ISSUE 148

June 2013 If no Victoria Cross, then why not a Star of Gallantry? The return of the Orions from the MEAO HMAS Vampire and her Last Captain: CMDR WTA Moran RAN The Limits of Extended Deterrence and the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the North West Pacific

On Maritime Military Health Services 2013 Creswell Oration

Journal of the

Issue 148 3 Letters to the Editor Contents

Dear Editor, I appreciated the biography of Fred T he return of the Orions from the As a seaman officer who served on Purves and was interested in the Vernon MEAO– enhanced RAN/RAAF training various projects with Admiral Purves, Parker Oration; he was also a close friend. benefits orO peration Resolute I was delighted to read Dr. Tom Lewis’s I wonder if you might be interested workhorses 4 article in the December 2012 issue. in a further story about Fred Purves told However, there was no mention of his by him to me many years ago. During most obvious habit of smoking cigars. the Depression, when jobs were scarce If no Victoria Cross, then why not a Star Freddie told me on various occasions and he was apparently in UK (and had of Gallantry? 7 that he acquired this habit whilst some connection with Vickers; I’m serving as an engineer in the Bolivian speaking here of 1934/35 (?); he was in Air Force. He said that, during the Bolivia during the war between Bolivia HMAS Vampire and her Last Captain: 1930s when it was difficult to get a job and Chaco and operating as an aircraft Commander WTA Moran RAN 10 as a ship’s engineer, he responded to an mechanic or engineer. He was arrested; advertisement in a British paper inserted placed, with others, on a truck, menaced by the Bolivian Air Force and was by machineguns and threatened with The Limits of Extended Deterrence accepted. He wasn’t an airman for very death (he must have been all of 22 plus and the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation long, just long enough to take up cigars. or minus at this stage) but managed, with in the North West Pacific 17 Late in the evening, he was proud to the help of the Brit Embassy (or whoever declare that he was the only RAN officer the diplomatic people were then) to be to have served in the Bolivian Air Force. I repatriated to UK as a distressed British On Maritime Military am sure that he was not pulling my leg… seaman. My husband and I did send Health Services 26 John Smith him a postcard from La Paz in 1990 to remind him of his time in Bolivia! To the Editor, There are many stories that can be World Naval Developments I have now received the December told about Fred Purves but my favorite is – Drones in Mali 36 copy of Headmark. I must express my after the first ships that were introduced admiration for the professionalism and in the RAN with “bridge control”, which excellent presentation of this journal; it meant not having to signal down to Australia’s pivot to the Indian Ocean 39 has changed immensely from way back the engine room for forward or reverse when my husband was named as the thrust etc., my husband (at this time a 2013 Creswell Oration “The Royal “publisher” so that he could be sued and Commander) was with Fred Purves at a F ront page : Australian Naval College: Creswell’s no-one else for the content – or at least gathering in Garden Island or Penguin HMAS Toowoomba Last Great Legacy” 44 that was as I understood it! or somewhere like that in Sydney in the Access Point Sentry’s Jonathan Brett Young also asks me to company of a number of senior officers, Leading Seaman Richard Magrath and thank you as he also received a copy of where one said senior officer brought Jack Crace: Boy from the bush, Task the December Journal – indeed I think up the subject of these new ships with Petty Officer Dean Group commander at the Coral Sea, Gilchrist conduct he was so impressed he may take out a “bridge control.” and Admiral RN 52 subscription! Despite his resignation Fred’s response was “you can give the checks at Port Rashid, from the RAN many years ago he retains bastards bridge control but you can’t give United Arab Emirates. close ties with his year; writes many them bloody brains!” Being the junior Book Reviews 58 obituaries for the London Times etc., officer present my husband chose to and has only just resigned as Deputy absent himself very quickly! Lord Lieutenant, after many years, of Best regards Visions from the Vault 67 Sutherland County in Scotland. Valmai Patterson Issue Number 148 SPONSORS: Printed in Style Notes for Headmark 69 Queensland Australia - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL - QINETIQ ISSN 1833-6531 CEA Technologies - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - ATI - SAAB - Design & DTP by + ANI Membership Application Form 71 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM VOSS NAVAL Diane Bricknell [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 The return of the Orions from the MEAO – enhanced RAN/RAAF training benefits or Operation Resolute workhorses By Lieutenant Sean Bates

he AP-3C Orion (P3) aircraft The return of the deployed P3s with the increased number of arrivals is Australia’s primary maritime will have a detrimental effect on the by boat. The Chief of Navy has made Tpatrol aircraft (MPA). For almost capability of the surface combatants several public comments about the ten years, two were serving in the still operating in the MEAO. The P3s inaccuracies of such reporting. Middle East Area of Operations have provided an invaluable service to The reduction of Australia’s air (MEAO) conducting overland and Coalition warships by providing surface commitment to the Global War maritime intelligence, surveillance reporting out to ranges far greater than on Terror and anti-piracy does not and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. the ships radars. They also have the necessarily mean more assets for There was, however, a long held belief ability to stay on station for up to three Operation Resolute. The current that Australia’s MPA forces, attached times longer than embarked organic commitment to Resolute is three to Operation Slipper (Global War on aircraft and patrol far greater distances. airframes and two crews that are Terrorism), would soon be returned to The loss of the P3s will also see a continually detached to Darwin Australia. reduction in ISR missions provided to from their home base at RAAF Base In early 2010, the P3s were removed Coalition ground forces in Afghanistan. Edinburgh in South Australia. Generally from Operation Catalyst (Stabilisation Although the overland ISR role is only one crew is required to fly Resolute of Iraq) and re-focused their efforts on important this paper will solely focus on missions per day, while the other Anti-Piracy operations off the Horn the P3s maritime capability. remains on standby for Search And of Africa and ISR operations over Rescue tasks. Afghanistan. This changed operational Future Employment of the P3s More ADF airframes being focus may have enhanced the belief that It is easy to say that the returning P3s made available to Resolute does not their tasking for the initial deployment should be re-directed to operate with necessarily mean more irregular to the MEAO was complete and that Border Protection Command. This arrivals will be detected. Intelligence they would soon return to Australia. would be particularly relevant in the gathered by civilian and military On 23 November 2012 the Chief of wake of recent media reports that agencies at home and abroad, by a the Defence Force formally announced sensationalize the influx of irregular variety of means, provides information that the P3s had completed their maritime arrivals into Australian for Border Protection Command. service in MEAO and would return waters. Such media reports discuss at This information is passed on to the P3 releases munitions over a to Australia. The return of the P3 length the supposed inability of our MPAs (P3s and chartered Coastwatch Meko 200 frigate detachment saw the conclusion of Armidale Class Patrol Boat force to deal aircraft) and provides a window for (Courtesy RAAF) 2410 missions flown since their initial deployment to the MEAO in 2003, which is a significant achievement. The return of these airframes and crews means there is an increased availability of airframes for other taskings. This availability can have benefits for the RAN and RAAF, particularly an improvement in both services high- end warfare skills. CDF has stated that ‘92 Wing will continue its primary roles to prepare for, conduct and sustain ISR and strike operations in support of Australia’s national interests. This includes the significant border protection commitment in support of Operation Resolute.’1 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 5

possible Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels detection. The fact that the majority of SIEVs are detected before arriving in Australian waters would suggest that the balance of MPA use is about right in the north and northwestern approaches. So, if the boost to P3s is not going to be utilised by Border Protection Command, what is the best use for them? 92 Wing, which operates the P3s, will be glad to see the return of these two airframes and two crews from the MEAO. The return will aid P8 Poseidon (US Navy) their own wing training burdens and MEAO and Resolute commitments such as the Triton series of exercises, provide greater respite for Resolute have continually demanded five PWO warfare assessment week and deployed crews. However, there is a airframes and four crews. The work up periods. This increased greater, mutually beneficial solution normal commitments required for aircraft availability will reduce the that can result from these assets ongoing training of personnel and strain on RAN aircraft controllers, returning. Airframes and crews could aircraft unavailability due to routine particularly the Anti-Submarine/Anti- be reinvested into combined high-end maintenance has added to the aircraft Surface Aircraft Controllers (ASAC), war fighting training, which would have and crew availability difficulties. to complete the required number of a greater net benefit for both the RAAF These factors, combined with normal live and dual control hours. PWO and RAN. Both services would benefit career development courses further and Operations Room inter-service from the extra crews and aircraft being effect crew availability, which has planning and execution skills will be made available for joint training. resulted in less participation by P3s in further enhanced. The RAN has long been concerned Fleet Concentration Periods and like Greater cooperation would lead to with the deterioration of high-end war exercises. an improvement in the high-end war fighting skills; Program Pelorus was This does not imply that the fighting skills for the RAN’s frigates/ created in 2011 to address this decline. RAAF/RAN have been ignoring their submarines and the RAAF’s P3s alike. A significant reason for this decline is diminishing skills. 92 Wing have The opposite is also possible if the ADF the recent lack of aviation assets and included high-end war fighting skills fail to take up this challenge. Training submarines to support RAN’s exercises simulation periods into a crew’s 18 opportunities and the chance to build and Unit Readiness Evaluations (URE). month training and operation cycle. significant high-end war fighting skills There are a number of additional The RAN’s Sea Training Group (STG) for both services will be lost and could reasons for this and it would be naïve to has similarly undertaken training in take years to be reacquired, if at all. argue that an increase in P3 availability the RAN’s Major Fleet Units providing The ADF needs to make some hard alone would reverse the trend. guidance and, where needed, training decisions on where to employ the However, if more assets were made and evaluation. But only so much can P3’s in the future either in rebuilding available for routinely occurring serials, be achieved with the current time and high-end war fighting skills or border Operation Rooms would be more asset constraints. Although there is less protection operations. Potentially more familiar with inter-service operations, the two services can do about the time civilian aircraft charter options could leading to an improvement in high-end facet, there is something that can be be used in border protection operations war fighting skills. done to identify the best possible use of and the P3s allocated to joint and 92 Wing has identified their limited assets. combined exercises. Why have a highly high-end war fighting skills are also With an increase of air assets for trained war horse pulling a cart! diminishing, which can be directly joint and combined exercises the linked to their recent operational high-end war fighting training burden Other roles for P3’s tempo. Out of 18 airframes and 12 will be eased. Air assets can be best Navies across the world have always had crews in two operational squadrons, used in Fleet Concentration Periods, a close relationship with MPA forces. In Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 The return of the Orions from the MEAO – enhanced RAN/RAAF training benefits or Operation Resolute workhorses many nations, such as the United States, advantage of inter- the MPAs are actually part of the Navy. service operability This closeness is due to the unparalleled opportunities, support surface combatants gain from while the P3’s MPAs in all capacities of operation. remain in service. Militarily, P3s increase surface Coupled combatants success in detection, with the border identification and prosecution of ASW protection and ASuW threats. In the constabulary requirements, role, P3s are able to respond to a SAR which are not likely more expeditiously than a surface unit to diminish in the and clear enormous search areas in far foreseeable future, P3 Border protector - HMAS Armidale leaves less time than surface units or organic there will soon be fewer airframes Darwin (Courtesy RAN) aircraft. This was most noticeable in to do the same amount work. This the 1997 Southern Ocean rescues of work consisting of border protection yachtsmen Tony Bullimore and Theirry operations, supporting exercises at Dubois where P3s quickly located the home and abroad and the conduct of stricken vessels and deployed life-rafts, SAR and diplomatic taskings, when on 6 January 1997, and the men were required. Additionally, the introduction then picked up by the frigate HMAS of an UAS will bring its own level Adelaide some three days later.2 of complexity for inter-operability MPAs also have a diplomatic role between the RAN and RAAF. The new where by they provide assistance system may not be nearly as functional to friendly nations. P3s can patrol for the RAN as working with a manned large expanses of ocean to identify system and in some cases, may not be illegal fishing or smuggling activities, as suitable for instance in deploying a Lieutenant Sean Bates RAN joined particularly in the South West Pacific life-raft to a sinking yacht. where many island nations do not have With the return of the P3’s, and their the Royal Australian Navy in 2005, the aviation resources to undertake air and ground crews from the MEAO, graduating ADFA in 2007 with a these tasks. The P3 is perfectly designed 92 Wing will be better able to support Bachelor of Business. Having received to work hand in hand with the RAN. the RAN in periods of high-end war his BWC in 2011 on Perth, Lieutenant They can search vast areas of ocean and fighting training activity. Unit work Bates has participated in several then provide the necessary data to allow up periods, PWO warfare assessment surface ships to undertake military, weeks and the Triton series of exercises domestic and international exercises. constabulary or diplomatic roles as would all be positively affected. Greater He is currently residing in the United required. training results will be possible for both Kingdom while working for the Sea the RAN and RAAF with 92 Wing Power Centre – Australia. Replacement of the P3s able to commit more airframes, more In the future, the size of Australia’s regularly and for longer periods. MPA force will be reduced with the The ADF has a golden opportunity References: introduction of the P3 replacement, the at this point to re-deploy the returning Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2010. Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN P8 Poseidon. Only eight airframes, at P3’s to high-end war fighting training Doctrine 1 – 2010. Royal Australian Navy. this stage, are being purchased by the and seek other solutions for border Air Power Development Centre, 2007. The RAAF. Although eventually the P8s protection operations. The risk of failing Air Power Manual (AAP 1000 - D) will be supported by a yet unspecified to do this is a continued diminishment (Endnotes) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), the of these hard to get – easy to lose skills 1 CDF Australia signal dated 23 November time for more inter service operability in order to satisfy the current border 2012 (AP-3C Orions return from the Middle East) is now. It is time for the RAAF to protection issues. t 2 Search and Recue: A Miracle in the South. deliver more P3s for high-end war Issue 3, January 2007. Semaphore Newsletter fighting training and the RAN to take of the Sea Power Centre – Australia. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 7 If no Victoria Cross, then why not a Star of Gallantry? B y DrTom Lewis

out needed to 100 out of 149 men be provided by lost. And in Darwin harbour on 19 witnesses. February 1942, Leading Cook The Francis Emms – another investigations into of the 13 – was shot in the circumstances the stomach in combat of the naval people manning a machinegun on the inquiry against Japanese air list – 11 out of attack. He died later that day. the 13 – have not His circumstances were a little Victoria Cross, taken account of different – the entire ship’s company of awarded to Major Peter John Badcoe of he decision by the federal the special circumstances surrounding HMAS Kara Kara, a ship tending the the Royal Australian Tgovernment recently that 13 naval battle. This is a new factor that boom net defence across the harbour, Infantry Corps former members of the armed forces has not been considered before, and numbered only 39 – and two of them (SA Museum) would not be receiving retrospective should have been. By its very nature, were killed.5 Hardly many witnesses to recognition for their deeds is not only witnesses to attest to such bravery are hand, given their locations around and shocking. It is wrong. far fewer than in land combat, because inside the ship – another factor that L eft: Star of Gallantry (Australian Over three years of researching the ships concerned often were sunk makes naval bravery hard to witness. Government) my book The Submarine Six, I came with massive loss of life. How was this Awarding the Victoria Cross to know three of these men: Hec taken into account? was even more difficult at sea as the Waller, Robert Rankin, and Teddy In the action between the German recommendation needed to come Sheen, as well as can be expected raider Kormoran and HMAS Sydney from a senior commissioned officer, across a gap of seven decades and for example, in November 1941, all normally the captain. Captains were their deaths in combat in World War 645 men died. With the loss of the mostly to be found in battle on their II. Their actions in fighting on board battlecruiser HMS Hood in 1941, all open unprotected bridges – the His Majesty’s Australian Ships Perth, but three3 of the 1, 418 crew were point of aim for enemy gunners. Not Yarra, and Armidale were heroic killed. With the loss of the ships in surprisingly the captains of Perth and indeed, and at the time they received which these Australians served, we Yarra were killed in action at their little recognition. Waller and Sheean saw on Waller’s ship, the cruiser Perth, posts. How was this limitation taken received what was called a “Mention in 353 of the 681 crew were killed in the into account? Despatches.” It wasn’t a medal, rather action, and a further 110 ashore or in Given the attrition numbers, it’s a badge, albeit a prestigious one. Many captivity later.4 (Fighting alongside the not surprising that the VC for naval thousands1 were awarded before it was Australian cruiser, and also sunk, was personnel was more difficult to phased out in 1975. USS Houston – her Captain Rooks obtain than it is for land forces. Of the In WWII the MID was one of received the very highest American Victoria Crosses given in Australian only two awards that could be given award, the Congressional Medal of military history, none have been posthumously, the other being the Honor. Why do the Americans reward therefore awarded to seagoing people, highest award of the Victoria Cross. their people so much more readily?) and only four to air servicemen. Exceptionally high circumstances The sloop Yarra’s personnel, fighting Admittedly it was always going were demanded before the Cross was as the sole convoy escort against to be hard to award a Victoria Cross given: it was “awarded for the most numerous Japanese warships, saw even to even one or two of these gallant conspicuous bravery or some daring more of a kill ratio for the enemy: 138 soldiers and sailors. To hand out a ”bag or pre-eminent act of valor or self- out of 151 died in the action or in the of VCs” would cheapen the award. sacrifice or extreme devotion to duty water later. No officer survived. Teddy Nevertheless, it is surprising that at in the presence of the enemy.”2 Of Sheean’s ship, the corvette Armidale, least some were not recommended: course, evidence to the deeds carried was less battered: but she still had it would show the depths of concern Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 If no Victoria Cross, then why not a Star of Gallantry? we as a nation have for these people. Admiral Scheer to try and let his H MAS Yarra (II) Further, more thought should have convoy escape. Like Rankin, he was Grimsby-class Sloop; built at Cockatoo Docks, Sydney; been given to alternatives, despite the killed in the action and his ship sunk. commissioned 21 January 1936 Tribunal’s attesting that “the Tribunal Fegen was awarded the VC for his 1,060 tons (standard), 1,500 tons (full load) was conscious that it should apply the actions. standards and values of the time, and Rankin had seen a strange and 266 feet length x 36 feet beam x 10 feet draught not those of contemporary Australian difficult war. He married just before Crew: 160 society and current expectations.” This the outbreak of hostilities, but had Parsons geared turbines, twin screws; 2,000hp; seems strange in an era of recognising been called from his chosen specialty 16½ knots; range: 9,000 miles @ 10 knots that in the past injustices were inflicted of naval surveying to serve in the Armament: 3 x 4-inch (Mark V) guns, on all sorts of people, from generations British Navy. He had distinguished 2 x 20mm guns (replaced original 4 x 3-pounder guns prior of children, to individuals – and we himself in senior positions in two to Mediterranean service), 1 x Quad 0.5-inch AA mounting have been lately remedying them, with support vessels, but his wife and (on platform amidships), Depth charges (two stern chutes, apologies to the stolen generation for new child had been packed off two throwers), Minesweeping gear example. home to Australia, while his ships H MAS Yarra was a sloop built locally in the mid-1930s to a modern British Take Lieutenant Commander survived attack after attack in the design. Sloops were not designed as true fleet warships, for example Robert Rankin’s case. He was Mediterranean. He was posted home lacking the speed and torpedo hitting power of destroyers. Some therefore might have said that they should never have faced enemy warships, commanding HMAS Yarra, and took to Sydney at the end of 1941, and which was in fact Yarra’s fate. Instead sloops were more suited to anti- her into combat against probably five almost immediately posted to his first submarine and anti-aircraft work, although in Yarra’s short but eventful ships, each of which outgunned him. command, HMAS Yarra; a surveyor in career she performed many duties including shore bombardment and But in a desperate attempt to save his charge of a warship. There is not a sign even sinking an Iranian gunboat. Other sloops, such as Yarra’s sister-ship, convoy, which scattered like sheep of a demur in the service records of this HMAS Swan, replaced their old open 4-inch single mounts with much more before wolves, Yarra charged the quietly redoubtable man. He kissed modern twin turreted guns, doubling their firepower as well as providing some protection for the gun crews. Nevertheless Yarra’s open Mark V enemy. She was shot to pieces. his wife and by-now infant daughter 4-inch guns could elevate to 85°, and her gun crews became very efficient, Rankin’s case is almost identical goodbye – and never saw them again. probably saving the ship during a couple of very heavy air attacks both in to that of British naval officer But through cumbersome the Mediterranean and off Singapore. Fogarty Fegen, who commanded the administrative procedures, inertia and Yarra’s crew were justifiably confident in March 1942, having met and converted liner HMS Jervis Bay in the the need for Australian naval actions won every challenge thrown at them to date. The profile here shows Yarra Atlantic. Defending a convoy, Fegen to be approved6 by the British parent as she appeared in 1941. Her appearance by 1942 was no doubt more as the sole escort charged his attacker, navy, Rankin has seen no award at worn and tattered, having just sustained damage from recent air attacks, the German “pocket battleship” all for his actions. Not that it has and having received little assistance in the chaotic atmosphere of Java. As dozens of vessels fled forF remantle or Ceylon, two powerful Japanese been unnoticed: stories of the event; forces lay in their path. One of these included three heavy cruisers, each histories of the RAN since, and even carrying three floatplanes. Yarra’s convoy was probably spotted by these the Australian Prime Minister at the aircraft, and perhaps it was no accident that dawn on the 4th March time lauded the actions of the ship and found the convoy within sight of the Japanese cruisers. In a ship not best her company. suited to surface combat, and against truly hopeless odds, Yarra’s captain Lieutenant Commander Rankin turned about and attacked, hoping to buy This recent inquiry found that there time for his convoy. But the Japanese squadron was well practised, having had been just accounted for a British and an American destroyer, as well as other errors in vessels. Before long an 8-inch shell smashed into the bridge, carrying away most of the superstructure and with it Rankin and almost all of the ship’s officers. Barely a dozen of her crew were destined to survive. 138 were killed during the engagement.

