CEU eTD Collection

Submitted to the Central European University partial in fulfillment theof The requirements for the Degree Doctorof of Supervisor: Professor Howard Robinson Central European University, Budapest Department ofPhilosophy Ş erban Popescu 2013

Theory ofNames Theory

CEU eTD Collection April 2013 Ş appropriate where acknowledgment inthe form made is ofbibliographical references. except person, another by published and/or written previously materials other any in degrees other any for accepted materials no contains dissertation the that declare hereby I erban Popescu institutions of higher education. Also, I declare that the dissertation contains no no contains dissertation the that declare I Also, education. higher of institutions

CEU eTD Collection treated are description that singles object outtheas viewed intended is communicating thesame singular thought. definite incomplete an mere of not t uses to is similar “that” bonus, and added “the” an between As connection contingency. historical the that saying by rephrased o the I that claim last The contextually to according adjusted are cluster a in present is that Descriptivism Cluster of version must Descriptivism of a believe, version I is, demands both to best proper answers that view The names. proper a of tokens on focus that is consequence second The . second a this singular of a for of conditions identity the that use consequencesis first The claim. two the are by There senses. expressed dynamic thoughts of composed singular are that name proper assert to is second The ac existent. is certain it entertains who subject the because not and features, structural its of because singular is thought a that hold to is, that thoughts, singular regarding view Cartesian importan three are There it. against adduced arguments answer successfully and descriptions, definite pre retain coherently My goal cam I eiv ms b md i odr o civ ti. h frt s o od a hold to is first The this. achieve to order in made be must believe I claims t n hs dissertation this in hose of a : any completion of the description by qualitative material material qualitative by description the of completion any name: proper a of hose a rpr ae r two are name proper a f - shall theoretical intuitions about the relationship between proper names and and names proper between relationship the about intuitions theoretical

make is that definite descriptions included in the cluster that gives that cluster the in included descriptions definite that is make

s o rsn ad eed vrin f ecitvs ta can that Descriptivism of version a defend and present to is ABSTRACT supplemented by the idea that the weights of the the of weights the that idea the by supplemented - iesoa snua trs Te li cn be can claim The terms. singular dimensional ii

thought do not entail concept entail not do thought - available information. available quainted with a with quainted - by

- CEU eTD Collection possible. gratitude go Aranyosi, and criticisms. helpful Ungureanu andCamil for discussions me toconstantly my Thanks rethink position. are Katalin and spurred Farkasrelated discussed kindly withme various topics toDescriptivism yearsover theconversations and thatreconsider made the me Iwould like tothank myprimary fo Robinson, supervisor, Howard

es to my wife, Noé, without whose support this this Noé,eswife, whose tomy without support ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii

also due to Andrei Apostol, Istvánalso due toAndrei Apostol, dissertation numerous numerous

r the advice he provided

My greatest debt of would nothave been arguments. Professor arguments. CEU eTD Collection 5.6 Non 5.5 Rigidified Descriptivi 5.4 BeliefAscriptions Modal in Contexts 5.3 NamesDesignators as Obstinate 5.2 The Actual 5.1 Dthat Descriptivism5. Rigidified 4.8 Two Countere 4.7 AVariant TheoryBe ofRichard’s of and4.6 Widescopism Belief Contexts of as4.5 Widescopism anExtension 4.4 Soames onthe BasicArgu 4.3 and4.2 Widescopism Truth Conditions 4.1 Early Formulations 4. Widescopism 3.6 Descriptive Names 3.5 The Epistemological Argument 3.4 The Semantic Argument 3.3 WhyAre 3.2 SemanticsFirst for Modal 3.1 MarcusTags as onNames 3. Kripke Incomplete2.6 Descriptions Descriptivism 2.5.4 Contextualist De2.5.3 Cluster 2.5.2 Metalinguistic Descriptivism 2.5.1 Causal Descriptivism 2.5 Types Descriptivism of 2.4 The Epistemological FoundationLogically of theCategory Names of Proper 2.3 Three Puzzles 2.2 The Theory Descriptions of 2.1 The Principles ofMathematics 2. Russell In1.5 1.4 De Re Senses 1.3 Sense and R aboutV 1.2 APuzzle Cognitive 1.1 Function and A 1. Frege Introduction An tentio Argument Free of ModalArgument Operators Free of -

M - T

odal Propositionalism nality and U erms Proper Names Rigid? Names Proper

F eference scriptivism

xamples toWidescopism xamples rgument

nsaturatedness nsaturatedness

sm and Content Identity sm andContent

-

ment against Widescopism Order Predicate LogicOrder Predicateand theModal Argument

alue

Russellian Descriptivism

CONTENTS

lief Ascription lief

iv

176 170 163 159 156 152 146 142 134 128 124 117 113 110 104 34 66 62 57 54 54 48 44 41 37 30 25 15 98 93 84 79 75 70 6 1

CEU eTD Collection Bibliography Conclusion 6.5 Are Description Definite 6.4 Understand 6.3 6.2 Definite asTwo Descriptions 6.1 Review 6. Names DefiniteDescriptions and The Same Name

ing anding Context

s Referring Expressions?

- D - ependency Dimensional Terms

v

219 218 207 200 192 188 182

CEU eTD Collection la on focusing when “” and subject the of operations mental the underscoring when “thought” use will I interchangeably. “proposition” 1 circumstan one from its change may description were A they to. individual assigned same initially the to referring keep Names rigid. are descriptions, definite use current the with associated material descriptive the satisfies name’s the than other individual an which in situation possible a describing involves argument modal the informs terms in explained be must name a of value semantic the that notion the with do to has problem first The name.” proposition problems. insurmountable be to information may by verbalized descriptions. be usesof definite identifyi with name the of tokens associate to how learn we individual, an of name the learn we When information. identifying store and collect to ability the on based is a understand information of an another bits one different reinforce where structure that a is in second organized The is information. information identifying identifying collect to ability our on based is persons firs The then. here made claims two are There clusters. to likened be may that dossiers mental in them about information identifying

Because I view language use as inheriting meaning from the subject’s mental activity, I will use “thought” and and “thought” use will I activity, mental subject’s the from meaning inheriting as use language view I Because f h nm. h pit s rdtoal prsd y aig ht ae, nie ordinary unlike names, that saying by phrased traditionally is point The name. the of As natural as they may seem, the two claims made above are beset by what many take manytake what by are beset above made claims two the seem, may they asnatural As storewe that answeris intuitive One individuals? about entertainthoughts we do How ng information concerning the name’s referent. Descriptivism claims that this this that claims Descriptivism referent. name’s the concerning information ng 1

xrse b a utrne hr te ae s sd te eatc au o the of value semantic “the used is name the where utterance an by expressed

f ecitv ietfig nomto. h sadr eape which example standard The information. identifying descriptive of d ensure the unity of the cluster. In this view, the ability to to ability the view, this In cluster. the of unity the ensure d nguage use and linguistic community. linguistic and use nguage

Let us call what a name contributes to the thought or or thought the to contributes name a what call us Let INTR t is that our ability to form thoughts about objects and objects about thoughts form to abilityour that is t O DUCTION 1

ce of of ce CEU eTD Collection 2 in work at is assumption The referent. its with associated information qualitative of identity require not does identity name that assumption the in grounded is which senses dynamic names different indisti use syntactically (though they then referent, name’s the with subjects information two different if associate senses, Fregean of interpretation an to According repertoire. conceptual th one’s that view Frege’s and senses Fregean of examination an to leads that themes Fregean of review a with opens 1 Chapter files. associat while name, same the use may subject different linguistic the to regard With two how of explanation an demands this language, the acquires subject life. the where community his in moments different at clusters different it with alt name usecan thesame subject ofexplanation demandshowthe this an subject, specific a to regard With composition. their in differ may clusters whereas referent, the regarding questions identi to lead automatically not does information incorrect including that such organized is cluster the how of account an present must Descriptivism of version ch such that hold not yet do weavailableinformation, best the accountforand it to eliminate files mental our adapt and revise commonly We life. of fact a is Error referent. name’s the from different individual m cluster a sometimes that incontrovertible properties the satisfies uniquely mentioned inthedescription. individual which on depending another, to evaluation

I will abridge throughout this thesis “definite descriptions” to “descriptions.” to “definitedescriptions” thesis will this throughout I abridge

ty of the name’s referent. The point can be rephrased by noting that a name has a stable a has name a that noting by rephrased be can point The referent. name’s the of ty My aim in this thesis is to defend a version of Descriptivism applied to proper names. names. proper to applied Descriptivism of version a defend to is thesis this in aim My is It information. identifying of clusters to appeal the from stems problem second The

anges nguishable). I will reject this reading and suggest a notion of of notion a suggest and reading this reject will I nguishable). affect 2

h iett o te aes eeet Ti etis ht any that entails This referent. name’s the of identity the oughts about an individual are sensitive to one’s one’s to sensitive are individual an about oughts 2

y nld ifrain ht etis o an to pertains that information include ay ing with it widely different mental mental different widely it with ing

hough he associates hough associates he CEU eTD Collection the operator, modal a of scope the in embedded is name the whenever requirement: compl must name a with associates subject a descriptions the that view the i.e., Widescopism, modal of assessment an the is 4 Chapter to successful. are argument answers extant whether question open an is it arguments, epistemological answe to resources enough has Descriptivism that show to try shall I descriptions and names. proper type. same the of not are tokens resulting the that entail not does cluster a in change mere notwithstanding, Appearances readjusted. be must weights and change a undergoes cluster a when happens and cluster a in grouped weight different with descriptions endowed with associated being of virtue in i.e., function, tokens name contextualist how of explanation good a provides Descriptivism Cluster that is idea core The a with supplemented Descriptivism in adjusted are weights how of understanding Cluster this of in version endorse will a I Descriptivism. dissertation of versions available of examination an chapter know and acquaintance by knowledge conceptsassociates the name, as hewith opposedto the that entail allegedly would Descriptivism because name, proper a of use a by exhibited intentionality of type the for correctly account cannot approach entit unsaturated are Descriptivist any that complaint the block can of conceptscharacter unsaturated the Stressing that view Frege’s of discussion a with chapter the up wrap will I referent. name’s the with presented when information distinct acquire may they l of cases Chapter 3 examines Kripke’s modal, semantic, and epistemological arguments. While arguments. epistemological and semantic, modal, Kripke’s examines 3 Chapter finds and Descriptions of Theory Russell’s explores 2 Chapter earning how to use a name where the participants in the learning game allow that allow game learning the in participants the where name a use to how earning I will end up this chapter with a note on similarities between incomplete incomplete between similarities on note a with chapter this up end will I

s. However, contextually However, s. eg by ledge 3

a cluster and how name tokens are identified. identified. are tokens name how and cluster a

description thinking about - available information informs what informs information available

atn. as tk u i this in up take also I wanting. wt a adtoa syntactic additional an with y ujc i tikn aot the about thinking is subject the name’s referent.the name’s the r to the semantic and semantic the to r distinction between distinction

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gis Rigidifi against the the defense o b cneta bcue ocps r rpaal entities. repeatable are concepts because conceptual be not - termsbe allowedmeaningful. are to ed Descriptivism and suggest that the most successful successful most the that suggest and Descriptivism ed of of Descriptivism. The modal argument trades on the idea idea the on trades argument modal The Descriptivism. r associated with the referent. referent. the with associated r 4

the previous findings. I will then outline a outline then will I findings. previous the

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Frege, “The Thought,” 203. Thought,” “The Frege, r

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Frege, “The Foundations of Arithmetic,” 140. Arithmetic,” of Foundations “The Frege,

A PUZZLEA COGNITIVEVALUE ABOUT tnig f ahmtc ta a apoc lk pyhlgs, hc wud ground would which psychologism, like approach an than mathematics of standing turns briefly to remarking on the status of status the on remarking to briefly turns Frege intended to propound in propound to intended Frege    “ propertiesof semantic the explains that imagesubjective a for looking to antidote The three fundamental principles:

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May, “Frege on Identity Statements,” 7. Statements,” Identity on “FregeMay, the judgment stroke 9

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Frege, “Function and Concept,” 150. Concept,” and “Function Frege, the otherthe as false. r might Star Evening the is Star Morning the that know [not] Earth the than revolution of period shorter a with planet Earth say we If app metalinguistic the of veracity the time in doubt to come would Frege unstab surely is explanation metalinguistic The resolutely still is Frege definition. this about remark one make to pause should We f determination are not part of the content of an identity statement. An utterance of of utterance An statement. identity an of content the of part not are determination f ’ The Conceptual Notation Conceptual The , the thought we express is other than in than other is express we thought the , Concept ‘ the Evening Star is a planet with a shorter a with planet a is Star Evening the

, an essay that he explicitly presents as an elucidat an as presents explicitly he that essay an , 16

that assigns objects to singular terms and concepts to to concepts and terms singular to objects assigns that semantics .

emantic theory, then? Frege says that to different names names different to that says Frege then? theory, emantic , he denies that identity of reference implies identity of identity implies reference of identity that denies he , , mrsin, r ujcie soitos among associations subjective or impressions, s, ”

expresses only the judgment that the two symbols two the that judgment the only expresses 19

the sentence the e I Frege In le. period of revolution than the than revolution of period ’ ; for somebody who does who somebody for ; ‘ egard one as true and true as one egard the Morning Star Morning the can not ’ cneta notation, conceptual s

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Frege, “On ,” 176. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege,

oe eeal, usiuig n o te w prss o te te i ay sentence any in other the for phrases two the of one substituting generally, More The Morning Star isaplanet ofrevolution a with shorter than theEarth. period The Evening Star i phrases the If be called proper a name. designation such every let brevity, For signs. other or words several of consist also designatio The article. another in further discussed be shall which relation, a or concept a not but range), widest the in taken word (the object definite a reference its as has thus which name, proper a representing designation by that context the from clear is It assumed Frege

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17

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e CEU eTD Collection radically not is conception 19 of sort This theory. designate. they what on po not possible any avoid to wanted Frege and mathematics and in formalism from different them, handle we how on depend identity fr in away embed inquiry variables of focus mathematical how the moves the analysis of metalinguistic a sense that fact the make with more have not may reason could the believe I it statements. because is view metalinguistic the abandoned 18 actually variable the that implies occurrence second the whereas quoted, be can entities linguistic only because expressions, the on constraints of theargument and theidentitysign as of variables of case co are names two the that proposition expr sentence identity the then names, proper are it flanking expressions the when that, says It it. flanking expressions the of value semantic the constrains sign identity the sentences two the that express different thoughts. comment the understand should we how and is theory semantic to respect with names proper from quote the identities. expressing sentences of class special the for approach metalinguistic the play of content the that accept identity statements not are consideration under sentences two The rehearsal. mere just than more is design object the with content conceptual be a case ofirrationality. would this cases, both in identical is expressed thought the If latter. the of truth the rejecting

‘ Heck, Jr., “Frege on Identity and Identity and Identity on “Frege Jr., Heck,  ’ indicates the argument the ’indicates

At an At have to appear might Frege

of the sort considered in the the in considered sort the of y rate, the metalinguistic analysis gives only an incomplete explanation of how of explanation incomplete an only gives analysis metalinguistic the rate, y Function and Concept and Function ?

18 variable range. The first occurrence indicates that the variable ranges over over ranges variable the that indicates occurrence first The range. variable

In the In

- place.

formula a proper name is the object designated and wanted to bring into into bring to wanted and designated object the is name proper a om numbers to numerals, i.e., it makes the meaningfulness of some signs signs some of meaningfulness the makes it i.e., numerals, to numbers om

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 sentence. He has to explain, therefore, what the new new the what therefore, explain, to has He sentence. - - simply x)(x=0 ttmns”8.Ide,Hc hnsta h esn w reason the that thinks Heck Indeed, 87. Statements,” referential. But how can we extend this analysis to the to analysis this extend we can how But referential.

makes it clear that Frege denies referentialism about referentialism denies Frege that clear it makes Conceptual Notation Conceptual ated ‘ F   21 , but the first quote from from quote first the but , restated the case against the identification of of identification the against case the restated . ‘

19

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the variable appears both as an argument an as both appears variable the two occurrences placeincompatible .

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CEU eTD Collection 22 21 20 that theobject self is subjec the statement, identity an objects. between relation a all, after is, identity So it. about speaking of way our about not object, the about assertion an make to was intent words, about that out finding in gain so we that knowledge the make would this Yet it. about designation of mode its to only sentence identity an then true, were that if in this frominferred and sentences the that fact the by challenged is names between relation a merely is identity that idea The objects. between relation a fact, in is, identity that held, previously he position in canvassed same he the that exactly arguments through on goes He names. between one or objects between relation a is whetheridentity of question the revisiting by article the beginsHe metalinguisticapproach. side of theidentity asconcept anargument and sign ofthe th But sentence, planet. a is Hesperus then reference, planet sentence the in that hold indeed, could, One ambiguity. to appeals that reply a impossible makes quantifier same the by bound are

Ibid. 175. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, 242 “Opacity,” in Kaplan, outlined as ofconsolidation method weKaplan’s apply Unless a=b

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243. ” have the same same the have 22

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Heck, Jr., “Frege on Identity and Identity and “Frege Identity on Jr., Heck, Gottl “What’sPuzzling Caplan, and Thau

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paragraph and the problem about identity discussed in the opening the in discussed identity about problem the and paragraph in which which in

- ob Frege?,” 52. Frege?,” ob Statements,” 88. Statements,” ” n es ad Reference and Sense On he did find baffling the be the baffling find did he

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Dummett, “Frege’s Distinction between Sense and Reference,” 130. Reference,” and Sense between Distinction “Frege’s Dummett, t is clear that Frege wants to infer ainfer to wants Fregeclearthat is t If 4. 3. 2. 1.

“ Hesperus whereas thelatter isnot Hesperus as sentences such of Utterances value the then utterances, two in grasped is content same of value cognitive The the of function a semantic expressions. values of constituent its is utterance an of value semantic The (Compositionality) The semanticproper ofa referent. value nameisits . ”

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Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” 176. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, Frege’s answer can be criticized by denying that a difference in sense leads to a difference in thought. One One thought. in difference a to leads sense in difference a that denying by criticized be can answer Frege’s Frege, “The Thought,” 203. Frege believed that truth is a primitive property of thoughts and criticized the the criticized and thoughts of property primitive a is truth that believed Frege 203. Thought,” “The Frege,

SENSE AND REFERENCE SENSE , “Illogical belief,” and and belief,” “Illogical , 1. names The

understanding an utterance. arises. truth False), the or True (the value truth a names sentence A sense. a expressing by reference, its designates phrase A phrases. constituent the of senses the compounding of result the is which thought, a is sentence a of sense The words. of meanings are Senses ). Prior versions were offered by Schiffer, “Naming and Knowing” and Loar, Loar, and Knowing” and “Naming Schiffer, by offered were versions Prior ). esperus and Phosphorus.” His analysis is repudiated by Yagisawa, “A Semantic Solution Solution Semantic “A Yagisawa, by repudiated is analysis His Phosphorus.” and esperus

and “Attitudes in Context”; the general idea is that the truth of belief reports depends on depends reports belief of truth the that is idea general the Context”; in “Attitudes and onal interests). Finally, Frege’s puzzle can be rejected by stating that belief is a triadic triadic a is belief that stating by rejected be can puzzle Frege’s Finally, interests). onal “

Hesperus by expressing a thought, that is that thought, a expressing by ” s approach insists that beliefs reported by using sentences containing proper names names proper containing sentences using by reported beliefs that insists approach s 28

“Being of two minds: Belief with doubt,” and and doubt,” with Belief minds: two of “Being Thought . 26

”

and

Stanley, “Context and ” Form” Logical and “Context Stanley, s

r bt tuh err ad ht hc w gap in grasp we which that and bearers truth both are

“ Phosphorus and sometimes rry “The Prince and the Phone Booth” Booth” Phone the and Prince “The rry -

referential. See also Tienson, “Hesperus and Phosphorus,” Phosphorus,” and “Hesperus Tienson, also See referential. Byn snua pooiin”. t re t ex to tries It propositions”). singular “Beyond 25

reference and ascriptions of belief,” of ascriptions and reference

” leads to a difference in thought (e.g., Richard, Richard, (e.g., thought in difference a to leads

sema ae ifrn sne, hc contain which senses, different have . 27 “

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rule that stipulates that all occurrences occurrences all that stipulates that rule and Soames, “Direct reference, reference, “Direct Soames,

“Making It A “MakingIt and

Salmon, Salmon, Crimmins, Crimmins, “Reference and and “Reference rticulated”. king Frege’s Frege’s king plain the the plain Frege’s Frege’s Talk Talk

CEU eTD Collection 36 q 35 34 knowledge.” that agreeing by if is that identical, is sentences two the of content that learnswho one respect what in clarify not does he However, (784). potential cognitive in vary sentences two the a=a to wanted Frege that suggestion the rejects He potential. logical in diverge can content 33 32 utte the of truthconditions the that proposition the with utterance the of significance cognitive the identifies and utterance, an by expressed 31 30 29 an Heck See that “judging too.” idea an were thing .”

Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” 182. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, “Belief Burge, also See 177. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, Evans, ibid. Frege, 176. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, That is, contexts where an attitude towards a proposition is reported, e.g., “ e.g., reported, is proposition a towards attitude an where contexts is, That See Perry, “Cognitive Significance,” 6. Perry also endorses a directly referential approach to the proposition proposition the to approach referential directly a endorses also Perry 6. Significance,” “Cognitive Perry, See Taschek in “Frege’s Puzzle” argues that the puzzle shows how two sentences with the same informational informational same the with sentences two how shows puzzle the that argues Puzzle” “Frege’s in Taschek

a and and = b , w , 5. 4. 3. 2. a=b The

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is attempting to refer, by refer, that thinking to isattempting b e eemns reference determines se

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d May, “Frege’s Contribution to the ,” 19: 19: Language,” of Philosophy the to Contribution “Frege’s May, d

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As Benson Mates pointed out in “Synonymity,” iterating propositional attitudes creates a problem for the idea idea the for problem a creates attitudes propositional iterating “Synonymity,” in out pointed Mates Benson As mpositionality. See for an example Putnam, Putnam, example an for See mpositionality. be should senses which in manner the about explicit not was Frege gford in his review of E.W. Beth’s “The Significs of Pasigraphic Systems,” 53. However, as Salmon Salmon as However, 53. Systems,” Pasigraphic of Significs “The Beth’s E.W. of review his in gford

urns tobethe out same Thus,he point. says, i contrast, (in es o te od wie xrsig nte sne f Henry of sense another expressing “ while word, the of sense “ words the of senses the aggregating of result planet. uttering when Henry by expressed ordinarily is that thought the is relation wi inabelief describesHenryas being report the that saying by this clarify can one then states, mental are beliefs that view the of is one If report. belief above the consider we if so, reasoned he why with reference indirect the identify to Hesperus Hesperus b

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Rieber in “Understanding Synonyms” argues, to the contrary, that a subject can can subject a that contrary, the to argues, Synonyms” “Understanding in Rieber c . ” ” ,

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are the lines connecting the vertices of a triangle to triangle a of vertices connectingthe lines the are 27

Idealism,” 442, for a formulation of the paradox. paradox. the of formulation a for 442, Idealism,” the customary sense and we can understand understand can we and sense customary the

Kit Fine’s Kit th a mental item. This mental entity a mental Thismental item. th “ Hespe icate two modes of presentation of modes two icate Semantic Relationism Semantic a

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Ibid. Ibid. 176. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, in “Sinning against Frege” comments that Frege allows for variation in the sense expressed by a a by expressed sense the in variation for allows Frege that comments Frege” against “Sinning in Burge Tyler

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the CEU eTD Collection 42 throughout especially and thesis inthe this final name the of aspects varying the of some encompassing as dynamically, analyzed be to has name the of sense the that hypothesis a as admitted least at be should it change, undergo can it that ou of parcel and part is it If sense. in difference a to leads aspect in difference every not that say to inclined therefore, am, I thing. same the of aspects are to access have subjects two the that aspects the that agreement the is names use to how one teachin about fact basic a that Note to? access has party other the which that from different grasp quite not does one Frege follow we color Should yours. from ways completely of variety a in am differ may me to Iavailable is that aspect perceptual and glasses, my wearing not am I perhaps finally, I Maybe side. left the from only Henry saying and him sense. in difference a to leads aspect in difference a that admit to willing normally be not would

Frege, “The Thought,” 208. Thought,” “The Frege, ’ ? Maybe you have frontal view of of view frontal have you Maybe ? rfrn, netie b dfeet s different by entertained referent, s Consider perceptual aspects. perceptual Consider d nt hn ta ti cneto ft or nesadn o hw ae wr. We work. names how of understanding our fits conception this that think not do I false. are all then every name. proper false as be is presented is to one referred is whatever which if in way single and a that true, are demanded all be really must it then So recognized. be must distinctness true their Nevertheless is one if say, to which thoughts samecorrespond truth their sentence in fromthe result thus different The name. a containing sentence a of sense particular a o depends withcorresponds way such everyand waysdifferent in it happen can This presented. name, proper a with Accordingly, “ He is Henry is He into thinking that most of the times when one is taught how to use a name, a use to how taught is one when times the of most that thinking into

