teorema Vol. XXIV/3, 2005, pp. 49-74 The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals* Manuel García-Carpintero ABSTRACT Some contemporary semantic views defend an asymmetry thesis concerning defi- nite descriptions and indexicals. Semantically, indexicals are devices of singular refer- ence; they contribute objects to the contents of the speech acts made with utterances including them. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, are generalized quantifiers, behaving roughly the way Russell envisaged in “On Denoting”. The asymmetry thesis depends on the existence of a sufficiently clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics, because indexicals and descriptions are often used in ways that apparently contradict the asymmetry thesis; the semantics/pragmatics distinction is invoked to see behind the appearances. The paper critically examines arguments by Schiffer against the asymmetry thesis, based on referential uses of incomplete descriptions. RESUMEN Algunas teorías semánticas contemporáneas defienden una tesis de asimetría respecto de las descripciones definidas y los indéxicos. Semánticamente, los indéxicos son instrumentos de referencia singular; contribuyen con objetos a los contenidos de los actos del habla que se llevan a cabo por medio de ellos. Las descripciones defini- das, por su parte, son cuantificadores generalizados, que se comportan a grandes ras- gos como Russell indicara en “On Denoting”. La tesis de la asimetría depende de la existencia de una distinción suficientemente clara entre semántica y pragmática, dado que tanto los indéxicos como las descripciones definidas se usan a menudo de mane- ras que parecen contradecirla; se invoca entonces la distinción entre semántica y pragmática para reconciliarla con las apariencias. El trabajo examina críticamente ar- gumentos recientes de S. Schiffer contra la tesis de asimetría, que se apoyan en usos referenciales de descripciones incompletas. In contemporary semantics an asymmetry thesis is hold concerning the behaviour of, respectively, definite descriptions and indexicals. Semantically, indexicals are devices of singular reference; they contribute objects to the contents of the speech acts made with utterances including them. Definite de- scriptions, on the other hand, are generalized quantifiers, behaving roughly the way Russell envisaged in “On Denoting”. The asymmetry thesis depends on the existence of a sufficiently clear- cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics, because indexicals and de- 49 50 Manuel García-Carpintero scriptions are often used in ways that apparently contradict the asymmetry thesis; the semantics/pragmatics distinction is invoked to see behind the ap- pearances. There are Donnellan’s “referential uses” of descriptions [Donnellan (1966)]; and there are descriptive uses of indexicals, Kaplan’s “monsters” [Kaplan (1989a)]. Defenders of the asymmetry thesis hold that these are non- semantic phenomena, a form of conversational implicature; for descriptions, Grice [Grice (1969)], Kripke [Kripke (1977)], Evans [Evans (1982)] and Neale [Neale (1990)] provided supporting arguments. It is therefore no sur- prise that writers who question the relevance or the very existence of the se- mantics/pragmatics distinction (whom I refer to as pragmaticists) argue against the asymmetry thesis. In this paper I will critically examine argu- ments by one of these writers, Schiffer [Schiffer (1995)], based on referential uses of incomplete descriptions. In so far as his arguments are symptomatic of the pragmaticist (mis)conception of language, we can learn a more general lesson from its weaknesses. I. THE ASYMMETRY THESIS STATED There is a very simple way of making the semantics/pragmatics distinc- tion and then stating relative to it the asymmetry thesis, which is unfortu- nately incorrect. According to this view, semantics has just to do with compositionally ascribing truth-conditions to sentences; anything involving speakers’ intentions is a matter for pragmatics to care about. From this per- spective, indexicals are semantically like Millian names, characterized by Kripke thus: “According to Mill, a proper name is, so to speak, simply a name. It simply refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, unlike a definite description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special identifying properties” [Kripke (1979), pp. 239-40]. Larson and Segal [Larson and Segal (1996), pp. 197-221] extend this view to indexicals. Unfortunately, I do not think that the contrast that the asymmetry thesis claims to exist is that simple. I do not think that proper names are Mil- lian; I believe that it is part of their function to describe their referent as hav- ing special identifying properties, and