U.S. Department of Energy Stockpile Stewardship Program

30-Day Review

November 23, 1999 NT O E F E TM N R E A R P G

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N A I C T I E R D E ST M ATES OF A

U.S. Department of Energy Stockpile Stewardship Program

30-Day Review

November 23, 1999 Table of Contents Stockpile Stewardship Program 30-Day Review

Chapter 1 - Purpose of this Review ...... 1-1

1.1 Statement by Secretary Richardson on Stockpile Stewardship ...... 1-1 1.2 Charge to the Senior Technical Advisors from Under Secretary Moniz ...... 1-3 1.3 Stockpile Stewardship 30-Day Program Review Participants ...... 1-5

Chapter 2 - Overview of the Stockpile Stewardship Program ...... 2-1

2.1 Program Goals and Organization ...... 2-1 2.1.1 New Business Model ...... 2-1 2.1.2 Directed Stockpile Work ...... 2-3 2.1.3 Campaigns ...... 2-3 2.1.4 Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities ...... 2-7

Chapter 3 - The Requirements Process ...... 3-1

3.1 National Requirements ...... 3-1 3.1.1 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan ...... 3-1 3.1.2 Nuclear Posture Review ...... 3-1 3.1.3 Stockpile Stewardship Program Plan ...... 3-1 3.2 DoD/DOE Relationship ...... 3-2 3.2.1 Nuclear Weapons Council ...... 3-2 3.2.2 Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee ...... 3-3 3.2.3 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Working Group ...... 3-3 3.2.4 Project Officer Group (POG) ...... 3-3 3.2.5 Other DOE/DoD Interactions ...... 3-4 3.2.6 Developing Stockpile Requirements ...... 3-4 3.2.7 The 6.X Process ...... 3-4 3.2.8 The Stockpile Life Extension Process ...... 3-6

Chapter 4 - Impact of Arms Control Agreements on the Stockpile Stewardship Program ...... 4-1

4.1 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ...... 4-1 4.2 START I/II ...... 4-1 4.3 START III...... 4-2 4.3.1 Goals ...... 4-2 4.3.2 Issues ...... 4-2 4.3.3 Technical Approach ...... 4-2 4.3.4 Risks ...... 4-3 4.3.5 Integration ...... 4-3 4.3.5.1 Other Programs/Campaigns ...... 4-3 4.3.5.2 Sites ...... 4-3 4.3.5.3 Other Offices, Agencies and Organizations ...... 4-3

i Chapter 5 - Accomplishments ...... 5-1

5.1 Stockpile Maintenance ...... 5-1 5.2 Stockpile Surveillance: Predicting and Detecting Problems ...... 5-1 5.3 Assessment and Certification: Analyzing and Evaluating ...... 5-4 5.4 Design and Manufacturing: Refurbishing and Certifying ...... 5-5 5.5 Simulation & Modeling: Underpinning the Stockpile Stewardship Program ...... 5-7 5.6 Experimental Facilities: Underpinning the Stockpile Stewardship Program ...... 5-8

Chapter 6 - Stockpile Stewardship Program Challenges– Now and in the Future ...... 6-1

6.1 Personnel Challenges ...... 6-1 6.1.1 The Chiles Commission ...... 6-1 6.2 Infrastructure Challenges ...... 6-2 6.3 Business Challenges ...... 6-6

Chapter 7 - Summary and Findings ...... 7-1

7.1 Introduction ...... 7-1 7.2 General and Specific Program Findings ...... 7-3 7.2.1 The Stockpile Stewardship Program structure is on track ...... 7-3 7.2.2 Science-based SSP is the right path ...... 7-3 7.2.2.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-3 7.2.3 SSP baseline will continuously evolve ...... 7-4 7.2.3.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-4 7.2.4 The process for generating program requirements needs attention ...... 7-4 7.2.4.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-5 7.2.5 Despite the many accomplishments, the program is under stress ...... 7-5 7.2.5.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-6 7.2.6 More work is needed to prioritize the directed stockpile workload ...... 7-7 7.2.6.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-7 7.2.7 ‘Metrics of Success’ need to be defined for the DSW program and each Campaign ...... 7-7 7.2.7.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-7 7.2.8 Additional external review and oversight is needed ...... 7-8 7.2.8.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-8 7.2.9. Increases in programmatic and security requirements have impacted the stability and morale of the work force ...... 7-8 7.2.9.1 Specific Program Findings for Production Plants ...... 7-8 7.2.9.2 Specific Program Findings for Laboratories ...... 7-9 7.2.10. SLEP production needs for the next decade require stable reinvestment in, and planning for work force and plant modernization...... 7-10 7.2.10.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-10 7.2.11 More long-term planning is required for new capital construction projects ...... 7-10 7.2.11.1 Specific Program Findings ...... 7-10

ii Appendix A - Listing of all SSP Program Reviews ...... A-1

Appendix B - Recommendations from the Chiles Commission Report ...... B-1

Appendix C - Bibliography ...... C-1

Appendix D - Acronyms...... D-1

Appendix E - Site Descriptions ...... E-1

iii This page left intentionally blank. Purpose of this Review ternal review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and to report back to me within 30 days. The review will examine the accom- plishments of the program over the last three 1 1.1. Statement by Secretary years and the program structure in meeting Richardson on Stockpile Stewardship current and long-term needs for certifying the (October 14, 1999) stockpile. This will form the basis for assess- ing whether the balance between program el- ements supports the national strategy. LAST NIGHT PRESIDENT CLINTON reaffirmed that the United States will continue In particular we must ensure that we are to observe–as we have since 1992–a policy placing sufficient attention and resources to of not conducting nuclear tests. As Secretary recruiting and retaining the best scientists and of Energy one of my most important responsi- engineers in our nation to meet the challenge bilities is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear stock- of maintaining our nuclear stockpile without pile remains safe, secure and reliable without testing. We must also review the balance of nuclear testing. The U.S. nuclear deterrent activities at the production facilities and at the remains a supreme national interest of the national laboratories to ensure that the prior- United States. ity given to these important tasks is commen- surate with the needs of the program. The Department of Energy, with our na- tional laboratories and production facilities, will For the Stockpile Stewardship Program continue to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons to be successful the Administration and the through the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Congress must work together to demonstrate The program rests on developing an unprec- their commitment to the U.S. nuclear deter- edented set of scientific tools to better under- rent by providing for sustained and stable fund- stand nuclear weapons, on significantly ing for the program over the years to come. enhancing our surveillance capabilities, and on This will be true whether or not a Test Ban completing a new manufacturing program Treaty is ratified since the U.S. will inevitably needed to extend the life of our nuclear weap- continue to rely on the new paradigm for main- ons. Through Stockpile Stewardship, the Sec- taining its weapons in the post-Cold War era retaries of Defense and Energy have where we are not building new weapons sys- successfully certified the nuclear stockpile for tems, and where we are dependent on a new the last three years, and we are well along our set of facilities and scientific resources to meet way to a fourth certification that the stockpile this critical challenge. remains safe and reliable and that nuclear test- The importance of a credible nuclear de- ing is not needed at this time. terrent to our national security was reaffirmed In order to ensure our continued confi- during last week’s Senate debate. We at the dence in the structure, progress and accom- Department of Energy will continue our work plishments of this important program, I have to fulfill this important national security mission. directed the Under Secretary of Energy, Ernest P. Moniz, to undertake a comprehensive in-

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1-2 1.2. Charge to the Senior Technical A comprehensive overview of the Stock- Advisors from Under Secretary Moniz pile Stewardship Program will be presented by the Office of Defense Programs and se- nior staff from the nuclear weapons complex ON OCTOBER 14, 1999, the Secretary on November 8-9, 1999, at U.S. Strategic of Energy directed me to undertake a com- Command. The afternoon of November 9 will prehensive internal review of the Stockpile be spent evaluating the program, defining the Stewardship Program and report my findings key issues, and framing recommended actions. to him within 30 days. In order to accomplish This discussion will shape the Stockpile Stew- this task I have invited a group of senior mem- ardship Program review presented to the Sec- bers of the defense and scientific communi- retary. The report will identify the key ties to advise me on the structure, balance, accomplishments and challenges of the Stock- and ability of the Stockpile Stewardship Pro- pile Stewardship Program, the critical senior- gram to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable level decision points and issues facing the nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of program, and the programmatic areas that will nuclear testing both now and in the future. require additional study in the future. I ask the Senior Technical Advisors to evaluate the program based on issues such Ernest J. Moniz as: the program goals, structure, and organi- zation; the ability of the program to meet DoD/ DOE requirements; the health and status of the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure, including both facilities and human resources; and the appropriateness of the program re- Under Secretary sources, schedules and integrated plan. This United States Department of Energy input will be central to the Secretary’s assess- ment of how these factors contribute collec- tively to our level of confidence in the stockpile now and in the future.

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1-4 1.3. Stockpile Stewardship 30-Day Participants Program Review Participants Dr. Gil Weigand Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Simulation Chair Office of Defense Programs U.S. Department of Energy Dr. Ernest J. Moniz Under Secretary Mr. David Beck United States Department of Energy Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Senior Technical Advisors Application and Stockpile Operation Office of Defense Programs Dr. John Birely (retired) U. S. Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory Mr. James Landers Dr. Jay Davis Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Support Director Office of Defense Programs Defense Threat Reduction Agency U. S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of Defense Ms. Karen Clegg Dr. Ted Hardebeck President Chief Scientist Allied Signal, Kansas City Plant U.S. Strategic Command, J-5B U.S. Department of Defense Mr. Robert Van Hook President Dr. Roland Herbst (retired) Lockheed-Martin Energy Systems, Y-12 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Dr. William Weinreich Mr. Gene Ives (retired) President Sandia National Laboratories Pantex Plant Dr. Raymond Jeanloz Dr. Thomas Hunter Professor Senior Vice President Department of Geology and Geophysics Sandia National Laboratories University of California, Berkeley Dr. George Miller Mr. Frank Miller Associate Director Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Office of the Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction Dr. Steve Younger U. S. Department of Defense Associate Director Los Alamos National Laboratory Mr. Robert Peurifoy (retired) Sandia National Laboratories Ms. Kathy Carlson Manager General Lawrence Welch, USAF (retired) Nevada Operations Office Chief Executive Officer U. S. Department of Energy Institute for Defense Analysis Mr. Rick Glass Manager DOE Senior Staff Albuquerque Operations Office BGen Thomas Gioconda U. S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Dr. James Turner Acting Manager U. S. Department of Energy Oakland Operations Office Mr. Robert DeGrasse U. S. Department of Energy Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Dr. Jerry Freedman Operations Office of Defense Programs Office of Defense Programs U.S. Department of Energy U. S. Department of Energy Dr. John Harvey Dr. Maureen McCarthy Deputy Assistant Secretary Office of the Under Secretary Office of the Secretary of Defense for Strategy U. S. Department of Energy and Threat Reduction Dr. Robin Staffin U. S. Department of Defense Office of the Secretary U. S. Department of Energy

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1-6 Overview of the velopment in preparation for refurbishment. The DOE must be able to remanufacture Stockpile Stewardship weapon components and continue to certify 2 Program them as safe, secure and reliable against threats of the 21st century. Two key systems– the W80 and the W76–are a large part of the nation’s nuclear deterrent and the refurbish- THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP ments of these systems will represent a sig- PROGRAM (SSP) was established in re- nificant effort to be undertaken during the next sponse to the FY 1994 National Defense Au- decade. The W76–as part of the Trident sub- thorization Act (P.L. 103-160), which called marine weapon system–plays a particularly im- on the Secretary of Energy to “establish a portant role as one of the most survivable stewardship program to ensure the preserva- elements of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. De- tion of the core intellectual and technical com- veloping the tools, technologies, and skill-base petencies of the United States in nuclear required to refurbish these systems is a major weapons.” In the absence of nuclear testing challenge of the Stockpile Stewardship Pro- the Stockpile Stewardship Program must: 1) gram. The cost and schedule of these tools support a focused, multifaceted program to and technologies, and the availability of the increase the understanding of the enduring proper skills in the work force, must be fac- stockpile; 2) predict, detect, and evaluate tored into the development of the requirements potential problems due to the aging of the expressed in the life extension programs of stockpile; 3) refurbish and remanufacture these two weapons. weapons and components, as required; and 4) maintain the science and engineering insti- tutions needed to support the nation’s nuclear 2.1. Program Goals and Organization deterrent, now and in the future. The SSP has been reviewed extensively since its incep- tion. A list of reviews of the Stockpile Stew- THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF the SSP ardship Program is given in Appendix A. is to ensure the operational readiness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The SSP As the civilian steward of the nation’s program is organized into three focus areas: nuclear weapons complex, the Department of 1) Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), designed Energy (DOE) is responsible to the nation for to ensure that stockpiled weapons meet mili- the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear tary requirements; 2) Campaigns, designed to arsenal. The Department of Defense (DoD) provide the science and engineering capabili- is the military customer for the nuclear stock- ties needed to meet the ongoing and evolving pile and partners with the DOE in setting re- DSW requirements; and 3) Infrastructure quirements and establishing production goals. (Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, The Secretary of Energy represents and is (RTBF)) that is required for stockpile work obligated to the United States public to ensure and computational and experimental research that the nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure activities. and reliable. A key challenge of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is to balance military weapon performance goals against civilian and 2.1.1. New Business Model military surety and safety concerns. A significant fraction of the nation’s During the last year, DOE’s Office of nuclear weapon systems are scheduled to un- Defense Programs (DP) has undertaken a dergo refurbishment during the next decade. major shift in program management strategy, Additional systems will be simultaneously un- which has resulted in significant changes to dergoing engineering and manufacturing de- the supporting planning, budgeting, and orga-

2-1 The nation’s enduring nuclear weapon stockpile, shown in the accompanying table, contains thirteen systems within nine weapon classes. The W84, which is in the inactive stockpile (IS), is also listed. It’s carrier, the ground-launched cruise missile, was eliminated by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1988.

Weapon Description Delivery System Laboratories Primary Use Service Date Entered Service B61-3/4/10 Non-Strategic F-15, F-16, NATO LANL & Sandia Air to Surface Air Force, NATO B61-3: 10/79 Bomb Tornado B61-4: 8/79 B61-10: 8/90 B61-7/11 Strategic Bomb B-52, B-2 LANL & Sandia Air to Surface Air Force B61-7: 9/85 B61-11: 11/97 W62 ICBM Warhead Minuteman III LLNL & Sandia Surface to Surface Air Force 4/70 ICBM W76 SLBM Warhead Trident I (C4) LANL & Sandia Underwater to Navy 11/78 Trident II (D5) Surface W78 ICBM Warhead Minuteman III LANL & Sandia Surface to Surface Air Force 9/79 ICBM W80-0/1 ALCM/ACM/ SSN Attack LANL & Sandia Air to Surface Navy W80-0: 3/84 TLAM-N Warhead Submarine, B-52 Underwater to Air Force W80-1: 2/82 Surface B83 Strategic Bomb B52, B-2 LLNL & Sandia Air to Surface Air Force 9/83 W87 ICBM Warhead Peacekeeper ICBM LLNL & Sandia Surface to Surface Air Force 7/86 W88 SLBM Warhead Trident II (D5) LANL & Sandia Underwater to Navy 6/89 Surface W84 (IS) GLCM No current carrier, LLNL & Sandia Air Force 9/83 removedbyINF

nizational structure of the SSP. The change in cific weapons in the nuclear stockpile. The approach responds to important drivers that DP second category of variable costs is termed presently faces. These include weapon refur- “Campaigns,” which are focused science and bishments starting in FY 2006, an aging engineering activities that address critical ca- workforce in the nuclear weapons complex, pabilities, tools, computations and experiments and an aging stockpile that must be maintained. needed to achieve weapons stockpile certifi- It also responds to the need for intensive inter- cation, manufacturing, and refurbishment now nal and external review to ensure that the pro- and into the future, in the absence of nuclear gram will achieve its goals, while preserving testing. the institutional viability of the laboratories, pro- duction plants, and the test site. It is important to understand that the fixed- cost portion of the SSP – RTBF – must be The approach now used by DP to manage funded. No weapons work or other activities the SSP involves developing an understanding can take place unless the infrastructure exists of both the fixed and variable costs associated and is maintained in the appropriate state of with the program. The fixed costs are associ- readiness. The implementation of this approach ated with the physical infrastructure, i.e., the of identifying both fixed and variable costs of costs associated with maintaining only the in- the program provides DP, laboratory and plant frastructure, facilities, capital equipment, con- managers an improved and coordinated tool struction, and other functions that are necessary for determining the costs associated with man- to have a viable nuclear weapons complex. DP aging the nuclear weapons complex. has termed fixed costs as Readiness in Tech- nical Base and Facilities. Another business practice introduced this year by DP was the establishment of a rigor- The variable costs are those that are asso- ous planning process that clearly lays out pro- ciated with the actual work that is performed grammatic milestones to be achieved within within the nuclear weapons complex. DP has each element of the SSP. The complete Stock- established two categories of variable costs. pile Stewardship Program is now defined by a The first category is Directed Stockpile Work, series of program plans that have a five-year which are those activities that directly support planning horizon, each with an accompanying the day-to-day work and activities associated annual implementation plan. The five-year with the refurbishment and certification of spe- program plans describe the goals and objec-

2-2 tives of the program elements, and the annual readiness across the nuclear weapons com- implementation plans provide detailed sets of plex. DSW represents the programmatic foun- milestones that allow for accurate program dation for setting current weapon system tracking and oversight. activities and implementing future weapon stockpile requirements. The combination of identifying the fixed and variable costs associated with the program, The key DSW program goals are to: and the rigorous planning that has been done, Maintain the readiness of the deployed is expected to provide an increased level of stockpile. focus and integration within the program, and a much greater level of resolution of program • Execute the limited life component ex- activities. DP management believes that, be- change program (LLCE); cause of the increased focus, this approach will significantly improve the laboratories’ and • Confirm the safety, reliability, and per- production plants’ ability to support, maintain, formance of deployed weapon sys- and build an excellent work force with the skill tems; and mix needed to ensure success of the SSP. This • Conduct authorized weapon alter- approach also is key to sustaining the labora- ations, modifications and repairs. tories as premier scientific and engineering institutions, supporting the manufacturing ac- Support nuclear deterrent into the future. tivities necessary to maintain and modernize • Refurbish the current stockpile to the stockpile. achieve life extension; and • Provide the capability to modernize 2.1.2. Directed Stockpile Work weapons.

The Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) Pro- Dispose of retired weapons and associated gram addresses activities that directly support components. the readiness of the enduring nuclear weap- • Dismantle retired weapons; and ons stockpile now and for as long into the fu- ture as is required. It focuses on nuclear • Provide for materials and component stockpile life-cycle management, maintains the disposition. nuclear deterrent as specified in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (see Chapter 3), and 2.1.3. Campaigns includes stockpile-related workload, policy guidance, coordination, and oversight of all Campaigns are technically challenging, activities that directly support stockpile re- multi-year, multi-functional efforts conducted quirements. DSW policy and program guid- across the Defense Programs laboratories, the ance is formulated within DP and implemented production plants, and the Nevada Test Site by a team consisting of DP, the national labo- (NTS). They are designed to develop and ratories, and the production plants that together maintain specific critical capabilities that are comprise the nuclear weapons complex. needed to sustain a viable nuclear deterrent. DSW encompasses a broad range of ac- The goal of the Campaigns is to provide the tivities that focus on the reliability, surety, and capabilities needed to address current and fu- performance of nuclear weapons. These ac- ture stockpile issues by employing world-class tivities include research, development, and pro- scientists and engineers, and by providing the duction associated with: weapon maintenance; most advanced scientific and engineering in- surveillance; life extension; assessment and frastructure. The Campaigns provide a focus certification; baselining; dismantlements; de- and planning framework that enables the labo- sign assessments; engineering; and production ratories to sustain their scientific preeminence.

2-3 Campaigns have milestones and specific end- End State: Provide accurate 3-D imagery dates designed to focus efforts in science and of imploding surrogate primaries. computing, applied science and engineering, • Secondary Certification and Nuclear- and production readiness, on well-defined Systems Margins Campaign – includes deliverables related to the stockpile. Currently, experimental and computational activities there are eighteen Campaigns. It is antici- designed to determine the minimum pri- pated that as these mature and milestones are mary yield needed to produce a militarily achieved, new Campaigns will be identified effective weapon. The activities in this and implemented. Campaign will develop a validated, pre- Eight Campaigns deal primarily with pro- dictive computational capability for each viding the scientific understanding necessary system in the stockpile, determine the pri- to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile in the mary radiation emission and energy flow, absence of nuclear testing and to support the and determine the performance of nomi- stockpile modernization required for weapon nal, aged, and rebuilt secondaries. life extensions. End State: Determine margins and • Primary Certification Campaign – in- weapon-primary factors necessary to pro- cludes experimental activities that will de- duce a militarily effective weapon. velop and implement the ability to certify • Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Ig- rebuilt and aged primaries to within a stated nition & High Yield Campaign – includes yield level without nuclear testing. Capa- experimental activities at the National Ig- bilities developed under this Campaign di- nition Facility (NIF) and other facilities that rectly support DSW, including the B61, will enhance experimental capabilities for W80, and W76 life extensions, and certifi- stewardship. Material conditions that can cation of the newly-fabricated W88 pit. be reached at the NIF, together with the End State: Develop the tools required to diagnostics available, will also provide en- certify the performance and safety of any hanced experimental capability for primary newly fabricated replacement or aged pri- certification and weapons-relevant mate- mary based on hydrodynamics and gener- rials dynamics measurements. alized materials descriptions. End State: Achieve ignition implosion by • Dynamic Materials Properties Cam- FY 2006. paign – includes efforts to develop phys- • Certification in Hostile Environments ics-based, experimentally-validated data Campaign – will validate computational and models of all stockpile materials at a tools for certification, reevaluate nuclear- level of accuracy commensurate with the weapon hostile environments, develop ra- requirements of primary and secondary diation-hardened technologies, and certification. demonstrate certification technologies on End State: Provide complete, accurate and the W76 life extension program. experimentally-validated models that de- End State: Develop certification tools and scribe the state and evolution of material microsystems technologies required to properties in imploding primaries, with spe- ensure that refurbished weapons meet cial emphasis on plutonium. Stockpile-to -Target Sequence (STS) hos- • Advanced Radiography Campaign – tile environment requirements. develops technologies for three-dimen- • Defense Applications and Modeling sional imaging of imploding surrogate-ma- Campaign – uses the tools of the Accel- terial primaries, with sufficient resolution erated Strategic Computing Initiative to resolve uncertainties in primary perfor- (ASCI) to provide 3-D, high-fidelity, full- mance.

2-4 system simulation software required for time, the necessary redesigns, refurbish- engineering, safety, and performance ments, and re-certifications can be made analyses of weapons in the stockpile. efficiently and cost effectively within the capabilities and capacity of a “right-sized” End State: 3-D high-fidelity-physics, full- manufacturing complex. The Enhanced system simulation capability. Surveillance Campaign develops the tech- • Weapon System Engineering Certifica- nologies and methods, as well as the fun- tion Campaign – establishes science- damental understanding of materials based engineering methods to increase properties and weapons science, to im- confidence in weapons systems through prove detection and predictive capabilities. validated simulation models and high fidel- These capabilities will be used to develop ity experimental tests. This Campaign will new estimates for weapon lifetimes. validate engineering computational mod- End State: Provide lifetime assessments els, and will develop a suite of tools to en- and the quantitative decision basis for fu- able science-based certification of the B61, ture life extension programs. W80, and W76 as required by the SLEP. • Advanced Design and Production Tech- End State: Establish a predictive capabil- nologies (ADAPT) Campaign – is de- ity integrated with fewer, but smarter, ex- signed to accelerate and advance product periments to assess weapon performance realization technologies by developing ca- with science-based certification. pabilities to deliver qualified refurbishment Three engineering Campaigns focus on products cheaper, better, and quicker. This providing specific tools, capabilities, and com- Campaign will develop modeling and simu- ponents necessary to support the maintenance, lation tools and information management modernization, refurbishment and continued technologies to enable full-scale engineer- certification of specific weapons systems. ing development with minimal hardware These campaigns support both certification and prototyping, and through totally paperless DSW work. processes, for monitoring weapon refur- bishment activities. • Enhanced Surety Campaign – develops enhanced surety options, including mod- End State: Provide the capability to de- ern levels of use-denial capabilities that liver qualified stockpile life extension pro- may be considered for incorporation in gram refurbishment products upon demand scheduled stockpile refurbishment. This at one-half cost, one-half the current time Campaign will develop enhanced surety and with zero stockpile defects by 2005. options for the B61, W80, and W76 Seven readiness Campaigns focus on sus- weapon systems in time to support refur- taining the manufacturing base within the bishment schedules. nuclear weapons complex. Some manufac- End State: Meet modern nuclear safety turing processes and capabilities are no longer standards and upgrade use-denial capa- practical. Without a viable manufacturing ca- bilities, in time for scheduled weapon re- pability, the U.S. nuclear deterrent cannot be furbishments. maintained. These campaigns are driven by the current work required to maintain the • Enhanced Surveillance Campaign – stockpile as characterized by the Stockpile Life develops the tools needed to predict or Extension Process (SLEP) schedule, and the detect the precursors of age-related de- fact that weapons must remain reliable for fects before they jeopardize warhead decades beyond the anticipated deployment safety, reliability or performance. Mate- period established when they originally were rial, component, system characterization, manufactured. and predictive modeling and simulation are central to this activity. With sufficient lead

2-5 • Pit Readiness Campaign – will reconsti- • Nonnuclear Readiness Campaign – fo- tute pit manufacturing within the DOE cuses on ensuring that future manufactur- nuclear weapons complex, including the ing capabilities for nonnuclear components reestablishment of the technical capability will be available. to manufacture all war reserve pits for the End State: By FY 2006, bring all identified enduring stockpile at a capacity of 20 pits production vulnerabilities to an acceptable per year. These pits will be produced at level of risk; develop advanced technolo- LANL. gies to yield defect-free products at half End State: Develop an automated, expand- the traditional cost and within 19 months able, robust manufacturing capability to after the need is defined. produce stockpiled and new-design pits, • Tritium Readiness Campaign – will pro- without underground testing, within 19 vide a source of tritium commensurate with months of the establishment of a need for the Secretary of Energy’s Record of De- a new pit, and with a stockpile life greater cision announced in December 1998. This than the weapon system. designated the Commercial Light Water • Secondary Readiness Campaign – will Reactor (CLWR) as the primary technol- ensure future manufacturing capabilities ogy option, with a linear accelerator op- (equipment, people, and processes) are in tion to be developed as a backup. New place and ready for production of second- tritium is needed by approximately FY aries. This includes the reestablishment 2005. of special materials processing, replace- End State: By FY 2006 deliver tritium gas ment of sunset technologies, development at a steady state to the Savannah River of technical work force competencies, and Site Tritium Loading Facility. Develop and the development of component certifica- demonstrate key components of linear ac- tion/re-certification techniques. This Cam- celerator and target/blanket technologies paign develops, implements, and maintains and complete preliminary design of Accel- the appropriate capability and capacity to erator Production of Tritium (APT) Facil- accomplish Directed Stockpile Work, and ity. responds to surge production scenarios to manufacture/remanufacture replacement • Material Readiness Campaign – includes components for all weapon systems in the activities to support the construction of a active stockpile. new Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) storage facility at Y-12. This will result in End State: Develop the capability to de- the consolidation of long-term HEU mate- liver a first production-unit secondary with rial at a state-of-the-art facility. It also will 36 months of receiving a request. involve planning activities for new nuclear • High Explosives (HE)/Assembly Readi- material storage vaults, to provide for long- ness Campaign – is focused on ensuring term storage of national plutonium assets. future manufacturing capabilities for high- End State: Develop by FY 2005 a fully in- explosive fabrication and weapon assem- tegrated material management system sup- bly. porting strategic material needs with either End State: Develop the capability for HE/ stockpiled material or the capability to pro- assembly readiness by 2008, by providing duce new material. the technologies, facilities, and personnel • Transportation Readiness Campaign – for high-explosives component manufac- will provide sufficient transport capacity turing, production re-qualification, and to meet the requirements of the DOE and weapon assembly/disassembly operations the DoD for safe and secure transporta- to support a Phase 6.4 (see Section 3.2.7) tion of nuclear weapons, nuclear compo- cycle time of 19 months.

2-6 nents, and other cargoes related to main- of stewardship, and ultimately enables the tenance of the stockpiled weapons. It will DOE to be ready to develop, produce, and test field improved transportation equipment, nuclear weapons. and increase personnel training to counter The primary goal of RTBF is to ensure postulated threats anticipated by the year that the infrastructure is in place and available 2010. The capacity will be at a level meet- to conduct the scientific, engineering, and ing the standards set for Transportation manufacturing activities of the Stockpile Stew- Safeguards Division (TSD) transport se- ardship Program. It also encompasses those curity. This is a multi-faceted campaign activities needed to ensure that the infrastruc- with improvements in both personnel and ture – utilities, facilities, equipment – are op- equipment. erationally safe, secure and environmentally End State: Field improved transportation compliant within a defined level of readiness. equipment and increase personnel train- RTBF also addresses safeguards and secu- ing to counter postulated threats anticipated rity needs, particularly cyber-security, at each by the year 2010; provide safe and secure of the sites. The remainder of this subsection transport of nuclear weapons and compo- summarizes RTBF activities related to facili- nents. ties and infrastructure, test readiness, simula- tion infrastructure, and other activities in more detail. Human resources issues are addressed 2.1.4. Readiness In Technical Base and in Chapter 6. Facilities – Maintaining an appropriate infrastructure RTBF activities are directed by DOE Fed- eral personnel at Headquarters, supported by Readiness refers to maintaining a state of the Albuquerque, Nevada, Oakland, and Oak preparedness to be able to perform necessary Ridge Operations Offices for contract man- activities and functions now and into the fu- agement, and implemented by contractor per- ture. In addition to ongoing activities, the SSP sonnel at the Lawrence Livermore National must maintain the capabilities to design, de- Laboratory, Livermore, California; the Los velop, test, and produce nuclear weapons in Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, the future, if so ordered by the President. The New Mexico; the Sandia National Laborato- Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities ries, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Livermore, portion of the SSP serves all of these func- California, and Tonopah, Nevada; the Nevada tions. It contributes in a real and tangible way Test Site, Las Vegas, Nevada; the Pantex to confidence in DOE’s performance of stock- Plant, Amarillo, Texas; the Kansas City Plant, pile stewardship. Readiness is required in three Kansas City, Missouri; the Y-12 Plant, Oak areas. First, it is essential to have high-qual- Ridge, Tennessee; and the Savannah River ity, motivated people with the correct skills to Site, Aiken, South Carolina. Site-specific sum- carry out stewardship, resolve unanticipated maries of capabilities and ongoing and planned technical issues, and resume design, develop- construction of planned major scientific facili- ment, testing, and production if it becomes ties are contained in Appendix E. necessary. Second, the proper infrastructure Facilities and infrastructure. At the must exist to support the activities of these three Defense Programs laboratories and the people, both from a stewardship perspective test site, this includes operation of existing sci- and from the perspective of resuming weapon entific facilities, planning for major new sci- development, testing and production. This in- entific facilities, and planning and construction frastructure must be maintained and upgraded of smaller facilities necessary to provide a as technology evolves. Third, the special ex- modern, evolving infrastructure. The enor- perimental and computational facilities needed mity of developing a comprehensive scientific for stewardship in the absence of nuclear test- understanding of all aspects of nuclear weap- ing must be developed. RTBF is at the heart

2-7 ons has led the laboratories to develop a num- without nuclear testing. Science-based manu- ber of facilities that are unique and of a “na- facturing involves increased application of pro- tional scale.” Those presently under cess modeling and simulation, enhanced data construction include the Dual-Axis Radio- collection for real-time product and process graphic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) characterization, implementation of process- at the Los Alamos National Laboratory based quality, the use of modern development (LANL), and the National Ignition Facility and production technologies, and the imple- (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore National mentation of more effective technical business Laboratory (LLNL). Considered for construc- practices for seamless integration across the tion are the Advanced Hydrodynamics Facil- weapons complex. Examples of resulting ac- ity (AHF) at LANL, which would enable tions include the identification of improved high-resolution, multiple-axis proton radiogra- engineered controls, elimination of nonessen- phy, and the Microsystems and Engineering tial hazardous materials, and enhanced inter- Sciences Applications facility (MESA) at and intra-lot quality pedigree. Examples of Sandia, which would provide research, design, the benefits include shorter product cycle and production capabilities for microsystem- times, better-characterized products, reduced based weapon surety options. To prepare for risk to the work force, and increased process the large computer systems necessary to meet efficiency. the SSP’s simulation objectives, major new Maintaining test readiness. Activities computer facilities are under construction at are conducted at the Nevada Test Site to pre- both LLNL and LANL as part of ASCI. Also serve the skills and facilities required to re- at the three laboratories and the test site, there sume testing within 24 to 36 months, if so is a coordinated, ten-year plan to provide con- directed by the President. Key and critical tinuous updating of the physical infrastructure positions are identified for the functional ar- by planning, constructing, and eventually op- eas necessary to safely execute an under- erating conventional facilities that are neces- ground nuclear test. Overall readiness is sary to sustain a constant infusion of new supported by experimental programs con- technology into the four institutions. ducted at the test site. In particular, test readi- At the production sites (Pantex Plant, ness at NTS is critically dependent on the Kansas City Plant, Y-12, Savannah River Site, Campaigns and laboratory-based experiments and certain facilities at LANL and Sandia), that exercise high-bandwidth recording and facilities infrastructure activities follow a “sci- advanced diagnostic development that are not ence-based” approach that aims to provide a required for subcritical experiments. weapon production capability that will enable Simulation and computing infrastruc- successful, timely execution of the SLEP ture. Simulation science plays a prominent, schedule. The production facilities, in concert underpinning role in the SSP. A significant with the weapon design laboratories, must portion of RTBF focuses on providing the in- constantly address issues pertaining to facili- frastructure necessary at each of the sites for ties, technology, personnel, and business prac- ASCI. Major activities include: tices. Because of the past cost-saving efforts to downsize the nuclear weapons complex in • Acquisition of terascale computer systems; place rather than build an entirely new, ex- tremely expensive one, significant gaps exist • Development of problem solving environ- in some areas of capability and capacity that ment software to enable effective use of will have to be overcome to prepare for the massively parallel computers; SLEP-driven future manufacturing mission. • Development of distance- and distributed- The science basis for manufacturing pro- computing software, tools and systems; cesses must be established to validate the • Development of extremely high-bandwidth safety and reliability of produced components data visualization capabilities;

2-8 • Partnerships with universities; and • “Path forward” activities through which SSP is partnering with computer vendors to develop next-generation computer sys- tems. Other RTBF activities. The final cat- egory of RTBF comprises small but neverthe- less important activities required for overall SSP success. Examples include waste man- agement activities, water treatment, and seis- mic studies. Also included are education and technology partnership activities.

