AMBIGUOUS ARTICLES AN ESSAY ON THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS by FRANCESCO PUPA A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2008 ii © 2008 FRANCESCO PUPA All Rights Reserved iii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. David M. Rosenthal Date Chair of Examining Committee John Greenwood Date Executive Officer Michael Devitt Robert W. Fiengo David M. Rosenthal Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iv Abstract AMBIGUOUS ARTICLES AN ESSAY ON THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS by Francesco Pupa Adviser: Professor Michael Devitt What, from a semantic perspective, is the difference between singular indefinite and definite descriptions? Just over a century ago, Bertrand Russell provided a standard philosophical response. Descriptions are quantifier phrases, not referring expressions. As such, they differ with respect to the quantities they denote. Indefinite descriptions denote existential quantities; definite descriptions denote uniquely existential quantities. Now, while most philosophers were busying themselves defending and expanding upon Russell’s position, some linguists were, quietly and independently, developing a radically different response. Descriptions, some linguists held, were referring expressions, not quantifier phrases. Accordingly, descriptions differ with respect to their rules of reference. Indefinite descriptions refer to ‘novel’ items, definite descriptions to ‘familiar’ ones. Although some philosophers, most prominently Peter Strawson, would independently propose their own familiarity theories and although many linguists of a model-theoretic bent would join lock-step with the Russellians, little attempt was made to bridge the gap between these two seemingly incompatible responses. This dissertation composes the first systematic effort to bridge that gap. It provides a satisfactory answer to the above question which links the seemingly intractable divide between Russellians and familiarity v theorists. This is achieved by utilizing two key observations: Donnellan’s observation and Devitt’s observation. Keith Donnellan observed that speakers use descriptions not only as devices of quantification but also as devices of reference. Michael Devitt, following Donnellan, observed that these two uses, being regular, systematic, and cross-linguistic, have the status of convention in our language. Taken in conjunction, these two observations, I argue, require postulating that descriptions are semantically ambiguous. These observations compel the thoughtful theorist to maintain that descriptions have two distinct semantic functions, one quantificational and one referential. Working within the confines of this ambiguity thesis, I argue that, in a certain sense, all parties to the dispute were right and wrong. On the one hand, Russellians provided a correct semantic account of quantificational descriptions. On the other hand, familiarity theorists presented a general framework that provides a correct account of referential descriptions. Accordingly, the semantic contrast between singular indefinite and definite descriptions is two-fold. Descriptions can contrast either quantificationally or with respect to the speaker’s view of the audience’s familiarity with the description’s referent. Thus, by conjoining the previous responses’ successes and disposing of their failures, I propose a theory that both successfully accounts for the semantic contrast of indefinite and definite descriptions and integrates two seemingly irreconcilable approaches. vi Acknowledgements This work is essentially a collaborative effort. Over the past two years, I have enjoyed an abundance of assistance and encouragement – both intellectual and emotional. I’d like to acknowledge several folks who made this process immensely enjoyable. Working with my adviser, Michael Devitt, proved to be one the most fruitful intellectual activities of my academic career. His influence can be found on every page of this work. Robert Fiengo, Stephen Neale, and David Rosenthal read various earlier versions of the dissertation. Without their comments and criticisms, many factual (and grammatical) mistakes would have remained, many points would have stayed obscure, and many countervailing positions would have remained omitted. Gary Ostertag must have poured over my thesis a half dozen times as well as listened to me carry on about descriptions for an unspeakable amount of time. I owe him a great deal of gratitude for his invaluable suggestions, insights, and, most of all, his generous time. Over the years, conversations with Alan Berger, Saul Kripke, Rita Nolan, and Alex Orenstein have also