DOCSLIB.ORG

Ship Self-Defense Against Air Threats

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ship Self-Defense Against Air Threats DOUGLASR.OUSBORNE SHIP SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST AIR THREATS Recent trends in the proliferation of advanced-technology cruise missiles and aircraft and emphasis on multiservice littoral warfare have prompted renewed congressional and U.S. Navy interest in fleet self­ defense. This emphasis is focused on ensuring that expeditionary forces can sustain operations to accomplish their mission. The near-land, cluttered, terrain-masked littoral environment places the Navy within enemy striking range and can stress the ship systems' ability to detect, rapidly react to, and engage air threats. Operating in this environment against advanced cruise missiles and aircraft equipped with affordable penetration techniques such as low-altitude, high-speed maneuvers, and deceptive countermea­ sures can challenge the Navy's most advanced combat systems. Integration and evolution of existing radar, missile, and electronic warfare weapon system elements and the application of new sensor, weapon, and processing technologies can provide the fleet capability necessary to counter these threats in the near term and as they are expected to advance into the next century. INTRODUCTION: A NEW FLEET EMPHASIS FOR THE LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT The U.S. Navy has witnessed countless changes ship system, owing to advances in coordinating threat throughout its long history, but few as dramatic as the arrival times and the limited number of fire control chan­ events within the last few years. The demise of the Soviet nels available in many frigate, destroyer, and amphibious Union and the rapid worldwide proliferation of advanced­ ships. The advent of patrol boat- and mobile truck­ technology weapons to Third World countries have result­ launched cruise missiles (similar to the SCUD ballistic ed in a rapid shift away from an emphasis on open-ocean missile Transporter Erector Launchers prevalent in global warfare to regional or limited conflicts involving Desert Storm) enables a "shoot and scoot" mode of op­ Third World nations in littoral waters. The recent Persian eration, thereby significantly reducing the effectiveness Gulf War is a clear example. of air superiority in mitigating the cruise missile threat. Such conflicts, frequently with geopolitical, religious, The littoral environment, depicted in Figure 1, is also or ethnic motivations, are more likely to occur as polit­ characterized by dense, commercial air traffic and mer­ ically unstable Third World nations are easily able to arm chant shipping, which present challenges to the combat themselves with state-of-the-art weapons. Faced with systems (and their operators) in distinguishing between economic recovery problems, the former Soviet Union hostile, neutral, and friendly tracks. The proximity to has begun to market its most advanced weapons and hostile shores and confined waters decrease the available aircraft, while western nations continue to export technol­ battles pace and warning time, increase clutter levels, ogy and weapons. In the recent Moscow! (11-16 August enable the employment of land-based electronic counter­ 1992) and Farnborough International2 (6-13 September measures, and increase the potential for unexpected at­ 1992) air shows, first-line former-Soviet Union weapons tack from land-based missile sites. and aircraft were for sale along with French, Chinese, To operate effectively in this environment, the required Italian, and Swedish advanced-technology weapons. The robust and integral self-defense capability must provide time lag between development and export is decreasing both a final anti air warfare (AAW) layer of defense when dramatically at the same time the number of producers operating in joint expeditionary operations and an auton­ is increasing, thus creating a very competitive market for omous capability. Although a frigate, destroyer, or air­ 3 weapons proliferation. ,4 This technology transfer defines craft carrier may be "under the umbrella" of an Aegis or and drives the regional/limited conflict threat. Desert New Threat Upgrade Combat Systems' Standard missile Storm clearly demonstrated the mature and effective envelope, an integral final layer of defense is needed to networks established in the Third World for procuring counter the sea-skimming missile threat. This is especial­ technology and weapons. It is expected that not only will ly true when the battle group/threat geometry prevents these networks strengthen with time, but that nations will engagement by the Standard missile ships and opportu­ develop increasing capabilities to modify imported weap­ nities for one ship to defend another against the sea­ ons and tailor them to their specific goals, even