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YJ-62 antiship cruise launched by transporter erector launcher (Courtesy Sino Defense)

A Potent Vector Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments

By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan

he numerous, increasingly This article draws on findings from Dennis M. Gormley is a Senior Lecturer and Cruise advanced cruise being a multiyear comprehensive study of Missile Expert in the Graduate School of Public developed and deployed by the Chinese cruise missiles based exclusively and International Affairs at the University of T Pittsburgh. Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate People’s Republic of (PRC) have on open sources. More than 1,000 Professor in the Strategic Research Department largely flown under the public’s radar. discrete Chinese-language sources were at the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Jingdong Yuan is an Associate Professor in the Department of This article surveys PRC cruise missile considered; several hundred have been Government and International Relations at the programs and assesses their implica- incorporated in some form. In descend- University of Sydney. This article draws on the tions for broader People’s Liberation ing level of demonstrated authority, these authors’ book A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (NDU Army (PLA) capabilities, especially in a Chinese sources include PLA doctrinal Press, 2014). scenario. publications (for example, Science of

98 Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Campaigns) describing how cruise AD) capabilities is the development and penetrate defenses.1 Employed in salvos, missiles might be used in operational deployment of large numbers of highly perhaps in tandem with ballistic missiles, scenarios; specialized technical analyses accurate antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) cruise missiles could saturate defenses (Winged Missiles Journal) from civilian and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) with large numbers of missiles arriving at and military institutes detailing many on a range of ground, naval, and air plat- a specific target within a short time. specific aspects of such weapons and their forms. China’s growing arsenal of cruise At the same time, optimal employ- supporting infrastructure; didactic PLA missiles and the delivery platforms and ment of cruise missiles imposes significant discussions (Modern Navy and People’s C4ISR systems necessary to employ them requirements: accurate and timely intel- Navy); generalist deliberations on the de- pose new defense and nonproliferation ligence, suitable and ideally stealthy and velopment trajectory and operational use challenges for the United States and its survivable delivery platforms, mission of cruise missiles (Naval and Merchant regional partners. planning technology, command, control, and Modern Ships); and unattrib- and communications systems, and dam- uted speculation on a variety of Web sites. Military Value age assessment. China has lagged in these To be accessible to a general audience, Chinese writers rightly recognize cruise areas, but its experts recognize their this article includes only a fraction of the missiles’ numerous advantages. Cruise importance, and the relevant Chinese several hundred citations found in the missiles are versatile military tools due organizations are working hard to make full study, together with several related to their potential use for precision progress. sources. conventional strike missions and wide These Chinese sources were range of employment options. Although Institutional and supplemented with a wide variety of China appears heavily focused on Organizational Actors English-language sources, including—in precision conventional delivery, cruise China began introducing ASCMs into descending level of demonstrated author- missiles could also be employed to its inventory in the late 1950s. The ity—U.S. Government reports, analyses deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical Fifth Academy under China’s Ministry by scholars and think tanks, and online weapons. Due to their superior aerody- of National Defense was assigned the databases. The authors drew on their namic flight stability compared to ballis- lead role in coordinating national efforts combined technical, arms control, and tic missiles, cruise missiles—by conser- in ASCM research, design, and licensed Chinese analysis experience to compare vative estimates—enlarge the lethal area production. Established in 1956 with and assess information for reliability. for biological attacks by a factor of 10. U.S.