had an enormous impact on my thought and work. In addition to faculty, I received an enormous amount of intellectual stimulation from my fellow classmates. Erika Troseth and Rachel Szekely’s incisive comments on early incarnations of the dissertation led to much needed clarifications and improvements. Walter Dean’s comments helped me to see what the nature of the articles ambiguity had to be. Countless hours spent discussing semantics with Felipe Amaral, Richard Brown, Jeremy Ginsburg, Joshua Livingston, David Pereplyotchik, and Susan Schweitzer vii provided me with much needed insights into many of the problems I was grappling with. I’m also grateful to the APA Central Division, CUNY Cognitive Science Group, CUNY/SUNY/NYU Linguistics Mini-Conference, Long Island Philosophical Society, Nassau Community College Philosophy Club, and Syracuse University Graduate Student Philosophy Colloquium for providing me with the opportunity to present various aspects of my work. Throughout this process, my family provided needed emotional and economic support. In particular, I’d like to thank my parents Josephine and Glen Mouradian, my siblings Serafina Pupa, Michael Pupa, and Jessica Mouradian, my granny Teresina Rizza, my uncle Salvatore Rizza, my aunt Margherita McGlinchey, my in-laws Rose and Robert Hernandez, my cousin Christopher McGlinchey (look, you’re in a book!), and my best friend Andrew Sbarra. And, finally, I would like to thank my wife Jennifer Pupa. Throughout this process, Jennifer provided both her editorial assistance and semantic intuitions. Moreover, her companionship made, and continues to make, any difficult day manageable. There is no possible world – near or far – in which this dissertation is completed with you. viii Table of Contents The Cast: Descriptions, Scales, Sets, and Chains 1.0 Introduction 1 1.1 What are Descriptions? 2 1.2 Horn Scales and Semantic Contrast Sets 5 1.2.1 Horn Scales 5 1.2.2 Semantic Contrast Sets 10 1.2.3 Do the Articles Constitute a Semantic Contrast Set? 11 1.3 Anaphoric Chains: The Articles Complementary Relationship 15 1.3.1 Anaphoric Chains 15 1.3.2 Descriptions as Anaphoric Chains 16 1.4 Conclusions 18 Russell’s Account: General Terms and Uniqueness Entailments 2.0 Introduction 20 2.1 The Singular/General Distinction 21 2.1.1 Singular and General Terms 21 2.1.2 The Distinctive Properties of Singular and General Terms 25 2.2 Russell’s Account of the Indefinite/Definite Contrast 31 2.2.1 Russell’s Semantics and the Indefinite/Definite Contrast 32 2.2.2 Russell’s Account and the Four Tests 39 2.3 A Modification 45 2.3.1 A Problem: Predictions and Informed Assessments 45 2.3.2 Some Solutions 47 2.4 Anaphoric Chains Revisited 51 2.4.1 A Russellian Account of Description-Based Anaphoric Chains 51 2.4.2 A Problem: ‘Elliptical’ Contradiction 54 2.4.3 A Final Issue: The Anaphoric Chain Problem 55 2.5 Conclusions 58 ix 3 Convention and Ambiguity: The Diligent Man’s Approach to the Articles 3.0 Introduction 59 3.1 Russell’s Semantics, Donnellan’s Distinction, and the Ambiguity Thesis 60 3.1.1 Donnellan’s Distinction 60 3.1.2 Donnellan’s Distinction and its Semantical Import 67 3.2 Russellian Accounts of the Referential Use of Descriptions 70 3.3 The Pragmatic Approach 71 3.3.1 Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature 71 3.3.2 Referential Uses as Generalized Conversational Implicatures 80 3.3.3 The Pragmatic Approach and Methodology 84 3.3.4 The Pragmatic Approach and Evidence 88 3.3.5 Assessing the Arguments 90 3.3.6 The Collapse of the Pragmatic Approach 102 3.3.6.1 The Pragmatic Approach and Conditionals 102 3.3.6.2 The Pragmatic Approach and Referential Uses of ‘Incomplete’ Definite Descriptions 105 3.3.6.3 The Pragmatic Approach and Convention 108 3.4 The Gödelian Approach 118 3.4.1 Referential Uses as Incomplete Gödelian Uses 118 3.4.2 Assessing the Gödelian Approach 123 3.5 Conclusions 131 4 Novelty and Familiarity: The Referential Articles and Their Character 4.0 Introduction 132 4.1 A Complication: Context-Sensitivity 133 4.1.1 English and English* 133 4.1.2 Context-Sensitivity 134 4.2 Content and Character 138 4.2.1 The Content/Character Distinction 138 4.2.2 The Articles and Character 141 4.3 Novel and Familiar Characters 142 4.3.1 FT ’s Modern Roots 143 4.3.1.1 Christophersen’s Heterogeneous FT 143 4.3.1.2 Strawson’s Homogeneous FT 148 4.3.2 Prompting, Reference, and Identification 151 4.3.3 The Referential Articles and Their Character 156 4.3.3.1 Character and Reference 157 4.3.3.1.1 A Brief Interlude: Reference and Discourse Reference 158 4.3.3.2 Character and Supposition 161 4.3.3.3 Character and Immediate Identification 162 4.3.4 The Referential Articles as a Semantic