further skimming cruise missile are limited. In addition, the compounding the threat environment. Although fewer declining force structure as well as the littoral warfare threats are expected in anyone encounter, they can still environment results more often in situations where ships represent a high-intensity threat scenario to the defending operate independently or as small expeditionary forces fohns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 14, Number 2 (1993) 125 D. R. Ousborne Area defense Landing area Figure 1. Air defense in the littoral environment includes defense against cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and aircraft in the diverse, dense-air-traffic, and cluttered near-land setting. A robust integral self-defense capability must provide a final layer of defense in joint expeditionary and traditional battle group operations as well as an autonomous capability for ships operating alone. (e.g., in amphibious landing operations, blockade or major weapon system elements-detect, control, en­ barrier operations, or search and rescue operations). As gage-are required to operate effectively in this environ­ a consequence of these trends, every surface ship will be ment and counter the air threat. The near-land, high­ threatened by advanced sea-skimming cruise missiles in clutter environment, coupled with sea-skimming mis­ the regional/limited conflict environment. A robust, au­ siles, can overburden many of our existing sensors. Radar tonomous ship self-defense capability is essential for improvements in effective radiated power, aperture, these ships to be able to sustain operations and accom­ waveform flexibility, and signal processing are required plish their missions. to achieve adequate detection ranges. Improved integra­ This situation has produced a sharply focused empha­ tion and the increased automation of sensors, weapons, sis on fleet self-defense within Congress and the Navy. and fire control systems are essential to shorten reaction In response, the Navy created a Program Executive Office time and coordinate weapon response. In addition, ad­ for Ship Defense (PEO-SD) (recently expanded and rechar­ vanced command and control features are needed to tered as the Program Executive Office for Theater Air enable command personnel to direct and monitor the Defense) to coordinate efforts to improve self-defense overall operation of the combat system in this environ­ capabilities across the fleet. The regional/limited conflict ment with complex rules of engagement and identifica­ setting and advanced-cruise missile threats introduce sev­ tion requirements. Finally, advanced defensive missiles eral new warfighting challenges that necessitate combat with increased kinematics, fast flyout, multimode seekers system advances. Improvements in each of the three (e.g., semi-active homing and IR terminal), improved au- 126 fohns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 14, Number 2 (1993) Ship Self-Defense Against Air Threats topilots and agility, and improved low-altitude ordnance commonplace. Trends in the cruise missile threat include fuzing are essential to countering the advanced-cruise the following: missile threat. 1. Smaller signatures and lower/higher altitudes. The Applied Physics Laboratory has assisted the Navy 2. Higher speeds and high-acceleration maneuvers. in creating a ship self-defense roadmap that identifies a 3. Radiation control and multimode guidance. technical approach for achieving the capability required 4. Advanced electronic countermeasures. to pace the threat through the incremental improvement 5. Hardening and relocation of vulnerable compo­ of existing elements, the development of critical new nents. elements, and their integration into the combat system. 6. Coordinated arrival times. This roadmap reflects, in part, the results of several These features are prominently promoted by several analytical, developmental, and evaluative programs con­ weapons producers, including French, Italian, and Swed­ 5 7 ducted over the past several years, including the Short­ ish manufacturers. - Supersonic, maneuvering, sea­ Range AAW Defense Systems Study (Kuesters Study, skimming missiles in development such as the French 1985), the Short-Range AAW Program (1986), and the Aerospatiale Anti-Naivre Supersonique (ANS)8 cruise NATO AAW Weapon System Program (1987-90). The missile exemplify the current trends. Reduced radar cross overall technical approach has been endorsed by the sections and lowlhigh-altitude flight profiles will be Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), Naval employed to reduce the available battlespace by limiting Sea Systems Command, and PEO-SD sponsors. Although the detection range and thus the time to react to and not all elements of the roadmap have been programmed engage the target. The high-speed and high-acceleration and funded, numerous specific recommendations have (high g) terminal