42

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Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” 176. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, Dummett, Dummett,

Reference of a Proper Name” and “ and Name” Proper a of Reference DE RE serious criticism fr serious criticism I believe that Frege was trying to show us the sense of the name by writing the the writing by name the of sense the us show to trying was Frege that believe I born Stagira.in th of sense the as takes who will this does who Anybody sentence the to sense Great. another attach the Alexander of teacher and Plato of pupil of sense [The only read be can Frege from fragment following the that me to seems it Nonetheless, Frege roots of Russell of roots ”

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, Evans, ,

Senses”. For another criticism, see Ackerman, “Proper Names,” “Proper Ackerman, see criticism, another For Senses”. ‘ Aristotle was born in Stagira in born was Aristotle

view about the Fregean sense of a proper name. name. proper a of sense Fregean the about view 30 The ecito, hn h dsrpin tef a be can itself description the then description,

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McDowell, “On the Sense a Sense “Onthe McDowell, I am intentionally vague. One can hold two types of thesis here. One can say that senses cannot exist in the the in exist cannot senses that say can One here. thesis of types two hold can One vague. intentionally am I

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Evans, Evans, Frege’s attitude towards empty singular terms vacillated among different theoretical approaches. In the the In approaches. theoretical different among vacillated terms singular empty towards attitude Frege’s e agrees that they express a thought, but goes on to express his doubts about whether they have a truth a have they whether about doubts his express to on goes but thought, a express they that agrees e Let me mention now one reason to be concerned about this semantic category. The category. semantic this about concerned be to reason one now mention me Let have names If The de re de ’

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, 29 , senses, then empty names are meaningless, because there is is there because meaningless, are names empty then senses,

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CEU eTD Collection that ca mind the that supposition the in support natural a finds intentional is state mental every that claim the Indeed, object. intentional the t said is which that towards oriented being by is concept unsatura the experiences mind the which in way The meant. object the or object intentional the is lacks it which That something. lacking as subject the to itself shows that unsaturated, is that something apprehends mind his concepts, grasp only can subject a Because provide. can object an only that something lack essentially and manifestly They entities. unsaturated Frege, to according are, Concepts Aristotle. determines that concept uttering in express we which That intentionality. of bearers are thoughts Frege for contrast, In incorrect. obviously something say would it because intentionality, of bearer the is content semantic parts. The of parked car mysteering aboutits infront isnot building wheel. its about not is whole A them. contains it although members, its of all or some any, about not to similar is bench the on girl the types. different of plainly, but, relations, both all all The result of these observations is that t that is observations these of result The mental statesareconceptual. “ Aristotle “ to be in the left pocket left the in be to ” is a philosopher a is

or “ to head towards the cafeteria. the towards head to

”

” or or

is about Aristotle in virtue of containing an individual individual an containing of virtue in Aristotle about is “ to sit down in th in down sit to n grasp n 36 “ To be about Aristotle about be To

he theory of direct reference cannot say that that say cannot reference direct of theory he only

concepts, supplemented with the viewthe with supplemented concepts, ” o be determined by the concept, i.e., concept, the by determined be o

“ e third row of the theater the of row third e To be contained in a proposition a in contained be To ”

is similar to similar is ted character of the of character ted

“ . to look at at look to ”

A set is set A ”

CEU eTD Collection sentence. the declarative contentto a of refer to usingterm the sometimes entities, linguistic if are they 53 52 m verydifferent thatisa of way but occurs; it which in sentence the ofmeaning the to contributes word the that is true “This is What isolation. in word view: have ‘must earlier word the a That rejects co mistaken. he be to Descriptions, out of turned Theory language understanding his reliable discovered a Russell only but after master,” published our “not is grammar that stating 51 words by indicated entities the contains it words: contain itself literally a parts proposition. of be make the propositional concerns the on difference placed second restrictions The concepts. also but objects, only not includes terms Frege in denote sentence the In subject. logical of position the on occur never can concepts that believed Frege with, begin To Russell. of those functions from terms topropositions. Russell are first in exposed theory The philosopher of opinions current the than logic correct a to nearer much us brings to me have must sentence a in occurring Mathematics quantified including phrases, all 2.1

Ibid., 43 Ibid., Ibid., 47. Russell vacillates throughout throughout vacillates Russell 47. Ibid., urse, not being gibberish, but one which has an intelligible use intelligible an has which one but gibberish, being not urse, Russell,

THE PRINCIPLES PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS THE This minimal set minimal This to assigns that theory semantic a propose to attempted originally Russell - The Principles of Mathematics of Principles The 44.

(henceforth, (henceforth, ’ s theory an object and not the concept the not and object an theory s ’ nm fr niiul, e hy hns r concepts or things they be individuals, for name s atter.” (page X) (page atter.”

PoM - up enables us to note a few differences between Frege between differences few a note to us enables up PoM

assumes the existence of terms and propositio and terms of existence the assumes

CHAPTER 2 ) is based on the methodological assumptions that assumptions onthemethodological ) isbased

“ PoM some [A] propo [A] , 42. Russell goes on to qualify the reliance on the surface form by by form surface the on reliance the qualify to on goes Russell 42. , “ ones

The concept concept The

between use and mention, sometimes speaking of propositions as as propositions of speaking sometimes mention, and use between

meaning Te hoy e kthd n the in sketched he theory The . sition, happens linguistic, unlessit does be to not 37 -

– up. Russell allows that ordinary objects can can objects ordinary that allows Russell up.

” RUSSELL

horse and that and ud. n h Itouto t te 2 the to Introduction the In guide. –

is not always true if taken as applying to the the to applying as taken if true always not is s concept a is horse “ on the whole, grammar seems to seems grammar whole, the on

. . For Russell, the category of of category the Russell, For . ” 53

some In contrast, Frege allowed Frege contrast, In , ”

meaning’ meaning’ the first three words words three first the . 52 nal functions. The The functions. nal

h scn are second The rnils of Principles ’ – “ s views s

every w h wr, of word, the nd

edition, s

and . ord ord ” 51

CEU eTD Collection (Frege metres high.” 4000 morethan 54 beach the on walking was girl every that proposition the yield to term this to applied be then would concept the value semantic beach. the walkingon phrase the instance for Take purpor phrases the what explain not does values semantic of assignment naïve the which for phrases of class a is there that noticed quickly Russell phrases. quantified of shal we Now chapter. last the of part final the in intentionalityofunderstanding this criticized already individual the because intentiona terms. over only range can functions propositional Russellian hand, other the On concepts. order conce of hierarchy a for allows concepts of understanding Fregean A propositions. propositional value as output and (terms) Russellian individuals arguments as False. take functions the or True the are values whose functions are concepts propositional Russellian with concepts Fregean identify to imprecise be value would it Finally, cognitive content. representational same in the assigned differences are that sentences for between account not does letters) predicate for concepts and for (objects content representational of explanation naïve a that noting by senses of notion the at arrives Frege way. certain a in being as world the representor depict to attempts declara of category thoughts compose to senses only

Thus, for Russell, but not for Frege, Mont Blanc itself is part of the proposition expressed by “Mont Blanc is is Blanc “Mont by expressed proposition the of part is itself Blanc Mont Frege, for not but Russell, for Thus, )

.

Russell views the assignment of a proposition to an utterance as a clarification of the of clarification a as utterance an to proposition a of assignment the views Russell l see that the same assumption leads to a difficulty in developing a semantic account semantic a developing in difficulty a to leads assumption same the that see l However, it is clear that a subject who utters the above sentence does not mean to to mean not does sentence above the utters who subject a that clear is it However, faue o te utteran the of features l tive sentences. Propositions are primarily what is said (stated) when one when (stated) said is what primarily are Propositions sentences. tive

”

himself In PoM, every girl every

, “ Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, Correspondence, Mathematical and Philosophical is literally a constituent of the proposition expressed proposition the of constituent a literally is Russell was of the view that the phrase should be assigned asassigned be should phrase the that view the of was Russell vr girl every . e A ce. 54

usl sek o pooiin i cneto wt the with connection in propositions of speaks Russell (the propositional fu propositional (the

s o te sentence the of use ”

as occurring in the utterance utterance the in occurring as 38

pts. Indeed, quantifiers are second are quantifiers Indeed, pts. nction “ mt Henry met I x

was walking on the beach the on walking was 169.) ucin. Fregean functions. ” “

Every girl was was girl Every is about Henry Henry about is

t to designate. designate. to t .

I have have I names -

CEU eTD Collection ( ofcollectively.” instead “severally 56 55 ofwhich individuals. furtherdenotescombination a abo is Henry met I that proposition the which in way same the in situation particular a in encountered have to report quantified a of phrase disjunction denotes of conjunction form the of sentence a in general, In Jones marry will she that or Brown marry will Smith Miss either that saying to equivalent is sentence last the of Jones or Brown combi typeof This individuals. two the of Smith Miss of two sentence the In values. semantic their of denotation the investigating The containingindividuals. intentionalutterances d features of “ phrases such called Russell girls. all concept the about anything assert denotingconcepts

Russell, Russel An utterance of the sentence sentence the of utterance An Russell house drunkenand a wife. a theshadowylogic of limbo the streets, livesin but walkthe “ say IIfconcept. the with peculiarway a in term connected a about concept,but the concept A tik ta, n snec o te om “Every form the of sentence a in that, thinks l I met a man, a met I The Principles of Mathematics of Principles The thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank a and tailor a with man actual an concept, a not thing, ’ F slto ws o sin o ah eoig ocp a eti cmiain of combination certain a concept denoting each to assign to was solution s

in the sentence the in s taken collectively, whereas in a sentence of the form the of sentence a in whereas collectively, taken s denotes ’ . s suitors s ” ”

, the the ,

the proposition is not about not propositionis the , when, if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not not is proposition the proposition, a in occurs it if when, , t er. ahr te rpsto cnan te concept the contains proposition the Rather, Henry. ut expression expression , ”

The Principles of Mathematics of Principles The the denoting complex complex denoting the 55 “

Miss Smith will marry Brown or Jones or Brown marry will Smith Miss ev , 53. , ery girl ery “ denotes a disjunctive combination of Brown and Jones. and Brown of combination disjunctive a denotes I met some man some met I

“ eoig phrases denoting “ nation is different from that denoted by the concept concept bythe denoted that fromdifferent is nation F All s , but rather wants to say something that applies to applies that something say to wants rather but , . 56 39

F a man a

are s F

is Brown and Jones and Brown : this is a concept which does not does which concept a is this : ” G , 58 , G

”, the expression “every “every expression the ”, is not about the specific person that I that person specific the about not is , ” -

” 59.)

the quantified phrase denotes a a denotes phrase quantified the n te ocps hy express they concepts the and - enoting phrases are clarified by enoting phrases are clarified by

books. What I met was metwas I What books. - account or a public a or account

“ denotes a combination a denotes “ Brown and Jones are Jones and Brown . Some Some ”

Since an utterance an Since F about ” denotes all all denotes ” F s are s oe man some -

G , ”

the F s , CEU eTD Collection different.” wouldbeen have words these uttering by meant I “what means simply different” been have would myproposition of purport “The man”. 58 57 usingof man. a met I 2008, 31, December uttering fact in am I that assume us let about, speak to mean I event specific the isolate to Finally, sentence. the uttering of point the to up met I that men to variable the of range saying Aristotle that out pointing byactualthe an of utterance said is what than different entirely something stated have would he world, actual the of that sentence the utteredsomebody had different. been have would proposition my of purport the exist, to going been or existed not had exist s the makes but propositions, singular by expressed proposition the two a in analyzed be to Russell that noting worth is It world. the historyof the in exist will or existed has that man each for on so and Brown met

Ibid., 62 Ibid., It should be obvious that Russell employs here the term “proposition term the here employs Russell that obvious be should It “ One can protest against this way of understanding utterances of quantified phrases by phrases quantified of utterances understanding of way this against protest can One of utterance an by conveyed is What combinat man which in human proposition every of to relevant procession always is whole ages the the throughout beings on: so and Brown, denoting actually and Smith different.… been have proposit my of purport the exist, to going been or existed not had exist concrete of will or existed class ever who manany if assertion: my in a involved is race human whole of one some that merely is asserted is What proposition. the in asserted not is happened which event concrete the Thus I met a man. a met I “

” a man a 58

occurs, and what is denoted is essentially not each separate man, but a kind of kind a but man, separate each not essentiallyis denoted is what and occurs, If we read we If , ion of all men. ”

the absence of an individual that I was acquainted with is irrelevant to what irrelevantto is Iacquaintedwith was that individual an ofabsence the

”

But this is a worry which can be easily be can which worry a is this But “ - dimensional semantic framework. Russell does not merely say that say merely not does Russell framework. semantic dimensional the purport of a proposition a of purport the ’ asne s f ite mot o ht wud ie o xrs by express to like would I what to import little of is absence s ’ same sentence s point can be interpreted a interpreted be can point s

57

[ “

S mt man a met I ] m man ome ”

Now i Now “ I met a man a Imet tronger claim that claim tronger t is simply not so clear any longer that, in this sense sense this in that, longer any clear so not simply is t

ut o b rgre a atal de actually as regarded be not must .

” “

40 I met some man some met I s qiaet t hs ol t a ijnto of disjunction a to world this at equivalent is

”

at a world whose domain is not identical to identical not is domain whose world a at ”

as what the proposition is about, then about, is proposition the what as s saying that quantified phrases have have phrases quantified that saying s “ if any man who ever existed or will will or existed ever who man any if ” to speak about the sentence “I met a a met “I sentence the about speak to ”

vns ok lc. The place. took events ”

is that either I met Smith or I or Smith met I either that is addressed by restricting the restricting by addressed ion would ion noting some “ On On CEU eTD Collection that can be re proposi the to description In a by entity. made contribution complete the contrast, a always is expressed proposition the to name a of contribution The symbols. incomplete of is from logical deep, their but names, resemble superficially They then the analogy disappears. withnames expressed, proposition the to thing specific one any contribute not do descriptions If names. s the in explained be to has phrases denoting of meaning the that denies he if this, accomplish can he that realized soon Russell phrases. denoting of analysis restrained ontologically more and unitary a for look to reasons semantic of assignment by clarified always not is aboutness one in accept to difficult are concepts, 2.2 had initially reported. of one met I 2008, 31, December answer to inclined be could I met, ever had I men only the were they that told was Iput was If different. entirelybeen have would represent to attempted have would I that facts relevant the else, somebody met I had that, such is convey man uttering in that say to intuitive rather now appear would It namely,Smith. and Jones, Henry, men, three met only have and existence secluded rather a live I fact, of matter a me leads that amnesia severe of conditions in made sentence above the of utterance an Consider said. is

THE THEORY THEORY THE ”

I am saying that I met either Henry or Jones or Smith. Smith. or Jones or Henry either met I that saying am I Definite descriptions cannot be assigned any value prior to being used being to prior value any assigned be cannot descriptions Definite denoting the of complexity the reflects structure whose individuals, of Combinations - to forgetting the name of each man I was introduced to. Suppose further that, as that, further Suppose to. introduced wasI man each of name the forgetting to assembled, along differentassembled, into withother ingredients, propositions. OF DESCRIPTIONS

you , m mne i wih e con fr h cnet of content the for account we which in manner ame ” ’ s . Moreover, Russell Moreover, ontology. s

without feeling that I was doing violence that what I what that violence doing was I that feeling without

41

in front of my acquaintances, and acquaintances,and my of front in values. We have, therefore, good therefore, have, We values. The information The tion expressed resembles bits bits resembles expressed tion ’ s proposal implies that implies proposal s

in a sentence. a in that I want to to want I that

“ “ a met I So on on So CEU eTD Collection 59 notes Kripke As descriptions. definite like supplemented indefinite descriptions, withthe uniqueness condition. an least at is there include not will expressed proposition In th define to order in specified is individual the unless individual, particular one any include not do They all. at anything about not are descriptions definite containing utterances that implies symbols proposition the to condition uniqueness a contributes it that fact the from but name, a like functions description com particular in somebody about speak we that feeling The form the to not similar notwithstanding, of utterance an definition, the to According or in contemporary symbolism, defined the contextually. definition14.01in Thus, utter an in plays it role the defining by explained

Whitehead and Russell, Russell, and Whitehead eiie ecitos r t b dfnd lo otxuly bt hi cnrbto t the to contribution their but contextually, also defined be to are descriptions definite Russell did not see his theory as one that provides an answer only to the semantics of semantics the to only answer an provides that one as theory his see not did Russell [( (14.01) [( Russell ɿ x)( uiuns cniin a in as condition, uniqueness e  x)] . x)] ’ s idea was, thus, that the semantic contribution of a can be of description a definite contribution that thesemantic s idea thus, was, ɿ x)(

 F xrse. Russell expressed. ( 

ɿ which is also is which x)] . x)] Principia Mathematica Principia x)(  x) = ( x)  ( ɿ

x)(

“  Henry sleeps Henry  x)[ x)[ x) .= :( x) G  . In Russell In . 60 x & ( & x ’ s decision to treat quantified phrases as incomplete incomplete as phrases quantified treat to decision s

,

h uiuns conditions. uniqueness the his is a philosophical attempt to analyze all denoting all analyze to attempt philosophical a is his , Vol.1, 184. Vol.1, ,   b): “ Henry y)( , 42 ”

but to but  x . = . x ance where it is used. Descriptions are to be be to are Descriptions used. is it where ance ’ y s theory, definite descriptions are analyzed are descriptions definite theory, s Principia Mathematica  ’

wife s x

x=y)&

“ . x=b : . x=b At least one man walks on the street the on walks man one least At ”

“ or   The The b x] s o fo te at ht the that fact the from not es “

y wife my

F “

An An is

G F , ” 59

” , uttered by Paul. Paul. by uttered ,

is

s appearances is, G ”

en that means . ”

CEU eTD Collection two with time same the at [the combines that as symbolized be quantifier would Democrat” a a is President U.S. as current “The sentence The i.e., sentence. a form quantifier, to formulae binary a as determiner a view to is [the as symbolized will be Democrat” a is President U.S. current “The sentence the Thus, quantifier. restricted a yielding and applied is it “a”) or “the”, “some”, “all”, (e.g., determiner the view to is first The phrases. quantified contain which language, natural a in sentences of the expressing for available suggestions two Mathematica unique a is there in developed theory the applying when Mathematica Descriptions, of Theory the of recommendations semantic 61 60 “ by introduced quantifiers, two the be of can which distinction deciding by the clarified Formally, her. love men all that such woman one least at is there m each for that either mean compose to structure different propositions. one than more in positioned be can fragment same the that reason to fragments, other with along fit, be can which part a to . scope exhibit they universal utterance, quantifier tothe while including phrases, every man

Kripke, “Ru Kripke, olwn Sehn Neale Stephen Following x ] (current U.S. President U.S. (current ] b. a. sentence the Consider that is symbols incomplete are phrases denoting that fact the of consequence direct A

, and does not have to be endorsed endorsed be to have not does and , ( ( ” to natural languages. The semantic proposal is that a sentence of the form “The “The form the of sentence a that is proposal semantic The languages. natural to ssell’s Notion of Scope,” 1007. Scope,” of Notion ssell’s   , y)( x) ( x) takes wide scope wide takes F

 that is also also is that  x) ((Mx & ((Mx Lxy)& Wyx) y) &((Mx Wy) “

all

x : current U.S. President President U.S. : current

F ( x Descriptions, Descriptions, ”

: member of the Democratic Party member Democratic : ofthe

G an there is at least a woman such that the man loves her or that or her loves man the that such woman a least at is there an or or . The syntactic proposal is couched using the formal language of of language formal the using couched is proposal syntactic The .

“ At least one woman is loved by every man. every by loved is woman one least At with regard “ If the contribution made by a denoting phrase can be likened likened be can phrase denoting a by made contribution the If some 

Lxy) 38

F - 47), it is customary to distinguish between the syntactic and and syntactic the between distinguish to customary is it 47), ” necessarily by a champion of the semantic proposal. There are There proposal. semantic the of champion a by necessarily

.

61 “

x to the other quantifier:to the some some ] (member of the Democratic Party Party ofthe Democratic (member ]

s gnrl principle, general a As 43

F ”

contributesexi an x ).

produce a proposition, it stands to stands it proposition, a produce

as restricting the formula to which to formula the restricting as

“ t es a woman a least at stential one. “ All x ” ). The second pr second The ).

The sentence can can sentence The F ” F

otiue a contributes is G

” is true iff iff true is ” Principia Principia Principia Principia ” oposal oposal

and and

CEU eTD Collection suc thought a informative find could one how explain to order referents,in to addition in entities, semantic of level second a provided Frege otiose. reference and sense o inquiry as either King the model can we then terms, singular not are descriptions if But, novel. historical he given actually toknowwhetherisScott, theauthor Scott thatisindeed wished of Scott this of author the was Scott whether know to wished IV George although Yet, value. truth preserving while terms, singular other with substituted terms. singular attit propositional are descriptions definite the idea the of review briefly from 2.3 r

as saying that

THREE PUZZLES THREE h itrrtto o definite of interpretation the Note that treating descriptions like incomplete symbols makes the distinction between distinction the makes symbols incomplete like descriptions treating that Note to) Scott. of author sole the Regarding identical Scott to s a is there whether know to wished IV George Russell the puzzles puzzles the crafted

u e re de his Theory of Descriptions Descriptions of Theory his

. ports. If definite descriptions are singular terms, then they can be be can they then terms, singular are descriptions definite If ports.

and assess whether they point unequivocally towards the rejection rejection the towards unequivocally point they whether assess ecitos s iglr terms. singular as descriptions Waverley 44 , George IV wished to know if he is (identical is he if know to wished IV George ,

Waverley in order in ole author of author ole , we would be reluctant to say th say to reluctant be would we , to solve to h first The Waverley In the following, I will will I following, the In three puzzles that arise that puzzles three puzzle puzzle h as that the author the that as h

such that he is he that such etis to pertains ’ at s CEU eTD Collection 63 are there men. if know to wants one that mean not does it men, honest are there if know to wants one If valid. not is x S the derivation 985), Centenary,” of author uni a is there if know to wished IV George that is consequences its of one then correct, is analysis Russell’s 62 circumstance ofevaluation. how of explanation an tender designates it that is term singular a of hallmark the that referent.itsoneHowever, is name a ofvalue semantic term. singular a being for condition Second, fir the from obtained is substituting second the though even information, different transmit conveyed. information the alter to seems names Saul Jennifer as First, stringent. too not is requirement this if debatable is it Yet context. any in substituted be can term the that fact the is term resorting tosenses of

which is wishes to know if there is at least an an least at is there if know to wishes Saul, “Substitution and Simple Sentences,” 102. Sentences,” Simple and “Substitution Saul, Kripke remarked that this is not so clear (“Russell’s Notion of Scope,” 1023.) His argument is that, if if that, is argument His 1023.) Scope,” of Notion (“Russell’s clear so not is this that remarked Kripke Waverley

noted ClarkphoneKent Kent booth,andClark came went the into out. Clarkphone came Kent booth,andSuperman went the out. into Russell one can simply deny that substitution substitution that deny simply can one F Waverley

,

“

hr ae ae o dcaaie etne, hr sbttto o co of substitution where sentences, declarative of cases are there Superman s ct. u the But Scott. is ’ s example s . However, as Kaplan replies on Russell’s behalf (“Reading ‘’ on Its Its on Denoting’ ‘On (“Reading behalf Russell’s on replies Kaplan as However, . . 62

”

with constitutes

“ a name a Clark Kent e dicto de x

which is both both is which a puzzle if one necessary condition for being a singular singular a being for condition necessary one if puzzle a

or a description a or usl ws f hs view this of was Russell

nepeain lrfe te King the clarifies interpretation

” :

F 45

and and

63 salva veritate salva av veritate salva

Thus, the following two utterances seem to seem utterances two following the Thus, G , therefore , can

can track the same individual in any in individual same the track can always the same individual same the always reject S

with other co other with wishes to know if there is at least an an least at is there if know to wishes n l cnet i a is contexts all in

this this

since he thought that the the that thought he since requirement

’ s curiosity without without curiosity s - referential terms referential , - say instead

referential , necessary

and then and t by st que CEU eTD Collection non why ask can we then available, readings scope both have descriptions denoting If true.) clearly something “The now states who (one incorrect obviously is that because “The form the 65 64 indeed,Russell, makeswhen assumption, stating this type the of sentences in available reading scope narrow the only that assume we unless universality, its in restored not is or as meaning that be clarifiedas either meaning that sentence the that view the held He ambiguous. scope be is either Thus, France. of King the mentioning mean also not will bald not are which things all or bald are which things all enumerating have that things the listed one if words, other In that type the of proposition singular a “ to middle excluded The King of France is bald is France of King The

Secondary occurrence, in Russell’s terminology. Russell’s in occurrence, Secondary This also raises the qu the raises also This F ”

or middle the lawexcluded doesuniversal have of not ambit. We should, first, note that, even even that, note first, should, We It(narrow scope)bald.King true not France is thattherewho isalso of isaunique (wide Kingbald scope)Thereisnot France isaunique who of can descriptions that idea the to appealing by problem this solve to intended Russell of law the of application an by caused is Russell troubled that puzzle second The F

is not is

G. sentences containing definite descriptions on the subject position. Either position. subject the on descriptions definite containing sentences

estion of how of estion ” Russell cannot claim that in such cases only the narrow scope reading is available, available, is reading scope narrow the only cases such in that claim cannot Russell ” ”

is true or true is denoting

“ The The a “

F if is

The King of France is not bald not is France of King The descriptions should be treated when occurring in sentences of of sentences in occurring when treated be should descriptions

is not is this analysis is correct, the middle excluded of law the correct, is analysis this F

each is grounded in the fact that fact the in grounded is 46

G of the above se above the of , ”

F current US president is not a Republican” asserts asserts Republican” a not is president US current

where the descriptio the where , one would also mention mention also would one , “ The King of Franc of King The ntences is not of the form the of not is ntences

.

