CSCE 813: Internet Security

Chin-Tser Huang [email protected]

University of South Carolina Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

 Provides a confidentiality and authentication service that can be used for electronic mail and file storage applications  Developed by Phil Zimmermann  Selected the best available cryptographic algorithms as building blocks  Integrated these algorithms into a general-purpose application independent of operating system and processor and based on a small set of easy-to-use commands  Package and its documentation, including source code, are freely available via the Internet  Also has a fully compatible, low-cost commercial version

09/29/2015 2 PGP Growth

It is available free worldwide in versions that run on a variety of platforms

The commercial version satisfies users who want a product that comes with vendor support

It is based on algorithms that have survived extensive public review and are considered extremely secure

It has a wide range of applicability

It was not developed by, nor is it controlled by, any governmental or standards organization

Is now on an Internet standards track, however it still has an aura of an antiestablishment endeavor 09/29/2015 3 Summary of PGP Services

09/29/2015 4 PGP Authentication

 Combination of SHA-1 and RSA provides an effective digital signature scheme  Because of the strength of RSA the recipient is assured that only the owner of the matching private key can generate the signature  Because of the strength of SHA-1 the recipient is assured that no one else could generate a new message that matches the hash code

 As an alternative, signatures can be generated using DSS/SHA-1

 Detached signatures are supported  Each person’s signature is independent and therefore applied only to the document 09/29/2015 5 PGP Confidentiality

 Provided by encrypting messages to be transmitted or to be stored locally as files

 In both cases the symmetric encryption algorithm CAST-128 may be used

 Alternatively IDEA or 3DES may be used

 The 64-bit cipher feedback (CFB) mode is used

09/29/2015 6 PGP Confidentiality

 In PGP each symmetric key is only used once

 Although referred to as a session key, it is indeed a one-time key

 Session key is bound to the message and transmitted with it

 To protect it, it is encrypted with the receiver’s public key

 As an alternative to the use of RSA for key encryption, PGP uses ElGamal, a variant of Diffie- Hellman that also provides encryption/decryption

09/29/2015 7 PGP Confidentiality and Authentication

 Both services may be used for the same message  First a signature is generated for the plaintext message and prepended to the message  Then the plaintext message plus signature is encrypted using CAST-128 (or IDEA or 3DES) and the session key is encrypted using RSA (or ElGamal)  When both services are used:

The sender first Then encrypts the And finally encrypts signs the message message and the session key with with its own private signature with a the recipient’s public key session key key

09/29/2015 8 PGP Compression

 As a default, PGP compresses the message after applying the signature but before encryption

 This has the benefit of saving space both for e-mail transmission and for file storage

 The placement of the compression algorithm is critical

 Applying the hash function and signature after compression would constrain all PGP implementations to the same version of the compression algorithm

 Message encryption is applied after compression to strengthen cryptographic security

 The compression algorithm used is ZIP

09/29/2015 9 PGP E-mail Compatibility

 Many electronic mail systems only permit the use of blocks consisting of ASCII text

 To accommodate this restriction, PGP provides the service of converting the raw 8-bit binary stream to a stream of printable ASCII characters

 The scheme used for this purpose is radix-64 conversion

 Each group of three octets of binary data is mapped into four ASCII characters

 This format also appends a CRC to detect transmission errors

09/29/2015 10 PGP Cryptographic Functions

09/29/2015 11 PGP Cryptographic Functions

09/29/2015 12 Transmission and Reception of PGP Messages

09/29/2015 13 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME)

 A security enhancement to the MIME Internet e-mail format standard based on technology from RSA Data Security

 Defined in:

 RFCs 3370, 3850, 3851, 3852

09/29/2015 14 RFC 5322

 Defines a format for text messages that are sent using electronic mail  Messages are viewed as having an envelope and contents

 The envelope contains whatever information is needed to accomplish transmission and delivery

 The contents compose the object to be delivered to the recipient

 RFC 5322 standard applies only to the contents  The content standard includes a set of header fields that may be used by the mail system to create the envelope 09/29/2015 15 Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)

 An extension to the RFC 5322 framework that is intended to address some of the problems and limitations of the use of Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)  Intended to resolve these problems in a manner compatible with existing RFC 5322 implementations  The specification is provided in RFCs 2045 through 2049

09/29/2015 16 Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)

MIME specification includes the following elements:

Transfer Five new encodings are message header defined that fields are enable the defined, which conversion of may be included any content in an RFC 5322 format into a header; these form that is fields provide protected from information alteration by the about the body mail system of the message

A number of content formats are defined, thus standardizing representations that support multimedia electronic mail 09/29/2015 17 The Five Header Fields Defined in MIME MIME-Version

• Must have the parameter value 1.0 • This field indicates that the message conforms to RFCs 2045 and 2046

Content-Type

• Describes the data contained in the body with sufficient detail that the receiving user agent can pick an appropriate agent or mechanism to represent the data to the user or otherwise deal with the data in an appropriate manner