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Security & Defence European
    a 7.90 D European & Security ES & Defence 4/2016 International Security and Defence Journal Protected Logistic Vehicles ISSN 1617-7983 • www.euro-sd.com • Naval Propulsion South Africa‘s Defence Exports Navies and shipbuilders are shifting to hybrid The South African defence industry has a remarkable breadth of capa- and integrated electric concepts. bilities and an even more remarkable depth in certain technologies. August 2016 Jamie Shea: NATO‘s Warsaw Summit Politics · Armed Forces · Procurement · Technology The backbone of every strong troop. Mercedes-Benz Defence Vehicles. When your mission is clear. When there’s no road for miles around. And when you need to give all you’ve got, your equipment needs to be the best. At times like these, we’re right by your side. Mercedes-Benz Defence Vehicles: armoured, highly capable off-road and logistics vehicles with payloads ranging from 0.5 to 110 t. Mobilising safety and efficiency: www.mercedes-benz.com/defence-vehicles Editorial EU Put to the Test What had long been regarded as inconceiv- The second main argument of the Brexit able became a reality on the morning of 23 campaigners was less about a “democratic June 2016. The British voted to leave the sense of citizenship” than of material self- European Union. The majority that voted for interest. Despite all the exception rulings "Brexit", at just over 52 percent, was slim, granted, the United Kingdom is among and a great deal smaller than the 67 percent the net contribution payers in the EU. This who voted to stay in the then EEC in 1975, money, it was suggested, could be put to but ignoring the majority vote is impossible.
    [Show full text]
  • Preparing for Nuclear War: President Reagan's Program
    The Center for Defense Infomliansupports a strong eelens* but opposes e-xces- s~eexpenditures or forces It tetiev~Dial strong social, economic and political structures conifflaute equally w national security and are essential to the strength and welfareof our country - @ 1982 CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION-WASHINGTON, D.C. 1.S.S.N. #0195-6450 Volume X, Number 8 PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR WAR: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROGRAM Defense Monitor in Brief President Reagan and his advisors appear to be preparing the United States for nuclear war with the Soviet Union. President Reagan plans to spend $222 Billion in the next six years in an effort to achieve the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war. The U.S. has about 30,000 nuclear weapons today. The U.S. plans to build 17,000 new nuclear weapons in the next decade. Technological advances in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and changes in nuclear war planning are major factors in the weapons build-up and make nuclear war more likely. Development of new U.S. nuclear weapons like the MX missile create the impression in the U.S., Europe, and the Soviet Union that the U.S.is buildinga nuclear force todestroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal in a preemptive attack. Some of the U.S. weapons being developed may require the abrogation of existing arms control treaties such as the ABM Treaty and Outer Space Treaty, and make any future agreements to restrain the growth of nuclear weapons more difficult to achieve. Nuclear "superiority" loses its meaning when the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles
    The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles The Chinese Navy Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Saunders, EDITED BY Yung, Swaine, PhILLIP C. SAUNderS, ChrISToPher YUNG, and Yang MIChAeL Swaine, ANd ANdreW NIeN-dzU YANG CeNTer For The STUdY oF ChINeSe MilitarY AffairS INSTITUTe For NATIoNAL STrATeGIC STUdIeS NatioNAL deFeNSe UNIverSITY COVER 4 SPINE 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY COVER.indd 3 COVER 1 11/29/11 12:35 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 1 11/29/11 12:37 PM 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 2 11/29/11 12:37 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, D.C. 2011 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 3 11/29/11 12:37 PM Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
    [Show full text]
  • Air-Directed Surface-To-Air Missile Study Methodology