U77

Yarra graphic courtesy of Peter Ingman Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 9

the case of HMAS Yarra. There Commemoration.7 Are we really (Endnotes) certainly were and not one decoration to think that household names such 1 Website. Honours and Awards. http:// was awarded. But rather than correct as Sheean have been adequately www.awm.gov.au/research/people/ that wrong, they gave the ship a “Unit rewarded? We now use the word hero honours_and_awards/?Name=&ServiceNu mber=&Unit=&Award=Mention+in+Dispat Citation.” No doubt this will be a to describe our prominent sports stars ches&Recommended=Both&Authority=All source of pride for the present ship and sometimes their codes induct them +authorities Accessed 3 March 2013. of that name and any successors, but into a Hall of Fame. Does the failure 2 Website. Anzac Day. http://www. it does not recognize the undoubted to recognise these naval heroes truly anzacday.org.au/education/medals/vc/ default.html Accessed 3 March 2013. bravery of Robert Rankin, Lieutenant reflect the real values of the nation? 3 Website. HMS Hood Association. http:// Commander Smith who took charge of Has the tribunal’s decision reflected the www.hmshood.com/history/timeline4.htm the abandon ship routine, and Leading national amnesia over the real heroism Accessed 3 March 2013. Seaman “Buck” Taylor, who stayed at of our sailors where the stakes were 4 Odgers, Navy Australia. NSW: Child & Associates, 1989. (p.112) his post firing his gun. Why was the not a game won or lost, or a cup or a 5 Website. Royal Australian Navy. http:// VC not asked for in the case of Rankin? trophy, but life itself? t www.navy.gov.au/hmas-kara-kara-i The Tribunal’s reasoning seems to be Accessed 3 March 2013. that few survived who actually saw 6 Navy was treated differently to Army brave conduct on the part of Rankin and RAAF – the Senior Service ship commanding officers could not suggest the and Taylor, and it is now 70 years on. nature of the award and the sister services That seems specious reasoning given could. Naval awards also had to go through the British Admiralty; the Army’s and the the above argument. Surely the fact RAAF went through the Air Force or Army that the ship made for the enemy in the Ministers; then to the Prime Minister and the Governor-General. (See Bradford. In face of hopeless odds is indisputable the Highest Traditions. p. 168) Also the – and should be evidence for Rankin’s government inquiry report: Valour. http:// defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/inquiries/ VC. British sailors were brought onto completed-inquiries/valour/Exec Summary the upper deck of the Japanese cruiser para E6: “In the case of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) units serving on the Australia in which they were captives to witness Station during the Second World War, the destruction of Yarra. One wrote recommendations were forwarded by the RAN to London without passing through after the war that they were all deeply the Australian Government.” impressed by the ship’s fight. They 7 TheValour report. http://defence- wrote that with Yarra on fire one gun honours-tribunal.gov.au/inquiries/ was still firing back at the circling completed-inquiries/valour/Exec Summary E20: The Tribunal also kept in mind that Japanese warships. That was Taylor’s the Australian Defence honours system who had told his sailors to abandon was not established to rectify past injustices caused solely by shortcomings in the ship but chose to stay with his dead Imperial system. Hence, in considering Captain, his ship and his gun, fighting possible retrospective honours, the Tribunal concluded that it should apply the rules as to the end. Taylor has been considered they were at the time. One pertinent rule but refused further honour. There were under the Imperial system was that only the VC and the MID could be awarded a number of sailors, now dead, who posthumously for actions in the presence undoubtedly saw this but is the fact of the enemy. The Tribunal therefore concluded that in considering possible they could not give evidence reason Dr Tom Lewis OAM is a former naval retrospective posthumous honours for enough? an action in the period when the Imperial officer and the author of 11 military system applied, it could only recommend The Tribunal stated that it was history books. He wrote about the the equivalent honours in the Australian now impossible for the Australian system, namely the VC for Australia and six men honoured by the names of the Commendation for Gallantry. To do government to award Imperial otherwise would open the Tribunal to honours, but even if that is correct the Collins-class submarines in The examining all the other cases where a posthumous MID had been awarded. there are however modern Australian Submarine Six, published by Avonmore A complete list of sources relating to the awards which could be used such Books in 2012. He is the Director of sinking of Yarra and Armidale can be found as the Star of Gallantry. Why not the Darwin Military Museum, and the in The Submarine Six, Avonmore Books. award these, or upon consideration, editor of Headmark. their lesser divisions of Medal or Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 HMAS Vampire and her Last Captain: Commander WTA Moran RAN B y Matthew B Wills T his is the story of the Australian and torpedoes. It destroyer HMAS Vampire from the start was not until the first of the war in the Pacific until she was month of the war sunk by Japanese aircraft off Ceylon on that the Royal Navy 10 April 1942 received authority from the Treasury to estroyer losses in the Royal Navy purchase the Swiss during the first two and one-half designed Oerlikon Dyears of World War II were inordinate. antiaircraft gun, a During nearly six years of war Britain fast firing weapon lost at least 160 destroyers. This with a high muzzle category of warship was particularly velocity using 20- vulnerable to divebombers. HMS Kelly mm explosive shells. commanded by a future Admiral of the Commander Louis Vampire in her WWII Fleet, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was Mountbatten made sure that his own fit-out (Tom Lewis sent to the bottom near Crete in May ship, HMS Kelly, was among the first Collection) 1941 by at least 24 Ju 87 divebombers, to be equipped with Oerlikons. At the dreaded Stukas. the commencement of the Pacific war This is the story of HMAS Vampire Vampire was equipped with twin Lewis that met a similar fate at the hands of guns on her bridge and a Vickers gun carrier based Japanese divebombers on her quarterdeck, but none of the off the east coast of Ceylon on 9 newer Oerlikons. April 1942. Vampire was originally For the better part of two years built for the Royal Navy. She was HMAS Vampire served with the Royal launched on 21 May 1917. She had Navy in the Mediterranean under CMDA R WT Moran a displacement of 1,090 tons. Her overall command of the Admiral dimensions were 312’o.a. x 29’ 6” x 10’ known as ABC, which stood for December 1903. Vampire was his 10” (mean draught). She was armed Andrew Browne Cunningham. He first command. He had less than two with four 4-inch guns and a few smaller was greatly admired by the Australians. months to familiarize himself with calibre guns and six 21-inch torpedo Vampire took part in countless actions his ship and his officers and ratings tubes. Her S.H.P. of 27,000 produced against the Italians. In the forenoon before the Empire of Japan launched its a maximum speed of 34 knots. She on 11 July 1940 she was straddled attacks on Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, carried a normal complement of 134 by a stick of bombs. One of her the Philippines and Singapore. officers and ratings. commissioned gunners, JH Endicott Japanese bombers first raided In 1932 HMS Vampire was RN, was mortally wounded by a bomb Singapore in the early hours of transferred to the Royal Australian splinter. He was the first fatality in any Monday 8 December. By noon Navy. Britain’s declaration of war Australian ship. By May 1941 Vampire that day, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips against Nazi Germany on 3 September was badly in need of a refit and was Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern 1939 was immediately followed by therefore withdrawn to the Singapore Fleet made up his mind that HMS similar declarations by Australia, Naval Base where she arrived on 19 Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse Canada and New Zealand. Australia’s June. should engage this new foe. He called Navy consisted of two 8-inch gun This story really begins on 16 a meeting of their captains and others cruisers and four 6-inch gun cruisers, October 1941 when Commander for 1200 onboard Prince of Wales. five destroyers (including Vampire) and William Thomas Alldis Moran Royal There is no official Royal Navy record two sloops. Australian Navy assumed command of the names of those at that meeting; With no armour plating Vampire of HMAS Vampire. He was born in however Commander Moran’s letter was clearly vulnerable to bombs, shells Kalgoorlie, Western Australia on 11 of proceedings forwarded to the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 11

Australian Commonwealth Naval rescued two ratings Board indicates that he was present. from the Prince It was his first and only meeting with of Wales. Neither Captain John Leach MVO DSO who Admiral Phillips nor commanded Prince of Wales. Moran Captain Leach was would have been well aware of Prince among the survivors. of Wales’ battle in the Denmark Strait For almost ten hours with the German battleship Bismarck Captain Tennant and of Captain Leach’s DSO. RN was a passenger At approximately 1700 Force Z on Commander consisting of HM Ships Prince of Moran’s ship. Wales, Repulse, Express, Electra, Captain Tennant Tenedos and HMAS Vampire steamed had lost his ship, into the South China Sea. Admiral 27 of her officers disciplinary problem as follows: ‘The H MS Hermes off Phillips, flying his flag in Prince of and 486 of her ratings. Moran could Christmas spirit and the local beer Yantai China circe 1931 (Royal Navy) Wales, planned to attack Japanese only offer the Repulse’s captain a bath were too much for some of the ship’s troop transport early on 10 December. and a clean uniform, but there was no company and I regret that a few Late on 9 December Phillips made consolation. Captain Tennant’s grief misbehaved rather badly. They have the difficult decision to return to was inconsolable. been suitably dealt with, and behaviour Singapore after his force was spotted Vampire reached Singapore at on shore has been exemplary since.’1 by enemy aircraft. The crucial battle 1125 and secured alongside Express. On that grim Christmas between Force Z and the land-based Commander Moran immediately Commander Moran could hardly aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy disembarked the wounded and then afford to be lax in enforcing discipline. took place on 10 December. The first the remainder of the survivors. Moran Christmas night Hong Kong attack developed shortly after 1100. and his men badly needed shore capitulated. The Japanese had gained By 1320 the Japanese torpedo planes leave but it seems unlikely they were superiority in the air and at sea from had sunk both the Repulse and the given any. The 11th of December was Hong Kong to Singapore. Their area of Prince of Wales. For reasons that have Commander Moran’s 38th birthday. dominance would all too soon expand never been fully explained Phillips One would like to think that he turned southeast throughout the Netherlands had refused to break radio silence and command of his ship over to his First East Indies and to the west throughout request fighters while there was still Lieutenant and treated himself to the Bay of Bengal. Vampire stern time. a birthday dinner at Raffles Hotel. On 5 January Moran received some gun defences None of the destroyers was sunk Regrettably, there is no evidence that badly needed short-range antiaircraft (Tom Lewis or even seriously damaged. Vampire he was able to take leave of Vampire, guns consisting of two 2-pounder “pom had fired at the Japanese aircraft with even for a few hours. poms” which were fitted in position Collection) everything she had and Commander The whole Moran believed that his gunners had ship’s company damaged at least two enemy planes. was given leave on The last signal sent from Prince of 25-27 December Wales to Vampire ordered her to pick but only to 1800. up survivors from Repulse. This limitation Commander Moran was the only was due to air raid destroyer captain to make a record precautions and the of the exact number of survivors he difficulty of getting rescued. From Repulse there were nine transportation to the officers including Captain Tennant who ship after dark. In his was a year senior to his close friend letter of proceedings Captain Leach, 213 ratings and one for December war correspondent, O’Dowd Gallagher Commander Moran of the Daily Express. Vampire also commented on a Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 HMAS Vampire and her Last Captain: Commander WTA Moran RAN while Vampire was secured in the Somerville, had King George VI dock in the Singapore transferred his flag Naval Base. For the first three weeks from HMS Dragon in January Vampire was engaged in a to HMS Emerald, variety of tasks including providing a slightly newer cover for mine laying operations and cruiser, and had sailed escorting allied convoys. for Colombo. The On 26 January a Japanese convoy admiral left Rear consisting of two transports, the light Admiral EJ Spooner, cruiser Sendai, destroyers of the 3rd Rear Admiral Malaya, Squadron and a minesweeper appeared in charge of all naval off Endau situated on the estuary forces in Singapore. mouth of the Endau River some 80 It is certain that it is miles due north of Singapore. This he who issued the from several sources!’4 Because of HMS Thanet (Tom was only five days before all British, order. Spooner’s order may have been Lieutenant Commander Terry’s Lewis Collection) Australian and Indian ground forces approved by the American Admiral intercession the admiral soon forget his withdrew from Johore for their last Thomas C Hart who on 15 January had threat to have Brooke executed. stand on Singapore. The Japanese assumed command of Allied Naval Commander Moran as senior group carried essential ammunition. Forces ABDA (American-British- officer took charge of both Vampire The British military historian HP Dutch-Australian Command). On 26 and Thanet. In order to appreciate Willmott has written of the vital role of January Admiral Hart was far away the tactical situation the firepower of this enemy convoy with these words, somewhere in Java. It is unlikely that Moran’s force needs to be contrasted ‘Without the Endau convoy of the he was fully apprised of the proposed with the firepower of the six enemy twenty-six [January] Yamashita would operation. destroyers he would most likely engage. have been forced to abandon the attack Spooner may not have been himself Vampire mounted four 4-inch guns. on Singapore or wage it with great during the last half of January. In this Thanet mounted only three 4-inch difficulty.’2 period he had threatened to shoot guns. Five of the enemy destroyers had On the afternoon of 26 January the a young Royal Navy officer called a main armament of six 5-inch guns RAF and the RAAF made an all-out Geoffrey Brooke, a survivor from mounted in twin turrets. The sixth effort to disrupt the Japanese landings. Prince of Wales, for allegedly looting. enemy destroyer was armed with five The British, Australian and New Brooke had taken possession of a brand 5-inch guns. Thus the total number of Zealand pilots were only able to inflict new MG sports car which he thought 5-inch guns on the Japanese destroyers direct hits on the light cruiser and the was abandoned. Brooke would later amounted to 35 as opposed to seven two transports. No Japanese vessel write, ‘Abandoned cars were two a 4-inch guns on the Australian and was sunk. Faced with heavy opposition penny … The little car burbled happily British destroyers. To make a bad from enemy fighters and accurate AA along on return from somewhere situation worse Vampire only had three fire, the British lost 13 of 68 attacking one evening and my thoughts torpedoes. In fairness to Spooner his aircraft with others badly damaged.’3 were anywhere but on personal intelligence had informed him that That same day the captains of trouble. Anthony Terry (Lieutenant the enemy force consisted of only two HMAS Vampire and HMS Thanet, also Commander AH Terry RN) came out destroyers and one light cruiser. an ancient destroyer, were given verbal to meet me … “Now you have done it,” To have any chance of success orders to make a night attack on the he said,” “That car belongs to a Surgeon Vampire and Thanet needed to Japanese ships off Endau. The question Commander Stephenson. You have attack under cover of darkness. has to be asked: Who ordered Vampire been reported to the Admiral … and he They departed Singapore at 1630 in and Thanet to embark on what wants to have you shot!”’ … Brooke’s broad daylight without attracting the promised to be a one-way mission? final words about Spooner were, ‘Rear attention of Japanese aircraft. The two Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton did Admiral Spooner, undoubtedly under ships steamed northward with Vampire not. On 16 January Admiral Layton, severe strain, had been making some in the lead at reduced speed to arrive who was Commander-in-Chief Eastern strange decisions, and Terry was off Endau after moonset. Shortly Fleet pending the arrival of Admiral not exaggerating as I soon learned before 0200 Vampire, with Thanet Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 13

two cables astern, headed into the total of 74 rounds. At least two of the bay where the dark hulk of an island rounds very probably damaged one loomed to the northeast. enemy ship. Moran’s final report reads: At 0237 Vampire sighted an enemy ‘At the last salvo before Vampire ceased vessel on the starboard bow. She fire, two orange flames were seen to continued on her course without firing come from close to on either side of the in hope of finding bigger game. Three searchlight of the destroyer on the port minutes later Vampire sighted a second beam … The searchlight went out and enemy ship dead ahead believed to Vampire ceased fire.’6 be a destroyer. Commander Moran Moran then ordered a smoke changed course to port and fired float to be lit and thrown over the H MS Hermes two of his torpedoes. The torpedoes side. When the flare was just astern sinks, with missed the enemy ship, which was a of Vampire it produced some flame members of the crew carrying minesweeper. and a shower of sparks. The enemy out the captain’s Vampire and Thanet lost the cruiser immediately illuminated the last order to Japanese ships in the darkness and float with searchlights and opened fire. abandon ship by 0313 they were close into Endau An enemy destroyer then closed on (Tom Lewis nearing shoal water. Finding no the smoke float and was fired on by the Collection) elements of the enemy convoy Moran cruiser and another Japanese destroyer, Hermes sinking made the decision to return to apparently under the impression that BJ Peel RAN and Petty Officer JH (Royal Navy) Singapore. At 0318 Moran sighted an they were engaging an antagonist. Hutchings, the Gunner’s Mate, who enemy destroyer on the port bow. He This was the start of a battle between have trained the gun crews and then ordered Thanetto alter course the enemy ships which continued for the supply parties. The Gunnery to starboard and fire her torpedoes. over half an hour. Before Vampire was Control Officer, Sub Lieutenant Moran fired his one remaining torpedo out of sight of the enemy ships there PN Thomson RAN (S) put up a which again missed. was a large explosion north of her splendid performance in his first full Between 0318 and 1400 a confusing, position which Moran believed to be calibre shoot… intermittent battle developed between the centre enemy destroyer. Moran The temperature in the engine room Vampire and Thanet and at least four attached his hand drawn map to his was 140 degrees and the manner enemy ships including one light cruiser final battle report. His caption by the in which Engine Room Artificer J B and three destroyers. Commander centre enemy destroyer reads: ‘Enemy Carter and Engine Room Artificer Moran’s first battle report describes Destroyer ‘A’ Illuminating and closing AH Rossell stuck to their jobs on Thanet’s part in the night action: S.F. (smoke float); heavily engaged by the manoeuvring valves under After about three salvoes from Destroyer ‘B’ and cruiser eventually such conditions was praiseworthy. Vampire, Thanetopened fire with appearing to blow up.’7 Lieutenant (E) L L Williams RAN, midship and after guns. She was The enemy ceased firing at each the engineer officer, showed great only observed to fire about three other and Moran saw no more of them. leadership and ability in getting salvos. When she was fine on our Vampire safely arrived at the Singapore such good results. port quarter a large column of Naval Base at 1000 on Tuesday 27 One of my most anxious moments sparks shot up from the vicinity January undamaged and without was after I had dropped the of her after tubes. Great clouds casualties. smoke float and saw my chance to of black smoke issued from her The pride that Commander Moran shake off the enemy, but owing to and she sheered off to starboard at had in his ship’s company is best searchlights, the smoke of gunfire reduced speed …5 revealed in his own words. and funnel smoke, I could not It was the first full calibre firing of see the land. I asked Lieutenant Twenty minutes after being hit any sort carried out by the present Cartwright, who is the navigating Thanet sank. Her captain Lieutenant ship’s company and the Control officer, if he knew where we were, Commander BS Davies was among Officer. The success they had, with and the course down the channel. the survivors. Vampire continued to the ship continually under wheel, He assured me that he did and engage the enemy ships. She fired a reflects great credit on Lieutenant when we got a glimpse of the islands Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14 HMAS Vampire and her Last Captain: Commander WTA Moran RAN

I found this to be correct. I consider Indies station. this a fine piece of work on the part In February of this young officer, after the ship and March the had been making frequent and war was still far large alterations of course during from Ceylon; the battle. The conduct of the ship’s however, company under fire was excellent.’8 Singapore’s surrender on 15 On 9 February 1942 at Colombo February and Lieutenant Commander Davies wrote the Netherlands his final battle report about the loss of East Indies his ship. His second paragraph reads, collapse on ‘Our movements were governed by the 12 March fact that neither Vampire nor I knew increased the the position of our objective namely risk that the the transports …’9 Japanese would On that same day in Singapore invade Ceylon. H ermes-Vampire RAMY (Rear Admiral Malaya) wrote Prime Minister Churchill acted old ‘R’ class battleships, which were veterans onboard his final report on the night action off decisively. The garrison at Ceylon was running short of fresh water, to Addu a SLN patrol boat Endau. It included the words: The V increased. Additional fighter aircraft Atoll some 600 miles southwest at Trinco harbour in 2005 (Courtesy [Vampire] did not go far enough north were rushed to Ceylon. The Eastern of Ceylon. Hermes and her escort Malcolm Ludgate) to locate the transports.’10 This thinly Fleet was reinforced with two modern Vampire were ordered back to veiled criticism is hard to fathom. carriers, HMS Formidable and HMS Trincomalee on Ceylon’s east coast to During that long night neither the Indomitable. They were joined by the embark Hermes’ aircraft. captain of Vampire nor the captain of small carrier HMS Hermes which was The Japanese air raid on Colombo Thanet had been told of the precise the first ship built as an aircraft carrier came on Easter Sunday, 5 April. That location of the transports. Indeed for the Royal Navy. On 24 March day in Colombo harbour Japanese there was no way to locate them Admiral Sir James Somerville assumed divebombers sank the destroyer until first light on 27 January with a command of the Eastern Fleet flying HMS Tenedos. Later that day they reconnaissance aircraft, provided one his flag in the battleship HMS Warspite. sank the cruisers HMS Dorsetshire was available. When Admiral Nagumo led his five and HMS Cornwall when they were In making the decision to return to carriers into the Indian Ocean he had about 220 miles south of Colombo Singapore Vampire’s captain obviously hoped to surprise and then destroy desperately trying to join the Eastern concluded that finding the enemy Admiral Somerville’s Eastern Fleet Fleet. Admiral Somerville then wisely transports in the dark was next to which he believed to be concentrated decided that he risked the annihilation impossible and that to have ventured at Colombo. In a rare intelligence of his carriers by engaging the vastly farther north would have invited the success the arcane Far East Combined superior enemy fleet. Beginning certain destruction of both Vampire Bureau succeeded in intercepting and on the night of 6 April he ordered a and Thanet. decrypting Japanese signals revealing withdrawal first to Addu Atoll and The 27th of January 1942 was that Nagumo’s carriers would launch shortly thereafter to Kilindini, East Vampire’s last appearance in Singapore. air strikes against Colombo on 1 April. Africa. The next day she left the Naval Base to Somerville anticipated that the On 8 April Nagumo decided to escort a convoy to Sundra Strait with enemy would approach Colombo from launch a heavy attack on the harbour the Australian sloop Yarra. Between the southeast and on 31 March he at Trincomalee and nearby airfields than and 5 February Vampire was concentrated the Eastern Fleet 80 miles before withdrawing from the Indian involved in convoy duty in and out of SSE from the southern tip of Ceylon. Ocean. The only major British warship Batavia. On 5 February Vampire sailed When the attack failed to materialize at Trincomalee was Hermes. Her for Colombo escorting two merchant on 1 April Admiral Somerville ordered escort HMAS Vampire was moored ships. She arrived in Colombo on 11 his two modern carriers Formidable nearby. When a Catalina aircraft February where she joined the East and Indomitable together with his discovered the approach of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 15

Japanese carriers Vice Admiral Sir its Recruit School a ‘Moran Division’ (Endnotes) Geoffrey Arbuthnot, Commander- named in honour of Commander 1 Commander W T A Moran RAN in-Chief East Indies, ordered the Flag Moran. Letter of Proceedings to the Australian Officer-in-Charge Trincomalee to It was Commander Moran’s Commonwealth Naval Board under date of 4 February 1942 retrieved through the good clear the harbour. That night Hermes misfortune while in command of offices of the Australian Department of and Vampire sailed southward with Vampire to witness the loss of three Defence. a minelayer, a tanker, a Royal Fleet capital ships, Prince of Wales, Repulse 2 Willmott, H P, Empires in the Balance Auxiliary and a corvette. and Hermes. He deserves to be (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982) p.328 The Japanese air raid on remembered for more than those 3 Gill, Herman G., Royal Australian Navy Trincomalee took place at 0700 on 9 disasters. This Australian officer 1939-1942 (Adelaide: The Griffin Press, April. About 55 bombers escorted deserves to be commemorated most 1957) p.559. by approximately 50 fighters flying of all for the night action off Endau on 4 Brooke, Geoffrey, Alarm Starboard! (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2004) at 15,000 feet bombed the China Bay 27 January 1942. Commander Moran p.130. airfield and the dockyard causing made every effort to inflict maximum 5 Final Report from the Commanding considerable damage. When the raid damage on the enemy. He had hoped Officer,HMAS Vampire to the Commander- in-Chief Eastern Fleet under date of 10 ended Hermes and Vampire were 65 to save Thanet by means of his funnel February 1942. The National Archives miles to the south about five miles smoke and his smoke float. Unknown London. off shore. Both ships were ordered to him Thanet was already sinking 6 Ibid to return to Trincomalee where it from a fatal enemy shell. When a battle 7 Ibid was believed they would have the developed between the enemy ships, 8 Ibid protection of fighter aircraft. About Moran made good his escape. In a 9 Final Report from the Commanding one hour and forty minutes after they difficult night action against a greatly OfficerHMS Thanet to the Commander- were sighted by a single enemy aircraft, superior force he had damaged one in-Chief Eastern Fleet under date of 10 February 1942. The National Archives waves of divebombers commenced enemy ship, confounded the entire London. their attacks on Hermes. Within ten enemy force and saved his ship without 10 Final report on the Endau night action by minutes the carrier suffered 40 direct suffering any damage or casualties. RAMY (Rear Admiral Malaya) under date of 9 February 1942, a fragment of which was hits and capsized and sank. Sixteen Rear Admiral Spooner’s regrettable found in an archive box at the Imperial War of the divebombers then attacked criticism that he should have taken Museum, London. Vampire. She was hit by thirteen 250 Vampire and Thanetfurther north in 11 London Gazette, 16 June 1942. kilogram bombs including a direct search of the elusive enemy transports hit to her boiler room. Commander is unfounded. t Moran ordered ‘abandon ship.’ Out of a total complement of 134 only Matthew B Wills is a lawyer and seven ratings and one officer lost their historian based in Colorado, USA. His lives. Sadly, that officer was Vampire’s latest book is In the Highest Traditions captain. The fighter aircraft that might of the Royal Navy: The Life of Captain have saved his ship and his life arrived too late owing to a breakdown in John Leach MVO DSO communications. Seven weeks later the Supplement Author’s Note to the London Gazette for 16 June The author wishes to express his 1942 read as follows: For gallantry, appreciation to Lieutenant Commander steadfastness and devotion to duty Douglas JP Hadler RN for his exceptional in HMAS Vampire and HMS Thanet in a night action with a superior diligence in obtaining highly relevant Japanese force: Mention in Dispatches documents from the Australian Commander William Thomas Alldis Department of Defence, from the 11 Moran RAN. National Archives, London and from the The Australian training Imperial War Museum, London. establishment HMAS Cerberus has in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Depth Charge Depth Charge Depth Charge Depth

Issue 148 Charge 17 The Limits of Extended Deterrence and the Risk of Nuclear

Proliferation in the the wish to demonstrate technical mastery which has driven proliferation since 1945. But determination to North West Pacific deter aggression and mistrust of an ally’s capacity or willingness to do this n February 2013 the Democratic deployable weapons with which to for a friend have also been a major IRepublic of North Korea (DPRK) intimidate their neighbours as swiftly as motivation for the ownership of detonated its third nuclear explosion their national resources will permit. nuclear weapons. The UK case study, in a tunnel under a mountain. Seismic Every new detonation and every which illustrates this truth, is now analysis suggests the device detonated new missile flight over the Sea of Japan 35 years in the past but it may still in February had a yield of 6-7 kilotons. chips at the confidence of those who have a lesson worth pondering as we The DPRK claimed that this was thought that their cities were safe from contemplate the crisis developing in a successful test of a miniaturised annihilation. the neighbourhood. warhead. Like every other statement It is difficult to know whether that comes from Pyongyang this the February explosion was fuelled To Trident or not to Trident may or may not be credible. But by plutonium or enriched uranium. In the early 1980’s, when the UK had whether it is true or not, the statement Plutonium makes building miniature to decide whether or not to replace confirms where the clear intent of the warheads more practical but the North its Polaris Submarine Launched Pyongyang regime lies. It plans to arm Koreans may be conserving their Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) with the its existing long-range missiles with limited stocks of this material. A hidden Trident system, a national debate nuclear warheads and defend itself by uranium enrichment plant holds out raged about the morality and utility of threatening others in the region and the prospect of a much greater number nuclear weapons. The Labour Party beyond. In December 2012 the DPRK of warheads being available soon. in opposition was viscerally opposed successfully launched a long-range Either way, with every detonation the to all nuclear weapons and wanted rocket that put a satellite into orbit. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and unilateral nuclear disarmament Unlike the Iranians who plan to have its successful functioning in the North on moral grounds. Prime Minister the same nuclear strike capability in West Pacific takes another direct hit. Thatcher and her Conservative the Middle East, the North Koreans Historically it has been national Government were equally determined do not hide their intention to possess pride, great power status status and to replace Polaris and maintain an ICBM capability, regardless of the cost or consequences for the rest of the British defence budget. This debate was ideologically driven and it overflowed into the streets as the unilateralists made their feelings known through sit-ins and protests across the UK and at the Polaris submarine base at HMS Neptune at Faslane in Scotland.

