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Home , Battle of the Bulge, Hasso von Manteuffel

A Fight Worth Remembering s p r o C

l a n g i S

y m By COL Kevin W. Farrell r he Allied landings at Normandy on June A

. S U.S. Army retired . U 6, 1944, remembered today as D-Day, re - main the most recognizable campaign of TWorld War II for most Americans. As the “Greatest Generation” moves on, this percep - tion will strengthen. The lasting impact of blockbuster Hollywood films and the powerful mental image of a great fleet launching an inva - sion to liberate a continent continue to domi - nate understanding of World War II. Next June, there will be numerous 70th anniversary tributes celebrating D-Day. In comparison, 70th anniversary commemorations of the , the U.S. Army’s greatest victory, will most certainly be fewer than those focused on s p r o C

D-Day. What is needed is to put some perspec - l a n g i S tive on the Battle of the Bulge and place it back y m r A

. S . on center stage. U

34 ARMY I December 2013 Clockwise from left: 101st Airborne soldiers exit the town of , , on New Year’s Eve, 1944; soldiers of 1st , 157th Regiment, 45th Division, man a machine gun at a roadblock near Bastogne; a Sher - man is read - ied to repel a Ger - man advance in the near Manhay, Belgium. s p r o C l a n g i S y m r A

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he Battle of the Bulge involved a large number of American soldiers and was arguably the most desperately fought battle in our history, yet it grows increasingly obscure. In addition to being the largest and bloodiest battle in TAmerican history, more than any other it demonstrated the emergent capa - bility of the U.S. Army as it withstood the full, final of a German war machine desperate to reverse the tide in a war that had turned inexorably against it. Although there were notable shortcomings—first, an intelligence failure second only to Pearl Harbor and second, disastrous battlefield performances by some

December 2013 I ARMY 35 east, launching the largest invasion in world history in June 1941 against the Soviet Union. Following astonishing initial victories, Hitler experienced his first major defeat, which occurred outside Moscow before Christmas 1941. Renewed offensives in 1942 brought Hitler’s empire to its maximum size, but military disaster at Stalingrad in Febru - ary 1943 permanently changed the strategic context of . ’s July 1943 offensive, Operation Citadel, in - cluded the largest armored battle in history near Kursk, but it failed, and with it so did Hitler’s opportunity for vic - tory over the Soviet Union. By autumn 1944, Germany was clearly losing the war—it was simply a question of when, not if. Allied armies were steadily advancing from three directions. The Allies had re - taken North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy in 1943, con - tinuing a slow but deliberate advance northward and cross - ing the Arno River by August 1944. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet juggernaut continued to roll relentlessly west - ward, inflicting massive casualties on the German Wehr- macht and suffering even more of its own in the process. The colossal Soviet offensive of June 1944, Operation Bagra - tion, inflicted the greatest defeat ever suffered by the Ger - man army—30 divisions annihilated—and it was punctu - ated with the attempted assassination of Hitler that July. By any measure, casualties on the Eastern Front were staggering: From June 1941 to May 1944, Germany lost an average of 60,000 men per month. Although the situ - s e ation stabilized by autumn 1944, it was obvious that a final, v i h c r unstoppable Soviet onslaught was inevitable in 1945. A l a In the west, the landings at Normandy on June 6, 1944, n o i t a changed the strategic situation further in favor of the Allies. N