” a

is true. But truth for truth But true. is n is non is n

has the has e is not bald not is e a

- However, . property denoting ” 64

can can

. “ F 65 is a - .

CEU eTD Collection 66 trueofan individual. they that account the on merely option syntactical this refused be should descriptions denoting that assert cannot we that seems it Then unique no is there suppose now But object. an for stand they as inasmuch meaning have (thinking) saying bewill counted as the sentence bald not Franceis ass be will be can term singular a that meaningful idea the entertain not could (Russell false are occur terms fr in as allow, we as long

Russell, “On Denoting,” 490. “OnDenoting,” Russell, Russell The Kingof France isbald. It trueFrance not he is that:the Kingbald of isnot issuch that: as terms, singular are descriptions that idea the with consistent is proposal this But them in occurrence. but true, are propositions France of King France “ [T] essed as false and the narrow scope reading of the description in description the of reading scope narrow the and false as essed

e ig f rne s o bald not is France of King he in the absence of its referent its of absence the in “ ” The King FranceThe of bald isnot

’ is primary, and true if it is secondary. Thus all propositions in which in propositions all Thus secondary. is it if true and primary, is s third puzzle is a replay of the Platonic riddle concerning the possibility of of possibility the concerning riddle Platonic the of replay a is puzzle third s

” 66 about that which does not exist. If descriptions are like names, then they then names, like are descriptions If exist. not does which that about true and notequivalent to and true

will be true. This true. be will

”

a a rmr ocrec ae as; h dnas f such of denials the false; are occurrence primary a has

ee logic, that atomic declarative sentences in which non which in sentences declarative atomic that logic, ee

also “ ”

)

allows for the description to be given wide scope in scope wide given be to description the for allows The

.

is false if the occurrence of of occurrence the if false is Then the sentence the Then “

” h Kn o France of King the

47 with the consequence that its deniwith the consequence thatits F

does not exist not does

, “ ” The King of France is bald is France of King The

” because this would deny the the deny would this because

a a secondary a has .

“ the King of of King the

“ happen not to be be to not happen al “ The King of of King The the

- denoting denoting F ” .

CEU eTD Collection one that impression not say anything stating when that would he that follow should it hallucination, the the during If name a introduce exist. to wished not subject does which object an hallucinate easily can one that aware was Russell their Since individuals. import semantic tag to is play can names proper logically that function semantic NAMES PROPER 2.4 I claim that this inwhat follows. shallturn a of value semantic implicitthe that idea the to appeal an is however, show, do they What terms. singular are descriptions definite that former sentence non a contains it because false, is sentence latter the that read we if happen is which thing sole a is there that true not is it that assert to simply is exist from derives descriptions own phrase the for exist to has which something of existence

THE example is On the one hand, he could hold that such scenarios indicate that one can one that indicate scenarios such that hold could he hand, one the On The name. proper logically a is term singular a of paradigm Russellian The of None that assume to reason no is there However, “

The The EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE CATEGORY OF LOGICALLY OF CATEGORY THE OF FOUNDATION EPISTEMOLOGICAL nothing is nothing F

“ does not exist not does is true, because it is the denial of a falsehood. of because thedenial itis is true, the above above the is exhausted by their referents, their by exhausted is The difference of

entertains a thought a entertains F

or being or the fact that they stand for something. To say that the that say To something. for stand they that fact the three puzzles provides a knockdown argument argument knockdown a provides puzzles three ”

as the denial of the sentence the of denial the as F

n is a is A is

and

F property which more than one thing has. As before, if before, As has. thing one than more which property , yet fail to fail yet , founda. Russell himselfinfront choice. of B

does not exist does not 48 singular term term singular

there are no are there do so do ” . On the other hand, he hand, other the On . “ , when t he the - consists in its referent its in consists empty genuine names. However, However, names. genuine empty denoting singular term, and the the and term, singular denoting “

The The F ” meaningfulness meaningfulness

A to have meaning (Russell meaning have to F

and

exists, B

do notdiffer). ” against

then we can say say can we then F , and this this and ,

be under the the under be could f definite of

F and it is to is it and

the thesis the

does not does claim claim

only can can ’ s

CEU eTD Collection mind. own one’s of wrong thecontents about canbe one acceptingthat and objects 67 so do knowingly a entertain do I that ente cannot I that and all at anything saying Russell thedemonstrative, use of mynormallyassigned to be can that object an of data sense no is there Since you. deceive to want I because object, make can I anything. experiencing not am I that aware perfectly position the in be may I world. the about think ordinarily we how reflect not does claim this Yet object. single a of appearance the entertaining is he name the of existence the deny meaningfully can one where scenario a imagine always could one names proper logically fact that ther that believes speaker the that English, of command his on based infer, may hearer The world. one in element an out single to is demonstrative the of function able be to English to names proper logically that concluded that thought the entertains he deny,effect, such as theaboveinvolve that genuine scenarios in propernames. to names of range the restrict should we that

n otat cneprr Rselas il ae h ohr ak alwn nms o ee t common to refer to names allowing tack, other the take will Russellians contemporary contrast, In refer to them to refer e is one red object in his vicinity, but he would not be able to comprehend the utterance utterance the comprehend to able be not would he but vicinity, his in object red one is e that ’ s referent. Ordinary proper names are abbreviated descriptions.s referent. namesare Ordinaryabbreviated proper According to the present analysis, a subject can utter a meaningful a utter can subject a analysis, present the to According that believing in mistaken be not could subject a that conviction Cartesian his Given

o understand to is red. The consequence of Russell of consequence The red. is Russellian Russellian . One can suggest here that I engage in a kind of activity similar to yearning to similar activity of kind a in engage I that here suggest can One . ( ‘ this

false ’ logically proper names proper logically

n lne wa i cmuiae by communicated is what longer any or or

thought, namely thought, ‘ that , because Russell believed that, believed Russell because

’ , used to indicate , are the closest counterparts in counterparts closest the are data, sense indicate to used , n

is F must refer must , while there is no such thought available, Russell Russell available, thought such no is there while , ,

rtain any thought whatsoever. Yet, it seems to me me to seems it Yet, whatsoever. thought any rtain ’ that the object that I am looking at is red is at looking am I that object the that s move is that ordinary proper names are not in in not are names proper ordinary that is move s ) 49 . Note, however, that another party would not would party another that however, Note, .

expressions expressions to sense data, because one could one because data, sense ’ s theory would imply that Iam not that would imply s theory to say to ht r gaate to guaranteed are that for each ordi each for “ ht s red is That ’ s private experience of the the of experience private s “ That is red is That

67 eiv ta I e a red a see I that believe

nary proper name, name, proper nary “ , that ”

ie ta the that given , ” , ”

while I am am I while onl

never fail never refer refer y when when y , and I and , - sense sense and and CEU eTD Collection co The here. indirectness no is There parts. its of one grasping by object an about thinking am I “ predicate the of content The predicates. for only but reference, direct of form a assume does explanation above The alone. form logical their by but referents, of class special a by guaranteed not is co generally be to me to seems conception Fregean a that the in said I exist. objects no where intentionality allows that thoughts of account Cartesian a is needed is What exist. to guaranteed are that objects identify to seeking mi is analysis his that and wanted Russell as neatly as descriptions from separated are actually they what from different like a logically Russellian name. proper anything is there that thesis the undermines appearances current against go which thoughts entertaining of possibility The thinking. of level basic most the at even noticed be can mind Y sensation. current the causing object the about hypothesizes subject level, complex more a at appear only can It level. primitive this at possible subject red thinking In intake. this of result a as formed be may that thought the and one) to the where thoughts saying indeceiving.false,point be there should somethingtrue no or or story a in ncept unifies the mind andncept the world. unifies themind ” , ”

objects, then in thinking about a universal that is singly exemplified in my environment, my in exemplified singly is that universal a about thinking in then objects,

one does not contribute contribute not does one The ava The Russell thinks, thinks, writing fiction, but this would overlook the fact that, where there is no point of of point no is there where that, fact the overlook would this but fiction, writing “ ’ red s empiricist leanings are evident in his instinct to look for a category of of category a for look to instinct his in evident are leanings empiricist s ilability of thoughts that arise as a result of pretending that appearances are appearances that pretending of result a as arise that thoughts of ilability i.e., ” re is no distinction between the experiential intake (how the world appears world the (how intake experiential the between distinction no is re

is simply the simply is h cnet f i togt i hw h wrd em t b. ro i not is Error be. to seems world the how is thought, his of content the anything aside from from aside anything

universal that is assigned to the predicate. If universals are are universals If predicate. the to assigned is that universal also

shows that indexicals or demonstratives cannot be be cannot demonstratives or indexicals that shows 50

ht is what rrect: the aboutness of our thoughts thoughts our of aboutness the rrect: already

experienced. What What experienced. et the autonomy of the the of autonomy the et previous chapter chapter previous e.g., when the the when staken in staken “ That is That the the CEU eTD Collection 71 70 69 68 sensed but onlyto the statesman himself,toour access have not do we because yet, and, Bismarck concerning thought singular a entertain to essay might we example, For denotation. the identifies singly that complex qualitative a but are we constituent of denotatio the contain not does proposition The concepts. acquainted with: type other sentence the contain a only by can description expressed definite a proposition embedding the descriptions, definite of referents purported tha objects with acquainted be cannot we Because name. proper that logically a features one like proceed cannot description definite a containing statement a understanding fordescriptive thoughts: blocks building the providing in foundational are acquaintance by known be can that impli generallybe will it and property; certain a having more, no and object, one is there that know when occurs description by knowledge s are knowledge such presentation constitutes which itself. object the of aware directly a through. and through epistemological s knowledge of a thing with which with thing a of knowledge s

Ibid., 254. Ibid., 252 Ibid., Ibid. 249. Description,” and Acquaintance by “Knowledge Russell, ed that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance. by object same the of knowledge have not do we that ed

ic Rsel eivd ht e ant ae iet ces o bet, t olw that follows it objects, to access direct have cannot we that believed Russell Since of analysis the composed wholly of constituents with which weare acquainted. in principle containingthis:descriptionsis epistemological fundamental The Russell

’ dsicin ewe lgcly rpr ae ad uniid hae is phrases quantified and names proper logically between distinction s

ne aa uiesl, n, osby one possibly, and, universals, data, ense

” . 69

” Among the entities Russell considered as being objects of objects being as considered Russell entities the Among 68 Every proposition which we can understandmustpropositionEverywhichcan be we

“ It is It Let us define with Russell knowledge by acquaintance by knowledge Russell with define us Let I have a have I “ e nw ht t is it that know we “ the converse of the relation of object and subject and object of relation the of converse the 51 direct cognitive relat cognitive direct

ata of him, we will always grasp descriptive a always will ofhim,we ata

‘ the 71

’ so on ef I contrast, In self. own s ion to… ion - and propositions n of the description, the of n - so, , i.e. , ’ ”

70 i.e.,

, The entities The

when I am am I when

hn we when t are the are t CEU eTD Collection grammar. of misunderstanding a by caused mirage yet, And semantic collapse. a not exactly should is knowledge denotation of types two the between distinction the if of clarification of thekindof attempt made the description todesignate expansion Russellian the by expressed thought descriptive the kno and acquaintance by knowledge between distinction sayto something like would we that is answer obvious The description? by knowledge of example an as it count as instances such with along acquaintance, words ( acquaintance by so know can are you that which concepts components are expressed propositional the because everything comprehend would you firs which “ so (i description by knowledge and it) seeing have can one that say objects, ordinary of acquaintance tha Russell, contra admits, one If object. an to routes epistemic description knowledgeby acquaintanceand singularwould we thought the describes that thought a is instead, know, do we What constituents. its knowing of sense the in diplomat, astute an was Bismarck that thought singular the know not do We thought. There is a unique a is There - and ) - . so). This means that denotation has to be construed as a as construed be to has denotation that means This me Let Extricated

o, h wouldn why Now, t - order predicate logic would have him say these words, then, according to Russell, Russell, to according then, words, these say him have would logic predicate order

review review from other Russellian assumptions, t assumptions, Russellian other from F

about who is also is who a more troublesome feature of the analysis at this stage. If one told you told If one stage. this at analysis the of feature troublesome more a o te ae object, same the of , like tograsp.

the object that the description denotes. It is essential in securing a in Itessential descriptionis denotes.the that object the ’ t this e.g., G

be simply another example of what can be known by by known be can what of example another simply be , ”

by looking at them, then it is not contradictory at all to to all at contradictory not is it then them, at looking by and by this made this by and

n virtue of being told by someone that the object is object the that someone by told being of virtue n “ can be seen as implying asseen be can

This is red is This 52 both knowledge by acquaintance (in virtue of of virtue (in acquaintance by knowledge both

” he distinction distinction he

it or or wledge by description that one take one that description by wledge

clear that he speaks in the way in in way the in speaks he that clear “ genuine property of descriptions, descriptions, of property genuine That is heavy is That t we can have knowledge by knowledge have can we t r ocie i Russell in conceive, or ’ the existence of existence the s denotation. between knowledge by by knowledge between “ The ” ? Why should we we should Why ? F

is

G different different ”

as a a as ’ s CEU eTD Collection n then introduced, is name a when to referred is nothing if that, and acquaintance neo as holding, while phrases, quantified f distinct his Thus, Russell an Before name? proper a of meaning the out spell that descriptions typeof the is what question: the to leads naturally description and knowledgeacquaintance. by unique mean would the that thought Ifthe that expansion. Russellian the in for because property, genuine a ack be cannot denoting Yet, denoting. Russell of level about the thought at cashed a be can essayed aboutness of one kind say, This Bismarck. when, have would one that thoughts of kind the are thoughts descriptive that out pointing by difference this justify to wants Russell knowledge. of type bedifferenta to it wants Russell and acquaintanceby knowledge of case adescription e we an that is thought understand descriptive a in included is that anything then be, to it wants Russell as located which could regardingwe There nopart is by dissolved are descriptions Definite same. Russell the stays utterance an in it using by said whether descriptions: of property inert an is Denotation nowledging that there is something at the grammatical level which cannot be accounted accounted be cannot which level grammatical the at something is there that nowledging . ’ ’ Russell foundational is acquaintance by knowledge If following. the from stems trouble The ” F aayi it sub into analysis s s

o hs hoy f ecitos Oe a edre h ve ta dsrpin are descriptions that view the endorse can One Descriptions. of Theory his rom

eatc n eitmlgcl rnils a be can principles epistemological and semantic thesis that ordinary proper names abbreviate definite descriptions is conceptually is descriptions definite abbreviate names proper ordinary that thesis hc is which ’ s comment that ordinary proper names abbreviate one or more descriptions descriptions more or one abbreviate names proper ordinary that comment s ntity that one is acquainted with. But that would make knowledge by by knowledge make would that But with. acquainted is one that ntity G te tee s o udmna dfeec bten k between difference fundamental no is there then , lzn etn ases n h nx scin I hud tes that stress should I section, next the in answers extant alyzing - rpstoa cmoet ta ae ennls o ter own. their on meaningless are that components propositional - Russellians do, that ordinary objects are objects of of objects are objects ordinary that do, Russellians say say

53 “

This is where thedescription is This F

is a description denotes or not, what is what not, or denotes description a G

ietnld from disentangled is just the thought that there is a is there that thoughtthe just is ’ s analysis only as as only analysis s ’ s contribution is nowledge by by nowledge n another. one othing is othing

CEU eTD Collection 72 w contact perceptual on either relies that network a via another, to subject one name the with interaction causal is there where answer of explained been 2.5.1 2.5 the possibility might thatobjects bepropositional object between distinction name the of absence the in available th idea the rejecting while constituents, propositional be can presentation of modes that accept can one that saw We propositions. existential or general from different are propositions Russell Lastly, phrases. quantified as represented be to ultimately are descriptions that confidence their way any in impacting this without data, sense on based contemporary Most epistemologicalbias. position. name the with associated descriptions of ordina that and terms singular as act descriptions definite incorrectcertainbecause is Descriptions Theoryof the hold that to is reaction,which possible second a available makes also distinction this Yet name. the embedding sentence a by said

See Neale, Neale, See

TYPES OF TYPES

Causal DescriptivismCausal The Russell Similarly,

builds on the idea that the introduction of a name usually takes place in a setting a in place takes usually name a of introduction the that idea the on builds Descriptions, proposal literally contain objects is not crucial for maintaining that singular propositions propositions singular that maintaining for crucial not is objects contain literally yet DESCRIPTIVISM which descriptions a subject associates with a given name. The first type first The name. given a with associates subject a descriptions which

which has been sketched until now is merely a framework, for it has not has it for framework, a merely is now until sketched been has which

48.

’ - aayi o dfnt dsrpin ms b sprtd rm his from separated be must descriptions definite of analysis s dependent propositions and object and propositions dependent

’

s referent. Such a position still operates with a a with operates still position a Such referent. s Russellians have lost faith in a theory of knowledge knowledge oftheory a in faith lost have Russellians ’ rfrn. hs hss il ru fr h latter the for argue will thesis This referent. s 54

’ s referent. The name is then is name The referent. s components ry proper names abbreviate a mass mass a abbreviate names proper ry - . 72 denies it yet ones, independent

’ s insistence that singular that insistence s at they would be be would they at

passed on from on passed ith the referent the ith CEU eTD Collection one only is there that assume indeed, 76 can, One so. be speaker. useper private word,not one and a use shared of public, should this why clear not is it However, c background. being as Descriptivism of version any address to led is and (81) internalism with Descriptivism conflates he because is so does he reason the believe I Descriptivism. 75 74 (10). isdetermined name ofa thewhich referent way the in of explanation an as only view the endorses Descriptivism” “Causal Kroon’s instance, For reservations. further hold not do theory the with associated papers Other Paradox.” “Putnam’s Lewis, and Anchored,” 73 problem this notes Raatikainen name or one passing from asubject name a introducing as practices such understand to unable be would we category, this of absence of brand by required is knowledge environment.their in objects to referability their to impede of type rich philosophically a with operate do speakers that argue Sterelny and Devitt knowledge. conceptual of amount thatthepossessiveassumption contributes asubject of name a of definition notes Raatikainen As shared. meaning linguistic the how fathom to difficult it make would proposal n form this Call of of meaning the that testimonies of form the in it, about information indirect or

Devitt and Sterelny, Sterelny, Devitt and 82. Descriptivism,” “Against Causal Raatikainen, is given by the description description the by given is t a b wort be may It See for instance Jackson “Reference and Description Revisited,” Pettit, “Descriptivism, Rigidified and and Rigidified “Descriptivism, Pettit, Revisited,” Description and “Reference Jackson instance for See “ n

is However, Descriptivism Causal of meaning the that stating as presented also be could theory the that think might One F Descriptivism ”

en oehn dfeet rm n ohr s other any from different something mean ntn ta Raiann isl aaye ol ti subject this only analyzes himself Raatikainen that noting h Descriptivism Langu asl Descriptivism Causal ’ n

s meaning an indexical ( indexical an meaning s

is that of the description the of that is

age and Reality and age operates with an ordinary notion of causality and argue that, in the in that, argue and causality of notion ordinary an with operates asl Descriptivism Causal

74

has been criticized on the score of supposing a rather unlikely rather a supposing of score the on criticized been has , because this version of version this because , “ “ h ett ta cue m cret s of use current my caused that entity the Causal Descript

too, but then goes on to state incorrectly that that incorrectly state to on goes then but too, , 61. ,

to another.

ant ov te rbe o epy names. empty of problem the solve cannot Causal Descriptivism Causal “ 55 my ouched in terms that do not presuppose an externalist externalist an presuppose not do that terms in ouched

“ ivism.

Oe can One . the entity that caused the current use of use current the caused that entity the

current use of use current - index

”

Causal Descriptivism Causal . 75 ubject . 76

73

hold that the main tenet of this this of tenet main the that hold

Yet it is not obvious whyobviousexpert not is it Yet For a name name a For n ’

s similar utterance, on the the on utterance, similar s ” and that this lack does not not does lack this that and ), it makes one makes it ), - centered version of Causal Causal of version centered n, of a name can be be can name a of n

” the theory states theory the . However, this this However, .

builds into the into builds

it true without without true it ’ o usually not s utterance s Causal n ” .

CEU eTD Collection phrases. denoting analysisof Russell’s of contextual purport 78 77 interactionnot enter intoany ( causalwith it someth name did I there, dog a is there if that that, think still should I in apartment. pet one be might there that believe to led been or it, about heard dog, a such seen say simply can I Yet it. with causally involved being their of virtue in world the target thoughts prominent t say not would we horse, name the being as cause any just accept look not would we yet name, a introducing of events including ha event Every name. the of referent the is drug the of piece particular that that say not would We substance. hallucinogenic a ingesting of result a as introduced was name the “ dictionary definition the in rejected implicitly is interaction Causal word. the of use current the caused thing a that use not do simply We terms. empty of usage ordinary reflect not does Me in indulges it because not is names empty of problem why reason The included. Russell in denote to have descriptions definite that need perceived the with descriptions definite for referents postulate of usage present Descriptivism Pegasus

Raatikainen, “Against Causal Descriptivism,” 82. Descriptivism,” “Against Causal Raatikainen, ht s vn oe nxlcbe Raiann oe ti pit s el bt os o se t apeit the appreciate to seem not does but well, as point this notes Raatikainen inexplicable, more even is What “ Look ’ asl Descriptivism Causal of use our of source causal initial the discovered one if even that, is point related A aayi de nt postulate not does analysis s ’ , ” s referent. s , I shall name the dog in the apartment next to mine to next apartment the in dog the name shall I ,

o be abandoned forfact. a mere we would not consider revising our use of the word. Suppose one discovers that discovers one Suppose word. the of use our revising consider not would we

“ seems to postulate odd referents for such expressions (e.g., the cause the (e.g., expressions such for referents odd postulate to seems ‘ Pegasus

Similarly, if one jokingly introduced the name the introduced jokingly one if Similarly,

“ the the mythol “ ’ asl Descriptivism Causal ) l ti tm w soe f that of spoke we time this All ”

. s n tep t fuse to attempt an is 77 ogical

f ore n Rsela bad of brand Russellian no course, Of

winged horse fathered by Poseidon with Medusawinged fathered horse by Poseidon any .

78 I add will

referent for a quantified phrase, descriptions descriptions phrase, quantified a for referent 56 Indeed, part of Russell of part Indeed,

os o poie sud ouin o the to solution sound a provide not does more inthefinal onthis chapter.) Descriptivism inongian ontology, but because it it because but ontology, inongian ay horse. lazy ‘ Spotty “ ’

Pegasus

s theory was to do away do to was theory s order to be meaningful. be to order ih h ie ta our that idea the with , “ ’ ” Descriptivism Pegasus

without having ever having without ”

The myth is too too is myth The ” ing, even if I did did I if even ing,

for a very slow slow very a for ”

as implying as s a cause, a s

a to has

of my of . ”

CEU eTD Collection 80 79 improperthe descriptionof Usesname. a meaningconventionalof qualifier referential the terms, his in contain, Terms Singular theory Bach on here implic philosophical carries name a with associated description the for value semantic as count to is what of choice the While improper. is name a with associated description the that hold to has Bach while reference, determine not does sense that accept “ in Bach Kent by endorsed that to similar is view resulting the Katz Jerold description the of sense the with identified Descriptivism associated description: metalinguistic Philosophy n name the of meaning the giving description the that is proposal second A 2.5.2 Descriptivism ”

Katz, “Names without Bearers.” without “Names Katz, Russell, Te da ma idea The .