-trained scientist Qian Xuesen as The result is a study whose details Modern cruise missiles offer land, its first director, the Fifth Academy was must be treated with caution, but whose sea, and air launch options, allowing a instrumental in China’s cruise missile larger findings are likely to hold. “two-stage” form of delivery that ex- development. Acting on guidance from tends the already substantial range of the the Central Military Commission, in Overview missiles themselves. They may also be 1958 the PLA Navy (PLAN) headquar- China’s military modernization is placed in canisters for extended deploy- ters built an ASCM test site at Liaoxi, focused on building modern ground, ments in harsh environments. Because Liaoning Province. naval, air, and missile forces capable of cruise missiles are compact and have Following several bilateral agree- fighting and winning local wars under limited support requirements, ground- ments, the transferred Type “informatized conditions.” The princi- based platforms can be highly mobile, 542 KS-1 Komet (North Atlantic Treaty pal planning scenario has been a military contributing to prelaunch survivability. Organization [NATO] designation: campaign against Taiwan, which would Moreover, cruise missiles need only ru- SSC-2A Salish) shore-to- and Type require the PLA to deter or defeat U.S. dimentary launch-pad stability, enabling 544 P-15 Termit (NATO designation: intervention. Beijing is now broadening shoot-and-scoot tactics. SS-N-2A Styx) antiship missiles, models, this focus to its Near Seas (Yellow, East, Since cruise missile engines or motors and technical data to China beginning in and South China seas) more generally. do not produce prominent infrared signa- 1959. Moscow was to assist Beijing with The PLA has sought to acquire asym- tures on launch, they are not believed to these and other missile programs. The metric “assassin’s mace” technologies and be detectable by existing space-warning P-15 would provide the basic founda- systems to overcome a superior adversary systems, reducing their vulnerability to tion for China’s future development of and couple them to the command, post-launch counterforce attacks. The more advanced ASCMs and eventually control, communications, computers, potential combination of supersonic LACMs. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- speed, small radar signature, and very low In 1960, Nanchang Aircraft sance (C4ISR) systems necessary for swift altitude flight profile enables cruise mis- Manufacturing Company established an and precise execution of short-duration, siles to stress naval- and ground-based air assembly line to initiate ASCM produc- high-intensity wars. defense systems as well as airborne sur- tion; it would later produce Shangyou-, A key element of the PLA’s invest- veillance and tracking radars, increasing Haiying-, and Yingji-series ASCMs. ment in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ the likelihood that they will successfully Despite the departure of Soviet advisors

JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 99 in September 1960, China conducted its requirements and evaluations (General Antiship Cruise Missile first successful missile test that November. Armaments Department) from civil- Developments In 1964, China’s first ASCM, a license- ian defense industry management and Like other nations, China has come produced version of the P-15, passed production (formerly the Commission to regard ASCMs as an increasingly factory tests. The following year, its first of Science, Technology, and Industry potent means of shaping the outcome flight test was successful. In late 1967, for National Defense, now the State of military conflicts and thereby also the resulting “Shangyou-1” missile was Administration for Science, Technology, strengthening peacetime deterrence. approved for production, and it entered and Industry for National Defense). China has developed its own advanced, service in the late 1960s.2 China has simultaneously worked to highly capable ASCMs (the YJ series) As part of China’s efforts to de- maximize access to foreign technology while also importing Russian supersonic velop an indigenous defense industry and employs an extensive bureaucracy to ASCMs, which have no operational base, cruise missile programs received facilitate its transfer (very effectively) and Western equivalents. (See table 1 for a high-level political support from the be- absorption (less effectively). list of Chinese ASCMs.) ginning. In 1969, Zhou Enlai reportedly China’s cruise missile design, re- China’s most sophisticated and approved the establishment of a Military search, development, and manufacturing threatening imported Russian ASCMs Industry Enterprise Base to produce are now concentrated