The Case for Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament The middle ground was occupied by those academics who genuinely debated the credibility of what was N orth Korean naval men on parade (Public domain) known as ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 The Limits of Extended Deterrence and the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the North West Pacific and the merits, or otherwise, of the British Government possessing a ‘second centre of decision taking’ and therefore a ‘second strike capability’. Those who believed in a ‘copper bottomed guarantee’ of extended deterrence from Washington argued that the United Kingdom, unilaterally disarmed of its own nuclear weapons, would be no more exposed to attack or nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union than any of the other NATO partners of the United States, only one of which, France, had its own nuclear weapons. This utilitarian case for British unilateral disarmament rested on the proposition that programs, including conventional unconditional support from the United extended deterrence by the United defence of the Central Front, were States in the face of nuclear threats States protected the rest of NATO, underfunded? coming from the Kremlin. why should it not do the same for The nuclear realists asked the blunt the United Kingdom? If it was good The Realist Case for an question: if during a crisis the Soviets enough for, Ottawa, Bonn, Rome, Independent second strike threatened to destroy Birmingham Madrid, Oslo, Athens and Ankara capability would any US President threaten to look to Washington for nuclear The alternative ‘realist’ school of to take out Kiev if Birmingham was defence, it should be good enough for defence academics pointed out that the incinerated? What would be the London. limits of the United States extended likelihood of such a protective counter The unilateralists’ rationale for not deterrence had never been tested. It threat actually being issued given that buying Trident was further predicated was impossible to say how far a future next Soviet threat might be to eliminate on the utilitarian financial question: American President would go to San Francisco or Washington, or both? why spend a national fortune on a ensure that any foreign government, Those who believed that this scenario redundant system, which could never including that of its close ally the UK, was fantasy and would not occur had be used, when so many other national without its own deterrent, could rely on the burden of proof placed on them to

N orth Korea regularly displays its military might in march-pasts (US Army) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 19

show that these dark imaginings could retaliation and mutually assured never happen under any circumstances destruction (MAD) worked through – that this game of nuclear chicken the cold war. would never arise. ‘Never’ was big Protests in the UK about the word in this context. The onus of replacement for Trident, even in a proof rested on those who believed post Soviet era are muted this century that extended nuclear deterrence was – the realists won the debate and a certain guarantee that a post-Polaris it has largely stayed won. The UK’s UK could relax safe in the knowledge opposition Labour Party’s leadership that the US ‘had its back’ and would is no longer unilateralist. The UK always be there for the British people, now advocates multilateral nuclear N orth Korean missile (Public domain) regardless of the consequences. disarmament but is proceeding with The unilateral disarmers lost the Trident’s replacement. France and political argument and the British Britain can now be seen as effectively taxpayer, with some grumbling about offering some extended nuclear the cost of it all, paid up for the deterrence to the European members Trident D5 SLBMs and the RN’s new of NATO, including those which were submarines to launch them from. The formerly Soviet satellite states. seamless continuation of the UK’s How might this case study in independent deterrent from Polaris the limitations of extended nuclear to Trident was maintained and is to deterrence from the United States South Korea’s ROKS Lee Sunsin (SS 068) arrives at Naval Station Pearl this day. inform our understanding of what may Harbor (US Navy) It is true that there were many other happen in the North West Pacific as reasons why the UK under Prime the North Koreans press ahead with Minister Thatcher went ahead with gaining nuclear-tipped ICBMs? replacing Polaris. National prestige and the continuing justification of a Japan, China and the American permanent seat on the UN Security nuclear umbrella Council no doubt all played an Japan’s constitution famously denies important part in the decision making. it the right to ever possess armed But the intellectual heart of the forces capable of offensive operations argument in favour of replacing Polaris, and specifically bans it from ever was that the UK could only deter acquiring nuclear weapons. Japan nuclear threats, or an imminent attack, signed the NPT in 1970 shortly after if the Kremlin knew that in London it was opened for ratification. It had there was a second centre of decision already been sheltering under the Helicopters fly over theR epublic of Korea Aegis destroyer Sejong the Great taking, not beholden to the Pentagon US nuclear umbrella since the Soviet (KDX 991) during the International Fleet Review “Pass and Review.” or the White House. Union first developed ICBMs in the The logic of the case for retention early 1950s. For decades a Japanese was that any future Soviet leader had independent deterrent has been to understand that the UK armed constitutionally and internationally with Trident, had the capacity to illegal, unnecessary and unthinkable. destroy Moscow and half a dozen Extended American nuclear deterrence other Soviet cities even after London over Japan has seemed to be an eternal and the industrial Midlands had strategic fact of geopolitics and one been incinerated. An undetectable, that suited all parties – particularly the and therefore invulnerable, second Japanese people, who are still the only strike from the sea would survive a population to have come under nuclear Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines assigned to the 7th Marine Regiment, devastated UK to extract revenge. That attack. Japan built up a first class navy 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Division, disembark from a US Navy landing is how deterrence through massive of modern cruisers able to destroy low craft air cushion (US Navy photo) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 The Limits of Extended Deterrence and the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the North West Pacific South Korean Navy its inhabitants. It plays successive P-3C Maritime Patrol American administrations expertly Aircraft-photo by and resists all attempts at leverage to Michael Nitz conform with international norms of behaviour in exchange for much needed aid. It constantly claims it is about to come under unprovoked attack from the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) and that when this occurs it will retaliate mercilessly! How far the leadership really believes that it is under threat and how much of this propaganda is for trajectory conventional missiles. Tokyo Japan is evident, the threat is imminent, internal consumption it is impossible left deterrence of ICBMs to its great and there are no other options, Japan to determine – like almost everything and powerful friend. is allowed under the law to carry out else about the decision making process The arrival of Chinese ICBMs strikes against enemy targets.’ This in Pyongyang. The military high 30 years ago made this American statement is a major ‘reinterpretation’ command has installed the youthful guarantee of deterrence even more of the Japanese constitution in its Kim Jong-Un. The ‘Hermit Kingdom’ relevant and necessary to successive adoption of a right of self defence of North Korea has its new Emperor. Japanese governments, but the Chinese untrammeled by alliance obligations. Given the completeness of the regime’s capability has not, in itself, proved It is analogous to the British and control over internal dissent Kim and destabilising. China’s doctrine and French positions on second centres of his military henchmen must assume public pronouncements state that its decision making when faced with the that they can look forward to decades nuclear capability is defensive. Their Soviet SS20 medium range nuclear more of dictatorial rule. They must nuclear weapons exist, the Chinese missiles put into Eastern Europe in the judge that the only threat to this state say, to deter, not to wage war. Early in 1980’s. The threat there was evident of affairs could come from military 2011, China published a defence white and might be imminent. No one knew attack or invasion from either China or paper, which repeated its nuclear policy that it was not. It is also reminiscent the ROK backed by the United States. of maintaining a minimum deterrent of the position of the undeclared The nuclear weapons they are devoted with a ‘no first use’ pledge. Even with nuclear power, Israel. The question to acquiring are clearly intended to the rising tension between Japan, therefore is Defence Minister Onodera checkmate that possibility. They have Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam considering aloud the right to use drawn their own conclusions about the and China over disputed islands and conventional missile strikes as a last vulnerability of non-nuclear armed Iraq contiguous maritime zones, Beijing has resort, or is he preparing the ground to invasion in 2002. not mentioned its capacity to target for an independent Japanese nuclear Pyongyang’s repeatedly stated aim missiles at its neighbours. Given the deterrent, or is he being deliberately is to achieve immunity from attack by number of nuclear weapons the USN strategically ambiguous? possessing the ability to target with has at sea in the region the Chinese are missile strikes South Korean cities and very wisely not about to refer to their North Korea – Serious nuclear American bases in the Pacific. They own more modest capability in this power or posturing minnow? also claim to have a rocket capable of currently highly charged international North Korea is not a rising economic striking the cities of the West Coast atmosphere. colossus like China which needs the of America with ICBMs. Presumably This longstanding strategic stability status quo of international world Hawaii will also be on the future target is now under real strain. In February, order and open trade and markets list and a more reasonable aspiration in direct response to Pyongyang’s third to keep its billion citizens fed. The given the range of the current nuclear test, the Japanese Defence DPRK is already sanctioned, has no generation of missiles. Japan is not Minister Itsunori Onodera said in an legitimate trade relationships and mentioned but presumably Okinawa interview, ‘When an intention to attack remains impervious to the needs of rates as a potential target given that Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 21

The ROKS Gangkamchan steams by a line of Republic of Korea Navy ships during the International Fleet Review “Pass and Review.”

it is still hosts a sizeable US strategic supplier, has made no difference to the voted with the rest of the UN Security base. If and when these nascent threats testing program. Council opposing the third nuclear can be demonstrated to be realistic, Since the end of the Korean War test. China may be reassessing its by a missile launch with the range and the Chinese have taken the view guarantee of North Korea’s continuing accuracy to strike US targets beyond that they needed the DPRK as a existence in its present form. Kim’s Korea, a threshold will have been buffer state. They supported their determination to embarrass the crossed. At that point the posturing bankrupt neighbour because it was Chinese leadership by ignoring its minnow with the ferocious rhetoric a Communist state and they were wishes over nuclear testing may be surely becomes impossible for the determined to avoid unification of stretching a friendship past breaking United States and perhaps China to the peninsular under America’s ally point. After the test in February discount as being a potential threat. South Korea. Whether this support is Beijing’s foreign minister summoned still so well founded and the objection North Korea’s ambassador for a formal China and the DPRK – to unification remains as true now is reprimand and expressed ‘strong Stretching a friendship with open to question. The prospect of a dissatisfaction and firm opposition’ to China to breaking point? flood of North Korean refugees fleeing the test. He urged North Korea to ‘stop The acquisition of enrichment from starvation and brutality crossing any rhetoric or acts that could worsen technology from China via Pakistan the Chinese border is particularly situations and return to the right kick-started the DPRK’s nuclear alarming to Beijing. It may be that a course of dialogue and consultation as programme. Pakistan got missile more pragmatic view is gaining favour soon as possible’. technology in return. North Korea has and any solution that avoids mass Before the February nuclear test also been helping Iran with missile migration northwards into China may North Korea uploaded a pirated You technology and was helping Syria be considered a reasonable option, Tube video showing a devastated New to build a reactor until the Israelis even perhaps a reunification under York City after being struck by its bombed it flat in 2007. The DPRK’s prosperous South Korea. That may missiles. This is highly provocative and testing of nuclear weapons and missiles be the least bad option for Beijing. not the nuanced approach to East-West continues unchecked by the IAEA, Without the DPRK the justification for relationships which Beijing favours as sanctions or global condemnation. United States troops on the Korean it plays a long game and rises steadily Even the condemnation of China, peninsular would disappear. in the global order using industrial Pyongyang’s erstwhile protector and In 2013, for the first time China espionage to steal the information it Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 The Limits of Extended Deterrence and the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the North West Pacific U SS Kittyhawk in Japan - the US is still South Korea’s best ally (RAN photo)

needs to gain its ends. It must be galling during the Cold War. It is the one South Korea and the for China to find it has no influence, missile that might get through, not threat to Seoul far less control over a younger brother the dozen that get intercepted, that South Korea has lived with the ongoing who keeps threatening to kneecap the determines national strategy, in a threat of a massive conventional biggest kid in the neighbourhood who democracy. artillery and rocket barrage striking is also China’s biggest customer. Pyongyang’s claims to be able Seoul for decades. Pyongyang regularly to make a mainland strike are threatens to turn it into a ‘sea of fire.’ The Range Game presumably intended to intimidate While this has been an uncomfortable The DPRK’s Unha-3 rocket has a American citizens, the Pentagon, reality, successive ROK governments theoretical range of 6, 200 miles which State Department and the White have been secure in the knowledge means it could reach the American House. They may also be calculated to that any attack would trigger massive mainland. Even if that were possible it chip away at America’s longstanding conventional, and potentially nuclear, is still just a missile without a warhead. unconditional guarantee to South retaliation from US forces on the Whether a distant intercontinental Korea to retaliate conventionally peninsular and from the seas off it. This strike right across the Pacific will ever in the event of an attack from the counter-battery response would be be achievable from North Korea, DPRK. Are these threats clumsy instant and overwhelming. given the enormous problems, both attempts to diminish the credibility That has been the theory. But in fact technical and financial, that would of extended nuclear and conventional when in 2010 the North Koreans sank need to be overcome is open to very deterrence? Presumably the intention the ROK corvette Cheonan, probably serious doubt. The capacity to intercept is to intimidate Seoul into demanding using a midget submarine, killing 46 and destroy in orbit single missiles an end to the US presence on the sailors, and later that year opened and warheads has been demonstrated peninsular. If that is the aim, it is likely up an artillery and rocket barrage on by Aegis armed warships. There is no to be entirely counterproductive. Yeonpyeong island killing five South expectation that the North Koreans Such a policy would come from an Korean civilians – nothing happened can complicate the problem by building unsophisticated isolated regime but protests and condemnation. The Multiple Independently Targetable entirely unfamiliar with the reality of Chinese even disputed that the vessel Re Entry Vehicles (MIRVS), though the United States and its bipartisan had been deliberately sunk despite decoy missiles may be possible. But understanding of its place in the post the incontrovertible evidence from perception is reality in the world of 1945 world. the wreck. No price was extracted ICBM deterrence, as was proved for these actions. This must have Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 23

emboldened the leadership to consider or potentially China, be that a sane American troops and ships, would the possibilities that await them for cautious realist view will govern the the Japanese increase their demands further acts of conventional aggression actions of the nuclear armed paranoid for US withdrawal and with it their once they are a declared nuclear power. military cult of personality that is the nuclear umbrella? It would be a What will Kim’s regime then threaten DPRK. Cults have a habit of ending deeply divisive debate for the western and against whom will those threats in self-immolation in a bunker. What alliance. Prime Minister Shinzo be made? Will it be limited to South happens to the threat of conventional Abe has already indicated that the Korea? massive retaliation as a stabilising Japanese Government will alter its The bellicose rhetoric that pours factor on the Korean peninsular if and self-denying constitution in the face from the DPRK has been able to be when the nuclear warhead carrying of China’s growing hostility. What discounted as the posturing of the missiles in the DPRK are real not just further pressures may be felt for an weaker party by successive South rhetorical? Will MAD remain just an independent nuclear deterrent if the Korean governments. But what acronym or be an apt descriptor for the Japanese public came to doubt the US happens when the threats from behaviour of the regime in Pyongyang could or would unconditionally provide Pyongyang to the ROK are backed that possesses them? its nuclear umbrella over Japan. Or, to by the reality of battlefield nuclear put the UK 1980’s debate and dilemma weapons and the rhetoric persists? An inconvenient reality in a contemporary light, will a future Will the ROK be content to live under With deployable WMD in the Japanese government really believe that the US ‘copper bottomed guarantee’ of possession of Pyongyang all all future Presidents will be prepared instantaneous retaliation indefinitely governments in the region will be faced to defend Kyoto if in doing so it risks when its northern neighbour is armed with a destabilising new reality in the a strike on Guam, Honolulu or even with short-range tactical nuclear North Pacific, including the Chinese. California? weapons facing Seoul over the DMZ? What happens to the credibility of Will Japan indefinitely be capable These thoughts must be exercising the extended nuclear deterrence if over of upholding its obligations under new ROK President Park Geun–hye as the next five years, it becomes clear national and international law which she prepares to deal with her northern the North Korean regime has the prohibit it from becoming nuclear neighbour’s current intransigence and capacity to drop a ballistic missile with armed? What pressures for an determination to acquire weapons of a nuclear warhead on the American independent deterrent will come from mass destruction aimed at her fellow base at Guam, or on Hawaii or even a frightened electorate that remembers citizens. California? Telling the American first hand, or has been taught, of the citizens of Guam to relax because horror of Nagasaki and Hiroshima? A paranoid military cult every one of a brace of nuclear tipped At what point in international law In retrospect the old Soviet Union and missiles aimed at them would be taken does a belief that it is under nuclear its geriatric leadership that ruled for out by interception long before any got threat justify a nation abrogating its decades was a most risk averse and to its target may not entirely convince membership of the NPT? How much cautious entity. This was particularly them that they are safe. The same logic doubt about existential protection is true after the Cuban Missile climb on a much greater scale applies to the enough to precipitate a determination down by Khrushchev in 1962. The Japanese who are closer in missile flight to possess an independent nuclear generation occupying the Politburo had time to the North Korean’s launch pads capacity? These are theoretical all seen what total war looked like ‘up than Guam is. questions at present but may not close and personal’ and 1962 reminded remain so. A world where Pakistan them of the risks of war through How extended can nuclear ‘legitimately’ owns nuclear weapons miscalculation. Their build up of deterrence be for Japan? because it is not a signatory to the long-range strategic ICBMs, medium If the US citizens anywhere were NPT, and Japan is permanently denied range SS20s based in Eastern Europe, even theoretically vulnerable, how them, under all circumstances, because and even their short range tactical or confident could Japan feel in extended it is a signatory, seems contrary to battlefield nuclear weapons were, we deterrence? If the conviction arose geopolitical common sense and lacks now know, essentially political and that the only reason Japan was realism. defensive in nature. a target for Pyongyang’s nuclear How sure can the ROK or Japan, missiles was because it was a base for Unanswerable questions and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 The Limits of Extended Deterrence and the Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the North West Pacific the threshold of provocation compared with countries which have hit so hard and fast by an enemy that In theory this scenario where Japan and no civilian nuclear industry. there would be no chance to strike back. South Korea become nuclear powers Sino-Japanese unresolved A century ago in a pre-nuclear age will never arise because Washington enmity – the biggest threat to the logic of getting national ‘retaliation will continue to state and re state that the hemisphere ? in first’ was alive and well and led to extended US nuclear deterrence over Also predictable would be the Chinese the destruction of a continent and both is inviolable under all and any reaction to any suggestion that Japan a generation. It may be asking too circumstances. It can also be asked was to be tolerated in an abrogation much of the contemporary zeitgeist, how real is this potential threat from of its post 1945 constitution, rejection when it is generally believed that the the DPRK ever going to be? How many of the NPT and acquisition of nuclear internet age has nothing to learn from long-range ballistic missiles armed weapons for self defence. The response earlier eras, but one can hope that with nuclear warheads will a bankrupt from Beijing would be strident light from this distant broken mirror and sanctioned DPRK ever be able to demands in the Security Council that can illuminate the contemporary muster anyway? These are currently Japan be stopped from becoming ‘a complexity and growing risks of unanswerable questions, but that is threat to the region.’ None of this miscalculation for all the players in the why they could matter to the Japanese rhetoric would help defuse the many North West Pacific. t and Korean public. Would the public grounds for growing hostility between perception of an undeterred nuclear these two neighbours. That unresolved “Depth Charge” submits his work threat of many missiles from the enmity is the biggest potential threat to anonymously to the Editor. DPRK aimed at their cities be enough a peaceful future for our hemisphere to change the pacifist mindset of the – bigger than the belief in North Japanese electorate? Time will tell. Korea that it can make itself immune from attack and can act accordingly. Overreaction to a perception The question is whether the DPRK’s of risk determination to acquire WMD has Uncertainly and fear of what an the capacity to trigger the fusion of enemy has in their order of battle these two sources of regional instability. can be a potent catalyst for national over-reaction. This was a feature of Europe 1904 – 1914. A distant the nuclear arms race throughout the mirror Cold War. We now know that many old We seem to be sliding toward a more 1950’s Soviet ICBMs would never have dangerous and less predicable region come out of their silos if their rocket armed only with generalised optimism motors had been ignited 20 years later, and the expectation that rationality and but that did not mean that they did not caution, will triumph. Perhaps the best get counted in Washington as being and most concerning analogy is with on ‘hair trigger’ alert. On the contrary, the years leading up to the European their existence gave rise to the belief in catastrophe of 1914. Count Otto von a ‘missile gap’ between East and West Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany, was which America strove to close with asked about the chance of war breaking new generations of its own missiles. out again in Europe. His response was: One thing is certain, If ever there is another war in Europe notwithstanding its post-Tsunami it will be over some damn silly thing in unpopularity with the electorate, the Balkans! Japan’s civilian nuclear industry and An Archduke and his wife’s sophisticated missile manufacturing assassination in Sarajevo was the capacity makes it very capable of ‘damn silly thing’ that lit the fuse. The creating deliverable land or air powder keg was the unresolved hostility launched nuclear weapons, without between the great alliances in the external assistance, relatively swiftly decade before 1914 and the fear of being Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