Content-Transfer-Encoding

• Indicates the type of transformation that has been used to represent the body of the message in a way that is acceptable for mail transport

Content-ID

• Used to identify MIME entities uniquely in multiple contexts

Content-Description

• A text description of the object with the body; this is useful when the object is not readable 09/29/2015 18 MIME Content Types

09/29/2015 19 MIME Content Types

09/29/2015 20 MIME Transfer Encodings

09/29/2015 21 Example MIME Message Structure

09/29/2015 22 Example MIME Message Structure

09/29/2015 23 Native and Canonical Form

09/29/2015 24 S/MIME Functionality

Enveloped data Signed data • Consists of encrypted content of any type • A digital signature is formed by taking the and encrypted content encryption keys message digest of the content to be for one or more recipients signed and then encrypting that with the private key of the signer • The content plus signature are then encoded using base64 encoding • A signed data message can only be viewed by a recipient with S/MIME capability S/MIME

Clear-signed data Signed and enveloped data • Only the digital signature is encoded • Signed-only and encrypted-only entities using base64 may be nested, so that encrypted data • As a result recipients without S/MIME may be signed and signed data or clear- capability can view the message content, signed data may be encrypted although they cannot verify the signature

09/29/2015 25 Cryptographic Algorithms used in S/MIME

09/29/2015 26 Cryptographic Algorithms used in S/MIME

09/29/2015 27 S/MIME Content Types

09/29/2015 28 Securing a MIME Entity

 S/MIME secures a MIME entity with a signature, encryption, or both  The MIME entity is prepared according to the normal rules for MIME message preparation  The MIME entity plus some security-related data, such as algorithm identifiers and certificates, are processed by S/MIME to produce what is known as a PKCS object  A PKCS object is then treated as message content and wrapped in MIME  In all cases the message to be sent is converted to canonical form

09/29/2015 29 EnvelopedData

 The steps for preparing an envelopedData MIME are:

Generate a pseudorandom session key for a particular symmetric encryption algorithm

For each recipient, encrypt the session key with the recipient’s public RSA key

For each recipient, prepare a block known as RecipientInfo that contains an identifier of the recipient’s public-key certificate, an identifier of the algorithm used to encrypt the session key, and the encrypted session key

Encrypt the message content with the session key

09/29/2015 30 SignedData

 The steps for preparing a signedData MIME are:

Prepare a block known as Encrypt the SignerInfo message digest that contains with the signer’s the signer’s private key public-key Compute the certificate, an message digest identifier of the (hash function) message digest of the content to algorithm, an be signed identifier of the algorithm used Select a to encrypt the message message digest digest, and the algorithm encrypted (SHA or MD5) message digest 09/29/2015 31 Clear Signing

 Achieved using the multipart content type with a signed subtype

 This signing process does not involve transforming the message to be signed

 Such that recipients with MIME capability but not S/MIME capability are able to read the incoming message

09/29/2015 32 S/MIME Certificate Processing

 S/MIME uses public-key certificates that conform to version 3 of X.509  The key-management scheme used by S/MIME is in some ways a hybrid between a strict X.509 certification hierarchy and PGP’s web of trust  S/MIME managers and/or users must configure each client with a list of trusted keys and with certificate revocation lists  The responsibility is local for maintaining the certificates needed to verify incoming signatures and to encrypt outgoing messages  The certificates are signed by certification authorities

09/29/2015 33 User Agent Role

 An S/MIME user has several key-management functions to perform: Certificate storage Key generation Registration and retrieval

A user requires access The user of some related A user’s public key must be to a local list of administrative utility must registered with a certificates in order to be capable of generating certification authority in verify incoming separate Diffie-Hellman and order to receive an X.509 signatures and to DSS key pairs and should be public-key certificate encrypt outgoing capable of generating RSA messages key pairs

A user agent should generate RSA key pairs with a length in the range of 768 to 1024 bits and must not generate a length of less than 512 bits 09/29/2015 34 VeriSign Certificates

 VeriSign provides a certification authority (CA) service that is intended to be compatible with S/MIME and a variety of other applications  Issues X.509 certificates with the product name VeriSign Digital ID  At a minimum, each Digital ID contains:  Owner’s public key  Owner’s name or alias  Expiration date of the Digital ID  Serial number of the Digital ID  Name of the certification authority that issued the Digital ID  Digital signature of the certification authority that issued the Digital ID 09/29/2015 35 Table 19.7 VeriSign Public-Key Certificate Classes

IA Issuing Authority CA Certification Authority PCA VeriSign public primary certification authority 09/29/2015PIN Personal Identification Number 36 LRAA Local Registration Authority Administrator Enhanced Security Services

 Three enhanced security services have been proposed in an Internet draft:  Signed receipt  Returning a signed receipt provides proof of delivery to the originator of a message and allows the originator to demonstrate to a third party that the recipient received the message  Security labels  A set of security information regarding the sensitivity of the content that is protected by S/MIME encapsulation  Secure mailing lists  An S/MIME Mail List Agent (MLA) can take a single incoming message, perform the recipient-specific encryption for each recipient, and forward the message

