Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia RIZAL PANGGABEAN IHSAN ALI-FAUZI Foreword by Sidney Jones Translated by Natalia Laskowska Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia i Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia ii Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia iii Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia Rizal Panggabean Ihsan Ali-Fauzi Rudy Harisyah Alam Titik Firawati Husni Mubarok Siswo Mulyartono Irsyad Rafsadi Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation Jakarta, 2015 iv Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia POLICING RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA Rizal Panggabean & Ihsan Ali-Fauzi ©PUSADParamadina All rights reserved Translated by Natalia Laskowska Rudy Harisyah Alam Titik Firawati Husni Mubarok Siswo Mulyartono Irsyad Rafsadi Published by: Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi, PUSAD) Paramadina Foundation In cooperation with: Magister Program for Peace and Conflict Resolution Magister Perdamaian dan Resolusi Konflik MPRK)( Gadjah Mada University With the support of The Asia Foundation Bona Indah Plaza Blok A 2 NO. D 12 Jl.Karang Tengah Raya, Jakarta12440 Tel. (021) 7655253 http://paramadina-pusad.or.id ISBN978-979-772-050-6 Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia v CONTENTS Foreword by Sidney Jones—vii Preface to the English Edition—xiii Preface to the Indonesian Edition—xvii PART I – INTRODUCTION 1. Studying Policing of Religious Conflicts in Indonesia—3 PART II – POLICING SECTARIAN CONFLICTS 2. The Case of Anti-Ahmadiyya in Manis Lor, Kuningan—29 3. The Case of Anti-Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, Pandeglang—63 4. The Case of Anti-Shi‘a in Sampang, Madura—101 5. The Case of Anti-Shi‘a in Bangil, Pasuruan—137 PART III – POLICING CONFLICTS OVER PLACES OF WORSHIP 6. The Case of HKBP Filadelfia Church, Bekasi—171 7. The Case of GKI Yasmin Church, Bogor—205 8. The Case of Nur Musafir Mosque, Kupang—235 9. The Case of Abdurrahman Mosque, Ende—265 v vi Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia PART IV – CONCLUSION 10. Lessons from the Eight Cases: Some Conclusion—301 11. Learning from Good Policing: Recommendations—315 Appendix: Data Collection Instruments—329 Acronyms—335 Glossary—339 Index—341 About the Authors—353 Foreword vii FOREWORD Sidney Jones Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict IPAC)( In these eight meticulously researched case studies, Rizal Panggabean, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and their colleagues illuminate two critical issues in post-Soeharto Indonesia: the prevalence of religious conflict and the institutional weaknesses of the police. Both are common problems in new multicultural democracies. Tackling them together helps un- derscore the complexities of both. The institutes involved in this study (PUSAD Paramadina and MPRK UGM) have developed a formidable reputation for work on religious conflict, combining rigorous research with practical advo- cacy, looking for lessons that might be learned to manage such con- flicts more effectively and prevent violence in the future. They start from a commitment to tolerance and pluralism and to democracy as a political system that should allow both to flourish. What they have found, however, is that in some areas of Indonesia, democracy can add complications: intolerant civil society organizations using freedom of expression to incite hatred of religious “deviants” and elected officials afraid to antagonize key constituencies or eager to use religious issues as a way of garnering votes.1 1The role of local elections in exacerbating religious conflict is the subject of another superb study, covering some of the same conflicts as those vii viii Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia Thus, when sectarian conflicts or disputes over the construction of minority houses of worship erupt, multiple interests quickly be- come involved, going far beyond the contending parties and mak- ing resolution more difficult. Enter the police, enforcers of the law in democratic Indonesia. They are perhaps the most vilified actors in government with a reputation for corruption and abuse, although good officers in positions of authority can sometimes transcend the institutional culture. Depending on when they decide to move and what actions they take, police can fuel or cool a conflict. It is sobering to realize that one of the “success” stories of polic- ing in this volume involves attacks on the Ahmadiyah community in Manis Lor, Kuningan in 2007 and 2010 where: the police took no preventive action as the problem escalated be- fore 2007 (the best they could do was put up a banner saying “We are all brothers”); they were powerless to prevent the local government from clos- ing three mosques or a mob from gathering on 18 December 2007 and vandalizing two of the mosques and eight Ahmadiyah homes as well as wounding seven people; while they charged six men with violence, prosecutors only asked for two months sentences and the judges gave them less; tensions steadily