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2-10 the stockpile. Under the current NWSP (1998), The Requirements DOE is required to support the stockpile at Process the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) level. Should START II enter into force, 3 DOE must continue to maintain the capability 3.1. National Requirements to return to START I levels under the “lead and hedge” strategy defined in the NPR and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR weapons program remains the cornerstone of the nation’s deterrence policy, and must be 3.1.2. Nuclear Posture Review ready to carry out the President’s orders for weapon employment, if necessary. The Stock- In 1994, DoD conducted the Nuclear Pos- pile Stewardship Program was established in ture Review, which was revalidated by the response to the FY 1994 National Defense May 1997 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review. Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160), which called The NPR assumes in the future there will be on the Secretary of Energy to “establish a no nuclear testing or fissile material produc- stewardship program to ensure the preserva- tion. The NPR further states that DOE is to: tion of the core intellectual and technical com- • Maintain the capability to design, fabricate, petencies of the United States in nuclear and certify new warheads; weapons.” It is the policy of the United States Government that the nation’s nuclear deter- • Develop a stockpile surveillance engineer- rent is to be maintained in the absence of un- ing base; derground nuclear testing. The SSP must meet • Demonstrate a capability to re-fabricate the requirements for performance, safety, re- and certify weapon types in the enduring liability and security set forth in Public Laws, stockpile; Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs and NSDDs), the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan • Maintain a nuclear weapons science and (NWSP), the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), technology base; and and other national security guidance. DOE is also required by Public Law to provide for tri- • Ensure tritium availability. tium production (P.L. 104-106 and 106-65), maintain a manufacturing infrastructure ca- 3.1.3. Stockpile Stewardship Program pable of meeting the objectives of the NPR Plan (P.L. 104-106), and carry out a program to provide for the extension of the effective life The DOE Stockpile Stewardship Plan is of weapons in the stockpile (P.L. 106-65). a corporate-level, multi-year program plan that embodies DOE’s strategy to ensure high con- fidence in the safety, reliability, performance, 3.1.1. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and security of the nuclear weapons stock- Annually, the President issues the Nuclear pile. The Plan responds both to Presidential Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP), which is Directives and Public Laws. The Stockpile prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Council and Stewardship Plan is prepared annually and is forwarded through the Secretaries of Defense submitted by the Secretary of Energy to Con- and Energy for approval. This sets the re- gress by March 15 of each year, as mandated quirement to maintain a safe and reliable by the FY 1998 National Defense Authoriza- nuclear weapon stockpile, and specifies for tion Act (P.L. 105-85, Sect. 3151). Congress the number of warheads, by type, in

3-1 3.2. DoD/DOE Relationship sentative of the DOE selected by the Secre- tary (currently the Under Secretary). The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense THE PRESIDENT IS ULTIMATELY (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense responsible for executing the nation’s nuclear Programs) serves as Executive Secretary and weapons policy. The DoD and DOE work Staff Director for the Council. The NWC has together at many levels to advise the Presi- one subordinate committee and one working dent and carry out the policy. The success of group. NWC’s responsibilities include: the Stockpile Stewardship Program depends • Preparing the annual Nuclear Weapons on a strong partnership between DoD and Stockpile Memorandum; DOE. This relationship is codified in the 1953 memorandum of agreement, as amended, be- • Developing nuclear weapons stockpiles tween the Atomic Energy Commission and the options and the costs of such options; DoD, and in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. • Coordinating programming and budget It is further specified in the 1983 memoran- matters pertaining to nuclear weapons pro- dum of understanding, which defines dual- grams between the Department of De- agency responsibilities for nuclear weapons. fense and the Department of Energy; The DoD is responsible for establishing mili- tary requirements, which are incorporated into • Identifying various options for cost-effec- the President’s NWSP; developing and operat- tive schedules for nuclear weapons pro- ing complete weapon systems; training per- duction; sonnel; and maintenance of nuclear weapon • Considering safety, security, and control employment plans. The DOE is responsible issues for existing weapons and for pro- for conducting nuclear warhead research and posed new weapon program starts; development; producing nuclear warheads; performing stockpile surveillance; producing • Ensuring that adequate consideration is and managing nuclear materials; dismantling given to design, performance, and cost retired weapons; maintaining critical capabili- tradeoffs for all proposed new nuclear ties within the nuclear weapons complex (labo- weapons programs; ratories, production plants, and the test site); conducting sub-critical and other experiments; • Providing broad guidance regarding priori- and advancing simulation capabilities in sup- ties for research on nuclear weapons; port of stockpile stewardship. • Coordinating and approving activities con- ducted by the Department of Energy for the study, development, production, and 3.2.1. Nuclear Weapons Council retirement of nuclear warheads, including concept definition studies, feasibility stud- The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), ies, engineering development, hardware established by the FY 1987 National Defense component fabrication, warhead produc- Authorization Act, is responsible for coordi- tion, and warhead retirement; and nation and resolution of nuclear weapons is- sues that are of mutual interest to the DOE • Preparing comments on annual proposals and DoD. The NWC is a joint DoD-DOE for budget levels for research on nuclear council codified and given specific responsi- weapons and transmitting those comments bilities by Title 10, United States Code, Sec- to the Secretary of Defense and Secre- tion 179. The NWC is comprised of three tary of Energy before the preparation of members: the Undersecretary of Defense for annual budget requests by the Secretaries Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who of those departments. serves as Chairman; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a senior repre-

3-2 3.2.2. Nuclear Weapons Council 3.2.3. Nuclear Weapons Requirements Standing and Safety Committee Working Group

The Nuclear Weapons Council Standing The Nuclear Weapons Requirements and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) is the joint Working Group (NWRWG) enhances the de- senior executive and flag officer-level com- liberative decision-making process by creat- mittee established to provide advice and as- ing a forum for additional senior-level attention sistance to the NWC. The NWCSSC to nuclear weapons issues. The NWRWG is coordinates and ensures completion of all ac- a sub-group to the NWCSSC and its purpose tions destined for the NWC, conducts joint is to review, prioritize, and where appropriate, transactions between the DoD and the DOE, more precisely define high-level DoD nuclear and generally deals with significant nuclear weapons requirements for inclusion in the an- weapons matters that can be resolved with- nual NWSP, the DOE Stockpile Stewardship out being elevated to the NWC. In particular, Plan, and other planning documents. Mem- the NWCSSC acts (on behalf of the NWC) bership of the NWRWG is similar to that of as the point of contact for DoD and DOE on the NWCSSC, with the addition of the Deputy all atomic energy matters that either Depart- Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for ment determines relate to nuclear weapons Nuclear Matters and deletion of the Assistant research, development, production, mainte- to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, nance, or dismantlement, allocation of nuclear Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, material, and nuclear weapon safety matters. and the Army member. The Vice Chair of the The NWCSSC has ten members: NWCSSC, the DOE’s Principal Deputy As- sistant Secretary for Military Application, • The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense serves as NWRWG Chairman. (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), who serves as Chairman; 3.2.4. Project Officer Group (POG) • The DOE Principal Deputy Assistant Sec- retary for Military Application, who serves as Vice Chairman; Every nuclear weapon or weapon family in the stockpile has a Project Officer Group • The DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for (POG). There is also one POG for each re- Military Application and Stockpile Opera- tired system and one for use control. The POG tions; is led by the appropriate military Service, and DOE field and laboratory personnel serve as • One member representing the members. DOE Headquarters staff are ob- Undersecretary of Defense (Policy); servers to the POGs. The POG is a field- • One member each from the Army, Navy, level group that is dedicated to the well-being and Air Force; of its weapon, including development, modifi- cations and alterations, resolution of signifi- • One member from the Joint Staff; cant findings, deployment, and maintenance. • One member from the United States Stra- The functions of POGs for nuclear weapons tegic Command; and include: • One member from the Defense Threat • Coordinating the design, development, test, Reduction Agency. weapon system integration, evaluation, and other life-cycle activities that are per- formed by the military Services and the DOE on joint DoD-DOE nuclear weap- ons activities;

3-3 • Making technological and interface rences at DOE’s defense nuclear facili- tradeoffs that still meet the requirements ties and makes recommendations to the and do not significantly change the Mili- Secretary of Energy that the Board be- tary Characteristics (MCs) or acceptabil- lieves are necessary to properly protect ity of the weapon, exceed program limits public health and safety. set by the DoD and DOE, or exceed guid- Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA ance provided by the NWC and achieve the best balance between requirements and is responsible for nuclear weapon support and operations, on-site inspections, coop- available DoD and DOE resources; erative threat reduction, technology secu- • Notifying the cognizant military Service and rity, and defense against chemical and the NWC of interpretations of the MCs biological weapons. Close cooperation as a result of tradeoff decisions, and rec- between DOE and DTRA is required in ommending changes to the MCs to the nuclear support, operations, and weapon- NWC; and related personnel training. • Examining issues affecting safety, secu- rity, cost, performance, reliability, or other 3.2.6. Developing Stockpile significant matters that may require reso- Requirements lution at higher levels in the DoD or DOE, or decisions by the NWC. DSW activities to maintain the nuclear stockpile are accomplished through several DP vehicles, including the 6.X process, the SLEP, 3.2.5. Other DOE/DoD Interactions and the Production & Planning Directive (P&PD). Under the broad DSW umbrella, Due to the vital importance of the nuclear each of these vehicles contributes to the for- weapons stockpile, there are a number of other mulation and execution of weapon Life Ex- DoD, independent, and joint organizations and tension Programs (LEPs). The 6.X process groups that study and recommend improve- provides a robust system to develop Life Ex- ments for stockpile stewardship. Three of note tension Options (LEOs). SLEP organizes the are: LEOs into discrete units, and allows for STRATCOM The mission of the United workload planning to balance the laboratory States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and plant workload levels over time, consis- is to deter military attack on the United tent with the needs of the stockpile, and the States and its allies, and should deterrence capacities of the laboratories and the produc- fail, employ forces so as to achieve na- tion plants. SLEP culminates with a recom- tional objectives. STRATCOM deploys mendation to DP management in the integrated the vast majority of U.S. nuclear weap- weapon schedule, and when approved, the in- ons, so close ties with the DOE are es- tegrated weapon schedule is distributed to the sential. The Commander in Chief, field in the P&PD. Each of these DP ve- STRATCOM, annually issues a report and hicles are outlined below. recommendations on Annual Certification, with the advice on technical issues of his Strategic Advisory Group. 3.2.7. The 6.X Process Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board In the 1953 memorandum of agreement, The Board is responsible for independent, the DOE and the DoD established a formal external oversight of all activities in DOE’s phased acquisition process to authorize the nuclear weapons complex affecting design, development, and production of new nuclear health and safety. The Board re- weapons. The phases in the process reflect views operations, practices, and occur- the logical progression of necessary activity,

3-4 and establish milestones to facilitate program Phase 6.2A Design Definition and management. The weapon life-cycle acquisi- Cost Study tion phases are: Phase 6.3 Development Engineering Phase 1 Concept Development Phase 6.4 Production Engineering Phase 2 Program Feasibility Study Phase 6.5 First Production Phase 2A Design Definition and Cost Phase 6.6 Full-scale Refurbishment Study Figure 1 illustrates the Phase 6.X major Phase 3 Development Engineering activities. Each phase ends with a major Phase 4 Production Engineering project decision to go forward into the next phase, to remain in the present phase, or to Phase 5 First Production return to an earlier phase (including a return Phase 6 Quantity Production and to Phase 6.0, which would be not to modify Stockpile the weapon). Phase 7 Retirement/Storage Phase 6.0 activities are those normal on- going activities that occur on all stockpile sys- Because all enduring stockpile weapons tems. These activities may expose issue(s) are currently in Phase 6, an expanded pro- that warrant development of concept(s) to cess within this Phase is used to provide a address them. Phase 6.0 activities include: framework for, and management of, weapon refurbishment. This process is referred to as • Routine maintenance, such as limited life the Phase 6.X process, and it provides a frame- component exchange, inspections, and work for DOE to conduct and manage mod- tests, done on a recurring basis; ernization activities for existing weapons. A • Stockpile evaluation (also called “surveil- detailed work plan for implementing the 6.X lance”) to evaluate weapon systems for process for modernization is being developed degradation of reliability, safety, or perfor- by the DOE, with input and coordination from mance. The Stockpile Evaluation Program the DoD. The proposed work plan still needs includes the Significant Finding Investiga- to be presented to, and approved by, the NWC. tion (SFI) process for investigating and It makes the maximum use of the established evaluating any significant anomalies ob- structure, flow, and practices from the tradi- served in stockpiled weapons through sur- tional acquisition process that previous weapon veillance; systems passed through, and applies to the new paradigm of refurbishing existing weapons. For • Annual certification to review the current purposes of the 6.X process, the enduring health of the stockpile, and state whether stockpile phase is designated Phase 6.0, and a return to underground nuclear testing is is the beginning and end point of the 6.X pro- required; and cess. The individual phases (6.1 through 6.6) follow the sequence of the traditional acquisi- • Baselining to assure that weapon system configuration is well understood and docu- tion process: mented for reference in the event that fu- Phase 6.0 Quantity Production and ture changes become necessary. Stockpile (presence in the stockpile before and after All Product Change Proposals (PCPs) are evaluated by DP for applicability to the Phase the refurbishment project) 6.X process. By default, the following go Phase 6.1 Concept Assessment through the Phase 6.X process: Phase 6.2 Feasibility Study and • All Modifications and Alterations (Mods/ Option Downselect Alts), except for the Alt 900 Series;

3-5 Figure 1. Phase 6.X Major Activities

• Changes to the Stockpile-to-Target Se- mented in the DOE-issued annual Production quence (STS) that require an alteration of & Planning Directive (P&PD), which provides a weapon; and the authority necessary to implement DP’s responsibilities in support of the SSP, the • Changes to the Military Characteristics NWSP, and the Requirements and Planning (MCs). Document (formerly the Long-Range Plan- The NWC or its delegates must approve ning Assessment (LRPA)). Additionally, the all PCPs, changes to the STS that require a P&PD provides direction and guidance for all change to a weapon, and changes to the MCs. major stockpile requirements for FYs 2000- 2005, and provides planning information for FYs 2006-2025. Phase 6.2/6.2A activities are 3.2.8. The Stockpile Life Extension underway for the W76 and W80. The results Process of these studies will be presented to the NWC in early 2000. Phase 6.2/2A activity on the The proposed Stockpile Life Extension B61 (all models) will commence in FY 2000. Process schedule is shown in Figure 2. This Production of refurbished W80 and W76 war- schedule reflects input from the POGs and heads is scheduled to start in FYs 2006 and still needs formal approval by the NWC. The 2008, respectively. Also shown in the figure current SLEP schedule calls for refurbishment are scheduled weapon Limited Life Compo- of the W80, W76 and B61 systems within the nent Exchanges (LLCEs), training, surveil- next decade. The SLEP schedule is docu- lance, and dismantlements.