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. In July, the Allies broke free from the Normandy bocage and U destroyed the Wehrmacht in France that August at Falaise. A A German soldier carries a full ammunition belt second invasion in southern France, , during the Battle of the Bulge. German armed forces on the Western Front grew to number more also in August 1944, complemented the drive to the west - than 1.3 million men in . ern border of the Third Reich. It seemed the war would soon be over. Even though — British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s daring U.S. Army units, most notably the 106th Infantry Division — plan to end the war before Christmas through an airborne overall, this battle demonstrated that five months of contin - spearhead into Holland—failed, the Allied war machine uous combat in Western Europe had transformed the U.S. appeared to be unstoppable. Army into a force capable of matching the Wehrmacht on its The dreadful strategic position of Germany was further own terms. For the U.S. Army, therefore, the Battle of the weakened as its major cities received daily bombing raids Bulge should be remembered as perhaps its greatest chap - that reduced them to rubble: the Americans by day and the ter in a very proud history. British by night. The German navy was trapped in a few Axis-held ports while U-boats had been rendered largely ’s Desperate Situation ineffective through Allied advances in technology and tac - By December 1944, World War II had been raging in Eu - tics. The few, pitiful allies that Nazi Germany once had in rope for more than five years. Nazi Germany’s spectacular Europe were all gone as 1944 neared its end. military victories from 1939–1941 were distant memories. As the combined industrial and military might of the Al - Unable to defeat Great Britain, sought final lied armies—united in purpose, confident in the justness of victory and culmination of his diabolical designs in the their cause, vastly improved in proficiency and fully moti - vated to stop the unspeakable horrors of Nazi Germany— COL Kevin W. Farrell , USA Ret., Ph.D., is the former chief of steadily closed in on a shrunken Third Reich, most viewed military history at West Point. He commanded a combined final victory as just around the corner. Surrounded and arms battalion in Iraq, and his most recent book is The Mili - alone, Nazi Germany appeared to be on its last legs. Unfor - tary and the Monarchy . tunately, Hitler had a vastly different strategic vision.

36 ARMY I December 2013 Wacht am Rhein: vance toward and seize important crossing points Germany’s Last Offensive in the West before the weather cleared and American airpower could On September 16, 1944, the day before Operation Market be brought to bear. Virtually from the start, however, Diet - Garden, at his headquarters near Rastenburg, , rich’s attack lagged well behind its optimistic schedule be - Hitler announced his decision to stage a major counter- cause of unexpectedly stiff American resistance and attack. Despite the gross imbalance of forces in the west— abysmally poor road conditions. 55 German divisions faced 96 Allied divisions with 10 more To the south, Gen. ’s Fifth Panzer en route from England—Hitler believed a lack of supplies Army attacked as a supporting effort to the Sixth Panzer (especially fuel) and the absence of functioning deepwater Army. Manteuffel came from a long line of distinguished ports weakened the Allied situation. He was convinced a Prussian army officers, making him suspect in Hitler’s surprise attack toward Antwerp would split the Anglo- eyes, but the general’s extensive experience and expertise American alliance and a major defeat would force the West - as a tactician made him invaluable. With four army panzer ern Allies into a separate peace. Recognizing the precari - divisions and four infantry divisions, his attack route ran ousness of the Allied logistics, he incorrectly believed through the Belgian cities of Bastogne and , rein - relations between the Americans and the British were forcing the drive toward Antwerp. Just below this southern strained and that Americans made poor soldiers. With the shoulder of the “bulge” —the dent the German forces made Western Front secure, “wonder weapons” (, su - in the Allies’ line— Gen. Erich Brandenberger’s Seventh per-heavy and improved U-boats) would reinforce Army attacked to protect the left flank. With only four in - the final effort to defeat the Soviet Union. fantry divisions and substantial , its mission was The plan, deceptively code-named Wacht am Rhein mainly protective. (Watch on the Rhine), depended on three great armies, two of them panzer. Launched from the Ardennes Forest near A Great Chapter of American Military History the start point of the 1940 invasion of France, the 1944 plan Despite an initial local advantage, the German surprise included an elaborate deception, Operation Greif (Griffin), attack failed almost from the start, mainly because of de - with Germans dressed as Americans operating behind Al - termined American resistance. In the north, the German lied lines. Fog and miserable weather would ground the main effort struggled against the 2nd Infantry Division, a vastly superior Allied airpower. Surprise was essential. veteran unit refitting, and the 99th Infantry Division, an Hitler assured his generals that sufficient assets would be outfit that had recently arrived from the . available to spearhead the offensive, and he refused any re - Hard fighting by both divisions doomed the entire attack ductions to the plan. because it delayed the German timetable. American front - Despite the military situation and deep skepticism of Hitler’s generals, the Wehrmacht on the Western Front increased to more than 1.3 million men in December 1944. Three armies ad vanced westward along a 60-mile front. About 400,000 troops, 1,400 tanks, 2,600 artillery pieces and 1,000 aircraft faced a thin sector: four Amer - ican infantry divisions and a partial armored division possessed some 83,000 men and 400 tanks. American units were either new arrivals and therefore “green,” or were refitting fol - lowing previous hard-fought engage - ments. The Germans achieved com - plete surprise. The Sixth Panzer Army—the main effort—attacked along a route now known as the northern shoulder. Led

by Hitler’s favorite commander, SS y m Gen. Josef Dietrich, a crude but experi - r A