Metalinguistic Descriptivism . ” A precursor of precursor A version two yields description this of value semantic the Clarifying name. described being is named, being of instead individual, named [I]

Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy Mathematical to Introduction f 79 “ . 80 ct i Sr Walter Sir is Scott , when he countenances the proposal that a name can be used to abbreviate the abbreviate to used be can name a that proposal the countenances he when ,

I dsrpin ae loe t hv sne, hn h maig f nm is name a of meaning the then senses, have to allowed are descriptions If . ’ If, on the other hand, descriptions are analyzed contextually à la Russell, then Russell, la à contextually analyzed are descriptions hand, other the on If, ‘

vrin of version s i Walter, Sir , Distilled ”

e a asn apaac i Russell in appearance passing a kes where

Bach .

” Loar ’

” Because a name regularly has more than one bearer, Katz has t has Katz bearer, one than more has regularly name a Because

’

hn h nms r big sd s descriptions: as used being are names the then eaigitc Descriptivism Metalinguistic s view s

”

argues ely means really

can be found in found be can

that every description associated with a name must must name a with associated description every that ,174. “ the bearer of of bearer the “ 57 h pro named person the

“ en te err of bearer the being Brian Loar Brian n

’

. s s h pro hvn that having person the as named ”

This is the version endorsed by by endorsed version the is This nrdcin o Mathematical to Introduction ‘ ’ Scott s article s “ “ “ the bearerof the What h nmnl description nominal the ’

s h person the is n ations, I shall focus focus shall I ations, , ’ ” “ i a name a in s n

The Semantics of Semantics The of

i.e., which gives the the gives which is Metalinguistic “

the bearer of bearer the the n ”

are, then, are,then, ”

and o CEU eTD Collection 81 about Think country names. new a some to of moving somebody records distorted keep bureaucrats that plausible seems name of act the with began that intuit the given especially unlikely, seems boy birth phonetically or orthographically corrupted, easily be can ambiguous. name. the with associates subject description name each with associate to able be one that only requires English of Command name. pre a not is predicate available contextually the of knowledge However, descriptions. proper yield to enriched pragmatically are descriptions “ impr the is name a of meaning conventional The use. and meaning between communicate of theform a that proposition the bearer of of bearer the that meaning “ contextually, available predicate a by enriched be to is description incomplete the of use Loar in Both this. than more communicate to wishes clearly speaker oak. ofmade refere to assimilated the bearer of of the bearer there. over table the

Boër, “Proper Names as Predicates,” 390 and Kroon, “Causal Descriptivism,” ft.12. Descriptivism,” “Causal Kroon, and 390 Names “Proper Predicates,” as Boër, ’ s name in the hospital the in name s “ Henrik Metalinguistic Descriptivism Metalinguistic of Advocates “ “ ” the bearer of of bearer the Henry ”

n While the conventional meaning is that there is a unique table made of oak, the the oak,table of made unique a thereis is that the conventionalmeaning While

, by his Norwegian mother, but a distracted nurse could have transcribed the the transcribed have could nurse distracted a but mother, Norwegian his by ”

while any of its uses is suitably enriched in the manner in which incomplete which incomplete mannerin enriched inthe issuitably itsuses any of while ” ntial uses of incomplete descriptions, such as such descriptions, incomplete of uses ntial

” means means

Similarly, although a use of the sentence the of use a although Similarly, eaigitc Descriptivism Metalinguistic ’ n s records as records s . “ ” n the bearer of

It does not require one to know the sundry predicates that the that predicates sundry the know to one require not does It s , sbet h wud utt would who subject a F, is

- According to According iig efre b Henry by performed giving

runs into two obstacles. The first problem is that names that is problem first The obstacles. two into runs and seeing his name mangled in various names by by names various in mangled name his seeing and “ Henry. ion that she intended to partake in the causal chain chain causal the in partake to intended she that ion ‘ Henry. 58 ”

Metalinguistic Descriptivism Metalinguistic Did the nurse give Henry a new name? This name? new a Henry give nurse the Did ’ - ” c

ondition for grasping the meaning of a a of meaning the grasping for ondition

prt, hrfr, ih distinction a with therefore, operate, n . 81

who is

Henry could have been named at named been have could Henry er it would probably wish to to wish probably would it er ’ mte. oe eeal, it generally, More mother. s “ n G “

is the table the

is ’ s and Bach and s F F ”

.

has the conventional the has

” oper description description oper , names are not are names , in “ ’ s views, s The table is is table The n e.g., e.g.,

the the the CEU eTD Collection 83 82 quelling all doubts is it but baseless, is charge the that insist to quick been description defendedwhile beingforegonean or account manner, asthought. ofcommunication inthis Descriptivism deprives it that drawn neatly so be to has use and signs of set a as language between separation the that shows only bo healthy a is Henry that proposition (singular) same the communicate nurse the and mother which sentence, the uttering which sentence, is the previous usesente example,thatthemother and thenurse in means, that and description different a with associated is individuated, syntactically name, with speak to acceptable is it thinks or hurry, a in is or language, the of command proper a have not does one because servants. public incompetent

Devitt, “Brian Loar on Singular Terms.” Singular on Loar “Brian Devitt, 8. Distilled,” “Descriptivism Bach, F y, but the linguistic meanings attached to the sentences they utter differ. However, this this However, differ. utter they sentences the to attached meanings linguistic the but y, , ”

which ae we name, name.… bei as property same refers the not is he name a bearingwhom however, fact, to man the to refers he well, as, given is answer if that objects then He any using avoid must “ names proper of theory a that Kripke insists rightly to He objection. vulnerable not is view metalinguistic [T]he of version any by faced problem second The B notion of reference in a way that is ultimatelyeliminate is to impossible waythat a in referenceof notion ach “

the bearer of of bearer the is a uniqueness proposition, the proposition communicated the proposition proposition, is auniqueness replies to these concerns by distinguishing among distinguishing by concerns these to replies I my ide, ok o n a a yri vcoy that victory Pyrrhic a as one to look indeed, may, It .

Although it is certainly more convenient to refer to people by their own their by people to refer to convenient more certainly is it Although

is a singular proposition, and the thought in the mind of the speaker the of mind the in thought the and proposition, singular a is could . Thus,Bach state

Metalinguistic Descriptivism Metalinguistic ee t te ised y hi mtra grandmother maternal their by instead them to refer

n one ”

“ has a circular aircirculara has

we ask to who does [a speaker] refer by refer speaker] [a does who to ask we

s n neia thought indexical an is ’ instance for phonetically, corrupted be can names Similarly,

muh full. mouth s

s that

. 59 eaigitc Descriptivism Metalinguistic 83

Advocates of this type of type this of Advocates

Metalinguistic of much of the initi the of much of regarding debatable whether they succeeded in in succeeded they whether debatable ’ well s nces havingnces different meanings.

the meaning of a sentence sentence a of meaning the ng referred to be to referred ng h name the - nw circularity known ‘

Socrates Descriptivism ”

(1980, 70). In 70). (1980,

Descriptivism by an the utterance of ”

’ (1980, 16).(1980, al nm or name s Descriptivism

’

’ referent. s entails that each each that entails impetus of early of impetus , … the … , that

is that the that is

can be be can 82

upon

have The

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Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description,” 253. Description,” and Acquaintance by “Knowledge Russell, ft. † 176, Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, when Wittgenstein makes a stronger case in favor of favor in case stronger a makes Wittgenstein are descriptions the which for reason the that saying by point same the make can We not of spite in entity, same the being acquainted with the entity to question. in apply all descriptions various the that knows friend friend the in actuallydescription a into come man a will of characteristics whichappearance chance of matter a much very course, of is, [i]t Russell , ”

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This is not the only charge brought against the Theory of Descriptions. Donnellan argued that Russell had not not had Russell that argued Donnellan Descriptions. of Theory the against brought charge only is not the This Strawson, “On Referring,” 332. “OnReferring,” Strawson,

INCOMPLETE DESCRIPTIONS INCOMPLETE

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“ On Referring On ”

were to mean that there is a unique table which is which table unique a is there that mean to were 70 ifiers?”). Burge in “Reference and Proper Names” also also Names” Proper and “Reference in Burge ifiers?”).

ss f h sentence the of uses , ” n ru ht they that argue and

one can utter can one n on Referring”). In some respects, respects, some In Referring”). on n n ” (see ” ed out, if a use of the of use a if out, ed “ stances where it is easy to easy is it where stances “ different descriptions descriptions different h tbe s covered is table The The table is covered is table The

Boër, “Proper Names “Proper Boër, exhibit a similar similar a exhibit e Theory of of Theory e n .” However, However, .” the CEU eTD Collection 105 104 with books. whichis covered table unique isa there that not true thatit is subject the although opaque, equally be would circumstance, similar a in made 285 Russell,” propo uniqueness or singular a either state to taken be not could one because grounds, pragmatic on unintelligible is utterance the that thinks Bach criticism. 103 quantification locatein t correctly thetable to means the lacked he if even description, incomplete the use to able be still would he that Ibelieve table. the identify demonstratively can he that state to unwilling is he hallucinations, f the to due yet, and, located, is he room the in moved was table a that learns one that Suppose table. relevant the demonstratively identify to able is one that supposing without sentence above the utter can one that me to seems it However, table. spatia identifying to amounts indexical the of value the determining where books, with of utterance An say could we reply, t of variation one On information. of mass identifying an for ellipsis an as used false sentence. other any of that be should meaningfulness Its intelligible. although false, was said was what “ surround our about true something state meaningful. tabl either. table salientcontextually particular any have not does one common is that it if knowledge even it, utters who one understand should we then books, with covered Quite so, indeed so, Quite

See Stanley and Szabó, “On Quantifier Domain Restriction”. Domain Quantifier “On Szabó, and Stanley See 200. “Presupposing,” Sellars, Ramachan A simple way to fix the problem is to say that the context can restrict the domain of domain the restrict can context the that say to is problem the fix to way simple A O ne obvious reply to Strawson to reply obvious ne - dran, “A Strawsonian Objection.” See Bach “Ramachandran vs. Russell” for a reply to this line of of line this to reply a for Russell” vs. “Ramachandran Bach See Objection.” Strawsonian “A dran, 286), this is insufficient. An utterance of “It is not the case that the table is covered with books”, books”, with covered is table the that case the not is “It of utterance An insufficient. is this 286), ( “ . 105

Which table do you have in mind? in have you do table Which “

The table is covered with books with covered is table The . ” h dsrpin te, ik ot h ol tbe rm h contextually the from table only the out picks then, description, The ) Yet, according to the truth conditions assigned by a Russellian analysis, Russellian a by assigned conditions truth the to according Yet, )

with Sellars that the ellipsis contains a contextually a contains ellipsis the that Sellars with

he room.

103

Nonetheless,

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CEU eTD Collection 109 demonstratives. as complex descriptions 108 107 Descriptions.” Definite and Reference 106 sentence the although that, realizes one if though, force, its loses point be propos singular the communicate would Jones, about then true, were completes a context the which in way same the in description, the by denoted object the only context provides the that data this from infers Wettstein ones. available other the over description Objects saying of utterance an description propositions singular Wettstein available one propositions for single theutterance But utterance. ambiguous. itselfisnot many are there that entire conclude should we said, is what in difference a trigger contexts the different in those or room, entire the in objects the or at, is Henry that room the of part the in objects the by determined partially be to context says Henry If yiel denotation. may intended contexts different that however, note, should We domain. relevant Refere Semantic and Reference “Speaker’s Kripke, Saul Salmon, “ Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions.” Descriptions.” Definite Incomplete Assertionand “ Salmon, 245. Descriptions,” Definite and Reference “Demonstrative Wettstein, true at a world where there are no murderers, but murderers, no are there where world a at true Donnellan, “Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again,” 204, Howard K. Wettstein, “Demonstrative “Demonstrative Wettstein, K. Howard 204, Again,” Together Dumpty Humpty “Putting Donnellan, One rewo a essentially is argument above The “

h tbe n om 215 Room in table The s itn at sitting is ’ s arguments that incomplete definite descriptions are used referentially to express to referentially used are descriptions definite incomplete that arguments s “

possible possible use of ause of demonstrative the table the the sentence “The murderer is insane is murderer “The sentence the “ The table is covered with books. with covered is table The

reply to this argument is to hold with with hold to is argument this to reply ” . t 106

1 and each of the of each and . ”

hr ae ay itnt as n hc oe ol cmlt the complete could one which in ways distinct many are There oevr te ujc hmef ol nt e be o hoe one choose to able be not would himself subject the Moreover,

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. or or 108 “

“ m would amount to different propositions expressed by expressed propositions different to amount would m h tbe s oee wt books with covered is table The T he table at which the author of of author the which at table he 72

nce,” 6 nce,” ” kn o Kih Donnellan Keith of rking 107

ition that Jones is insane, is Jones that ition ,”

where One can complete the description, by description, the complete can One -

7 and 22 is also inclined to treat incomplete incomplete treat to inclined also is 22 and 7 where Salmon that Salmon

Jones is deranged is Jones the description description the apartment, and so on. Since Since on. so and apartment, ,

if , ” h Pritne of Persistence The

the above above the “ one can take the the take can one The murderer is is murderer The ’ ad Howard and s is used used is . which 109 d the same same the d

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’ s CEU eTD Collection 113 112 271. Descriptions,” Definite on“Wettstein Blackburn, Debate: Wettstein/Salmon “The Reimer, also 111 See Fallacy”). Pragmatic ano for overview Resolution” Critiqueand (“The assertion content speaker’s semantic about the conclusions inferring from namely fallacy, pragmatic a committing for Wettstein criticizes 110 various obtained thus are propositions different. the that is incorrect is think I What utterance. the comprehending as count can template the contextual a in plugging by obtained proposition Bu in correct partially Schiffer producecompletion of a speaker a that such description isincomplete,toapropositional issimilar templateof or theform blueprint expressed. was proposition one Second, description. the of completions possible the by determined propositions of class vague a only but expressed, proposition single no is there used, is description incomplete an when ways two in bullet the bite can counterfactual imagined circumstances by Salmon insane,

Bach, “You Don’t Say?” and Neale, “This, That, and the and Other.” “This,That, Neale, and Say?” “You Bach, Don’t ofInc the Problem “Has Ostertag, and Buchanan Schiffer, “Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (But not the Ones You Expect),” Expect),” You Ones the not (But Dilemmas Some Reports: Belief and Indexicals, “Descriptions, Schiffer, etti, Te eatc infcne f h Referential the of Significance Semantic “The Wettstein, ” eas I eiv ta itnig o ee i awy determin always is refer to intending that believe I Because [the Wettstein Facing -

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an utterance of the above sentence if he knows that he has to to has he that knows he if sentence above the of utterance an f the debate, sympathetic to Wettstein’s claims. Wettstein’s sympatheticto debate, f the defenders of Russell of defenders ompleteness Rested on a Mistake.” a on Rested ompleteness ’ s explanation. What I think is correct is that any that is correct is think I What explanation. s .

73 I

o hn, oee, that however, think, do ly . 110 appropriate appropriate

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CEU eTD Collection philosophers. 114 have found objectionable: would himself Frege that anything implying without tenet, Descriptivist the stating of way Russell that prejudge to reason no see I However, Russell. la à away analyzed be to are descriptions Frege to vital seem that distinctions of host a that Russell fact with synonymous being as interpreted the to due mainly is opposition of sort this that me to seems It Evans. and McDowell, Dummett, as such philosophers from attack sustained away definitionsprovidedcontextual in viathe are descriptions, definite and names proper ordinary as such terms, singular inapplicable. Russell In terms. singular are names proper logically only that held Russell terms. singular are descriptions definite and understood be cannot They referents. their for tags mere are names proper Genuine descriptions. definite truncated with endowed thedisagreementsmind philosophers separate the two that descriptions 3.1

See Bach, “Comparing Frege and Russell,” for a more detailed analysis of the differences between the two two the between differences the of analysis detailed more a for Russell,” and Frege “Comparing Bach, See

MARCUS ONNAMES TAGS AS MARCUS ’ peiul mnind ht h ie ta Fee s Des a is Frege that idea the that mentioned previously I names proper ordinary that maintained Russell and Frege Both s theory defau isthe

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CHAPTER 3 . This general thesis should be accepted while bearing in bearing while accepted be should thesis general This .

’ dsicin ewe sne n rfrne is reference and sense between distinction s 75 ’ s bran s ’ Principia Mathematica

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KRIPKE d of d . Descriptivism 114 alue: its referent its alue:

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I speak about about speak I escription which are intensionally equivalent iff the sentence the iff equivalent intensionally are Descriptivism “ content of an utterance an of content 76 ) expressed by the same utterance. same the by expressed ) assigns oin of notion

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. or ~ or 115 assigns to each to assigns xpressed by an an by xpressed

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is - , CEU eTD Collection 119 118 117 116 phrases affect only can which in way the inquiry evaluate we world once twonames followsthatthe it necessarilytrue. is it then true, is names two between statement aMarcus name and referent. was its singul equatable strongly not is It tags. simply It meaning. no has name, proper tag. to is purpose only whose number assigned randomly a to likened be may hand, other the on name, A description. the in mentioned properties the exemplifying object description. referent. the label to only speaksa more theoretical of bias intension an with names endowing that argued Marcus Barcan Ruth names? proper of case extension and intension between distinction

Ibid., 307. Ibid., 310. Ibid., 309. Languages,” Intensional and “Modalities Marcus, 138. Marcus,” ofRuth B. Paper the on “Discussion Marcus, it is it ar descriptions of the thing…the of descriptions ar eas te ny eatc ucin f nm i to is name a of function semantic only the Because Names, sake di a as immediately one strikes name proper a by named intension unnecessarily. entities proliferate does and unnecessary accord must, name) (or term Every Carnap, to According established that the that established

” of of 117 symmetry.

Marcus A description conveys information and can denote only insofar as there is is there as insofar only denote can and information conveys description A next next

insisted, are mere tags. Their function, unlike that of descriptions, is descriptions, of that unlike function, Their tags. mere are insisted, that denote in virtue of an object an of virtue in denote that 116 h tuh f h iett sentence identity the of truth the

the “ To give a thing a proper name is different from giving a unique a giving from different is name proper a thing a give To actually

actual two names label the same object, same the label names two then, then, , rather ” 118 in effect each course of events events of course tag the same object. object. same the tag

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Marcus, “ Marcus, Names.” and Kripke, “Marcus, Burgess, and Reference” “Revisionismabout Soames, ofReference.” Theory New theofthe Origin and Kripke, “Marcus, Smith, al and epistemic arguments, epistemic and al m from Burgess ’ ’ ’ (18) (18) Venus and if (17) Venus notit is an empirical fact that Marcus that fact the on mainly focus replies The talk colloquium the attended Kripke that fact the of made been has Much s. Similarly, when Marcuss. Similarly, states that when

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erenced in connection with this reply are descriptions rigidified by the operator the by rigidified descriptions are reply this with connection in erenced ferent ingredient senses. Because Stanley takes the assertoric content of content assertoric the takes Stanley Because senses. ingredient ferent This is not to say that denying premise 5 amounts to denying premise 2. Unlike a supporter of Rigidified of supporter a Unlike 2. premise denying to amounts 5 premise denying that say to not is This

WHY ARE PROPERWHY RIGID? NAMES The modal argument is based on the idea that names, unlike ordinary definite definite ordinary unlike names, that idea the on based is argument modal The notwithstanding, appearances again that, argue and 4 premise reject can one Finally, Anoth formidable a is argument modal the Although Descriptivists Descriptivists Descriptivism usage and call this version of version this call and usage shing between names and descriptions. As Kripke himself acknowledges, there acknowledges, himself Kripke As descriptions. and names between shing er way to counter the modal argument is to deny premise 5. Drawing on the the on Drawing 5. premise deny to is argument modal the counter to way er

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CEU eTD Collection 132 131 130 nicknamed a provide ju is introduction whose names of category familiar Nicknames name. the of features descriptive apparently other any supersedes as such rules whatarbitrariness they standfor. by Michael The isendorsed Pendlebury thesis who states underst be cannot which marks arbitrary completely are descriptiona and at function rules aworldobjective of linguistic is facts. is, world the how of basis the d names, to opposition In to. refers name the what determining t is referent its tag name the makes that convention The worlds. different object are names rigid, jure then, the source rigidity names? of specific toproper that is description the example, alway which descriptions are

Pendlebury, “Why Proper Names are Rigid Designators?,” 520. NamesDesignators?,” Rigid are “WhyProper Pendlebury, Ibid. Kripke,

and .

” ae ae eatcly ntutrd n ht hi smnis s ie b decree by fixed is semantics their that in unstructured semantically are Names world) actual the perspective of language in users, might well as have been so assigned) denotation its (i.e., bearer its been has which termsingular a but nothing is all, after name, proper A namely rigid, are names why explaining of way possible one to leads This between distinction the introducing by difference the clarify to attempts Kripke 131 de facto de Naming and and Naming

Names are rigid since they are expressly introduced to track the same object across object thesame totrack aresince introduced expressly theyare Names rigid “ both linguistic conventions that associate predicate words with properties and and properties with words predicate associate that conventions linguistic both Shorty “ This object shall be named named be shall object This

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Ibid., 530. Ibid., “Aristotle”. uttering by Aristotle to not refer did Greeks Ancient its translation. Actually, , ”

Pendlebury that argues man that situation in as itdenotes in the actual world. ‘ situati the arbitrary is it no all, After world. actual the above [the counterfactu of antecedent the by specified situation the in denotation determinate that clear quite me to seems it has it then denotation, determinate a has name a if that, this from infers Pendlebury I ” Churchill

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Ibid., 535. Ibid., 533. Ibid., The details of Pendlebury’s analysis are also unclear. Thus, he endorses an anaphoric account, according to to according account, anaphoric an endorses he Thus, unclear. also are analysis Pendlebury’s of details The “ Well, you mean the same syntactically defined name, defined syntactically same the mean you Well, ’ ’ A different way to account for the rigidity of names is to say that rigidity is a a is rigidity that say to is names of rigidity the for account to way different A names of analysis resulting The Pendlebury that insisted one If way. this in sentences interpret not do we that me to clear seems It

s parentss bestowing upon him the name the him upon bestowing ” S 136

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CEU eTD Collection 140 Cons “Semantical 139 138 to refers name the that is answer to respect remains still question the However, worlds. all at exist to has name a of referent the that imply not does rigidity that show to meant is designators called be can exist object the wherever states Kripke worlds. possible given at true be can existentials they arerigiddesignatorsnames Smith: and McGinn, by Almog, adopted position factthe in is This material. descriptive the satisfies which entity mathematical only the is it because a names number (directly) first description isthatthe ofproperties,that denote through a w complex designators and referents their to directly refer that designators between one as designators between difference fundamental the explain to appears himself Kripke

Kripke, Kripke, Kripke, lo, Nmn wtot eest, MGn, “ McGinn, Necessity,” without “Naming Almog, are referential directly hs nepeain a te diinl datg ta i as caiis o negative how clarifies also it that advantage additional the has interpretation This between difference the that saying as Kripke read to easy is It circumference of acircle to its diameter. name of alternative of cluster a diameterits to circle circumferencea the of of ratio mebeingthathereasnot usedletter thisisseemsto Greek it 

’ Naming and Necessity and Naming Necessity, and Naming is supposed to be the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Now, diameter. its to circle a of circumference the of ratio the be to supposed is smtig ht hv ntig u a au itiie eln t age o: It for: argue to feeling intuitive vague a but nothing have I that something s a world a

o a el ubr wih n hs ae s eesrl te ai o the of ratio the necessarily is case this in which number, real a for that iderations on Rigid Designation” and “Rigidity and Scope.” “Rigidityand and Designation” Rigid on iderations togy rigid strongly “ a designator rigidly designates a certain object i object certain a designates rigidly designator a wh

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name’s While commenting on the rigidity thesis, rigidity the on commenting While , whereas the second denotes thenumber second the , whereas “ ” If you say you If

nor is it even used as short for as used even it is nor “

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‘ does not exist not does suppose Hitler had never never had Hitler suppose f it designates that object object that designates it f

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CEU eTD Collection 142 141 not have talk toinvolve does proposition a to contributes term a what asking because descriptions, definite and names distinguis for test good a be can referentiality pure of notion the that is idea sentence the value of truth whatway the asking of trut the what Dummett counter to there attempts in argument thatbehaviormimic inmodal of contexts. names that descriptions when for look to behavior open again be will their door the and of sentences modal in terms embedded in descriptions definite and names between comparison from element modal doesproposition have not theproperty existing at the world of ofevaluation included individual the iff world a at true is and existing propertyof the and individual as such sentence A use. their ter referential directly exist objects designated the whether of irrespective designators, rigid obstinately worl the at nothing and exist individuals designators, counterfactual described. situation born been

Salmon, 78. , Ibid., oee, hs separatio this However, any remove thoroughly must rigidity of account this circularity, avoid to order In rigid persistently between Salmon with distinguish to then, natural, seems It Reference and Essence and Reference ’

then then i.e., “ h value of the proposition proposition the of value h Rigidity and Scope and Rigidity

phrases which designate the same thing at those worlds where the designated designated where the worlds thingatthose which thesame designate phrases ‘ Hitler

ms, then they contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by expressed propositions the to referents their contribute they then ms, the the ’ of

ees ee sil iil, o oehn ta wud o eit n t in exist not would that something to rigidly, still here, refers explanation of direct reference. Failure to do so will will so do to Failure reference. direct of explanation

modalities. , 33 ,

“ i.e., Hitler does not exist not does Hitler i nt las s la a i sol b. ins Smith Witness be. should it as clear as always not is n - 34. ”

” to the effect that names are purely referential terms. Smith terms. referential purely are names that effect the to ’

141 s reply to the modal argument, according to which asking which to according argument, modal the to reply s hae wih eint te ae hn a al worlds, all at thing same the designate which phrases

p s hr te eintd bet d nt xs, and exist, not do objects designated the where ds at some possible world is turns out to be a sloppy a be to out turns is world possible some at 89

“ Possibly ” in

expresses a proposition comprising an an comprising proposition a expresses those worlds or not. or worlds those p ”

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142

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CEU eTD Collection 145 144 143 he unchanged remain none) (or individual different a designated have would expression sayshe descriptions, definite natureof analyzingthe Smith where believe, I here, is It conditions? certain satisfies it provided individual, an names which somethingof idea related the have we that accept we cannot why individual, an names which something of idea an have can we that Smith accept we If material. descriptive the satisfies individual the if ‘ “ conventions: semantic of basis the on only designate names descriptions, definite Unlike possibility such as thatlanguages, notions modal of absence the in even descriptions, definite ob it finds Smith operators. Aristotle Things are quite otherwise with proper names. It is a genuinely semantic fact about the name Itareis agenuinelyThings withproper quite otherwise fact aboutthename semantic names.