    H. T. KAUDERER Air-Directed Surface-to-Air Missile Study Methodology H. Todd Kauderer During June 1995 through September 1998, APL conducted a series of Warfare Analysis Laboratory Exercises (WALEXs) in support of the Naval Air Systems Command. The goal of these exercises was to examine a concept then known as the Air-Directed Surface-to-Air Missile (ADSAM) System in support of Navy Overland Cruise Missile Defense. A team of analysts and engineers from APL and elsewhere was assembled to develop a high-fidelity, physics-based engineering modeling process suitable for understanding and assessing the performance of both individual systems and a “system of systems.” Results of the initial ADSAM Study effort served as the basis for a series of WALEXs involving senior Flag and General Officers and were subsequently presented to the (then) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. (Keywords: ADSAM, Cruise missiles, Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense, Modeling and simulation, Overland Cruise Missile Defense.) INTRODUCTION In June 1995 the Naval Air Systems Command • Developing an analytical methodology that tied to- (NAVAIR) asked APL to examine the Air-Directed gether a series of previously distinct, “stovepiped” Surface-to-Air Missile (ADSAM) System concept for high-fidelity engineering models into an integrated their Overland Cruise Missile Defense (OCMD) doc- system that allowed the detailed analysis of a “system trine. NAVAIR was concerned that a number of impor- of systems” tant air defense–related decisions were being made
    [Show full text]
  • REFERENCE LIST Referencelist Surface Vessels 2017 Rev.05.Xlsx Page 2 of 10
    REFERENCE LIST Referencelist Surface vessels 2017 Rev.05.xlsx Page 2 of 10 No. Country Ship type Ship name Ship class Shipyard Year HVAC System HVAC CBRN Protection WaterChilled Plant Provision Cooling Plant Firefighting 1 Frigate El Moudamir MEKO A-200 TKMS 2016/17 X X X X X Algeria 2 Frigate Erradii MEKO A-200 TKMS 2016 X X X X X Tenix Defence System 3 Frigate Perth MEKO 200 2006 X X X X Williamstown Australia Tenix Defence System 4 Frigate Toowoomba MEKO 200 2005 X X X X Williamstown Tenix Defence System 5 Frigate Ballarat MEKO 200 2004 X X X X Williamstown Tenix Defence System 6 Frigate Parramatta MEKO 200 2003 X X X X Williamstown Tenix Defence System 7 Frigate Stuart MEKO 200 2002 X X X X Williamstown Tenix Defence System 8 Frigate Warramunga MEKO 200 2001 X X X X Williamstown Transfield 9 Frigate Arunta MEKO 200 1998 X X X X Williamstown Transfield 10 Frigate Anzac MEKO 200 1996 X X X X Williamstown Daewoo 11 Frigate F25 2000 X X Okpo Bangladesh 12 Peenewerft 13 Patrol forces Gravataí 12 Grajaú Class 2000 X X X Germany Brazil Peenewerft 14 Patrol forces Guaratuba 12 Grajaú Class 1999 X X X Germany Peenewerft 15 Patrol forces Gurupi 12 Grajaú Class 1996 X X X X Germany Peenewerft 16 Patrol forces Guajará 12 Grajaú Class 1995 X X X X Germany Referencelist Surface vessels 2017 Rev.05.xlsx Page 3 of 10 No. Country Ship type Ship name Ship class Shipyard Year HVAC System HVAC CBRN Protection WaterChilled Plant Provision Cooling Plant Firefighting Peenewerft 17 Patrol forces Guaporé 12 Grajaú Class 1995 X X X X Germany Brazil Peenewerft
    [Show full text]
  • A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier Assessing China’S Cruise Missile Ambitions
    Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan and Erickson, Gormley, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier ASSESSING CHINA’s CRUISE MISSILE AMBITIONS Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan and Jingdong Yuan Jingdong and S. Erickson, Andrew Dennis M. Gormley, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (China Center) was established as an integral part of the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies on March 1, 2000, pursuant to Section 914 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. The China Center’s mission is to serve as a national focal point and resource center for multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s Republic of China and to focus on China’s ability to develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument in support of its national strategic objectives. Cover photo: Missile launch from Chinese submarine during China-Russia joint military exercise in eastern China’s Shandong Peninsula. Photo © CHINA NEWSPHOTO/Reuters/Corbis A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier ASSESSING CHINA’s CRUISE MISSILE AMBITIONS Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, D.C. 2014 The ideas expressed in this study are those of the authors alone. They do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. Government. All the resources referenced are unclassified, predominantly from non-U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Deals with Deliveries Or Orders Made for 1970 to 1996
