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Preparing for Nuclear War: President Reagan's Program

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Preparing for Nuclear War: President Reagan's Program The Center for Defense Infomliansupports a strong eelens* but opposes e-xces- s~eexpenditures or forces It tetiev~Dial strong social, economic and political structures conifflaute equally w national security and are essential to the strength and welfareof our country - @ 1982 CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION-WASHINGTON, D.C. 1.S.S.N. #0195-6450 Volume X, Number 8 PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR WAR: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROGRAM Defense Monitor in Brief President Reagan and his advisors appear to be preparing the United States for nuclear war with the Soviet Union. President Reagan plans to spend $222 Billion in the next six years in an effort to achieve the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war. The U.S. has about 30,000 nuclear weapons today. The U.S. plans to build 17,000 new nuclear weapons in the next decade. Technological advances in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and changes in nuclear war planning are major factors in the weapons build-up and make nuclear war more likely. Development of new U.S. nuclear weapons like the MX missile create the impression in the U.S., Europe, and the Soviet Union that the U.S.is buildinga nuclear force todestroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal in a preemptive attack. Some of the U.S. weapons being developed may require the abrogation of existing arms control treaties such as the ABM Treaty and Outer Space Treaty, and make any future agreements to restrain the growth of nuclear weapons more difficult to achieve. Nuclear "superiority" loses its meaning when the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both possess far more nuclear weapons than the number required to destroy one another in all circumstances. 0 This Monitor features a status report on all U.S. nuclear weapons programs, an inven- tory of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and information on locations of nuclear weapons in the U.S. President Reagan has announced negotiations. large- order." It is a verv-. expensive his hopes for reaching agreements President Reagan and his advisors and very dangerous order as well. with the Soviet Union on limiting appear to have psychologically de- The Reagan Administration is nuclear weapons in Europe and in clared war on the Soviet Union. Some planning a major expansion of U.S. newly revived negotiations on officials believe the U.S. is in a nuclearforcesover thenext six years. strategic weapons (START talks). "pre-war" situation and that there is Both the United Statesand the a good chance of nuclearwarwith the The programs involve land, sea and Soviet Union have recently stepped Soviets. They want to prepare our air-based missiles, new bombers, up their propaganda campaigns to country to fight and win this ap- space weaponry and missile defense sway public opinion. Whether any proaching nuclear war. systems, among others. The implied practical achievements will flow Thi~dramatic, if not apocalyptic, purpose of this $222 Billion effort is from the war of words remains to be presumption is what underlies the to gain nuclear "superiority" over the seen. What is already clear is that new nuclear weapons program of the Soviet Union. The new nuclear President Reagan has approved the Reagan Administration. It is an at- weapons program, coupled with pro- most ambitious build-up of nuclear tempt to acquire a full-fledged nu- grams already funded and under de- weaponry in U.S. history. The danger clear war-fighting capability. As velopment, will result. in 17,000 new of nuclear war is increasing, despite Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of nuclear weapons over the next dec- attempts to revive confidence in Defense,hasadmitted, "that is a very ade. PAGE 2 CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION Contributing to the dangers of de- protracted conflict to an all-out at- ploying thousands of new nuclear tack. A Nuclear Warfighting weapons is an unsettling change of These recent developments in Capability emphasis in U.S. strategic doctrine strategy and doctrine also have seri- "I think we need to have a counter- that may make nuclear war more ous implications for attemptsat arms force capability. Over and above probable in the coming decades. control. So long as our leaders em- that, I think that we need to have a These changes in doctrine gained phasized concepts such as assured warfighting capability." much public attention when an oufr- destruction or sufficiency, fixed Frank Carlucci line of Presidential Directive 59 was criteria could be arrived at for deter- Deputy Secretary first leaked to the press in August mining the size and characteristics of of Defense January 13, 1981 1980. PD-59 codified the strategic U.S. nuclear forces. But war-fighting doctrine known as "countervailing concepts remove all constraints on strategy" which evolved during the the number, variety