e. with states) and encouraged/ advocated by the agency and its implementing partners? • To what extent has capacity building of local structures and organisations been part of the agency’s (and its operational partners’) approach? Was this appropriate? To what extent was it informed by an analysis of conflict dynamics? • Has the design and implementation of emergency interventions by operational part- ners been informed by an analysis of conflict dynamics? To what extent have inter- ventions exacerbated, or reduced the likelihood of violent conflict, either as an explicit objective, or indirectly? • Has the design of programme interventions by operational partners taken into account and attempted to minimise the potential negative impact on vulnerability of IDPs in the longer-term (for example, that the provision of large quantities of relief resources might make IDPs more vulnerable to attack in the future)? • Has the design of programme interventions by operational partners taken into account the longer-term environmental consequences of the provision of humanitari- an assistance to IDPs?

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• How has the agency decided that there is no further need for humanitarian assis- tance to IDPs? In other words, how has the agency decided that displacement has ended? How appropriate was this decision? And how effective was the exit strategy? • Is there any evidence of follow-up monitoring of the situation of IDPs after they have returned home, or been re-settled, and aid assistance has ceased? • To what extent have different aid instruments (ie humanitarian and development aid) been used coherently and effectively to address the needs of IDPs, and the pro- tracted nature of many IDP situations? Have there been any gaps? How are decisions made and how flexible are agencies to respond to displacement especially when it is short term or unexpected?

Evaluation Department October 20 2003

101 Appendix 3 Bibliography

Appendix 3 Bibliography

The bibliography includes both the documents referred to in the text and the docu- ments consulted for the preparation of the brief case study. In addition to the cited doc- uments several hundred documents were studied during the evaluation (including over 300 OCHA reports for the period under review).

Ball N and Campbell KF (1998) Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola. OCHA, New York.

Benjamin A, and Fancy K (1998) The Gender Dimensions of Internal Displacement: Concept Paper and Annotated Bibliography; Unicef, New York.

Bettocchi G, and Jamal A (2002) UNHCR and Internally Displaced Persons in Angola: A Programme Continuation Review; UNHCR, Geneva.

Birkeland, N and Brlun, C (2003) Researching Internal Displacement: State of the Art: Conference Report; 7-8 February, Trondheim, Norway. Forced Migration Review, Oxford.

Birkeland, Nina, M and Gomes, A U (2001), “Angola: Deslocados in the Province of Huambo” in Caught Between Borders, Editors Marc Vincent and Birgitte Refslund Sorensen. Pluto Press, London.

Brookings Institution (1998) Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; OCHA: Geneva.

Contat Hickel, M (2001) “Protection of internally displaced persons affected by armed conflict: Concept and challenges” International Review of the Red Cross 483, ICRC, Geneva.

Danida (1999) Evaluation Guidelines. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen.

Deng, F (1998) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Addendum to Report of the RSG of 11 February 1998. United Nations, Geneva.

Deng, F (2000) Summary Report of the Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons on his Mission to Angola 31 October - 9 November. OCHA: Geneva.

Eguren, L E (1999) “Acompañamiento in Colombia international human rights protection of IDPs” Forced Migration Review 4:16-18. Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford.

Frelick, B (2003), “Displacement without end: internally displaced who can’t go home” Forced Migration Review No 17:10-12. May 2003. Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford.

102 Appendix 3 Bibliography

Global IDP Project (2003) Profile of Internal Displacement Angola: Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council; Norwegian Refugee Council - Global IDP Project, Geneva.,

Government of Angola (2003) Government Declaration on Final Closure Of Reception Areas For UNITA’s Former Military Forces: 19 June 2003. GoA, Luanda.

Hallam, A. (1998) Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance programmes in Complex Emergencies. Relief and Rehabilitation Network, ODI, London

Human Rights Watch (2002a) The War is Over: The Crisis of Angola’s Internally Displaced Continues - A Human Rights Watch Background Briefing Paper.; Human Rights Watch, New York.

Human Rights Watch (2002b) The War is Over: The Crisis of Angola’s Internally Displaced Continues: Testimonies from Displaced Persons, 2000 and 2001; Human Rights Watch, New York.

Human Rights Watch (2003a) Human Rights Watch World Report:2003. Human Rights Watch, New York.

Human Rights Watch (2003b) Struggling Through Peace: Return And Resettlement In Angola. Human Rights Watch, New York

Inter Agency Standing Committee (1999) Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: IASC Policy Paper; IASC: New York.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (2001) A Discussion Paper on Future Options for a Humanitarian Response to Internally Displaced Persons; ICVA, Geneva.

International Crisis Group (2003) Dealing with Savimbi’s Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola. International Crisis Group, Brussels/Luanda

Jamal, A. (2000) Angola 2000: A real-time assessment of UNHCR’s IDP intervention. UNHCR, Geneva.

Jamal, A. and Stage, O. (2001) UNHCR’s Programme for Internally Displaced People in Angola: A Joint Danida/UNHCR Review. UNHCR, Geneva.

Mooney, E (2003) “Bringing the end into sight for internally displaced persons” Forced Migration Review No 17:4-7. May 2003. Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford

Norwegian Refugee Council (2001) Seminar Proceedings: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced: Changing the Humanitarian Lens; Forced Migration Review, Oxford.

103 Appendix 3 Bibliography

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (1999) Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, OECD, Paris, and referenced to: Minnear, L. (1994) “The International Relief System: A Critical Review” paper presented to the Parallel National Intelligence Estimate on Global Humanitarian Emergencies, Meridian International Centre, Washington DC, September 22.

Peace Brigades International (2002) International Field Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Needs and Challenges, Acors and Strategies; Peace Brigades International, Brussels.

Porto, JG and Parsons I (2003) Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration: BICC Paper 27. Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Bonn.

Robinson, C. (2003) Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-Induced Displacement. The Brookings Institution-SIAS Project on Internal Displacement, Washington.

Sanchez-Garzoli, G. (2001) Selected Bibliography on the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. Brookings Institution-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement, Washington.

Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement (2001) Mission to Angola 12-17 March 2001 - Findings and Recommendations. United Nations: Geneva, 2001.

Sphere Project (2000) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.1st Final Edition. 2002. The Sphere Project, Geneva.

Stage O, Zucula P, Rekve P, and Kamp N (1999) Evaluation: Danish Humanitarian Assistance: Volume 3 Angola; Danida, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Copenhagen.

Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (1994) Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. SCHR, Geneva.

Steinberg D, and Bowen N (2003) Food Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Angola; Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network, Pretoria.

UNHCR (2000) Handbook for Emergencies. 2nd Edition. UNHCR, Geneva

USAID (Undated) Field Operations Guide, 3rd Edition. USAID Washington.

104 Appendix 4 Persons met

Appendix 4 Persons met

An analysis of the persons met is included, with a breakdown on page 16. in the list below the type of interviewee is:

• a – Agency employee, including UN, NGOs, and the Red Cross. • b – A member of the beneficiary community. Some interviewees denied receiving assistance from Danida funded agencies, but these denials did not always ring true. • d – Donor representative • g – Government employee or representative

Where there were multiple meetings, only the date and place of the first meeting are given below.

Name Function and organisation T Place Date Abdi Awil Hersi Programme Officer, UNHCR Angola a Luanda 24/06/03 Adriano, Salvador IDP from Liangongo and Smith. b Enama 13/07/03 Alberto, Viagem Soba, Calundo Dois b Calundo Dois 12/07/03 Aldino, Migueil Teacher, 4th Class, Dange g Dange 01/07/03 Alfonse, Manuel Teacher, 11 November g 11-Nov 02/07/03 Alfonso, Kiala Agricultural Technican, Uige a Kindeneco 04/06/03 Amisse, Maiken Representative, Save the Children, Denmark a Uige 28/06/03 Andrade, Agusta Returnee from bush 2002 b Luchazes 11/07/03 André, Alberto Horticultural group member b Kimakala, Uige 28/06/03 Anes da Silva, Luis DRC agricultural technician, Negage. a Negage 02/07/03 Anglade, Jean-Luc Director, MSF France a Luanda 25/06/03 Antonia, Cristana DRC beneficiary, Kindeneco b Kindeneco 04/06/03 Antonia, Teresa 19, DRC beneficiary, 11 November b 11-Nov 02/07/03 Antonio, Gilberto Returnee from Congo b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Bambe. Figueirio Horticultural group member b Kindenuco, Uige 28/06/03 Barretre, Manuel Seculo, Vista Alegre g Vista Alegre 02/07/03 Bell, Paula Returnee from QFA b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Biango, Pedro Group Leader and DRC beneficiary. b Kindeneco 04/06/03 Birra Sawyer b Kiongua 04/06/03 Boas Chisambo, Alberto Director and 3rd class teacher, g Machiava 12/07/03 Machiava School Bonadio, Rinaldo Director, CUAMM a Luanda 25/06/03 Bonura, Rosanna Director, GVC a Luanda 25/06/03 Brathwaite, Constance Independent Consultant and former a Luanda 24/06/03 director of AHA and LWF in Angola Bravo, Dominges Administrator, LWF, Luanda a Luanda 10/07/03 Brook, Matthew Harris External Relations Officer, UNHCR Angola a Luanda 24/06/03 Brooks, Simon Head of Sub Delegation, ICRC Huambo a Huambo 07/07/03 Buch-Hansen, Ellen Advisor, Danida d Brussels 10/06/03 Cabanha, Joanna ZeZe DRC Self-built Housing beneficiary, Negage b Negage 02/07/03 Cabata, Sozinoho Dando Teacher training monitor, Uige g Uige 03/07/03 Cachimbi, Maria IDP from Saurimo. Mother of four b Enama 13/07/03 with 2 week old baby. Caiva, Teresa Widow and mother of ten. b Enama 13/07/03 Calondo, Maria IDP from Luacano, separated by war from b Enama 13/07/03 husband and children Calzuola, Gauco EU Ambassador and Head of Delegation d Luanda 23/06/03 Camacho, Monica MSF – Espagne a Luanda 25/06/03