3-6 Figure 2. The Stockpile Life Extension Schedule

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3-8 Impact of Arms Control 4.2. START I/II Agreements on the AT THE MARCH 21, 1997, Helsinki 4 Stockpile Stewardship Summit, President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin underscored their interest in Program further nuclear warhead reductions beyond START I and II, as well as the need to monitor SEVERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREE- nuclear warhead inventories, nuclear warhead MENTS and related national policies directly dismantlement, and fissile materials resulting impact the Stockpile Stewardship Program. from warhead reductions. At the conclusion These include the Comprehensive Test Ban of the Summit, the Presidents agreed that once Treaty, the Presidential moratorium on nuclear START II is ratified by the Russian Duma and underground testing, the START I and START enters into force, the United States and Russia II Treaties, and the possible framework for a will immediately commence negotiations on a future START III Treaty. START III agreement. In August 1999, the United States and Russia commenced discussions, but not negotiations, about START 4.1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty III and potential modifications to the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty to accommodate a U.S. national missile defense deployment. THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) will – after it enters into The impacts of START I and II center on force – prohibit “all nuclear weapon test Department of Defense strategic force explosions or other nuclear explosions structures, and involve the downloading of anywhere in the world.” It was adopted on ICBMs and SLBMs, and the elimination of September 10, 1996, by the United Nations some strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. General Assembly by a vote of 158 to 3, with START I and II affect DOE in terms of the 5 abstentions, after two and one half years of stockpile size and composition, warhead return, negotiation at the 61-nation Conference on transportation schedules, and the Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. On dismantlement of excess warheads. Under September 24, 1996, the treaty was opened START I and II, there are no Russian on-site for signature at the United Nations, and inspections at DOE facilities. START III will President Clinton signed it on behalf of the be the first treaty to significantly impact DOE United States. As of September 30, 1999, 155 operations because of its warhead and fissile nations had signed the treaty, including the five material transparency components. Impacts that have nuclear weapons. To enter into resulting from additional reductions in the size force, 44 nuclear-capable states must ratify of the stockpile are not expected to be the treaty. To date, 51 nations have ratified significant. the treaty, including 26 of the required 44. On The stockpile workload requirements do October 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate rejected not significantly change between START I and the CTBT by a vote of 51 to 48, with one II, because the total stockpile size does not abstention, after three days of hearings. That appreciably change. Most weapons removed same day, the President reaffirmed the United from active status under START I will be States’ policy to refrain from nuclear testing, placed in the inactive stockpile to meet “lead stating that “the United States will continue, and hedge” requirements contained in the under my presidency, the policy we have NPR. These weapons’ limited life observed since 1992 of not conducting nuclear tests.”

4-1 components will be removed, but the warheads 4.3.1. Goals will still undergo life extensions as defined by the SLEP schedule. The dismantlement Helsinki’s START III goals include: workload will increase slightly for the few weapons that will be retired. There is an • Establish lower aggregate levels of stra- anticipated small reduction, on average, in the tegic nuclear warheads in the U.S. and SLEP workload as systems are retired. The Russia; relative timing for refurbishments and • Promote transparency of strategic nuclear dismantlements has yet to be determined, and warhead inventories and the destruction capacity at Pantex will need to be sized to of strategic nuclear warheads; and accommodate the simultaneous requirements of both. • Promote irreversibility of reduction in stra- tegic nuclear warhead inventories, includ- ing prevention of a rapid increase in the 4.3. START III number of warheads.

4.3.2. Issues START III MAY REQUIRE the DOE to dismantle excess nuclear warheads resulting • Intrusiveness of the START III regime and from a new lower accountable level of 2,000- its impact on stockpile stewardship, espe- 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads. It may also cially at a time of increased SLEP work; require that the DOE prepare, negotiate, and implement transparency measures at both U.S. • Protection of classified and sensitive in- and Russian facilities to provide confidence formation from being inadvertently re- that dismantlement and destruction of some vealed to Russian on-site inspectors; and number of nuclear warheads actually takes place. It is anticipated that START III • The potentially unfunded costs of imple- provisions will be expanded in future follow- menting the START III regime, which on treaties, so potential impacts to DOE and would be a requirement above existing DoD operations must be considered carefully. stockpile stewardship commitments. Be- cause the implementation details of any Modifications to Pantex operations, equip- START III agreement presently are un- ment, and facilities are being examined to determined, the associated budget require- ensure that potential START III transparency ments are not known. The cost of any requirements can be implemented without ad- START III provisions outside of normal verse impact to the SSP and its annual DOE operations must be considered as certification requirements. additional to the current Stockpile Stew- ardship Program budget. The stockpile workload will change under START III. The overall reduction in delivery system numbers, in addition to a potential ne- 4.3.3. Technical Approach gotiated quantity of warhead dismantlements, will increase the dismantlement workload. The START III planning effort at DOE This dismantlement workload will need to be has been active since the March 1997 Helsinki reconciled with the required SLEP refurbish- Joint Statement. DOE is continuing to evaluate ment schedule. the impact of potential START III monitoring

4-2 activities at various facilities in the DOE 4.3.5.2. Sites nuclear weapons complex. The national laboratories have contributed by assessing the Because Pantex is DOE’s single facility risks to stockpile stewardship, and by for assembly and disassembly of weapons, it participating in a number of working groups to will likely be the major focus of provisions of prepare DOE for START III discussions. START III that affect DOE. Y-12 may be Milestones for START III planning are affected by provisions for monitored storage contingent on the pace of negotiations. of fissile material from warheads dismantled under START III. Expertise from the national laboratories and DOE Operations Offices is 4.3.4. Risks important to ensure provisions of START III do not unacceptably affect stockpile By adding a significant requirement to stewardship. It is not expected that the support a new arms control regime, DOE’s laboratories or other DOE facilities will be flexibility for performing weapon operations directly affected by START III, but it will be at Pantex will likely be reduced. The DOE necessary to prevail upon the expertise at the has a responsibility to maintain the safety, Defense Programs laboratories, production reliability, and performance of the stockpile, plants, and the DOE Operations Offices to and any provisions that hinder that mission must ensure that provisions of START III do not be carefully considered. Any Russian affect unacceptably stockpile stewardship inspection at Pantex will disrupt normal weapon activities. operations and will require planning and extensive operational and security measures to ensure that the health of the enduring 4.3.5.3. Other Offices, Agencies and stockpile is not compromised. DOE will fully Organizations support any funded initiatives agreed to by the United States, but will also work to mitigate any risks by careful planning and implementing DOE’s Office of Defense Programs and provisions that place support of the stockpile the Office of Nonproliferation and National as the highest priority. Security are working together to formulate a recommended DOE position regarding START III. The Office of Fissile Material Disposition 4.3.5. Integration is involved to ensure a smooth handoff of fissile material resulting from START III 4.3.5.1. Other Programs/Campaigns dismantlements to organizations focusing on material disposition. Other agencies Stockpile stewardship activities are likely represented on the National Security Council- to be affected by the provisions of START led Arms Control Interagency Working Group III, especially if it requires an intrusive regime are the Department of Defense (Office of the at the Pantex Plant. A Russian presence at Secretary of Defense and The Joint Staff), DOE’s only assembly and disassembly facility the Department of State, and the Central could fundamentally alter the flow of material Intelligence Agency. and information through the nuclear weapons complex. Transportation Readiness: Warheads must be transported from DoD facilities to the Pantex plant for dismantlement. Weapons “in process” between the DoD and DOE are not expected to be monitored under START III provisions.

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4-4 Accomplishments • Fielded SafeGuard Transporters (SGT) to enhance the security of weapons in ship- ment. 5 ONE METRIC FOR EVALUATING the • Began first production of the W76 success of the SSP is to examine program ACORN and Neutron Generators. accomplishments in the areas of stockpile maintenance, surveillance, assessment and • Resumed uranium operations at Y-12 certification, design and manufacturing, Plant. simulation and modeling, and experimental • Made the first W88 development unit pit facilities. at LANL. • Conducted hi-fidelity flight testing. 5.1. Stockpile Maintenance • Developed 51 gas generators and 808 tri- tium reservoirs in FY 1999, required to THE DOE IS RESPONSIBLE for main- keep weapons operational. taining the existing stockpile with capabilities • Began the 6.2/2A life extension study for to design, develop, and produce components. the W76. The primary strategy of stockpile maintenance is to preserve the readiness of the stockpile • Began the 6.2/2A life extension study for by meeting directed stockpile requirements by the W80. supplying hardware for limited life component • Achieved first production unit and deliv- exchanges (LLCEs), stockpile repairs, stock- ery to DoD of the W87 LEP. pile rebuilds, and by supporting the military by providing assistance in training, publication of • Began the planning for the 6.2/6.2A life manuals, and development of test and handling extension study for the B61. equipment. Stockpile maintenance also pro- vides long-range support to the stockpile 5.2. Stockpile Surveillance: Predicting through life extension that includes refurbish- ment and modernization. Life extension ac- and Detecting Problems tivities include studies to define and establish appropriate alterations or modifications nec- essary to modernize and extend the life of the STOCKPILE SURVEILLANCE HAS weapons for an additional 30 years. BEEN a major element of the U.S. nuclear weapons program ever since the first weap- Accomplishments in these areas include: ons were put into service. Approximately • Developed the Stockpile Life Extension 14,000 weapons have been examined and sub- Process. jected to a variety of nonnuclear experiments and flight tests since 1958. In cases where • Completed three annual certifications of these nonnuclear tests could not provide con- the stockpile, which resulted in no require- clusive answers, nuclear tests of stockpile ment for underground nuclear testing. warheads or warhead components were con- ducted. All of the warhead types in the en- • Developed, certified, produced, and fielded during U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile have the B61-11 to replace the B53 bomb. had repairs or retrofits, and several have re- • Conducted field retrofits to enhance the quired repairs to the nuclear explosive pack- surety of the B61 bomb. age. • Completed W76 Dual Revalidation.

5-1 To successfully maintain an aging stock- provided recommendations regarding re- pile, new surveillance methods and predictive use of main charges for the W87 and W76 capabilities are needed so that the full range life extension programs. The program has of problems that may arise in the enduring also demonstrated that aging does not de- stockpile can be detected. There is also a grade safety during impacts in accident need to predict and identify aging-related conditions. To support continued monitor- changes and their potential effects on war- ing of identified signatures of aging, the head safety and performance. Some changes program has developed and delivered sev- may have little or no effect, whereas others eral new HE performance tests to the rou- could make a major difference. The prohibi- tine surveillance program. tion against performing nuclear tests has put a • Systems - The program has used new min- high premium on the fundamental understand- iaturized instrumentation to characterize ing of the properties and response of stockpile key features during missile flight while pre- materials. Of particular importance is the de- serving system fidelity to the greatest ex- velopment of advanced capabilities–experi- tent possible. mental, theoretical and computational–to predict physical properties of matter under the • Non-nuclear components - Accomplish- extremely broad range of dynamic conditions ments in this area center on the charac- found in nuclear explosions. These include terization of components and the fielding materials, radiative, and nuclear properties. of tests to monitor changes in components. These efforts are primarily supported by the The program has categorized the large Enhanced Surveillance Campaign, the Dy- number of non-nuclear components to namic Materials Properties Campaign, and the identify those most likely to exhibit aging Defense Applications and Modeling Campaign. effects, those most important to weapon performance, and those most pervasive in Accomplishments in this area include: the stockpile. One example of a new test • Pits - The program has established the is an examination tool to rapidly screen an dominant aging mechanisms for pits and important component for weld flaws. begun testing old pit materials. The pro- • Non-nuclear materials - The program has gram has begun fabrication of accelerated developed and implemented a non-destruc- aging alloys, and has also fielded a suite of tive method to monitor warhead space diagnostic tools to test new and aged (sealed volumes) for signs of organic- samples. chemical degradation. Data from the pro- • Canned Subassemblies (CSAs) - The pro- gram also avoided replacement of gram has established the principal aging components in fielded units by understand- mechanism for CSAs and selected units ing component behavior. from specific weapon types for special • Fundamental Plutonium High-Pressure study. The work has resulted in CSA types Thermodynamic Properties - The first- being ranked by potential for corrosion and principles determination of the high-pres- assessed lifetimes of key components. sure properties of plutonium illustrates Work has also established a three-dimen- fundamental advances in our ability to pre- sional war reserve compatibility model, dict the properties of actinides under con- demonstrated neutron imaging as a supe- ditions of relevance to stockpile rior system for flaw detection, and devel- performance. oped corrosion protection systems. • Hydrogen equation-of-state (EOS) - Equa- • High Explosives (HE) - The program has tion-of-state experiments on hydrogen iso- demonstrated that main charge high ex- topes revealed important behavior at Mbar plosives are aging gracefully. It has also pressures, highlighting the difficulties with

5-2 theories of matter undergoing strong an extremely powerful laser with matter shocks. For example, gas gun experiments have been performed. In particular, mea- have succeeded in “metallizing” fluid hy- surements of the production of 100 MeV drogen under shock-loading conditions electrons, the fission of nuclei, and the pro- above 1.4 Mbar. The existence of a me- duction of anti-matter have been per- tallic phase of hydrogen confirms a funda- formed. mental prediction made 50 years ago. • Gold Opacity Measurements - Recent • High-Performance Quantum Simulations opacity experiments on the Nova (LLNL) of HF-H2O Fluid Mixtures - Detonation and Omega (University of Rochester, of insensitive high explosives (IHE) pro- Laboratory for Laser Energetics) lasers duces hydrogen-bonded HF and H2O. The have extended Rosseland mean opacity performance of IHE is sensitive to the pres- measurements into new areas. Opacity ence of these molecules, but there is no measurements of high temperature gold experimental data because of the highly plasmas have resolved large differences corrosive nature of these mixtures. Quan- between opacity models that affect the tum-level terascale ASCI calculations to design and interpretation of a large class simulate an equimolar mixture of HF and of stockpile stewardship experiments on H2O have been performed to elucidate the lasers and pulsed power devices. The structural and thermal properties of these experiments have also proven the tech- mixtures at high pressure and temperature. niques needed for the high temperature These simulations revealed structural in- opacity experiments proposed for the NIF. formation at high pressure and tempera- ture, showing the formation of stable • Los Alamos Neutron Science Center F--( H O)+ complexes. (LANSCE) Neutron Total Cross Sections 2 - Measurements of the total cross section • Discovery of Polymeric Carbon Dioxide - for neutrons on 37 different nuclei to an The existence of extended-solid forms of accuracy of 1% for neutrons in the en- major detonation products (CO2, N2, C, ergy range from 5-600 MeV have been H2O) at high explosive (HE) detonation performed. These precision measure- conditions provides critical information for ments represent a significant step forward developing predictive HE performance in the nuclear data needed in the evalua- models. In a breakthrough discovery, a tion of nuclear cross sections for stockpile team of LLNL scientists has synthesized calculations and provided important input a new extended-solid form of polymeric to the design of projects involving spalla- CO2 under conditions of ultra-high pres- tion neutron sources (APT, etc.). The pro- sures and temperature. The CO2 poly- gram is being expanded to lower neutron mer–a carbon-based analogue to α-quartz energies interacting with nuclei in the ac- (SiO2)–was also found to be an optically tinide region. non-linear, super-hard material, which could lead to new technology innovations. • 1998 American Physical Society Award This discovery has led to many scientific for Excellence in Plasma Physics - publications in 1999, including in Science, Awarded to Peter Celliers, Gilbert Collins, Phys. Rev. Lett., The New York Times, Luiz DaSilva, and Robert Cauble, LLNL. C&E News, and Laser Focus World. • 1997 American Physical Society Award • Laser-Driven Nuclear Physics - As part for Shock Compression Science - Awarded of the studies related to the National Igni- to William Nellis and Arthur Mitchell, tion Facility (NIF) and laser-driven radi- LLNL. ography, observations of nuclear physics phenomena produced by the interaction of

5-3 5.3. Assessment and Certification: Accomplishments in these areas include: Analyzing and Evaluating • Multi-laboratory radiation-flow experi- ments have been performed on ICF facili- ties, Nova, Omega and Z, confirming that DATA AND TEST RESULTS must be AGEX experiments coupled with detailed analyzed, assessed, and evaluated before con- modeling can meet weapons physics goals. clusions can be drawn regarding the safety and reliability of stockpile warheads. A sig- • The conditional certification of the nificant imperative of assessment and certifi- MC4380 neutron generator to hostile en- cation is to conduct a program using the best vironments without UGT tests tools available to baseline the existing stock- demonstrated the efficacy of a certifica- pile while a number of experienced designers tion process based on validated models with nuclear test expertise remain to mentor plus AGEX experiments, pending new designers. This baselining activity is an reconfiguration of the Annular Core Re- integral element of DSW. There are many search Reactor (ACRR). areas of warhead operation that cannot be • Advances in ICF target physics, especially adequately addressed with existing tools and higher efficiency hohlraum-capsule de- the current knowledge base of the weapons signs, are reducing the technical risk in scientists and engineers. Of particular con- achieving ignition on NIF. cern is the assessment challenge posed by heretofore unrecognized problems. The SSP • Equation-of-state experiments on deute- must support rigorous computational and ex- rium at the Nova laser won the Excellence perimental processes not only to confirm and in Plasma Physics Award of the Ameri- extend what is known and expected but also can Physical Society. These results im- to close gaps in our current understanding. This pact analysis of weapon performance and ability to fill in gaps is especially important in provide improvement of anticipated igni- those areas where nuclear testing would have tion experiments at the National Ignition been used to bound the margins of our con- Facility. cerns in the past. • Developed preliminary models to support In the absence of nuclear testing, differ- certification of weapons systems in the ent experiments and tools must be relied on to normal flight environment. obtain data relevant to nuclear warhead per- • Developed model of mass transport in formance. However, because these older tools weapon secondaries, and provided frame- were designed to complement nuclear testing, work for long-lived secondary assemblies. they are not, in and of themselves, sufficient in the absence of nuclear testing. A suite of • Developed preliminary computational enhanced capabilities and facilities that will be baseline models for some aspects of the used to fill in the knowledge gaps and provide W80 nuclear explosive package. data relevant to various stockpile concerns has • Developed computational engineering been identified. models for structural and thermal analy- These efforts are principally supported by ses. the Primary Certification Campaign, the Sec- • The first hydrodynamic test was success- ondary Certification and Nuclear-Systems fully completed using the first axis of the Margins Campaign, the Certification in Hos- DARHT facility. The improved radio- tile Environments Campaign, the Weapon Sys- graphic performance offered by this facil- tem Engineering Certification Campaign, the ity will be crucial to developing the needed Advanced Radiography Campaign, and the resolution for benchmarking primary code Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Ignition & calculations and assessing system perfor- High Yield Campaign.

