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AANN AANNTTHHOOLLOOGGYY OOFF PPHHIILLOOSSOOPPHHIICCAALL SSTTUUDDIIEESS VOLUME II EEddiitteedd bbyy PPaattrriicciiaa HHaannnnaa ATINER 2008 1 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies Volume 2 Editorial Board Carol Nicholson Rider University USA Donald Poochigian University of North Dakota USA T. Ann Scholl United Arab Emirates University UAE Board of Reviewers Chrysoula Gitsoulis City College, CUNY USA Keith Green East Tennessee State University USA Effie Papoutsis Kritikos Northeastern Illinois University USA Raymond Petridis-Tzombanos The New School for Social Research USA Penelope Voutsina University of Sheffield UK 2 Athens Institute for Education and Research 2008 AANN AANNTTHHOOLLOOGGYY OOFF PPHHIILLOOSSOOPPHHIICCAALL SSTTUUDDIIEESS VOLUME II EEddiitteedd bbyy PPaattrriicciiaa HHaannnnaa 3 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies Volume 2 PUBLISHED BY ATHENS INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 14 Solomou Street, 10683 Athens, Greece Tel. +30 210 36.34.210 Fax +30 210.36.34.209 Email: [email protected] URL: www.atiner.gr This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of the Athens Institute for Education and Research. First Published: 2008 ISBN: 978-960-6672-38-5 Typeset, printed and binding by Theta Co. 4 T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s List of Contributors History of Philosophy Introduction Hanna, P. Part I. Ancient and Medieval 1. Aquinas and Ibn Rushd on the Added Dimension of 1 Reason in the Comprehension of Revelation in Two Medieval Religious Tradition Ahmad, Isham P. 2. The Conquests of Alexander and Greek Knowledge 13 of Indian Philosophy: A Context of Understanding Bruseker, George 3. Vasubandhu’s use of Vijñapti-mātra: 25 A Reinterpretation in the Context of the Bodhisattva Ideal Collinson, Hazel 4. The Hollow Truth of Ockham's Razor 37 Goodman, Jeffrey 5. Socrates’ Wisdom in the Apology 43 Green, Jonas Stigaard 6. The Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian 53 Metaphysics Tahko, Tuomas E. Part II. Modern 7. Kant’s Rejection of Right of Revolution 65 Azeri, Siyaves 8. Spinoza on Hatred and the Impotence of Reason 77 Green, Keith 9. Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction: 89 A Reply to a Classical Objection Lee, Seung Kee 10. Class-theoretic Paradoxes and the Neo-Kantian 101 discarding of Intuition Onof, Christian 11. Kantian Intelligibility 113 Räsänen, Petri 12. Throwing Out Scholastic Metaphysics with the 123 Bathwater? Scholl, T. Ann 5 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies Volume 2 Part III. 20th Century 13. Wittgenstein's Treatment of Philosophical Problems 137 Gitsoulis, Chrysoula 14. A Shriveling Vitalistic Return: Butler's Critique of 149 Foucault's Masculinist Ontology Igrek, Apple Zefelius 15. Levinas and Arendt on Violence and Conscience: 159 The Disharmony of Everyday Life Kaye, David 16. Describing the Unspeakable and Demonstrating the 171 Unprovable: Wittgenstein, Gödel, and the Metamathematics that Wasn't O'Loughlin, Ian Part IV. Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Language 17. Internal Realism 181 Bremer, Manuel 18. The Fregean Theory of Belief Reports and Anaphora 191 Bonardi, Paolo 19. How Private is Private?: What's Wrong with 199 Chomsky's Mentalism Hanna, Patricia 20. Lotteries, Knowledge and Vagueness 211 Murzi, Julien 21. Abstraction and the Interpretation of Quality 223 Poochigian, Donald V. 22. Hegel's Analysis of Universality in The Science of 235 Logic Trisokkas, Ioannis D. Part V. Ethics and Political Philosophy 23. Human Enhancement—The Alterability of Human 249 Nature? Anthropological and Ethical Aspects Heilinger, Jan-Christoph 24. Should we believe our Ethical Theories? 261 Virtue Ethics and Self-Effacement Martinez, Joel A. 25. The Physician-Patient Relationship: An Aretaic 271 Formulation McCabe, Matthew S. 26. Utilitarianism, Obligation, and Significant Sacrifice 281 Michael, Mark A. 6 27. Global Justice after Rawls: Kantian and Hegelian 291 Strategies Nicholson, Carol 28. Competition and Reasons of Autonomy: 303 A Rejection of Korsgaard’s Theory of Reasons Salazar, Heather 29. 'Weeds are the Bane of the Fields; Desire is the Bane 313 of Mankind': Desire, Intentional Action, and the Good Life' Schiltz, Elizabeth A. 30. What are the Prospects for Armchair Ethics? 