105 Appendix 4 Persons met

Name Function and organisation T Place Date Canga, Adão Pedro DRC agricultural technician, Negage. a Negage 02/07/03 Cano, Cungatilquilo Trainer, RB teacher project g Uige 03/07/03 Canongue, Carlito Returnee from IDP camp in Luena b Inacio 12/07/03 Cappi, Yvonne Representative, DRC, Angola a Uige 27/06/03 Carla, Alica IDP from Liangongo. Mother of 4 and b Enama 13/07/03 wife of smith. Carlota, Maria Domestic Science Teacher, Kituma b Kituma 04/06/03 Carosi, Paola Senior Field Coordinator, OCHA a Luanda 24/06/03 Castro, Rui Returnee from IDP camp in Luena b Inacio 12/07/03 Catule, Madelena Teacher, 2nd Class, Sanza Pombo g Sanza Pombo 30/06/03 Cavanagh, Patricia Desk Officer for Angola, ECHO 1 – ACP d Brussels 10/06/03 Cavendish, Peter Head of Evaluation Sector, ECHO d Brussels 10/06/03 Cervoni, Sabina Health Coordinator, ICRC a Luanda 25/06/03 Chilombo, Dulcia Sonia 16 and returnee from Congo. Walked one b Enama 13/07/03 week from Luacano with inflamed foot. Chinoya Ngunga, Costa LWF Sewing project trainer, Luchazes a Luchazes 11/07/03 Chipango, Anna 3rd Wife to Myongola Mucazo b Enama 13/07/03 and IDP from Luacano. Chipango, Guilhermina Communal Association Promoter, a Luena 11/07/03 LWF Luena Clara, Rebeca Returnee from Luena via Camanonge and b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 maize beer brewer. Codia Carlos Pedro, Agricultural Technician, DRC Uige a Kinguoa 04/07/03 Esmereldo Comate, Antonio Charcoal maker b Muacanhica 11/07/03 Conway James Head of Mission OFDA/USAID, Luanda d Luanda 16/07/03 Cordeiro, Kathia Finance Director, ADRA a Luanda 25/06/03 Cristina, Upale 7. Charcoal seller. b Enama 13/07/03 Cubrera, Ana Grace Community Services Officer, UNHCR a Luanda 24/06/03 Luanda (formerly programme officer for the UNHCR IDP project). Cuchat, Vera Emergency Response Fund Manager, OCHA a Luanda 25/06/03 Cuckow, Justin Representative, GOAL a Luanda 25/06/03 Daly, Mary Director, CCF Angola a Luanda 24/06/03 Dandula, Kenneth Trainee Carpenter and returnee from b Muacanhica 11/07/03 Zambia das Neves, João Field Director, SC-UK, Angola a Huambo 09/07/03 de Fato, Julieta Mother of four and widow, Sambo QFA b Sambo 08/07/03 De Jesus Pio do Amaral Project Coordinator, LWF, Luena a Luena 11/07/03 Gourgel, Moises de Riedmatten, Janvier Representative, UNHCR Angola a Luanda 24/06/03 De Tunga, Adelia Returnee from Enama IDP Camp in Luena b Inacio 12/07/03 Dietz, Guenter Correspondent, ECHO d Luanda 23/06/03 Dolan, Tim Representative, Trócaire Angola a Luanda 26/06/03 Domingos, Marta IDP from Luacapa and mother of 7 b Enama 13/07/03 Domingos, Mendes Vice Governor, Uige Province g Uige 27/06/03 Dondela Member of command, Sambo QFA b Sambo 08/07/03 (ex-Unita) dos Santos de Silva, Júlio Provincial Coordinator, IERA a Uige 28/06/03 Eduardo, Juliuto Project Coordinator, Uige a Uige 28/06/03 Engberg, Anders Angola Programme Coordinator a Uige 29/06/03 (Desk Officer) Copenhagen Esperanca Minars Child Protection Officer g Huambo 08/07/03 Ester, Eunice 25, Mother of three and maker of b Enama 13/07/03 Cachipembe Eugenio Angolan Red Cross Volunteer, Sambo QFA a Sambo 08/07/03 Ezekiel, Joaquim Head of JOTA, Luchazes b Luchazes 11/07/03

106 Appendix 4 Persons met

Name Function and organisation T Place Date Faria, Custódio Head of the Demobilised and Disabled g Uige 27/06/03 Department, MINARS, Uige Faustino, Bonito Paulo Teacher training monitor, Uige g Uige 03/07/03 Feio, Raul Health Technical Advisor, Delegation of the d Luanda 17/07/03 European Commission, Angola Fernando, Rafael Camp Manager, Luena a Luena 11/07/03 Figueirio, Jaime Horticultural group member b Kindenuco, Uige 28/06/03 Flatin, Anne L 2nd Secretary, Royal Norwegian d Luanda 15/07/03 Embassy, Luanda Flor, Maria IDP from Luacano and mother of 4. b Enama 13/07/03 Husband’s whereabouts unknown since forcibly recruited by FAPLA. Flor, Temba Mother of 2. Returnee from IDP camp b Inacio 12/07/03 in Luena Francisco, Anna DRC water point user. b Catalabanza, Uige 28/06/03 Francisco, Manuel Displaced from N’dalatando b Cautepue 11/07/03 Fulo, Jumba Teacher, Candombe Vehlo g Uige 04/06/03 Gafuci, Maria IDP from Luacano and mother of 2. b Enama 13/07/03 Second husband is soldier in FAA Gaita, Salvador Social Promoter, LWF a Luena 11/07/03 Gante, Celeste Midwife g Langongo 12/07/03 Garcia, Paiva Manuel Regional Secretary, ACM-YMCA a Uige 28/06/03 Gaspar, Mariano Josefina Operations Officer, a Uige 30/06/03 Geva, Flora IDP from Luacano and war widow b Enama 13/07/03 (younger of two twins) Gjerdrum,Cecilia Counsellor, Swedish Embassy, Luanda d Luanda 16/07/03 Goer, Esnavai Representative, MSF Holland a Luanda 25/06/03 Gomes, Alexandre Borges Counsellor, Delegation of the European d Luanda 17/07/03 Commission, Angola Gonçalves, Pedro OCHA Field Officer, Uige a Uige 27/06/03 Griffith, Sally Acting Programme Manager, SC-UK, a Huambo 09/07/03 Huambo Haile, Agustino Nurse, Luchazes Health Post g Luchazes 11/07/03 Higino Marques Assistant Project Coordinator, Luena a Luena 11/07/03 Periquito, Artur Hosé, Manuel Peasant shoemaker b Cautepue 11/07/03 Iyer, Akhil UNICEF a Luanda 25/06/03 Jaime, Justina Wife of prisoner b Cautepue 11/07/03 Jaime, Lobo Programme Officer, WFP Uige a Uige 29/06/03 Jesse, Alberto Returnee from Luena via Camanonge. b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 João, Adriana DRC beneficiary, Kindeneco b Kindeneco 04/06/03 João, Ermina Complained that not a Beneficiary, b 11-Nov 02/07/03 11 November João, Fineza Petty Trader, Luanda and Uige b Serrador 2 30/06/03 Johnston, Martin Country Representative for Angola, DFID d Luanda 17/07/03 Jose António, Egasmito DRC water point user b Catalabanza, Uige 28/06/03 Julia, Isabel Returnee from bush, Jan 02 b Muacanhica 11/07/03 Justa, Claudia 15. Returnee from bush. Never studied b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Kalaila, Domingos Son of Soba, Kimiyala b Kimiyala 30/06/03 Kalaila, Toana Soba, Kimiyala g Kimiyala 30/06/03 Kaowina, Jeremiah Smith and mortal maker b Cautepue 11/07/03 Kiala, Domingos Administrator, Sanza Pombo g Sanza Pombo 30/06/03 Kiala, Estevão Manuel Director, MINARS, Uige g Uige 27/06/03 Koly, Alain Outgoing Head of Delegation, ICRC, Angola a Luanda 07/07/03 Kuatoko, Fernando Paulo Transitional Coordenator, WHO Uige a Uige 29/06/03 Kumah, Fred Programme Representative, Oxfam Angola a Luanda 18/07/03 Kutemba, Ekenia 2nd wife to Myongola Mucazo and IDP b Enama 13/07/03 from Luacano