in a single business include the 3M80E and 3M80MVE ASCMs. Top leaders allocated funding division within one of two state aerospace Moskit (NATO designation: SS-N-22 and human capital and helped protect conglomerates, the China Aerospace Sunburn) and the 3M54E Klub (NATO programs from political interference dur- Science and Industry Corporation designation: SS-N-27B Sizzler). China’s ing the Cultural Revolution. (CASIC) Third Academy. One of seven Sovremenny-class (Project Yet this support has an important design academies under CASIC—which 956E and 956EM) boast the supersonic caveat: political leaders placed the highest has over 100,000 employees—the Third Sunburn ASCMs that were first delivered priority on nuclear and Academy is China’s principal research and to China in 2000–2001. The Project programs given their strategic deterrence development (R&D) and manufactur- 956E ships carry the early 3M80E mis- function. Cruise missiles, while priori- ing entity for cruise missiles; all others sile with a range of 120 kilometers (km), tized more highly than aircraft and some are secondary. Established in 1961, the while the Project 956EM destroyers other armaments, suffered from their Third Academy has been involved in the have the 3M80MVE that has an optional logical application as armaments for the design and development of 20 types of longer range (240 km) through the air force and navy and were subordinated cruise missiles, including the indigenous incorporation of a second, high-altitude to ground forces. Moreover, as the early Haiying- and Yingji-series and their flight profile setting. But this longer Nanchang connection indicates, ASCMs export versions.3 Today, it boasts 10 re- range comes at a price, as a 3M80MVE were initially developed within China’s search institutes and 2 factories, with over missile using the higher altitude profile aviation industry. This fact, and the 13,000 employees, including 2,000 re- would be detectable at much greater industry’s connection to a politically sus- searchers and around 6,000 technicians. distances and thus more vulnerable to at- pect PLA Air Force (PLAAF), imposed China’s aviation industry remains tacks from advanced air defense systems, significant limitations. involved in cruise missile R&D and such as Aegis. Both missiles execute Cruise missile programs therefore en- production. Hongdu Aviation Industry sea-skimming attacks at an altitude of 7 countered more problems and registered Group (formerly Nanchang Aircraft meters and perform terminal maneuvers slower progress than their ballistic missile Manufacturing Company), under to reduce the target’s point defense counterparts. Not until the late 1960s Aviation Industry Corporation of China, systems effectiveness. The Sunburn is and early 1970s was China able to pro- produced Feilong-series cruise missiles reported to have a speed of Mach 2.3 duce its own modified derivatives of early for export.4 and has a 300-kilogram (kg) semi-armor Soviet-model cruise missiles. While recent Finally, for three decades China piercing .5 years have witnessed remarkable progress has marketed a wide range of indig- Eight of China’s Kilo-class subma- in ASCMs such as the YJ-62 and LACMs enously produced cruise missiles (and rines are Project 636M variants fitted such as the YJ-63/AKD-63 and DH-10, other weapons systems) through China with the Klub-S missile system, which China continues to rely on foreign tech- Precision Machinery Import and Export includes the 3M54E/SS-N-27B Sizzler nological support—particularly Russian Corporation (CPMIEC), the CASIC ASCM—also known earlier as Novator and Ukrainian design assistance. Third Academy’s export management Alpha. This missile is unique in that it To address persistent problems in branch. Established in 1980, CPMIEC combines a subsonic, low-altitude ap- its defense research, development, and is a member of the Xinshidai Group proach with a supersonic terminal attack acquisition system, China has converted and jointly owned by CASIC and the conducted by a separating sprint vehicle. numbered ministries to corpora- Chinese Aerospace Science and Technical The 3M54E’s cruise range is 200 km at a tions, encouraged competition (with Corporation. speed of Mach 0.6–0.8. This is followed mixed results), and separated military by the release of a solid-rocket-propelled,

