Modality and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface
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Modality and the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface Anna Papafragou Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. University College London 1998 (LONDON) To my family with love and gratitude Abstract This thesis explores certain aspects of the structure of lexical semantics and its interaction with pragmatic processes of utterance comprehension, using as a case-study a sample of the English modal verbs. Contrary to previous polysemy-based accounts, I propose and defend a unitary semantic account of the English modals, and I give a relevance-theoretic explanation of the construction of their admissible (mainly, root and epistemic) contextual interpretations. Departing from previous accounts of modality, I propose a link between epistemic modality and metarepresentation, and treat the emergence of epistemic modal markers as a result of the development of the human theory of mind. In support of my central contention that the English modals are semantically univocal, I reanalyse a range of arguments employed by previous polysemy-based approaches. These arguments involve the distributional properties of the modals, their relationship to truth-conditional content, the status of so-called speech-act modality, and the historical development of epistemic meanings: it turns out that none of these domains can offer reasons to abandon the univocal semantic analysis of the English modals. Furthermore, I argue that the priority of root over epistemic meanings in language acquisition is predicted by the link between epistemic modality and metarepresentation. Finally, data from a cognitive disorder (autism) are considered in the light of the metarepresentation hypothesis about epistemic modality. The discussion of modality has a number of implications for the concept of polysemy. I suggest that, despite its widespread use in current lexical semantics, polysemy is not a natural class, and use the example of the Cognitive Linguistics to illustrate that polysemy presupposes some questionable assumptions about the structure of lexical concepts. I propose a division of labour between ambiguity, 3 Abstract semantic underdeterminacy, and a narrowed version of polysemy, and present its ramifications for the psychology of word meaning. In the final chapter, I extend the proposed framework for modality to the analysis of generic sentences, thereby capturing certain similarities between genericity and modality. 4 Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 9 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Lexical meaning and context-dependence 11 1.2 The concept of polysemy in linguistic semantics 14 1.2.1 Background 14 1.2.2 Polysemy 17 1.3 Modality: a test case 19 1.4 Theoretical commitments: Relevance theory 21 1.4.1 Semantics, pragmatics, and underdeterminacy 22 1.4.2 A theory of utterance comprehension 28 1.5 Summary of the thesis 34 2. A CASE STUDY: ENGLISH MODAL VERBS 2.0 Introductory remarks 36 2.1 Previous analyses 36 2.1.1 The ambiguity view 36 2.1.2 The polysemy view 42 2.1.3 The monosemy view 45 2.2 Modal verbs and semantic underdeterminacy: a proposal 54 2.2.1 Background: tripartite structures in quantification 54 2.2.2 Domains of propositions as modal restrictors 55 2.2.3 Semantics for modal operators 57 2.3 Deriving root interpretations 62 5 Contents 2.3.1 Root interpretations of modals 62 2.3.2 Selecting/constructing modal restrictors 75 2.4 Deriving epistemic interpretations 82 2.4.1 The metarepresentation hypothesis 82 2.4.2 Epistemic interpretations of modals 86 2.4.3 Alethic and 'objective epistemic' modality 94 2.5 Concluding remarks 99 3. THE EVIDENCE FOR POLYSEMY REVISITED (1): REMOVING OBJECTIONS TO A UNITARY SEMANTICS FOR MODALS 3.0 Introductory remarks 101 3.1 Evidence from grammatical reflexes 102 3.2 Evidence from truth-conditional behaviour 113 3.2.1 The standard view 113 3.2.2 Multiple acts of communication 118 3.2.3 Metarepresentation and truth conditions 124 3.3 'Speech-act' modality 134 3.3.1 The proposal 134 3.3.2 Some problems 136 3.3.3 A reanalysis in terms of metarepresentation 140 3.3.4 Further examples 148 3.3.5 Metarepresentational uses of logical operators 155 3.4 Concluding remarks 157 Appendix 3A: Diachronic evidence for the root-epistemic distinction 158 4. THE EVIDENCE FOR POLYSEMY REVISITED (2): THE ACQUISITION OF MODALITY 4.0 Introductory remarks 163 4.1 Psycholinguistic evidence for the acquisition of modality 165 4.1.1 Naturalistic longitudinal studies 165 4.1.2 Experimental studies 170 4.2 Alternative explanations 174 6 Contents 4.2.1 The theory of mind hypothesis 174 4.2.2 Auxiliary hypotheses and a sketch 180 4.2.3 From metacognition to metalogic: the emergence of alethic modality 184 4.3 Concluding remarks 186 Appendix 4A: Linguistic data from autism 190 5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SEMANTICS-PRAGMATICS INTERFACE: POLYSEMY AND CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE 5.0 Introductory remarks 197 5.1 Background: theoretical objections 198 5.1.1 The Conceptual Embodiment thesis 200 5.1.2 Mental imagery 211 5.1.3 Metaphor and conceptual structure 219 5.2 Polysemy and mental representation 225 5.2.1 Criteria for polysemy 225 5.2.2 Processing polysemy 240 5.2.3 The psychology of word meaning 248 5.2.4 Historical and developmental perspectives 254 5.3 Concluding remarks 257 6. EXTENSIONS: MODALITY AND GENERICS 6.0 Introductory remarks 259 6.1 Previous approaches to characterising sentences 262 6.1.1 Preliminaries 262 6.1.2 The semantics of the generic operator 268 6.1.3 GEN as a modal operator 274 6.2 Modality and characterising sentences: some suggestions 278 6.2.1 Genericity in the proposition expressed: the role of pragmatics 278 6.2.2 Restricting the domain of the generic operator 283 6.2.3 Some comparisons 292 6.2.4 Inferring the grounds for generics 295 6.3 Concluding remarks 299 7 Con tents 7. CONCLUSION 301 REFERENCES 305 Acknowledgements I want to thank a number of people for their support, both academic and personal, in the years of writing this thesis. Deirdre Wilson, my main supervisor, has been a constant source of intellectual stimulation, moral support and emotional generosity. She has seen numerous versions of the thesis, and her detailed and sharp comments were the main reason new versions were better than previous ones. Our long discussions have had an obvious influence in my thinking about communication and cognition; her humour and spirit have made these discussions even more fun. Neil Smith, my second supervisor, has read multiple drafts of every chapter, and has unfailingly come up with insightful comments and provocative questions; the breadth of his knowledge and the wit with which he delivers it made his encouragement all the more heartening. Robyn Carston has discussed with me various aspects of this work, and has provided me with penetrating comments, thoughtful guidance and steady support. Villy Rouchota has offered me illuminating opinions and invaluable help on a number of occasions. Dick Hudson and Giannis Veloudis have read and discussed with me parts of this work, and their observations and clear thinking are gratefully appreciated. I have also profited from comments from and discussions with the following people: Paul Horwich, Rita Manzini, VIad Zegarac, Adrian Pilkington, Steve Nicolle, David Adger, Francesca Happé, Marjolein Groefsema, Manuel Leonetti, Annabel Cormack; I am indebted to them all. I was fortunate to be a member of the Pragmatics Reading Group in the Department of Linguistics at UCL, where much of the material in this thesis was presented. I want to thank my fellow research students Richard Breheny, Corinne Iten, 9 Acknowledgements Milena Nuti and George Powell for many enjoyable discussions on Wednesday afternoons. During the past five years I received enthusiastic encouragement and moral support from my university teachers in Athens; the contact with them helped me find my way through many difficult moments. I wish to thank especially Georgios Babiniotis, Dimitra Theofanopoulou-Kontou, Keti Bakakou-Orfanou, Dimitra Chila- Markopoulou, Christoforos Charalambakis, Amalia Mozer and Kiki Nikiforidou. Irini Warburton-Filippaki at Reading has been a source of much-appreciated guidance and encouragement. My research was financially supported by successive grants from the State Scholarships Foundation in Greece and the A. G. Leventis Foundation; I thank them both. I am also indebted to the Newby Trust and the Gilchrist Educational Trust for funding more specific parts of this project. Writing a thesis can be a very solitary experience. Several friends have made sure I remember that life is a lot noisier, messier and more intoxicating place than my desk. I thank Irini Veliou, Kostas Mantzos, Vassilis and Tasos Paschalis, Angelos Kokolakis, Valia Kordoni, Dawn Walter, Giorgos Roussos and Theano Moussouri for many memorable London days. Special thanks to Villy Rouchota and Hans van de Koot for their warmth and understanding, and to Ad Neeleman and Corinne Iten for keeping my spirits up in the last stages. Finally, I thank my parents, Dimitris and Eleni Papafragou, and my sister Efie, for their love, patience and trust. Their affection and optimism have sustained me all this time and, although being far away, they were never so close. 10 Chapter One Introduction 1.1 LEXICAL MEANING AND CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE A well-known property of lexical items in natural language is that they are capable of conveying different meanings in different situations of utterance. Examples of the context-dependence of lexically expressed meanings include the following: (1) a. The lawyers approached the bar to have a word with the judge. b. The lawyers approached the bar and ordered two martinis. (2) a. I asked her many times but got no answer. b. I rang her many times but there was no answer. (3) a. I want to fly like a bird. b. A bird was flying above the corpses.