that this is a semantic, linguistic matter. Intuitively, the same applies even more obviously to indexicals. Here is a reason. Competent speakers of English recognize the validity of the following inferences; if someone does not recognize their validity, that prima facie disqualifies him as a competent speaker of English: (1) He is hungry ∴ Some male is hungry The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals 51 (2) That pot is empty ∴ Some pot is empty (3) You are angry ∴ Someone in the audience is angry Competent speakers possessing the relevant concepts also recognize the tautological character of the following sentences: (4) He is whoever is most salient male when that very token of ‘he’ is uttered (5) That pot is whatever is most salient pot when that very token of ‘that pot’ is uttered (6) You are whoever is addressed when that very token of ‘you’ is uttered In order to capture this point (the point, as he put it, that there is a logic of indexicals) while still holding the asymmetry thesis, Kaplan [Kaplan (1989a), (1989b)] ascribed to indexicals not only a referent as content, but also descriptive features as character, and suggested a more complex way of making the semantics/pragmatics distinction than the one just outlined. Kaplan [Kaplan (1989b)] distinguished the descriptive features associated with indexi- cals constituting their character, which belong in a semantic account of a lan- guage, from other descriptive features associated with them (and from every descriptive feature associated with proper names), which in his view belong only in a metasemantic account. Stalnaker [Stalnaker (1997)] makes a similar distinction with a different terminology, between descriptive and foundational linguistic matters. I will borrow from Kaplan’s and Stalnaker’s suggestions. Lewis [Lewis (1983)] distinguished languages (and theoretical accounts thereof) understood as abstract objects, which may or may not be actually used, from languages seen as actually spoken by a given individual or population. In this vein I distinguish, firstly, a (linguistic-descriptive) theoretical characteriza- tion of an abstract language intended to have the constitutive features necessary and sufficient for it to count as a given natural language, i.e., to fully character- ize the language used by a given population; and, secondly, a (linguistic- foundational) theoretical characterization of facts such that a given abstract language is indeed used by a given population. Different views on what Schiffer [Schiffer (1993)] calls “the actual-language relation” would provide different elaborations on this distinction, but we can suggest some relatively non-contentious illustration. Thus, general psychological facts regarding memory, attention, and perceptual or procedural capacities will have to be 52 Manuel García-Carpintero invoked in a foundational characterization that a given population uses a given abstract language; for, together with language mastery, those general psychological capacities are a crucial causal factor of language use. Simi- larly, something like the Gricean conversational maxims will have to be in- voked in a foundational characterization that a given population uses a given abstract language; for once again, together with language mastery they are, at least in some cases (those involving undisputed cases of conversational im- plicatures), a crucial causal factor of language use. None of them, however, belong in a descriptive account.1 This framework, I submit, provides a taxonomically (and therefore theoretically) more accurate way of tracing the semantics/pragmatics distinc- tion than the simplistic one previously outlined: semantics is part of descrip- tive linguistics; pragmatics rather belongs in foundational linguistics. That this is more accurate can be seen in that, for instance, it allows us to plausibly contend both that moods (interrogative, imperative, indicative and so on) do not make truth-conditional contributions, and also that it is part of semantics, not pragmatics, to account for them. Davidsonian partisans of the view that semantics has just to do with the compositional determination of truth- conditions dispute this; but their view goes against intuition, Davidson’s [Davidson (1979)] arguments for it are fallacious, and in any case it should not be established just by a not merely stipulative definition.2 In addition to a non-truth-conditional view of the illocutionary forces signified by moods, the present proposal allows us to count conventional im- plicatures and presuppositions conventionally conveyed by expressions as phenomena for a semantic account to care about, not for a pragmatic one; and this is crucial for my purposes, because in my own view those phenomena provide the proper