100 Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 sea-skimming sprint vehicle that travels Table 1. PLA Antiship Cruise Missiles (Major Systems) the last 20 km to the target at a speed of Guidance Mach 2.9. The 3M54E ASCM has a 200- Launch (inertial/ kg semi-armor-piercing warhead. Type Manufacturer Platform Range (km) Payload (kg) Speed terminal) Electro- As in so many other areas, even as CASIC Third Ground, ship, YJ-7 (C-701) 25 30.5 Subsonic optical/active Academy air China seeks the best foreign systems radar available, it continues to develop increas- Inertial/ Ship— YJ-62 (C-602) CASIC Third 280–400 active ingly capable indigenous systems. Of Luyang II, 210 Subsonic and YJ-62A Academy (YJ-62A) terminal ground China’s foremost indigenous ASCMs, guidance the YJ-82 and YJ-83/83K are the most Ship, Inertial/ YJ-8 series CASIC Third , active widely deployed, while the YJ-62 is (CSS-N-4 42 165 Subsonic Academy (YJ-82), air terminal Sardine/C-801) among the most advanced. The YJ-82 (YJ-81) guidance is a solid-rocket-propelled, submarine- YJ-83 (CSS-N-8 120 Saccade/C-802) CASIC Third Ship, ground, (ground/ Inertial/ launched missile contained in a buoyant 165 Subsonic multiple Academy air ship), 130 active radar launch canister that is, for all intents variants (air) and purposes, identical to the U.S. YJ-83A/J Ship, 180 submarine-launched . While (C-802A) CASIC Third submarine (ground/ Inertial/ 165 Subsonic credited with a range of 42 km, the lack multiple Academy (?), ground, ship), 250 active radar variants air (air) of a solid-rocket booster, as with the Zvezda-Strela, Ship, air 87–90 kg surface-ship-launched YJ-8/8A, strongly YJ-91/KR-1 Russia; Passive/ (PLAAF/ 15–110 HE blast/ Supersonic (Kh-31P) indigenized by Anti-radiation suggests that the YJ-82’s range will be PLAN) fragmentation China shorter. The missile has a speed of Mach 320 kg AP Inertial AS-13 Kingbolt PLAAF 0.9 and a terminal sea-skimming attack Raduga, Russia 45–115 HE or 280 kg Subsonic and TV/ (Kh-59MK) Su-30MKK altitude of 5 to 7 meters, and it carries cluster electro-optical a 165-kg high-explosive fragmenting Ship; 6 Project 956 warhead. SS-N-22/ Sovremenny Sunburn The YJ-83/83K missile represents an destroyers; inertial/ 3M80E Moskit; Raduga 120–240 3M80MVE 300 Supersonic active/ evolutionary improvement over the YJ- 3M80MVE (Russia) (3M80MVE) on Project passive (improved 8/8A and the exported C802. Entering 956EM variant) service with the PLAN in 1998–1999, Sovremenny destroyers the YJ-83 missile has the same propul- Submarine— SS-N-27B/ Novator sion system as the export C802 missile Kilo Project 200 200 Supersonic INS/active Sizzler (Russia) but uses an indigenous CTJ-2 636M instead of the French-made TRI 60-2. Submarine— Song, Yuan, By replacing the bulky electronics and CH-SS-NX-13 Shang, to be ? ? ? ? inertial reference unit (IRU) of the YJ- deployed on 8/8A/C802 with digital microprocessors Tang and a strap-down IRU, additional volume Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s was made available to increase the YJ-83’s Cruise Missle Ambitions (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014), 18–19. range to 180 km at a speed of Mach 0.9. The air-launched YJ-83K has a rated small-scale model was clearly larger than journals, articles, and Web sites quote range of 250 km at the same speed. Both the one of the C802 nearby, and the sys- the YJ-62’s range as 280 km, this value the YJ-83 and 83K possess a slightly tem brochure boasted of a longer range is only appropriate to the export C602. larger high-explosive fragmenting war- (280 km), global positioning system China has limited the range of its export head of 190 kg. The YJ-83 is the main (GPS) guidance—an unprecedented cruise missiles in conformance with the ASCM of the PLAN and is currently claim—and a larger semi-armor-piercing Missile Technology Control Regime outfitted on virtually every surface com- warhead (300 kg). The missile size was restrictions of 300 km. The YJ-62 itself batant in active service. The YJ-83K can roughly consistent with large round has a true range on the order of 400 be carried by large and small aircraft alike launch canisters that had started show- kms. The long range likely necessitated and has been seen on JH-7/A fighter- ing up on coastal defense test sites and the need for , and the bombers and H-6 bombers. The export the Type 052C destroyers then under YJ-62 is described as having the ability to variant of the YJ-83/83K is the C802A construction in 2004. The indigenous use both GPS and Beidou constellations. and the air-launched C802AK.7 YJ-62 is very similar to the YJ-83 The missile’s speed is between Mach 0.6 In September 2005, China unveiled technologically and largely reflects an and 0.8, and it executes a sea-skimming the C602 ASCM for the first time. The evolutionary change in size. While many terminal attack at 7 to 10 meters. With

JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 101 Table 2. PLA Land-attack Cruise Missiles are increasingly poised to challenge U.S. Launch surface vessels, especially in situations Type Manufacturer Platform Range (km) Payload (kg) Speed Guidance where the quantity of missiles fired can INS/(?)/ overwhelm Aegis air defense systems Passive CASIC Third Air (H-6H Electro- through saturation and multi-axis tactics. YJ-63/KD-63 Academy/ and H-6K 200 500 Subsonic optical CHETA bomber) More advanced future Chinese aircraft terminal guidance carriers might be used to bring ASCM- INS/Sat/ and LACM-capable aircraft within range TERCOM/ CASIC Third Ship, ground of U.S. targets. Probable DH-10/CJ-10 Academy/ (3 canister on 1,500+ 500 Subsonic DSMAC for A consistent theme in Chinese writ- CHETA TELs) terminal ings is that China’s own ships and other guidance platforms are themselves vulnerable to Inertial; CASIC Third cruise missile attack. But China appears active KD-88 Academy/ Air 180–200 165 Subsonic terminal to believe it can compensate by further CHETA guidance developing its capacity to threaten enemy CASIC Third KD-20/ INS/Sat/ warships with large volumes of fire. Academy/ Air 1,500–2,000 500 Subsonic YJ-100 TERCOM CHETA CASIC Third Land-Attack Cruise Possible Academy/ Submarine ? 500 Subsonic ? DH-2000 Missile Developments CHETA China has deployed two subsonic Zvezda- LACMs, the air-launched YJ-63/ Strela, 87–90 kg YJ-91/KR-1 Russia; Air (PLAAF/ Passive/ AKD-63 with a range of 200 km 15–110 HE blast/ Supersonic (Kh-31P) license- PLAN) Antiradiation fragmentation and the 1,500+ km-range ground- produced by China launched DH-10. (See table 2 for a AS-13 320 kg AP Inertial and list of Chinese LACMs.) Both systems Raduga, PLAAF Kingbolt 115 HE or 280 kg Subsonic TV/electro- Russia Su-30MKK benefited from ample technical assis- (Kh-59MK) cluster optical tance from foreign sources, primarily Source: Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan, 25–26. the Soviet Union/Russia. The first- generation YJ-63 is an air-launched the exception of the Type 052C destroy- the CH-SS-NX-13 missile discussion in LACM that employs an electro-optical ers, the YJ-62 is only deployed in mobile the Department of Defense’s 2010 and (EO) seeker with man-in-the-loop coastal defense batteries.8 2011 annual reports to Congress. The steering via a command data link. Finally, China has been working YJ-18 has also been characterized as This missile reportedly reached initial diligently on producing its own su- being able to be launched from a surface operating capability in 2004, was first personic cruise missiles after the failed ship’s vertical launching system (VLS), seen in 2005 in Internet photography, YJ-1/C101 and HY-3/C301. Both the which is consistent with the capabilities and is right at the cusp as to when YJ-12 and YJ-18 are undergoing tests of the generalized or universal VLS being China incorporated satellite navigation and represent the next phase in China’s fitted to the new Type 052D .10 in some of their weapons systems. It ASCM capabilities. The YJ-12 appears Along with the growing improve- is currently unknown if the YJ-63/ to be a considerably lengthened Russian ments in ASCM performance, the PLAN AKD-63 has this ability.11 In addition Kh-31–type missile and is speculated has begun to expand its training and has to the YJ-63, two other LACMs use to have a range of 250 km and a speed become more diverse and realistic in re- some sort of a command data link to of Mach 2.5. The YJ-12 is probably an cent years with increasing focus on cruise feed back the data gathered from the aircraft-carried weapon only. Thus far, missile operations. Beijing has furnished EO sensor: the YJ-83KH and the K/ only certain H-6 bombers have been seen its ASCMs with improved guidance and AKD-88.12 The second-generation with a long pylon necessary to support a has started to implement satellite navi- DH-10 has a satellite navigation/iner- large missile with an integrated / gation capabilities. Most of the PLAN tial , but may also use booster propulsion system.9 warships now have a dedicated over-the- terrain contour mapping for redundant The YJ-18 appears to be a Chinese horizon (OTH) targeting system, either midcourse guidance and a digital scene- copy of the 3M54E Klub. This missile the Russian-supplied Mineral-ME, or the matching sensor to permit an accuracy has been described as having a cruise indigenous version. Still, OTH targeting of 10 meters. Development of China’s range of 180 km at Mach 0.8 and a sprint remains a challenge. Beidou/ navigation-positioning range of 40 km at Mach 2.5 to 3.0. It has Chinese researchers are studying how satellite network is partly intended to been reported to be submarine torpedo to best overcome Aegis defenses and eliminate dependence on the U.S. GPS tube–capable, which is consistent with target adversary vulnerabilities. ASCMs for guidance.