. S enced armor officer, the Sixth Panzer . U Army attacked along five preplanned A gun crew assigned to the 217th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion read - routes. With four SS panzer divisions, ies the “Black Widow” 90 mm antiaircraft gun to fire at an enemy plane a parachute division and four infantry sighted outside Bastogne. The engagement between American and divisions, Dietrich’s army had to ad - German forces at the crossroads town lasted about one week.

December 2013 I ARMY 37 A civilian casualty picks his way through the rubble of the Belgian town of La Roche-en- Ardenne in . Allied bomb - ing raids helped liberate it from the Germans but de - stroyed much of it in the process. y m r A

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line units were quickly overrun, but isolated troops fought effort as its success surpassed that of the army to its north. heroically against overwhelming odds. A telling example Following the collapse of the 106th Infantry Division, was an 18-man intelligence and reconnaissance platoon fierce resistance, once again combined with superb com - from the 99th Infantry Division commanded by LT Lyle mand decisions, halted the German offensive along the Bouck Jr., that held off the spearhead of the entire German southern shoulder as well. Although the Germans ultimately Sixth Panzer Army for almost a full day. Bouck’s platoon seized the vital road junction at St. Vith, BG Bruce Clarke of remains the most decorated platoon in World War II, and the 4th Armored Division assumed command of scattered its performance reflects the best of the U.S. Army engaged American units—remnants of the 7th and 9th Armored Divi - during the Battle of the Bulge. sions, the 28th Infantry Division, and the sole surviving regi - Securing the Elsenborn Ridge to protect the northern ment of the 106th Infantry Division—and brilliantly con - flank of the German drive was essential to the German plan. tained the German advance. Even though the Germans Inspired command decisions—especially by 2nd Infantry captured St. Vith, they did not do so until December 21, four Division commander MG Walter M. Robertson at the twin days later than planned. By Christmas Eve, the German ad - villages of Krinkelt and Rocherath—further impeded the vance in the south was halted, and the 4th Armored Division German advance. Hard-fought battles at Trois Ponts, relieved the defenders of Bastogne on the 26th. and permanently halted the northern The weather improved on December 23, allowing Allied German attack. By December 19, Peiper, spear - airpower to pound German positions as American rein - head of the Sixth Panzer Army, was surrounded as GEN forcements, most notably GEN George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Dwight D. Eisenhower committed the theater reserve, the Army, poured into the region. Victory came with a steep elite . Widespread individual hero - price, though. The bulge was not fully cleared until early ism, combined with outstanding leadership at all command February 1945, and Allied and German casualties incurred levels, defeated the best the Wehrmacht could muster. In three in reducing the exceeded those of the initial attack. difficult days, the U.S. Army had met and overcome the American casualties totaled about 80,000 men, of whom greatest challenge it would face during the war in Europe. 19,000 were killed. German losses neared 85,000. The German attack to the south by Manteuffel’s Fifth Historical debates remain, primarily about an intelli - Panzer Army, though intended to be a supporting effort, met gence failure that enabled the Germans to attack with com - with greater success. Manteuffel trapped most of the 106th plete surprise. Nothing, however, should diminish the fact Infantry Division, causing the greatest American defeat in that the Battle of the Bulge was not only the greatest and the European Theater when approximately 9,000 soldiers bloodiest battle in the history of the U.S. Army, but that it surrendered. Seizing St. Vith after bitter fighting and sur - also was the Army’s finest battlefield performance on such rounding Bastogne, the supporting effort became the main a grand scale. (

38 ARMY I December 2013