26 ON MARITIME MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES1 Boy C mmander Neil Westphalen

Background

he last century saw two global wars, the first using chemical and Tthe second nuclear weapons. There have also been smaller but at times no less devastating regional conflicts in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and southeast and southwest Asia, as well as numerous long-term but lower-intensity conflicts. The last 30 years has also seen an increase in peacekeeping and other military operations under the auspices of the United Nations, while the last decade has numerous military operations worldwide in response to terrorist incidents. Naval forces have frequently been at the forefront of many of these in both diagnosis and treatment, and traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) conflicts. expectations in health care delivery – and traumatic amputations have The maritime force structures of within allocated resources. dominated the attention of political developed nations in the last hundred In response to these changing and military leaders, veterans’ groups years have therefore entailed preparing demands, there are a small number and the media. Indeed, these injuries for a wide spectrum of conflict. of functions and roles that military have become the ‘signature wounds’ of Strategic planning for this spectrum health services can apply at the the recent southwest Asian conflicts. is becoming more difficult for various strategic level. These functions ad During this time, considerable reasons, including the increasing roles are fundamental to ascertaining attention has also been expended on complexity and cost of platforms, and how military health services can best other clinical conditions that can be recruiting and training the personnel be integrated with the operational, characterised by their novelty, severity with the skills and expertise required personnel, logistical, infrastructure and and/or lack of ascribable causation.2 to operate them. Furthermore, training requirements of the (in this These short-term military health the last hundred years also saw the case) maritime forces that they serve. imperatives have diverted attention global economic depression in the This article describes the strategic level from the far greater toll on military 1930s, the 1970s oil shock and the functions and roles of maritime health personnel from conventional yet lower current global financial crisis, all of services. profile preventable disease and non- which have had major influences on battle injuries (DNBI). In the ten years national economies (and their defence Current Situation expenditures). The political and economic Over the past two decades, a factors that determine maritime force combination of short-term political, structure have important implications media and/or resourcing imperatives for their supporting health services. has taken priority over the functions In order to meet the changing needs and roles of national military health of the navies that they serve, these services. These short-term imperatives health services not only need to continue to threaten their long-term respond to the health threats posed effectiveness and efficiency. by the spectrum of conflict, but also For example, in the last ten years the rapidly emerging developments traumatic brain injury (TBI), post- Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 27

from October 2001, 81% of the 62,087 “functions and roles” also reduced following: US military medical evacuations from these to zero. • The administration and the Middle East were not for ‘signature The ongoing political, media and practice of health care for wounds’, but for DNBI, of which about academic preoccupation with ‘novel’ military service members half included musculoskeletal injuries, conditions and exposures in these and (in some countries) their ‘mental disorders’ and ‘ill-defined countries, has diverted attention from dependents in non-deployed conditions’. However, even these DNBI the long-term strategic functions and settings.10 This definition rates are still significantly exceeded by roles of their respective military health parallels the medical system the morbidity and mortality in non- services. It is also driving a perception that exists in the civilian sector, deployed US military populations.3 that military health services are simply thereby perpetuating the view The US experience is by no means civilian treatment services in uniform, that military health services unique. Besides PTSD, the last 20 years for use primarily in operational are simply uniformed civilian have seen preoccupations in the US, circumstances. These two issues are treatment services. UK, Canada and Australia with Gulf having a disproportionate and negative • The organisation of structured War Syndrome and depleted uranium influence on the current organisation medical command and exposures. Google searches have found and resourcing of many Western administrative systems that 734,000 hits for “Australian Gulf War military health services.4 interact with and support veterans PTSD”, 128,000 hits for “UK This view is supported by the deployed combat units.11 Gulf War veterans PTSD” and 130,000 published mission statements of many • The medical research and hits for “Canadian Gulf War veterans military health services. Consistent development with respect to PTSD”. Google searches for “depleted themes for the US5, UK6, French7, problems of military medical uranium” reveal a comparable number German8 and Australian9 military interest. Some of these of hits. health services include maintaining advances have ultimately In contrast, information on the medical readiness to deploy, providing proved important beyond the functions and roles of military health health care to deployed forces, and purely military considerations services is almost non-existent. restoration of health on their return. that originally inspired them.12 Google searches for “military health These mission statements can be • The branch of occupational services” or “military medical services” misinterpreted as assuming that the medicine that attends to the produced over 813,000 and 583,000 strategic functions and roles of military preventive and interventional hits respectively. Adding the phrase health services are limited to the medical risks and needs of “functions and roles” reduced these treatment and rehabilitation of military sailors, soldiers, airmen and hits to three, none of which reflect the personnel. other military personnel. functions and roles of military health Some guidance regarding the full This includes the historical services. Similarly, a Google search range of functions and roles of military prevention and treatment of peer-reviewed medical journals health services can be derived from of infectious diseases, and for these phrases produced 53 and multiple existing definitions of the term the more recent interest in 63 hits respectively; however adding ‘military medicine’. These include the the ergonomic and other Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 ON MARITIME MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES

health effects of operating submarines, tanks, aircraft, and other platforms.13 However, none of these definitions address all the fundamental strategic- level functions and roles of military health services per the following prioritised list: • Operational health support. • Casualty evacuation. • Humanitarian Aid / Disaster Relief (HA/DR). • Military medicine capabilities. • Health-related suitability for military employment. • Occupational and environmental health. • Health promotion. of the operational activities being capability. • Treatment services. undertaken, the number of personnel • Distances at sea mean that The relevance of this list lies in the involved and estimations of casualty seagoing health assets are mutual interdependence of military numbers and types. The operational required to be at least as health services and the military forces environment (whether land, sea – self-contained as any other that they support. Consideration of including surface and sub-surface – or seagoing personnel, logistic all the functions and roles of military air) dictates the range of military and and other operational enablers. health services is essential at the environmental health hazards likely This requirement is driven not strategic level, if commanders are to to be encountered. This means that only by personnel welfare and meet their full range of responsibilities the responsibility for battle casualty morale considerations, but also for the planning and conduct of (BCas) estimation is usually assigned to the need to ensure that where military operations. This particularly military planning staff. possible, mission success is not refers to informed decision making Health support for seagoing compromised by preventable with respect to health-related operations needs to reflect the health-related adverse events. personnel, organisational, training, maritime environment in that: • The elevancer of mobility major systems and other fundamental • Life at sea is inherently to seagoing health support capability inputs. This article explains dangerous: indeed, the effects stems from how access to the rationale for the presence of each of wind, water and underwater shore-based health services item on this list, and how they are hazards have frequently can alter considerably prioritised. proved more deadly than any within a comparatively small human enemy. Furthermore, timeframe. A ship alongside Operational Health Support operational hazards by- should have comparable and-large target ships rather access as the local shore- The primary reason that why military than individuals. Both based population; however health services exist is to provide factors result in significant on sailing such access almost health support to (in this case) naval differences in the number immediately entails using forces whenever and wherever they are and nature of maritime BCas a boat to land patients, and conducting their operations. and DNBI compared to those within hours may entail using Operational health support typically ashore. These differences a helicopter, meeting other has levels of health services, ranging have important implications ships, or returning the ship from preventive, primary, secondary with respect to training, alongside. This has important and even tertiary care. These levels of organisation, materiel and implications with respect to care depend on the scale and nature other inputs into Navy health organic health service delivery Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 29

to seagoing units according this requires close engagement with evacuation typically entails using a to the mission(s) being operational commanders, the health combination of sea, air and/or land undertaken, and identifying personnel supporting them require transport. suitable shore-based health a level of military expertise that is at The levels of casualty evacuation facilities where they are least as important and relevant as their in the military setting are typically operating. These factors clinical expertise. classified as follows: necessitate the application of • ‘Forward’ casualty evacuation a risk management approach, Casualty Evacuation typically refers to moving which may create problems casualties from their point of when interacting with other If naval forces are required to deploy, illness or injury to a health health services that can afford the supporting operational health facility that can provide initial to be more risk-averse. services themselves need to be assessment and treatment. • The inherent flexibility of supported by a robust system for This function is usually warships means that they moving casualties between health performed on behalf of can be reassigned from one facilities in what may be multiple tactical level commanders by operation to another with little operational area(s), and/or to return uniformed health personnel. or no notice. Furthermore, them home. The mode of evacuation is the seagoing environment Casualty evacuation is about dictated by the same military is both self-contained and moving the right casualty, at the right and environmental hazards as relatively consistent: a ship time, to the right level of medical care, for operational health support. doing RIMPAC off Hawaii with the right amount of in-transit Health and transport resources faces more-or-less the same medical care. The geographic aspects may or may not be specifically health hazards as one doing of the operational environment (in dedicated for the role. RESOLUTE off Ashmore Reef, particular with respect to designated • ‘Tactical’ casualty evacuation as another doing SLIPPER in support bases) dictate the mode of typically refers to moving the Persian Gulf. These factors casualty evacuation. casualties from the collection/ mean that unlike deployments Access to appropriate transport initial treatment health facility, ashore, health-related is essential for effective and efficient to a secondary or even tertiary maritime individual readiness casualty evacuation. Usually only facility within the operational and force preparation needs very large militaries have transport area, for casualties whose to be tied to each member’s designed, equipped and dedicated for return to duty is likely to be posting to a ship, rather than casualty evacuation. Maritime casualty delayed, or if they require whatever operation that their ship may force-assigned to at a particular time.14 Ascertaining the health services required to support a military activity, and at what level, does not occur in a vacuum.15 Planning and practice for the prevention and treatment of both BCas and DNBI includes consideration of the logistic and administrative aspects of planning, training, establishing and operating the health facilities required, which may range from first aid to combat support hospitals. This entails the organisation of structured medical command and administrative systems that interact with and support operational units. As Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 ON MARITIME MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES

more appropriate diagnostic at sea – to have at least some aviation force, military health services and definitive care. This medicine expertise. may be the primary force function is usually performed The planning and practice of BCas being supported by other arms. on behalf of operational- or and DNBI evacuation must consider Although this is less of an theatre-level commanders by the logistic and administrative aspects issue in the maritime HA/DR specifically trained uniformed of establishing and operating casualty setting, there is greater overlap health personnel. The mode collecting points and staging health between land-based HA/DR of in-theatre evacuation is facilities to return casualties home. and operational health support also dictated by the resources The ability to move large numbers of if it needs combat force available and environmental casualties simultaneously if required, protection, typically in areas hazards, but is generally also requires the organisation of where there is a significant characterised by greater use structured medical command and security threat in which Non- of aircraft (whether rotary or administrative systems that not only Government Organisations fixed wing), which also may interact with and support operational (NGOs) and other civilian or may not be specifically combat units, but also the commanders health care providers are dedicated for the role. and medical facilities at their unable to operate. • ‘Strategic’ casualty evacuation destination. • By definition, HA/DR entails refers to moving casualties The health personnel supporting providing health care for from a theatre level health operational commanders therefore civilians. The health-related facility back to the country require very high levels of service- HA/DR services required of origin. Depending on specific expertise.17 Such expertise is for women, children and the nature and scale of the also at least as important and relevant the elderly are substantially operation (which influences to health personnel in the casualty different from those required the number and types of evacuation setting, as their clinical for military populations that casualties), this function can expertise. (still) predominantly consist be performed on behalf of of physically fit working-age national commanders either by Humanitarian Aid / Disaster Relief males. trained uniformed or civilian (HA/DR) • Military health services are health personnel. Strategic frequently called upon to evacuation over trans- or Given the often considerable resources provide HA/DR in response intercontinental distances can and expertise that exists in many to natural disasters in the generally be characterised by military health services, it is not short term, either until normal the use of fixed wing aircraft, surprising that governments direct services are restored, or until which (again) may or may not or seek their assistance in response other health agencies can take be specifically dedicated to the to local, national or international over. Lack of predictability role.16 disasters. Military assistance to civilian as to when HA/DR may be The medical personnel who undertake communities has also been increasingly required means that the notice the maritime casualty evacuation role recognised by governments over the to move is often far shorter therefore require specific training in past two decades as being of political than for many other military the provision of emergency care in an importance.18 operations. This particularly often austere operational environment, Depending on higher level national applies to maritime HA/DR especially at the forward level. direction, HA/DR can be therefore taskings.19 Although the use of aircraft at the considered either a component of • The hort-terms nature of tactical and strategic levels in particular operational health support, or a military HA/DR operations means that casualty evacuation tends discrete capability in its own right. also means that there is a far to be an air force health responsibility, However, in most situations HA/ greater level of interaction the requirement for seamless joint DR should be differentiated from between deployed military casualty evacuation systems imply the operational health, in that: health services, NGOs and need for all operationally deployed • Rather than acting as a other civilian health agencies health personnel – including those supporting arm to a deployed compared with other military Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 31

operations, particularly during are primarily focused on hyperbaric entails consideration of the logistic and the withdrawal phase. This therapy for a small proportion of older administrative aspects of establishing also particularly applies to patients with relatively uncommon and operating military health facilities maritime HA/DR taskings. conditions. They also tend to be in with this expertise. This also requires The planning and practice of providing fixed locations, typically associated the organisation of structured medical HA/DR health care therefore needs to with major tertiary treatment command and administrative systems consider the logistic and administrative centres.21 Military DivMed services that interact with and support the aspects of establishing and operating are also differentiated from their operational units that need it. This military health facilities, this time civilian counterparts, in that they are requires close engagement with in a lead role. This also entails the focused on preventing diving injuries, operational commanders, which organisation of structured medical maintaining readiness to treat such means that the military medicine command and administrative systems injuries should they occur, and only providers supporting them also that interact with and are (in this then providing treatment when they require very high levels of service- case) supported by other arms. This occur, for populations that (still) specific expertise, including access to again requires close engagement with predominantly consist of physically fit classified information. Such expertise operational commanders, which means working-age males.22 is therefore also at least as important that the health personnel supporting Submarine Medicine (SubMed). and relevant to health personnel them require very high levels of Although there is considerable overlap as their clinical military medicine service-specific expertise. In the HA/ between SubMed and DivMed, the specialist skills. It also assumes greater DR setting, such expertise is therefore former typically entails a greater importance at the policy level. also at least as important and relevant level of occupational health expertise to health personnel as their clinical (particularly for those navies that H ealth-Related Suitability for knowledge and expertise. operate nuclear submarines), and Seagoing Service providing for the prevention and Military Medicine Capabilities treatment of simultaneous multiple In order to meet their operational Military medicine services are essential hyperbaric casualties.23 taskings while complying with to maritime forces that operate certain CBRN Medicine. The focus of their duty of care obligations, Navy capabilities, in particular combat military CBRN health services typically personnel managers, commanders and aircraft (including but not limited to includes maintaining readiness to treat divisional staff need medical advice fast jets), submarines, special forces military CBRN casualties should they regarding: with a parachuting or diving capability, occur, and providing treatment when • Whether their particular sailor and or offensive or (in Australia’s they occur, for populations that still of interest has any medical case) defensive chemical, biological, predominantly consist of physically fit condition(s) that limits or radiological or nuclear (CBRN) working-age males. prevents them from doing capability. Depending on the scale (size their job(s), and Aviation (Aerospace) Medicine and complexity) of the military • Whether the jobs that their (AvMed). The size and scope of capabilities being supported, these particular sailor of interest the civilian aviation industry means military medicine capabilities may undertakes, will make any there is probably more overlap with not entail a recognised civilian medical condition(s) they may military AvMed, than for other military specialist-level qualification. However, have worse. medicine capabilities. However, the requirement to deploy these The inappropriate employment of civilian AvMed agencies are unlikely health practitioners poses significant medically unsuitable personnel may to provide the full range of services limitations on the use of civilian compromise achieving the operational required for seagoing aviation arms agencies that – whatever they may or mission. These personnel may also that operate fast jets, attack helos, and/ may not have regarding the necessary pose a threat to themselves if they are or night vision aids.20 ‘treatment’ capabilities per se – are unable to receive the care they need, or Diving (Underwater) Medicine unlikely to have the full range of non- if the operational setting makes their (DivMed). Although they have the clinical capabilities required to do so. condition(s) worse.24 Furthermore, capability to treat diving casualties, The planning and practice of evacuating personnel with known pre- civilian hyperbaric medicine clinics providing military medicine support existing conditions wastes resources Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 ON MARITIME MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES

O ccupational and Environmental that could otherwise be used to achieve the mission, or may place others at risk. Health (OEH) Health-related suitability for service It has previously been noted that employment therefore encompasses even in the non-warlike setting, Navy entry and serving standards, short and personnel are exposed to a wide range long term employment restrictions, of physical, chemical, biological, occupational rehabilitation and ergonomic and other hazards. transition. This means that assessing Furthermore, the very nature of medical suitability for Service maritime warfare uniquely places Navy employment is a day-to-day function personnel at risk from weaponry that undertaken by military health staff on is specifically designed to damage or a daily basis on behalf of personnel destroy their workplace.26 managers, commanders and divisional As in civilian workplace settings, staff. most modern OEH legislation requires Health staff who provide care for Navy commanders and divisional seagoing personnel therefore not only staff to minimise personnel exposures need to know about the clinical status to hazards encountered in their of their patients, but also something workplaces that may adversely affect about the work that they undertake at their health. Exceptions are typically the incidence and cost of compensable sea, as well as the seagoing hazards to only granted in those operational illness and injury is to be contained. which they may be exposed. environments where control of The absence of unions in most However, the need to provide this hazardous exposures cannot be maritime workforces means that the advice may pose ethical dilemmas for assured. However, risks deemed imperative and responsibility for this treating health staff, with respect to acceptable during these operations task rests primarily with commanders balancing the needs of commanders have frequently become highly emotive and divisional staff. and divisional staff against the needs of political issues, up to decades later.27 The OEH paradigm for control their patients. It is likely that civilian Notwithstanding the advances of workplace hazards is useful for medical practitioners may be required in naval hygiene since Commodore addressing most seagoing operational by their medical registration authorities George Anson’s 1740-144 threats and other hazards. The to default to the latter.25 circumnavigation, infectious disease hierarchy of control of workplace The provision of relevant advice can still compromise maritime hazards consists of elimination, regarding medical suitability for operations, with illness rates that can substitution, isolation, engineering Navy service therefore requires far exceed the morbidity and mortality controls, administrative controls knowledge and understanding of rates from seagoing BCas.28 Prevention and the use of personal protective the hazards potentially faced at sea, of infectious disease epidemics equipment. as well as detailed knowledge of the therefore remains fundamental However, the provision of relevant tasks that they undertake. Provision to maritime health planning appropriate OEH advice to maritime of such advice frequently requires and implementation. Particular forces still requires a high level close engagement with commanders emphasis is placed on determining of understanding of the seagoing and divisional staff, which means immunisation and other preventive environment. This again requires that health personnel providing this strategies against endemic diseases, close engagement with commanders, advice also require a high level of and using established public health and managers and supervisors, which Service-specific skills, knowledge engineering practices to secure clean means that the health personnel and experience in addition to their food and water supplies, and provide providing this advice also require a clinical expertise. At the policy level, for waste disposal and sanitation. high level of service-specific expertise. the ability to provide credible and The assessment and measurement At the policy level, such expertise is consistent advice may be regarded by of chemical, biological and physical also at least as important and relevant personnel managers just as, if not more hazards in the operational, training as clinical expertise. important, than the clinical expertise of and peacetime environments in which health staff. Navy personnel work is important if Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 33

H ealth Promotion and relevant to health personnel as their Health promotion for military clinical expertise. personnel requires a broader focus than the programs often usually T reatment Services encountered in civilian practice. The latter usually focus on prevention of In most countries, there is an chronic disease, such as addressing expectation that the standard of cardiovascular disease risk factors, the care for military personnel is at least detection of diabetes and obesity, and/ comparable to that provided for or the minimisation of tobacco, alcohol the general civilian community. It and other substance abuse. Chronic is therefore accepted that military disease prevention remains particularly treatment services do have much relevant for military health services in common with civilian health that provide health care for ex-serving services, particularly with respect members and their dependants.29 to primary, secondary and tertiary Although many of these level health care.30 It is this aspect of considerations also apply to military military health services that drives the personnel, health promotion is, or perception that they are simply civilian should be, aimed improving their health treatment services in uniform. education, in order to enhance mission However, there are some important success through minimising casualties differences, in particular: from avoidable factors, and improved • How and where these services functionality in hostile or challenging are provided. In the seagoing environments. Typical emphasis is setting, the services provided therefore often placed on physical depend on the hazards and fitness, resilience training, prevention number of people in that of heat stress, sea and combat survival, environment. undertaken by Navy personnel and personal health care. • The age and sex distribution and the hazards potentially In the maritime setting, health of the seagoing population faced in an operational, promotion can be applied by a compared to the civilian training or normal maritime combination of formal training community. working environment. programs, opportunistic interventions • The equirementr for health- • Difficulties in personnel (typically during routine primary health related force preparation to administration and care), and/or a planned component counter hazards associated in compensation for health care of other interventions (typically while particular with the seagoing (as providers in the seagoing undertaking health-related suitability opposed to the shore-based) operational setting. This is assessments). operational environment. usually overcome by use of The provision of relevant health • The xtente of illness and uniformed health personnel. promotion requires a high level of injuries that arise from The provision of military treatment understanding of the Navy population individual and collective services for Navy personnel being supported. Effective health training activities. therefore still requires a high level promotion programs also require • BCas and DNBI associated of understanding of the logistical effective planning and policy with the seagoing operational and administrative considerations of development, in conjunction with environment. operating military health facilities, commander commitment. • The importance of returning which involves the organisation of This means that health personnel casualties to duty as soon as structured medical administrative providing health promotion advice also possible. This reinforces the systems that are integrated with the require at least some service-specific importance for primary care Navy population that they support. expertise. At the policy level, such providers to have a sound This requires close engagement with expertise is also at least as important knowledge of the duties commanders and divisional staff, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 ON MARITIME MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES

which means that the health personnel • Health promotion military personnel regardless of where providing this advice also require at • Treatment services they may be required to perform their least some service-specific expertise. The prioritisation of these functions duties. At the policy level, such expertise is and roles is based on the concept that The functions and roles of military also at least as important and relevant the level of military expertise required health services can be used as a to health personnel as their clinical to conduct them increases as one heads template to design their structure expertise. up the list. and organisation. The resulting structure will be driven by the size, the Prioritisation of Military Health Service Conclusions operational roles and capabilities of Functions and Roles the (in this instance) naval forces that With pressures on many national are supported, as well as the extent In most cases, health professionals military services to become more cost- and demand for care of dependents, commence their military service effective, there is a need to increase veterans and reserve personnel. with the same skill sets as their awareness of the strategic functions and Basing the organisation of military coeval civilian counterparts. Their roles of military health services. This health services on the level of service- subsequent professional development will enable essential skills, knowledge specific expertise for each of these is characterised not only by the and experience to be retained within functions and roles promotes the acquisition of service-specific clinical military health services, as well as development of professional mastery skills, but also the development of providing a sound basis from which in military medicine. It facilitates the non-clinical military knowledge, skills, commanders are able to make decisions recruitment, training and retention of experience and expertise with respect in adapting their military health services knowledgeable and suitably qualified to the planning and provision of health to changing roles and demands. military health service personnel care for military forces. Successful clinical care in support of (whether uniformed, government This means that civilian-equivalent combat operations depends on sound employee, or civilian contractor). This treatment services only comprise the strategic health planning, provision of in turn has implications with respect entry level for health personnel who appropriate training, and provision of to military health service policy choose to undertake a Navy career. In an appropriate infrastructure which development and its implementation, the early stages, they provide treatment is adaptable to changing military leading to the development of effective services, initially in the base or ‘garrison’ requirements. This means that the as well as efficient services. setting, and later at sea. As they gain provision of clinical services in the In short, the full range of functions training and experience, they acquire military setting is dependent of the and roles of military health services a combination of both clinical- and availability of highly skilled and trained cannot be met by ‘uniformed civilian’ service-specific skill sets. The latter personnel, whose capacity to provide treatment services. t assumes a higher priority as their career clinical services (whether medical, progresses from treatment roles, to dental, nursing or allied health), is planning, policy, advisory, supervisory, simply a pre-requisite core skill. Commander Neil Westphalen, MBBS management and leadership roles. In order to provide appropriate care The functions and roles of military to personnel who undertake military (Adel), MPH, DAvMed, FRACGP, FAFOEM, health service attributes are therefore operations, these clinical skills must be FACAsM, psc, RAN graduated from prioritised as follows (from highest to supported by additional military skills. Adelaide University in 1985, and joined lowest), based in the level of military This in turn entails well developed the RAN in 1987. His seagoing service expertise required to perform them: processes and training, which need included Swan, Stalwart, Success, • Operational Health Support to be initiated and developed in • Casualty Evacuation the non-operational setting, and Sydney and Perth, while that ashore • Humanitarian Aid / Disaster Relief integrated and coordinated with the included Cerberus, Penguin, Kuttabul, • Military medicine capabilities rest of the military service that they Albatross and Stirling. He escaped • Medical suitability for military support. This approach provides the three back-to-back Canberra postings duties essential framework, planning and in January 2013, to assume the role of • Occupational and environmental administration to allow high standards health of clinical care to be delivered to Fleet Medical Officer. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 35