5-4 mance re-certification of the existing • A series of experiments leading to the per- stockpile or future remanufactured weap- formance of full-scale systems tests were ons. successfully completed to examine anoma- lous case fracture incidents. Correlations • With the commissioning of DARHT, re- between manufacturing defects and ac- search leading to the next generation of celerated case deformation were accom- advanced hydrodynamic testing has been plished validating the experimental demonstrated through time-resolved imag- techniques for upcoming full-scale system ing of weapon parts, proving the applica- tests. bility of proton radiography for primary simulation and testing. 5.4. Design and Manufacturing: • A concept for proton radiography, based in part on improved image focusing tech- Refurbishing and Certifying niques, has opened a possible route to multi- time, multi-view radiographic images of dynamic behavior in nuclear weapon con- WITH AN IMPROVED UNDER- ditions. The viability of this approach has STANDING of the effects of aging on war- been demonstrated with dense, static tar- head safety and reliability, developed through gets at the Alternating Gradient Synchro- the enhanced surveillance and assessment tron at Brookhaven National Laboratory, efforts, DOE will be able to take a proactive and multi-time images in low-density dy- approach to refurbishment. The goal is to re- namic implosions with LANSCE at Los place or fix components through systematic Alamos. modernization, before aging-related changes jeopardize warhead safety or reliability. The • Conventional hydrodynamic testing has DSW Stockpile Life Extension Process (SLEP) successfully shown that the low-tempera- provides the framework for research and de- ture performance of insensitive high ex- velopment activities and production planning plosive (PBX 9502) primaries conforms that will strive to overcome these and other to design intent. These tests, coupled with hurdles facing stockpile stewardship. To com- the first-time imaging of HE burn around plicate this effort, some manufacturing pro- corners utilizing LANSCE, have greatly cesses and capabilities are no longer practical. enhanced the capabilities for certifying Replacement of these processes and capa- weapon performance at extreme condi- bilities is a significant challenge to the mainte- tions within the STS. nance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. • Subcritical experiments were successfully The six production readiness Campaigns– performed to enhance data for high-pres- Pit Readiness, Secondary Readiness, HE/As- sure EOS and ejecta evolution for pluto- sembly Readiness, Nonnuclear Readiness, nium. First-ever data for the actual EOS Tritium Readiness, and Material Readiness– of the current weapon-grade plutonium and the ADAPT and Enhanced Surety Cam- were obtained and found to be consistent paigns are required to sustain the with expectations. Ejecta experiments manufacturing base within the nuclear weap- were performed and demonstrated the ons complex. capability to image and quantify the tem- poral and spatial distributions of surface Accomplishments in these areas include: ejecta. These experiments, combined with • W87 First SLEP–Successfully met the first the results of the Materials Dynamics and production unit milestones and delivery for Enhanced Surveillance Campaigns, will initial operational capability, and is continu- form the basis of new primary simulations ing to provide units to the DoD. that more accurately model real material performance.

5-5 • Underground Nuclear Test Readiness– - Developed, certified, and fielded the During FY 1999, DOE and DoD (Program T1565A to replace the T1565, which Analysis and Evaluation) assessed the was not Y2K compliant; and DOE’s readiness to resume underground - Successfully utilized interactive electron- nuclear testing within the two to three year ics procedures on test-bed assembly. period directed by the President. The re- view team concluded that readiness is ad- • Advanced Design and Production Tech- equate, provided that funding does not nologies (ADAPT). decrease. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) accepted the analysis, but re- - Interconnected the distributed nuclear quested an evaluation of additional test weapons complex via SecureNet; scenarios and the possibility of reducing - Used electronic data capture and net- the readiness period. This work is under- worked access to acceptance data way. across the design and production com- • Assessed age-induced replacement needs plex for the W87 LEP; in support of the W80 and W76 6.2 stud- - Developed and used a model-based ap- ies. proach for product realization of • Enhanced Surety. telemetry systems, nuclear weapon com- ponents, assemblies, and test hardware; - Designed direct optical initiation and optically-isolated micro CDU compat- - Developed and applied computer mod- ible with the W76 and W78; els of sites and processes in planning and resource scheduling; - Initiated the EUCOM PAL Theater Se- cure Recode System; - Applied virtual prototyping methods to neutron generator design and certifica- - Designed and validated infrared sources tion, and used visualization techniques for sensors and subminiature triggers; to identify unknown weapon perfor- mance issues; - Fabricated parts for integrated miniature strong link; - Completed and deployed new processes to recycle nitric acid used in plutonium - Completed W78 slow heat studies; operations and dispose of HE in an eco- - Continued installation of B61-3/4/10 Alt nomical and environmentally acceptable 339 and 335; manner; and - Resolved 10 items regarding safety - Demonstrated for the first time in the studies and safety assessments; nuclear weapons complex, a totally paperless Product Definition Release. - Achieved FSED for new security con- cepts in FY 1999; • Pit Readiness. - Started 6.x studies for W76 and W80; - Identified all manufacturing processes (~103) needed to produce new W88 pits; - Introduced encrypted PAL in the B83- 1 Quality Improvement Program; - Deployed all but three of the manufac- turing processes; - Demonstrated micro firing set; - Forty-four processes will require design- - Initiated the fielding of the B61-11 al- agent and production-agent qualification lowing the retirement of the B53-1; approval. Twenty-four plans have been completed, and all plans will be com- pleted by January 2000;

5-6 - Manufactured four complete pit devel- • Simulated re-entry body response to a hos- opment units, and another one is sched- tile radiation environment. The analysis uled for completion in November 1999; was requested by DoD to define a future and STS test program. - Manufactured twelve process-develop- • High-fidelity confinement vessel simula- ment shells. tion was performed to support the hydro- dynamic experimental program. The simulation was run on ASCI Blue Moun- 5.5. Simulation & Modeling: tain using 1 million brick elements to simu- Underpinning the Stockpile late structural and dynamic response of Stewardship Program the vessel. • High-fidelity casting simulations have been COMPUTATIONAL MODELING AND done in parallel using Telluride in support PREDICTION are integral to every activity of the W88 pit rebuild. within the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and • The Eolus project computed simulated ra- underpin our ability to maintain confidence in diographs of an experiment that reduced the nuclear deterrent under a no-nuclear-test- background signal levels by greater than a ing regime. ASCI provides the leading-edge, factor of 150 for DARHT. high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet weapon assessment and certification require- • Current “hero” calculations can do 1,000 ments without nuclear testing. To accomplish or more time steps on a billion-cell mesh, this, ASCI integrates the resources of the na- creating datasets in the 10-100 terabyte tional laboratories, computer manufacturers, range. and academia. • During CY1998, multiple weapons appli- Accomplishments in the ASCI Program cations were scaled to run on many thou- include: sands (>5,000) of processors. Applications Platforms • See classified ASCI accomplishments in the compilation of 30-Day Review • The world’s three most powerful comput- STRATCOM presentations. ers are the current ASCI platforms at Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia National • ASCI simulations have enabled the certi- Laboratories. fication of the MC4380 neutron genera- tor. This is the first radiation-hardened • Performance of the present day ASCI component to be certified without an un- machines (Blue Pacific at Lawrence derground nuclear test. Livermore, Blue Mountain at Los Alamos, and Red at Sandia) is between three and • Resolved a nuclear test anomaly by using four TeraOPS. a 3-D ASCI application code. The calcu- lation required four months on ASCI Blue • ASCI Red (SNL) ran the first ever dem- Mountain, and would have required 80 onstration of a sustained TeraOPS capa- 12 years on a Cray-class supercomputer. bility (1.068 TeraOPS, 1.068x10 floating-point operations per second) on • Simulated a nuclear-test diagnostic mea- December 4, 1996. This was the first dem- surement for the first time. The calcula- onstration of a sustained TeraOPS capa- tion took one day on ASCI Blue Mountain, bility by a general purpose computer and would have required 2-3 years on a system. Cray-class supercomputer.

5-7 • Both ASCI Blue systems were delivered ers that are providing valuable expertise in in the Fall of 1998 (3-5 months ahead of algorithms development and potential ac- schedule). Programmatic usage of this cess to future program personnel. platform is extremely high and many his- toric scientific calculations (world record National Awards received by the ASCI Pro- number of zones, complexity of calcula- gram tions, etc.) have been performed. • 1999 Gordon Bell Prize for high-resolution, 3-D simulations of Richtmyer-Meshkov Physics and Materials Modeling instability and mixing using the ASCI Blue • A new high-explosive grain-level model Pacific SST supercomputer. has been developed and incorporated into • 1998 VeriBest Superior Systems Award: an ASCI application code for assessment Reconfigurable Communications Hard- of its utility on stockpile problems. ware Board, SNL. Verification and Validation • 1997 R&D 100 Award: High Performance • A baseline survey of software quality as- Storage System, a collaboration of LLNL, surance (SQA) practices was completed LANL, ORNL, SNL and IBM Global Gov- for all ASCI code projects at all three labs. ernment Industry. • 1996 R&D 100 Award: Scalable Asynchro- Problem Solving Environments nous Transfer Mode (ATM) Encryptor, • New programming methodologies and soft- SNL. ware architectures used in ASCI code • 1996 R&D 100 Award with Giganet for development have dramatically decreased network performance among massively the time and effort required to parallelize parallel computers. simulation codes.

Distance- and Distributed-Computing 5.6. Experimental Facilities: (DisCom2) Underpinning the Stockpile • A parallel high-performance network ar- Stewardship Program chitecture has been demonstrated and is ready for wide area deployment in FY 2000. NEW EXPERIMENTAL CAPABILI- TIES WILL be required to achieve certifica- Visualization and Interactive Environment tion in the absence of underground nuclear for Weapons Simulation (VIEWS) testing. These include subcritical experiments, • Initial versions of the Data and Visualiza- as well as advanced experimental facilities to tion Corridors (DVCs) have been deployed provide high-resolution data on the stages of at all three laboratories, and have been nuclear explosions. The facilities are Dual- used in support of the neutron generator Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test certification and the ASCI applications (DARHT) Facility and the National Ignition burn-code mileposts. Facility (NIF), which are currently under con- struction, and Atlas, which is in detailed de- University Partnerships–University Alli- sign. Also included is the Short Pulse Spallation ances and Institutes Source enhancement to the Los Alamos Neu- tron Science Center (LANSCE), which is an • ASCI has established partnerships with upgrade to an existing facility. In addition, the universities under the Alliances program. need for an Advanced Hydrotest Facility This involves over 400 university research- (AHF) is being studied for the future.

5-8 The first axis of DARHT has been • Subcritical Experiments–Three subcritical brought into operation as the lead facility for experiments were successfully conducted radiography of dense objects. The second axis during FY 1999, as planned. Los Alamos of DARHT, to provide two views and four National Laboratory executed Cimarron. time sequenced pictures, is under construction, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and is scheduled for completion at the end of FY completed Clarinet and Oboe 1. Oboe is 2002. a series of small subcritical experiments in vessels. All three experiments obtained Accomplishments include: data on the behavior of plutonium subjected • LANSCE–A proof-of-principle demon- to shock from high explosives. stration for proton radiography success- • High Temperature Hohlraums for Stock- fully culminated in the firing of the joint pile Stewardship Program Experiments– Los Alamos/UK-AWE experiment named Experiments demonstrating the creation of “Billi G.” The dynamics of this first-of- high temperature hohlraums on Nova have its-kind experiment were captured in a 14- validated NIF capabilities critical for the frame series spanning a few Stockpile Stewardship Program. microseconds. This demonstration not only illustrated the multi-framing capabilities but • DARHT–Successfully conducted (No- also the ability to examine realistic objects vember 8, 1999) first hydrodynamic test, of relevant radiographic density with pro- marking the operational readiness of the tons. first axis of DARHT. The second axis is to be completed in 2002. • Chemistry and Materials–Orientation Im- aging Microscopy has revealed that the • NIF–The NIF conventional facilities, in- probabilistic nature of uranium hydride re- cluding target-chamber installation, and actions is significantly controlled by the pilot optics production are on schedule and uranium microstructure. Results indicate meeting their goals. However, installation that specific uranium crystallographic ori- of laser equipment has proven more com- entations are most rapidly attacked when plex than anticipated originally, and will exposed to hydrogen. This work will en- take longer and cost more than planned. able a correlation between uranium com- ponents that have been subjected to a variety of manufacturing processes result- ing in varied but predictable microstruc- tural conditions and eventual hydride corrosion susceptibility.

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5-10 Stockpile Stewardship 6.1. Personnel Challenges Program Challenges - 6 Now and in the Future THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF the SSP depends on the excellence of the scientists, engineers, and managers at the laboratories, THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP production plants, test site, and at DOE. Pre- PROGRAM faces many significant challenges serving a cadre of nuclear-weapon-experi- as it moves into the future. These challenges enced personnel within these institutions is one center on making the right decisions for an of the most pressing and crucial challenges uncertain future. The SSP’s approach is to DP faces. Unstable funding leading to volun- ensure that production capabilities and capac- tary and involuntary separations at the labo- ity are in place when needed, to have the sig- ratories and plants, pressures from increased nificant experimental and computational security requirements, and a perceived decline facilities available in time to annually certify in the importance and excitement of nuclear the stockpile, and in time to impact the SLEP stewardship have contributed to a loss of valu- schedule, and to preserve premier science and able skills throughout the nuclear weapons engineering capabilities to maintain, refurbish complex. and modernize nuclear weapons. With the new business model of Cam- 6.1.1. The Chiles Commission paigns, DSW, and RTBF, DP is implementing To understand comprehensively the issues new methods for addressing a broad range of surrounding the personnel challenges, Con- stockpile issues. The SSP now has the man- gress directed in Public Law 104-201 the es- agement tools to redefine the program and tablishment of the Commission on Maintaining make difficult decisions. For example, DP has U.S. Nuclear Weapons Expertise. This Com- defined criteria for certifying reliability, design, mission, chaired by Admiral H. G. Chiles, Jr., and production readiness for FY 2005. Es- reported its findings and twelve recommen- tablishing these criteria has resulted in tightly dations (Summarized in Appendix C) to Con- coupled experimental programs and readiness gress on March 1, 1999. These findings and efforts with measurable deliverables. With the recommendations also were supported by the new business model, the program accepts that Foster Panel report. meeting DSW milestones requires limits to experiments and options. In a similar manner, In response to the Commission’s recom- the program has also addressed the challenge mendations, DP immediately formed a Steer- of defining and executing test readiness. In ing Group of senior headquarters, field office, most cases, meeting these challenges has and production plant and laboratory represen- forced the SSP to develop new approaches tatives to develop a path forward for each of that support the program’s commitments both the Commission’s twelve recommendations. to directed stockpile work and to sustaining Admiral Chiles, the Defense Nuclear Facili- the science and engineering base needed to ties Safety Board, and the Nuclear Weapons maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile. Council have been briefed regarding the path