107 Appendix 4 Persons met

Name Function and organisation T Place Date Lafunda, Georgio IDP from Luacano with no surviving b Enama 13/07/03 children and wife in hospital. Laurinda, Frolinda Youngest daughter (8) of Widow de Fato b Sambo 08/07/03 Lisboa, Mendes Teacher training monitor and acting g Uige 03/07/03 director of education, Uige Lopes, Fonseco School Director, Kibaba g Kibaba 02/07/03 Lorenço, Lemos DRC horticultural group member b Kiongua 04/06/03 Lourdes, Jacinta Teacher training monitor, Uige g Uige 03/07/03 Lourdes, Nelita Peasant, Huamba b Sanza Pombo 30/06/03 Lucas, Maria Petty Trader, Luanda and Uige b Serrador 2 30/06/03 Luis, Manuel Water Group leader, Villa Nova b Villa Nova 30/06/03 Luiza Trelina Returnee from Bush b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Lula, Francisco Soldier on leave and husband to Maria Gafuci g Enama 13/07/03 Mabasse, Marcos Soba, Masabe g Masabe School 01/07/03 Makema, Zezina Returnee from bush 2002 b Luchazes 11/07/03 Manuel Fonseca Returnee from IDP Camp b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Manuel, Antonio Demobilised Unita Soldier, Sambo QFA b Sambo 08/07/03 Manuel, Domingos Camp Secretary, Muacanhica b Muacanhica 11/07/03 Manuel, Evarist Clerk, Administration Post, Langongo g Langongo 12/07/03 Manuel, Fostino School Director, Candombe Velho g Uige 04/06/03 Manuel, Mateus School Director, Sanza Pombo g Sanza Pombo 30/06/03 Maquina, Ernesto Horticultural group member b Kimakala, Uige 28/06/03 Maria, Ana Returnee from bush 2000 b Luchazes 11/07/03 Marques, Pedro Teacher, 3rd Class, Sanza Pombo g Sanza Pombo 30/06/03 Mateus, Madelina DRC water point user (18), Villa Nova b Villa Nova 30/06/03 Mavinga, Santos Manuel MPLA Cell Coordinator and tailor. b Enama 13/07/03 Diplaced from Liangongo. Mimo, Dantes Senior Field Assistant UNHCR a Uige 29/06/03 Field Office, Uige Montanhas, Venacio Regiador, Kibaba g Kibaba 02/07/03 Montgrain-Boivin, Louise Economic Security (EcoSec) Delegate, a Huambo 07/07/03 ICRC, Huambo Moto, Bemvendito Demobilised Unita Sergeant and well b Sambo 08/07/03 owner, Sambo QFA Moyo, Fineza Head of Agricultural Project, DRC, Uige a Uige 28/06/03 Mucau, Luiza João Petty Trader, Serrador 2 b Serrador 2 30/06/03 Mucazo, Nyongolo 64 and husband of 3. IDP from Luacano b Enama 13/07/03 Muchinga, Celeste IDP from Luacano and war widow. b Enama 13/07/03 Mufuca, Flor Mother of 4, claims to be 15 but is b Inacio 12/07/03 probably older. Muila Rosa Returnee from Congo b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Mundo, Alberto IDP from Liangongo and guard. b Enama 13/07/03 N’yemba, Fatima Returnee from Congo b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Na Paulo, Nanda Mother of 8 and one week old baby b Calundo Dois 12/07/03 (Sapalo Bela Cuaha) Naik, Prasant Programme Operations Manager, a Luanda 18/07/03 Oxfam Angola Nakapamba, Jaimise Camp Coordinator, Cautepue b Cautepue 11/07/03 Namuzal, Leviana Returnee from Luena. b Calundo Dois 12/07/03 Narciso, André Horticultural group member b Kimakala, Uige 28/06/03 Nasceu, Filomena DRC beneficiary, 11 November b 11-Nov 02/07/03 Nascimento Operations Officer, Sambo QFA (ex-Unita) b Sambo 08/07/03 Natito, Bendito Returnee from bush b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Negrera Espa-Sanoin, Mila Protection Delegate, ICRC, Huambo a Huambo 07/07/03 Nene, Joana Mother of 3. Returnee from IDP camp b Inacio 12/07/03 in Luena Ngombe, Viera Returnee from Bush b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Nkozi, Filipe OCHA Field Assistant, Uige a Uige 28/06/03

108 Appendix 4 Persons met

Name Function and organisation T Place Date Nunes, Mario Deputy Programme Manager, Action, a Luanda 15/07/03 NPA Angola Olsen, Lilli Administration and Finance Officer, a Uige 27/06/03 Angola Olsen, Maria Correspondent, ECHO d Luanda 23/06/03 Panço, Luis Head of the Social Assistance and g Uige 27/06/03 Resettlement Department, MINARS, Uige Panzo, Jose Student (19) in 8th class in Sanza Pombo b Villa Nova 30/06/03 Panzo, Manuel Soba, Villa Nova b Villa Nova 30/06/03 Paques, Feliciana Teacher, pre-schoolers, Dangee g Dange 01/07/03 Paula, Lourdes Assistant Camp Coordinator, Cautepue b Cautepue 11/07/03 Paulo, Daniel Assistant UN Field Security Officer, Uige a Uige 27/06/03 Paulo, Paulina Mother of three, Sambo QFA b Sambo 08/07/03 (also wife of QFA 2ic) Pauzo, Maximo Project Assistant, SELUT a Uige 28/06/03 Pedersen, Erik Schiøtz Emergency Coordinator, LWF a Luanda 25/06/03 Pedro, Jose Student in 3rd class (15) b Luchazes 11/07/03 Pedro, Malungo Agronomy technican, Provincial a Uige 04/06/03 Department of Agriculture, Uige Pinto Martins, Carlo Responsible for mobilisation in Langongo g Langongo 12/07/03 and former LWF activist in Luena Pisani, Vincento Uige Coordinator, CUAMM a Uige 28/06/03 Praia Private Security Company Guard, Huambo b Huambo 08/07/03 Quais, Florinda Gin maker and seller. b Muacanhica 11/07/03 Quilnta, Isaura Returnee from Enama IDP Camp in Luena b Inacio 12/07/03 Ramos Second in Command and acting b Sambo 08/07/03 Commander, Sambo QFA (ex-Unita) Recuta, Paulo Regiador. Luchazes g Luchazes 11/07/03 Reddo, Manuel CIC – Portugal a Luanda 25/06/03 Roça, Cristina Representative, CIC – Portugal a Luanda 25/06/03 Rosa, Adelina Grandmother (60+) b Muacanhica 11/07/03 Sabao, Jose Displaced from near Luau b Cautepue 11/07/03 Sahile, Beatrice Mother of 6 and recent returnee from Luena b Inacio 12/07/03 Salvador Abel Returnee from IDP camp in Luena b Inacio 12/07/03 Samosambo, Jacques Soba, Samosambo Nova b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Chicomba Samvumbo, Andre Returnee from bush b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Sandol, Armindo Returnee from Bush b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Sanza, Saloman Teacher, 1st Class, Dange g Dange 01/07/03 Sao Pedros, Adelina Mother of two and wife of land victim, b Sambo 08/07/03 Sambo QFA. Sao Pedros, Pondo Land victim (left leg amputated below b Sambo 08/07/03 knee), Sambo QFA Savoir, Catherine Medical Delegate, ICRC, Huambo a Huambo 07/07/03 Schmid, Alain Incoming Head of Delegation, ICRC, Angola a Luanda 07/07/03 Sebastião, Venacio Soba, 11 November g 11-Nov 02/07/03 Seculunde, Antonio Returnee from Zambia b Luchazes 11/07/03 Secundo, Paulo Village craftsman and mortar maker b Luchazes 11/07/03 Selundu, Paulina Returnee from bush 2002 b Luchazes 11/07/03 Simao, Sofia DRC beneficiary, Kindeneco b Kindeneco 04/06/03 Simon, Tones Displaced from Melange b Cautepue 11/07/03 Sombo, Teresa Divorcee and mother of one surviving child. b Enama 13/07/03 Sonia, Anita Widow and mother of 7. IDP from Luacano b Enama 13/07/03 Sozinho, Paulo Project Supervisor b Uige 01/07/03 Spadola, Francesca Representative, Movimundo a Luanda 25/06/03 Stage, Ole Consultant, Danida d Brussels 10/06/03 Steinlechtner, Robert Delegation of the European Commission, d Luanda 17/07/03 Angola

109 Appendix 4 Persons met

Name Function and organisation T Place Date Tellum, Jon Norwegian Refugee Committee a Luanda 25/06/03 ten Velde, Gerrit Programme Officer, LWF Angola a Luanda 25/06/03 Thaddeau, Paulino Demobilised Unita 2nd Lieutenant, b Sambo 08/07/03 Sambo QFA Thierry, Yves Water and Habitation (WatHab) Delegate, a Huambo 07/07/03 ICRC, Huambo Timmerman, Quirine AJ Second Secretary, Netherlands Embassy, d Luanda 17/07/03 Angola Toze, Fernando Student in 3rd class (16) b Luchazes 11/07/03 Trepannier, Simon Action Base Station Manager, WFP Huambo a Huambo 09/07/03 Upale, Guelhermina Returnee from QFA b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 Upale, Zinha 12. Daughter of Guelhirman Upale. Never b Samosambo Nova 12/07/03 been to school Uzana, Dominga Pregnant mother of three and IDP from b Enama 13/07/03 Luacano Vanackere, Martine Evaluations Officer, ECHO d Brussels 10/06/03 Vázquez, Irma Director, ACH a Luanda 25/06/03 Victor, Viera Administrator, Puri Municipio g Puri 02/07/03 Von Mentzingen Desk Officer, Development, d Brussels 12/06/03 Konstantin European Commission von Seth, Carl F. Representative, LWF, Angola a Luanda 16/07/03

110 Appendix 5 Consultant’s Itinerary

Appendix 5 Consultant’s Itinerary

The consultant’s itinerary is summarised on the map at the start of the report.