11 Military medicine [online]. http:// hit by the 412 ton Japanese fishing trawler Acknowledgement en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_medicine. Kiowa Maru, ten minutes from her expected I am indebted to the advice and [2012, 17 Jan] arrival at the port of Callao. Four men were killed in the collision and 23 abandoned ship support provided by my colleagues 12 Military medicine [online]. http:// before Pacocha sank, of whom three died of en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_medicine. below for this article; however any hypothermia. Another 22 survivors escaped [2012, 17 Jan] from the sunken wreck the next day, of errors remain my responsibility. 13 Military medicine [online]. http:// whom several developed decompression • AIRCDRE Warren Harrex, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_medicine. illness with one death. [2012, 17 Jan] RAAFSR, MSc (OccMed), 24 Department of Defence, 2007, ‘Report of Board of Inquiry into the Death of CAPT BMedSc (Hons), MBBS, 14 See Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 [online] http://www.navy.gov.au/ Paul Lawton’, [online], DObstRCOG, DAvMed, sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf. http://www.defence.gov.au/coi/reports/ FAFOEM, FAFPHM, FACAsM [2013, 14 Feb]. Lawton_R.pdf, [2012, 02 May] • COL John Turner, RAAMC, 15 Tyquin, M.B. Gallipoli: the Medical War. 25 Medical Board of Western Australia The Australian Army Medical Services in MBBS, DAvMed, FRAeS, (2004). Case No 1501-7: in the matter of the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, NSW an inquiry pursuant to section 13 of the FACAsM, FAFOEM University Press, Kensington NSW, 1993. Medical Act 1894 (WA) regarding Dr Disclaimer 16 A notable exception to the use of aircraft Douglas Mckenzie, delivered 20 July 2004. for tactical and strategic casualty evacuation, The views expressed in this article 26 See Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN was the use of the educational cruise liner Doctrine 1 [online] http://www.navy.gov.au/ are those of the author, and do not SS Uganda, and the Royal Navy’s H-class sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf. hydrographic survey vessels, as ‘Ambulance [2013, 14 Feb]. represent those of the Royal Australian Ships’ for casualty evacuation from the Navy, Joint Health Command, or the South Atlantic to Ascension Island during 27 See F.B. Smith. Agent Orange – The the 1982 Falklands War. See Jolly, R. The Australian Aftermath, in O’Keefe, B. Australian Defence Force. Red and Green Life Machine: A Diary Medicine at War: Medical Aspects of of the Falkland Field Hospital. Century Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian (Endnotes) Publishing, London, 1983. Conflicts 1950-1972. The Official History of 1 After ‘Vom Kreig’ (‘on War’), with Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian 17 Tyquin, M.B. Gallipoli: the Medical Conflicts 1948-1975, Allen and Unwin apologies to the late Carl von Clausewitz War. The Australian Army Medical Services (1780-1831). (through the Australian War Memorial), in the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, 1994. 2 Chretien, J-P. 2012. Protecting Service NSW University Press, Kensington NSW, members in war: non-battle morbidity and 1993. Although aeromedical evacuation 28 Although successful in capturing the command responsibility. New England was clearly not a capability that existed Acapulco galleon off the Philippines, Journal of Medicine. Vol 366 No 8 pp 677- for the Gallipoli landings, the initial chaos Anson lost 1300 dead from a total force of 679. regarding casualty evacuation from the 1900 men, of whom only four were killed beaches provides a salutatory lesson should in action. See Williams, G. The Prize of 3 Chretien, J-P. 2012. Protecting Service this consideration be ignored. All the Oceans: The Triumph and Tragedy members in war: non-battle morbidity and of Anson’s Voyage Around the World, command responsibility. New England 18 Examples include the USN-led PACIFIC Harper Collins, London 2000. For a more Journal of Medicine. Vol 366 No 8 pp 677- PARTNERSHIP deployments, following the recent example (albeit involving a cruise 679. response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. liner), see US Center for Disease Control, ‘Investigation Update on the Emerald 4 Australian Government Auditor-General 19 For example, the first ships to participate Princess’ [on line] http://www.cdc.gov/ (1997). Performance Audit Report No 34: in Operation NAVY HELP DARWIN nceh/vsp/surv/outbreak/2012/decemer27_ Australian Defence Force Health Services. sailed on 26 Dec 74 – less than 48 hours emerald_princess.htm, [2013, 27 Feb]. A Australian Government Publishing Service, after Cyclone Tracy struck. See RAN Sea similar incident aboard an LHD would have Canberra, 26 May 1997. Power Centre. Semaphore 14: Disaster Relief - Cyclone Tracy and Tasman considerable potential to limit operational 5 [US] Military Health System [online]. Bridge [on line] http://117.55.225.121/ capability – especially immediately prior to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ Publication:Semaphore_-_Issue_14,_2004 an amphibious landing. Health_System. [2012, 17 Jan] [2013, 28 Feb] 29 See Hawe, P, Dengeling, D, Hall J. 6 (UK) Defence Medical Services 20 Johnson, C. (undated). Dept of Evaluating Health Promotion: A Health (DMS) [online]. http://www.mod.uk/ Computing Science, University of Worker’s Guide. McLennan and Petty Pty DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DMS/ Glasgow, Glasgow. The Role of Night Ltd, East Gardens NSW, 2002. WhatWeDo. [2012, 17 Jan] Vision Equipment in Military Incidents 30 Australian Government Auditor-General and Accidents [online] http://www.dcs.gla. 7 French Defence Health Services [online]. (1997). Performance Audit Report No 34: ac.uk/~johnson/papers/night_accidents.pdf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_ Australian Defence Force Health Services. [2012, 05 May]. Defence_Health_service. [2012, 17 Jan]. Australian Government Publishing Service, 21 Hyperbaric medicine. [online] http:// Canberra, 26 May 1997. 8 Bundeswehr Joint Health Service [online] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperbaric_ [2012, 17 Jan] [German]. medicine. [2012, 05 May] 9 Joint Health Command [online] 22 Diving medicine, [online] http:// http://intranet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/sites/ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diving_medicine. JHCorganisation/ComWeb.asp?page=38800. [2012, 05 May]. [2012, 20 Jan]. 23 BAP Pacocha (SS-48) [online] http:// 10 Military medicine [online]. http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAP_Pacocha_(SS- en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_medicine. 48). [2012, 05 May]. On 26 Aug 88, the [2012, 17 Jan] Peruvian Navy submarine Pacocha was Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 World Naval Developments – Drones in Mali by DR Norman Friedman

e hear a great deal about drones, particularly armed Wones, but it is rarer to see an analysis of how difficult it is to operate without them. A French report published in the wake of the rescue mission in Mali is illuminating. The Mali operation highlighted the growing role of an Al Qaeda affiliate which calls itself AQIM – Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb. The Mahgreb is the vast desert region of Africa stretching south from the Mediterranean. Most of it was once French colonies, and for decades France has helped local governments that the two French surveillance UAVs both cases the issue is, however, the A jet-powered drone with a defend themselves. For example, spend half their endurance merely same: something airborne has to be comprehensive in the 1980s French forces helped flying to and from the area of interest. available when the target pops up. As suite of weapons the government of Chad beat off a A single fighter can spend no more the French example shows, the further (Lockheed Martin) Libyan attack. The Mahgreb is now than two or three hours over that area. away it is, the less time the airborne increasingly important to the world The fighter patrols are supported by attacker can spend anywhere near as a source of energy (in Mali AQIM two tankers. the target. Manned aircraft have the was attacking foreign workers at a BP This is not classical air warfare, additional limitation that pilots become [formerly British Petroleum] site). Its which focuses on fixed targets revealed fatigued, so their performance declines vast empty spaces may, it is feared, by reconnaissance. For such warfare, with distance from a base. This become a refuge for Al Qaeda and what matters is how well an attacker limitation was obvious when the British its friends analogous to Afghanistan can survive in the face of anti-aircraft tried to support the Libyan resistance before 9/11. Such refuges are generally weapons. Ideally the attacker spends using Tornado bombers flying out of described in terms of training camps. almost no time over the target. That the United Kingdom. That they would Possibly the most important point is why endurance over a target area is have done much better with carrier- about a refuge is that terrorists working rarely quoted as a measure of tactical based aircraft, which could have there know who their recruits are. The aircraft performance. However, in Mali spent much more time in the combat mere existence of a system of face-to- as in Afghanistan, the targets which area, may explain why the British face identification makes it difficult to matter are fleeting. In Mali most often Government now considers its decision infiltrate terrorist groups. Infiltration they are the individuals leading the to eliminate its carriers an unfortunate feeds the natural paranoia of terrorists AQIM operation. They can often be mistake. and is probably the single best way to spotted by the UAVs, based on other The US government has negotiated destroy them. The US government, for forms of intelligence, but that does no a basing arrangement with nearby example, successfully attacked the Ku good unless a fighter happens to be on Niger, and it seems likely that armed Klux Klan in exactly this way. station – which cannot be nearly often US UAVs will soon be deployed France operates UAVs, but not enough. This is, incidentally, much the in support of the French in Mali. armed ones. Without them, its same situation as in close air support, AQIM is a global problem, and the airborne fist in Mali is two Mirage in which the targets which matter pop US government is pledged to pursue fighters. They carry a lot more up at random times and do not remain Al Qaeda and similar terrorists. US ordnance than a UAV, but they have in place for long. involvement of course raises the nothing like its endurance – which is The difference is probably that the perennial problem of whether strikes what matters most in the vastness of targets of close air support fire are hard by armed UAVs (rather than, say, by the Mahgreb. The territory involved enough to require more ordnance than soldiers on the ground or by tactical is far larger than France. It is so large the average UAV can possibly carry. In aircraft) are somehow a new and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 37

questionable form of warfare. That surveillance of the German population. to the followers, we attack a valuable issue has been raised most recently by German history gives that last enemy resource. As experienced many on the German Left in response argument particular force, but surely leaders are killed, the enemy is more to a report that the German Defense German constitutional provisions have likely to falter and to commit errors Ministry now plans to deploy armed greater force. which make our own operations more UAVs. Both of the first two arguments effective. At some point individuals There seem to be two main have some validity, but ultimately fall. may be less and less anxious to take arguments against UAVs. One is It is certainly true that UAVs are used dangerous leadership positions. that they are typically used against to hunt particular individuals. It is not Incidentally, if it is difficult for the particular individuals rather than clear how to deal with a guerilla or French to keep a single Mirage airborne against the mass (if that is the right terrorist force without hunting down over central Mali for two or three word) of enemy personnel or the its leaders. Nor is it clear why attacking hours, it is not clear exactly how they installations supporting the enemy. those leaders is significantly different or we could possibly keep even a squad Such attacks on individuals are said from wartime sniping (assuming, as of soldiers in place waiting to pounce. to contravene the laws of warfare. A we and Al Qaeda do, that we are at For the US government, moreover, second is that because their operation war). It is certainly true that, if troops UAV strikes are probably the only never risks pilot casualties, it somehow could be moved instantly into position, viable way to deal with the problem makes war-making less painful for those same leaders could be captured of sanctuary. No government, the government using the UAVs. and perhaps tried as criminals, but however friendly, is likely to be able The latter argument was highlighted generally that is impossible. From a to keep enemy combatants from when the US Air Force boasted about moral point of view, moreover, it is fleeing into its territory. The border how it was controlling Predators difficult to understand why the US or between Afghanistan and Pakistan is from a comfortable base in Nevada, French government would prefer to particularly porous, largely because the reducing attacks on terrorist leaders risk our troops’ lives in order to capture Pashtuns on both sides do not consider to something more like a video game. enemy leaders, when we have a much the border itself to be legitimate. The An additional argument, which seems less expensive (in blood) way to deal Pakistanis have mounted military to be particularly forceful in Germany, with them. operations on their side of the border, U S Customs and is that the UAVs that begin as military Ultimately the argument is that but in a territory whose inhabitants Border protection tools end as a means of government by attacking the leaders in preference largely sympathize with our enemies drone (US Navy)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 World Naval Developments – Drones in Mali

that is unlikely to be very effective. fewer innocent people we kill, the less involves difficult and dangerous work Intelligence gathering is a different unacceptable what we do is. on the ground. We often ignore that N orthrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk proposition, and it can support The issue of wars becoming too easy human cost because we forget that has a wingspan of 40 UAV strikes. The strikes themselves to fight is a deeper one. A government intelligence gathering, which carries metres, the same as have made the United States quite can certainly develop a taste for what real human costs for us, is a larger and a C130, a length of unpopular; a Pakistani once told me it sees as an inexpensive way to fight. larger component of the current war 14.5m, weighs in at that now the United States can kill This issue came up during the brief against Al Qaeda and its associated. 14,500kg, and has anyone it decides is a terrorist. In effect time the United States had a monopoly The human costs are often obscured an endurance of 28 hours. (Northrop) the UAVs have made terror two-sided. on nuclear weapons. The reality is that because intelligence gathering is so This is not a happy situation, but it may although operating UAVs does not secret. We are used to overlooking be the only way to convince people to carry direct human costs for us, it is by these costs because, in past more reject Al Qaeda. no means the whole story of the war conventional wars, the intelligence As for morality, although the UAVs against Al Qaeda. Whatever success component was a much smaller part of certainly do kill innocent people we are enjoying in Afghanistan comes the overall effort. t from time to time, they kill many from a combination of work with the fewer than the alternative methods population on the ground, which is of conventional air attack and ground hardly cost-free, and direct attacks on assault do. Al Qaeda kills a lot more the Taliban. The Taliban cannot be innocent people in its effort to frighten cancelled out altogether by attacking populations. Unless we hunt down its its experienced leaders. Rather, the leaders, it will continue to do so with attacks on the leaders make our other impunity. Which is the greater evil, that efforts more effective. in pursuing Al Qaeda leaders who kill For that matter, the apparently regularly we accidentally cause small cost-free attacks directed from Nevada numbers of innocent deaths, or that were never cost-free. The intelligence Al Qaeda will be left free to kill vast operation which revealed that those numbers of innocent people, often by driving that particular car happened to bombing public places – by completely be senior Taliban came from enormous random attacks? Obviously morality efforts on the ground, often conducted should never be a matter of numbers. at great risk to the individuals who However, war is a brutal process. If gained the information on which the Norman Friedman’s latest book is The we are to fight wars, we have to think strike was based. We too often forget Naval Institute Guide to World Naval seriously about which of various evils that any air strike is only part of a is worst. It seems fair to say that the much larger process, most of which Weapon Systems Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 39 Australia’s pivot to the Indian Ocean B y Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

hile much is being said about more important in Western Australia infrastructure both on and offshore, Australia’s refocus towards the than in the east. including oil and gas platforms, port WAsia Pacific, another equally interesting “There’s a sort of sense in Western infrastructure, and shipping lines in the ‘pivot’ is Australia’s initiative to Australia...that we’ve never been defended North West. simultaneously engage the Indian Ocean and when the eastern states say, ‘We have “The resource industry has previously Region. Celebrating the 35th anniversary been!’, we say, ‘Where’s the evidence of called for a greater defence presence in of the ‘Two Ocean Navy’, 2012 has been it?’ This is what really gave some political the North West of Western Australia, to auspicious for Australia’s relations with impetus to the idea of a ‘Two Ocean Navy’ provide increased protection for strategic countries in the Indian Ocean Region, which was arrived at for strategic reasons. infrastructure of national economic with Australia now poised to enter a new “But West Australians like to see significance. The strategic importance era in its diplomacy and strategic policy. a substantial defence presence and of the North West will only continue to very proud they are of the SAS and of grow with the demand from China and ‘Look West’ policy in the making serious air bases in the north. Also, they India for Western Australia’s minerals and Historically speaking, the development want indications that we are capable of energy. Safeguarding energy supply for of an Indian Ocean policy is a relatively protecting the offshore developments domestic markets is also critical. recent phenomenon, partly due to in Western Australia. People don’t think “CME was supportive of the Force the fact that Australia’s population is about that in Sydney and Melbourne, but Posture Review when it was first overwhelmingly east coast centric and people in Western Australia obsess about announced as it would consider energy reflects a different world view. it,” he said. security, and security issues associated Commenting on this point, in 2010, Indeed, true to this sentiment, with the rapidly expanding offshore Australia’s Ambassador to the US, Kim Western Australia’s resources sector, resource developments in the North Beazley, who is a noted Indian Ocean has in recent years lobbied the state West of Western Australia. Oil and Gas expert and the pioneer of the Two Ocean and federal government for a larger Platforms and pipelines of the North Navy policy in the 1980s, claimed: “I and more visible defence presence in West shelf provide the vast majority of do think that West Australians have a Western Australia. In August this year, Western Australia’s energy needs, and the different perspective to those in the east. Reg Howard-Smith, the Chief Executive region itself is responsible for more than For instance, Southeast Asia is viewed of the Chamber of Minerals and Energy $70 billion of Australia’s production and from the Indian Ocean perspective and Western Australia (CME), confirmed: export value of minerals and energy. The the Indian Ocean, and what happens with “We believe there is a case for a greater importance of this infrastructure makes it India has always been seen as slightly defence presence to protect strategic worthy of further protection.”

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 Australia’s pivot to the Indian Ocean

While domestic actors may have Index in 2011 pointed out that 11 out of R A N .” substantially shaped the debate on the world’s 20 most unstable states are As the RAN’s largest base, HMAS developing a national strategy to engage located in the Indian Ocean Region. Stirling supports half the RAN’s frigate its western frontier, the impetus behind Indeed, since the implementation of fleet and the entire submarine fleet. Adm Australia’s expanding Indian Ocean the Two Ocean Navy policy, the RAN, Griggs explained: “Today, we basically outlook is also likely to reflect upon the and the RAAF, have been at the forefront have a 50-50 split of the RAN’s major numerous external factors outside of of safeguarding Australia’s Indian Ocean assets between the east and west coasts. Australia. interests. HMAS Stirling, which is located In essence, probably a third of the RAN For example, it is not well known at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia, is based in the Indian Ocean. A lot of our that since World War II, the ADF and once safeguarded Australia’s western Darwin-based assets, which are patrol Australian police have been involved an frontier from a possible Soviet threat. In boats and the like, spend a large amount estimated 46 UN and coalition missions the post-Cold War era, the base continues of time in the Indian Ocean,” in the Indian Ocean region. At present, to support RAN warships and submarines The very fact that the ADF has a thousands of ADF personnel are deployed operating in the eastern, north-western, strong Indian Ocean disposition has in 11 overseas operations out of which north-eastern Indian Ocean, and the also a lot to do with Australia’s military nine are situated in the Indian Ocean Southeast Asian archipelago. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan region. Partly reflecting this point, the current in support of the US, the prevalence of Furthermore, in the sphere of security RAN Chief, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, terrorism and insurgency, increasing cooperation, out of 17 countries that affirmed: “In my mind, and I know in concerns over human trafficking, have signed bilateral counterterrorism the minds of most senior RAN officers, management of fisheries, the RAN’s MoUs with Australia, 11 are located in the strategic importance of the Indian ongoing contribution to anti-piracy the Indian Ocean Region. This should not Ocean has never changed and has always operations, bilateral defence cooperation be surprising given that the Failed States remained a critical waterway for the with Pakistan, the rapid rise of Chinese

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 41

influence throughout the Indian Ocean through the Region, expanding bilateral linkages with Indian Ocean India, participation in the Indian Ocean and its adjacent Naval Symposium (IONS) and other waterways. naval and strategic forums, widening Another economic and diplomatic ties with Africa, dynamic that adds increased US interest in accessing ADF to the complex base facilities in Northern Territory and geopolitical Western Australia. tapestry of the Indian Ocean Taking stock of a vast region region is the In devising policy towards such an influence of inherently complex and contested part Islam, which is of the world, Australian policymakers one of the world’s need to be more cognisant of the region’s largest and geopolitical dynamics. fastest growing The Indian Ocean region contains religions. According to Kim Beazley: Southeast Asian countries, which are 36 littoral and 14 dependent hinterland “Islam is basically an Indian Ocean also refocusing their naval and maritime states, consisting of more than 2.6 billion phenomenon and so the sorting out of security interests. Both Malaysia, which people or 40 per cent of the world’s what Islam needs is something of the is a Five Power Defence Arrangement population. There are at least five extra- Indian Ocean political activity.” He further partner-nation, and Indonesia, are also regional powers that are heavily active in emphasised: “Presently, these are two big increasingly focusing their attention the region, namely the US, UK, France, generators of global focus; the economy towards their western shores. For Japan and increasingly, China. Similarly, and Islam. If you take a very broad view, example, the Malaysian Navy has built there are also seven littoral states which excessively broad some would say, about a base at Pulau Langkawi, Kedah, for its are regional middle powers. They include the hinterland, pretty well all of Islam navy to operate along its Indian Ocean Australia, India, Indonesia, Iran, South is in the Indian Ocean or its hinterland waters. Africa, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. such as the Middle East, East Africa, the Similarly, Indonesia’s Navy Chief, Unsurprisingly, the nature of the region Gulf, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and, Admiral Soeparno, recently told Jane’s and its geopolitics has led to an escalating of course, Indonesia, which is the biggest Defence Weekly: “Indonesia is concerned strategic rivalry between the US, China Islamic nation in the world.” about Indian Ocean maritime security, and India, on the one hand, Pakistan It is this complex and convoluted particularly because our main sea lanes and India on the other, and a cold war region that Australia will need to of communication connect the Indian confrontation between the US, Saudi consider where its finite resources could Ocean and Asia-Pacific regions. We Arabia, Israel and Iran. be best utilised in the national interest. have, therefore, deployed warships and Furthermore, what also makes the At this point in time, there appears to naval aviation along our Indian Ocean region more important is that the Indian be a clear case for Australia to expand territorial waters and EEZ,” he said. Ocean is now considered to be the cooperation with Burma, France’s Indian “The Indian Ocean is Indonesia’s world’s most important energy and trade Ocean possessions, Indonesia, Malaysia, western-most defence perimeter and transmission belt. More than 80 per cent Mauritius, South Africa, Thailand, and our navy regularly deploys maritime of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits the countries of South Asia, particularly patrol elements around the northern and through Indian Ocean choke points, with Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan western recesses of Sumatra. Over the 40 per cent passing through the Strait of and Sri Lanka, all of which have last few years, our navy has increased its Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Strait significant maritime security interests defensive infrastructure and assets by of Malacca and eight per cent through that are directly and indirectly related to establishing new naval bases along our the Bab el-Mandab Strait. Moreover, Australia’s national interests. Indian Ocean coastline. Indonesia has reportedly up to 50 per cent of the world’s Of noteworthy interest, the manner national interests in the Indian Ocean,” seaborne container traffic, one-third of in which our regional neighbours have Adm Soeparno added. the world’s seaborne bulk cargo, involving shifted their attention towards the Indian “While acknowledging that Southeast around 100,000 ships, annually transit Ocean can readily be seen among certain Asia is our main zone of interest, we Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 Australia’s pivot to the Indian Ocean

also recognise that political and security for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning challenges that affect this part of the developments in the Indian Ocean could and Mitigation System. In addition, world. t directly affect the Southeast Asia region Australia is also a signatory to the Indian and vice versa. Therefore, the Indonesian Ocean MoU on Port State Control. Navy is trying to balance attention in both In addition to this, the conclusion regions, which are critically important to of the Force Posture Review this year, our interests.” and the soon to be concluded Senate Inquiry into the Indian Ocean region and Rise of the Indian Ocean Region Australia’s foreign, trade and defence policy, means that Australia is making In attempting to devise an Indian significant headway in developing a Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe has Ocean policy Australia has a major strategy to engage the Indian Ocean advantage over its other Indian Ocean region. This is especially timely given published widely on South Asian and neighbours in that it is effectively the that Australia, from 2013 to 2015, is set Indian Ocean security issues and is only regional middle power in the vast to Chair the Indian Ocean’s pre-eminent currently undertaking his Masters by and isolated southeast quadrant of the regional forum: the IOR-ARC comprising Research at Curtin University analysing: Indian Ocean, and is already a member 19 member states, and shall also assume Evolution of Australia’s Defence Policy of five multilateral Indian Ocean the Chair and Secretariat of the IONS in institutions. These encompass the Indian 2014. and Strategic Interests in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Clearly, the resurgence of the Indian Ocean. Cooperation (IOR-ARC), IONS, Indian Ocean region in Australia is unlikely to Ocean Tuna Commission, UNESCO be a temporary phenomenon, especially Intergovernmental Oceanographic given the unprecedented rise of the Indo- Commission and UNESCO Pacific economies, and the enduring Intergovernmental Coordination Group nature of the geopolitical and security

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

44 2013 Creswell Oration “The Royal Australian Naval College: Creswell’s Last Great Legacy” Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN – Chief Capability Development Group