    Transfers of major weapons: Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1970 to 1996 Note: The No. delivered and the Year(s) of deliveries columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. The Comments column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL 5 <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods>. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database Information generated: 21 December 2017 10 Year(s) Recipient/ No. Weapon Weapon Year of No. supplier (S) ordered designation description of order delivery delivered Comments 15 Angola S: France (180) HOT Anti-tank missile 1985 1986-1987 (180) For 6 SA-342K and possibly 6 SA-365N helicopters Argentina S: France (20) R-530 BVRAAM (1970) 1972-1973 (20) For Mirage-3E combat aircraft 20 (30) AS-12 ASM/anti-ship missile (1973) 1974 (30) For SA-319B helicopters (75) MM-38 Exocet Anti-ship missile (1975) 1976-1981 (75) For Sheffield (Hercules or Type-42) destroyers and D'Orves (Drummond) corvettes and for modernized Gearing (Py) and Sumner (Bouchard) destroyers 25 (15) R-530 BVRAAM (1977) 1980 (15) For Mirage-3E combat aircraft (80) SS-11 Anti-tank missile (1977) 1978 (80) For SA-319B helicopters (30) AM-39 Exocet Anti-ship missile 1979 1982-1983 (30) For Super Etendard combat aircraft (60) MM-40 Exocet Anti-ship missile (1980) 1983-1984 (60) For MEKO-360 (Almirante Brown) frigates (84) R-550 Magic-1
    [Show full text]
  • Cruise Missile Proliferation
    Order Code RS21252 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Cruise Missile Proliferation Andrew Feickert Updated July 28, 2005 Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary About 75 countries currently possess cruise missiles.1 Many experts predict that anti — ship and land attack cruise missile proliferation will increase in terms of both scope and technological sophistication. This report will be updated as events warrant. Introduction There are reportedly about 130 different types of cruise missiles in the world today and approximately 75 different countries are believed to have cruise missiles — with the majority of these countries having only short range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM).2 In testimony to to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2005, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby stated: The numbers and capabilities of cruise missiles will increase, fueled by maturation of land-attack and Ant-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) programs in Europe, Russia, and China, sales of competing systems, and the spread of advanced-dual use technologies and materials. Countering today’s ASCMs is a challenging problem and the difficulty in countering these systems will increase with the introduction of more advanced guidance and propulsion technologies. Several ASCMs will have a secondary land- attack role.3 Land attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which can be launched against ground targets from the air, surface naval vessels, submarines, and from the ground, are of particular concern. According to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center: 1 Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles in that they are powered throughout their entire flight and fly a relatively flat, as opposed to ballistic, course to the target.
    [Show full text]
  • C-MASAD-82-13 Air Launched Cruise Missile Shows Promise but Problems Could Result in Operational Limitations
    “” $fcukwJ 11fg'This is an unclassified digest ftihed in lieu of',, it a report con-8 classified security information. 1 ",,,, ,mm,, ,',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,m,,m,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,s REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES SHOWS PROMISE BUT PROBLEMS COULD RESULT TN OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS ---m-mDIGEST The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is a sub- sonic, jet-powered airframe armed with a nuclear warhead for use against a variety of targets. ALCM u,ses sophisticated navigational aids for flying at low altitudes, avoiding detection, and for obtaining a high degree of accuracy in strik- ing targets. ALCM is to be used with the bomber component of U.S. strategic offensive forces. (See p. 1.) This report is part of GAO's annual review ef- forts to provide the Congress with an independ-, ent evaluation of certain weapon system programs, and with information to consider when making judgments concerning the ALCM program. The De- partment of Defense has placed the highest na- tional priority on the deployment of ALCM to preclude shortfalls in strategic weapons in the 1980s. On September 30, 1981, ALCM attained first alert capability status, a major program milestone leading to initial operational capability planned for December' 1982. First alert capability refers to 1 B-52G bomber capable of alert status and equipped with (1) an offensive avionics system, (2) 12 external ALCMs, and (3) internal short- range missiles and/or gravity bombs. Initial operational capability requires a B-$2G squadron--l6 aircraft--similarly equipped. (See p. 3.) Meeting initial operational capability in December 1982 with a fully operational missile may be achievable, albeit difficult.