6-1 forward, and have endorsed DOE’s strategy tion for the salaries of scientists and engineers, to address each recommendation. One of the especially in highly competitive areas such as most important recommendations calls for the information science and technology. The sci- development of work force plans for each DP entific productivity at the laboratories is also facility. These site-specific plans address Fed- impacted by the long lead time needed to pro- eral, production plant and laboratory human cess clearances. In the months following the resource needs over the next decade to en- publication of the Cox Commission Report, the sure that the weapon complex has in place overall morale at the laboratories has dimin- qualified scientists, engineers and technical ished due to a perceived lack of trust in the experts who can ensure the safety and reli- nuclear weapons workforce. If unchecked, ability of the enduring stockpile. these and related factors could severely im- pair the laboratories’ ability to attract and re- Challenge: Maintaining the proper skill tain the caliber of scientists and engineers mix. Skill mix at the laboratories and the plants required to steward the stockpile into the 21st is an issue. Because the Stockpile Steward- century. DP is addressing many of these is- ship Program has shifted away from under- sues through actions that implement the Chiles ground testing toward a more simulation-based Commission recommendations. and aging-analysis-oriented approach, it is nec- essary to shift the skill mix at the laboratories accordingly. Likewise, at the production plants, 6.2. Infrastructure Challenges there will be more emphasis on computer- and network-based design tools and techniques in the next decade. This may necessitate a shift BALANCING INVESTMENTS IN in skill mix at the plants. Changing the skill INFRASTRUCTURE with other important mix at the institutions across the nuclear weap- activities is a significant challenge. DP faces ons complex will be a major challenge, possi- significant challenges in the next decade with bly requiring more employment reductions in regard to the facilities and infrastructure needed order to implement hiring programs that tar- to preserve the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Plans get needed skills and disciplines. to develop and implement necessary new fa- Challenge: Attracting and retaining a cilities, and upgrade the nuclear weapons com- premier workforce. Two factors that have plex infrastructure have been underway by DP, significantly impacted recruitment and reten- the laboratories, NTS, and the production tion are resource constraints combined with plants for the past several years. The increased programmatic need for maintenance overarching challenges in this area are 1) to of the stockpile. This has resulted in fewer have production capabilities and capacity in opportunities to conduct exploratory research place when needed; and 2) to have the signifi- at the laboratories. Another factor that is caus- cant experimental and computational facilities ing stress in the scientific environment is the available in time to achieve the SLEP sched- new categorization of some research topics ule. Appropriate programmatic support is as “sensitive unclassified technical informa- needed to certify and refurbish weapons dur- tion” (SUTI); this may preclude scientists and ing the next decade. Many of the necessary engineers from publishing their results in the facilities are now under development at the open literature, or sharing information at tech- laboratories, production plants, and the test site. nical meetings or conferences. In most in- Construction of others is planned to occur dur- stances, information that is designated as SUTI ing the next few years. The remainder of this within the DOE complex is openly published subsection covers each of the challenge ar- by other scientists at non-DOE institutions. eas mentioned above. Discussion is combined for annual certification and upgrading the stock- Another workforce issue is the pay freeze pile, because there is significant overlap in their implemented during the early 1990s, which has infrastructure challenges. resulted in a measurable loss in market posi-

6-2 Challenge: Certifying and refurbishing are under construction (e.g., DARHT and the stockpile without underground nuclear NIF), others are only in a planning stage (e.g., testing. In the absence of underground nuclear MESA and AHF). Because the SLEP calls testing, certification is being achieved through for production of refurbished weapons by FY combined efforts in stockpile surveillance, 2006, it is essential to continue development stockpile maintenance, nonnuclear experimen- of facilities that are underway, and transition tation and testing, and computational simula- from planning to developing and constructing tion, performed by a diverse and skilled those that are not. workforce. Certification becomes increasingly An important focus of the planned up- more challenging as both the stockpile and the grades is to increase nuclear weapon surety workforce, with weapon-design experience, (safety, reliability, and security), consonant with age. The development of new nonnuclear NSDDs, DoD Directives, and DOE Orders. experimental facilities, simulation capabilities, Surety features in stockpile weapons are based and processes to evaluate archived data are on 1960s and 1970s technology. Considerable essential to maintaining high confidence in the progress has been made during the past five safety, security, reliability, and performance of years that now makes it feasible to incorpo- the stockpile. The experimental and compu- rate new technologies based on microsystems tational tools used in the past were designed devices and other technologies. These tech- to complement, not replace, nuclear testing. nologies offer the possibility of eliminating all As a consequence, they are not, in and of safety exceptions and security “hot spots” in themselves, sufficient to maintain confidence the current stockpile. Failure to develop and in the absence of nuclear testing. A suite of mature these technologies during the next 3-5 enhanced capabilities and facilities is being years could lead to the re-use of 20- to 30- developed to fill in the associated knowledge year-old technology in refurbished weapons, gaps, and provide data to address and resolve which then would remain in the stockpile for stockpile concerns that have been identified. at least thirty years. This is viewed by DP as During the next decade, it will be neces- unacceptable from a safety and security per- sary to refurbish and modernize stockpile spective, and exploration of a wide variety of weapons, starting with the W80 in FY 2006, options for consideration by both DoD and and the W76 in FY 2008. These upgrades are DOE is warranted in the national interest. necessary to replace limited-life components, Challenge: Dealing with facility legacy upgrade tritium storage technology, and to and the need for modernization. Depreci- modernize weapon surety features. Because ating production facilities in the late 1980s and significant changes will be made to these early 1990s was the prudent decision in light weapon systems, and underground nuclear of the decline in production workload and the tests may not be performed, it will be neces- geopolitical environment at that time. Unfor- sary to use a significantly different approach tunately, DP is now faced with the realities of for certification than has been used in the past. those aged and marginally maintained facili- This new approach requires that computational ties. During the past year, the Nuclear Weap- facilities be available to simulate weapon per- ons Council tasked the Department of Defense formance with full-fidelity physics in three di- Comptroller’s Office of Program Analysis and mensions. Also required are facilities to Evaluation (PA&E) to conduct an independent conduct subcritical experiments to verify dy- review of the nuclear weapon production in- namic properties of nuclear weapon materi- frastructure. PA&E’s initial findings high- als. Additional radiographic facilities, both lighted the contrast between DOE’s current x-ray and proton, are required along with fa- and historical rate of reinvestment in facilities cilities for developing microsystem-based (0.8% of replacement value) and the industry surety options. While some of these facilities and DoD norm (2-4% of replacement value). exist today (e.g., subcritical test facilities) or This has resulted in a large bow wave of de-

6-3 ferred improvements. For example, 70% of Challenge: Build new, certifiable pits the facilities at Y12, 80% of the facilities at using new tools and processes in a new the Kansas City Plant, 50% of the facilities at environment. When Rocky Flats was closed Los Alamos National Laboratory, 40% of the in 1989, U.S. pit production came to a halt, facilities at Pantex, and 40% of the Savannah interrupting the production of war-reserve River tritium facilities are more than 40 years W88s. Presently, the U.S. is the only nuclear old. These facilities were not designed or built power that lacks the ability to manufacture for today’s missions and operational standards, pits. The recently released Foster Panel Study nor were they designed or constructed to meet noted the need for more planning for long-term today’s environmental, safety, and health stan- pit production. Although DoD does not re- dards. As these facilities continue to age, their quire DOE to produce pits per se, it does re- maintenance and operating costs continue to quire DOE to support the stockpile as defined rise. by the NWSP. To do this, DOE performs sur- veillance on weapons, some of which is de- In addition to maintaining the program- structive, to assure that their performance can matic and site infrastructure at the production be certified. Because of the increased lon- plants, the SSP is proceeding with a major ini- gevity of weapons remaining in the stockpile, tiative to “right-size” the manufacturing com- more systems than originally planned will be plex to better match changes in the workloads tested destructively. This produces a require- and budgets with maintenance of core capa- ment to manufacture pits so as not to deplete bilities and facilities. This right-sizing is being the required stockpile. The first of the new conducted consistent with the Stockpile Stew- certifiable pits will be required for the W88 ardship and Management Programmatic En- warhead, whose production availability require- vironmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the ment is the end of FY 2001. Subsequent to the Record of Decision for which was signed by W88, the next pit manufacturing requirement the Secretary of Energy on December 19, to support the surveillance program will be for 1996. The PEIS formally defines the archi- the W87. tecture of the weapons complex for the fu- ture. The right-sizing originally was based on In the future it may become necessary to “find or fix” scenarios, and current facility plan- manufacture large quantities of pits for stock- ning has been re-scoped accordingly, and is piled weapons due to unforeseen requirements reflected in the implementation of the new that surface from the surveillance program, business model. or changing national security requirements imposed by DoD. For the near term, support The aim of the production readiness cam- to the surveillance program will be met with a paigns and RTBF is to ensure that the produc- limited pit production capability being imple- tion facilities are ready and able to deliver mented at LANL. Incremental increases to defect-free modernized weapon components the pit production capacity at LANL must be for SLEP weapon refurbishments. Before the balanced with the need to maintain the pluto- B61 and W76 SLEP refurbishments can be nium research capabilities at the laboratory. completed it may be necessary to re-establish The requirements and designs for alarge-scale material formulation and fabrication capabili- pit production facility are being evaluated now. ties for critical weapon components. Other future SLEPs may require reestablishing the Challenge: Preserving needed skills in ability to synthesize and formulate high explo- the absence of testing. By PDD, the Presi- sive materials that are no longer available com- dent has stipulated that DOE must be prepared mercially. Future SLEPs could introduce to resume underground nuclear testing within micro-machined non-nuclear components 24 to 36 months, if so directed. Presently, NTS never before used in nuclear weapons. All of has plans that would allow a limited level of these processes must be established, proven, testing to be performed within 12 months of and certified before any war reserve produc- receiving a Presidential Directive to conduct tion can proceed. 6-4 a test. The ability to resume testing has two greatly increased, and requires electronic safe- important dimensions. First, the necessary guards more capable than any currently in use. infrastructure needs to be kept in place, pro- Because of these issues, an intensive viding required facilities, diagnostics, and study of cyber-security recently has been per- equipment. Second, key and essential per- formed within DP. It covered the status of sonnel who possess the expertise required to cyber-security and needed upgrades at both perform tests, and collect and analyze test data, the laboratories and the plants. The study must be retained. Performance of subcritical found that secure information environments experiments uses much of the needed equip- across the complex were outdated and poorly ment and infrastructure, and exercises the supported compared to unclassified systems. human skills required for this activity. Sub- This situation reduces the efficiency of DOE critical experiments are supported by the Cam- contractors in maintaining the stockpile expe- paigns and RTBF, and it is essential that ditiously. The findings of this study are docu- adequate support for these be sustained. It mented in the Information Security will also be necessary to continue to support Management (ISecM) plan published Novem- and maintain test facilities that are not used ber 15, 1999 for DOE management consider- by subcritical experimentation. ation and implementation decisions. Challenge: Balancing the implementation The study recommends a broad range of of programmatic requirements and new improvements to DP’s computer networks. security upgrades. During the last year, a These begin with creation of an Agency Se- number of security-related issues within the cure Network (ASN) that will provide the func- nuclear weapon complex have been surfaced. tionality necessary to conduct the nuclear These include cyber-security, the protection weapons program, while providing security of classified information and special nuclear commensurate with the classification levels of materials, and the protection of nuclear the information. The ASN will be a single, weapons while being transported from station integrated network to allow better manage- to station. At the agency level, a new office ment, improve security design and implemen- reporting to the Secretary was created to tation, and eliminate redundant efforts. The consolidate the management and execution of report also recommends upgrades to the un- all security activities. Ultimate resolution of classified networks that process sensitive in- these security-related issues will have formation to provide better protection of significant financial, and in some cases, sensitive information while ensuring that it is cultural, impacts on the laboratories and plants. sharable with industrial partners who need To execute its stockpile stewardship mis- access to it. Finally, it recommends that stan- sion, the SSP depends on an information net- dards be established for open networks to en- work that interconnects its sites. This sure the integrity and availability of the information network presents challenging se- information that is shared publicly. The study curity risks that must be managed carefully to concludes that a robust set of cyber-security properly protect Restricted Data. The most related upgrades would cost approximately significant risk is that introduced by intercon- $850 million, and would take four years to com- necting the multiple sites. These interconnec- plete. At present, funds are not identified to tions require that previously used security commence the needed upgrades. A approaches, i.e., those based on physical pro- prioritization process will be needed. tection of stand-alone systems, are no longer As a result of reviews of the management adequate, and must be upgraded to a system- of classified information during the past few based approach for both physical and elec- years, certain nuclear weapon sigma catego- tronic security measures. The presence of ries are proposed to be elevated from the Se- the interconnections also means that the dam- cret Restricted Data (SRD) level to the Top age that can be done by malicious insiders is

6-5 Secret Restricted Data (TSRD) level. This for protection, communication, and tracking. will require significant physical and adminis- In the personnel area, training and training fa- trative changes in the management of infor- cilities are being upgraded to accommodate mation that falls into the affected categories. the new standards. Additionally, professional More significantly, however, would be the re- leadership training, analogous to that used by quirement to operate the ASCI the military, is being developed and deployed. supercomputers, the networks that intercon- In aggregate, these activities will allow TSD nect them, and the facilities in which scien- to counter additional threat scenarios that could tists and engineers use them at the TSRD level. impact the security of transported weapons. The cost impacts associated with this change In response, DP executive management has presently are being analyzed, and are expected committed to increasing funding for the Trans- to be very large. The Office of Defense Pro- portation Safeguards Division through aggres- grams has sent a letter on this “Higher Fences” sive budgeting and reprogramming. initiative to DoD to inform them of the issue, and that it will need to be addressed through the Nuclear Weapons Council interface. 6.3. Business Challenges More stringent procedures are being implemented to protect special nuclear mate- THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP rial (SNM), classified hardware, and the PROGRAM currently faces several manage- manufacturing of classified hardware at the ment challenges. These include: 1) the need laboratories and the plants. In some instances, for further integration across the nuclear weap- these tighter practices are resulting in entire ons complex to increase efficiency; 2) the need facilities being operated as a vault, with ex- to assess and manage program risk; 3) the tensive physical protection measures being need to assess requirements and produce required. The increased level of security also deliverables within the constrained resources; frequently requires the restructuring and re- and 4) the need to improve the management deployment of protective forces, and other practices for the construction of large, techni- physical protection measures, all of which drive cally complex scientific facilities. up security costs. Historically, the nuclear weapons complex During the past year, DP’s Transportation evolved as a number of sites that were inten- Safeguards Division (TSD), which is respon- tionally isolated from each other. As a result sible for providing safe, secure and cost-ef- the contractors that manage the laboratories fective transportation for nuclear weapons in and plants have established independent busi- DOE custody, received a “marginal” security ness practices geared to their specific mission rating. DP has developed a “Get Well Plan” assignments. This has impacted the ability of to remedy this situation. Upgrades are planned the laboratories and the plants to work effec- both for the transportation fleet and personnel tively and efficiently together. New business who execute TSD’s activities. Within the fleet, practices are being developed and implemented the older armored tractors and safe secure by DP to increase coordination and integra- trailers (SSTs) are being replaced with newer tion across the complex. models, incorporating up-to-date technologies

6-6 Summary and Findings • No testing with nuclear yield Maintaining the nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing has led to a profound 7 7.1. Introduction change in the program structure. In par- ticular, in-depth science-based weapon surveillance, subsystem experiments, and THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY is large-scale simulation now play a much the civilian agency responsible for providing more prominent role. Fundamental the Nation with nuclear weapons and for en- progress in understanding of nuclear suring that those weapons remain safe, secure weapons has been made that is laying the and reliable. This stewardship and manage- foundation for a robust program for main- ment responsibility addresses the supreme taining weapons of well-tested designs. national interest of sustaining the nuclear de- • Continuous reliability of weapon sys- terrent. Carrying out the responsibility entails tems a complex linked set of activities ranging from scientific research to detailed surveillance and Even as the program changes dramati- remanufacturing, while continuously sustain- cally, and new scientific capabilities are ing the reliability that underpins our strategic developed, the weapon systems that form military posture. our deterrent must be maintained reliably year in and year out. This is addressed In 1992, the United States declared a through a rigorous annual certification pro- moratorium on underground nuclear testing cess, now in its fourth year. This require- and, since 1995, the Administration has pur- ment drives significant work throughout sued a zero-yield comprehensive nuclear test the DOE complex, in collaboration with ban. The President and the Congress have DoD. directed DOE to continue to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the enduring • Preparing for the future stockpile. The DOE is closely partnered with The stewardship program must take a long the Department of Defense (DoD) in this mis- view that extends decades into the future, sion. The DOE, in addition to being account- both in providing the capability to able for maintaining nuclear weapons in remanufacture certifiable weapon compo- accordance with DoD specifications, has the nents and in sustaining the needed scien- responsibility to represent the public’s interest tific and human resource base. It must in assuring the safety and security of these be emphasized that the programmatic de- weapons. The generation of requirements and cisions taken years hence about each certification of weapons systems are accom- weapon system will be based, in large part, plished through joint DOE/DoD processes that on the science and engineering performed work through the auspices of the Nuclear by the laboratories. Thus, the weapons Weapons Council for the Secretaries of De- laboratories must remain premier scien- fense and Energy. tific organizations, with an appropriate in- This review of the Stockpile Stewardship frastructure and skill mix. Concomitantly, Program provides an opportunity for assess- the laboratories must be viewed as excel- ing program accomplishments over the last lent places to do science, so that recruit- few years, for evaluating program direction ment and retention of the best talent and goals, and for identifying those investments continues. This is the ultimate basis for in facilities and people that will best position successful and sustainable stewardship the program to meet both near-term and long- under any technical approach. In addi- term challenges. The review is carried out in tion, viable production facilities are needed the context of:

7-1 to meet the manufacturing requirements making throughout the Stockpile Stewardship of the stockpile refurbishment program. Program must reflect both objectives. Accomplishing this stewardship task, in the A significant fraction of the nation’s absence of underground testing, requires not nuclear arsenal is scheduled for refurbishment just new and innovative technical approaches; over the next decade. Two key systems–the it demands a clear articulation of our underly- W80 and W76–are a large part of the nation’s ing approach to decision making, problem solv- nuclear deterrent and will comprise the ma- ing, and prioritization. Thus, this review jority of the directed stockpile workload early addresses the overall Program organization. in the new century. The W76–as part of the Trident submarine weapon system–plays a This review is not designed to assess the particularly important role as one of the most intricate details of specific program elements survivable elements of the nation’s deterrent. or resource requirements; rather, it is a chance Developing the tools, technologies, skill-base, to take stock and determine if DOE is funda- and production capabilities required to refur- mentally on the right track and is making the bish and modernize these systems is a major investments today needed to be outstanding challenge of the Stockpile Stewardship Pro- nuclear stewards tomorrow. Does DOE have gram. The cost and schedule of these tools the infrastructure and tools, across the nuclear and technologies, and the availability of the weapons complex, to meet current goals? proper skill mix in the work force, must be Does DOE have the program flexibility re- factored into the development of the require- quired to be responsible stewards in the fu- ments expressed in the life extension programs ture? Does DOE’s decision-making for these two weapons. philosophy and investment portfolio reflect both short-term drivers and long-term needs? Does To meet near-term refurbishment goals, DOE have the correct planning process in the DOE must work closely with the DoD to: place to allow the program to balance appro- 1) identify and assess technical drivers and priately the workload and resources between schedules for weapon component replacement the production of deliverables and the invest- and/or certifiable modification; 2) develop ment in science and engineering? schedules for production and certification; 3) determine current and projected resource re- A key challenge of the Stockpile Stew- quirements; and 4) develop a process for ardship Program is to balance DoD’s military changing the work plan to accommodate un- drivers, which result in a targeted set of goals expected technical issues. This review is an and schedules, against the set of technical is- opportunity to evaluate the current structure sues arising from aging in nuclear weapons. of the requirements generation process and to The Program must be fundamentally robust recommend actions to strengthen this process enough to support the evolving production and for the DOE, in partnership with the DoD. certification requirements and sufficiently flex- ible to address unanticipated problems and is- Performing stockpile stewardship without sues. It must also be able to sustain an testing has been likened to the technical chal- environment that fosters inquiry and problem- lenge of putting a man on the moon. Need- solving in both science and engineering. The less to say, with a sustained national DOE has the responsibility to provide the lead- commitment over the better part of a decade, ership required to balance the demand for America succeeded in that challenge. DOE short-term deliverables against the need for expects to succeed as well in stockpile stew- long-term institution building. DOE’s decision- ardship with the same level of national com-

7-2 mitment to the nuclear deterrent and to Up until 1992, nuclear testing was prima- America’s preeminent scientific and techni- rily a tool for developing and verifying new cal enterprise. This review will help define weapon design and performance. The ulti- elements of that commitment. mate challenge for the program today and into the future is to create and sustain the organi- zation, knowledge base, and tools that will pro- 7.2. General and Specific vide a robust scientific foundation for Program Findings understanding weapon performance; this is a significant change from the historic approach. 7.2.1. The Stockpile Stewardship Program To date, the SSP is on track to meet this chal- structure is on track. lenge, but more work is required to strengthen Substantial progress has been made in the the technical foundations, the physical and development of the organizational structure and human infrastructure, and the SSP program management of the Stockpile Stewardship planning process. The true test of the sci- Program (SSP). The restructuring of the pro- ence-based approach to stockpile stewardship gram into Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), will be its ability to recognize and meet a di- Campaigns, and Infrastructure–Readiness in verse set of technical challenges well into the Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)–is a future. positive step in the right direction. Program management is on the right track. Continuing 7.2.2.1. Specific Program Findings work is needed to address and balance the • Several technical areas such as primary evolving challenges of maintaining a safe, se- and secondary certification are exceed- cure, and reliable stockpile, and supporting the ingly challenging science and engineer- scientific, engineering and manufacturing in- ing problems requiring extensive stitutions needed to carry out this mission. experimental and computational efforts. The campaign plans for these efforts 7.2.2. Science-based SSP is the right path. are a good comprehensive start. Con- In 1993, President Clinton directed the tinuing work is needed to define the cer- DOE to develop the SSP to maintain the tification process and to develop metrics nation’s nuclear arsenal without testing. Sci- for success. ence-based SSP responds to a supreme na- • The large-scale experimental and com- tional interest, and the program is on track. putational facilities such as DARHT and Substantial progress has been made in the SSP ASCI, respectively, are already provid- during the past five years in developing the ing important data and analysis capa- scientific and technical capabilities to meet bilities that are increasing our program goals. Significant accomplishments understanding of aging and performance in the directed stockpile work and the simula- of the stockpile. In particular, the modi- tion and experimental science campaigns are fications leading to the B61-11, the life providing important data and analyses that are extension of the W87 warhead, and cer- needed for the certification of weapon com- tification of the Sandia-designed neutron ponents. Science-based stockpile stewardship generator were made possible because moves the nuclear weapons complex from a of scientific advances achieved with paradigm based on new weapons design and these new capabilities. development to one focused on life extension through modernization. This approach has • The Directed Stockpile Work has suc- required a change in attitude, programmatic cessfully produced significant quantities direction, and approach across the weapons of weapon alterations, modifications, complex. and limited life component exchanges each year, most notable of these was

7-3 the fielding of the B61-11 and Alt 342 the goals and milestones of the science, for the W87. engineering, and readiness Campaigns, and the certification and SLEP sched- • Production readiness, especially at Y- ules they support, must be commensu- 12, needs more support because many rate with the allotted resources. of these facilities have not been main- tained and need to be restored in a timely • Transformation of aging data into esti- manner to meet refrubishment produc- mates of weapon component lifetimes tion schedules. is needed to establish a program baseline for refurbishment. More will • Programs to maintain test readiness are be needed in the SSP to connect the on track and supporting the national re- results of the research Campaigns with quirements; however, more long-range the development of revised estimates for planning is needed to ensure that the the component lifetimes; these lifetime Nevada Test Site will have the infra- estimates need to be presented to and structure and intellectual base to main- coordinated by the Nuclear Weapons tain readiness for twenty years or more. Council. Work is currently underway in the Nuclear Weapons Council to evaluate • Arms control agreements have a direct options for enhancing test readiness bearing on the workload and schedules through consideration of specific test- of the SSP. At present, the stockpile ing scenarios. must be maintained to support a START I stockpile level. Although the total num- 7.2.3. SSP baseline will continuously ber of delivery systems would be re- evolve. duced if START II were to be implemented, the Directed Stockpile The overall development of the science- Work for the SSP under START I and based stockpile stewardship integrated START II are nearly the same since the baseline continues to be an evolving process total of the active and inactive stock- that was started at the inception of the SSP. piles remain essentially constant under The work of the last four years should be con- both treaties. sidered as part of the ongoing effort to “de- velop the SSP baseline.” The program baseline • Potential elements under consideration must: 1) define a realistic assessment of the for a proposed START III treaty could scope and schedule for the Directed Stock- have a significant impact on the pile Work; 2) identify scopes, schedules and workplans for the SSP, especially at the end-states for each of the Campaigns; 3) build Pantex plant. The potential for a moni- contingency and flexibility into both the Di- tored warhead dismantlement regime rected Stockpile Work and the science, engi- and prescribed dismantlement numbers neering, and readiness campaigns; and 4) and timetables will need to be factored ensure that the facilities (existing and new into the refurbishment schedules and capital construction) are scoped and sched- costs. uled to meet program requirements. This baseline will be used as an important manage- 7.2.4. The process for generating program ment tool for setting priorities for future work requirements needs attention. within the Office of Defense Programs. The current DoD/DOE process for gen- erating program requirements has problems 7.2.3.1. Specific Program Findings on both ends. At present, DOE, the laborato- • The SSP needs to refine a resource- ries and plants absorb requirements presented bounded systems analysis approach to by several elements within the DoD and de- establish a solid program baseline; i.e., velop workplans and budgets. The resulting

7-4 refurbishment plans and SLEP schedules are tures. Simply remanufacturing 30-year- presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council. old parts may not match the military More work is needed within the Office of needs for performance with the public Defense Programs to address both the tech- expectation for enhanced safety. In nical and process issues involved in develop- addition, reproducing vintage technolo- ing requirements. Program drivers gies is no longer practical at the engi- (requirements) must be differentiated from neering and manufacturing facilities. “wish-lists” of activities that should or could • When evaluating surveillance and re- be done if resources and schedules permit. A furbishment requirements, the random lack of prioritization of program drivers at DoD sampling approach should be supple- is causing the DOE to accept an expanding mented so as to focus on aging as a key set of additional “requirements.” In addition, phenomenon. DOE’s lack of a formal process for assessing military and civilian requirements, developing • The “lessons learned” from the W76 implementation plans–with corresponding dual revalidation should be reviewed and scopes, schedules and budgets–and prioritiz- used by DoD and DOE, through the ing the workplan has caused significant stress Nuclear Weapons Council, to develop in the SSP. workplans for future dual revalidations or baselines. It was agreed that the DOE should work more closely with the DoD to generate a more • In weapon refurbishments (such as that comprehensive and coordinated process for for the W80), military logistical options generating, assessing, and implementing re- (such as performing refurbishment by quirements. There was strong support among tail number) should be considered as the Senior Advisors for having both Depart- part of overall system optimization. This ments work through the Nuclear Weapons may relieve stress and resource require- Council–and its Standing & Safety Commit- ments for the SSP. tee and Requirements Working Group–to de- velop a more defined workplan for prioritizing • The W62 is not part of the present SLEP program drivers and developing requirements schedule, but arms control issues may for DoD and DOE. Likewise, a more formal force DOE to keep it in the stockpile. process is needed within the SSP to evaluate An assessment of options, costs, and resource impacts of proposed requirements schedules for maintaining or dismantling from the NWC and to establish the program this warhead is needed. milestones and goals. This will require a much • More work is needed by DOE, in coor- more robust prioritization process and more dination with DoD, to assess the require- senior-level DOE management support. The ments and implementation plans for the SSP program planning and prioritization must W76 and W80 LEPs. clearly identify scope, schedule, and resources for meeting requirements and, when neces- • The DoD and DOE should work through sary, indicate regrets (schedule relief) and/or the Nuclear Weapons Council to evalu- additional resources needed to stay on target. ate potential programmatic impacts from future arms control negotiations. 7.2.4.1. Specific Program Findings 7.2.5. Despite the many accomplishments, • A more structured process is needed at the program is under stress. DOE to assess the military require- ments. The SSP must be optimized to In order to meet program goals and mili- balance the drivers for increased mar- tary requirements, the SSP must have an ex- gins, minimal changes to the weapon, tensive and diverse set of concurrent activities and the need for enhanced surety fea- in Directed Stockpile Work, science and engi-

7-5 neering Campaigns, readiness Campaigns, and munity (e.g., sensitive unclassified tech- infrastructure planning and management. The nical information). These issues are overlap in activities needed to meet the W80 placing a significant burden on resources and W76 LEP schedule, combined with addi- throughout the program and lessening tional requirements assumed by the program, the scientific attractiveness of the insti- have seriously depleted program contingency tutions, thus making recruitment and re- and flexibility. In addition, the original pro- tention more difficult. gram plans developed in 1996 did not consider • More contingency is needed in the re- the production capacity requirements that will sources and program planning of the sci- be necessary to meet the stockpile refurbish- ence and engineering campaigns to allow ment mission. Changes and upgrades to the the program to accommodate future un- manufacturing facilities are needed in order anticipated requirements and to continue for DOE to meet the military’s near-term and to allow creative scientific enquiry. long-term production requirements. • More contingency is needed in the re- Additional pressures such as increased sources at the production facilities to en- security requirements, newly discovered stock- sure continuity in the workforce and pile issues, and resource limitations have col- functionality and safety of the facilities. lectively forced the program, overall, to be “wound too tight” with too little program flex- • Maintaining scientific quality through the ibility or contingencies. This is evident from laboratory peer review process should the fact that the Campaign and Directed Stock- be a key objective of the program. There pile Work is so tightly intertwined that adjust- is a risk that the program is becoming ments to specific program milestones or so integrated that the strength of the in- budgets may result in significant regrets for ter-laboratory peer review process be- the SSP as a whole. Flexibility and contin- tween LANL and LLNL could be gency is needed in both the science and engi- weakened. neering programs and the production facilities to address these issues. Indicators of stress • Closer cooperation is needed between include lowered morale in parts of the work the Defense Programs laboratories and force and increased difficulty in recruitment the plants on engineering and manufac- of top scientists and engineers. turing projects. This may require chang- ing contracting processes to facilitate more direct exchanges and cost-shar- 7.2.5.1. Specific Program Findings ing. • The current requirements generation • Reductions in resources for programs, process has resulted in the program ab- such as radiochemistry and nuclear sorbing too many drivers as “require- manufacturing engineering, could leave ments.” More assessment, prioritization the complex without a critical intellec- and coordination is needed to develop tual base to meet long-term program viable workplans across the complex. goals. • A significant source of program stress • The number and complexity of the new has resulted from the yet-to-be-deter- experimental and computational facili- mined consequences of new security ties under construction is a significant requirements, including: the implemen- challenge for the SSP program planning tation of new cyber-security regulations; process. Issues surrounding the con- restrictions/moratoria on foreign visitors struction of NIF have indicated the need and assignments to the laboratories; the for more rigorous program planning and introduction of polygraph testing; and project management oversight for these uncertain impacts of new export con- facilities. trol procedures on the scientific com-

7-6 7.2.6. More work is needed to prioritize the must ensure that our current high-level of con- directed stockpile workload. fidence in the stockpile is maintained, in ac- cordance with the necessary military standards The Office of Defense Programs should and civilian expectations. This will require use the new DSW management plan to imple- changing and building upon the traditional ap- ment a more rigorous process for prioritizing proach that relied extensively on the personal the work done across the complex. This is experience of the designers. This also requires particularly important for the W76 and W80 program responsibility and accountability to LEP refurbishments. The workplan for the ensure that the science programs are both SLEP schedule needs to prioritize the military supporting scientific inquiry and focusing on and civilian program drivers into “musts,” the defined path forward. “shoulds,” and “coulds.” The workplan must reflect the cost and schedule for each of the Each of the Campaigns have stated “end- program elements and a well-defined set of states” and the Campaigns have provided a options for each of the major program activi- structure within which metrics can be set. ties. This is essential for ensuring that the SLEP Programmatic discipline will be needed to en- schedules proposed to the DoD are feasible sure that the end-states are met according to and realistic. Better coordination is needed a well-defined set of metrics. The cautionary across the nuclear weapons complex (DOE, message, “Better is always the enemy of good DoD, the laboratories and plants) to assess enough,” must be a guide. In addition, obtain- the military drivers and develop overall imple- ing more knowledge about the health of spe- mentation plans for the SSP. cific weapon systems and components should not be confused with loss of confidence in their 7.2.6.1. Specific Program Findings reliability and safety. Problems that are de- tected and fixed are measures of program • A set of options and priorities needs to success not program or system failure. It is be defined for the implementation of the the nature and responsibility of the SSP to ask W76 and the W80 LEP schedules. This questions about weapons that were never should result in a list of programmatic asked before. trigger points requiring senior-level de- cision making. 7.2.7.1. Specific Program Findings • Clarification is needed about the mili- • More analysis is needed to define the tary priorities for setting the workplan measurements and metrics (precision for the W76 and W80 LEP schedule. and accuracy) required to estimate • More support is needed for W88 pit weapon component lifetimes and per- production capability at LANL in order formance/surety characteristics. to meet requirement for first pit produc- • A well-defined process is needed to tion in 2001 and certification in 2004. develop the proper balance between in- • The balance of work dedicated to hos- creasing margins, upgrading surety fea- tile environments should be reexamined. tures, and minimizing changes to the design, during refurbishments. 7.2.7. ‘Metrics of Success’ need to be de- • Certifying the stockpile without under- fined for the DSW program and each Cam- ground testing into the future will require paign. that the design and integration laborato- Well-defined sets of metrics are needed ries, and the production plants define to set the standards for certifying weapon com- specific metrics for safety, surety and ponents and estimating lifetimes, in the ab- reliability. sence of nuclear testing. These standards