escalated again in June-July 2010 even though the police had full were in touch with all sides; the police chief accompanied the municipal police in the closing of an Ahmadiyah mosque and four smaller prayerhouses, in co- ordination with the local government despite the fact that these actions violated a 2008 decree; analysed here, by a partner institution at Gajah Mada University. See Moh. Iqbal Ahnaf, Samsul Maarif, Budy Asyari-Afwan and Muhammad Afdillah, Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik dalam Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi dan Kupang (Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies/CRCS, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, [February] 2015). Foreword ix in the midst of rising tensions, police were powerless to prevent a meeting of hardline groups on 29 July 2010 attended by over 1,000 individuals mobilized by text message and bent on vio- lence; despite deploying hundreds of troops and using tear gas, po- lice were powerless to prevent the mob arming itself with bricks, rocks and sharp objects, wounding five people and damaging more homes; and no one was arrested. If this is successful policing, it makes one realize how low the bar is set. In this case, the police chief is seen to have performed well in 2010 because she realized the potential for violence, mustered enough officers to confront it, and had non-lethal means— teargas — on hand to control the mob. No one in the Ahmadiyah community had to be relocated, and no further violence in Manis Lor has taken place. The last is important, although how much this is due to policing and how much to other factors is a question. The fact remains that no effective preventive or deterrent mea- sures were in place before the 29 July meeting. In the lead-up to the mob incitement, the police seem to have been reduced to the role of message-carriers, urging the Ahmadiyah to accede to some of the demands of the hardliners, and urging the hardliners to avoid vi- olence. Neither effort at “persuasion” was ever going to work: the police toolkit of possible responses to violence has to be much more sophisticated. In this case, at least the key police actors at the district level were well-intentioned men who were genuinely trying to ful- fill their duty to protect. The obstacles to improving policing, not just of religious conflict but of any disputes likely to produce an angry crowd, are many. The police themselves cited several. They had no instructions on how to handle the case from their superiors or the central government, and in an institution that remains highly centralized, local police often fear to act without orders. The relevant laws were unclear and x Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia contradictory. The local ulama council insisted that the Ahmadiyah were guilty of blasphemy under a 1965 law; the 2008 decree suggest- ed they could worship as long they did not proselytize. The police had enough human rights training to understand they could not force anyone to renounce his or her beliefs, but they were also clear- ly reluctant to take on the mob and the mob’s political backers. The latter included the district head and many members of the district council who had turned banning the Ahmadiyah into a campaign promise. Once the mob had massed, the police were afraid of taking any action that might lead them to be accused of human rights vio- lations. One reason they did not arrest anyone was that they knew no one would be willing to testify against the hardline provocateurs for fear of retribution. (Witness protection in Indonesia is in its in- fancy.) Beyond the obstacles that were specific to Manis Lor, there are broader issues that hamper good policing. Institutionally there are no incentives to building a genuine community policing program. Having good relations with the community does not produce pro- motions. There are no useful or enforceable procedures for handling social conflict; a disastrous attempt to produce one for handling “an - archy” in October 2010 (Protap No.1/X/2010) ended up amounting to orders to shoot on site. There are no guidelines on hate speech, and an understandable reluctance in the civil society community to countenance any measure that could be seen as returning to the provisions of the criminal code used during the Soeharto days to punish dissent — including provisions on incitement and spread- ing hatred. Police and other officials, when faced with a conflict, often have a tendency to fall back on trying to negotiate a middle way, even when one side is clearly in the wrong. Enforcing the law and defending constitutional principles such as freedom of religion sometimes become secondary. The recommendations to the police at the end of this volume are common-sense lessons from both the “successes” and failures this book describes. In the call for better training, better intelligence, Foreword xi more interaction with the community, and respect for due process, they echo many of the calls for police reform that have been made in Indonesia, mostly without much success, since Soeharto fell.