Ibid., 189. Italics in Italics original. 189. Ibid., 190. Ibid., 189. Scope,” “Rigidity and Smith, adds that adds Yet this account cannot explain clearly why a description cannot description a why clearly explain cannot account this Yet an part, determined by facts the of world.the to designation of relation the determine not do of themselves descriptions definite For semantic. purely not contrast, in is, world the in item de a and relation expression thisan and expression an designationsuchbetween relation of semantic.The genuinely is descriptive its It of definite designatum. virtue a a by in met between expresses, be latter, to the condition descriptive unlike a former, meaning, the that is name ordinary of kind any about distinctive is What language a imagines Smith this, establish to order In ’

that it designates; or,more designates; that it precisely,

“ [s] uch a name [ name a uch , ” 145

while later while

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“ definite description as contrasted with any with contrasted as description definite implausible. 90 143

names names ’ a s

that cut eoe unclear becomes ccount L the particular individual Aristotle. 0 ” “

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CEU eTD Collection 148 147 146 words, proposit a of notion the comprehend contribute totheexpressed. propositions na definite and names between stage. evaluation the at difference a in descriptions difference the ground to wanted and evaluation semantic In etc.) places, moments, (worlds, indices semantic relevant the at proposition the assesses stage, evaluation the step, second The names. to individuals and letters predicate to universals assigning by the calls Almog which step, This name. a to referent a assigning involves Naming necessity. without Almog In contexts. modal in name the of behavior the contribu name a what between neatly separate to wants contradict meaning. in changed

mes and defini and mes Almog, “Naming without Necessity,” 220. without Necessity,” “Naming Almog, Ibid. 190. Ibid.,

This type of type This Smith to specific not is difficulty of kind This or in notions modal need name not the satisfaction of does referentiality pure one the because between distinguish is modal of this grasp a And lack they notions. though even language, their in descriptions definite [w] “

generation stage generation directly the statement that directly the statement e are now able to see how speakers of speakers how see to able now are e

hs nepeain Kik fie t dsigih ewe te w sae of stages two the between distinguish to failed Kripke interpretation, this te descriptions becomes salient becomes descriptions te - type relation. proposal faces two major difficulties. The first is that we are required to to required are we that is first The difficulties. major two faces proposal

” 146

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only when only could distinguish between names and names between distinguish could However, t However, . 148 ’ s position. The account under review review under account The position. s ’ tes to the proposition expressed and expressed proposition the to tes

s words, it wants to define naming define to wants it words, s It involves It we focus on the constituents they constituents the on focus we - err eain n any and relation bearer he genuine difference between between difference genuine he “ building e to der ”

a proposition a they ’ s CEU eTD Collection 149 edgeloses this over considerations, modal rejecting in Yet description. definite a using by expressed that and sentence a in name a the using by expressed proposition a of profile modal between differences fundamental are there that showing by worries these all counter argume modal The shape. round a having or red being with level same the on property a as it treats that existence of view a to us commit not should exists Aristotle that denying analysi the tying Frege empty. are they if even buttressed initially that worries Ifdescription. theonly thing definite a of that all, after not, is name a of value semantic the that view the accept should be e name the to value a of assignment semantic properties other had it o change through endures that something of substance, of category metaphysical the to related inescapably is individual an of notion the However, of. made are they what you tells one if are they what understand fail to doomed endeavor at it evaluating without

Ibid., 220. Ibid., xtricated from modal discourse. fromxtricated modal The second difficulty raised by this proposal is that it is not clear any longer why we why longer any clear not is it that is proposal this by raised difficulty second The Almog’s find its truth value, evaluate to on go we can ground the off propositiongets the after onlyhave: not t he proposition is generated is proposition he

s of names to that of the concepts we associate with their referents. Finally, referents. their with associate we concepts the of that to names of s analysis requires us to be able to form a notion of the proposition expressed expressed proposition the of notion a form to able be to us requires analysis Descriptivism

. Almog wants us to be able to think of a name a of think to able be to us wants Almog . any

in variousin lociof evaluation. r, to recast it in modal terms, modal in it recast to r, Amg hns of thinks Almog .

world, the actual one included here as well. as here included one actual the world, that

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92

propositions as of ordinary objects: you can can you objects: ordinary of as propositions are bound to return. Names seem meaningful seem Names return. to bound are

149 very notion that he operates with operates he that notion very

that would have stayed the same, had same, the stayed have would that

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’ This, I submit, is an is submit, I This, s referent as a pre a as referent s it , cannot cannot nt did nt - CEU eTD Collection 150 of howwe inreferring succeed toindividuals. physicist. a was he that is Feynman orator. Roman answer likely most would they asked, If Cicero. of knowledge identifying no possess people Many name? a of referent the of true uniquely anything state arguments can toby replied be a Descriptivist. Kripke that argue shall I incorrect. are theses both that argued Kripke description. the of that with name description the endows definite a least) (at provide can user the name, a of user each per that, is and name a between connection the about theses distinct this of remainder the in of 3.4 process of ti space, through endure to assumed is which substance individual an about speak to name this use a is why reason rigid are names that fact fac the the of view, consequence my In rigidity. of analysis semantic purely

Kripke, Descriptivism

THE SEMANTIC ARGUMENTTHE Consider the first thesis. A thesis. first the Consider defenders from attention most the received understandably has argument modal The I rigidity. regarding thought final one add should I e ad osbe ols Rgdt i bt rfeto a te igitc ee of level linguistic the at reflection a but is Rigidity worlds. possible and me,

Naming and Necessity and Naming deploying the transcendendeploying the “ Aristotle ”

Similarly, the only knowledge that many speakers of English h English ofmany speakers onlythat the knowledge Similarly, . However, Kripke has offered additional reasons for rejecting this view and, view this rejecting for reasons additional offered has Kripke However, .

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meaning. The second is that the refer the that is second The meaning. refers only to one individual across any possible world is because we we because is world possible any across individual one to only refers t that they stand for the metaphysical category of substance. The The substance. of category metaphysical the for stand they that t chapter , 81. ,

I , re we not many times in the situation of being of situation the in times many not we re 150 at o ae lo a them at look a take to want tal category of substance.tal category of

Descriptivism

93

seems to paint, then, an unlikely image unlikely an then, paint, to seems its its am skeptical am ent of the name is the denotation denotation the is name the of ent associated description. The first The description. associated

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Ibid., 83 Ibid., Even so, the modal argument would prevent the further comment that the description gives the meaning of meaning the gives description the that comment further the prevent would argument modal the so, Even it on to other subjects who decide to use it with the same reference as that intended by by intended that as reference same the with it use to decide who subjects other to on it In contrast to the Descriptivist view, Kripke advocates a two a advocates Kripke view, Descriptivist the to contrast In that argumentis modal the consequenceofThe subject given a for name a of referent the identifies thesis Descriptivist second The individual “

“ Schmidt - Neptune 84. the meaning of names, because replacing because names, of meaning the

hud ml ta we w ue h name the use we when that imply should on of the definite description associated by the subject with the name. Note, name. the with subject the by associated description definite the of on , ”

” to a name in virtue of the causal chain of communication that grounds the the grounds that communication of chain causal the of virtue in name a to

the

was the person who actually discovered that arithmetic is incomplete is arithmetic that discovered actually who person the was the object that causes perturbations thatthe object causes perturbations

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94

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and there may be a temptation to say that, that, say to temptation a be may there and n otat i w cnie a iuto wee knowing where situation a consider we if contrast, In “ Cicero “ Cicero s in the process of conducting an investigation of investigation an conducting of process the in s toa ifrain rm te mmes f his of members other from information itional ’ s referent.s 95 ”

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Boër, “Reference and Identifying Descriptions,” 218 Descriptions,” “ReferenceIdentifying and Boër, 347. IdentifyingDescriptions,” Names and “Proper Donnellan, Id “Reference and Boër, also See , the subject himself would face extraordinary difficulties trying to explain whom he he whom explain to trying difficulties extraordinary face would himself subject the , ’ As charge the that notice should we argument, semantic the of step second the to Turning and orators Roman such two fact, in are, there that suppose explanation, this test To ? ” , the subject replies replies subject the , Boër “ “ beta I shall call by the name bythe call Ishall

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points out, the answer depends on the way he wants us to comprehend the comprehend to us wants he way the on depends answer the out, points ”

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156

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entifying Descriptions,” 216. entifyingDescriptions,” “ believes is the top square, then we should take him to speak speak to him take should we then square, top the is believes el I m akn aot oe aos oa orator. Roman famous some about talking am I Well, ‘ 155 alpha 154

However, unbeknownst to him, he wears spectacles wears he him, to unbeknownst However, onla ak u t iaie stain hr a where situation a imagine to us asks Donnellan ’

the square on top on square the y areas. 96 - 219. “

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“ This square shall be called be shall square This

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CEU eTD Collection thecreatorindividual the name of had inmind. linguist the that assumption the on based is which limitations, epistemic against safeguard a as description this view can We to. referred name the of inventor the that thing same the to refer to subject name the with associates one descriptions interpreted by hisaudience. t it bestows becan writings.He better regardingown his is a novelist which in theposition isin others, he name the of creator the When communication. streamline to means a also but material, descriptive of mass a mind to bring to meant tag chosen randomly a only not e everybody like user a becomes name the of creator the Afterwards, used. are name the of tokens first the when timeframe narrow a to reference with only sense makes distinction The place. first always is name the of c become inventor can One infallible. the that hold to have not do We distinction. the accept to. referred initially name the of inventor the whatever to refer u can one sayingthat when himself, by Kripke possibility themistaken name information about ofacquiring can argument semantic the in step second The description. the of denotation the about infallible be to name the introduced who subject the of require not does Descriptivism but description, the satisfy fact in did object which about inco was used he description the whether asking in sense no is There denotes. name the of reference the fix to uses he description the whatever to refers name the with tagged he that conclude should we If the above remarks are correct, then a Descriptivist can accept that the cluster of of cluster the that accept can Descriptivist a then correct, are remarks above the If acknowledged is practice naming the of originator and users between distinction The lse and can stand corrected regarding this or that piece of information. A name is is name A information. of piece that or this regarding corrected stand can and lse c omnt oe eog t cn rvd cret nomto aot the about information correct provide can to belongs one community ic

onfused regarding the object whose name one introduced in the in introduced one name whose object the regarding onfused “ alpha ’ s referent s 97 se a name simply on the basis of intending it to intendingit of basis the simplynameon a se ”

the top square. This shows that the creator of creator the that shows This square. top the only apply to use to apply only includes ’ s referent is genuine.s referent is a description that requires the the requires that description a Descriptivism r s of the name, where the the where name, the of s rrect. rrect. He may be wrong wrong be may He

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CEU eTD Collection 157 t speaking, roughly Necessitypertains, d conceptually category a into it turns it that is ours from object actuallyby referredcan tobeidentical to bothnames fail itself. to fact the in grounded expressed proposition the of necessity The objec the could how then world, this at here, obtains relation 3.5 the semantic argumentbe can countered by to referred name the of creators Descriptivism be to prove sometimes may de it revising then history, long a has convention naming the If descriptivematerial. massof a practicalto becauseare shortcuts Names introduced they are t reference trumps island the with associate we descriptions the of weight the support that here argue could one because cases Such incorrect. intuitively be would This mainland? the of mainland. the of part “ that thought mistakenly Polo Marco reference, of theory causal the of criticism a as tendered situation any in description other every trump to intentions Madagascar

rmna t is sfles I a itk i rpael md, hn t eoe te norm. the becomes it then made, repeatedly is mistake a If usefulness. its to trimental Gareth Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 11. ofNames,” Theory Causal “The Evans, Gareth

THE EPISTEMOLOGICALTHE ARGUMENT n itrsig osqec o dfnn ncsiy s rt a al ols accessible worlds all at truth as necessity defining of consequence interesting One identity the If true. necessarily are true, if designators, rigid between Identities inventor the references that description the expect however, not, should We ”

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157

Should we say, we Should

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can be outweighed in certain circumstances certain in outweighed be can o whether something takes place takes something whether o then, that we referred all this time to a certain region certain a to time this all referred we that then, Descriptivism

98 by

“ eprs s dnia t Phosphorus to identical is Hesperus .

. To give an example that Evans that example an give To . that there is no world where the the where world no is there that sic fo ta of that from istinct t lose it at some other world? other some at it lose t

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“ h ojc ta the that object the . I conclude that conclude I . Descriptivism priori a city ”

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CEU eTD Collection 159 158 contingent, might Neptune notcausedthereported because have perturbations. Uranus of orbit the in perturbations sentence the by expressed perturbations causes that planet the to refer sentence,although cau this and lower was temperature the because say, meter, proposition sentence the the However, use to resolved people how is this imagine, may we because, it the bar sentence the by expressed proposition the of truth the know we that say can how we beliefs justify inthetruthofcertain our propositions. truth d to have categories Modal truth. its establish to order in investigation empirical is it and true actually is that designators posteriori experience priori a if is something that say us Let it. believe or it know to come we how of regardless

“ Ibid., 54 Ibid., Kripke, a particular person or know or person particular a - values that propositions have at various worlds. Epistemic categories have to do with do to have categories Epistemic worlds. various at have propositions that values This scenario is similar to that where Le Verrier introduced the name name the introduced Verrier Le where that to similar is scenario This S of definition the Consider sentence the that follows It

evidence Naming and Necessity and Naming meter is one -

55. . rt. t s eesr tu bcue t s n dniy etne ewe to rigid two between sentence identity an is it because true necessary is It truth. . 158 159

n ifrn crusacs te egh of length the circumstances, different In , ” a priori

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If Neptune exists, then Neptune is the planet causing causing planet the is Neptune then exists, Neptune If “ one meter one

evidence is defined as justification independent of any any of independent justification as defined is evidence ” “

eprs s Phosphorus is Hesperus is known known is posteriori a ” 99

as S

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is one meter one is “ n h obt f rns Te propositi The Uranus. of orbit the in priori a the length of a certain bar bar certain a of length the a priori a

re eas w nee t rl on rely to needed we because true S , but remains, at the same time, time, same the at remains, but ,

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CEU eTD Collection 161 160 and inconjunction with(3), isequivalent saying it to that Thesis (4) as be can rewritten adhere,the followingamong others, totwotheses: incomplete. is arithmetic that of type Therefore,propositions. properties the the sentence speaker, t Given descriptions. of cluster a with or description one with speaker given a by associated against argument third a his foundational connection between names and descriptions, we can say that, for a given a for that, say can we descriptions, and names between connection foundational his

Ibid, 64 Ibid, 65. Ibid.,

weighted ofthe most, (4 does refer not the of most, weighted a or most, satisfies object unique no If (4) is thereferent of mos weighted a or most, If (3) know to position a in normally not are we that think Kripke does Why Havin propositions? Remember the story of the hapless Schmidt, who actually discovered actually who Schmidt, hapless the of story the Remember propositions? Descriptivism - ’ 65. I rephrased (4). I Thesis rephrased 65.

I tee s n niiul that individual an is there If )

“ g distinguished between distinguished g If φ n .

160 exists, then exists,

. 161 However, ordinary speakers do not regularly know know regularly not do speakers ordinary However,

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the proposition expressed by expressed proposition the , Kripke can propound can Kripke , φ ’ s, then then s, priori a “ a priori a Gödel, y “ , then , Gödel

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CEU eTD Collection 163 162 identified thetrue claims tohave above. Jeshion Robin worryexposed themainaddressing givenwas isnot toit name establish the of referent the not is (Schmidt false is (3) that shows establish one could how the by means simply connection.This conceptual arely on to out turns him to attributes assumptio this Given incomplete. is arithmetic that discovered having with credited somebody for name the use to willing are form

Jeshion, “The Epistemological Argument against Descriptivism,” 330. Descriptivism,” against Argument Epistemological “The Jeshion, 87. Ibid, φ ’ “ s turns out to be a conjunction of two rather distinct theses, namely theses, distinct rather two of conjunction a be to out turns s If If not that answer certain a that show to want I because length at argument this rehearse I we if exists, Gödel that assume to have We follows. as arguing be to seems Kripke So b Gödel about knowshardly [n] know cannot we why Explaining weighted ofthe most, of referent The elief elief hardly constitutes n a priori

otice that even in a case where (3) and (4) and (3) where case a in even that otice “ exists, then exists, Gödel. - p

is epistemically possible, thenpossible, is epistemically

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is is But saying that Gödel is identical to the individual who satisfies most of most satisfies who individual the to identical is Gödel that saying But a priori a

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that they are, as required by the theory.the byrequired as are, theythat φ

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that (3) and (4) are true? Consider the Schmidt case, which which case, Schmidt the Consider true? are (4) and (3) that n, the fact that Gödel has most of the properties the subject subject the properties the of most has Gödel that fact the n, exists

knowledge.

φ  ’ a priori a

s, hr i a idvda wo aife ms, r a or most, satisfies who individual an is There ”

101 Kripke states Kripke p ‘

Schmidt could be not known 162

propositions expressed by sentences of the of sentences by expressed propositions happen ’

story is just a fantasy. But the But fantasy. a just is story

to be true, a typical speaker typical a true, be to

’ s argument,whichisthat I think I a priori “ Gödel.

that my beliefmythat is , 163

what the speaker speaker the what ” (3) and (4), and (4), and (3) ) How can we we can How ) ,

CEU eTD Collection 165 164 the exact of opposite is them for vouch others because true are they that Believing proofs. their understand cannot know not do I not. Obviously, claim I Can true. is it that else everyone by told was I Pythagoras that believe to come the to accessible cognitively be should support, its in offered reasons the also but conclusion, the only not that constraint additional the impose then, can, One cannot. proof) (the themselves reasons the but subject, the by grasped be can proposition not is Jeshion tar The conveyed. 2. information the understand to subject the by allowing on thorough entirely divisible are numbers even all not that believe to me allows which that is claim not allevenbydivisible numbers are 2 that showing numbers, large involving proof, complicated very a devised he that me assures ima similarly can I that claims Jeshion then comprehend, can I of class If the numbers. manyprime infinitely fact in are there that doubt to come would I reputation, his given that, and theorem Euclid of falsity the of me informs mathematician a that imagine can I false. manifestly propert the of most has Gödel one where

Id., 332. Id., 331. Ibid., ’ s presentevid - Schmidt case is possible to the conclusion that one could not know not could one that conclusion the to possible is case Schmidt p hr ae w cam md hr ad wl age ht oh r icret Te first The incorrect. are both that argue will I and here made claims two are There fac the from infers he when premise this on relies Kripke that argues Jeshion

is epistemically possible possible epistemically is

the testimony from the renowned mathematician involves acquiring justification justification acquiring involves mathematician renowned the from testimony the ence which wouldence justifybelieving which one in that

“ justifications independent any experience. of particular ies attributed to him. However, she thinks that the premise is is premise the that thinks she However, him. to attributed ies

a pri a ’ s theorem is correct not because I understand it, but because but it, understand I because not correct is theorem s “ if one could imagine acquiring evidence consistent with consistent evidence acquiring imagine could one if ori a priori a . 165

many complicated mathematical theorems, because I because theorems, mathematical complicated many

knowledge is to be restricted to propositions that propositions restrictedto be to is knowledge 102

to

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is not just the name that I use for whoever discovered that arithmetic is incomplete, is arithmetic that discovered whoever for use I that name the just not is ’ eitmlgcl ruet nwr Kripke answers argument epistemological s

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employ look at the epistemological argument. The basic point, which was which point, basic The argument. epistemological the at look posteriori a

claim that Jeshion makes, namely makes, Jeshion that claim is is in fact correct and that the the that and correct fact in 103

reasons. One would probably ask others others ask probably would One reasons.

a priori ’ s point and Jeshion has not answered toanswered not has Jeshion and point s ’ oiia wry I ad ht Kripke that said I worry. original s

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DESCRIPTIVE NAMES ’

s referent or that other peoples referent orthatother – eas L Vrir a s was Verrier Le because Kripke holds that a sentence such as such sentence a that holds Kripke member If “ that assume us Let

.

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104 “ If Neptune Neptune If φ

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’ s or s expresses a contingent a expresses in this manner manner in this “ one meter one n is the individual referred to by other other by to referred individual the is exists, then Neptune is the planet the is Neptune then exists,

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as the length of stick stick of length the as the orbit of Uranus. It ofUranus. is the orbit no easy answers in many in answers easy no make

a priori a a mere possibility. mere a by reference to other to reference S

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in in a . CEU eTD Collection 167 is sentence conditional See assessment. this challenges “On non on Carter, justified be cannot See information of grounds. piece latter this and something to refers name proper the 166 pointed have may I description, the uttering of instead then, not, is it If attributively. used is is description the in the is, it If expressed. proposition the mentioned identifying in operational semantically material descriptive the whether to respect with made asconveyingthe whole propositioncounts known be only can conjunct second the because but, contingent, is proposition use) referential the by denotes speaker the by expressed proposition the and necessary is expressed proposition the context, any in mass abbreviated the with functionally truth replaced be can abbreviations Because description. wordier the for shortcut linguistic a t in perturbations the causes that description. name the then attributively, if that, holds He propositions. contingent app to wants instance, for Casullo, referential the of terms in it framing by furthered surrounding debate the that believe not do I that saying by begin “ long meter descriptive names

Casullo, “Kripke on theon “Kripke Casullo, “ simplysaying because needed as seen be may existence of assumption The a

priori We said that the distinction between referential and attributive uses of a description is description a of uses attributive and referential between distinction the that said We propositions? singular express names descriptive containing sentences Can . 166 167 . If, on the other hand, the description description the hand, other the on If, .

Fo Similarly, we should infer that, if Le Verrier used the description description the used Verrier Le if that, infer should we Similarly, llowing Evans, l Evans, llowing ” a priori a .