Date Day Activity 10-Jun Tuesday Flight Cork-Amsterdam-Brussels: Team Briefing at Echo 11-Jun Wednesday Discussion with Ole Stage. Document Research 12-Jun Thursday Interview with desk officer, document research 13-Jun Friday Flight Brussels - Amsterdam – Cork (Evaluation postponed 1 wk.) 14-Jun Saturday Desk Study 15-Jun Sunday Desk Study 16-Jun Monday Desk Study 17-Jun Tuesday Collecting materials for ECHO team 18-Jun Wednesday Preparing CDRom for ECHO team 19-Jun Thursday Flight Cork - London – Brussels 20-Jun Friday Collecting passport, research 21-Jun Saturday Researching CAP funding 22-Jun Sunday Flight Brussels - Kinshasha – Luanda 23-Jun Monday Briefing EU delegate, making trip plans 24-Jun Tuesday Interviews with OCHA and multiple interviews with UNHCR. 25-Jun Wednesday ECHO partner meeting, research and writing up notes 26-Jun Thursday Travel planning. Vulnerability meeting. Evening meetings 27-Jun Friday Writing up notes. Flight Luanda to Uige, Interview with Govt. 28-Jun Saturday Meeting with NGOs in Uige, site visits with 29-Jun Sunday Meeting with UN Agencies in Uige, Writing up. 30-Jun Monday Field visit to Sanza Pombo and Alfandega 1-Jul Tuesday Visit to rehabilitated schools in Quitexe. 2-Jul Wednesday Visit to water, agricultural, and school sites in Negage and Puri. 3-Jul Thursday Interview with Red Barnet. Visit to teacher training. Writing up. 4-Jul Friday Visit to horticultural project, school, and domestic science. 5-Jul Saturday Visit to theatre group. Debriefing meeting with 6-Jul Sunday Flight Uige-Luanda. Writing up 7-Jul Monday ICRC Briefing. Flight Luanda-Huambo. Further ICRC briefing. 8-Jul Tuesday Field Visit to Sambo QFA and admin 9-Jul Wednesday Interviews with Save the Children and World Food Programme. 10-Jul Thursday Flight Huambo to Luanda. Writing up notes 11-Jul Friday Flight Luanda to Luena. Visit to Resettlement sites and IDP sites 12-Jul Saturday Visit to resettlement sites in Leua and Liangongo 13-Jul Sunday Visit to Enama IDP camp in Uige, Writing up 14-Jul Monday Flight Luena to Luanda on fuel tanker. Writing up 15-Jul Tuesday Interviews with Norwegian Embassy and NPA 16-Jul Wednesday Interviews with USAID, Sida, and LWF 17-Jul Thursday Interviews with DFID, and NL Coop. Briefing EC delegation 18-Jul Friday Briefing ECHO Delegation. Interview with Oxfam 19-Jul Saturday Writing up notes. 20-Jul Sunday Writing up notes. Flight Luanda to Brussels 21-Jul Monday Flight Brussels-London-Cork

111 Appendix 6 Chronology

Appendix 6 Chronology

Date Event 1300s Kongo kingdom consolidates in the north of Angola.

1483 Portuguese arrive and convert the Kongo kings and many of their subjects to Christianity.

1575 Portuguese found Luanda.

1580 Angola becomes a major Portuguese trading arena for slaves. Between 1580 and 1680 more than a billion slaves are shipped to Brazil.

1836 Slave trade officially abolished by the Portuguese government, but trade continues until the closure of the Brazilian market in the early 1850s.

1885-1930 Portugal consolidates colonial control over Angola, local resistance persists. New cities like Uige are established in the interior. The push to the interior is perhaps symbolised by the building of the Benguela railway, which started in 1902 to serve the Shaba s in the Belgian Congo which it reached in 1928.

1951 Angola's status changes from colony to overseas province.

1956 The early beginnings of the socialist guerrilla independence movement, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is founded with the help of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party.

1957 FNLA founded (under another name) it draws its strength largely form the Bakongo people of the North of Angola.

1961 A revolt breaks out in the north following Congolese independence in 1960. Portuguese families are massacred and the revolt is suppressed with great ferocity leaving 50,000 dead. The fight for independence is bolstered. The Portuguese respond by increasing white settlement, abolishing forced labour, forced cultivation and stringent test for “assimilated” status (the “assimilated” had the same civil rights as Portuguese citizens.) Some refugees from 1961 are still in DR Congo.

1964 Savimbi and other Ovimbundo members withdraw from FNLA, alleging northern tribalism.

1966 Savimbi and other Ovimbundo leaders form UNITA. It also enjoys support among the Ovambo people of the far South and the Chowke of the East of the country.

1974 Revolution in Portugal, colonial empire collapses. Portugal rushes to rid itself of its colonies. Almost all of the 330,000 white colonists in Angola begin to leave.

112 Appendix 6 Chronology

1975 Angola gains independence but a power struggle ensues between MPLA, backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the FNLA plus UNITA, backed by South Africa and the USA. The MPLA successfully seizes power and establishes a one party state. The planned elections are not held. UNITA with its support in the largest population group (Ovimbundu) had expected to do well in elections.

1976 MPLA gains upper hand and UNITA begins a guerilla war supported by South Africa and USA.

1979 MPLA leader Agostinho Neto dies. Jose Eduardo dos Santos takes over as president.

1987 South African forces enter Angola to help UNITA.

1988 After the defeat of the South African army at Cuito Cuanavale, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba sign agreement on withdrawal of Cuba's 50,000 troops from Angola by mid-1991. South African army withdraws. The withdrawals are supervised by UNAVEM.

1989 Dos Santos, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi agree cease-fire, which collapses soon afterwards and guerrilla activity resumes.

1991 Apr MPLA drops Marxism-Leninism in favour of social democracy.

1991 May Dos Santos, Savimbi sign peace deal in Lisbon (the Bicesse Accords) which results in a new multiparty constitution. UNAVEM II established to super- vise the accords.

1992 Sep. Presidential and parliamentary polls certified by UN monitors as generally free and fair. Dos Santo gains more votes than Savimbi. Savimbi rejects the results. The Civil War restarts.

1993 UN imposes sanctions against UNITA. The US acknowledges the MPLA.

1994 Government, UNITA sign Lusaka Protocol ending the war and reaffirming the Bicesse Accords. Between one million three hundred thousand and two million people have been displaced by fighting.

1995 Dos Santos, Savimbi meet, confirm commitment to peace. First of 7,000 UN peacekeepers arrive under UNAVEM III. Quartering of UNITA sol- diers begins.

1996 Dos Santos, Savimbi agree to form unity government and a joint national army.

1997 Apr Unified government inaugurated, with Savimbi declining post in unity gov- ernment and failing to attend inauguration ceremony.

1997 May Tension mounts, with few UNITA troops having integrated into army.

113 Appendix 6 Chronology

1998 May Full-scale fighting resumes. UN plane shot down. Suspension of humani- tarian activities recommended by UCAH in eight out of the eighteen provinces.

1998 Feb The UN publishes Francis Deng’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

1998 Angola intervenes in civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo on the side of President Laurent-Desire Kabila.

1999 The Angolan government successfully forces out the UN peacekeeping mis- sion by arguing that they failed in their mandate by allowing UNITA to rearm under their supervision.

1999 Sep Government launches an intensive military offensive against UNITA. This offensive intensifies over the next two and a half years with an increasing use of scorched earth tactics.

2001 Jan The Government estimates that over four million Angolans are displaced. The Government publishes decree 1 of 2001, which essentially incorporates key features of the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement into Angolan Law.

2001 Jul Government troops begin to make wider use of scorched earth.

2002 Feb. Savimbi is killed by government troops.

2002 Apr Government and UNITA sign ceasefire agreement, the fourth such agree- ment in thirteen years. IDPs begin to return to their places of Origin.

2002 May UNITA's military commander says 85% of his troops have gathered at demobilisation camps. But there are concerns that food shortages and star- vation in the camps could threaten the peace process.

2002 Jun The UN appeals for aid for IDPs and for refugees who have started return- ing home after the ceasefire.

2002 Aug UNITA officially scraps its armed wing. “The war has ended,” proclaims Angola's defence minister.

2002 Dec The Government issues Decree 79 of 2002 which detailed standards for areas of return, including the level of service which returnee populations should receive.

2003 Jan President Dos Santos appoints Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, known as Nando, as prime minister. The post had been vacant for more than three years.

2003 Feb UN mission overseeing the peace process winds up its operation.

114 Appendix 6 Chronology

2003 Mar The Government estimate that 1.8 million IDPs have now returned to their areas of origin.

2003 Jun UNITA, now transformed into a political party, elects Isaias Samakuva, widely seen as having “clean hands”, as its new leader in what some inter- pret as a defeat for the old leadership that was closely aligned with Savimbi. The Government estimates that 2.34 million IDPs have now returned to their areas of origin.

2003 Jul The Government estimates that there are still 1.2 million IDPs in Angola. The UN’s figure for assisted IDPs is half of this, but even the lesser figure is 5% of the total population.

115 Appendix 7 Initial brief desk study

Appendix 7 Initial brief desk study

The following very brief desk study was prepared prior to the evaluation visit to Angola.

Introduction

This study was produced as an initial stage in a review of the assistance provided to IDPs in Angola. This review, funded by Danida, is being conducted in conjunction with an evaluation of ECHO funded interventions in Angola from 2001 to 03. The review has a broader focus on the whole issues of assistance to IDPs, with a particular emphasis on Danida funded interventions.

The aims of this desk study are to:

• Highlight some of the principal issues surrounding the situation of IDPs in Angola for the use of the ECHO evaluation team. • Assemble some of the key references in a format accessible to the evaluation team.

The emphasis in this study is on brevity to maximise its usefulness to the evaluation team. Those wanting a more detailed summary of the situation of IDPs in Angola should consult the excellent Profile of Internal Displacement: Angola. (Global IDP Project, 03).

Key issues for IDPs in Angola

No Longer Displaced

Each report since April 2002 show decreasing numbers of Internally Displaced Persons. WFP now report that there are effectively no large IDP groups left in transit centres in Angola65. It appears that the majority of those who were displaced have now returned. During the l8 months following the end of the war in April 2002, some 1.3 million people are though to have returned to their homes (Save the Children UK, 03, quoting UN sources).

It is not clear how many displaced are left outside of the transit centres. However, return has not led to huge improvements for former IDPs. There are still many problems with the return

Continuing protection issues

Protection, against a background of continued human rights abuses continues to be a major issue in Angola (Human Rights Watch 03). Former IDPs are particularly exposed to risk given the impunity with which the police and military act in the areas of Angola to which they are returning. (Human Rights Watch 2002). NGOs are very concerned about protection issues and have raised these during the visit by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

65) Personal Communication , Aart van der Heide

116 Appendix 7 Initial brief desk study

Abuses reported by Human Rights Watch have included murder, rape, forcible return, and extortion.