102 Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Beijing has purchased foreign systems platforms. Over the past decade, the Various Chinese writings and the and assistance to complement its own PLA has commissioned numerous new, logical employment of forces China indigenous LACM efforts. From Israel, it modernized ships, , and has been developing suggest that in the has received Harpy antiradiation drones aircraft capable of launching cruise mis- event of a maritime conflict with U.S. with standoff ranges of 400+ km. It is siles. China has produced a new array forces, the PLAN is likely to undertake conceivable that China may also have of and destroyers that carry massive multi-axis ASCM attacks against the Russian Klub 3M-14E SS-NX-30 sophisticated medium- to long-range U.S. CSGs and their Aegis air defense LACM, which can be launched from ASCMs, and some PLAAF/PLAN perimeters. The PLAN’s focused experi- the PLAN’s Project 636M Kilo-class aviation aircraft can carry LACMs mentation and training in long-range sea submarines and deliver a 400-kg war- in addition to ASCMs. Song-, Kilo-, strike, its variety of indigenous ASCM head to a range of 300 km. But there is and Yuan-class diesel submarines are weapons, and modernization of ASCM little evidence at present to support this equipped with Russian and indigenous delivery platforms may yield a high prob- possibility. ASCMs. Shang-class nuclear-powered ability of success for this effort. While current DH-10 ground-launch submarines have or will have ASCMs, cruise missiles and YJ-63/AKD-63 air- as will their Type 095 follow-ons when Potential Employment launched systems are most relevant for they enter service.15 China thus appears in a Taiwan Scenario a Taiwan contingency, there are strong to be making a concerted effort to Chinese ASCMs and LACMs could be signs that China is expanding its inven- develop its delivery capabilities from used in conjunction with other A2/AD tory to include both air-launched and air, surface, and subsurface platforms capabilities to attack U.S. and partners’ ship-launched LACMs. An air-launched simultaneously. In the near term, China naval forces, land bases, and sea bases version of the DH-10, called the CJ-20, will likely continue to expand its cruise that would be critical for U.S. efforts to has reportedly been tested on the H-6 missile inventory and precision delivery respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. bomber, which has the capability to carry capabilities. While cross-Strait relations are relatively four CJ-20 LACMs externally. stable at present, Beijing worries that China’s Weapon Test Ship Dahua Cruise Missile Employment, that could change, and in any case 892 has experimented with on-deck can- Doctrine, and Training wants to achieve reunification in peace- ister launchers that contain either YJ-18 China’s new ASCM and LACM pro- time, supported in part by its increasing ASCMs or DH-10 LACMs for at-sea grams—like its current military mod- military advantage over Taiwan. testing.13 Although most PLAN surface ernization efforts more broadly—are Operating in tandem with China’s combatants have a limited capacity of 8 to focused on preparing for contingen- huge inventory of conventionally armed 16 canister launchers—meaning tradeoffs cies in the Taiwan Strait and other ballistic missiles, LACMs could severely between ASCMs and LACMs—China’s proximate disputed areas, which clearly complicate Taiwan’s capacity to use its air apparent interest in a sea-launched include the possibility of U.S. interven- force to defend against Chinese attacks. DH-10 strongly suggests that future tion. The land, sea, and air components Chinese military planners view LACMs PLAN destroyers, such as the new Type of such a contingency would involve as particularly effective against targets 052D, will likely be equipped with a new ASCMs and LACMs. China appears to requiring precision accuracy (for example, vertical launching system, with a greater believe in the value of large-scale attacks airfield hangars and command and con- capacity to carry both ASCMs and in all three domains. trol facilities). They also view large-salvo LACMs. Since President Bill Clinton’s decision attacks by LACMs and ballistic missiles Should China add large numbers to deploy two aircraft carriers to waters as the best means to overwhelm enemy of air- and sea-launched LACMs to its near Taiwan in response to China’s missile defenses. already substantial inventory of ground- March 1996 ballistic missile tests, PLA Chinese planners emphasize the shock launched cruise missiles, it would planners have focused on U.S. aircraft and paralytic effects of combined bal- significantly extend the range of the carriers as the main threat to the success listic and LACM attacks against enemy PLA’s capacity to employ LACMs to of such PLA missions. Chinese strategists airbases, which could greatly increase the deal with