A priori A priori A

and contingent. and lo dgr, “ Odegard, also “

and the Necessary,” 156 the and Necessary,” S

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the distinction the

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CEU eTD Collection 168 not does it world, this meter of length the S of length the where world, this to alternative an consider we when that, be to seems idea The inference isplainly true: the thinks he why determining in helpful be may following the but this, for explanation clear H abbreviation. an as used be only can description the then expressed, proposition definite descriptions. random a of length the on based system measurement a introducing of process the analyzing for used was example name the introducing to prior perturbations, speci a about belief any hold not did Verrier “ shiftingother in theaud action was successful whatever done or it, holding while whistled, then and it grabbed or object, relevant the at Neptune

at

Ibid., 156. Ibid., t 0 ”

is different from what it actually is, we should agree that the term term the agreethat should we actuallyis, it what differentfrom is

metre sentence the by expressed proposition the definition, metre an calls Kripke what in results term the introducingof method description.This definite the satisfy as but out singled has speaker the which [ term The the individuating in operational is material descriptive the if that, thinks Casullo name the introducing in used material descriptive the that obvious rather is It is introduced to refer to whatever fits the description the fits whatever to refer to introduced is ”

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S is necessary a one,true solely virtue in of the terms expressing in used it. as an abbreviation of the phrase the of abbreviation an as

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“ bet Dsrpie ae ae nrdcd i attribut via introduced are names Descriptive object. one meter one

mean that whatever fits the description at another world is also the also is world another atdescription the fits whatever that mean ” ] is not being introduced as the name of a particular length particular a of name the as introduced being not is ]

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is relevant to identifying the proposition expressed. Le expressed. proposition the identifying to relevant is fic object to the effect that it causes the observer the causes it that effect the to object fic ’ “ 106 ‘

fr h sekr s sn te term the using is speaker the for , ience the len the Neptune the name of whatever length happens to happens length whatever of name the

’ s attention towards the object.s attentiontowards the gth of gth ”

in the language. Similarly, the meter meter the Similarly, language. the in ‘ The length of length The S hing but obvious. If the term term the If obvious. but hing

at at “ t the length of length the 0 ’ . As a result of this of result a As . S “

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pulative act. pulative Jeshion, “Ways of Taking a Meter,” 299 Meter,” Takinga “Ways of Jeshion, Contingent “The Cowles, e as Kthr “pirt ad eest, wo rus th argues who Necessity,” and “Apriority Kitcher, also See .

. However, its truth is known not in virtue of arithmetic reasoning, but in virtue of a a of virtue in but reasoning, arithmetic of virtue in not known is truth its However, . th ” iial, h polm rie b ue o dsrpie ae d nt eed n the on depend not do names descriptive of uses by raised problems the Similarly, believe I Since

prime number. It is clear that the proposition that Joe is the 69 the is Joe that proposition the that clear is It number. prime for the actual number of planets, whatever this is. this whatever planets, of number actual the for does not rely merely on the on merely rely not does non

”

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“ me was introduced was me that A priori, A n m one Descriptivism . Suppose, for instance, that one introduces the name the introduces one that instance, for Suppose, .

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Sosa, “Rigidity in the Scope of Russell’s Theory,” 17. See also pages 28 pages also See 17. Theory,” Russell’s of Scope the in “Rigidity Sosa, vrt, Rcn Dfne o Dsrpiim” 112 Descriptivism,” of Defenses “Recent Everett, - ambiguous in modalcontexts. in ambiguous

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the sentence

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rance of “The last great philosopher of antiquity was antiquity of philosopher great last “The of rance

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that 2 1 ) The last great) The last of philosopher of was antiquity dogs. fond ) Aristotle was dogs. fondof U U w 2 1 F 1

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115

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CEU eTD Collection 184 183 case former rephrase Kripke of consequence necessary “ the that proposition The which doesmodalsentence. employ the not a following Consider where pair, ambiguities. is between contrast a drawing in operators modal of use makes it because deficient Widescopism against argument ineffective? 4.3 it is necessary on the assumption that there is a unique F unique a is there that assumption the on necessary is it

Ibid., 64. inItalics original. 64. Ibid., Descriptions.” Definite Names and “Proper Tye, Hudsonand F

AN AN ”

and The difference between the original argument and the new one is that, while in the in while that, is one new the and argument original the between difference The ( ( that there isaunique ( The n Widescopism make would which way a in insight Kripke’s express we Can ARGUMENT FREEARGUMENT OFMODALOPERATORS 3 2 1

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183 the F , ” , then ,

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CEU eTD Collection 187 186 185 and false, ifthe if Finally, Tye iterated. be could reply Widescopist the Kripke of reworking a essentially is criticism new the that claims Yu argument the also establishes sentence the in Since the description in Tye and Hudson then, in ambiguity scope no is there rejoinder,because Widescopist the disarm argument latter

Ibid., 209. I replaced corner quotes with quotation marks. withcornerquotes quotation replaced I 209. Ibid., ofNames.” Theories Description against Argument Modal Yu,“The Descriptions.” Definite Names and “Proper Tye, Hudsonand ’ s argumentcan rephrased be true. If (4) If(3) true. If (2) unique If (1) Ina ambiguities? scope to proof argument the Is “ The n 187

is replaced with the associated description in description associated the with replaced is F n n n n

F

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F ( 1 ” )

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falsity ofWidescopism.

is F as follows: as “ ” it is necessary that, if there is a unique a thereis if necessarythat, is it “

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118 ”

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reply given to Hudson and Tye, Paul Paul Tye, and Hudson to given reply (4), the result is scope is result the (4),

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Ibid. 177. Yu,” “Reply to Tye, Hudsonand the ,

” Iliad

being someone of author unique a being There (c) expressed by The proposition (b) The expr proposition (a) expressed by The proposition transformations of chain above the that out pointing by answer Tye and Hudson where “

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ne wds soe n sentence a in scope widest anted Ibid., 176. Ibid., First, I should remark that remark should I First, necessarily thentrue. someone is isblind, isblind ifhe of author

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122 F ” which ”

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F

can coherently state that it is not true that there being a unique a being there that true not is it that state coherently can .

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it is it true thatthere isaunique is it true thatthere isaunique w w , the , the proposition expressed by “The byexpressed proposition the , “The F

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CEU eTD Collection with associated description the is which this that thinks Soames thewider,variable bound,in isitself (the variable a with name the of substitution the from results that formula open the to applied name, proper a of occurrence an least at contains argument modal the name, proper a of occurrence any contain not does predicate or operator modal the of argument the When 4. take must thesameit scopeinanywheresentence context this ismentioned. “the description the that fact the sentence, a to relative only defined is scope of notion the since But Widescopism. that the assumption was it since lost, is Descriptivism Classical abandoning for impetus original the then non and rigid between ambiguous be to held are names hand, also can descriptions (rigid redundant become considerations scope then descriptions, scope wide rigid with identified are names hand, one the on if, that say to on goes He holds. relation entailment the where description, “The of truth Widescopist “The in as scope (wide) same the take to has description the 4

SOAMES ON THE AGAINSTSOAMES BASIC ARGUMENT WIDESCOPISM can be be can Widescopism is premised on the idea that modal constructions modal that idea the on premised is Widescopism “The

F must further distinguish between a rigid sense of “the of sense rigid a between distinguish further must F uncover

is

is ae ad ecitos eae ifrnl i mdl otxs ht e to led that contexts modal in differently behave descriptions and names F F ” isentailed byisa “There ” is not entailed by there being a uniqu a being there by entailed not is ” ed

F characteristic through what he names names he what through expression ” takes wide scope in the sentence “The sentence the in scope wide takes ” n

wih xrse a otnet rpry f h name’s the of property contingent a expresses which , non is applied to the entire argument. However, when the the when However, argument. entire the to applied is

take narrow scope, e.g., “the actual actual “the e.g., scope, narrow take ons oad a towards points - modal part of thesentencemodal part 124

unique

“ the basic argument basic the F .”

udmna fa i Widescopism, in flaw fundamental e the modal operator/predicate is is operator/predicate modal the F - rigid wide scope descriptions, scope wide rigid , and a non a and , F F

) F

is . is

. , ” ” i.e., one in which the which in one i.e., ” F F are Suppose that “the that Suppose ,” ” does not mean th mean not does ” F

- ”) he reasons that a a that reasons he essentially shifty. shifty. essentially rigid sense of the the of sense rigid

.

If, on the other other the on If, G at at ” CEU eTD Collection 192 mandatory one only reading the Consider first oftheone: twopremises. be can there why unclear is it Yet out. way his find to Widescopist one than more is there and, under thisreading, argument the conclusion as following argument properties the that and referent,

Soames, “The Modal Argument,” Argument,” Modal “The Soames, that ifthe ( if since unambiguous, are argument basic the of premises both that assumes Soames is anecessary truth. (C the rephrase to has Widescopism However, valid. it, of face the on is, argument The truth. if that proposition The (C) truth. (P that ifthe (P P 2 1 1 ’ ) the if that proposition The ) if that proposition The ) ) The The )

The proposition that if that proposition The 192

G G G

is such that the proposition that if it is is it if that proposition the that such is : is is

F F , thensomething isboth , thensomething isboth

way to understand them, then there may be enough leeway for a a for leeway enough be may there then them, understand to way

5 - 6. F

n n and n

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F is , then something is both is something then , , then something then ,

te smtig s both is something then , ar F 125 nt eesrl correlated. necessarily not e , then something is both is something then , F F

and and

G G . .

F is both is , then something is both both is something then , F F

F and and F

and

and G G

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= the proposition proposition the = = the proposition proposition the = G G

s necessary a is is a necessary necessary a is F

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CEU eTD Collection 194 193 scope ofthe description: the increasing of order the in ranged readings, three following the between ambiguous is Moreover, noted,theas second David itself Sosa premise and a wide false, narrow “ a that argued has Hunter David the proposition that... proposition the

Sosa, “Rigidity in the Scope of Russell’s Theory,” 26. Theory,” ofRussell’s Scope the “Rigidityin Sosa, 237. Widescopism,” “Soames and Hunter, - (P (P (P truth. (P and (P that proposition (P scope readingscope 1narrow 2c 2b 2a 2 1wide ) The proposition that if the if that proposition The ) ) (the x: Gx) Necessarily) (the x:Gx) [Fx ) Necessarily, Gx)) Fx) x: [((the ) Necessarily, (Fx Gx) x: [(the G

) The propositi = the proposition thatifthe = theproposition Te rpsto ta i the if that proposition The ) - scope reading scope

” if the

and claim that a sentence such as P as such sentence a that claim and on, withrespect tothe G

is Widescopist F , then something is both , thensomething isboth

G 

is G 

( 

F is (

y)(FyGy)]. & 126  G

, then something is both is something then , can extend his treatment to phrases of the form form the of phrases to treatment his extend can ( F y)(Fy& Gy))] 

is , then something is both , thensomethingisboth y)(FyGy)]&

F G hn oehn i both is something then , , that if he if is that ,

194 F

1

and

is ambiguous between a true, true, a between ambiguous is F G , then something is both thensomethingisboth ,

F

F and

and G F G

is a necessary necessary a is

. and 193

G

the = F

CEU eTD Collection 195 following as synonymous: (C as rephrased onlybe can (C) that thinks Soames why reason The with,namely Soames burdens Widescopism himself pronouncing from refraining while is indeed synonymo conclusion ofargument thebasic the allows This predicates. modal with interact descriptions ( adverbs modal and descriptions definite between interaction the exclusively concerning thesis a is Widescopism truth. necessary predicates, modal and descriptions definite between interaction the about

Hunter, “Soames and Widescopism,” 234. Widescopism,” “Soames and Hunter, (1) is anecessary truth. truth, (C (C) The that proposition if Soames (C ’

’ ’ Necessarily, ) The ) )

The proposition that if the if that proposition The ’

” ruet lo sue ta the that assumes also argument G

u ti i aan o srn a asmto. s utr ons out, points Hunter As assumption. an strong too again is this But

us with is such that the proposition that if it is it if that proposition the that such is

“ necessarily p .

” n

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F “ G , then something is both both , thensomething is possibly

is , with regard with

F 127 , then something is both is somethingthen ,

” ) . Widescopist 195

t s not is It

to the truth value of the reading that that reading the of value truth the to F , then something is both both is something then ,

Widescopist F also view specific a have to has

and ’

) is because he views the the views hebecause is ) tei aot h way the about thesis a G F

and is anecessary truth.

o od ht the that hold to G

uh as such is a necessary a is F

and “ s a is G

CEU eTD Collection 196 Then hold: assumptions sentence the asserts Bill that now I sectionthis the consider second will one in andnames of analysis Widescopist theories.the to challengesother two marshals Soamesargument, Reference Direct of variant mere a seem Widescopism acknowledg properly not when which, idea, this of consequence certain a at sentences of form logical 4.5 denying suc welcome A well commitment. very may Soames exist. propositions that assumes Widescopist Soames of reflective more is this But

Soames, “The Modal Argument,” 11. Argument,” Modal “The Soames,

WIDESCOPISM AS OFRUSSELLIAN WIDESCOPISM EXTENSION AN

the following intuitively is argument valid: ( ( spe that assume us Let the analyzing in undertook Russell that project the of continuation a is Widescopism (2)

2) theproperties 1) that

That F the propertygenetic a oforiginating particularbitof from materialand

there are propositions and modalpredicates,there are propositions that and denying thus expresses an essential, but non but essential, an expresses coherence conceptual of grounds on accept, to bound is p

Widescopist is ane

cessary truth. cessary F containing

and o te te hand, other the on ,

akers associate the name the associate akers G

arecorrelated. notnecessarily “ definite descriptions. In what follows, what In descriptions. definite

If n ’ .

196 xss then exists, w pioohcl supin ta of than assumptions philosophical own - obvious property, of the name the property,of obvious

128

a acp ta te rt of truth the that accept can n n

with the description the description the with is F , ”

DESCRIPTIVISM and that the following two two following the that and

sd fo te basic the from Aside alone ’ s referent, s a ontological an h I . will take a look a take will ( 2 ( ed, can make make can ed, 2 ) , unlike , )

G

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1 ) , while while , such as such what

( 1 ) a , CEU eTD Collection another. to world possible one from varies any) (if denotation whose the description, ordinary because an as is interpreted case the be could this why reason only co necessarily arenot properties two the when true necessarilybe cannot as such sentence a that thinks Soames that is argument further a of absence be can that justification potential only The view. this of support in reason any wide a containing sentence considers thatfurtherWidescopism. we a have reasondiscard to this descriptive to relative formula open Bill of the content the by since assignment, expressed proposition the with identical not is (actual) the assigned F while that, states Soames Yet wouldsymbolize theargumentas: Widescopism te rt of truth the , hr ae w pit rn oehr ee Te is i ta atiuig eest t a to necessity attributing that is first The here. together run points two are There (C (P (P (C) Bill asserteda necessarytruth. (P (P 1 2 1 2 ’ ’ ’ It) a is ) Bill asserted thatif ) (

) (the ) Bill asserted [that: proposition. But since he denies that such a proposition could be necessary, he he necessary, be could proposition a such that denies he since But proposition.  p )[Bill asserted ( P x 2 necessary truth thatif necessary truth : ’ Gx ) oee, i However, G trbts eest t te pn formula open the to necessity attributes ) [ . He goes on to say that the proposition expressed by expressed proposition the that say to on goes He .  ( ( P x - scope descriptive cannot yield a truth. Soames does not advance not does Soames truth. a yield cannot descriptive scope

2 exists exists ) p attributes necessity to the proposition that if that proposition the to necessity attributes n

n w hl, ln wt Wdsoim ta te description the that Widescopism, with along hold, we f and

exists, then exists, exists exists  p

Fx

is anecessary truth] ’ asrin in assertion s  n )]

exists, then exists, Fn ] n 129

is

F .

n (

P is 1 ) F

. s acrig o iecps, a Widescopism, to according is,

description “

( x

exists exists - instantiated “  the

n Fx

“ exists, then exists,

n supplied in the in supplied ) G “

” exists exists The ” where ,

ol be would . G But the the But 

is

Fn x n

F

is is is ” ”

CEU eTD Collection 197 no actual unique be there should that, sense the in singular proposition the make would this since way this in variable the interpret Widescopism, of impetus initial the to faithful be to want we if cannot, descriptio the matching of virtue in selected initially adverbis modal the of scope the in variable the to assigned object the where theory, reference direct of variant a as Widescopism of interpretation (incorrect) an precludes way this point the Putting requires thatsome proposition: singular a is second the whereas kind, particular a of proposition descriptive a Widescopist, attribu we property ofthe description that and worldactualat the extant objectsof domain the ofmember a the of denotation the that assumptions the under truth, yielda not would sentence the to necessity attributing why clear not is it then adverbs, modal over scope wide takes always it that in description regular a not is name a with associated

Soames, “The Modal Argument,” 11. Argument,” Modal “The Soames, Gx &Gx ( of truth The Russell. by endorsed be would which analysis an not is this But variable ( formula open the by expressed P of truth the analysis, the to According in states Bill that proposition the that is point second The te necessity in in necessity te

 ‘ x y)(Gy F ’

of the unique object which (actually)is , the open formul open , the actual objectactual therangevariable in formula the satisfies of theopen

x=y)& [ ’ s denotation. ( P

2 ) are simply not identical. The first is, according to the the to according is, first The identical. not simply are

a would come out as meaningless. Thus, saying thatthe Thus, outasmeaningless. wouldcome a (x exists(x x

exists  130 2 

Fx)] requires the necessity of t of necessity the requires

Fx , eaie o n sinet o the to assignment an to relative ),

G . 197

n associated with the name. We We name. the with associated n ( P 1 F )

and the one to which to one the and expresses necessary a a wih is which hat description is always always is description “ The The

G

is ( P F 2 G ’ ” )

CEU eTD Collection 11) Theory,” of level the at represented not are names proper ordinary question), the beg would 198 Gx then adverbs, modal over scope wide takes that one as name the with associated description a define we If valid. The fi and,Widescopism more generally, Russellian any variantof ordinary if that, obvious is It Widescopism. against question the begs premise first the assuming But infact is What thattheonly saidis object whichisthe (read

See also Sosa for a similar remark concerning Kripke: “...[O]n Russell’s theory (and to to (and theory Russell’s “...[O]n Kripke: concerning remark similar a for Sosa also See ) Fx à

” (P (P Bill about argument intuitive the symbolize indeed can Widescopism expressed.proposition ( interpretation given the under variable, Bill (3) (2) (1) The thought behind Soame la Widescopism) is possibly is Widescopism) la

with the modaladverb 2 1 proper names are about individuals the way Soames think they are, then then are, they think Soames way the individuals about are names proper

’) ’)

The description is not aboutanyThe isnot specific description object. Bill Therefore, the only part of the Widescopist rendition that can salvage the idea that that idea the salvage can that rendition Widescopist the of part only the Therefore, ’ logical asrin s bu a specific a about is assertion s rst two sentences will be represented asrst twosentencesbe will represented (the x: Gx) (the x: existsBill Gx) (x asserted (the x: [that: by definition by ’ s assertion is about is aspecifics assertion object.

form that that form

(x exists(x the relevant scope ambiguities arise).” (Sosa, “Rigidity in the Scope of Russell’s Russell’s of Scope the in “Rigidity (Sosa, arise).” ambiguities scope relevant the

“ (the

“ necessarily x s : ’  Gx

F argument be: to seems

Fx)

does not mean that mean not does ) 

Fx ” bet s h oe frua wee h unbound the where formula, open the is object . 131 ”

is the result of prefixing the sentence the prefixing of result the is

“ of the the of

G Fx)]

logically is alsopossibly of

G

Descriptivism ” the , otiue a ojc t the to object an contributes ),

by an individual constant (and it is is it (and constant individual an by G

it is said to be possibly be to said is it F .

are incorrect. ’ assume s statement as statement s

its falsity falsity its “ (the (the 198

F x : . CEU eTD Collection 199 abov sentencecomes outas saying that outlined Widescopism of version strengthened the assuming then, But According following two sentences: name the with synonymous descriptions. complementizers propositional marks quotation to treatment Widescopist the extend to has Descriptivist a that showing by this, do to out sets Caplan theories. Reference Direct the of variant stylistic a becomes it then “ Against Widescopism Against

Caplan, “Against Widescopism,” 185. “Against Widescopism,” Caplan, Alexander. sentence (T’ (T) (2). (1) with issynonymous (2) The of teacher Alexander (1) Aristotle taught Alexander. strengthened. so be must Widescopism that assume us Let question similar A

Te ece o Alexander of teacher The ) to Widescopism,

“ ” He 199

i

, agt Alexander taught ”

where Ben Caplan attempts to show that, if Widescopism is tenable, is Widescopism if that, show to attempts Caplan Ben where -

begging

“ Aristotle

uh s “that,” as such

taught Alexander. argument

i ”

”

n te ece o Alexander of teacher the and

is is is synonymous with the sentence sentence the with synonymous is 132 “ h tahr f Alexander of teacher the s ae n h mr srihfrad article straightforward more the in made is

n nms medd in embedded names and

ups te description the Suppose j ”

r sc ta the that such are and consider the the consider and e, this very very this e, Widescopist “ He j taught taught , CEU eTD Collection descriptive be content, of version this that that such the of level should correct,one then is Widescopism (deleting of part a is it fashion: straightforward rather a in context modal a in embed sentence The does. apparently name a containing one which in way same the Alexander either of utterance to held is This would bewould be true, equivalent because it to then did, it if since pronoun the binds that description the of content descriptive the inherit not sentence the in pronoun personal the that states Caplan content. e two the of neither that is problem The

Caplan assumes that a sentence containing a wide scope inexactly embeds containing description Caplan a assumes sentence wide thata of teacher the then Alexander, of Alexander ta teacher unique a is there if Necessarily, (ii) Alexander, then he teacher The (i) ,

“ ” possibly, it is it possibly, possibly

has a descriptivecontent.has logical pose

form ” Descriptivism ught Alexander. a serious problem for a Descriptivist since he would like to hold that an that hold to like would he since Descriptivist a for problem serious a

“ il lo ev a leave also will rsol tuh Alexander taught Aristotle cause the only modally embedded counterpart at the levellogical at the of the embedded modally counterpart the only cause of Alexander of , because , F i .

” taught Alexander. taught

It would be a misunderstanding of the Widescopist tenet to say to tenet Widescopist the of misunderstanding a be would It

“ cannot succeed in depicting the sentence the depicting in succeed cannot Possibly

i

is such that, necessarily, if there is a unique teacher of teacher unique a is there if necessarily, that, such is not complete complete mbedded sentences seems to have a descriptive descriptive a have to seems sentences mbedded

Fa expect a similar phenomenon to take place at the at placetake to phenomenon similar a expect

133 ”

turns out in fact to have the form the have to fact in out turns ”

igitc nt n place in unit linguistic or “ h tahr f lxne taught Alexander of teacher The “ He i taught Alexander taught “ Fa ) . “ “

Fa ” Poss However, if if However,

as having a having as ” “

The seems to seems ibly ”

does G Fa

is ”

CEU eTD Collection F co if that, 4.6 content and, fails thus, toanswer of tothe demand very “ sentence the in that out pointed well as have could He Widescopism. of versions many so rejecting and propounding with himself byexpounded (T’ parts o entirety the description the (T), of context the within that follows it said, being These description. the match would that formula quantified contextuall Russell Aristotle. taught sentence the of meaning the an by bound formulae open are find of case the in as Yet, quantifier. existential does he What (2). or (1) of meaning the express se actual the be to happens variable free the to assigned object the where proposition, singular a expressing formula, open an is form Possibly, h sol as blee that believe also should he , ntence

WIDESCOPISM AND CONTEXTSWIDESCOPISM BELIEF to be found at found be to ’ n o te rgnl oiain i pro in motivations original the of One troubled he not have should then isright, ifCaplan way, inadifferent To putthe point (T’ in find to expects Caplan oiia isgt namely insight, original s “ - Possibly referential names make the same semantic contribution, then, if then, contribution, semantic same the make names referential y defined, and that it would be a mistake to look for a unit within the existentially existentially the within unit a for look to mistake a be would it that and defined, y n

is f (T) which is paraphrased in (T’ in paraphrased is which (T) f F ”

, ) Widescopism, in whatever form Caplan would like to recast it, stays true to true stays it, recast to like would Caplan formwhatever in Widescopism, ” .