Minimum Operating Standards are not being met

While displaced, IDPs received fairly limited services (Jamal and Stage, 2001). Most of those returning are returning to areas with no social services whatsoever (only 15% are returning with formal resettlement programmes. There are no functioning clinics or schools in many areas of return.

The lack of social support means that the minimum operating standards are not being met in many areas of return. In particular the former displaced have effectively no access to health services, schools, or clean water.

The following documents were consulted in the preparation of this desk study. All of these documents were collected in electronic format and indexed (together with another 700 background resources such as the Forced Migration Review and the ODI publica- tions) to form a basic reference set for the evaluation team. This reference set included the reference sets supplied by ECHO and by Dania, but has the advantage that it is indexed for rapid searching of the reference set.

Bibliography

The documents consulted in the preparation of the desk study were collected in elec- tronic format and indexed (together with another 700 background resources such as the Forced Migration Review and the ODI publications) to form a basic reference set for the evaluation team. This reference set also included the reference sets supplied by ECHO and by Dania, but has the advantage that it is indexed for rapid searching of the reference set. The documents consulted are referenced in the main bibliography.

117 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

The following comments relate to specific technical points noted by the evaluator during the field visits. Not all of the points raised refer to Danida funded activities. While some are raised in the general text, other are too specific for general comment.

Location: Renovated school at Kisange.

Problem: One of the Roof trusses of the renovated school has cracks in the lower member. This may eventually lead to failure and collapse.

Possible solution: Fixing of timber rein- forcement to truss after temporary prop- ping of the truss.

Agencies should only undertake technical work when they have the competence to supervise it.

Location: Various

Problem: The latrines that have been built at the water points are not being used.

Possible solution: Drop the construction of latrines at water points unless there is a community demand for these. The con- struction of laundry basins and washing areas is good and should be continued.

Location: Renovated school at Kisange.

Problem: The school desks have no diago- nal bracing. Within a year of use the desks will sway from side to side, despite the dovetail joint at the front.

Possible solution: Change the design to include a diagonal cross brace dovetailed into the rear of the seats or just under the seat. Alternatively use triangular gussets or a deeper cross member at the back.

118 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Problem: People are plugging the outlets from the protected spring with plastic or other materials to allow water to build up in the chamber. The use of unsanitary plugs carries a high risk of contamination.

Possible solution: Consider whether simple globe valves could be fitted to the outlets, or provide some tapered plugs that can be tied to the wall so that they don’t get lost.

Location: Mission Village School Negage.

Problem: The backs on several of the school desks have broken off since the school was renovated in 2000.

Possible solution: Change the desk design to do away with the rear support and instead have a wide cross member on the front of the desks. Only the rear row won’t have support at the back

Location: Various.

Problem: Inadequate space for drying clothes.

Possible solution: Encourage community to build drying rack at the water point. This could be part of the agreement for future water point construction.

119 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Location: Health Post at Alfandega.

Problem: The purlins are spanning 3.5m between supports. While there is a rafter half way along, this is effectively unsup- ported and adds little other than weight to the roof. The creases in the corrugated Unsupported sheets suggest that the builder may have Rafter experienced problems during construction.

Possible solution: Fit a collar (a horizontal timber or pair of timbers from the front to the back of the roof at the wall level) to the roof at this location and put props from the wall to the purlins.

Agencies should only undertake technical work when they have the competence to supervise it.

Approx. 7 cm by 8 cm

3.5 m span between supports

Location: Various.

Problem: Some of the village-built adobe schools don’t have roofs that are tied down. In others, the roof is not very well tied down (In the case on the left, a bit of barbed wire has been used. This arrange- ment is not very satisfactory as the wire may cut through the blocks in very windy conditions.

Possible solution: Change the DRC policy to include galvanised wire in the roof kit to ensure that roofs are properly tiled on to the structure. DRC will also need to check that roofs are properly secured. DRC should consider producing a checklist for schools to ensure that certain minimum conditions, like tied down roofs, are met.

120 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Location: Various.

Problem: is distributing collapsible jerri- cans. While these are much cheaper to transport than normal jerricans, they have a relatively short life under rural conditions. While representing good value for aid agencies they are usually bad value for the beneficiaries.

Possible solution: should, if possible, source strong jerricans on the local market or failing this, distribute an additional bucket or basin

Location: Various

Problem: There are no visual aids apart from a blackboard in any of the schools. No maps, no posters, nothing.

Possible solution: should consider provid- ing a package of basic visual aids for all schools supported.

Underlying issue: Lack of integration of software and hardware aspects.

Location: Dange School

Problem: There is only one truss along the length of the classroom – over 10m. The span is too long for the size of purlins used.

Possible solution: Introduction of additional trusses.

121 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Location: Masabe School, (but probably a general problem).

Problem: Roof trusses are not tied down. Roof failure under wind load is the most common structural failure seen in schools in developing countries. The higher and the larger the roof the bigger the risk. Trusses should be tied down to the ring beam to prevent such failures.

Possible solution: Ensure that renovated schools have tied-down roofs.

Location: Various.

Problem: The windows on the community school are often relatively small and there are only two for a classroom. This leads to very hot conditions in the hot season and to a dark classroom.

DRC should consider whether the cost of providing ventilated blocks for a large window area would be justified. Alter- natively, any further schools should have at least four windows per classroom.

Location: Various

Problem: The interior of the village schools are quite dark. This makes the blackboard harder to read. While it is apparently planned to have the walls whitewashed, this has not been done in any of the schools seen.

Possible solution: should provide lime and encourage the communities to white-wash the internal walls of the classrooms.

122 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Location: Various.

Problem: was often criticised for not finish- ing schools or providing desks. Deeper investigation showed that the community had not yet done some of the agreed work for the completion of the school.

Possible solution: should prepare a simple poster for placing at school sites showing:

What the community is expected to do.

What inputs DRC will provide and under what conditions.

The poster should ideally be graphical rather than text based, and will serve as a reminder to all what exactly was agreed.

Location: Various

While some schools have adequate room for expansion like this one, others do not allow any room for development or expan- sion, or for the eventual construction of brick schools.

Possible solution: DRC should ask that communities provide a large enough area for the school to allow for future expan- sion. This will also provide a play area for the children.

Location: Nov 11 Water point.

Problem: People have to enter the water to collect water and the outlets are quite low.

Possible solution: Deepening the drain to the river to drop the water level and building a platform for users. It may be necessary to set the outlets higher or have recesses in the platform so that they can be used to fill buckets.

123 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Location: Various.

Problem: Many of the cooking pots are made from very light gauge aluminium and have a fairly limited life. Many cooking pots seen were falling apart despite being less than 2 years old.

Possible solution: specifications for kitchen sets should include: either a minimum thickness (e.g. 2mm or a minimum weight (800gm for a 6l pot) to ensure that they are of adequate quality.

Location: Various

Problem: Many agencies were distributing felted blankets rather than woven blankets. Felted blankets are cheaper than woven blankets, but are far less resistant to the wear and tear common in rural environ- ments.

Possible solution: Agencies should stick to standard specifications, such as those presented in the UNHCR handbook, for non-food-items.

Location: Machiava and elsewhere.

Problem: Old Colonial schools only have two large classrooms, making them very expensive to rehabilitation per classroom.

Possible solution: Divide the very large classrooms into two when renovating and convert the open area into a classroom also.

124 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Locations: Various.

Problems: Many types of donor identifica- tion quickly wear off, leaving no visibility for the donor and wasted money.

Possible solution: Marking non-food-items with permanent donor identification pro- vides good visibility. Buckets are particular- ly effective for this end as they are often carried outside the home. There is little point in marking items that rarely leave the home.

The only problem is that the non-food- items may not always be used in a way that the donor would approve of, as might be the case with the Action by Churches Together bucket being used to sell home- made Gin.

Location: Various.

Problem: Blankets supplied as non-food- items wore out very quickly. This blanket, despite being woven, was not of very good specification. The blanket being held up by this couple is less than two years old and is already worn through in one location.

Possible solution: A more detailed specifica- tion should be used for blankets that would include the breaking strength of the weft and weave in the blankets.

125 Appendix 8 Detailed Technical Comments

Location: Machiava.

Problem: These children are playing with an inflated condom and using it as a balloon. It is not clear if the condom has ever been used.

Possible solution: Condoms should only be distributed when accompanied by effective social mobilisation not only on their proper use, but also on their effective disposal.

Agencies should distribute balls and other simple toys to children at returnee sites so that they have some other toys. (Toys could be distributed as a reward for other activities, like planting trees or clean-up campaigns).

Location: Various.

Problem: Old colonial schools often have toilet blocks which originally had water borne sewage.

Possible solution. The old toilet blocks should be converted to offices and store- rooms. The resulting offices would be small, but sensibly sized. (School offices are often disproportionately large, wasting space that could be better used for teaching.)

126 Appendix 9 The legal instruments: The Norms

Appendix 9 The legal instruments: The Norms

(Unofficial translation)

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: DECREE NUMBER 1/01, 5 January 2001

Considering that the UN document titled “Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons” establishes the general principles governing the treatment of internally displaced persons;

Given that Angola is a country with high numbers of internally displaced persons resettling and returning to their areas of origin;

Having found it necessary to establish the rules governing the resettlement process under the terms of the provisions of paragraph (f) of Article 112 and Article 113, both of the Constitutional Law, the Government decrees the following:

Article 1

The herein attached norms on the resettlement of internally displaced, which are inte- gral to the present decree, are approved.

Article 2

The doubts and omissions resulting from the interpretation and enforcement of this decree are resolved through ministerial proclamations issued by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration.

Article 3

This decree will come into force on the date of its publication.

Seen and approved by the Council of Ministers, in Luanda, 18 October 2000.

