Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: a Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities
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FICTIONAL CHARACTERS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS: A PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS OF FICTIONAL ENTITIES CHAKRAVARTY SHAMIK PHD LINGNAN UNIVERSITY 2020 FICTIONAL CHARACTERS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS: A PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS OF FICTIONAL ENTITIES by CHAKRAVARTY Shamik A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Lingnan University 2020 ABSTRACT Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: A Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities by CHAKRAVARTY Shamik Doctor of Philosophy In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives in 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) as well as Walton’s (1990) pretense view, which denies the existence of such entities. In the process, I propose modifications to these views to deal with problems they face and show how the modifications better account for the philosophical data. Key abstractionists (van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999) make a strict distinction between discourse within fiction, in which statements about literary characters cannot be literally true, and discourse about fiction, as it occurs in literary criticism, where statements about fictional characters can be literally true. Fictional objects are postulated to account for the truth of the latter. This runs into trouble because statements thought to be literally true are not literal. (Yagisawa 2001, Friend 2002) I provide a uniform analysis to account for the truth of statements involving fictional characters by appealing to a presupposition involving a metaphor in both contexts. The presupposition is that there is an x such that x is fictional; x is likened to a real person; and x is and ought to be treated/counted as a real person for all relevant intents and purposes. More generally, I adopt Everett and Schroeder’s (2015) realist view that fictional characters are ideas constituted by mental representations. This, to me, better accounts for how fictional characters are created within the world’s causal nexus (unlike non-spatiotemporal entities in abstractionism), among other things. One key challenge they face is to explain how ideas can possess properties such as being a detective. I present a fine-grained version of their view, according to which the mental representations constituting fictional entities encode mind- dependent properties. Moreover, I explain how reference to such representations is possible, using Bencivenga’s (1983) Neo-Kantian view of reference and Karttunen’s (1976) view on discourse referents. Finally, I suggest that the identity of fictional characters is interest-relative. The constant, and sometimes radical, change of properties that, fictional characters can undergo is taken to be a consequence of the fact that unified mental representations are bundles of simpler mental representations. As change occurs, simpler representations are replaced by others. A key theme that runs through the thesis is that neither fictionality nor pretense is relevant to the semantics of fictional sentences—a claim bolstered by Matravers’ (2014) arguments. Whether or not my account works, this claim, as well as the new philosophical data I bring up, are some of the challenges I pose to the heart of established views. DECLARATION I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged. ______________________________________________ (CHAKRAVARTY Shamik) Date: CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………….vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………vii 1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………….1 1. Meinongianism 2. Fictional Possibilism 3. Anti-Realism about Fictional Entities 4. Fictional Abstractionism 5. My Account 5.1 Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Theory of Metaphor 6. Motivations for my Account 6.1 Fictional Characters as Sets of Properties 6.2 The Problem of Creation 6.3 Problems of Identity 6.3.1 Problems with Essential Properties of Fictional Characters 6.3.2 Problems with A Necessary Condition for Identity 6.3.3 Interest Relative Identity 7. The Problem of Internal and External Perspectives 8. Advantages over Meinongianism and Possibilism 9. Conclusion 2. VAN INWAGEN’S FICTIONAL CREATURES AND THEIR DISCONTENTS………………………………………………….…………………....