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and for an Australian Navy. For many years to various organisations and Gentlemen, prior to Federation, it seemed he was a societies. Creswell later wrote: It is a great honour to be asked lone voice. “The undertaking I so to give the 2013 Creswell Oration. I William Creswell joined the Royal lightly took in hand when I commend the Navy League for this Navy as a 14-year-old cadet in 1865. penned my articles for the Oration series that helps commemorate After an eventful 13-year career Adelaide Register, thinking the father of our Navy and also allows including service against pirates then only how I might an opportunity for discourse on our off Zanzibar, Creswell resigned his convert unbelievers of the Navy. commission to join his brother in a colony of South Australia, The title of this year’s Creswell pastoralist venture in the Northern I subsequently discovered Creswell badge Oration is “The Royal Australian Naval Territory then part of South Australia. was Imperial in its dimensions. The amalgamated with College: Creswell’s Last Great Legacy”. In 1885 Creswell met an old shipmate small job I thought to accomplish that of RANC On the eve of tomorrow’s Commander John Walcott, the-then in the twinkling of the eye turned commemoration in Geelong of the Naval Commandant of the South out to be a mighty one, involving opening of the Royal Australian Naval Australian Defence Force. That great protagonists and affecting College in February 1913 at its interim meeting led Creswell to become the destiny of an Empire. My own site, it is timely to recognize this less First Lieutenant of the small South small share in its accomplishments heralded aspect of Vice Admiral Australian gunboat Protector. Over took me, as I have already William Rooke Creswell’s legacy to our the next two decades Creswell observed, three and twenty years.”1 Navy and our nation. served in evermore responsible In the lead up to Federation William I am particularly honoured, positions in colonial navies, including Creswell advocated in the press therefore, to give this oration in the Commandant of the Queensland Naval and with politicians the need for an Ships participaiting presence of not only the descendants of Forces. From those vantage points he Australian Navy to go hand in glove in the exercise Ocean Admiral William Creswell, but also of provided intellectual arguments for the new nation. His efforts would Protector at anchor the cadet-midshipmen who were part an Australian Navy. Creswell wrote have gone in vain without the dogged in Jervis Bay, NSW, of the first intake. innumerable letters and articles on support of Prime Minister Alfred with HMAS Creswell in the foreground In this oration, I will: the subject, as well as giving speeches Deakin. The Prime Minister held sway (RAN photo) • briefly set the scene by touching on key aspects of the creation of our Navy as they impacted on the creation of the Naval College; • describe and then analyse the RANC model, then • relate how the Naval College performed in practice; and then • assess the legacy. Recently I had the opportunity to read the Creswell Papers that are now at the RAN Seapower Centre. What is remarkable, when you read the papers in conjunction with Sir William’s memoir Close to the Wind, is for how long the Admiral advocated the need Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 45

against British Government opposition they would receive further training 1909 Creswell’s trusted deputy and to an Australian Navy. The British on specific equipment in the UK. The supporter, Captain Frederick Ticknell, at the time would have preferred manpower was to come from multiple wrote a memorandum which distilled that Australia continue to provide sources, spanning sailors from the old the character and size of a naval college funds to their Government for naval Colonial navies, the merchant marine for the new navy. It was based on the protection. In 1905 Deakin said: “No or fishing industry, fresh recruits Royal Navy model and would involve Commonwealth patriotism is aroused and from the Royal Navy itself. The training 13-year-old cadets for four while we merely supply funds that prospect of a new life in Australia and years. Because of the cadet system disappear in the general expenditure of better pay and conditions provided in place in some Australian private the Admiralty”2 sufficient attraction for a significant schools the title ‘cadet-midshipman’ Creswell and Deakin understood number of British sailors to transfer would be used in the RAN to avoid that an Australian Navy was essential to the fledgling navy. They had confusion. In 1913 C.E.W. Bean wrote to the young nation’s security and experience in operating a blue-water of RAN College training system: prosperity. As Deakin said in 1906 navy and their contribution to the safe That is the scheme. It will be a to the Governor General, “Nowhere and efficient operation of the RAN matter of fascinating interest to are maritime communications more Fleet cannot be underestimated. In watch it develop – like watching an important than to Australia.” the longer term, a dedicated training experiment from Plato’s Republic. But to Creswell and Deakin, the establishment was needed. Admiral It is an attempt to obtain the best Navy had another dimension. It would Henderson identified a site at Crib ability from the people, wherever be a great national institution that Point near the site for a future naval it lies. The State realises that, for would help bind the colonies together base on Westernport, Victoria. the sake of efficiency, it must catch and help create an Australian identity. As events unfolded, the training young those who are to fill its In the interests of time, I will not establishment HMAS Cerberus was higher posts. …Is there any reason discuss the momentous events that led commissioned but the naval base was why that experiment, if it succeeds, to the formation of the Australian Navy never constructed. should end with the Army and the and the conception of the Australian In 1906 William Creswell, as part of Navy?4 Fleet unit centred on the battle cruiser a UK visit, called on Professor James While Creswell and Ticknell developed HMAS Australia. Suffice to say Ewing, Director of Naval Education. their plans for a Naval College, efforts the first Australian Fleet was much The meeting was at the behest of the were well underway to create a sister grander than even William Creswell’s University of Melbourne which wanted military college for the Army. On 30 aspirations. the Commonwealth Government to May 1910 Colonel William Bridges, From earliest days, however, both fund a School of Naval Science on who had been involved in the School Creswell and Deakin recognized that their campus. This would complement of Military Science initiative, was navies were more than just their ships. the new School of Military Science at promoted to Brigadier General and In particular they appreciated the need the University of Sydney. The meeting appointed as Commandant of the yet to train significant numbers of men as with Ewing was of great value. Ewing to be established military college. The officers and sailors for the Australian was a remarkable figure and a practical government had decreed that it was Navy. How this was to be achieved educationalist.3 He had spent five to be built on Federal land where the coalesced into an increasingly coherent years as the Professor of Mechanical new capital of Canberra would be built. program with supporting public works Engineering at Tokyo University and There would be distinct differences in in the years 1903 to 1912. during World War I would manage the the Army and Navy college models. With respect to initial entry for Admiralty’s famous Room 40 which The new military college would be sailors, the intent was to expand the broke the German coded signals. heavily influenced by the US Military modest colonial training facilities. From this and other meetings College at West Point as well as the His Majesty’s Australian Ship Creswell formed the view that Canadian Royal Military College at (HMAS) Encounter became a training while university training for some Kingston at which Bridges had been cruiser which would allow sailors technical officers was essential, a naval a cadet. In contrast to their much to achieve basic naval and specialist college along the lines of the Royal younger naval counterparts the Army competencies. For the sailors that Naval College at Osborne House cadets would be from 17 years old on would man the Navy’s new Fleet, was the correct course of action. In entry and would initially receive three Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 2013 Creswell Oration “The Royal Australian Naval College: Creswell’s Last Great Legacy” it was at the Australian Commonwealth Vice Admiral years training before graduation. This Territory on Jervis Bay where the port Sir William would be extended to four years once for Canberra was hoped to be built. The Rooke the shortfall of officers was addressed.5 citizens of Geelong generously offered Creswell A question that both Bridges and not only Osborne House as the interim Creswell had to grapple with was the naval college but warmly welcomed the officers, sailors, cadets and their families size of their cadet population. Bridges into their community. concluded the Military College would eventually have a population of 150 Fortunately for us today, there cadets. For the Navy the planned were other politicians to pick up the Fleet size became the guide and it baton from Alfred Deakin. Worthy was estimated that about 30 cadet- of mention was the first Navy and midshipmen would be needed each Defence Minister, Senator George year. Based on the eventual 120 cadet- Pearce, who said, “We do not regard midshipmen at the Naval College the Navy as a toy – we regard it as a Ticknell calculated the requirements deadly instrument which may have to for facilities as well as naval and be used some day in the maintenance academic staff. The naval staff would of our independence and liberty”. comprise a Captain, three Lieutenants, Senator Pearce and Prime Minister a gunner, a boatswain, a carpenter and Andrew Fisher helped shape the an artificer engineer. The academic distinctive character of the Royal staff would be five masters and five Australian Naval College. I should assistants. elaborate on this aspect, alluded The officer the Royal Navy had to by CEW Bean. In the Royal loaned to be the inaugural Captain of Navy parents were expected to the naval college had recently arrived pay for the tuition and uniforms in Australia. He was Captain Bertram of midshipmen for the duration of Chambers. An astute Londoner and their training. This meant of course navigation specialist, Chambers had that officers were drawn from himself joined the Royal Navy as the middle and upper classes of a 13-year-old cadet-midshipman. British society. In a new approach He had extensive sea service, most consistent with the egalitarian recently as Flag Captain to the aspirations of the new nation, Admiral commanding the Home Fleet. Prime Minister Fisher insisted While commanding the flagship, the there be no impediments to boys RANC with Creswell, battleship HMS Bulwark, the ship was from the working class being able receiving this splendid education at probably in the grounded. Fortunately for Chambers to join the new Naval College, the cost of the State.7 1920s (RAN photo) the damage was minor and he was At the opening on the Naval College, Captain Bertram Chambers fully acquitted at a court-martial.6 From the Governor General Lord Denman embraced the egalitarian approach the outset Chambers and Creswell said to the 28 new 13 year old cadet and declared that he would “guarantee established a strong rapport and they midshipmen assembled before him: that after six months at the College it were to become life-long friends. You cannot all be Admirals. You would be impossible to tell that the Consistent with the notion that can all do you best to become lad had lacked any social advantage.”8 the Services were important elements efficient officers of the Royal The Government had also established of nation building, it was decided by Australian Navy. You are a picked a quota system to ensure a rough the Australian Parliament that both lot of lads from every State of representation of suitably qualified the proposed Royal Military College and the Royal Australian Naval College the Commonwealth and some boys from each state on the basis of should be sited in Federal Territories. day I hope you will be joined by their population. In the case of the Royal Military comrades from New Zealand. You The egalitarian desire was broadly College it was at the Australian Capital have advantage, which, so far as I met. Twenty-eight boys were selected, Territory; in the case the Naval College know, no other country offers, in of which only a quarter of the initial Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 47

intake came with a private school education. Of the occupations of the parents, there was one millionaire, but the remainder were teachers, farmers, doctors, shopkeepers, policemen, an architect and a diamond cutter. One boy was an orphan of humble circumstance. Having championed the need for a Naval College in Australia, William Creswell continued to play an important role in its early development. In particular he involved himself in the selection of the civilian Director of Studies and in the curriculum. The other key figure in establishing the training regime and culture of the Naval College was Lieutenant T he hospital at RANC Commander Duncan Grant. He was discernible differences between the successive entries joined and rugby (now inside HMAS personally selected by Chambers and RN and RAN Colleges, besides the became the dominant sport. In Creswell) probably in would rise to the rank of Captain egalitarian approach to selection. In addition, athletics and the ‘Swedish’ the 1920s (Courtesy RAN) and command the Naval College for the RAN College there was a greater system of physical training were two periods. Grant was a specialist emphasis on sport and a more humane adopted from the Royal Navy model. in physical training who had served approach to discipline. A Naval College brochure which on the staff at the Royal Naval Sport figured greatly in the life of extolled the Swedish system said it “is Colleges. Duncan Grant was a keen the cadets. They played rugby, soccer, conducted not with the idea of ‘putting photographer and I have had the Australian rules, boxing, hockey and on muscle’ but the building up of a opportunity to view his fascinating cricket against the staff and local healthy and vigorous constitution. collection of photographs. It is at times teams, as well as visiting schools and Particular attention is paid to the hard to tell which photographs are ships. Because of the small numbers development of the chest, and thus RANC waterfront with taken at the Royal Naval Colleges and of cadet-midshipmen, soccer was of the heart and lungs, as health and power station (Tom which are taken at Geelong. the predominant winter game until therefore physical efficiency are largely Lewis Collection) As to be expected, the curriculum, daily routines and accommodation arrangements for the Naval College were modeled closely on the Royal Navy. In later years Eric Feldt later reflected that: The scheme of training was exactly the same as that used at Osborne in the Isle of Wight, where the British cadets were trained. The object was to produce a naval officer who was interchangeable and, in fact, so far as possible, indistinguishable from the RN officer. That was all right. That was the only way they knew how to produce a naval officer when it comes to that.9 It is important to note that there were Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 2013 Creswell Oration “The Royal Australian Naval College: Creswell’s Last Great Legacy” dependent on the healthy action of these organs.”10 Naval discipline was ever-present, even on the sporting field, and on one occasion one of the boys refused to swap football jerseys with another on the order of the Sports Officer. The boy “was marched off the playing field by a file of the guard, two six-foot sailors in gaiters and side arms”. John Collins wrote he: wondered aloud whether he would be hanged that night or in the morning.’ ‘They always hang them at dawn’ whispered the cadet next to me. Rather to our surprise he was not hanged. If I recall correctly 15 T he Royal Australian he was awarded the most serious memoirs, he wrote: “My apology for form of indoctrination.” This regime Naval College - based punishment other than dismissal, putting this story of my life on paper continued when the College moved to at what was later namely, a caning strapped over a is the desire to show that a person of its purpose built facility at Jervis Bay. It to become HMAS box horse before the assembled average ability, and in a profession for well prepared the boys for the rigors of Creswell - takes on cadets and ship’s company. Grave which by constitution and mentality he sea life. the Duntroon Army cadets in 1916 - and offences were usually dealt with in has by no means well fitted, may still On 12th December 1916 the Pioneer wins (RAN photo) this manner which had much to score a modified success provided he Class finally graduated from the recommend it, so long as you were tries his best.”14 still-new naval College at Jervis Bay. not the victim. Even for him it was The College experience for the cadet During their time at Jervis Bay they soon over, and better in many ways midshipmen was intense. The typical had the distinction of leading the Naval than a long drawn-out period of summer day for the cadets began with College rugby team that beat the older extra drills.”11 Reveille at 7am followed by breakfast Duntroon team in their inaugural A College officer recalled “I have never and a short parade before studies encounter. At their graduation, met a man who remembered a cadet commenced at 9am. Studies would Admiral Creswell was in attendance. to whimper. Gasps and grunts were continue after lunch until 4.30pm when He made the journey from Nowra to proper: but no blubbering.”12 there would be sport until 6pm. After the Jervis Bay with a correspondent The Naval College discipline was dinner, the cadets’ accommodation from the Sydney Morning Herald and not however the brutal style practiced would be inspected and from 7.30- gave an interview with the reporter at the Royal Navy Colleges of the 8.30pm there would be homework enroute. He reflected on the Navy time. I believe we have Chambers and followed by cocoa and biscuits with and this momentous occasion to the Grant to thank for this. In particular, lights out at 9.15pm. On Wednesday reporter: Chambers’ approach was in part due and Saturday afternoon sport would The life of the Navy is a life apart. It to his own experiences in 1881 at commence at 2.15pm while Sunday may be likened to one of the great Britannia Naval College where he was there would be an hour of divinity monastic orders. The political life beaten so often that he and some fellow studies followed by divine service. of the day sees changes. The work midshipmen regularly hid in an old Sunday afternoon was set aside for of the Navy goes on regardless, to a boat shed.13 Chambers also had great recreation. Eric Feldt later said: “Well, large extent, of the political issues. empathy for the less naturally gifted it left no time for idle dreaming. It The life of the Navy, during the past cadet-midshipmen and a willingness took every part of the day and took up ten years, does not seem to have to go to extra efforts to ensure their all you can do. All the energy you had been realised by the public. The old eventual success. Chambers would went into your living the ordinary life idea of a comparatively idle life on eventually rise to the rank of Vice and carrying out the instructions that foreign stations has disappeared. Admiral and in introducing his were given. It was, we realise since, a The past decade has been one of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 49

strenuous endeavour, of practical of Jervis Bay Naval College as Canada, Glorious and Royal Sovereign. work in the North Sea, and of the Midshipman to be posted to In the Glorious, the Australian maintenance of that efficiency your Majesty’s Fleet. Sir Ronald midshipmen found the Gunroom run which has served the Empire in is confident that they are fitted by by two sub-lieutenants with a total of such good stead during the past training and character to worthily 20 midshipmen or snotties, as they two years.16 maintain the traditions of your were called onboard. Edwin Nurse For the correspondent it was his Majesty’s sea service.”18 wrote: first visit to the Naval College and he In his obituary of Admiral Creswell It was a strange life we had entered. reported: in the British “Naval Review”, the I didn’t like it much. The sub- As we cross the heights leading first Captain of the Naval College, lieutenants and senior snotties down to Captain’s Point, with Bertram Chambers, wrote of Creswell’s made the junior ‘snots’ fag for the College buildings visible four achievements: them and beat them if necessary. miles away, the idea of a life apart It is perhaps not amiss to add A survival of the public school I appealed to me. Here, indeed, here that Sir George Pearce, the suppose. We five were of course was a miniature monastic order Minister of Defence during the junior snotties. But we were so big nestling by the waterfront in a pear- first and most anxious years of and strong compared to them that shaped bay, with clean white sand the scheme, was a man of both they didn’t order us about with marking the foreshore. It seemed a ability and tact, a fact which greatly much assurance. We did minor sylvan retreat, this spot where the helped to get measures accepted fagging duties for a while until for personnel for Australia’s Navy were which were by no means always some trifling thing they decided to being trained. Outside the Heads palatable to certain other members beat ‘Bagger’ (Ernest Cunningham). the sea was running. The wind of the Labour Government. He was the smallest of us. Getting was a little treacherous. There was It seems incredible, when one organized the revolt. We marched even a tendency to squalls. This remembers the procrastinations in en bloc, told them we refused sea brought the sylvan retreat into and delays inseparable from such any further fagging and demanded relationship with the stern business work, that in the three years before the release of ‘Bagger’. Though with which it is concerned. The call the outbreak of the war so much they outnumbered us four to one, of the sea was there. The spirit of should have been accomplished. they didn’t do anything more the Navy was there.17 Sir William Creswell, as the first than argue. We won on points, In many respects that graduation, in member of the Naval Board, can and they made us senior snotties the presence of the Governor General claim credit for: The completion forthwith.”20 Sir Munro Ferguson, marked the final of the first fleet unit: main details Besides their physical size, the fact that legacy of William Creswell. During the of naval administration settled: they were selected from a broader pool proceedings the Herald correspondent Brisbane well on in construction of society caused comment within the noted Creswell’s reflective and proud at the Cockatoo Island, which Royal Navy. The Commanding Officer countenance. had been taken over by the of the battleship HMS Agincourt wrote: By that stage he had been the Commonwealth: Naval College and The success generally speaking architect and had overseen all boys’ training ship Tingira actually of the scheme of education and the elements required of a new in operation: work started at training at the R.A.N. College is, I Navy. Importantly the Navy had Western Port: depots and wireless think, accentuated, when the fact demonstrated their mettle in battle stations in being – to say nothing is taken into consideration that the and made a meaningful contribution of a large number of seamen under selection of candidates is made on to the Great War. At the ceremony the training. It was a state of things a far wider basis that is the case Governor General announced: which few would have ventured to in the Imperial service, although I am sending the following cable to anticipate as a possibility.19 the actual conditions of entry the King: Sir Ronald Ferguson, with To conclude the Oration, it is are similar. In manners, general humble duty, begs to inform your important to assess how the Pioneer conduct and appearance there is Majesty that he has to-day said class performed in the Grand Fleet no noticeable difference between good-bye to the first contingent and beyond. The Class spread into four any of the RAN Midshipmen, and of Cadets who have passed out ships, HMAS Australia and HM Ships of these characteristics I can speak Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 2013 Creswell Oration “The Royal Australian Naval College: Creswell’s Last Great Legacy”

highly. The system of practically the graduates of the Naval College, like (Endnotes) open competition which obtains, the Pioneer Class that demonstrated 1 Creswell, W.R. Close to the Wind: The I understand in Australia, seems the leadership, courage and sacrifice Early Memoirs (1866-1879) of Admiral Sir William Rooke Creswell, edited by P. to me to have thoroughly justified that cemented Admiral Creswell’s final Thompson, London, Heineman, 1965, p.200. itself, and the competition being legacy. t 2 Jose, op.cit. p. lv. extremely severe (about 17 to 1) 3 Bates, L. F. (1946) Sir Alfred Ewing: A the boys entered should be the pick Pioneer in Physics and Engineering, London, Longmans, 1946. of the community. The advantages 4 Bean, C.E.W., Flagships Three, Alston of such a system, i.e. of selection Rivers, London, 1915, p.303. from the very first on a wide basis, 5 Moore, D.C, Duntroon: The Royal are here exemplified, as opposed to Military College of Australia 1911-2001, Canberra, Royal Military College of a system which attempts to select Australia, 2001, pp.10-21. boys from training ships and the 6 Vice Admiral B.M. Chambers lower deck, which, so far as my Confidential Report ADM 196-88. information and experience go, has 7 Ibid, p.8. 8 Eldridge, op.cit. p.35. proved an utter failure.21 9 Feldt, E., Reminiscences of Commander Further vindication of the system Eric Feldt, transcript of an oral history, advocated by Creswell and other I have Archival Number OH 465, State Library of South Australia, 1966, p.5. previously mentioned was attained in 10 Handbook of the Royal Australian the service of the Pioneer Class in the Naval College, Sydney, Government Printer, interwar period and World War II. 1918, p.22. Finally, I would reflect on the 11 Collins, J.A., op.cit, p.16-17. twenty-eight 13 year old boys who 12 McGuire, P. & McGuire, F.M., The Price of Admiralty, Melbourne, Oxford joined at Geelong in 1913. The Pioneer Vice Admiral P.D. JONES, AO, DSC, RAN University Press, 1944, p. 25. Class were the first and the greatest joined the Royal Australian Navy 13 Chambers, B.M., Salt Junk: Naval class to enter the Royal Australian Reminiscences, 1881-1906, London, in 1974 and is a surface warfare Constable & Co. Ltd, 1927, p.37. Naval College. Their contribution to specialist. Vice Admiral Jones’ sea-going 14 Ibid, p.1. the Navy and Australia was remarkable. postings have included command 15 Feldt, op.cit, p.5. In war time from young midshipmen 16 Sydney Morning Herald, The Naval such as Eddy Nurse in charge of a gun of the frigate HMAS Melbourne College – Australian Sea Officers, 18 December 1916, p.8. in the Glorious during the Battle of and Commander Australian Surface 17 Ibid, p.8. Heligoland Bight; Ernest Cunningham Task Group. During 2002-2003, the 18 RANC Magazine, 1917 Edition, p.12. tragically losing his life in the then Captain Jones commanded the 19 Chambers, B.M., Naval Review, Spring submarine K17, to latter years where 1933, p.554. RAN Task Group in the Arabian Gulf as John Collins, Harold Farncomb, Harry 20 Nurse, op.cit, Entry for 8 April 1917. Showers, James Esdaile, Joe Burnett well as the multi-national Maritime 21 Report “Midshipman R.A.N” Rear Admiral Commanding H.M. Australian and Frank Getting commanded Interception Force. He is the present Fleet by Captain M.L. Mawbey, RN cruisers in World War II. Fittingly Chief of the Capability Development (Commanding Officer HMS Agincourt), 14 September 1918 (NAA). Later Admiral by war’s end Commodore John Group. Henry Lancelot Mawbey, C.B., C.V.O. RN Collins commanded the Australian (1870–1933). Squadron and was onboard the USS Missouri for the Japanese surrender. Less appreciated was the notable contribution members of the class made to our broader society. A number such as John Howells became highly respected teachers or in the case of King’s Medallist Winn Reilly successful businessmen. It was therefore in the final analysis Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

52 Jack Crace: Boy from the bush, Task Group commander at the Coral Sea, and Admiral RN B y Mike Taylor

century after Federation, the moored in the River Dart, in May 1902. spirit of independent Australian He was fulfilling an obsession that he Anationalism has never burned brighter; could not explain. He knew nothing of and as time goes by it will burn brighter naval life, and grew up far from the sea; still. But one area that seems to have, so but it was what he wanted to do with his far at least, avoided public notice is the life, and fulfilled a long-held ambition. several native-born Australians from Jack Crace graduated from Britannia the earliest days of nationhood who around the middle of his class in achieved high rank in the Royal Navy. September 1903, and joined HMS Good The first Australian-born admiral was Hope, flagship of the Cruiser Squadron Philip Parker King; two Australian- of the Channel Fleet. He did well at sea: born commanders of the Australian his Captain reported him to be a smart, Squadron/Fleet were Rear Admiral John reliable and capable young officer of Saumarez Dumaresq CB CVO RN who great promise. earlier commanded HMAS Sydney in In 1906 he undertook 18 months of World War I; and Rear Admiral Robin Sub-Lieutenant’s courses ashore and Campsie Dalglish CB RN. then was posted to HMS Powerful, then Another of somewhat later vintage the flagship of the British Squadron is Rear Admiral John Gregory Crace CB operating in Australian waters, based RN, and he is the subject of this article. in Sydney. He saw his family and home A dmiral John Crace Jack Crace, who joined the Royal Navy after an absence of nine years. His problems. He wrote the ship’s Electrical and went on to command the Allied mother and several unmarried sisters Detail Book; joined with another Task Group 17.3 during the Battle of the still lived at Gungahleen with Everard officer in inventing a contrivance for Coral Sea, was born on 6 February 1887 as Manager. Jack was promoted the control and operation of the ship’s at Gungahleen (now Gungahlin, ACT), Lieutenant in September 1908 whilst in searchlights; invented a torpedo safe- and spent all his boyhood there. Powerful and returned to England. range indicator, which the Admiralty accepted for trial manufacture and From rural beginnings... First command, assessment; and collaborated with to the River Dart and specialisation another officer in producing a “Book Crace was the second son of pioneer Crace received his first command in of Questions in Torpedo” as a guide to pastoralist Edward Crace (after whom 1910, T.B.105, a torpedo boat serving as Midshipmen preparing themselves for the Canberra suburb is named) in a tender to the Afloat Torpedo School at promotion to Lieutenant, which was family of two sons and seven daughters. Devonport, and next year he was sent also used by the Admiralty. The family seat was an impressive two- to HMS Vernon, the Torpedo School in Such “inventiveness” was not storey residence. It is still intact and is Portsmouth, for specialist training as a unusual among officers of the period. now (2012) occupied by the CSIRO. torpedo officer. In that era a Torpedo Navies were still adjusting to the Crace senior drowned when the Officer’s duties included all aspects of massive changes from wooden hulls to boy was five; the lad’s elder brother the ship’s electrics: lighting, power for steel, sails to power, and muzzle-loaders Everard, working in London in the machinery and turrets, plus telephones to breech-loaders. Electric power had a wool business, came home to run the and other internal communications multitude of applications. Submarines property. When Jack was 12 he went equipment. emerged, and had to be countered. Flags to The King’s School in Sydney as a After a period in a non-seagoing were supplemented by radio. There were boarder; after a year he left to complete battleship, Lieutenant Crace was posted many fields for inquiring minds to see further education in England to prepare on loan to the RAN for service in the solutions to problems and opportunities himself for a career in the Royal Navy. new battlecruiser HMAS Australia, in presented by new technology, and to He was eligible for a reserved colonial UK waters. Crace was eager to apply exploit them for advantage. The careers cadetship, and joined HMS Britannia time and energy to solving technical of many officers of the period show the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 53