PUBLISH.

The President of the Republic JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

127 Appendix 9 The legal instruments: The Norms

NORMS ON THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS

Article 1: Organs to Lead the Process

The responsibility for the resettlement and return of populations rests with the Provincial Governments that will oversee the process through the Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Group and the reactivated Subgroup on Displaced Persons and Refugees. The Subgroup on IDPs and Refugees must be composed of Government entities, NGOs, humanitarian organisations and other institutions involved in the process.

Article 2: Competences of Provincial Governments

It is the responsibility of the Provincial Governments, through the Sub-Groups on Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Groups, to carry out the following:

a) To plan, organize and ensure the implementation of all resettlement and return processes for displaced persons; b) To receive new internally displaced persons and returnees and direct them to the reception centres; c) To identify the displaced persons who wish to be resettled or return to their areas of origin, giving particular attention to the most vulnerable (widows, children, elderly, disabled) that may require special assistance; d) To identify resettlement and return sites; e) To monitor the overall resettlement and return process, ensuring the imple- mentation of the norms on the resettlement of internally displaced popula- tions; f) To verify the voluntary nature of resettlement and return and the presence of State Administration; g) To guarantee adequate transportation to assist populations returning to their points of origin; h) To take appropriate measures to ensure family reunification, and the safety and dignity of populations during movements to return and resettlement sites; i) To exercise any other competences as deterd by higher authorities or conferred by the law.

Article 3: Identification of Land

During the identification of resettlement and return sites, the Subgroup on Displaced Persons and Refugees must consider:

a) The quality and quantity of agricultural land to be provided, free of charge, to resettled or returned populations shall be, whenever possible, at least one-half hectare of arable land per family; b) Community involvement in land identification and distribution; c) Secure access to the nearest market; d) Availability of sufficient space to construct dwellings.

128 Appendix 9 The legal instruments: The Norms

Article 4: Security of Site

a) All resettlement and return sites must be verified as free of s. b) For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, INAROEE and its partners will create awareness brigades and, when necessary, conduct de-mining. c) In all resettlement and return sites, the relevant Defence and Security organs will conduct, when necessary, an assessment to verify and certify the security of the resettlement sites. d) For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, humanitarian organisations may be invited to verify security conditions in the resettlement or return site.

Article 5: Voluntary Resettlement and Return

1. To ensure the voluntary nature of the resettlement process, the Sub-Group on Displaced Persons and Refugees in the provinces must reach agreement with the traditional authorities representing the IDPs who are resettling, as well as with the traditional authorities in the host communities. 2. The Sub-Group on Displaced Persons and Refugees must include the involved per- sons in the planning and management of their relocation.

Article 6: State Administration

1. State Administration must be present in the resettlement or return sites. 2. In the framework of humanitarian assistance coordination, UTCAH and the UN Agencies will assist the provincial authorities in assessing the viability of resettlement areas.

Article 7: Rehabilitation of Infrastructure

The Provincial Governments will be assisted by UN Agencies and other partners in the rehabilitation of health posts and health centres as well as schools in the resettlement and return sites.

Article 8: Social Assistance

1 Appropriate Government sectors will health and education personnel at the resettle- ment and return sites and will ensure that essential medicines and emergency school materials are supplied, without prejudice to the provisions of other 2. Articles herein. 3. The operation of PICs (Community Children’s Programmes) and the Community Education Programmes will be ensured by the assistance sector. 4. Humanitarian organisations will be invited to Provincial Governments in the provi- sion of school materials and essential medicines.

Article 9: Water and Sanitation

The water sector will work with humanitarian agencies and communities to ensure water quality and to guarantee the presence of water points in sufficient quantity to supply the persons being resettled. The local authorities and humanitarian agencies will work with communities in the construction of latrines.

129 Appendix 9 The legal instruments: The Norms

Article 10: Resettlement Kits

Provincial Governments and humanitarian agencies will provide agricultural seeds and tools to resettled and returned families, as well as a tool kit to constructions and self- employment.

Article 11: Food

Humanitarian agencies will provide food rations to resettled populations for a period to be deterd, and will food-for-work programmes aimed at preparing land, rehabilitating social infrastructures and other activities necessary for community stability.

Article 12: Assessment

The Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Group shall regularly carry out evaluations of the resettlement and return process.

The President of the Republic JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

130 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECREE Nr. 79/02, 6 December

Needing to implement the “Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations”, approved by Decree 1/01 of 5 January, to facilitate the organised resettlement and return of IDPs to their areas of origin, upholding each citizen´s free will;

Agreeing to regulate the participation of different Government sectors in this process; Under the terms of the combined provisions of paragraph f) of Article 112 and article 113 of Constitutional Law, the Government decrees the following:

Article 1

The attached standard operational procedures of the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, which are integral part of the present decree, are approved.

Article 2

All previous legislation on this matter is revoked.

Article 3

The doubts and omissions resulting from the interpretation and enforcement of the present decree will be resolved through executive dispatch from the Minister of Social Affairs and Reintegration.

Article 4

This decree comes into force on the date of its publication.

Seen and approved by the Council of Ministers, in Luanda, on 27 September 2002. PUBLISH.

The President of the Republic JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS

131 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

Standard Operational Procedures for the Enforcement of the “Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations”

CHAPTER 1: General Provisions

Article 1: Definitions

For the purpose of the present document, the abbreviations and expressions below mean:

CNRSPDD – National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel and Displaced Populations;

CP – Provincial Commission;

GTCN – Technical Group of the National Commission;

GADH – Ad-hoc Group for Technical and Administrative ;

UTCAH – Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance;

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;

INAROEE – National Institute for the Removal of Lands and Unexploded Ordnance;

PAV – Extended Programme of Immunisation

IRSEM – Institute for the Social and Professional Reinsertion of Former Soldiers

FAA – Angolan Armed Forces

Displaced persons – are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, particularly as a result of violence, or in order to avoid the results of armed conflict, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border;

Resettlement – process of temporary or permanent settlement of displaced populations in areas other than their areas of origin;

Return – process of permanent settlement of displaced or returning populations in the area of origin;

Temporary resettlement - occurs when humanitarian, socio-economic and security conditions in the camps and transit centres are unacceptable, without prejudice to the rights of displaced populations to voluntarily return to their areas of origin when

132 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

conditions are conducive, or the right to fix permanent residence in an area different than the one of origin.

Article 2: Jurisdiction

The provisions of this document are applicable to displaced populations and Angolan refugees returning to the country.

CHAPTER 2 : Implementing Entities

Article 3: Entities

1. The process of resettlement and return of IDPs is lead by the following entities: a) CNRSPDD – National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Personnel and Displaced Populations; b) CP – Provincial Commission; c) GADH – Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative .

2. The entities referred to in subparagraphs b) and c) of no. 1 above report to the National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Personnel and Displaced Populations, in accordance with article 4 of Presidential Dispatch no. 5/02 dated 4 June.

Article 4: Composition of Provincial Commission

3. The Provincial Commission is chaired by the Provincial Governor and includes the following members: a) Provincial Vice-Governor; b) Military representative; c) Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Interior; d) Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Justice; e) Provincial Director of Social Assistance and Reintegration, Former Soldiers and War Veterans; f) Provincial Director of Public Administration, Employment and Social Security; g) Director of Provincial Cabinet of Studies, Planning and Statistics; h) Provincial Director of Health; i) Provincial Director of Agriculture and Rural Development, Fishing and the Environment; j) Provincial Director of Education and Culture; k) Provincial representative of IRSEM; l) Provincial representative of UTCAH; m) Provincial representative of INAROEE; n) OCHA representative.

Article 5: Competence and operation of the Provincial Commission

1. The Provincial Commission shall: a) Evaluate the provincial plan for the resettlement or return of the displaced populations on a monthly basis;

133 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

b) Submit a monthly report on the resettlement or return process of IDP popula- tions to the National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Personnel and Displaced Populations; c) Issue general guidelines on the activity of the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative ; d) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. The Provincial Commission meets regularly on a monthly basis and whenever con- vened by the Provincial Governor.

3. The Provincial Commission is ed by the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative .

Article 6: Composition of Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative

The composition of the Group varies, depending on the specificities of the issues to be addressed.

Article 7: Competence of the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative

1. The Group has the following competencies: a) Ensure technical and administrative to the Provincial Commission; b) Conduct studies and analyses, issue position papers and make proposals; c) Be accountable to the Provincial Commissions; d) Propose the programming and implementation of the resettlement or return process for displaced populations; e) Draft, organise and adjust the provincial plan for resettlement or return of populations; f) Implement all aspects of the resettlement or return process of populations in the provinces; g) Assess transportation needs and draft a plan for transporting populations wishing to resettle or return; h) Make transportation and logistical available for populations; i) Ensure that the health status of populations wishing to resettle or return is evaluated at least 48 hours prior to transportation; j) Ensure that IDP populations not in condition to be transported for medical reasons remain in the location accompanied by their family members until they recover; k) Ensure the participation of the IDP community and women in the working sessions; l) Ensure that populations are accompanied by a health professional with a medical first aid kit during transportation if the trip to the resettlement or return area will last more than five hours; m) Guarantee that recovering patients continue receiving treatment at the resettle- ment or return areas; n) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. To implement paragraph 1, the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative shall adopt the following procedures: a) Take into account the local administrations´ priorities regarding territorial regulations in the identification of resettlement or return areas;

134 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

b) Prioritise resettlement or return areas with operational health structures; c) Consider the existence of appropriate conditions in accordance with the procedures established by the present standard operational procedures. d) Reach consensus among resident and IDPs communities on the use of land in accordance with the procedures established by the present standard operational procedures; e) Use the standard form in Annex II to these standard operational procedures during the verification work in the areas. f) Present the list of identified areas to the Provincial Government for final approval.