contingencies beyond Taiwan have thus sought ways to target U.S. effectiveness of follow-on aircraft strikes. and the rest of its immediate maritime carrier strike groups (CSGs); Chinese These effects depend significantly on the periphery.14 Time and dedicated effort specialists are acutely aware of carrier number of launchers available to deliver will increase the PLA’s ability to employ vulnerabilities, having conducted a wide missiles. China currently has between LACMs, even in challenging combined- variety of research directed toward threat- 255 and 305 ballistic missile and LACM arms military campaigns. ening aircraft carriers with “trump cards” launchers within range of Taiwan, which such as cruise missiles. Aegis ships are are capable of delivering sustained pulses Cruise Missile Platforms also viewed as essential targets; without of firepower against a number of criti- A given type of cruise missile can typi- their protection, carriers are much more cal airfields, sites, early cally be launched from many different vulnerable to attack. warning radars, command and control

JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 103 JH-7A fighter-bomber carrying KD-88 land-attack cruise missiles and drop tanks (Courtesy Sino Defense) facilities, logistical storage sites, and criti- follow MTCR guidelines is problematic, To realize the full benefits, China cal civilian infrastructure such as electrical especially regarding cruise missiles and will need additional investments in all distribution.16 unmanned aerial vehicles. China needs the relevant enabling technologies and not only to improve its commitment to systems required to optimize cruise mis- Proliferation Implications address shortcomings in implementation sile performance. Shortcomings remain If China’s past record of proliferating and enforcement but also to work with in intelligence support, command and ballistic missiles and technology is any exporters on improving their compli- control, platform stealth and survivability, indication of its intentions vis-à-vis ance with export control regulations and and post-attack damage assessment, all of cruise missile transfers, the conse- increase its own governmental capacity which are critical to mission effectiveness. quences could be highly disruptive to deal with the explosive growth of To employ cruise missiles to maximum for the nonproliferation regime and in exporting industries across China’s huge effect, the PLA needs to be able to locate spreading A2/AD capabilities. China landmass. This would require significant targets at a distance, to deploy its air, has sold ASCMs to other countries, efforts on China’s part. However, if surface, and submarine platforms within including Iran. Beijing is suspected of China becomes a fully compliant MTCR range of those targets, and then to ex- furnishing with either com- member, it would be an important ecute a complex, carefully orchestrated plete LACMs or components for local achievement in limiting widespread joint air and missile campaign—poten- assembly. LACM proliferation. tially over many days. Operational success China is not a full member of the also requires accurate, near-real-time 34-nation Missile Technology Control Conclusion intelligence and post-attack assessment Regime (MTCR) but has pledged to ad- China has invested considerable capabilities. here to the MTCR’s guidelines for missile resources both in acquiring foreign A successful campaign depends on and missile technology exports. Beijing cruise missiles and technology and in both human and technical factors—ex- began seeking MTCR membership in developing its own indigenous cruise tremely well-trained military personnel 2004 but has thus far been denied due missile design and production capabili- who have practiced these routines in to concerns about its poor proliferation ties. These efforts are bearing fruit in diverse ways over many years and the record. The reason why China represents the form of relatively advanced ASCMs command and control architecture a critical wildcard regarding the further and LACMs deployed on a wide range needed to deal with complex combined- spread of cruise missiles is that Beijing’s of older and modern air, ground, sur- arms operations. Chinese planners current compliance with its pledge to face-ship, and subsurface platforms. envision establishing a Firepower