327 Winter, Michael Part VI. Philosophy of Religion 31. The Franciscan Concepts of Joy, Laughter and 339 Foolishness in the Post-modern Context Golozubov, Aleksandr 32. The Question of Ineffability in Semantics and 349 Negative Theology Lehtonen, Tommi 33. Deconstructing God-On the Logical and Conceptual 359 Clarification of the Problem of Evil Muenster, Harald 34. An Evaluation of Freud’s Concepts of Morality and 371 God O'Meara, William 7 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies Volume 2 8 L i s t o f C o n t r i b u t o r s Isham P. Ahmad is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the International Islamic University, Malaysia. His research interest is mainly in epistemology. His primary focus concerns the relationship between revelation and reason, and how this shapes our worldview and our understanding of ethics. He has applied this research to interfaith dialogue, collaborating in works on the understanding and appreciation of religion from a global perspective. Siyaves Azeri is a Research Fellow in Philosophy at the Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran. He received his Master of Arts in philosophy from the New School for Social Research, and his PhD from the University of Ottawa. His major areas of research concern the problem of personal identity and the metaphysics of the self, and the application of particular philosophical theories to literature and film. Paolo Bonardi is a PhD student in the Philosophy Department at the Université de Genève, Geneva, Switzerland. He has been a visiting student and tutor at the University of Sheffield and New York University. He has delivered papers on epistemology, problems of belief and philosophy of language at a number of philosophical conferences; in addition he has published papers papers in Dialectica and Abstracta. Manuel Bremer is University Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Düsseldorf. He has also worked as a software engineer and computer science teacher. He studied Philosophy, Linguistics and Computer Science at the universities of Cologne, Hagen and Düsseldorf included philosophy, linguistics and computer science, receiving Master of Arts, a PhD and a post-doctoral thesis [German "Habilitation"]. He specializes in logic, philosophy of language and cognitive science. He has published on semantics, rationality, information flow, logic, cognitive science, and epistemology. George Bruseker is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Athens, Greece. His research interests include ancient Greek, Indian and Chinese philosophy and the theory and practice of intercultural philosophy. He is currently completing a dissertation on the encounter of Greek and Indian philosophy at the end of the classic and beginning of the Hellenistic period. He has a BS in history and philosophy from the University of Alberta, Canada, and an MA in philosophy from the Catholic University of Leuven, Holland. Hazel Collinson is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Manchester, UK. Her research focuses on issues of ‘consciousness’ in the Sanskritic philosophical traditions of Vasubandhu (fourth century CE), Kumārila (seventh century CE) and Śakara (eighth century CE). Other research interests include epistemology, philosophy of language and pedagogical methods in Sanskritic philosophical texts. She has a BA and an MA in the study of Religion and Theology from the University of Manchester. Chrysoula Gitsoulis received her PhD in Philosophy from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York in 2008. Her research interests include Wittgenstein, ancient Greek philosophy, and contemporary moral and social issues. She holds a BA in Philosophy, a BS in Mathematics, and a Minor in Classics from Rutgers College, New Jersey. She is an adjunct lecturer at the 9 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies Volume 2 City University of New York, and is currently working on publishing her dissertation. Aleksandr Golozubov received his PhD in Philosophy of Culture and Philosophical Anthropology from V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine, where he is an Associate Professor of Philosophy. He has been a visiting scholar at the Central European University, Budapest, the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., as a Fulbright Scholar. He has published papers on Theology of Laughter in the western culture; Franciscan tradition, the problem of the sacral violence and utopian and anti-utopian genres. Jeffrey Goodman is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia, USA. He works in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Logic, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Religion, and has published papers in these areas in international journals. Jonas Stigaard Green is a Sessional Lecturer in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, London. UK. He received his PhD in Philosophy from University of London at King’s College. His research interests include Ancient Greek Philosophy, Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology, and Selfhood and Character. Keith Green is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, Tennessee, USA. He serves as the Advisor for Religious
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