CHAPTER 3: Provincial Programme on Resettlement or Return

Article 8: Provincial Programme

The Provincial Programme on the Resettlement or Return of IDPs shall include the following elements:

a) List of areas considered appropriate for resettlement or return in accordance with the criteria established by the present standard operational procedures; b) List of basic infrastructure needs in the identified areas so that minimum conditions for resettlement or return can be created; c) Number of families each area can accommodate based on available space and arable land; d) List of populations wishing to resettle or return, with priority to those living in camps or reception or transit centres where humanitarian conditions are unacceptable; e) Data related to most vulnerable groups that may need specialised assistance (widows, women heads of families, children, the elderly, disabled persons); f) Identification of the means necessary to transport populations to resettlement or return areas; g) Identification of projects to resettlement or return that aim to improve the living conditions of the populations; h) Plans of action to implement the resettlement or return plan, including the identification of responsible entities and deadlines; i) Identification of financial and material resources available for the implemen- tation of the resettlement or return plan; j) Other elements deemed necessary.

CHAPTER 4: Responsibilities for the Implementation of the Resettlement or Return Process

Article 9: Resettlement or voluntary return

1. The Provincial Government shall, through the Ad-Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative ,:

a) Hold meetings with displaced populations to inform, sensitise and discuss the resettlement or return process and visit proposed areas;

135 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

b) Ensure that displaced populations are informed about the stages of the resettle- ment or return process and the legislation in force on the issue; c) Ensure the active participation of displaced populations in the resettlement or return process; d) Ensure respect for the voluntary and consensual nature of the resettlement or return process; e) Facilitate agreement on the resettlement or return process between resident and displaced communities; f) Verify the voluntary nature of the resettlement or return process through surveys and meetings with resident and/or displaced communities; g) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. During the resettlement or return process, the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative shall ensure that the process is voluntary and consensual and that it includes the active participation of displaced populations through the creation of an operational group composed of the following members:

a) Representatives of Local Authorities; b) Representatives of Traditional Authorities; c) Traditional authorities of resident and displaced communities; d) Representatives of displaced communities, guaranteeing women´s participation; e) Representatives of humanitarian organisations.

3. The group may include other members at the invitation of the Provincial Governor.

Article 10: Local state administration

1. The local state administration shall:

a) Be represented in the resettlement or return areas; b) Create mechanisms for the proper functioning of public services; c) Plan assistance activities; d) Hold meetings between traditional authorities and representatives of resident and displaced communities in order to facilitate reintegration; e) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

Article 11: Registration, tracing and family reunification

The provincial entity responsible for social assistance and reintegration, former soldiers and war veterans shall:

a) Organise and ensure registration of resettling or returning populations, respecting the present standard operational procedures and using the attached forms; b) Guarantee the installation and management of a database that facilitates the planning of resettlement or return activities of populations; c) Identify children separated from their families; d) Create a database with photographs; e) Take appropriate measures for family reunification; f) Share information with other provinces to facilitate family reunification;

136 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

g) Keep the family members together during the resettlement or return process; h) Ensure that data on children separated from their families are taken into account during the preparation of provincial plans on resettlement or return; i) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

Article 12: Identification of populations

The Provincial Delegation of the Ministry of Justice shall:

a) Carry out birth registration in order to issue personal identification; b) Ensure that national identity cards are issued; c) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

Article 13: Security of the location)

1. The Provincial Government shall:

a) Assess, verify and guarantee the security of resettlement or return sites; b) Receive updated information from the central database on the situation in the respective areas; c) Ensure information sharing on d areas; d) Facilitate logistics follow-up of and UXO clearance operations; e) Ensure, through INAROEE, the assessment of areas identified for resettlement or return; f) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. To implement paragraph 1, the Provincial Government shall adopt the following procedures:

a) Provide information to the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative on the ded areas for subsequent planning of resettlement or return activities; b) Ensure that the subgroup on action and awareness and action NGOs in the provinces where INAROEE is not represented is responsible for receiving and analysing documentation on ded areas; c) Provide FAA and National Police liaison officers access to lists of areas where the situation needs to be verified; d) Include populations and humanitarian personnel in technical assessments of the security situation; e) Make the FAA and National Police liaison officers responsible for developing a joint report on the technical aspects of the security situation; f) Entrust to the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative the analysis of reports on the viability of areas identified for resettlement or return of dis- placed populations.

Article 14 : Identification and allocation of land

1. The Provincial Government shall:

a) Develop a plan on land needed for housing and agricultural purposes, based on information provided by the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative ;

137 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

b) Prepare maps to facilitate the identification of land available for distribution to populations; c) Survey the areas allocated to communities and private landowners; d) Oversee the land allocation process; e) Ensure the distribution of land for housing and agricultural purposes; f) Take into consideration the relation between land quality and quantity when defining the area to be allocated to each resettling or returning family; g) Allocate at least one hectare per family to begin agricultural activities during the installation phase; h) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. The Municipal and Communal Administrations shall:

a) Ensure the involvement of resident and displaced populations in land identification and allocation; b) Demarcate community lands, defining the areas to be distributed; c) Monitor negotiations between resident and displaced populations on land allocation; d) Maintain the conditions of roads and bridges; e) Ensure that resettlement or return areas have access to markets; f) Guarantee security in accordance with the procedures established under article 13 of the present standard operational procedures; g) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

3. The Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative shall:

a) Design the housing area in order to facilitate the planning of activities of intervening bodies; b) Identify the housing area and ensure that the size allows for the construction of houses in accordance with the habits and customs of local rural and urban populations; c) Respect the local housing customs and include a component on improved construction; d) Construct houses as close as possible to areas where local building materials are available; e) Integrate reforestation projects in resettlement or return activities in collabo- ration with municipal and communal administrations and the local offices of agriculture and rural development, fishing and the environment; f) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

Article 15: Resettlement kits

1. The Provincial Government shall:

a) Ensure timely procurement and distribution of seeds and tools; b) Carry out needs assessments; c) Assess the populations´ needs in collaboration with the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative ; d) Develop a plan that takes into account the most vulnerable groups in the resident community; e) Develop a distribution plan for seeds that covers the area available;

138 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

f) Ensure that imported seeds are in conformity with phytosanitary norms; g) Ensure that each family has a kit of agricultural materials or tools; h) Promote the organisation of community vocational training; i) Ensure that each craftsman receiving the self-employment kit is responsible for training a number of apprentices deterd by the community; j) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

To implement paragraph 1, the Provincial Government, through the relevant bodies of agriculture and rural development, fishing and the environment, social assistance and reintegration, and former soldiers and war veterans, shall adopt the following procedures:

a) Ensure that each family has access to a kitchen set, hygiene materials and building tools; b) Ensure that resettled or returned populations have shelter and clothing ade- quate to the local climate.

Article 16: Rehabilitation of infrastructure

1. The Provincial Government shall:

a) Conduct assessments and map the location of existing health, school and pre-school infrastructure in the identified areas; b) Evaluate the condition of the infrastructure; c) Present proposals and recommendations for the construction or rehabilitation of identified infrastructure; d) Construct or rehabilitate infrastructure in the areas selected for the resettle- ment or return of internally displaced populations; e) Ensure that infrastructure is maintained in accordance with established norms; f) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. To implement paragraph 1, the Provincial Government, through the relevant bodies of agriculture and rural development, fishing and the environment, social assistance and reintegration, and former soldiers and war veterans, shall adopt the following procedures:

a) Locate health units in a radius not greater than 5 km from the resettlement or return area; b) Build or rehabilitate a health post if the population is at least 5,000 inhabitants; c) Build or rehabilitate a health centre if the population is at least 15,000 inha- bitants; d) Provide medical assistance through a mobile health unit if the size of the resettled or returned population does not justify the construction or rehabilita- tion of a health structure and if no referral structures are in place; e) Build or rehabilitate schools in resettlement or return areas with the capacity to accommodate 35 to 45 students in two daily shifts; f) Integrate pre-school aged children into Community Infant Programmes- Community School Programmes (PIC-PEC) whose structures can be constructed with local materials and in the form of jangos;

139 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

g) Ensure the social and professional integration of IDPs in accordance with their technical and professional skills.

Article 17: Water and sanitation

1. The Provincial Government shall:

a) Ensure that adequate measures are taken for the provision of water and sanitation; b) Collaborate with the community to ensure appropriate management of water and sanitation systems, including aspects related to water quality; c) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. To implement paragraph 1, the Provincial Government, through the relevant bodies of agriculture and rural development, fishing and the environment, social assistance and social reintegration, and former soldiers and war veterans, shall adopt the following procedures:

a) Enable access to potable water for IDPs; b) Place the public water supply points not further than 500 metres from the houses; c) Guarantee the supply of drinking water; d) Enable the functioning of each water pump to serve 600 persons for 10 hours a day; e) Design the construction and maintenance of latrines in accordance with stan- dards set by the Ministry of Health; f) Build latrines with the participation of resettled or returned families; g) Promote health education among the community regarding garbage disposal and burning.