104 Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014 Coordination Center within the Joint apply most to Taiwan, where ground-, characteristics, see the Tactical Missiles Corpo- ration JSC Web site at . power. Separate coordination cells would have the range to reach Japan and the 6 Christopher P. Carlson, “China’s Eagle be created to deal with missile strikes, U.S. territory of Guam and will provide Strike—Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: YJ-81, , special operations, and ground a limited capability wherever the PLAN YJ-81, and C802 (Part 2),” Defense Media Network, February 6, 2013, available at . leverage the effectiveness of subsequent cruise missiles to degrade air defenses and 7 Ibid. aircraft attacks is developing the skill to command and control facilities to enable 8 “C602: Anti-Ship Missile Weapon System,” China National Precision Machinery coordinate and deconflict large salvos of follow-on airstrikes. Import and Export Corporation marketing missiles and waves of aircraft operating in Defenses and other responses to PRC brochure, 2010. multiple sectors. Chinese doctrine calls cruise missile capabilities exist, but they 9 Christopher P. Carlson, “YJ-12 Photo- for such attacks, but the PLA’s ability to require greater attention and a more graphic Analysis,” February 2014; “Chinese execute such a complex joint campaign focused effort. They include the develop- YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Revealed,” Chinese Military Review, January 2013, avail- against a capable adversary has never been ment of more effective missile defenses, able at . cruise missile systems will depend on against large-volume Chinese LACM 10 Christopher P. Carlson, “Deciphering multiple factors. One is the role of threats will need special attention, if the the Eagle Strike-8 Family of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles,” presentation at Workshop on Open ASCMs/LACMs in Chinese defense poor U.S. performance against Iraq’s Source Exploitation. doctrines and military campaign strategies primitive and small number of LACMs in 11 “PLA’s Tactical Air-To-Surface Mis- and their relative cost-effectiveness com- Operation Iraqi Freedom is an indicator of siles (Part 1),” SinoDefence, February 18, pared to other weapons systems. Second, U.S. weaknesses vis-à-vis such threats. JFQ 2014, available at . China’s overall defense modernization, 12 Pan Wenlin, “Small Gas-Turbine Unit will be determined by the government’s Notes and China’s Antiship Cruise Missiles,” Ship- priorities as Beijing assesses its eco- borne Weapons 8 (August 2010), 14–25; “KD- 1 nomic, social, and defense needs against To be sure, the combination of all three of 63 (YJ-63), K/AKD-63,” Jane’s Air-Launched these aspects is difficult to achieve. A supersonic the security environment and real and Weapons, January 28, 2014, available at . perceived threats. Third, U.S. military an infrared perspective, and such missiles tend 13 “Navalized DH-10 LACM,” China De- developments, including missile defenses, to fly higher to get decent engagement ranges. fense Blog, July 25, 2012, available at . flight profiles. Combining all of them into one 14 how China will react and thus the role of James C. Bussert, “China Destroyer Con- missile is difficult to do, and China currently solidates Innovations, Other Ship Advances,” cruise missiles within PLA doctrine and lacks a missile with all three of these character- Signal, December 1, 2013, available at . of China’s defense industry will continue P. Carlson at the Workshop on Open Source 15 Military and Security Developments to be a critical factor in whether Chinese Exploitation, sponsored by Naval War College Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, and Potomac Foundation, Vienna, VA, March cruise missiles can continue to develop Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: 3, 2014. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 4, and close the technical gap with other 2 A good synopsis of Chinese antiship cruise available at . and Russia. Wang Wei, “Development of the PLA-Navy’s 16 Military and Security Developments ASCMs and LACMs have signifi- Anti-ship Missile,” Shipborne Weapons 5 (May Involving the People’s Republic of China 2009, 2008), 35–47. available at . Fig- and are key components in Chinese been exported as the C-201/201W. ures were derived from the chart on page 66 of 4 efforts to develop A2/AD capabilities This series is essentially defunct, having the 2009 report. Only CSS-6 and CSS-7 missile that increase the costs and risks for U.S. not competed well with the export versions of launchers and DH-10s were considered. As the forces operating near China, includ- the HY and YJ series. most important factor in delivering pulses of 5 Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI ing in a Taiwan contingency. Effective power, missile launchers (not missiles) were the Century Encyclopedia—Naval Weapons, Volume focus. Like aircraft launched from carriers, mis- ASCMs give the PLAN an expeditionary III (Moscow: Arms and Technologies Publish- siles launched are the appropriate measure of capability and the ability to deploy and ing House, 2001); Machine Building Design the intensity of fire within a unit of time. take on other navies. LACMs give China Bureau marketing brochure—3M80E antiship new conventional strike options. These attack missile-weapon complex. For 3M80MVE

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