09/29/2015 37 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)

 A specification for cryptographically signing e-mail messages, permitting a signing domain to claim responsibility for a message in the mail stream  Message recipients can verify the signature by querying the signer’s domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key and can thereby confirm that the message was attested to by a party in possession of the private key for the signing domain  Proposed Internet Standard RFC 4871  Has been widely adopted by a range of e-mail providers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)

09/29/2015 38 Function Modules and Standardized Protocols Used

09/29/2015 39 E-mail Threats

 Characterized on three  RFC 4684 (Analysis levels of of Threats threat: Motivating The most sophisticated and financially motivated senders of messages are DomainKeys those who stand to receive substantial financial benefit, such as Identified Mail) from an e-mail based fraud scheme

 Describes the threats

being addressed by The next level are professional senders of bulk spam mail and often DKIM in terms of the operate as commercial enterprises and send messages on behalf of third characteristics, parties capabilities, and location of potential attackers At the low end are attackers who simply want to send e-mail that a recipient does not want to receive

09/29/2015 40 09/29/2015 41 Secure Shell (SSH)

 A protocol for secure network communications designed to be relatively simple and inexpensive to implement

 SSH client and server applications are widely available for most operating systems

 Has become the method of choice for remote login and X tunneling

 Is rapidly becoming one of the most pervasive applications for encryption technology outside of embedded systems

09/29/2015 42 Secure Shell (SSH)

 The initial version, SSH1 was focused on providing a secure remote logon facility to replace TELNET and other remote logon schemes that provided no security

 SSH2 fixes a number of security flaws in the original scheme

 documented as a proposed standard in IETF RFCs 4250 through 4256

 SSH can also be used for other network functions such as file transfer and e-mail 09/29/2015 43 SSH Protocol Stack

09/29/2015 44 SSH Transport Layer Protocol

 Server authentication occurs at the transport layer, based on the server possessing a public/private key pair  A server may have multiple host keys using multiple different asymmetric encryption algorithms  Multiple hosts may share the same host key  The server host key is used during key exchange to authenticate the identity of the host  RFC 4251 dictates two alternative trust models:  The client has a local database that associates each host name with the corresponding public host key  The host name-to-key association is certified by a trusted certification authority (CA); the client only knows the CA root key and can verify the validity of all host keys certified by accepted CAs

09/29/2015 45 Transport Layer Protocol Packet Exchange

09/29/2015 46 SSH Transport Layer Protocol Packet Formation

09/29/2015 47 SSH

Transport

Layer

Cryptographic

Algorithms

* = Required ** = Recommended

09/29/2015 48 Authentication Methods

 Publickey  The client sends a message to the server that contains the client’s public key, with the message signed by the client’s private key  When the server receives this message, it checks whether the supplied key is acceptable for authentication and, if so, it checks whether the signature is correct  Password  The client sends a message containing a plaintext password, which is protected by encryption by the Transport Layer Protocol  Hostbased  Authentication is performed on the client’s host rather than the client itself  This method works by having the client send a signature created with the private key of the client host  Rather than directly verifying the user’s identity, the SSH server verifies the identity of the client host

09/29/2015 49 Connection Protocol

 The SSH Connection Protocol runs on top of the SSH Transport Layer Protocol and assumes that a secure authentication connection is in use  The secure authentication connection, referred to as a tunnel, is used by the Connection Protocol to multiplex a number of logical channels

 Channel mechanism  All types of communication using SSH are supported using separate channels  Either side may open a channel  For each channel, each side associates a unique channel number  Channels are flow controlled using a window mechanism  No data may be sent to a channel until a message is received to indicate that window space is available  The life of a channel progresses through three stages: opening a channel, data transfer, and closing a channel 09/29/2015 50 Example SSH Connection Protocol Message Exchange

09/29/2015 51 Channel Types

Four channel types are recognized in the SSH Connection Protocol specification Session • The remote execution of a program • The program may be a shell, an application such as file transfer or e-mail, a system command, or some built-in subsystem • Once a session channel is opened, subsequent requests are used to start the remote program X11 • Refers to the X Window System, a computer software system and network protocol that provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for networked computers • X allows applications to run on a network server but to be displayed on a desktop machine Forwarded-tcpip • Remote port forwarding Direct-tcpip

• Local09/29/2015 port forwarding 52 Port Forwarding

 One of the most useful features of SSH  Provides the ability to convert any insecure TCP connection into a secure SSH connection (also referred to as SSH tunneling)  Incoming TCP traffic is delivered to the appropriate application on the basis of the port number (a port is an identifier of a user of TCP)  An application may employ multiple port numbers

09/29/2015 53 SSH Transport Layer Packet Exchange

09/29/2015 54