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Home , Theory of descriptions

PLIN 3002 PHILOSOPHY OF 14 November 2006

Lecture 6: Objections to Russell’s theory of

Russell’s theory – a summary:

• Definite descriptions are not referring expressions, they are denoting expressions – in other words, “the F” works more like “an F” or “every F” than like “Tony Blair” or “that” • When I say “The F is G” what I have said doesn’t depend truth-conditionally on any particular individual (I express an object-independent ) • When I say “The F is G” what I’ve said will be true if and only if there is one and only one thing which is F and it is also G

Strawson’s objections to Russell’s theory:

Empty descriptions and truth values:

1. a. The king of France is bald. b. The king of France isn’t bald.

Incomplete (improper) descriptions:

2. The table is covered with books.

Russell’s underlying argument: • There is a strong intuition that definite descriptions can be meaningful even when they don’t in fact pick out anything in the world – think of the king of France. [premise 1] • Therefore, the of a definite cannot be the thing it picks out in the world. • The meaning of an expression and what that expression contributes to truth conditions are one and the same thing. [premise 2] • Therefore, definite descriptions cannot contribute the individuals they pick out to truth conditions.

Strawson’s distinction between expression-type meaning and truth-conditional contribution:

• The meaning of “The F” is the rule that it is used to refer to individuals who have the F. • What “The F” contributes to any made (truth conditions) is the individual referred to, not its linguistic meaning (i.e. the rule for use).

3. a. The king of France doesn’t exist. b. This morning my father met the king of France. c. The king of France is coming to UCL tomorrow. d. Mary believes the king of France lives in a beautiful chateau. (Neale 1990: 26-27)

Donnellan’s distinction (attributive vs. referential uses)

4. The Ferrari driver has an unfair advantage. (Powell 2001)

Context 1: Bert and Ernie at home, B. is reading an article about this year’s Monaco Grand Prix, no details about identity of particular drivers are given, but it says that Ferrari are going to be allowed to start a minute before anyone else. Context 2: It’s the day of the Grand Prix and B. and E. are hanging around the pit lane. They overhear someone who seems to be the race organiser telling a guy in a red jump suit and helmet, who appears to be the Ferrari driver, that he will help him win.

5. Bert to Ernie: (That’s totally outrageous), the Ferrari driver has an unfair advantage.

Attributive use: the Ferrari driver, whoever he is Referential use: that person over there (who I take to be the Ferrari driver)

Is there a truth-conditional between these two uses?

Cases of misdescription:

6. The man with a martini is Oscar’s brother.

According to Russell, the proposition expressed is: 6a. There is one and only one man with a martini and he is Oscar’s brother.

According to Donnellan, the proposition expressed is: 6b. a is Oscar’s brother. [where a is the person the speaker intends to refer to]

Donnellan’s claims:

• Attributive uses of definite descriptions and referential uses of definite descriptions are truth-conditionally distinct. • An attributively-used makes a Russellian contribution to truth condition, i.e. on an attributive use, “The F is G” is true iff there is one and only one F and it is G. • A referentially-used definite description contributes nothing but its referent to truth conditions. • Russell’s theory of descriptions therefore fails to account for referential uses of definite descriptions.

Donnellan’s distinction, definite descriptions and :

7. Albert has lost his case.

Two distinct sets of truth conditions, hence ambiguous.

Does it follow that “The Ferrari driver” (and all other definite descriptions) are ambiguous?

Evidence against ambiguity:

8. The ‘translation’ test. ‘case’ in English Æ ‘valise’ (luggage), ‘affaire’ (legal dispute) in French, ‘maleta’ (luggage), ‘causa’ (legal dispute) in Spanish, etc.

9. Bert: Someone has forgotten to water the plants again. Communicates: Ernie has forgotten to water the plants again.

10. Well, everyone taking my philosophy course turned up. (Neale 1990: 87-88)

Quantifier phrases, quite generally, can be used to refer to individuals and so to convey singular (object-dependent) .

Surely, we do not want to say that ‘someone’, ‘everyone’ and all other quantifiers are ambiguous.

Donnellan’s suggestion: definite descriptions are neither structurally ambiguous (like ‘visiting relatives’) nor semantically ambiguous (like ‘case’, ‘bank’, ‘coach’, etc.), but are instead pragmatically ambiguous.

Homework:

Read and come prepared to discuss the following:

Donnellan, K. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. The Philosophical Review 75: 281- 304. Reprinted in: Davis, S. 1991. (ed.) : A Reader. Oxford University Press, pp. 52-64. [Multiple copies on departmental files.]

Questions to consider: 1. Is the distinction between attributive uses and referential uses of definite descriptions clearcut? Are there other uses of descriptions that don’t fall neatly into either category? 2. Is this a semantic distinction or a pragmatic distinction? How might a pragmatic account go?

Further reading for the keen and committed:

Powell, G. 2001. The referential-attributive distinction – a cognitive account. Pragmatics and Cognition 9: 69-98. [Earlier version in UCL Working Papers in 11: 101- 25. Available at: http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/publications/WPL/uclwpl11.html ]