……30 1. Introduction 2. Van Inwagen’s Account of Fictional Characters 2.1 Van Inwagen’s Argument for the Existence of Fictional Characters 2.2 Classification of Fictional Characters Van Inwagen’s Argument Against Paraphrase 3. Yagisawa’s Objections to Van Inwagen 4. Goodman’s Defense of Van Inwagen against Yagisawa 4.1 Goodman’s First Argument 4.2 Goodman’s Second Argument 5. Jung and Pellet’s Objections to Van Inwagen i 5.1 Jung and Pellet’s First Objection 5.2 Jung and Pellet’s Second Objection 6. Solodkoff and Woodward’s objection to Van Inwagen 7. Hayaki’s Objection to van Inwagen 3. THOMASSON’S FICTIONAL ARTEFACTS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS. ……56 1. A Brief Overview 1.1 Fictional Characters as Dependent Abstracta 1.2 Reference to Fictional Characters 1.3 Identity Conditions for Fictional Characters 1.4 The Problem of Negative Existentials 2. Zemach’s Objections 2.1 Zemach’s First Objection 2.2 Zemach’s Second Objection 2.3 Zemach’s Third Objection 3. Friend’s Objections 4. Iacona and Voltolini’s Objections 4.1 Iacona and Voltolini’s First Objection 4.2 Iacona and Voltolini’s Second Objection 5. Reicher’s Objection 6. Howell’s Objections 6.1 The Problem with a Non-Spatiotemporal Fictional Character 7. Everett’s Objection 7.1 Solodkoff’s Modification of Thomasson 7.2 My Objection to Solodkoff 8. Van Inwagen’s Objection 4. SALMON’S SINGLE TIER THEORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS………………..100 1. Introduction 1.1 Salmon’s Account 2. Sawyer’s Objections 3. Interlude: My Objection to Salmon 4. Contessa’s Objection 5. Hayaki’s Objection 6. Predelli’s Objection to Salmon and Modification ii 6.1 Predelli’s Solution 6.2 My Objections to Predelli 6.3 Why Are Properties Salient 6.4 The Problem with Negative Existentials 5. WALTON’S PRETENSE THEORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS…………...…..…...136 1. A Brief Overview 2. Friend’s Objections to Walton 2.1 The Problem of Intersubjective Identification 2.1.1 Friend’s Objection to Walton 2.1.2 Friend’s Account of Intersubjective Identification for Fictional Characters 2.1.3 Garcia-Carpintero’s Objections to Friend 2.1.4 Garcia-Carpintero’s Account 2.2 My Objections to Friend and Garcia-Carpintero on Intersubjective Identification 3. Zemach’s Objections to Walton 4. Richards’s Objection to Walton 5. Pautz’s Objections to Walton 5.1 Excursus into my account 6. Matravers’ Objections to Walton 6.1 How Matravers’ Account Fits in With Mine 6. THE METAPHYSICS OF FICTIONAL ENTITIES…………………………………191 1. Fictional Characters as Ideas 1.1 Master Argument for Fictional Characters 1.2 Mind-Dependent Properties 1.3 What are Mind-Dependent Properties? 2. Arguments for Fictional Content 2.1 Explanation for van Inwagen’s Mistake 2.2 Explanation for Kripke not finding an “Internal Structure” 2.3 Persistence Conditions for Fictional Characters 2.3.1 Thomasson’s Continued Dependence Condition 3. Interest Relative Identity 3.1 Objections Against Bundles 4. Referring to Mental Representations 4.1 Discourse Referents and Denotation 4.2 Kartunnen’s Discourse Referents iii 4.3 Negative Existentials and Valuation Features 4.4 Discourse Referents Clarified 4.5 Reference, Not Denotation 5. Idiolects and I-Language 5.1 Refers (to) as an Intentional (sic.) Transitive Verb 6. Objections 6.1 Objections on Aboutness and Reference 6.2 A Fregean Objection 7. Everett’s Problem of Indeterminacy 8. Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………...………………...259 iv List of Figures Figure 1. Reference Picture for sentences (8), (9), (10)…………………...…….231 v Acknowledgements No amount of gratitude is enough for my supervisors, Rafael De Clercq and Andrea Sauchelli as well as my wife Ipshita Mukherjee for this thesis. My supervisors not only provided valuable feedback, challenging discussions and probing questions, but also bore with my seemingly endless arguments. My wife Ipshita, who is from an entirely different Business major background, not only patiently sat through as a guinea pig when I tested her intuitions on thought experiments and gave feedback, she also took care of me and provided valuable emotional support through the thesis. Kyle York was the bouncing board for my arguments even as I barged into his room without notice. So I thank him. I am grateful to my friend Chris Atkinson who heard out my ideas and helped me. I thank Shampika Mukherjee, my mum-in-law, for her hospitality and warmth. I thank Jeffrey Ketland, Derek Baker, Dan Waxman, Dan Marshall, Simon Goldstein, Micheál Lacey, Ezechiel Thibaud, David Saldanha, Haktan Akcin and Andreas Matthias for giving me insights, feedback and providing valuable discussion. My mentors back in India, Bijoy Boruah, Arudra Burra, Kranti Saran and Scott Dixon did readings with me, read my work and rigorously forced me to clarify my ideas for which I am deeply grateful. Last but not the least, I thank Nilanjan Bhowmick, who patiently checked my arguments for rigour and heard me out when I needed him most. vi Chapter 1 Introduction In recent metaphysics, the issue of fictional entities has undergone extensive debate. Are there any fictional entities? This question is motivated by another question: What makes a statement about a fictional character true? Apart from the ontological question, there is also the broader metaphysical question: What is the nature of these entities? (Thomasson 1999) For those who accept the existence of fictional entities (fictional realists), there are three broad solutions to the ontological and metaphysical questions: Meinongianism, Fictional Possibilism and Fictional Abstractionism.