Fa

h pr wih olw te oa oeao de nt ae descriptive a have not does operator modal the follows which part the the surface level of (T) will be matched by parts parts by matched be will (T) of level surface the ”

is paraphrasedis as

“ He b

takes wide scope as shown in (T’ in shown as scope wide takes is i

,

agt Alexander taught F ht snec cnann a ecito cn ny be only can description a containing sentence a that “ The The provided , , ihn utto mrs snecs hc would which sentences marks, quotation within ), G “ The Wa oe hud nta sy s ht h entire the that is say instead should one What . G “ Fa

134 is such that, possibly, it is is it possibly, that, such is G ) and that there should be no expectation that expectation no be should there that and ) ” pounding

and is such that that

“

” Possibly, a

Descriptivism

ih ht f h sentence the of that with and Descriptivism ,

b possibly, is it

ee t te ae individual. same the to refer Fa , ), with ), ”

it is misguided to match to misguided is it .

occurring occurring

F a te observation the was ” the caveat that it is it that caveatthe S , which stands for for stands which , F

believes that believes . ”

at the the at “ Aristotle level a

is CEU eTD Collection 201 200 operators.following Thus,the argument modal of scope the in placed are constructions attitudinal where arguments valid intuitively because Widescopism, for trouble spell can requirements abbreviate they attitude in Frege salient is which approaches, Millian to resistance philosophical of kind same the expressing t the is this (assuming god Greek powerful assign to vengeful. commitment Theis thatbelieveshe Plato that such associated description) most the is which nothing is there though resulting the wi empty), translation is name the (and anything pick not does then, description verb, the attitude whenever propositional the over scope wide take to allowed is description the the explain to commitment associated verb. withnarrow aattitudinal scoperegarding name the ar contexts belief that conclusion the avoid can one then content, descriptive have names that takingasname bodySun. by the illuminated a is Star Evening the that thought related the reject but Sun, the by illuminated body a is Star noted, Frege as However, he associated description only narrow scope in attitudinal contexts may be viewed as as viewed be may contexts attitudinal in scope narrow only description associated he tasaet o usiuin f co of substitution to transparent e

Soames, “The Modal Argument,” Modal “The Soames, 179. Reference,” and “On Sense Frege, narrow given be to are names with associated Descriptions their of because Descriptivists, many by endorsed been already had idea This argues Soames contexts. However, the same descriptions are to be give wide scope when the name the when scope wide give be to are descriptions same the However, contexts. ’ s puzzle. s puzzle. ll issue in a falsehood. Plato can believe that Zeus is a vengeful god, even even god, vengeful a is Zeus that believe can Plato falsehood. a in issue ll narrow are

embedded in a modal context. Soames thinks that these two opposing opposing two these that thinks Soames context. modal a in embedded

scope in propositional attitudepropositional contexts. in scope that Widescopism is bound to view the description associated with a with associated description the view to bound is Widescopism that it is possible for one to believe at the same time that the Morning Morning the that time same the at believe to one for possible is it

apparent meaningfulness of sentence of meaningfulness apparent 200

4

- 5.

-

referential terms, only by giving the description description the giving by only terms, referential 135

it is easy to consider examples of examples consider to easy is it 201 s

If one upholds the principlethe If upholds one containing empty names. If names. empty containing

cp i propositional in scope s

CEU eTD Collection 202 sentences a that as this presenting from state refrains and true unambiguously to are names empty such not embedding careful is Soames verb. attitude propositional a of scope the adv modal a of scope the within used is name empty an where statement any actual unique a of existence the stating as arguments initial is symbolized as Similarly,valid inference theintuitively asis symbolized by Widescopism

Soames, “The Modal Argument,” Argument,” Modal “The Soames, Soames finds such symbolizations faulty in two regards. First, because they depict the depict theybecause First,regards. two faultyin symbolizations such finds Soames (ii that (believes) asserts Bill if Necessarily, (ii) (i that believes/asserts Bill if Necessarily, (i) w w ) )

asserted/be (believes) istrue, then asserts/believes te : Gx) x: (the te : Gx) x: (the asserts/believes

lieved something true something lieved  (il set/eivs ta: (th [that: asserts/believes [(Bill  p (il asse [(Bill ) &)

p 12. )  p

n p is true]]. is

is is true]) is true]) F

t/eivs ta: te : Gy) y: (the [that: rts/believes .

136 

Fx].

202

n n

y Gy) y: e

is is G F , they have to present as false false as present to have they , , and everything Bill asserts asserts Bill everything and , F

and Fy] & Fx) Fx) & Fy] n

y & ( & Fy] is erb and outside outside and erb F  te Bill then ,

(  p p )[(Bill )[(Bill ) [(Bill

CEU eTD Collection 204 203 with names natural in langu couched when inference the of validity intuitive the for account would which argument is that not follow the description does it constructions attitude propositional in scope narrow takes normally description a that context, So modal to reply a the in Thus, included. in verbs attitude embedded part speech every over scope wide take to description valid. co necessarily the that rather is says he What argument. final

Sosa, Sosa, Ibid., wide age.

u oe a sil ru ta tkn Wdsoim eiul mas loig the allowing means seriously Widescopism taking that argue still can one But 13. sentence the containing is in name the (WDB) (i symbolization the that insist to is idea The still permissible. descriptionsThose beiscan viewed as having scopes both available. that scope, wide take to required not are verbs attitude of scope the within the on although fact, of matter a As if that, is reason second The “Rigidity in the Scope of Russell’s Theory,” Theory,” ofRussell’s Scope the “Rigidityin - w scope analysis is false. analysisscope is

” Let usassume ) (the x: Gx) Gx) x: (the )

can be p ) & -

ntnitd te iecps rend Widescopist the instantiated, The The p

formulated asformulated follows

is true]] description description

, therefore,, 

[(Bill asserts/believes [that: Fx] & Fx) Fx) & Fx] [(Bill asserts/believes[that:

must must ” associated with a name name a with associated 203

that the rule for assigning scope to descriptions assigningfor rule todescriptions scope that the always I returnwill idea tothis inthe final section. G

is not an essential property of property essential an not is :

wide “ take narrow scopeinsuch cases If 32. 137 scope of a modal operator.scopea of

proper names proper ames

- cp aayi, ecitos occurring descriptions analysis, scope

ition of the two above arguments is not not is arguments above two the of ition

’ sanctioned by Widescopism for the first the for Widescopism by sanctioned

criticism, Sosa states that from the fact the from that states Sosa criticism, is to take wide scope only when the when only scope wide take to is of this sort exist in English, then English, in exist sort this of 

(  p n )[(Bill asserts/believes )[(Bill

and and

F

and and 204

associated G

are not are CEU eTD Collection mounted: be then can argument following the because Widescopist a for result unwelcome an is This is embeddedcontext inamodal of form logical the that accepted be also should (i that held is it if that fact the from arises problem The here. missing be to seems leeway such But saying as proposition Russell of distortion a be would te unique of content the on expounding when similar charge a reject could Widescopism proposition. singular a but anything as assertion) (or would make resemblemore it direct rather than referencetheories, classical However, r initial the matches result This scope. narrow takes description the operator, modal a of scope the in itself not is which construction attitude propositional a in embedded is description the when that, above the from follows It w ” 2. 1. S t noted be should it First, ) uncovers the logical form of the natural language argument expressed in (i), then it then (i), in expressed argument language natural the of form logical the uncovers )

acher of Alexander such that it is possible that he was wise was he that possible is it that such Alexander of acher believes that:

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See Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” 521 “Demonstratives,” Kaplan, See 292 “Dthat,” Kaplan, ralinguistic demonstrations which complete tokened demonstratives on a par with definite definite with par a on demonstratives tokened complete which demonstrations ralinguistic

DTHAT - terms are, thus, a species of directly referential terms: if the description is improper, is description the if terms: referential directly of species a thus, are, terms Kaplan later acknowledged that there are two possible ways of interpreting of ways possible two are there that acknowledged later Kaplan argu modal the of premises central the of One “ Dthat Descriptivism - TERMS ”

” CHAPTER 5 is a technical term originally introduced by Kaplan in his eponymous paper paper eponymous his in Kaplan by introduced originally term technical a is

a ulse,Kpa wud oet rgr h prtra expressing as operator the regard to come would Kaplan published, was - ” 305.

in -

“ terms are directly referential terms. When they are construed along construed are they When terms. referential directly are terms , a variety of of variety a , Dthat [the teacher of Alexander the Great] the Alexander of teacher [the Dthat

- 522 and “Afterthoughts,” 578 “Afterthoughts,” and 522 ated descriptions are rigid is to let them have the form the have them let to is rigid are descriptions ated –

RIGIDIFIED . Descriptivism 209

152 In ’ rfrnil s o a eiie description definite a of use referential s

“ e relevant object. The proposition expressed proposition The object. relevant e Demonstratives DESCRIPTIVISM ment is the assumption that the definite the that assumption the is ment -

term is effaced at the level of content, of level the at effaced is term hc rjcs hs assumption. this rejects which - 590. 590.

, ”

oe i te description. the in ioned ” aln omly treats formally Kaplan

is simila is

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CEU eTD Collection structure. a of circumstance the to 210 identical be always not may context The content. assigning of process this by determined proposition the of evaluation the provides contrast, in evaluation, moments (subjects, domain specific a over range that variables unbound to similar semantically are of token a and time, o token a identified, is context relevant the that given general,In indexical. the correctly utilizing on language the of pronoun. p the of tokens to agents assigns that function this “ pronoun personal the using for rule linguistic the that saying by them between commonality one However, represented). is world the (how conveyed information the of level the at different therefore, are, utterances two The himself. about) (is concerns utterance conte The Romania. in born was Şerban that is expressed proposition the while Şerban, is me by of content The expressed. proposition t its or content The content. and demonstrative or indexical an of character the between distinguish us let Kaplan, Following names. for theory reference direct the of supporter a by embraced thoroughly be Descriptivis a by espoused be could which way begivenas assessedatfalse true a orworld. secur object no is there I ”

But see Braun, “What is Character?,” regarding Kaplan’s attempt to define character without relativizing it to it relativizing without character define to attempt Kaplan’s regarding Character?,” is “What Braun, see But

is that a token of token a that is nt of the same word (type) in a similar utterance made by Henry is Henry, because his because Henry, is Henry by made utterance similar a in (type) word same the of nt h cnet rvds aus o idxcl o dmntaie. h circum The demonstratives. or indexicals for values provides context The a in it do not does it description, definite the to role a grants construal this Although 210 ,

or places).

The character of an indexical can be thought of as the rule that instructs a speakera instructs that rule the as of thought becan indexical an of characterThe “

“

here I ed as propositional constituent and, therefore, there is nothing that can can that nothing is there therefore, and, constituent propositional as ed f ”

he semantic value is what accounts for the intentional features of the the of features intentional the for accounts what is value semantic he “ has as semantic value the agent of the relevant context. Kaplan calls Kaplan context. relevant the of agent the value semantic as has I ” ”

the place of the context. Note that in this interpretation indexicals indexicals interpretation this in that Note context. the of place the will be assigned the agent of the context, a token of token a context, the of agent the assigned be will

“ I ”

in the utterance the in

153 t. In fact, this interpretation of dthat of interpretation this Infact, t.

roa pronoun ersonal “ I was born in Romania in born was I “ h character the can express the express can - “ terms can can terms ” now tne of stance ”

as used as

of the the of ”

the the CEU eTD Collection 211 complete syntactically construal, demonstration insecuringlevelat value ofcharacter: a the semantic Kaplan demonstration. a usually completed, be to needlatter the values, contextual relevant the assigned formerare the at evaluation the for irrelevant is It incorrect. manifestly is This expressed. proposition utters who subject the determine to needs circumstance the with utterance to true is it way: customary the in worlds possible different at evaluated afterwards Şerban (that proposition specific a thus, and, tokened the for value a provides context The Romania. “ express proposition the example, above the on build To evaluation. Possibly, I was born in Romania in born wasI Possibly,

Kaplan, “Afterthoughts,” 581. “Afterthoughts,” Kaplan, world a proposition expressedproposition by utteranceornot my somebody whether Dsrpiit hud o eut nms ih uh dthat such with names equate not should Descriptivist A thein other. semantically unless content… character the descriptioncompletes The syntax.) the of part a hardlybe couldextralinguistic, no requires that term interpretation this On completingdemonstration. the for surrogate a be to intended was it completes which description word The demonstratives and indexicals between difference The names w

iff

“ “ f h ascae ocrec of occurrence associated the of

dthat Dthat to respect with 211 un u t be to out turn

. The presence of the description in the of the term can can term the of nomenclature the in description the of presence The . ” ”

was intended to be a surrogate for a true demonstrative, and the and demonstrative, true a for surrogate a be to intended was is no more an oper an more no is ’ “ s idea was to treat descriptions as playing the same role as a a as role same the playing as descriptions treat to was idea s completed

synt

actical of evaluation may lead one to the mistaken idea that one first one that idea mistaken the to one lead may evaluation of ”

w is that there is a possible world in which Şerban is born in born is Şerban which in world possible a is there that is em o direc of terms

” ebn s on n Roman in born is Şerban

by a context in the one case and a demonstration a and case one the in context a by completion by an operand. (A operand. an by completion ator than is is than ator “ “ dthat I 154 ”

in a given world given a in “

” dthat

s on n oai) Ti pooiin is proposition This Romania). in born is s snatcly opee singular complete syntactically a is rfrne Fr aln dthat a Kaplan For reference. t “ ” I bt ae n cnrbto to contribution no makes but , ” “ , though neither has a referent a has neither though , I ”

that determines a specific content content specific a determines that a Cnuig h cnet of context the Confusing ia. w osss in consists

“ in order to determine the the determine to order in may utter - pointing terms ed by my utterance of of utterance my by ed bcue i this in because, , ” , being ,

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by of CEU eTD Collection 212 also actualwhich world is and “ that right the read to bound not are we that suggests This not. or worlds those at exists description the of denotation the whether worlds, all at object same is that designator, obstinate an yields description in the actual property world hasthe becaus operational semantically is unique the whetherassessing involves world given a at expressed proposition the assessing description The referential. directly not yet rigid, dthat with synonymous are names If availIf himself of. we view in instrumental is that designating a rule partic linguistic the for device mnemonic a as viewed most, at be, Dthat[

Ibid., 580. Ibid.,

the interpreting that thinks Kaplan that note to interesting is It content. there who individual the dthat description get complete and The home specifications. certain back satisfies run to instructions rather carry but world would possible a into itself individual the carry not would proposition dthat Complete D “ a is there However, Dthat[ ”

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iff there is an object in objectan is there iff “ 155 representation w

iff, at iff, , obstinately rgd eintr hc dsgae t designates which designator rigid a w

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THE ACTUAL F ACTUAL THE “ the person who utters who person the sub a at approach this Pursuing “ The semantics for operator is this defending for strategy second A Actually, ” Descriptivism

s s ” is se is ” ”

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is associated with the rule the with associated is 156 w truth of the complex sentence depends on how how on depends sentence complex the of truth s hn discussing when

s

is true in the actual worl actual the in true is

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those that obtain in the actualthose that the world. obtain in

from the modal argument is to hold to is argument modal the from and “ I ” a pooiin ht n u world our in that proposition lar

the only relevant facts that can can that facts relevant only the is associated with the linguistic linguistic the with associated is w “ the actual actual the

iff the (actual)the iff Branquinho “ Actually, “ actually “ culy Nxn was Nixon Actually, “ the world where the the where world the d, then the sentence the then d,

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w the . I . CEU eTD Collection the assignment of truth and the Then identical. are star morning the and star evening the world that in that false is it Suppose evenin have the that wouldmeant it constant, descriptions associated by the uttered keeping been world, another sentence in the somebody had However, object. same the and one are star morning it ours, to accessible worlds all In necessary. is statement identity this of truth the rigid, are descriptions two the since that, Note star. morning actual the is star evening actual the that proposition the expresses sentence the Then respectively. are descriptions associated their behavior. shou they then descriptions, definite rigidified fact, in are, names If terms. (type) sentence co context the be can one hand, one as such indexical is semantics operator the with rigidified descriptions definite as names Defining ntext of utterance the same rule that is applied by another subject who utters the same same the utters who subject another by applied is that rule same the utterance of ntext utterance w 2

osdr s n xml te name the example an as Consider actual world “ the world where the evening star is different from the morning star, we can represent represent can we star, morning the from different is star evening the where world the The actual The

to the tokened pronoun. On the other hand, one can be viewed as applying to the to applying as viewed be can one hand, other the On pronoun. tokened the to expresses iia to similar

t dfeet context different a at “ I, . F

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g star in that world is identical to the morning star in the same world. same the in star morning the to identical is world that in star g viewed as stating the stating as viewed

one can be viewed as being engaged in two types of activity. On the the On activity. of types two in engaged being as viewed be can one - denotes at a given world given a at denotes values asvalues follows: letting Schematically, proposition. false necessarily a ht f neias r eosrtvs W sw ht we uig an using when that, saw We demonstratives. or indexicals of that

s h cs ta, ee i or ol, h eeig tr n the and star evening the world, our in here, that, case the is “ Hesperus is identical to identical is Hesperus “ h ata eeig star evening actual the Idxcl ad eosrtvs r two are demonstratives and Indexicals .

s

proposition resulting from assigning from resulting proposition “ 157 Hesperus

w

an individual individual an ”

and Phosphorus ”

and “ Phosphorus i

“ iff h ata mrig star morning actual the “ actual ” “

as uttered in our world our in uttered as the ld exhibit a similar similar a exhibit ld ” F ”

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CEU eTD Collection as asserted are they hand, other the on mean and, which informative, situation possible any are they exclude hand, cannot one thus, the is and, on that, proposition true is necessarily asserted Phosphorus” to the identical is which “Hesperus as in such situations utterances by those raised problem of utterance of context the with compatible 215 Semantics.” Dimensional 214 rules. oflinguistic knowledge models that character proposal 213 reinterpretation,by dictatedfacie ofconversational violations prima rules. the examination rational upon subject a to dimensional semantics asso meaning linguistic demonstrative. the conveying as character one on two use for two dif denoted have might names two the with here associate we descriptions Phosphorus is by conveyed information the depict to have we then it, comprising words the use h on also depends sentence a of meaning the that notion further the capture to decide of( traditional notion content

Stalnaker, “Assertion Revisited,” 300. For Stalnaker, an assertion is an exclusion from the possible situations situations possible the from exclusion an is assertion an Stalnaker, For 300. Revisited,” “Assertion Stalnaker, To be sure, a supporter of Rigidified Descriptivism would jettison singular propositions, but retain the the retain but propositions, singular jettison would Descriptivism Rigidified of supporter a sure, be To hles “h Fudtos f Two of Foundations “The Chalmers, - - two dimensional terms is further proof of the soundness of Rigidified of soundness the of proof further is terms dimensional dimensional ’ “ th Given = istheactualHesperus The evening actual morningstar Phosphorus is star - s view of how we should interpret a interpret should we how of view s dimensional actual, ” 213 ”

t we at as the above above the as to functions from possible worlds totruth from worlds possible to functions

matrix matrix o ie nte eape Camr dvlp a acut f two of account an develops Chalmers example, another give To

s that they seem to exclude some other possibilities. Stalnaker proposes to resolve this resolve to proposes Stalnaker possibilities. other some exclude to seem they that s

matrix in which the diagonal proposition is arrived at via a process of of process a via at arrived is proposition diagonal the which in matrix that identify represents makes use of makes useof a function a

w two w h rlvn cnet f s, h hrzna lns oe the model lines horizontal the use, of context relevant the 1 2

- a function from possible worlds, which fix the content of content the fix which worlds, possible from function a dimensional - iesoa Smnis” Te Componen “The Semantics,” Dimensional

.

214 from possible worldfrom possible epistemic possibilities epistemic

Finally, 158 w T F two 1

matrix, allowing that, in other worlds, the the worlds, other in that, allowing matrix, -

dimensional Staln

aker adopts an externalist reading of reading externalist an adopts aker - values. s w ciated with an indexical or or indexical an with ciated T

F to truth 2

, that is, what, thatis, appears possible matrix. Kaplan interprets the interprets Kaplan matrix.

Whether viewing names as as viewing names Whether - valu Descriptivism s f otn, “Two Content,” of ts 215 es ferent objects. The The objects. ferent )

.

However, if we However, if

“

Hesperus

false. The The false. depends ow we we ow - - CEU eTD Collection 217 216 of names. to values assignment direct by c elucidated still is intentionality of is, that is, name a rules of referent the what Gricean or who knowing and semantics Millian two from interpretation, derivative this in that, bottom Note objects. different label concept (propositional statement, names Paul’s with two consistent situations the possible the where exclude to is assertion Henry’s of point The matrix. proposi diagonal the is over argue Paul and Henry what that thinks Stalnaker Phosphorus.” is singular the Hesperus course “Of states mistake, not the correct to keen and, asserting Phosphorus to identical not is diago Hesperus as that thinks the but Phosphorus” itself, is to identical “Hesperus is Venus of that utterance proposition an reinterpreting by conflict apparent different across object same the to refer Names names. of profiles temporal and modal refer. Rigidified name syn a where are worlds at descriptions, names rigidified that Assuming there. anything denote to fails description existent obstinate an while exist, not does designator designates sameex whether object the world, atany thedesignatum designatum the where worlds at nothing and exists object the where world any at object designators. same the obstinate designates that fact, one is in designator persistent are, names that view the of support in arguments desig persistent In I willcontexts. deal thefirst section of with this line attack. Rigidified argument, second th to According designators. obstinate, not and persistent, are names that implies it because Rigidified argument, first the to According 5.3

Soames, “The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions,” 14. Descriptions,” Rigidified and Scope Wide Argument: Modal “The Soames, Ess and “Reference Salmon, Alice” and and Ted and Carol and “Bob Kaplan,

NAMES AS OBSTINATE AS NAMES DESIGNATORS - p prah inl ta Sankr iw te osrcin f two a of construction the views Stalnaker that signals approach up The case against this conclusion can be built by noting the noting by built be can conclusion this against case The description The passing in mentions Soames i now are We

that is in our world the only only the world our in is that

aos n nts floig aln n Salmon and Kaplan following notes, and nators Descriptivism s, as Stalnaker calls them) are built from singular propositions, as in Kaplan’s theory. This This theory. Kaplan’s as in propositions, fromsingular built are them) calls Stalnaker as s,

n a position to review two arguments against Rigidified against arguments two review to position a n “ the actual the Descriptivism

would, thus,entail that namesdesignators. are persistent D

” ht Rigidified that

denotes at a world world a at denotes D

I te actual the If .

Descriptivism 159 ant con fr eif srpin i modal in ascriptions belief for account cannot

’ rfrn de nt xs,tenm fis to fails name the exist, not does referent s nal proposition. Suppose Henry finds out that Paul Paul that out finds Henry Suppose proposition. nal ommunication. Intentionality is still a matter of of matter a still is Intentionality ommunication. Descriptivism

w is untenable on semantic grounds, semantic on untenable is D

iff the domain of domain the iff

os o eit at exist not does

- dimensional matrix as a process process a as matrix dimensional ence,” 32 ence,” , 216

similarities between the the between similarities mle ta nms are names that implies

ht hr ae strong are there that - - dimensional matrices matrices dimensional 40.

ists ornot. ists onymous with with onymous Descriptivism tion in the above above the in tion w w contains an contains te the then ,

217

A e .

CEU eTD Collection Rigidified that anddesignators obstinate are names that therefore, appear, would It world. that respectto name the that accept should we sense, common with variance at seem alternatives both Since false. is expressed proposition the that fact the of us convince to linguistical regard with counter appear options truth a lacking either is expressed name the namely worlds, possible some to respect with be should names then holds, obstinately modal discourses temporal the and modal the between parallel w other in Names, name. the of referent say assigned theas name. thereferent are Names of temporally rigid. then was that person same the to refer to rule the by abide to agree it employ who subjects name the Rather, time. that at applied is name the person which to discovering by then and utterance referent the that imply object same the saying In worlds. possible different across to refer they which in way same the in world a of history the in periods “ Aristotle is dead, is Aristotle Consider the sentence the Consider spe can we that however, Note, “ Descriptivism “ ly encoded. At the same time, one would have to be a remarkably talented rhetor rhetor talented remarkably a be to have would one time, same the At encoded. ly Aristotle

Hitler to that world by the above sentence, so there is an appearance that content was content that appearance an is there so sentence, above the by world that to ”

rigid designators asrigid well. designators

” os o dsgae ih epc t sc a ol, hn h proposition the then world, a such to respect with designate not does

receives ”

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of the name has to be identified by determining first the time of the the of time the first determining by identified be to has name the of intuitive, however. There does appear to be information transmitted information be to appear does There however. intuitive, the include not does utterance of context temporal current the if even

is false.