    [Show full text]
  • GAO-21-378, HYPERSONIC WEAPONS: DOD Should Clarify
    United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Addressees March 2021 HYPERSONIC WEAPONS DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts GAO-21-378 March 2021 HYPERSONIC WEAPONS DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts Highlights of GAO-21-378, a report to congressional addressees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found Hypersonic missiles, which are an GAO identified 70 efforts to develop hypersonic weapons and related important part of building hypersonic technologies that are estimated to cost almost $15 billion from fiscal years 2015 weapon systems, move at least five through 2024 (see figure). These efforts are widespread across the Department times the speed of sound, have of Defense (DOD) in collaboration with the Department of Energy (DOE) and, in unpredictable flight paths, and are the case of hypersonic technology development, the National Aeronautics and expected to be capable of evading Space Administration (NASA). DOD accounts for nearly all of this amount. today’s defensive systems. DOD has begun multiple efforts to develop Hypersonic Weapon-related and Technology Development Total Reported Funding by Type of offensive hypersonic weapons as well Effort from Fiscal Years 2015 through 2024, in Billions of Then-Year Dollars as technologies to improve its ability to track and defend against them. NASA and DOE are also conducting research into hypersonic technologies. The investments for these efforts are significant. This report identifies: (1) U.S. government efforts to develop hypersonic systems that are underway and their costs, (2) challenges these efforts face and what is being done to address them, and (3) the extent to which the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Greek Deterrence of Turkey: Living to Fight Another Day
    Greek Deterrence of Turkey: Living to Fight Another Day by Emmanuel Karagiannis BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,770, October 6, 2020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Greece is facing a serious security challenge from Turkey, a fellow NATO country. The recent deterioration of bilateral relations has generated suspicion and distrust in Athens. The upcoming exploratory talks are bound to fail. The Greek deterrence strategy is shifting significantly because the possibility of conflict is growing. Greece and Turkey are strange neighbors. They are bitter rivals with a history of armed conflict, but are both member-states of NATO. The list of bilateral issues between them has lengthened over the years, including the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, the status of ethno-religious minorities, the delimitation of territorial waters, the continental shelf/Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and national airspace, and the problem of illegal immigration. Greek-Turkish relations hit a new low on July 21, when the Erdoğan regime announced its decision to send a seismic exploration ship near the Greek island of Kastellorizo. Ankara’s main objective has been to grab as much continental shelf as possible by preventing Athens from declaring an EEZ in the area. Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s center-right government rose to the challenge and mobilized its fleet to disrupt a Turkish oil and gas survey in what it deems the Greek continental shelf. This was the first time since January 1996, when the Imia crisis erupted, that Greece showed a clear willingness to use military force to defend its sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.
    [Show full text]
  • China's New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities And
    October 28, 2015 China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific Author: Michael Pilger, Research Fellow, Security and Foreign Affairs Acknowledgments: James Acton, Christopher Carlson, Jeffrey Engstrom, Robert Haddick, Christopher Twomey, and Christopher Yeaw provided helpful insights and reviewed drafts of this paper, but do not necessarily agree with or endorse the assessments and statements contained herein. Errors and views are the author’s own. Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.- China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report. Introduction In April 2015, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence confirmed that China has deployed the YJ-18 antiship cruise missile (ASCM) on some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy submarines and surface ships.1 The YJ-18’s greater range and speed than previous Chinese ASCMs, along with its wide deployment across PLA platforms, would significantly increase China’s antiaccess/area denial capabilities* against U.S.
    [Show full text]