Revisiting Russell’s Theory of Descriptions By Patrick Henning (California State University, Fullerton) Abstract: Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions played a significant role in the development of philosophy of language. However, the shift from semantics to pragmatics in the narrative of language philosophy seemed to leave Russell’s theory in the past as an important but obsolete stepping stone. There is a chance that Russell may have been dismissed too casually, and if so, the grounds on which his theory is rejected must be carefully re-evaluated. In this paper I examine two problems with Russell’s theory that extend beyond the most well-known direct criticisms. In particular, I investigate problems with Russell’s approach to egocentricity as well as his treatment of descriptions of fictional subjects. I then proceed to explore the high-level implications of these problems. Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, first presented in “On Denoting”, played a significant role in the development of philosophy of language. The shift from semantics to pragmatics (initiated in part by P. F. Strawson’s reply to Russell: “On Referring”) in the narrative of language philosophy seemed to leave Russell’s theory in the past as an important stepping stone that has since been superseded by newer theories. “Mr. Strawson on Referring”, Russell’s subsequent attempt to uphold his theory in the face of changing trends, is “seldom taken seriously, at least not as a well-reasoned and successful defense against Strawson's superior criticism” (Austin, 531). However there is a chance that Russell may have been dismissed too casually, and if so, the grounds on which his theory is rejected must be carefully re-evaluated. In this paper I will first examine two problems with Russell’s theory that extend beyond Strawson’s direct criticisms. I will then proceed to explore the implications of these problems. In order to be reasonably charitable throughout the course of criticism, our initial point of engagement with Russell will be within his own domain of logical analysis. Russell’s theory was constructed, in part, as a solution to the problem of empty denotation. There are names and other denoting phrases which seem to refer to nothing, and thus present a puzzle for language philosophers. An example of an empty denoting phrase is ‘the present King of France’, as there is currently no King of France to refer to. Empty denotation is at the root of confusion regarding how to analyze sentences such as the following: (S1): “The present King of France is wise” Since there is presently no King of France, what is the correct way to interpret this sentence? There are several potential answers. According to Alexius Meinong, if a denoting phrase is grammatically correct then there is a guaranteed referent. In the case of no real referent it is an unreal object. Russell is unsatisfied with such an answer due to his belief in the importance of a robust sense of reality which excludes nonexistent objects (“On Denoting” 885). Gottlob Frege put forth the idea that denoting phrases 49 have sense (meaning) as well as denotation (reference). An empty denoting phrase refers to the null class, and has a meaning despite its failure to refer. However Russell felt that a distinction between meaning and denotation is erroneous: if ‘the present King of France’ retains meaning in the absence of a referent, then we are inclined to say that S1 is nonsense (due to its seeming lack of truth or falsity) (“On Denoting” 878). Russell viewed S1 as a meaningful sentence, and by his reasoning, (P1): a sentence is meaningful if and only if it has a truth value. So the demonstration of the meaningfulness of S1 would require a demonstration of either truth or falsity. Russell argued that the ambiguity of sentences in the vein of S1 is due to fact that the structure of ordinary language is at odds with the structure of logical propositions. Contrary to Frege, Russell held that denoting phrases (which are not complete sentences on their own) do not in themselves have a meaning. If Russell was correct, then the correct explicit rendering of a proposition adjusts the role of the denoting phrase, yet preserves the meaning. In order to prevent S1 from being nonsensical, Russell formulated it in the following way: (S1*): “There exists one and only one x such that x is the present King of France and x is wise.” S1* serves Russell’s goal as it is both sensical and false. This mode of interpretation allows Russell to treat language which involves empty denotation as sensical without having to admit Meinongian nonexistent objects into his ontology. An important assumption that the formulation of S1* depends on is the premise that (P2): “all uniquely referring expressions entail a uniquely existential claim” (Austin, 532). Strawson takes issue with P1 (the contingence of meaning upon truth value), which can be challenged by asserting that sentences such as S1 actually have no truth value yet are meaningful nonetheless. Strawson contends that P2, and the special treatment given by Russell to empty denoting phrases, is part of an ad hoc attempt to preserve the integrity of P1 in the face of sentences like S1. Although S1* is logically compatible with P1, for Strawson the fact remains that meaning is not dependent on truth or falsity. Central to Strawson’s account of meaning (and his criticism of Russell) is the distinction between a sentence and the use of a sentence. For Strawson the meaning of a sentence is simply the rules which govern its correct usage. To illustrate the difference between a sentence and its uses we can consider several examples. First, we imagine that S1 is uttered during the reign of Louis XIV, and that Louis XIV is wise. In this case, the assertion made by the use of S1 would be true. Next, we imagine that S1 is uttered during the reign of Louis XV, and that Louis XV is not wise. Here the assertion made via the use of 50 S1 is false. Finally, we imagine that S1 is uttered in the present. Russell would say that in this situation the sentence is false. Strawson, on the other hand, would say that in this case S1 has been used vacuously and is neither true nor false. We can’t ascribe truth or falsity to a sentence or every use of a sentence; only to assertions made in particular correct uses of sentences. At this point it may appear that Strawson is the clear winner in this dialectic. However James Austin’s examination of “Mr. Strawson on Referring” presents a compelling reason why Russell may have been at least partially correct. Russell’s theory is dismissed by Strawson based on P1, but Austin suggests that Russell was not asserting P1 in the first place. Austin argues that Russell is dealing strictly with propositions, not sentences, and that Russell would not assent to P1 as it has been constructed here; he is not making a normative claim about strings of words in all possible forms and contexts. Instead of P1, Russell may have been claiming that (P1*): a sentence is meaningful when and only when it is being used to make a true or false assertion. P1* brings Russell’s theory closer to Strawson’s in terms of how truth values are assigned. Of course it is important to examine precisely how it is that Russell’s theory handles differences in truth values between uses of sentences. The Russellian account of variations in sentence use relies on the concept of egocentric particulars. Egocentric particulars are "words of which the meaning varies with the speaker and his position in time and space" (Austin, 534). The idea is that egocentric particulars allow for variations in the referent of a description. Variable reference accounts for the difference between a sentence in isolation and a sentence in use in a specific context. To show that Strawson’s criticisms are taken care of by egocentric particulars, Austin provides an adjusted version of S1 which removes the egocentricity: (S2): “The king of France in 1905 is wise”. S2 can only be used to assert one thing, thus its meaning has been fixed via the removal of egocentricity. It appears that the claim can no longer be made that Russell’s theory overlooks the difference between sentences and their use. Austin’s defense of Russell is a strong one (for now we will grant its validity) and in its wake a valid criticism of Russell will likely need to somehow demonstrate the weakness of Russell’s use of egocentricity. In “A Strawsonian Objection to Russell's Theory of Descriptions”, Murali Ramachandran presents an interesting criticism of Russell’s theory that goes beyond the territory explicitly covered by Strawson. Ramachandran’s approach circumnavigates a difficulty (related to Austin’s point) faced by the 51 Strawsonian. Strawson would insist that Russell’s theory requires sentences with multiple potential referents to be false (when they could in fact be found true based on contextual clues). The Russellian reply to this argument would be that the context of utterance will provide the missing piece of an incomplete description (regarding an egocentric particular), which seems to place the debate at an impasse. The possibility for Russell’s theory to be embellished in the aforementioned way necessitates an alternative angle of attack. Ramachandran’s goal is to find an example of an utterance that, under Russellian analysis, has a truth value even though it shouldn’t. In search of such a case, we can imagine a situation in which the sentence (S3): “The table is covered with books” is uttered.