H MAS Hobart results of such creativity; devices that in 1946, having came to be taken for granted in the survived the war (RN 1940s (the Battenberg course indicator photo) being one of the better-known ones) often came from ingenious young men working at sea. At age 30 in 1917 Crace was promoted to Lieutenant Commander, and posted to the Mining School at Portsmouth. He had made a big impression in Australia. His Captain described him as “a most excellent Lieutenant T full of ability and resource and never at a loss when carrying out received more than his share of luck, Church of St John the Baptist where he repairs or introducing improvements.” attributing much of that good fortune to was christened, the parsonage, the tiny his Australian origins. Unquestionably cottage which also served as post office, A conventional this was a factor in postings to Australia the pub, and the shoeing forge and the trajectory - and promotions and Danae and his next posting as store. But it became clear that this was His career path from that point Rear Admiral Commanding Australian not to be a happy posting. until 1939, when he took command Squadron (RACAS — it seems that In 1939 the RAN was relatively of the Australian Squadron, was a at the time, the former “Australian small. It comprised 13 ships: two conventional trajectory for an officer of Fleet” no longer qualified for that title, heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, five such talents. He was Torpedo Officer owing to paucity of units), following his destroyers and two sloops. The five of the mighty battlecruiser HMS Hood, promotion to Rear Admiral on 1 August destroyers had been detached to the building in 1918. He was promoted 1939. RN; HMA Ships Perth and Hobart Commander in 1920, and received On 1 November 1939 he hoisted were deployed out of the Australian an appointment to the Admiralty in his flag in HMAS Canberra. He said area at that time. HMAS Sydney was Whitehall. at the time: “Speaking as an Australian in refit and would shortly be deployed In 1924 he became Executive I feel highly honoured to be chosen to to the Mediterranean after Indian Officer of the cruiser HMS Danae, command our Navy, and it is a happy Ocean convoy escorting duties. HMAS which visited Australia as part of an augury that my flag flies from a ship Adelaide conducted patrol and convoy RN squadron making a world cruise – named after my home town, Canberra.” duties within the Australia Station. including visits to Australian ports. He He is quoted as wistfully recalling the Thus Crace had only three worked-up was Commander of HMS Osprey, the few public buildings that dotted the cruisers to command at sea. anti-submarine school newly formed Limestone Plains of his childhood, the at Portland, then after promotion to Crace centre with Captain, commanded destroyer-leader staff,L CDR John HMS Valhalla and the 6th Flotilla; then Bath, CAPT Harold back to Osprey again; the Admiralty Farncombm CMDR again in 1932, and in 1934 to command Pat Perry, and LCDR of the light cruiser HMS Emerald in George Oldham (RAN photo) the West Indies for two years (which he afterwards recalled as his most enjoyable time in the service). In early 1937 Crace was back in Admiralty, and stayed there until war broke out. Command of the Australian Squadron By 1939 Crace had enjoyed a successful career. He acknowledged that he had Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 Jack Crace: Boy from the bush, Task Group commander at the Coral Sea, and Admiral RN

Friction then, HMAS Sydney had already been The Allied OTC was Admiral Command of the Australian Squadron sunk; HMAS Perth soon would be; Frank Fletcher USN commanding became an unfortunate source of Canberra was in refit. Crace flew his flag Task Force 17, to which the Australian friction between the Squadron in HMAS Australia. Squadron was initially attached. In Commander and the Naval Board in The Australian Squadron joined the the preparatory stages for the battle, Melbourne. Squadron exercises and US Navy’s Task Force 17 in the Coral Fletcher established Task Group 17.3, the monotony of escorting convoys Sea to prepare to repel a southward under Crace’s command, comprising across the Tasman Sea led to Crace thrust of Japanese Fleet Task Forces the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and recording problems being experienced expected through the Louisiade USS Chicago, the light cruiser HMAS with the Naval Board on operational Archipelago, the island chain stretching Hobart, and destroyers, US Ships control of his squadron. He believed eastward from New Guinea’s “tail”. The Farragut, Perkins and Walke. that staff at Navy Office were taking Battle of the Coral Sea has been well decisions which impinged on his role covered many times elsewhere; and Battle of the Coral Sea as sea-going commander, and that they this account is mainly concerned with Fletcher detached TG17.3 at 0530 on demonstrated unwillingness to note his the actions of TG17.3 - but it must 7 May 1942, assigning it the objective views. (The First Naval Members during be placed in the overall context of the of preventing a Japanese invasion force the period were Admiral Sir Ragnar battle. from passing through the best deep- Colvin KBE CB RN until March 1941, and Admiral Sir Guy Royle KCB CVO CBE RN thereafter.) This tension went on throughout Crace’s time in Australia to the extent that he offered to resign the command, proposing an amalgamation of his duties with that of Commodore-in- Charge Sydney to relieve tedium, and giving total squadron control to Navy Office. Privately, Crace called himself “Flag-Officer-Without-Authority”. Nevertheless he was much admired by the local media. The Bulletin held that he had proved to be “well liked in the RAN, and his methods admirably suit its temperament.” Another publication commented approvingly, “Efficient in himself, looking for efficiency in others but, above all just and fair in his treatment of all hands, RACAS … had won a high place in the affections and esteem of those who serve under him.”

Japan enters the war In late 1941, to his dismay, Crace’s posting back to the Royal Navy was deferred until April 1942, which would take his time in the RACAS appointment to 2½ years. But even this came under threat when Japan entered the war on 7 December 1941. Before Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 55

Detail of water passage through the Louisiade reversed the course of the invasion HMAS Archipelago, Jomard Passage, en route convoy. The same day the Japanese Australia to intended landing at Port Moresby launched strikes on what they believed early in (which was known to be the Japanese to be the position of the American WWII (Tom Lewis plan from signal interception and carriers, but found only an oiler and a Collection) decryption). To achieve that objective, destroyer. The destroyer was sunk; the TG 17.3 was stationed south of Jomard. oiler was severely damaged (and later The remainder of Fletcher’s force, based sank). About the same time, Fletcher on the aircraft carriers USS Lexington launched a huge strike on what he and USS Yorktown, plus escorts, thought was the main force of Japanese Dramatic operated further to the south-east, carriers; it wasn’t, it was the covering shot of the where they were unable to provide air force for the invasion convoy, in which detonation cover for Crace’s force. the only carrier was the light carrier of a Fletcher’s main force, TF17, after Shoho, which was sunk. 1,000-pound detachment of TG 17.3, was centred on On the same day Crace’s force, (450 kg) bomb on the two fleet carriers USS Yorktown and TG17.3, was attacked by Rabaul-based Shōhō during USS Lexington, with six cruisers and 10 aircraft at 1430. Under a hail of AA the Battle of destroyers. fire from every ship, the attackers were the Coral Sea Japanese forces involved in the forced to release their torpedoes at (US Navy) Coral Sea battle were under the overall long range; all of them missed. The USS command of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi ships were then subject to strafing, Lexington Inoue, in his flagship the cruiser followed shortly afterwards by high level (USN) Kashima in Rabaul. Under him, the bomb attacks. There were 12 torpedo Port Moresby Invasion Force had 11 bombers and 19 high-level bombers transports and about 5,500 troops; it left involved. Rabaul on 4 May. Its close escort was No doubt Crace and others were the Port Moresby Attack Force with one mindful of the disaster that befell the light cruiser and six destroyers. Also in British battleship HMS Prince of Wales support was the Covering Group of the and battlecruiser HMS Repulse off the light carrier Shoho, four heavy cruisers east coast of Malaya just five months and one destroyer. The main Japanese earlier, when both ships fell to Japanese The XTBD-1 Devastator pictured Carrier Strike Force comprised fleet bomb and air-launched torpedo attacks. in flight nearN aval carriers Shokaku and Zukaku, two But on this occasion, in a model of co- Air Station Anacostia heavy cruisers and six destroyers. The ordinated air defence from the three in Washington DC. Japanese forces operated generally to the cruisers – HMAS Australia (Captain Devestators helped north of the Louisiades. H B Farncomb CB DSO RAN), HMAS sink the Shoho (US Navy) Hobart (Captain H L Howden CBE Confusion reigns RAN) and USS Chicago (Captain H Neither main carrier force knew where D Bode USN) – and their escorts, all with enthusiasm in the 7 May battles. the other was, although Allied aircraft air attacks were repulsed with at least After the sinking of Shoho and the had sighted the invasion convoy. The five enemy aircraft destroyed (though reversal of course of the invasion Battle of the Coral Sea was one of the Japanese records show that only two of convoy, they bombed the convoy. And most confusing sea battles in history, the 12 torpedo-bombers returned to after the attacks on Crace’s TG17.3 by marked as it was by mistakes and Rabaul). The Japanese claimed to have the Rabaul-based aircraft, the B-17s misidentifications by both sides. sunk a California-type battleship in this bombed TG17.3 for good measure. In On 7 May, Japanese reconnaissance action; in reality, none of Crace’s force neither case did any of their bombs find aircraft sighted Crace’s TG, but suffered a hit other than small-arms fire a target. erroneously reported the two heavy from the strafing. cruisers as battleships. Somewhat B-17s of the USAAF operating out The real carrier battle deterred, the Japanese temporarily of Queensland bases also participated On 8 May early efforts by both sides to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 Jack Crace: Boy from the bush, Task Group commander at the Coral Sea, and Admiral RN locate the enemy’s main carrier force surviving carrier, Yorktown, were rewarded almost simultaneously and her escorting forces to at about 0820, at which stage the the south. two forces were about 210 nm apart. Both groups launched strikes. The Criticism of Fletcher Americans hit Shokaku with several Fletcher’s conduct of bombs, severely damaging hangars and operations has attracted flight deck. The vessel was incapable some criticism. His of conducting aircraft operations and stationing of Crace’s force withdrew to the north east under escort. far from carrier-based air Zuikaku, well covered by low cloud, was cover left it exposed to land- not located by many aircraft. based air attack - though The Japanese strikes on the to its credit Crace’s ships American carriers hit both of them. survived that challenge Lexington sustained severe damage with distinction. Fletcher’s from two torpedoes and two bomb communications policy Crace Memorial, hits and hull damage from several was frugality personified, driven by Fletcher on 6-7 May might then have Hotspur Street, Crace ACT near-misses. She was able to steam, and an obsession with maintenance of been very different, possibly triggering a successfully recovered her returning radio silence. For that reason, it seems, less-favourable outcome for the battle. aircraft; but fires resulting from the Crace was never told that his assigned damage later became uncontrollable. target, the invasion convoy, had been Who won? She was abandoned, and was sunk by withdrawn; nor was he informed of The battle was a tactical victory for USS Phelps later in the day. Fletcher’s movements either during the Japanese, but a strategic one for Yorktown took a bomb through the the battle, or when he vacated the area. the Allies: it was the first time a major flight deck which exploded four decks Ultimately, in an information vacuum, Japanese advance had been stopped. below; and sustained hull damage with no orders, and desperately short More importantly, in the longer term, from near misses. She sustained heavy of fuel, Crace had no option but to both Shokaku and Zukaku and their casualties, but remained operational. withdraw too. air groups were unable to be made Aircraft losses on both sides were Having said all that, if Fletcher had ready for the Battle of Midway; but heavy, though Japanese aircraft losses not positioned Crace south of Jomard, Yorktown was there. Today, Coral Sea is exceeded American by about 50%. His and TG17.3 had not defended itself so universally regarded as a decisive Allied aircraft losses convinced Inoue that the capably, the convoy in all probabiliy victory; in reality, it was a close-run Port Moresby assault must be further would not have reversed course as it thing. delayed. With one carrier unable to did. The tactical situation confronting operate aircraft, and both air groups seriously depleted, Inoue’s self-defence capability was severely compromised; he withdrew his forces to the north, towards his secure base at Rabaul. The Allied forces, with their carrier The Coral Sea battle looms large in US strength halved and their air group naval consciousness. seriously depleted (many serviceable An aerial view aircraft sank with Lexington), were also of Hunter’s Point in no condition to continue the battle. Naval Shipyard, San Additionally, TG17 had lost its oiler Francisco, California and ships were already low on fuel; 25 August 1971. The carriers are the USS furthermore, erroneous intelligence Ranger (in dry dock), reports led Fletcher to believe that USS Coral Sea, and both the Japanese fleet carriers were the USS Hancock left. undamaged. Fletcher withdrew his (USN) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 57

Epilogue Commander Mike Taylor RAN (Rtd.) is Chairman of the ACT Division of the Rear Admiral Crace returned to graduated from RANC in 1955. He Naval Officers Club and a regular and England very soon after the Battle of commanded HMAS Vampire in the early valued contributor to their Newsletter. the Coral Sea. He became Admiral 1980s. After resigning from the RAN Superintendent of Chatham Dockyard and remained in the posting until his he worked for the Australian Maritime retirement in 1946. During this time he Safety Authority for 12 years. He has was promoted to Vice Admiral, and on for many years conducted volunteer retirement to the rank of Admiral. He work for his local sub-branch of the was appointed Knight Commander of RSL, and has been active in sub-branch the Order of the British Empire (KBE) in 1947. management as an office-holder. He After a seven-year battle with leukemia Crace died at Liss, Hampshire, on 11 May 1968, aged 81. There were ten Admirals in attendance at his funeral, but no RAN officers or Australian representatives were present. Admiral Crace was never invited to a Coral Sea Commemoration ceremony. Thankfully, this lack of recognition and honour to a distinguished former RAN Squadron Commander who played a leading role in the nation’s defence during a heroic moment of its history has been rectified by the superb Memorial in Crace Hilltop Reserve, Hotspur St, Crace ACT. This was made possible by the contributions of the development company, CIC Australia, and the ACT Government; and the advocacy of two veterans who were crew-members of HMAS Hobart during the Battle. Thanks to all of them, future generations of Australians will continue to be reminded of Jack Crace’s part in Australia’s naval history: in battle, he commanded Australian and Allied forces with distinction in a crucial SMARTER AND SAFER engagement, on the outcome of which Australia’s security depended. He was UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS tried, and not found wanting; he earned a special place in our lexicon of military leaders.t ...Since the beginning

For more information, please contact: [email protected] www.thalesgroup.com.au Photograph © Australian Department of Defence

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 Book Reviews

when turned to comint and code bestowed on Rochefort by President Reagan in 1986. breaking, reveals a voracious tenacity Rochefort began his code breaking career in September for concentration, imagination and 1925. Having escaped the tedium of the Cayuma, he was innovation, carried out in dungeon- serving in the battleship Arizona when he was posted like surroundings in the 1920s ‘Main to Washington for temporary duty to receive training in Navy’ building in Washington and in ‘advanced cryptanalysis’. This career move came as a result, a Pearl Harbor basement in 1941-42. according to Rochefort, of his friendship with a Cayuma He and his similarly gifted professional shipmate with whom Rochefort shared an interest in the associates were largely scorned by ‘line’ game of bridge and in the solving of crossword puzzles. This officers, which Rochefort’s irascibility officer had departed the Cayuma for the Chief of Naval did not mitigate. Operations’ staff and had facilitated Rochefort’s transfer. Joe Rochefort, who entered the Despite the formidable and harsh working conditions US Navy as an apprentice electrician in the ‘sprawling, brutish-looking headquarters which in April 1918 after having dropped stretched for blocks along Constitution Avenue’, there out of high school one month before were opportunities for ambitious junior officers to make Joe Rochefort’s War; graduation, retired as a captain in their mark in the highly competitive and budget paring The odyssey of the January 1947. In US Navy parlance, interwar US Navy. However, his Main Navy billet in the he was a ‘mustang’(commissioned Code and Cypher Section (CCS) of the Office of Naval codebreaker who from the lower deck) although his Communications (ONC) was unfashionable and little outwitted Yamamoto time as an enlisted man only lasted understood or appreciated by line officers as code breaking until 1919 when he was accepted for ranked equally with intelligence as a dead end calling. at Midway engineering officer training in the Although the USN had been active in cryptography since Naval Auxiliary Reserves. He received 1917, the emphasis was on operational security of its own E lliot Carlson, Naval Institute Press a rare commission into the postwar communications rather than breaking the codes of potential Reviewed by Dr Tim Coyle downsized US Navy and he was to adversaries. Rochefort undertook a cryptanalysis course spend the next five years aboard the run by CCS senior officer Lieutenant Laurance Safford, a To the well documented history of US oiler USS Cayuma. pioneer code breaker. An indication of the determination code breaking and communications While the author emphasises and application required of a tyro code breaker was intelligence (comint) comes this Rochefort’s mustang status as a Rochefort’s four month full time attack on cryptograms and biography of Joe Rochefort, lauded disadvantage in the almost wholly puzzles from the War Department’s manual Elements of as the man who lured the Japanese Annapolis-officered USN, his fitness Cryptanalysis. Safford’s posting to sea left Rochefort as CCS fleet to its defeat at Midway. But while reports and the opportunities open senior officer after four months. the book covers the drama of code to him as a junior officer belies this Rochefort’s professional staff comprised one civilian breaking and comint so crucial to stigma. It is only as a commander and assistant, the formidable Aggie Driscoll. Associated with victory in the Pacific, it also reveals later captain that his progress was CCS was Room 2646 where two Japanese linguists, Emerson the jealousies and politics of the arguably hindered by antagonistic Haworth and his wife, were laboriously translating a copy interwar US Navy and the treatment Annapolis officers. This antagonism of the 1918 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) operational of unconventional officers whose had a lot to do with Rochefort’s code (the Red Code), which had been acquired through personalities did not accord with the outspoken attitudes, based on his ‘black’ methods. An indication to the modern reader of the perceived standards of the line officer intolerance of those who disagreed apparent lack of coordination within the USN intelligence cadre. with his analyses and views. But he had community of the 1920s was that the Haworths, despite four Joe Rochefort’s War is a worthy strong allies, including Admiral Chester years of work on the Red Code, could not complete the work addition to the intelligence literature Nimitz, Commander in Chief Pacific because they could not find English equivalents for Japanese of World War II. The author, (CinC PAC), who recommended him technical terms. Rochefort sought assistance through the Elliot Carson, provides a definitive for the Distinguisher Service Medal Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) which managed to find chronology of Rochefort’s naval life for his Midway intelligence coup. Lieutenant Commander Ellis Zacharias, an accomplished which, with the exception of his family, Detractors in ‘Main Navy’ convinced Japanese linguist, serving in a cruiser. Zacharias’ subsequent was his whole life. The author reveals the US Navy Commander-in-Chief intelligence career has been well documented elsewhere Rochefort’s natural problem solving (COMINCH) Admiral King to deny as one of the USN’s greatest cryptanalysts. Zacharias’ and analytical capabilities which, this award, which was posthumously description of CCS and its work is worth quoting: Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 59

The few persons who were intelligence credentials and his comprised 23 personnel made up of language officers, traffic assigned to this section of the unconventional career was his 1929 analysts, ship plotters and cryptanalysts. The author details navy department were taciturn, selection to study Japanese for three the strengths and idiosyncrasies of Rochefort’s crew, whose secretive people who refused years. Rochefort’s ally – Zacharias at intense efforts in meeting the cryptology and traffic analyses to discuss their jobs or to reveal ONI – had facilitated this posting, challenges were instrumental in the intelligence coup that led details of their assignments. Hours which took only two students per year. to the Midway victory. went by without any of us saying a Rochefort’s fellow language student In 1941 the USN’s cryptology target was the IJN’s JN-25 word…just sitting there in front of was Lieutenant Commander Edwin code, the 1938 replacement for the Red Code. JN-25 proved piles of indexed sheets on which a Layton, who later became Admiral consistently hard to attack and Hypo found that its main mumbo-jumbo of figures or letters Nimitz’s, intelligence officer. Layton, operational intelligence capability was Traffic Analysis (TA). were displayed in chaotic disorder, in his autobiography ‘And I was There: TA’s disadvantages included its inferential characteristics, trying to solve the puzzle bit by bit Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking requiring analysts to assess what was going to happen by like fitting together the pieces of a the Secrets’, closely parallels Joe drawing on the past, even though the information may have jigsaw puzzle. Rochefort’s War in the commentaries been very recent. The Red Code succumbed after over and assessments of the Pacific comint The lack of entry into JN-25, nor access to the US a year of intensive concentration. But war. decrypts from the Japanese Purple diplomatic code, coupled Rochefort didn’t only have Japanese The description of Rochefort’s with deficient TA, led Hypo and the other stations to assess codes to deal with. The rivalry between and Layton’s adventures as language that the IJN was moving against Singapore and Malaya in ONI and ONC continued to fester as it students in Japan is particularly early December 1941, while the Hawaiian attack force was did throughout the rest of Rochefort’s interesting given the rising tensions forming up under complete radio silence. JN-25 became the naval intelligence career. ONI had between the US and Japan and the cryptanalysts’ highest priority after the Pearl Harbor attack. turned over the Red Code to ONC with USN’s identification of the IJN as its Although Cast and Negat had made some inroads into JN- the expectation that the information main threat. Applying himself to his 25, the immediate post-attack period saw Hypo assume the gleaned from the code would be studies with characteristic intensity lead. The repercussions following the 7 December attack shared. When this did not happen, Rochefort relished the independence and the loss of Wake Island to the Japanese have been ONI sought to take over Rochefort’s of a foreign language student whose exhaustively covered in many works. The book’s author, section, which was subordinate to only association with the USN was to Carlson, adds to this volume of narrative with Rochefort’s ONC. collect his monthly paychecks from the reactions, particularly his erroneous perception that the IJN This feud between the two Offices is embassy. did not practice radio deception. discussed in detail throughout the book With his advanced Japanese On 21 January 1942 Rochefort received a note from his and is fundamental to Rochefort’s later language skills and cryptanalysis ONC superior Commander Safford that ‘..a whispering struggles to justify his assessments to experience, Rochefort’s destiny as the campaign has started in the Navy department…’. Shortly the detriment of his career. Rochefort’s man who provided the intelligence afterwards Safford was replaced by Commander John two year posting ended in September assessment for the Midway victory was Redman who, together with his brother Rear Admiral 1927 when he was ordered to sea. His sealed with his posting to COM14, the Joseph Redman, would expel Rochefort from Hypo and dog achievements at Main Navy were, in his Pearl Harbor decryption unit. COM his intelligence career for the remainder of the Pacific war. view, mixed. Although he had gained 14, nominally subordinate to ONC, was Joseph Redman had championed radio deception which valuable cryptanalysis experience, he administered by the Hawaiian-based Rochefort denied had been used by the IJN. was disappointed in the naval political 14th Naval District, providing comint In his defence of Hypo at the Roberts Commission – climate which permeated the comint support to the Pacific Fleet. convened on 18 December 1941 to investigate the Pearl world and resolved to avoid the field–­ COM14, named Station Harbor attack – Rochefort stated that there was an IJN ­which had career limiting potential – in Hypo, together with Stations Cast buildup by early November around Palau in the Caroline the future. However, Rochefort found (Corregedor, Philippines) and Negat Islands which was assessed as a task force to secure the he could not totally divorce himself (Main Navy) comprised the USN’s resource-rich South East Asian countries. But around from comint and, when ordered to comint capability Associations were early December all communications associated with the the flagship USS California, became also established with the British Far aircraft carriers vanished. These assessments were all by involved in US fleet communications East Combined Bureau at Singapore TA and although correct as regards South East Asia, had security which he found to be abysmal. and Hong Kong. Station Hypo was completely missed the Central Pacific operation. The Roberts The next significant move which located in the basement of a Pearl Commission did not raise the radio deception issue and would consolidate Rochefort’s Harbor administrative building and Rochefort was not directly accused of failure to detect the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Book Reviews

