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Nussbaum on Moral Perception and the Priority of the Particular Nussbaum on Moral Perception and the Priority of the Particular Benjamin Visscher Hole IV University of Washington Department of Philosophy Seattle, WA 98195 E-mail: [email protected] Phone: (509) 570-8428 Abstract prior to ethical principles. This is her priority of the particular Martha Nussbaum’s account of moral perception holds the thesis thesis and my stalking horse of my paper. that we perceive moral particulars prior to ethical principles. First, I explain her account. Second, I present her with a dilemma: our §1. The Priority of the Particular Thesis perception of moral particulars is either non-inferential or it is Nussbaum’s account of moral perception assumes that inferential. If Nussbaum accepts a non-inferential interpretation, moral value is heterogeneous and non-commensurable.6 She then she is committed to an unsavory view about moral claims that the objects of this moral perception include: new epistemology – one that invites intuitionism and further invites and unanticipated features, the context-embeddedness of relativism. But if she accepts a non-inferential account, then the moral particular is no longer prior to the ethical principle. I suggest these relevant features, and the ethical relevance of particular 7 that her better option is to grab the second horn. This move avoids persons and relationships. the problems of the first horn without sacrificing her neo- We perceive new and unanticipated features the same way Aristoelian commitments or her overarching view that literature doctors perceive the medically relevant features when plays an ineliminable in moral enquiry. At the same time, this move performing differential diagnoses.8 Doctors are trained to renders her priority thesis trivial. (135 words) apply their medical knowledge to novel cases with unexpected symptoms. So too, moral deliberators are trained §0. Introduction to apply ethical knowledge to new and unanticipated features. What is moral perception? In Love’s Knowledge, Martha But just as a doctor’s knowledge of medical texts radically Nussbaum describes it as follows: under-determines her response toward new cases, a moral [The] ability to discern, acutely and responsively, the deliberator’s knowledge of ethical principles radically under- salient features of one’s particular situation.1 determines how she will respond to the new and [This] is some sort of complex responsiveness to the unanticipated features of her situation. Rather, it seems that salient features of one’s concrete situation.2 moral deliberators, like doctors, perceive something valuable By way of example, consider the following sketch. One day in particular features. And these features play an important a spouse asks, ‘Honey, how was dinner? Was it good?’ And role in moral deliberation. The moral deliberator may have to suppose that the dinner was really, really disgusting. The look for creative unique solution when faced with an virtuous person can tell that answering negatively would everyday moral dilemma, as in the ‘Honey, how was dinner?’ likely hurt her spouse’s feelings. Perhaps the virtuous person example. is especially perceptive of her spouse – she can tell that her In addition, we perceive the context-embeddedness of spouse is especially sensitive to criticism about certain things, these relevant features. The ways in which the moral such as cooking. If she is both honest and kind, she will try deliberator looks for creative unique solutions depends to find an honest way to respond that will also spare the greatly on the context-embedded features of her situation. spouse’s feelings. Perhaps she will notice that she is The deliberator in the dinner example might look to the kind particularly proud of a side dish, which she can honestly of person her spouse is, the quality of each dish, the amount compliment. Or perhaps she realizes that honestly saying that of time and effort put preparing … and so on. Nussbaum the food was not very good is actually, in the long run, the refers us back to Aristotle to explain this context- kindest course of action. So the person in question starts embeddedness.9 According to the doctrine of the mean, with the particulars of her given situation – her spouse, the virtue requires being rightly disposed toward many different quality of the dinner, and all of the salient features of the situation. That is to say, she looks for creative, unique ways 6 Her argument for this goes as follows (see Nussbaum (1990), 118): of solving these everyday dilemmas. And this process seems Suppose that value were homogeneous and commensurable. Particular to involve a kind of moral perception, that is, a kind of instances of value, such as persons, would therefore be nothing more than sensitivity to what is valuable in her perceptual field. placeholders for value. (Perhaps ‘instance’ is not the right word; it is unclear what sort of value Nussbaum associates with persons. She claims that it is Nussbaum claims that “much is made of an ethical ability “mysterious” – see Nussbaum (1990), 31.) For example, suppose that all 3 that [she] call[s] ‘perception’” –but much also depends on value in the world were to consist entirely in pleasure. Then different states what she means by this. Her grand thesis in Love’s Knowledge is of affairs are valuable insofar that they are the loci of pleasure. But the that literature is “indispensable to philosophical enquiry in particulars that confer pleasure are “thick and interesting” enough to 4 differentiate from one another (Nussbaum (1990), 118). That is, we can the ethical sphere.” The proper starting point of such qualitatively differentiate, which suggests that different instances of value are 5 enquiry, she suggests, is to ask: ‘How should one live?’ This not, or at least not always, commensurable with one another. For example, question is the basis for her Aristotelian conception of moral the pleasure I get from reading a fascinating book is different from the epistemology, which involves moral perception: our ability to pleasure I get from eating a delicious meal. This, at the very least, suggests that particulars are relevant in ways that set them apart from homogenous, perceive moral value in objects that are ultimately particular. commensurable value. Given this, she suggests that we perceive Central to this is the claim that we perceive moral particulars heterogeneous, incommensurable value in the world. (One may well be suspicious that Nussbaum’s argument is question-begging. However, she sees this not as a knock-down argument, but more as a prima facie reason for 1 Nussbaum (1990), 37. the heterogeneity and non-commensurability of value. See Nussbaum (1990), 2 Nussbaum (1990), 55. 118.) 3 Nussbaum (1990), 37. 7 See Nussbaum (1990), 38 – 40. 4 Nussbaum (1990), 23. 8 See Nussbaum (1990), 38. 5 See Nussbaum (1990), 25. 9 Nussbaum (1990), 38. 1 features depending on the given situation (EN.II.6.1106b20- make the right decision. Moreover, ethical principles lack 24). For example, Milo, the wrestler must take his weight, flexibility to accommodate moral particulars.13 physical training, relative size, and so on, into account when Nussbaum cites the following passage to defend her trying to determine how much to eat. Eating too much and Aristotelian conception:14 eating too often are both excessive with respect to [Practical] wisdom is concerned with the ultimate temperance. Eating too much involves an amount feature, particular, which is the object … of perception … while eating too often involves an occasion feature. Similarly, (EN.VI.8.1142a-23-30)15 a person may be deficient by eating too little or too seldom. Aristotle claims the ultimate particular is the object of moral But note the deep context-embeddedness of these kinds of perception – but to understand this, commentators have features. Because Milo is a wrestler who exercises all the suggested that we look at Aristotle’s practical syllogism.16 time, perhaps he needs to eat a large amount of protein and This is because practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue carbohydrates. If he has a big wrestling match the next day, which structures the practical syllogism is constructed: it perhaps he needs to eat a lot of carbohydrates. If he plans on finds the right means to the right ends. A syllogism has a exercising soon, perhaps he should not eat (or wait 20 major premise, such as ‘All men are mortal’ and a minor minutes after eating). And so on. premise, such as ‘Socrates was a man.’ From this we can infer Finally, we perceive the ethical relevance of particular ‘Socrates was mortal.’ In the practical syllogism, the major persons and relationships.10 Nussbaum draws an example premise is a universal ethical principle and the minor premise from The Golden Bowl, by Henry James. In the novel, Adam is a particular fact that falls within the perceptual field. When Verver is Maggie’s father. Maggie marries Prince Amerigo the agent combines the major and minor premises, she infers and encourages Adam to propose to Charlotte, a former the conclusion. And when this demands virtuous action, she mistress of the Prince. Although Charlotte accepts Adam’s therefore acts. What the virtuous agent perceives is some proposal, Charlotte and the Prince eventually rekindle their morally salient particular in her perceptual field. This is the relationship. (This is in no small part because Maggie and ultimate particular. Adam appear more interested in their relationship with one There is, however, an ambiguity in this Aristotle passage, another than in their respective marriages.) Nussbaum claims which I think carries over to Nussbaum’s Aristotelian that Maggie perceives the value of her relationship with her conception of moral epistemology. It is unclear whether the father. Even if Adam were replaced with a clone, or with object of moral perception is the content of the minor another person meeting all of Adam’s describable properties, premise, or the inference drawn from combining the major something would be missing: “She loves him … – however mysterious that is.”11 This is not something she can abstract from her particular situation because it is ultimately 13 Here, Nussbaum refers to Aristotle’s Lesbian Rule: “the rule adapts itself particular.
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