and complexity Several other features of the Rea- 1970's. In effect, it expands the of new nuclear weapons and their de- gan nuclear weapons programs are capabilities required or demanded of livery systems. particularly troubling. The exemp- U.S. nuclear forces in a nuclear war This new phase of the arms race is tion of strategic programs from and attempts to give the Resident a being pushed along by technological budgetary restraint will cause an wider range of choices. advances, which when added to war- imbalance in our armed forces, de- Emphasis has shifted from con- fighting doctrineandvast numbers of priving much neededfunds from con- ceiving of nuclear weapons as deter- new nuclear weapons, make their use ventional forces. Second, there is no rents to how they can be used as war- more plausible. Advances in the evidence that the Reagan Adminis- fighting weapons. technical sophistication of this new tration has seriously incorporated a The Reagan Administration ap- generation of weapons support war- role for arms control into its national pears to be carrying the countervail- fighting concepts that are becoming security plans. ingstrategy one step further. It plans part of the strategies of the U.S. and In October 1980, candidate Ronald to incorporate both the "limited nu- the U.S.S.R. Reagan stated that there was, in- clear options" of the Carter strategy For example, through advances in deed, an ongoing nuclear arms race, and its own ill-conceived notions of propulsion, guidance, and engineer- but that only the Soviet Union was nuclear superiority into the nuclear ing, our intercontinental ballistic participating. This issimply not true. weapons build-up. missiles (ICBMs) and other nuclear The U.S. is not now nor ever has been No one in the Administration has delivery systems are developing the "strategically inferior" to the Soviet bothered to produce a realistic defini- accuracy to destroy small hardened Union. As the survey below of U.S. tion of nuclear superiority in an age targets such as missile silos and nuclear weapons programs demon- when both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. command bunkers. This accuracy, strates, the enhancement and en- have thousands of nuclear weapons when incorporated into all our deliv- largement of U.S. nuclear forces has and the ability to effectively destroy ery systems (cruise missiles, SLBMs, continued unabated throughout the one another. However, it appears ICBMs, etc.) will give the U.S. a 1970's and will be accelerated in the that a major component of such a counterforce capability that could 1980's. drive for superiority will be the abil- soon threaten Soviet nuclear forces. The Reagan Administration's ef- ity to wage "limited" nuclear war. Our leadership, both civilian and fort to prepare to fight a nuclear war Through tremendous expenditures military, have consistently empha- is a dangerous and futile objective for both new nuclear weapons and sized that we seek only a nuclear that must be reconsidered. The rec- the systems to deliver them, the Ad- force capable of deterring our oppo- ord of the arms race shows that each ministration intends to build the ca- nents. Yet, when first strike advance will be met by the other side, pacity to Fight nuclear wars that capabilities and threats are weighed probably sooner than later, and that range from limited use through a what really matters is how the other neither nation can gain a significant side views our intentions. advantage. U.S. nuclear forces long ago sur- Nuclear weapons should serve only U.S. Seeks to "Prevail" passed the criteria of "minimum de- one purpoae, to deter war. The only in Nuclear War terrence" or "assured destruction." true test for the sufficiency of our nu- The U.S. public is being mistakenly clear forces is that they be able to 'We set out to . achieve im- led to believe that the continued ex- proved capabilities to enhance deter- meet any Soviet attack in a way that rence and U.S. capabilitiesto prevail pansion of our nuclear forces en- denies the Soviets an advantage for should deterrence fail." hances deterrence. In fact, if it con- having made the attack. Our present Defense Secretary tributes to Soviet insecurities about capability to deliver over 12,000 nu- Caspar Weinberger the safety of their own nuclear re- clear weapons on the Soviet Union November 3,1981 taliatory forces it may be doing just more than meets this test of suffi- the opposite. ciency. THE CENTER-FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION PAGE 3 THE STATUS OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS Land-based Missiles to include three missile squadrons at Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Missile Experimental (MX). The (MARVJ. The Air Force's Advanced Reagan Administration has decided Dakota, and one at Malmstrom Air Ballistic Reentry System (ABRES) Force Base, Montana, is scheduled tocancel the Carter Administration's program develops reentry technology for initial operation in 1984 and com- multiple shelter basing plan but in support of existingand future mis- move ahead with the missile itself.
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