IJN strike force. Comint pointed to carrier movements and analysts. Rochefort and Hypo were working round the Events leading to the Midway away from the Dutch East Indies clock...’I would personally translate about 140 messages a episode emerged in mid-February towards the South West Pacific, New day’ Rochefort stated. On 13 May Hypo solved the task force 1942. Hypo TA noted activity Guinea and Northern Australia. The destination question: it was Midway Atoll. indicative of a strike group formation, Battle of the Coral Sea turned on the The sequence of events leading to the identification of which included seaplanes. Hypo’s Hypo and Belconnen (former Station Midway as the strike force’s objective constitutes the core cryptanalysts, having made some Cast removed to Melbourne) decrypts of Joe Rochefort’s War. Its summary in this review is offered progress into JN-25, assessed a possible and analyses which identified Port as an illustration of his effectiveness as a comint analyst carrier attack against Pearl Harbor on Moresby as the primary IJN combined and unit commander who was instrumental in providing 4 March. Decrypts established that the fleet target. CinCPAC with the intelligence information which led to the operation was designated ‘K’. Hypo and Hypo and Cast reported on successful interdiction and destruction of the IJN’s premier Cast surmised that the codes AA and potential operations against the strike arm and changed the direction of the war in the AK were Wake Island and Pearl Harbor Aleutian Islands during May and also Pacific. respectively. This assessment was a campaign to commence around The 13 May intercept comprised a signal from the based on an IJN message addressed 21 May. This was based on a signal 4th Air Attack Squadron to the aircraft transport Goshu to AA asking for an estimate of the from the battleship Kirishima to Maru to proceed to Imieji – a small IJN air base to load number of ships at AK. AA responded Admiral Yamamoto, the Combined air base equipment and munitions for transport to Saipan. that : ‘…aviation facilities, repairs Fleet commander that the ship would On arrival the ship was to join the occupation force and completed…three battleships present’. be unavailable due to maintenance load base equipment and ground crews and proceed to Cast partially decrypted a signal ‘during the said campaign’ with Affirm Fox…’everything in the way of base equipment and associating ‘AH, AFH and AF’ with work being completed by 21 May. military supplies which will be needed for the K campaign…’. operation K. Although these locations Adding to the build up for upcoming Significant to the decrypts was the use of the term ‘invasion were unknown, their similarity to AK operations was a 6 May decrypts force’ indicating an amphibious element to the operation. lead to the assessment that they were in which the Kwajalein-based IJN The Hypo decrypts identifying Midway as the destination somewhere in the Hawaiian island 4th Air Attack Force requested 10 for the strike force were forwarded to Op-20-G – part of chain. aircraft radio crystals for specific ONC and Hypo’s nominal superior – which hotly disputed Operation K, comprising two long frequencies applicable to aircraft the assessments. Admiral Nimitz was conscious that he range ‘Emily’ flying boats, took place communications with submarines might be risking the Pacific Fleet on radio intelligence on 4 March. The aircraft ineffectively for use in the ‘second King campaign’, provided by Rochefort and told his intelligence officer, dropped bombs in the Pearl Harbor which indicated that the target was Layton, that he could not be satisfied with Rochefort’s ‘guess’ area and the fact that they were not AK, Pearl Harbor. Additionally, a force as to the identity of AF. Layton told Rochefort that…’he was intercepted caused consternation in of four battleships and three aircraft to do anything he could within his power to try to solve this the US Command. Hypo’s experience carriers, with supporting combatants, problem and to pin down the fact that AF was or was not in decrypting the location indicators were assembling in Japanese home Midway…’ led the station to note the increasing waters for an operation around 21 May. On 19 May Rochefort consulted his analysts and they mention of AF in radio traffic. On 10 There was no inkling of the target; the found a solution. The confirmation that AF was Midway March Rochefort signaled stations Aleutians was a possibility but Hypo came from a contrived Hypo-directed signal sent in plain at Palmyra, Johnston and Midway assessed the South Pacific was more language from the USN’s Midway air station that the island’s Islands that they may be attacked by probable. water distillation plant had broken down resulting in a flying boats. He also signaled Nimitz On 8 May Hypo reported a merging critical shortage of fresh water and urgently requested Pearl and COMINCH Admiral King: ‘AF of the IJN Second Fleet of battleships Harbor to replenish the losses. The Japanese station on probably somewhere in this area. AF and cruisers with the First Air Fleet Wake Island intercepted the signal and repeated the message is probably Midway’. On 11 March of four aircraft carriers – the most to Tokyo. The Japanese acceptance of the ruse convinced US radar on Midway detected two formidable IJN force ever assembled. Nimitz that AF was Midway. contacts, one of which – an Emily Subsequent decrypts revealed that The machinations and repercussions leading to the Battle flying boat – approached Midway and the force would depart Sasebo on 21 of Midway and its aftermath are covered in as much detail was destroyed by intercepting aircraft. May for an unknown destination. in the book as the actual sequence of comint intercepts By April Hypo could read up to 15 During the first two weeks of May IJN and decrypts. Rochefort’s high profile, built on his code percent of JN-25 signals, with gaps transmissions increased exponentially, breaking, coupled with his open deprecation of the Main filled by TA and inspired guesswork. overwhelming the US comint operators Navy intelligence staff, who he believed hindered his comint Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 61

efforts, were the catalysts for his describes the rivalry and lack of communication in London removal from Hypo. This occurred in between the Strategic Operations Executive, SOE, based in November 1942 when he was posted to Baker Street, and Combined Operations based in Richmond a new challenge; that of overseeing the Terrace in Whitehall, both of whom planned strikes against construction of high capacity forward- the same target, giving just enough factual detail to show deployed floating docks for the Pacific its impact on the operation as it was carried out. Bombing as part of the USN’s Construction by the RAF was ruled out because of fears it would cause Battalion organisation. Rochefort French civilian casualties. returned to naval intelligence duties as Hasler led a team of 11 other Royal Marines in an attack a captain in September 1944 to serve on enemy shipping in Bordeaux that had evaded the British as a section head for Pacific Strategic blockade and brought in valuable commodities from the Intelligence directly responsible to Far East. Several were about to sail on the return voyage COMINCH, Admiral King. with strategic materials including aircraft designs and Joe Rochefort’s War is a seminal components from Germany to Japan The marines were biography of a dedicated, irreverent launched from HM Submarine Tuna outside the fierce tidal and irascible officer engaged in a line A Brilliant Little rip off the Gironde Estuary to paddle their two-man canoes of naval appointments which, through 70 miles up the river to the port. Only two canoes reached intense concentration, innovation Operation: the the target area to set their limpet mines which sank four and natural talents, contributed to Cockleshell Heroes and ships but, more importantly they struck an enormous blow a turning point in history with the the most Courageous at the German sense of impregnability. triumph of Midway. The book is an Such was the importance attached by Mountbatten, intimate glimpse into the USN of Raid of WWII Head of Combined operations, to carrying out the attack as the interwar and war years with its soon as possible that, unusually, it included no plan for the intelligence community’s internal By Paddy Ashdown extraction of the small force and marines that were captured feuds and conflicting loyalties. The ISBN 978-1-84513-701-4 by the enemy were executed because of an order by Hitler author’s extensive use of primary that commandos were to be shot. The exact way in which sources provides a solid base for the Aurum Press www.aurumpress.co.uk several met their end will probably never be known and they Rochefort biography which, while £25 in the UK have no known grave; Ashdown’s research has revealed that lauding his achievements, does not 413 pages including Appendices, they may even be buried in a German cemetery as ‘unknown resile from exposing his defects in his German soldiers’ having been buried in unmarked graves Notes and Bibliography relations with the naval authorities and after their execution. Only Major Hasler and Marine Sparks, associated agencies. Reviewed by Commander David his number two, managed to escape and evade long enough Joe Rochefort’s War is a worthy Hobbs MBE RN (Ret’d) to join up with French patriots who guided them to the addition to naval intelligence historical Spanish border and eventual freedom. literature and is recommended, Paddy Ashdown was a Royal Marines This has to be the definitive work on the achievement together with the contemporaneous officer who qualified as a swimmer of the ‘Cockleshell Heroes’ and I was particularly moved by biography of Australia’s own naval canoeist in the Special Boat Service the author’s penultimate words “no amount of Whitehall cryptanalyst, Eric Nave (A Man of long before he took up politics; his infighting, no petty inter-departmental jealousies, no Intelligence; Ian Pfennigwerth), for work, therefore, shows knowledge, squabbling rivalry, no intrigue, no deception, no stupidity reading by current naval intelligence insight and the ability to bring the story can detract from the extraordinary bravery, endurance specialists. The challenges, pitfalls, of Operation ‘FRANKTON’ to life. and determination of the young men who followed an successes and disappointments He writes in a lively and informative outstanding leader, ‘Blondie’ Hasler, into the mouth of experienced by Rochefort and his style that holds the readers’ attention danger on that bitterly cold night of 7 December 1942”. colleagues in the great maritime battles and his book follows years of research By our standards they lacked the equipment normally of the recent past are as relevant today into archives in the UK, France and associated with special forces, wearing standard-issue kit as they ever were. t Germany; interviews with surviving with no radios and little food; they were ill served with witnesses and a genuine admiration for information but their courage shines through on every page. the courage and achievements of Major This is an outstanding book about a remarkable operation. I ‘Blondie’ Hasler and his small team recommend it very highly. t that is apparent from the first page. He Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62

ships, the diversion of skill, talent and on which they were sent met with complete success, none manpower from regular service into failed to damage the enemy and to exact a price in increased these clandestine activities, and the security measures, additional defences and the more subtle loss of several submarines, X-craft, loss of confidence in their ability to defend against these new chariots and 39 officers and men of the British threats. Commonwealth navies. It was a combination of bad luck and swift action by the However, to accept this conclusion captain of Tirpitz that left his ship merely severely damaged would be to ignore the strategic instead of sunk in Kaafiord by X-craft in September 1943. An situation which demanded some form earlier attempt on the battleship by chariots had failed just of action to offset German and Italian short of its target when the rigging holding the craft under successes at a time of extreme stress on the hull of a Norwegian trawler parted and they were lost. the Royal Navy and, in the case of the The X-craft attack on Bergen in April 1944 missed its floating chariots, a Churchillian edict – after dock target through inadequate intelligence and not by any two of his battleships had been sunk in fault by the crew. Chariot tasks in the Mediterranean were Alexandria Harbour by chariots – to badly compromised by navigation difficulties and equipment C .E.T. Warren & James ‘emulate the exploits of the Italians’. malfunctions and not through any lack of determination by It would also ignore and discount the the two-man crews, several of whom were lost. Benson, Above Us the skill, dedication, fortitude and courage So, although one could discount these two special Waves: The Story of of the men who led the two special units as of small consequence in the totality of the Second Midget Submarines & units and those who conducted their World War, as examples of innovative responses to difficult assaults on the enemy. operational problems they would be hard to fault. Certainly, Human Torpedoes In this book, first published in the number of awards won by the men of the X-craft and 1953, the authors had access to the chariot units indicates their relative value at the time and in Barnsley South Yorkshire: Pen & veterans who had survived the war, so the circumstances in which they conducted their operations. Sword Books, 2006. it presents at first-hand the experiences Not surprisingly, Australians feature in both the list of the ISBN 1-84415-440-8. of those who had trained for and recipients and those who were lost. executed their orders. What shines This book is easy to read, extensively indexed and Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth through is their willingness to accept contains a glossary of terms no longer in naval use. The primitive equipment: chariots which maps showing the routes of attacks are particularly useful, With the benefit – and luxury – of were difficult to control and even keep and there are several photographs of interest as well as well- hindsight, it is possible to conduct at a safe operating depth; and severe presented diagrams of the arrangements of the chariots and a broad cost-benefit analysis of the environmental constraints – rubber X-craft. It is recommended for both the merely interested multitude of ‘special’ forces which the suits without gloves for operations in as a true ‘ripping yarn’ and to the naval specialist as a case British, in particular, seemed able to Norwegian fiords. history on how to conjure up something from almost conjure up out of nothing to prosecute Operation of the X-craft was nothing and to create a weapon with which to attack the elements of the Second World War. similarly fraught with difficulties: four enemy. t This book deals in detail with two men crammed into a small space in such units: the midget submarine which they could not all stand, for force (X-craft) and the human torpedo hours on end with limited oxygen using (chariot) force. primitive navigation to reach their Their material balance sheet makes heavily defended targets. They at least bleak reading: one German battleship had the possibility of making a post- damaged, one merchant ship sunk, attack rendezvous with the submarines one Italian cruiser destroyed, and which had towed them to the operating two Japanese submarine cables cut. area: charioteers were obliged to The cost was the expenditure of skills surrender to the enemy, whose ships and resources on the design and they had just attacked and hopefully development of the special vehicles, destroyed, a fact that precluded their the establishment of bases, support use in the Pacific. facilities and conversion of mother And, although few of the missions Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 63

Military College of Canada. He also corrupt or inefficient system belying the war, whereby distant served as historical advisor to the command chains and bureaucrats, who do not understand Chief of Land Staff for the War in the cultural complex or nature of the conflict, are bumbling Afghanistan. He is the first historian to their way through the destruction of a society. deploy with Canadian forces into active Finally, there are the many historical accounts of what operations since the Korean War. He happened and continues to happen in conflicts written by has written Enduring the Freedom: A historians and commentators who are removed from the Rogue Historian in Afghanistan, which battlefield. These are generally quite stoic and academic looks at some of his early experiences in their intent. Rather than offer an experience, they in Afghanistan, and Confronting the offer an analysis which is useful as a text for students in Chaos, which recounts his experiences training institutions. Throughout these genres, soldiers and in Afghanistan during the 2004-05 officers from the author’s country are usually portrayed as period. Fighting for Afghanistan: A exceptional human beings capable of great feats which are Rogue Historian Goes to War is the rooted in their national character. third instalment to this series. It is Mahoney’s work strikes a middle ground between all of Fighting for Maloney’s first-hand account of his the above genres, using elements of each, as well as adding Afghanistan: A Rogue experiences with Task Force Orion in his own unique style. He is able to write at a level which southern Afghanistan in the summer satisfies both the inquiring academic and the casual reader’s Historian Goes to War of 2006. This book is an easy to read, mind. One thing which makes this book stand out is that United States Naval Institute Press enjoyable, well written and engaging Mahoney worked at every level in theatre from platoon to By Sean Maloney piece. combined headquarters. He was involved in active patrols When it comes to writing the and at the receiving, as well as, delivering end of live fire. He Reviewed by Michael Paes history of contemporary operations, sat in offices with Generals and contributed to operational there seem to be three genres which planning with the general staff. He spent time in detention The story of General Petraeus prevail throughout the discourse. centres and at bases which were run by a combination of harnessing the intellectual capital Firstly, there are the many soldier contractors, foreign military and local authorities. With this of historians and historical studies accounts of their experiences in first-hand experience he is able to comment on all aspects to achieve successes in Iraq and war. These usually involve a tactical of operations with acerbic wit and clarity. There is no blame Afghanistan is well known. His level fighter sharing with the world afforded to the headquarters staff for difficulties on the promotion of studies in counter the brutal and trying experiences of grounds and even Generals are given a humorous persona in insurgency in order to analyse the modern war, in which young men and this very personal account. manner in which insurgencies have women are given impossible tasks and, All players in the theatre of this war are covered; the been dealt with was essential to the despite possessing the weapons and soldier, the contractor at the patrol base, the disaffected redraft of the US Army counter equipment to achieve great things, are villagers, enemy commanders, locals who are trying to make insurgency field manual. Ex-Australian not allowed to use their full arsenals a difference and the military complex which has imposed Army Lieutenant Colonel John due to budgetary, command or national itself on the landscape that has been dubbed ‘the graveyard Kilkullen was seconded to Petraeus’ limitations. Quite often, these pieces of Empires’. The cast in this book are presented as if they are office during operations in Iraq to portray the lone warrior or band of weaved together by an author who is seeking a convenient advise in this area, and is now a world brothers as a unit working against the plot to describe modern war, except this is the real thing. authority in this field of research. enemy and the system which doesn’t Mahoney’s account is passionate and unashamedly Among the myriad of civilian seem to understand or support them. patriotic. It is sympathetic to the plight of the Afghans while contractors and government workers Another genre is the many accounts at the same time, uncritical of coalition soldiers. There who have been involved in the of journalists which are written with are the odd shots across the bow of government policy, campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the investigative aim of exposing for example, he comments on the caveat regarding fuel it is interesting to note the number ineptitude at certain levels. This genre consumption which limited aircraft to certain flying hours of historians who have advised and generally involves well connected per month without exception as to operational necessity. recorded what has been happening in journalists, some of whom have been However, this criticism was made without any large scale theatre at various levels. This brings embedded with coalition units or spent accusations against coalition governments, rather, as an us to Sean Maloney, an Associate time in the communities which exist observation from someone who wants to see the war-weary Professor of History at the Royal in the conflict zones. They portray a soldiers given a chance to succeed in their missions. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 Book Reviews

Maloney’s book is not a textbook. for Afghanistan is a book which It contains endnotes but these are not can be read as a stand-alone piece a bibliography of the existing literature in itself, as well as being a gateway on the war in Afghanistan, but rather piece which compels the reader to supporting documents which give find the predecessors and read up on his experiences context. This further Mahoney’s previous visits to the war highlights how his piece finds a niche zone. His “rogue history” provides a between first-hand accounts of war and compendium of anecdotes, lessons scholarly writings. and commentary that would be In one story, Maloney recounts beneficial for staff colleges and training how operational planners invoked institutions of armed forces around the words of General Templar, the the world, even if to only provide mastermind behind the success of the a footnote in the study of modern Malaya Emergency, when planning warfare. for a clear, hold and build operation in The legacy of post-September 11 The rise and fall of the Singapore Southern Afghanistan. The frustration counter insurgencies seems to be Naval Base, 1919–1942 of an historian to hear this kind of coming to a close with ISAF troops language only being used at such a late looking to withdraw from Afghanistan by W. David McIntyre stage in the campaign (five years in), by the end of 2014. New forms of The Macmillan Press Ltd.: London; 1979; 289 pp.; ISBN emerges in this anecdote. It provides a warfare such as the drone campaign, 0333248678; stark reminder of the importance of the cyber warfare and the race to claim utility of history, and the need to have every island in the oceans as sovereign Ursula Davidson Library call number: 740 MCIN 1979 a command of its use prior to going territory are taking precedence over Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth into operations, rather than resorting the interventions of the last decade. to it half way through operations. Western governments are also The crumbling and capitulation of the ‘impregnable’ redoubt Through this experience, Maloney grappling with how best to respond and naval base of Singapore in February 1942 has spawned highlights how history provides a to war amongst the peoples scenarios many books. The fall of this cornerstone of Allied defence dialogue for contemporary operators, which are being witnessed in Syria policy in the Far East and the basis upon which Australian through which an understanding of the at the time of writing of this review. defence capabilities and strategies were built was a traumatic interrelation of past and present assists With this shift comes a collective and event. Most writers have attempted to analyse the causes of the in best determining how to address the institutional amnesia of lessons learned collapse of British resistance and to assign blame. However, this strategic issues that confront occupying in counter insurgency. Mahoney has book, published in 1979, starts from first principles and details forces. done his part to document Canada’s the story of the design and construction of the base itself and the Those who have served in the experience and it is to be hoped that associated defence works. Afghan theatre may be interested to if we see interventions return to the ‘Everybody knows’ that the defences were inadequate (true), read about the Canadian experience forefront of military operations in that the naval guns could only enfilade the sea approaches to in order to discover how another the future, policy makers and future Singapore (false), and the Japanese were shown to be invincible country has interpreted events which commanders like Petraeus and advisers jungle fighters (also false). What McIntyre demonstrates is that Australian soldiers have also been like Kilkullen will pick up Mahoney’s there was a long chain of causation that produced the first result involved in. This reviewer believes works and take heed of the experiences and that the project was bedevilled by political, financial and that anyone who is interested in the which are found therein. t strategic wrangling from the very start, and that the military wider discourse regarding the war in planning for its manning and defence was deeply flawed. Afghanistan should read this book. Readers will be familiar with the well-rehearsed arguments It shows the functioning of coalition about the merits of the ‘main fleet to Singapore’ basis for the warfare and exposes readers to the naval reinforcement of Singapore, but may not be aware that experiences of soldiers and officers at the arrangements for bolstering the island’s air defences were all levels of a theatre. This reviewer equally fragile and tenuous. The failure by military commanders confesses to not having read Mahoney’s to exercise their troops, the bulk of them Indian regiments, first two instalments of the trilogy, to in the arts and sciences of jungle warfare seems inexcusable. this end, it can be said that Fighting Effective construction of defences and the provisioning was Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 65

hamstrung during the 1930s by an the RAN in the war of 1914-18 and offers little in the way of interminable war of words between the new material at the strategic or operational level. There are gunners and the aviators about which several interesting anecdotes at the tactical level from what could provide the most effective defence, are obviously first hand sources (such as National Archives, shells or aircraft bombs. family records and the like) but as the author fails to provide Meanwhile, the centrepiece of this a suitable bibliography, a list of source material or even an crucial defensive position, the naval index it’s hard to discern fact from fiction. His writing style at dockyard, lurched from crisis to crisis. times shows some journalistic flair but on other occasions it There was simply not enough money replicates a text message from a teenager. I don’t know what voted, nor the priority given, to have this he means by describing HMAS Swan’s Commanding Officer ambitious major work of construction as having a “Doctor Zhivago moment“ and still find it hard to completed, so that the dockyard opening believe that the 11 Australian sailors at Zeebrugge were the ceremonies had to be photographed from spearhead of the operation which involved over a thousand predetermined angles to ensure that the men! state of incompleteness was not revealed They Sang Like Overall this is a disappointing book. It is riddled with to the enemy – or more importantly – to factual errors and unsupported assumptions and, while I the British and their allies. McIntyre Kangaroos: Australia’s am no Anglophile, the constant ‘British bashing’ throughout concludes that senior British politicians Tinpot Navy in the Great wears thin very quickly. The French and Italians get and military officers were engaged in a similar treatment. The proof reading is abysmal: there are programme of corrosive disinformation War several errors in typesetting, spelling, missing words and from the early 1930s. By Anthony Delano obvious errors in fact that could have been easily corrected There was never an official enquiry Australian Scholarly Publishing, if someone with a cursory knowledge of Australian naval into what Churchill described as ‘the North Melbourne, 2012 history and the English language had been allowed to look at worst disaster and largest capitulation in it prior to publication. British history’, and in his discussion in ISBN 978-1-921875-72-4. Whilst lavishly illustrated the photos are often very his chapter titled ‘Post-Mortem’ McIntyre 247 pp blurry and poorly, or incorrectly, captioned. Several of the suggests cogent reasons why this was so. Reviewed by Greg Swinden photos look like poor photocopies from other books or have None of the senior figures in the British been lifted from dodgy websites and few have their sources government from 1923 to 1941, or their Oh dear. My grandmother often said attributed. One even looks like a photocopy of the picture senior military advisers, could escape that if you can not say something nice from the top of an Airfix model kit. Having seen the bulk of censure for their role in the steps that led about someone, then say nothing at the original photos (which are very clear) it’s a mystery as to to the debacle. It would have been too all. My grandfather, a veteran of both where these poor quality photos were obtained. The book embarrassing to reveal the shifting sands world wars, however said if you point could also have greatly benefited from the use of several on which the strategic jewel in the British a rifle at someone: then shoot to kill. maps – but there is only one postage stamp size map of the Crown in the Far East had been built. Regrettably for this book I will take the Mediterranean included – complete with the identification McIntyre provides a very good set of latter point of view. of Tobruk, Bardia, Benghazi, Derna, Mersa Matruh, Sidi notes on the British and other records to Anthony Delano has attempted to Barrani and other World War II North African battlefields! which he had access from 1972 onwards, put forward a new light on the history The overall publishing is poor. but he did not have the advantage of the of the Royal Australian Navy during The bottom line is don’t waste your money on buying discussion that signals intelligence of World War I, but does so poorly, yet this book. Borrow a copy from your local library and read the time can now add to this sad saga. he has obviously done quite a lot of it in an afternoon and make your own decision as to its Nevertheless, this is a valuable and original research. The back cover value. Unfortunately They Sang like Kangaroos is more like a interesting book and the researcher will states the book “offers yarns from the Quokka drowning in a mud puddle. t be gladdened by McIntyre’s assessment earliest days of the RAN that are largely of other publications on the subject unheard”; and pretty much this is what available to him at the time. t it is – a rambling stumble through the history of the Australian Navy at war Originally printed in United Service, the during the period 1914-1918. Journal of the Royal United Services Institute They Sang like Kangaroos relies very – reproduced with thanks. heavily on AW Jose’s Official History of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 67

A Hobart Regatta to remember

fter the arrival of the Australian submarine, the Sydney one of the – it consisted of a motor car, and Fleet Unit in October 1913, the old Victory in which were visible a was an exceedingly good imitation. ARAN did its best to show as many couple of sailors and one officer in To see this quaintly constructed Australians as possible their newly the uniform of 1805. HMS Sealark craft skimming over the water was acquired sea power. The Hobart [a survey vessel], which was also at a sight not to be missed. The ‘car’ Regatta, held on 27 January 1914, Hobart at that time, had entered a had four occupants, gaily attired – attracted thousands of spectators, and pirate ship, but the elements were one as a lady with flaxen hair, and certain events were specially arranged unkind to it and the pirates very whose complexion was particularly for the fleet. soon got a taste of the unpleasantly attractive on account of the vivid ‘One of the most interesting’ of cold water. As they were towed red of her nose. The party waved these, according to a contemporary away, sitting in drenched clothes fondly to the crowds on shore, report, was the parade of copper punts: on their upturned raft, they looked now and then each of them in turn more like shipwrecked mariners would raise a black bottle to their TheAustralia had a very well than rovers of the High Seas. lips – the lady evidently enjoying constructed model of the ship her share – and vigorously ‘tooting’ erected on her copper punt; this TheAustralia was awarded the as any craft approached them, they was driven by a torpedo, and going prize for best decorated copper circled in front of the Reserve to along at a good speed the Young punt, and the Encounter took the the excessive amusement of all the Australia created quite a sensation. prize for the most humourous. The onlookers. t TheMelbourne had a model of a latter has not yet been described

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

O ur new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). F igure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member

ID and password. Figure 8

Figure 7

Participating in the forum Figure 2 Figure 3 In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login Logging in to your account and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with and your reply will not be added to the topic. the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

Figure 4

Logging out of your account Figure 9 In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4). Figure 10

Further questions If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a Figure 5 Figure 6 feature request, post a topic in the “Website Questions” forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 148 69 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: If citing web sites please use the alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute H MAS Parramatta travelled to Thailand in March 2013 to conduct Exercise AUSTHAI 2013 with the Royal Thai Navy’s HTM Ships Rattanakosin and Phutthayotfa Chulalok. The three ships were joined by two maritime patrol aircraft: an AP3-C Orion from the Royal Australian Air Force, and a Royal Thai Navy Dornier 228.