Article 18: Social assistance

1. The Provincial Government shall:

a) Provide health units with human and technical resources to facilitate the provi- sion of services in health posts and centres; b) Ensure that health units are provided with the required equipment; c) Ensure the regular supply of medicines and medical material; d) Allocate funds to procure medicines in a timely manner; e) Distribute an appropriate essential medicines kit to each health facility; f) Comply with the training package of the Ministry of Health on the rational use of essential medicines; g) Ensure that health units are provided with appropriate means of transporta- tion; h) Ensure the procurement of expendable materials and vaccines through the Extended Programme of Immunisation (EPI); i) Ensure the transportation of the above-mentioned material to their final desti- nations, as well as fuel for cold chains to conserve vaccines; j) Ensure that children and adults are enrolled in appropriate educational programmes and provided necessary school material;

140 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

k) Identify the school and pre-school aged children in collaboration with the Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative ; l) Define educational needs on the basis of age and previous school attendance and include children in the educational system; m) Create mechanisms to guarantee that children who were already enrolled in school continue their studies following resettlement or return; n) Enrol in the Teacher Emergency Package programme (TEP) children who did not have access to formal education because of war or other reasons or who are not in the system because they have surpassed school-age; o) Create mechanisms to guarantee that children can attend school without school uniforms and that they are not required to pay any school fees; p) Guarantee the provision of adult education, particularly for women; q) Guarantee food assistance to resettled or returned populations; r) Distribute food free of cost until the first agricultural harvest; s) Ensure the continuation of food assistance, depending on the outcome of the agricultural campaign and nutritional and food security assessments; t) Carry out other tasks as assigned.

2. To implement paragraph 1, the Provincial Government, through the relevant bodies of agriculture and rural development, fishing and the environment, social assistance and reintegration, and former soldiers and war veterans, shall adopt the following procedures:

a) Strengthen programmes aimed at eradicating polio, leprosy, malaria, tuberculo- sis and trypanosomiasis, and preventing HIV/AIDS in the resettlement or return areas; b) Provide required school materials (textbooks, exercise books, blackboards, chalk, blackboard erasers, pencil erasers, pencils, pencil sharpeners, pens) and furnish schools; c) Integrate the pre-school aged children into Community Infant Programmes- Community School Programmes (PIC-PEC); d) Deploy personnel required for the provision of services, prioritising those orig- inating from the resettled or returned community; e) Guarantee the normalization of employment and wage situation of personnel, as well as staff housing and the payment of allowances stipulated by law; f) Guarantee training for personnel through courses and workshops.

Article 19: Norms and technical issues

The Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration is primarily responsible for issuing norms, without prejudice to the right of other government departments to issue direc- tives and instructions on specific issues pertaining to their areas of responsibility.

Article 20: Assessment

The Ad Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative is responsible for monitoring the resettlement and return process of the populations, using the following indicators:

a) Level of implementation of resettlement or return plan; b) Registration of internally displaced populations wishing to return or resettle; c) Provincial database on resettled or returned populations;

141 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

d) Family tracing database; e) Birth registration database and issuance of identification cards; f) Family reunification activities; g) Functioning of health, education, water and sanitation, social assistance and security services; h) Identification and allocation of agriculture land; i) Food assistance and distribution of family kits; j) Number of resettled or returned families.

2. The Ad-Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative shall inform in a timely manner the Provincial Commission, which then informs the Technical Group of the National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised and Displaced Persons, about issues and irregularities requiring immediate inter- vention.

3. The Ad-Hoc Group for Technical and Administrative shall submit a monthly report to the Provincial Commission, which then submits the report to the Technical Group of the National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel and Displaced Persons, demonstrating, among other things, progress made in the preparation and implementation of the provincial plan for resettlement or return, constraints faced during the operations, and the definition of priorities for the following month.

4. The Technical Group of the National Commission for the Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel and Displaced Persons shall moni- tor the resettlement or return process at the national level, as well as ensure its imple- mentation in accordance with the Norms on Resettlement.

5. The Provincial Commission shall make efforts to address specific cases of non-com- pliance with the Norms and the present standard operational procedures at the local level, before resorting to higher bodies.

6. The Provincial Commission shall submit a monthly report to the National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel and Displaced Persons on the resettlement or return process.

7. The Provincial Commission shall make monthly assessments of the Provincial Plan for resettlement or return.

8. The National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised and Displaced Persons shall make monthly assessments of the resettlement and return process.

CHAPTER 5: Funding and Management

Article 21: Funding

The Provincial Programme for the Resettlement or Return of Internally Displaced Populations is funded by:

142 Appendix 10 The legal instruments: The Regulations

a) The state budget; b) National and international donations; c) Any other legally accepted form that s specific projects and programmes.

Article 22: Management tools

The Provincial Programme for the Resettlement or Return of Internally Displaced Populations is managed by the Provincial Commission and is subject to Government approval as provided by law.

The President of Republic, José Eduardo dos Santos

143 Appendix 11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards

Appendix 11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards

The standards established in the Angolan Decree 79 of 2002 are compared with three sets of standards widely used in humanitarian relief operations:

• The Sphere Project’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, 1st Final Edition. The second edition of this is being finalised and is expected to be published in 2003. • UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies, 2nd Edition. The standard handbook for refugee operations (and refugee-like internal displacement) since the first edition in 1982. This was recently revised in 1999. • USAID’s Field Operations Guide, 3rd Edition. The standard handbook used by the Disaster Assessment and Response Teams of the United Stated Agency for International Development. A new edition is being prepared and is to be published in 2004.

Indicators for Minimum Standards Issue Decree 79/02 Sphere UNHCR USAID Water 15 - 20 litres Quantity per maintenance Not specified 15 litres 15-20 litres person per day 7 litres short term survival Max distance 500m 500m 100m 100m

Water: 600 persons 250 persons 80-100 per tap Persons per per water per water 200 per hand- source point point pump 40-60 litres 40-60 litres Water for Not specified Not specified per person per per person per health centres day day

66) For example: Article 15.1 (f) specified that “imported seeds are in conformity with phytosanitary norms”, Article 16.1 (e) specifies that “infrastructure is maintained in accordance with established norms”, and Article 17.2 (e) states that the design of the construction and maintenance of latrines is “in accordance with standards set by the Ministry of Health”.

144 Appendix 11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards

Indicators for Minimum Standards Issue Decree79/02 Sphere UNHCR USAID 0 Implied Minimum 0.250 for 15 0.125 l/s per water flow at litres per Not specified Not specified point water point person per day <10 faecal <10 faecal < 10 faecal coliforms per coliforms per Quality Potable coliforms per 100ml is 100ml is 100ml reasonable reasonable quality quality Sanitation Not specified but 250gm per 250 gm per 200gm per presumably Soap person per person per person per included in month month month "hygiene materials" Build latrine 1 latrine per with the family or 1 Number of participation 1 latrine per per 20 or 1 per 1 latrine per Latrines of returned or 20 persons 100 or use 20 persons resettled defecation family field Distance to Not specified < 50m 6m - 50m 6m - 60m Latrines Non Food Items Seeds and Timely Appropriate Where Not specified tools distribution tools and possible materials to support livelihood activity Self build Distributed to Only Not specified Not specified tools included all reference is to to be tools for distributed latrine constructio n Self Distributed to Appropriate Not specified Not specified employment craftsmen tools and kits materials to support livelihood activity

145 Appendix 11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards

Indicators for Minimum Standards Issue Decree 79/02 Sphere UNHCR USAID 1 cooking pot with lid 1 Every family basin, I knife, 1 7l pot with to have Cooking pots 2 wooden lid, 1 5l pot Kitchen sets unspecified and utensils if spoons. 1 with lid, 5 cooking necessary Plate, spoon, mugs, plates materials and mug per and spoons person Water Presumably 2 collection Enough to Suitable Collection and included in vessels of 1-20 transport 10 containers Storage "hygiene litres and litres and materials" t o storage store 20 litres be distributed vessels of 20 per houshold to all litres Adequate Suitable to Sufficient for clothing. Appropriate Clothing the climate climate Avoid used clothing clothing Wool or 30% or 50% polyester Sufficient for wool 1.5kg. 1.5kg - Blankets Not specified climate. Sufficient for number climate according t o climate. Land Amount of 1Ha, later 45m2 - 45m2 30m2 land increased to equivalent to desirable, minimum 1.5 Ha, 0.027Ha for a 30m 2 equivalent to family of 6 minimum 2,500m2 per person for a family of 6 Shelter space Not stated 3.5m2 to 4.5m2 3.5m2 in warm 3.5m2 per person tropics and 4.56m2 to 5.5m 2 in cold climates Health Distance t o < 5km not specified not specified not specified health service If less than Mobile Clinic not specified not specified not specified 5,000 persons

146 Appendix 11 The Angolan Regulations compared with the indicators for other standards

Indicators for Minimum Standards Issue Decree 79/02 Sphere UNHCR USAID 10,000 Persons served 5,000 to (Peripheral by Health Post 2,000 to 5,0 00 5,000 15,000 health or Clinic facility) Persons served 50,000 10,000 to by Health 15,000 + (Central 20,000 20,000 Centre facility) 2 doctors, 1 1 Doctor pl us midwife, 6-8 3 to 5 health Nurses and 10 2 doctors and workers plus Health Centre health 8-10 nurses Not specified 1 per 50 Staff workers (1 per per 20,000 consultations 50 to 70 persons plus 1 per 20- consultations 30 beds. per day) 1 Community Community 1 Home Health 2 to 3 per Not specified Health Care visitor per 500 Worker per 5,000 1,000 Traditional Birth Not specified 1 per 2,000 1 per 3,000 Not specified Attendants Education Schools in areas of 1 School block Schools No standard No standard return and per 5,000 resettlement 35 to 45 with Not specified Class size two shifts No standard but 40 to 54 No standard daily. implied. Protection Birth For all Not specified Establish Not specified Registration children by attestation Provincial system if no Delegation of formal birth Ministry of registration Justice

147

D a n i s h

A s s i s

t Evaluation a

2 Asiatisk Plads n c e

DK-1448 Copenhagen K t o

I n

Denmark t e r n

Phone: +45 33 92 00 00 a l l y Danish Assistance to Fax: +45 32 54 05 33 D i s

E-mail: [email protected] p l a c

Internet: www.um.dk e

d Internally Displaced Persons in Angola

P e o p l e

i n 1999-2003

A n g o l a

1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 3 2 0 0

ISBN (report): 87-7964-986-6 3 / ISSN: 1399-4972 9 2003/9