“ a referent at a certain point in the history of this world and all and world this of history the in point certain a at referent a Hitler was never born. never was Hitler

value (no referent, no content expressed) or is false. Both false. is or expressed) content no referent, (no value ak now of people who do not exist any longer. We can We any longer. exist not do who people of now ak ords, are obstinately temporal obstinately are ords, “

Aristotle Aristotle 160 ,

those whose domains do not include Hitler. If Hitler. include not do domains whose those

is a subtle philosopher, subtle a is ”

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“ Hitler

rigid designators. If theIf designators. rigid ”

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CEU eTD Collection 219 218 truth The worlds. given to relative evaluating of level the and demonstrative or rigid are terms indexical such tokened a to value of a assigning of level the tokens between distinguished We designators. that intuition the preserve would that demonstratives developi when presented originally was evaluation himself. exist not does Hitler where world a to respect with person a to refer someone to refer not does it that mean not does evaluation. ofcircumstance that charged because, world a designators.idea thatnames are persistent logic Free true. be to out turn will one original the and denote when time a at false as counted be will sentence second the then logic, sentence the of negation we that sentence result the count the can is we Similarly, this correct. is and think intuitively true is sentence composed the that imply would false as born (false) that maintain to us allow sentence the Since absencedenotation. ofthe wouldin conveyed, was information logic, free of advocates by depth in explored non

Branquinho, “In Defence of Obstinacy.” of “In Defence Branquinho, 567. Designation,” Rigidified and “Names Stanley, - ” to leads terms denoting

is the negat the is The Kaplanian distinction between distinction Kaplanian The Stanley Jason

support for this thesis can only stem from confusing the context of use with the with use of context the confusing from stem only can thesis this for support Stanley thinks that we can avoid the above argument by holding that the use of use the that holding by argument above the avoid can we that thinks Stanley ’ s answer is based on the assumption that the name the that assumption the on based is answer s ion of ion in

that world, there is no one denoted by the name. name. the by denoted one no is there world, that

“ “ Hitler was born, was Hitler Aristotle is alive. is Aristotle 219

xrsig as propositions. false expressing Just because the name does not refer to anyone to refer not does name becausethe Just

- value of the proposition depends, as usual, on facts facts on usual, as depends, proposition the of value ”

” the policy of counting the latter (simple) sentence (simple) latter the counting of policy the the the

If we extend the free logic approach to temporal temporal to approach logic free the extend we If 161 h pooiin hs eie a tu o false or true as defined thus proposition the context of utterance and utterance of context

with respect to respect with g smnis o idxcl and indexicals for semantics a ng 218

allows us to make sense of the the of sense make to us allows

h sgeto, hc was which suggestion, The

that “ “ Hitler rsol s dead is Aristotle

world. In fact, it does does it fact, In world. João Branquinho has has Branquinho João “ the the ” - Aristotle

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162

n object n

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CEU eTD Collection 220 not might Aristotle descriptions. rigidified containing those and names containing sentences teacherGreat of Alexander the “ that Suppose substitutable indeed are names then element, modal any of free are contexts belief If descriptions. rigidified associated their with names well. that assumption in description the with veritate “ Rigidified to reply damaging more stronger, a is there that convinced was he because did Branquinho 5.4 names areand obstinate Soames designators counter that insight the preserve to us allow would manner this in descriptions rigidified Interpreting that dthat Kaplan Rememberthat correct? is this that believe to have we do why But Aristotle. actual the

Soames, “The Modal Argument,” 13 Argument,” Modal “The Soames,

BELIEF ASCRIPTIONSBELIEF INMODAL CONTEXTS Yet oee, dig oa oeaos o eif otxs pes h prleim between parallelism the upsets contexts belief to operators modal adding However, pre the on elaborate not did Soames Scott “

in all contexts. Modal constructions verify this prediction since substituting the name name the substituting since prediction this verify constructions Modal contexts. all in The actual - terms can obstinatelycertainly, can, rigid. We be replythe proper that belief (hyperintensional) contexts do not always accommodate the substitution of substitution the accommodate always not do contexts (hyperintensional) belief ”

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Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 200 Contingency,” and “Reference Evans, Ibid. See also Davies and Humberstone, “Two Notions of Necessity” and their distinction between two operators operators two between distinction their and Necessity” of Notions “Two Humberstone, and Davies also See

- dimensional logic. Ev logic. dimensional

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- are di hfig n ta ti las o ifclis Se atn ais Rfrne n Cnigny fr a for Contingency” and “Reference Davies Martin See difficulties. to leads this that and shifting which is the function that assigns to the utterance truth utterance the to assigns that function the is which

“ fferent. Dummett disagrees:fferent. Dummett ih have might n hi dfeet otiuin t te etne fre fo te by them from formed sentences the to contributions different their in fferently modal under operators “ proposition

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Julius ans in “Comment on ‘Two Notions of Necessity’” argues that the fixedly operator operator fixedly the that argues Necessity’” of Notions ‘Two on “Comment in ans that John is as tall of John (himself). Evans uses the distinction distinction the uses Evans (himself). John of tall as is John that ” te noaie oe dfe i igein sne being sense, ingredient in differ ones unmodalised the , F ” ”

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is treacherous. What the two unmodalised sentences share sentences unmodalised two the What treacherous. is “ are epistemically equivalent, but express different propositions propositions different express but equivalent, epistemically are

Julius invented the zip the invented Julius one is in a position to know that the sentence the that know to position a in is one 230 i.e.,

- 201.

utterances such that, if one unde one if that, such utterances

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Ibid., 329. Ibid., Stanley, “Modality and What is Said,” 322 Said,” is What and “Modality Stanley, There is, however, another reason for doubting the coherence of demarcating modal demarcating of coherence the doubting for reason another however, is, There expl proposals All Stanley “ - Julius is the inventor o inventor the is Julius mo

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t its usefulness by banishing modal constructions from the scope of its inquiry. its of scope the from constructions modal banishing by usefulness its t apply to different semantic different to apply a dsore I hs rtcs o Stanley of criticism his In discourse. dal i.e.,

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is assessed as contingent because the person who person the because contingent as assessed is 179

. Distinguishing between them dissolves dissolves them between Distinguishing . these two notions, Stanley identifies a third kind kind third a identifies Stanley notions, two these rn te etne cmuiae the communicates sentences the ering ’ ter, vrt atmt t tackle to attempts Everett theory, s - modal propositionalism, propositionalism, modal Descriptivism Descriptivism

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communicated Stanley, “Modality and What is Said,” 337. isSaid,” What and “Modality Stanley, 130 Descriptivism,” of Defenses “Recent Everett, - n h cam ht setrc otn i nt ujc t mdl evaluation modal to subject not is content assertoric that claim the on From the first the From believe one have would Stanley terms, different in point same the put To assumptions background which in modal contentof a term affected not is by its meaning. ones possibilities, determined by mean the alternative consider speakers.… competent of background a commo form together language the in expressions the of meanings The n knowledge that is a crucial crutch in successful communication successful in crutch crucial a is that knowledge n

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wha i i fr oehn t b te ae niiul through individual same the be to something for is it t

hud o b dfne b rnig wy from away running by defended be not should 181

- connoted phrases from the purview of the the of purview the from phrases connoted ubstance is not only temporally temporally only not is ubstance CEU eTD Collection rm h lre pioohcl rmwr wee t s medd n wih explains which and embedded is it where framework philosophical larger the from cont my exegetical is It largely exercise. a into section this transform to wish not do I Frege but how thinking, exactly understood is this that view the for mounted arguments be can there think I eye. of conceive should objects of we sort different a too as concepts so perception, of objects direct as objects ordinary of think we as Just concepts. of contemplation Platonic of form a essentially being as thinking view s rational direct of objects as concepts for account to bias object. contemplating subject a of tools various on byrelying actions various undertaking subject a of that is picture correct The mistake. a is argued, I This, individual. particular a out single thought the entertaining abou be thoughts singular makes account an such that comment the in manifested idea, this about uneasiness significant is there that mentioned I objects. their include not do thoughts singular Russell, Pace entities. an with it enrich we that provided intentionality, the onto latch concept a that said to Ialso object. putative employs subject the that concepts the account into take must thoughts proper A them. entertains who subject the of repertoire conceptual one that idea the buttress to used be can puzzle 6.1

REVIEW

The philosophical instinct to analyze thinking in terms of seeing and its counterpart its and seeing of terms in thinking analyze to instinct philosophical The Frege that chapter first the in saw We conclusions. main the of stock take us Let CHAPTER 6

ention, nonetheless, that, even if it is true, we can separate this thesis this separate can we true, is it if even that, nonetheless, ention, t their objects only indirectly, insofar as the concepts employed in employed concepts the as insofar indirectly, only objects their t – “

NAMES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS internally , more abstract, which can be perceived by the mind the by perceived be can which abstract, more , ”

abstract entities that happen to be true of a specific specific a of true be to happen that entities abstract - based account of singular thoughts can explain their explain can thoughts singular of account based 182

’ s thoughts of an object are sensitive to the the to sensitive are object an of thoughts s

xlnto o cnet a unsaturated as concepts of explanation crutiny leads to a predisposition to predisposition a to leads crutiny analysis of singular singular of analysis

, not , ’ ’ s s CEU eTD Collection description the others, of Great Alexander the is amistake. co and identical syntactically be to happen only which names, different use they that concluded have would Frege Aristotle, about information qualitative ent subjects two of case the with presented been he had that, accept should expressed thoughts of analysis Descriptivist standard a to diffe May to According name. unsaturated the character concepts used of inentertaining thought. this writing and altogether can It astray. us lead not should co the When concept. the saturate would represented schematically thought the entertaining that individual missing a absence, an gap, a says: it their very towards nature point an whom of individual the of direction activity this in on relying am I that tools very the because Henry about is philosophy reads Henry that thought My concepts. by a exercise, vicarious mere a as intentionality vie the reject can we this, accomplish we Once entities. unsaturated using of terms in intentionality rence in names from a difference in senses associated with them. If this idea is wedded is idea this If them. with associated senses in difference a from names in rence ncepts Yet surely, one could reply, if I associate associate I if reply, could one surely, Yet proper of a sense represent the should we about how unclear Frege was thatI also said th respect, this In ta a ocpuls acut f iglr huhs s on t acut for account to bound is thoughts singular of account conceptualist a that w

F

and G . The presence of the sign the of presence The . ” “

the philosopher that my teacher spoke about in th in about spoke teacher my that philosopher the and you (syntacticallyamong nameand the associate with, defined) same “ e formal sign of an object, which is the variable, means exactly what exactly means variable, the is which object, an of sign formal e te : [the ’ s interpretation, Frege was positively committed to inferring a a inferring to committed positively was Frege interpretation, s F

“ ] “ also G outside pull

are Concepts true. are they ” ” wee h epy pcs ev t underscore to serve spaces empty the where , e ersne i ti sml cs b laig t out it leaving by case simple this in represented be

e oad Hny s t sek pit e n the in me point speak, to so Henry, towards me ” , a world. , a 183

“ x Aristotle as “ as -

product that ensues from grasping pure pure grasping from ensues that product is mere symbolism, a convention which convention a symbolism, mere is

[ the while using while ” x

: with the description the with Fx - referential. I think that this too this that think I referential. , therefore, entities which by which entities therefore, , ] Gx , ”

the mind employs only employsonly mind the proper names, then we we then names, proper e ertaining distinct distinct ertaining Tuesday “ the teacher teacher the class, the the ”

CEU eTD Collection use of rendition not are restatements or the had who by mean you do same. the being as concepts distinct of up made are which thoughts two the treat to as singular of account thoughts be constituents? andallowingto propositional objects conceptualist a up giving view, opposite the embrace we should Or thoughts? different entertain Richard and Paul that follow it does But name. the use to time qualitative of identity an t himself was in who subject the alone let Richard, and grounded Paul by shared information not is name the of teaching the circumstances, a bears Henry (say, Henry color is Richard where or blurred is vision his and info qualitative of type same the to access have not may Richard and Paul that plain is It name. his uttering name the of activities howtous of teachingone different. be must from up built are they thoughts the match, not do individuals other from Aristotle co identifying the that given and, components their list metaphysician. saying when thought same the exactly think both cannot we then

“ I mean the man who came by when we stopped at the fountain the at stopped we when by came who man the mean I ’ a they thesame name, all mean thing, s face to which Paul and Richard, respectively, have access are qualitatively differ qualitatively are access have respectively, Richard, and Paul which to face s I am inclined to say the following: whatever a name is, its use convention is so framedis so use convention is,its a following:name whatever sayI the am inclined to ordinary the and inference habitual this between is contrast the marked how But

birthmark “ Henry. ” rmation. One might only think of cases where Paul does not wear his glasses his wear not does Paul where cases of think only might One rmation.

We cannot do so because a thorough account of our singular thoughts would would thoughts singular our of account thorough a because so do cannot We ‘ Henry reads philosophy reads Henry ”

birthmark birthmark Suppose I introduce Henry to Paul and Richard, pointing to him and him to pointing Richard, and Paul to Henry introduce I Suppose on on his face o dfeet huhs Udr h convention the Under thoughts. different of s n i rig his on ” e a name! Consider a case of teaching two subjects the use subjectscase theuse ofteaching atwo a name!Consider e

or

“ The person that was sitting in the shade next to Paul to next shade the in sitting was that person The ’ ? t he ta ol Pu cn see can Paul only that cheek ht ” i.e., 184

“ Well, I speak about the person I met that day that met I person the about speak I Well,

that Henrythat reads philosophy. - ncepts that we employ to discriminate discriminate to employ we that ncepts ln o, ial, hr te at of parts the where finally, or, blind

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Cluster Desc Cluster “ of substances. - repeatable

and definite descriptions descriptions definite and , ” Logically proper names cannot be communicatedbecauseLogically be cannot names proper

of what props them into existence, of what what of existence, into them props what of nt to the compositionality principle and his Theory of of Theory his and principle compositionality the to nt ” riptivism

niis is t h hat f Kripke of heart the at lies entities

s osbe t l. ocps r inter are Concepts all. at possible is names are rigid designators underscores a potentially potentially aunderscores rigiddesignators are names 185

can counter the two the counter can

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a b epoe i communication in employed be can . On the other hand, the semantic semantic the hand, other the On . ”

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is allowed in the cluster. Kripke is right to say that such descriptions should not be notbe should descriptions such tosay that isright thecluster.Kripke allowed in is two subjects did not use the same namesame the use not did subjects two

our linguistic practices, by holding that, in such cases, the cluster of information of cluster the cases, such in that, holding by practices, linguistic our “ the individual referred to by other members of my linguistic community via via community linguistic my of members other by to referred individual the hs iprac ws ruh t or teto b Kripke by attention our to brought was importance whose Descriptivism each , 186 I - ett thro dentity product at the linguistic level of the more more the of level linguistic the at product

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reuil tp o continuous of type irreducible then it is minimally se minimally is it then suig ht h ohr has other the that assuming gidity is an essential an is gidity Descriptivism

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Rigidified Another way to block the modal argument is to deploy Rigidified deploy to is argument modal the block to way Another entertain the same object of belief of object same the entertain I said that one way to depict depict to way one that said I ost inconsequential differences between two worlds should lead, according to this to according lead, should worlds two between differences inconsequential ost rsol i wise is Aristotle the formalization of both the formalization “ “ actual Possibly, Santa Claus does not exist not does Claus Santa Possibly, Descriptivism ”

to every description in the cluster associated with the name. But then then Butname. the with the associated cluster in everydescription to e identical from all relevant viewpoints to English, an utterance of of utterancean English, to viewpoints relevant all from identicale ”

ol eti ta to ujcs lcd n ifrn worlds different in placed subjects two that entail would cannot mean the same thing as an utterance of the the of utterance an as thing same the mean cannot utterances - em, obstin terms, The only remaining option was a form of Rigidified Rigidified of form a was option remaining only The the the ”

because the rendition is false, while what was was what while false, is rendition the because when they utter utter they when 187 of account ts on Christmas to good children is such that at at that such goodis children to Christmas on ts

range over distinct domains “ Aristotle is wise is Aristotle uns o ne of fulness ately rigid terms which are not directly directly not are which terms rigid ately

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iesoa trs a epan h aprn divergent apparent the explain can terms dimensional - DIMENSIONAL TERMS DIMENSIONAL 188 one of Everett of one

- dimensional terms. Let us explore us Let terms. dimensional ’ ” s examples that we discussed in in discussed we that examples s

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and CEU eTD Collection 238 237 communication abidesand by thefollowingthe Cooperative Principle maxims: Bach with badly communication nopossibility involved, thus toinfer a thought further conveyed. sit examples of sort This thought. unique the denoting as used form the has world the with interaction our from available intak conceptual The descriptions. definite by conveyed information the tokening cold. H Henry hear not did you If description. definite a use to likely very are we name, its of privy not is who one that involve only one subject. cases about say to all at nothing absolutely has It more. or subjects two between exchange situations to nature very its by limited is analysis of type this inf more for allow and analysis Russellian classic the only endorse should we case, present the in dimensions semantic two postulating of instead that, if contains, which proposition, anything, ofthe thedenotation defin singular distinct a mean certainly can one proposition, uniqueness a say only can one although that, fact the prove should meant is what and said is commu rational concerning norms general more from inferred be can description definite a of function referential apparent the that fact enry

Neale, Neale, “D Bach, ”

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nication. 189

237

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Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” 26 Conversation,” “Logic and Grice, Following Evans ( Evans Following Let me point out, first, that this kind of inference thrives when applied to cases where where cases to applied when thrives inference of kind this that first, out, point me Let 4 3 2. addressing that know thesubjectis and he speaker 1. Both the ambiguity, brief andbe perspicuous.BeManner: Maximof Maxim Relation: of Be relevant. adequate evidence. s not true. is that one contribution your make to Try Quality: of Maxim than is required. informativemorecontribution yourmake not exchange).Do the of purpose current inform as contribution your Make Quantity: of Maxim is as talk exchange which in you are engaged. such contribution conversational thedirection of or acceptedpurpose the byoccurs, it which at stage your the at required, Make Principle: Cooperative The . . singular which involve proposition uniqueness assigned proposition Descriptions. by theTheory of Principle and maxims. its exchange it knows he that knows other the that knows party that that knows he that knows other the that aware is them hr i n rao t spoe ht h sbet s o osrig h Cooperative the observing not is subject the that suppose to reason no is There S S

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the information conveyed. “ y disagree with respect to the correct specification of the semantic value of a name, they they name, a of value semantic the of specification correct the to respect with disagree y Phosphorus f e iw cutr s n niy ih t on itr, hn h fu the then history, own its with entity an as cluster a view we If identity. its explains that history a has cluster The a that said I in the proposal put forth within the direct reference framework reference direct the within forth put proposal the in rocesses that explain theirrocesses identity time explain are that distinct. over

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Descriptivism

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even if I believe that you wish to deceive me and present me with a lookalike, I am I lookalike, a with me present and me deceive to wish you that believe I if even reads who friend my of fact in speaking were you that and wrong was I that er to world a is There of version current the how now assess can We same the are uses he tokens two whether is subject the to transparent is what wit, To are you that assume can I distinctness. guarantee to itself, by enough, not is this Yet

on Christmas, Christmas, on the the modal operator, the entire proposition expressed is false. However, if we treat treat we if However, false. is expressed proposition entire the operator, modal the F , “

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such that there is no object no is there that such Widescopism cannot explain how utterances how explain cannot Widescopism

197

“ ” Henry. are true. The problem stems from the fact the from stems problem The true. are some x Descriptivism

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of the utterance. Space to want I that said I Rigidified “ - the the ie dniy s ae o a ojcie fact objective an on based is identity time F Descriptivism

at time time at ontents which differ differ which ontents

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Kripke, Kripke, n ht ol. s rpe tess t i ivle pstn ta te dniy ae place. takes identity the that positing involves it it, stresses Kripke As world. that in consequences

a language that is that language a It also explains also It This born. was Great the Alexander of teacher actual the when time same the exactly at Rome individual The = Great the Alexander of teacher actual The n number n Naming and Necessity and Naming the

strategy ,

that the most insignificant change in our world leads necessarily to a change in in change a to necessarilyleads world our in change insignificant most the that above above regarding ) .

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how we can identify cont identify can we how to all purposes identical to English, has the same content as a as content same the has English, to identical purposes all to description, then Henry has a singular belief about Aristotle. Aristotle. about belief singular a has Henry then description,

in this alternate world alternate this in ” , 46. , what what Then we stipulate that the fol Then we stipulate that

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w 1 is the case the is , Henry has a belief abo belief a has Henry , “ “Aristotle was“Aristotle asubtlemetaphysician.” In w 1 , Aristotle was born in Rome at the same time time same the at Rome in born was Aristotle , 199 on our pla our on , I ,

ent across languages. We saw in the chapter chapter the in saw We languages. across ent would be would - by

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Assuming that the sets of worlds accessible from the actual wor the actual from accessible worlds sets of the that Assuming

UNDERSTANDING AND

“ Possibly/Necessarily A name is a placeholder for description for placeholder a is name A T by the cluster which is adjusted to track the putative individual. Reflecting the nature the Reflecting individual. putative the track to adjusted is which cluster the by he careful reader must have noticed that I only spoke of reports of the form the of reports of spoke only I that noticed have must reader careful he /Necessarily ’ this kind of kind this s referent, the sense of the name is essentially dynamic. To say that two subjects two that say To dynamic. essentially is name the of sense the referent, s - in English in changing substance, our conception of it has to be articulated in such a way way a such in articulated be to has it of conception our substance, changing - by

obtain obtain - ocp iett bten the between identity concept is Aristotle that believes Henry , reports attribute in fact any singular belief to Henry. They do say that that say do They Henry. to belief singular anyfact in attribute reports . Yet because we define this possible world as one in which certain which in one as world possible this define we because Yet . , Henry believes the that and are known by the subject who utters the sentence, we there we sentence, the utters who subject the by known are and

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in the cluster that the subject relies on when when on relies subject the that cluster the in oncern Aristotle, but they do not have the the have not do they but Aristotle, oncern ir F

conceptions is not required. They can can They required. not is conceptions is the same the ld and from the alternative one are identical. are one alternative from and the ld F G . ” . ” It will later turn out that I do not do I that out turn later will It

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Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description,” 254. Description,” and Acquaintance by “Knowledge Russell, ir

conceptual intake conceptual The corollary that, if something has a purely conceptual nature, then its application is application its then nature, conceptual purely a has something if that, corollary The the correct), is description the long (so description proposition described is still the same. the vary may we however that, and Bismarck, actual the concerning proposition true a is there know we that descriptions varying the of spite in communicate to us enables What an involves which proposition a description by know only can we that arguing While Im agine two subjects watching from opposite directions a red cup sitting on a desk. a on sitting cup red a directions opposite from watching subjects two agine ing the same exact place thesame ing onthe conceptual. conceptual. -

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retains its meaning whether we utter it now, at a later time later a at now, it utter we whether meaning its retains two positive semantic proposals. The first is that singular that is first The proposals. semantic positive two )

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Ibid, 723. Ibid, 722 Ibid., Russell “Howto Kaplan, metaphysic trans to pair such partyhisof member respected States concept the by time of moments two across linked are by distinguished and concept common trans of notion no is there worlds view, opposite The Anti backs thereby one then Frege, with sides one if contrast, In distinctor thisnesses may underlie great resemblance, I call common a that and time, and possiblespace through (i.e., space physical in extended being logical as them regard commonly we way in the much in worlds) extended be can individuals that world, behavior and attributes doctrineThe holdsdoes that thatitmake ask to sense Here isKaplan e to wish I that view the define better to try me Let 244

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R s n tmc etne n hc the which in sentence atomic an is

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is Chines referential fer that free variables under direct assignment are not singular terms? But then But terms? singular not are assignment direct under variables free that fer e & ( , but thosethat can be only , but bound

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is completely orthogonal on myis completely orthogonal thought. having on a singular

do not require any special ability or prior prior or ability special any require not do g a singular thought is not guaranteed any longer longer any guaranteed not is thought singular a g 216

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information. information. c) n bcue eti cneta srcue cn agt ny one only target can structures conceptual certain because and ect) loyed by other subjects in his community. Eliminating old information information old Eliminating community. his in subjects other by loyed - available information. Thoughts are singular because of their make their of because singular are Thoughts information. available The though The CONCLUSION t expressed t o associate with name tokens distinct qualitative distinct tokens name with associate o 218

by such by

a an utterance an variety of of variety - terms (terms which can be be can which (terms terms

comprises exclusively exclusively comprises Descriptivism. I have have I Descriptivism. ability to store store to ability ns ns - - CEU eTD Collection Burge, and Proper “Reference Names.” Tyler. Mistake?” Buchanan,IncompleGary Ostertag. Ray of and “Has theProblem Philosophy Brogaard,Berit. Predicates Australasian or “Descriptions: Journal Quantifiers?” of ——— BraunDavid. Character?” “What is Branquinho, “In Perspectives17 (2003): João. Defence 1 ofObstinacy.” Philosophical Phil ——— 208 IdentifyingBoër, and "Reference PhilosophicalReview Steven. Descriptions." International Blackburn, “Wettstein William. onDefinite Descriptions.” Bell, MindFrege?” was David.99(1990): ‘Russellian’ 267 “How Reimer and 189 Bezuidenhout, Anne ——— http://online.sfsu.edu/~kbach/oldies/descriptivism.htm ——— http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/FregeRus.html ——— ——— ——— Bach,Kent. name.” “What’s ina Necessity.” without Almog, “Naming Joseph. Analytic Tradition Connotations.” andAckerman,Attitudes, Non Names,“Proper Diana. Propositional An InternationalPhilosophyinthe An Journalfor Abbott, Barbara.“A and Reply Uniqueness.” toSzabó's “Descriptions - osophy inthe AnalyticTradition 228. . “Understandingbelief reports.” . . . “Descriptivism LastDistilled.” September 14, 2002. modified . "ComparingLast Fregeand Russell."September modified 14, 2002. . “You Don't Say?” . “Ramachandran vs. Russell.”

“Properas Predicates.” Names “Descriptions: PointsofReference.”In and Descriptions Bey

Mind

85 (2007): Journal inthe forPhilosophy AnalyticTradition Philosophical Philosophy Journalfor Studies: An International inthe

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