7-7 7.2.8. Additional external review and over- ued budget instability and uncertainty. Em- sight is needed. ployment reductions are planned at most sites in FY00 and FY01. This will adversely im- A standing external advisory committee pact the plants’ ability to meet both the FY00 (e.g., Defense Programs Advisory Commit- and FY01 proposed workload. A lack of con- tee) could provide ongoing insight, assess- tingency in resources impacts the plants’ abil- ments, and advice on the program structure ity to recruit and retain the necessary skill mix. and effectiveness. Large-scale projects (e.g., Retention of mid-level engineers and scien- AHF, MESA, NIF, etc.) also need stronger tists with 2 to 5 years experience is particu- external review earlier in the program plan- larly difficult. In addition, retaining and ning process and more extensive vetting with recruiting managers with 5 to 15 years expe- senior DOE management. rience is getting significantly more difficult. Additional resources are needed to provide 7.2.8.1. Specific Program Findings adequate lead time to recruit and train the • The program would benefit from more needed work force skill mix to meet capacity continuity in the external review process. (not just capability) requirements. The plants Senior advisory committees, established have developed programs that provide career under the Federal Advisory Committee path incentives and merit-based rewards in Act, have been used extensively by the response to the Chiles Commission recommen- DOE. In addition to providing the DOE dations. Continued implementation of these with program advice, they also are very programs will require additional resources. effective in communicating with orga- nizations outside the Department. The 7.2.9.1. Specific Program Findings for Office of Defense Programs, and the Production Plants Department as a whole, should benefit Workforce issues reported by the plants from establishing a senior advisory com- include: mittee that will focus specifically on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. • Safety concerns resulted in shutdown of enriched uranium operations at the • There was strong support for the pro- Y-12 plant in 1994. Since that time, only posed JASON 2000 Summer Study to part of this operation has been restarted. evaluate the focus, pace, and appropri- The Department must rapidly return to ateness of the current Campaigns. full capability to resolve security con- • An extensive collection of internal and cerns and production needs. external reviews have already been done • Lack of approved safety authorization on the SSP. The lack of adequate data- basis for operations at Pantex prevents base management within the program the contractor from working on four of makes accessing and utilizing these find- the ten weapons in the enduring stock- ings very cumbersome. An accessible pile. Establishing a basis for surveillance electronic database is needed to improve and production of these four systems the program’s ability to respond to the should be a high priority during FY 2000. recommendations made by the many and varied program review teams. • Employment at the Kansas City Plant has dropped from 3790 in FY 1993 to 7.2.9. Increases in programmatic and se- 2556 in FY 1999. Additional reductions curity requirements have impacted the sta- would put at risk the engineering and bility and morale of the work force. production support for surety upgrades to the enduring stockpile. Plants: The plants indicated that most of their current stresses resulted from contin-

7-8 • A strong recommendation was made more effort is needed to focus and prioritize that DOE needs to permit the contrac- these activities at the laboratories so that the tors at the plants to have the freedom to programs are sustained within the mandated pursue a wide range of personnel incen- resources. More insight and management tive programs to build and maintain the advocacy is needed at DOE/DP into labora- critical workforce. This is consistent tory program planning and budgeting to make with a Chiles Commission recommen- the long-term planning process more effec- dation that “DOE establish and imple- tive. ment plans […] for replenishing essential technical workforce needs in critical 7.2.9.2. Specific Program Findings for skill,” across the nuclear weapons com- Laboratories plex. Work force issues reported by the labora- Laboratories: The laboratories are suf- tories include: fering morale problems due to impacts of new security requirements, budget uncertainty, and • Reduction in LDRD (6% down to 4%) reduction (or elimination) of resources to sup- in FY00 will impact the breadth and port innovative scientific inquiry. In particular, scope of the fundamental/exploratory there have been significant changes in the last science programs. This could under- five to eight years in the ability of the labora- mine the scientific appeal of the labora- tories to conduct long-term exploratory re- tories in the short term and search. It should be noted that many of the science-based stockpile stewardship in key elements of the present stewardship pro- the longer term. gram including ASCI, high-powered lasers, • At LANL, two top candidates for a Di- proton radiography, and materials modeling, vision Director post withdrew from con- owe their existence to exploratory research sideration citing a decline in the scientific that was conducted five to ten years earlier. environment; several other senior- and There is also an urgent need to reestablish junior-level staff members have left the the compact (and trust) between laboratories laboratory in direct response to the re- and DOE to address these issues. It is abso- cent security changes at the laboratory. lutely crucial that the scientific excellence at Several employees have expressed se- the laboratories be maintained in order for the rious concerns about no longer being SSP to succeed both now and into the future. trusted at the laboratory and many have Recruiting and retention of scientists and en- opted for transfers to unclassified re- gineers at the laboratories is being impacted search groups. by the perception that the laboratories are of- • LLNL reported significantly more prob- fering fewer long-term creative and challeng- lems recently in recruiting and retaining ing career paths. top-notch employees due to: 1) security More balance is needed at the laborato- constraints (polygraphs, cyber-security, ries between the near-term Directed Stock- restrictions on foreign nationals, and pile Work programs and scientific research sensitive unclassified technical informa- programs that contribute to long-term institu- tion (SUTI) designations); 2) additional tion building. A stronger program planning pro- Congressional constraints (travel restric- cess is needed to ensure that the emphasis tions, LDRD reductions); and 3) institu- placed on producing deliverables (Directed tional issues (credibility of LLNL Stockpile Work) is commensurate with the SSP management, viability of future of labo- need to maintain scientific excellence, an im- ratory). The reductions in LDRD will perative for sustaining a creative intellectual result in a 20% reduction in postdoctoral environment. However, it was also noted that appointments.

7-9 • Sandia reported that its image as Em- • Traditionally, recapitalization was ac- ployer of Choice has been affected ad- complished through development and versely by recent downsizing; continued production of new weapon systems. In funding uncertainties; polygraph testing; particular, Sandia’s reinvestment rate– and security concerns. The 5-year once among the highest in the complex– DOE complex salary freeze has resulted has dropped dramatically since the end in loss in market position. Time to pro- of the design work; it is now ten times cess clearances discourages new hires less than comparable industrial firms and delays productivity. Recent budget such as Intel and Hewlett-Packard. reductions in DP-funded student pro- • Some key production areas at Y-12 are grams will impact negatively Sandia’s operating in the absence of physical student interns program and reduce its safety controls, and thus are relying interactions with academic institutions. heavily on administrative controls and personal protective equipment. A con- 7.2.10. SLEP production needs for the next tinued lack of improvements to the ex- decade require stable reinvestment in, and isting facilities at Y-12 could jeopardize planning for, work force and plant modern- the program’s ability to meet campaign ization. end-states. More long-range planning is needed to ensure that the plants maintain the physical 7.2.11. More long-term planning is re- structures and proper skill mix to produce at quired for new capital construction the capacity anticipated by the SLEP sched- projects. ule. In general, the basic capability exists at There was a strong sense that more work the plants, but meeting short-term capacity is needed in developing the long-term plan for demands will require more stable funding. future pit production capabilities and capacity. Additional resources are needed now for re- This plan needs to be presented and worked capitalization and modernization investments in the NWC within the next year. There was to provide plants and laboratory production also consensus that large-scale SSP projects facilities with tools for capacity production in (e.g. MESA, Atlas, AHF) need better and more the near future. More flexibility in funding at timely vetting with DOE senior-level manage- the plants is required to respond to emerging ment, DoD, and external review bodies. technical issues/problems in the DSW and campaigns. 7.2.11.1. Specific Program Findings 7.2.10.1. Specific Program Findings • An in-depth analysis of short-term pit production options may be needed. In • The costs, schedules, impacts, and pro- particular, the plans, budgets and sched- grammatic options for a proposed moni- ules for manufacturing 20 pits per year tored warhead dismantlement at Pantex, at LANL may need additional review. under a possible START III Treaty, must The production activities at LANL must be evaluated, prioritized and incorpo- be balanced to ensure that the scientific rated into the SSP planning process. research done at TA-55 is not adversely • The plants and laboratories have not impacted. made significant investments in produc- • Long-term conceptual planning is tion equipment and facilities during the needed to evaluate options for building past decade. This is impacting the abil- a large-scale pit production facility. This ity of the complex to keep pace with recommendation was a key element of industry standards for engineering and production.

7-10 the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile (Foster Panel, No- vember 15, 1999). • Stronger project management oversight and review in Defense Programs will greatly help multi-year program plan- ning. A mechanism similar to that em- ployed in the Office of Science is the suggested pathway.

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7-12 Appendix A Listing of All SSP Program Reviews

JASON Reviews: 3. Department of Energy and Department of Defense Report on Long Range Plan on 1. Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Pit Production to the Committees on Armed (JSR 94-345) Services of the Senate and House of Rep- 2. Letter report: Vic Reis Stewardship As- resentatives (U), March 5, 1999 sumptions (JSR 94-346) 3. Accelerator Production of Tritium: 1995 GAO Reports: Review (JSR 95-310) (follow-on to JSR 1. ASCI, June 1999, DOE Needs to Improve 92-310) Oversight of the $5 Billion Strategic Com- 4. Nuclear Testing (U) (JSR 95-320) (SRD) puting Initiative (GAO/RCED-99-195) 5. Simulation for Stewardship (JSR 96-315) 2. ASCI, Information Technology: Department of Energy Does Not Effectively Manage 6. Preliminary Review of Stockpile Steward- It’s Supercomputers (GAO/RCED-98-208) ship and Management (JSR 96-320) 3. ASCI program implementation of milestones 7. Subcritical Experiments (JSR 97-300) and budget projections 8. Signatures of Aging (JSR 97-320) 4. Nuclear Weapons – Key Nuclear Weap- 9. Signatures of Aging Revisited (JSR 98- ons Component Issues are Unresolved, 320) November 1998 (classified supplement is- sued in July 1999) 10. System-Level Flight Tests (JSR 98-310) 5. DOE: Problems and Progress in Managing 11. Remanufacture (JSR 99-300) Plutonium, April 17, 1998 12. Primary Performance Margins (U) (JSR 6. Nuclear Weapons: Design Reviews of 99-305) (SRD) DOE’s Tritium Extraction Facility, March 13. Inertial Confinement Fusion Review 31, 1998 (Hammer, 1996) 7. Combating Terrorism: Spending on Govern- 14. Inertial Confinement Fusion Review ment-Wide Programs Requires Better (Drell, 1994) Management and Coordination, December 1, 1997 15. Enhanced Fidelity Flight Testing, 1998 8. Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities of DOE’s LLC Program to meet Operational Needs, Congressional Oversight: March 5, 1997 1. Commission on Maintaining U.S. Nuclear 9. Nuclear Weapons: Improvements Needed Weapons Expertise, March 1, 1999 (Chiles to DOE’s Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Sur- Commission) veillance Program, July 31, 1996 2. Commission for Assessment of the Reli- 10. LANL Plutonium Processing Facility ability, Safety and Security of the U.S. Deterrent

A-1 11. Stockpile Stewardship Management – (on- 3. “A View of DoD’s Requirements for going) Examining how SSP budget, DOE’s Programs in 2010 - A Strategy for planning and organizational structure is Sustained Capability and Flexible Re- integrated to support implementation of sponse; Meeting National Security program activities and to avoid duplica- Requirements” (a.k.a. the “2010 Report”) tion. August 1997 12. Tritium alternatives, selection criteria, cost 4. “The Laboratories’ Contribution to the estimates and independent review SSP” (a.k.a. the “Robin Report” January 1998 Congressional Research Service Studies 5. ASCI Burn Code Review #1, June 1998 and Reports: 6. ASCI Alliance External Review, October- 1. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test November 1998 Ban, updated November 10,1998 7. ASCI Blue Ribbon Panel Review, Decem- 2. Nuclear Weapons Production Capability ber 1998-January 1999 Issues, June 1998 8. ASCI DisCom Review, January 1999 3. Nuclear Weapons, Capabilities of DOE’s 9. ASCI Burn Code Review #2, scheduled Limited Life Component Program to Meet June 1999 Operational Needs, March 1997 10. Subcritical Experiment Evaluation Com- 4. Nuclear Weapons, Improvements Needed mittee (SEEC) has reviewed all subcritical to DOE’s Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance experiments to insure that their design will Program, July 31, 1996 keep them subcritical when executed. 5. Testimony, Status of DOE’s Nuclear The SEEC also examined other technical Stockpile Surveillance Program, aspects of the subcritical experiment pro- March 13, 1996 gram and provided assessments to DOE, the laboratories and the Nevada Test Site, 6. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship: which were discussed and evaluated in A Comparison of Alternatives, December July 1999. 14,1995 7. Nuclear Deterrence of Non-Nuclear Independent External Reviews (IER): Threats: Implications for U.S. Policy, No- vember 29, 1995 1. Renovate Existing Roadways at Nevada Test Site (Defense Programs Project No. 8. Nuclear Dilemmas: Nonproliferation 99-D-108) Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban, and Stockpile Stewardship, December 15, 2. Model Validation and Systems Certifica- 1994 tion Test Center (MVSCTC) at SNL/ ALO (Defense Programs Project No. 99- D-106) DOE-Sponsored: 3. Central Health Physics Calibration Facil- 1. ATLAS Pulsed Power Facility Review of ity at LANL (Defense Programs Project Planned Technical Activities by DP-13, No. 99-D-105) September 1999 4. Protection of Real Property (Roof Recon- 2. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task struction – Phase II at LLNL) (Defense Force Reviewed fusion energy (including Programs Project No. 99-D-104) inertial fusion energy) and the role of De- fense Programs (Report issued September 1999) A-2 5. Isotope Sciences Facilities at LLNL (De- 2. Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear fense Programs Project No. 99-D-103) Weapons Surety (JAC) 6. Rehabilitation of Maintenance Facility - manufacturing study by General (RMF) at LLNL (DOE 99-D-102) Welch 3. DoD Program Analysis & Evaluation is- National Academy of Sciences: sues analysis to the Nuclear Weapons Council 1. Review of ICF, March 1997 - tritium - pit production DoD Sponsored: - ASCI 1. USSTRATCOM Strategic Assessment - NIF Team (SAT) review of SAG studies - underground nuclear testing within the - high explosives 2-3 years - gas transfer systems 4. Institute for National Security Studies, - development of metrics for the National Defense University: “US Nuclear nuclear stockpile Policy in the 21st Century,” August 1998 - nuclear explosive safety studies

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A-4 Appendix B Recommendations from the Chiles Commission Report

The Commission on Maintaining United improve communication among the laborato- States Nuclear Weapons Expertise (Chiles ries as well as ways to strengthen coordina- Commission) was prescribed by the National tion within the DOE and between agencies. Defense Authorization Act of FY 1997. The Regarding Personnel Policies, the Commission Congress identified the need for the Commis- issued specific recommendations for improv- sion because of the substantial changes in the ing the Department’s ability to recruit and re- environment affecting nuclear weapons de- tain the technical talent it will need, now and sign, production, and testing since the end of in the future, to replace the test-experienced the Cold War. In view of these changes, the nuclear scientists and engineers as they retire Commission was tasked with reviewing on- from the workforce. Finally, the report calls going efforts by the Department of Energy for reinvigorated Congressional Oversight and (DOE) to attract scientific, engineering, and a multi-year fiscal commitment to stable fund- technical personnel, recommending improve- ing for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. ments and identifying actions where needed, Following receipt of the Commission Re- and developing a plan for recruitment and re- port, DP formed a Steering Group of senior tention within the DOE nuclear weapons com- program officials from Headquarters, field plex. offices, industrial plants and the weapons labo- The Chiles Commission Report offers 12 ratories to develop a coordinated “Path For- specific recommendations for action under four ward” on each of the 12 Commission broad categories: National Commitment; Pro- recommendations. The Steering Group de- gram Management; Personnel Policies; and veloped a coordinated action plan and briefed Oversight. With respect to National Commit- senior department officials, Chiles Commis- ment, the Commissioners urged the Congress sion members, the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Administration to make a concerted and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety and continuing effort to unequivocally and Board (DNFSB). There is an overall consen- clearly convey the importance of the nuclear sus that DP’s Path Forward is sound and can weapons mission to the nuclear weapons com- achieve the objectives outlined in the Com- munity. In the area of Program Management, mission Report. the Commission recommended measures to

B-1 Commission Recommendations

The twelve major Commission Recommendations are organized into four areas:

A. NATIONAL COMMITMENT C. PERSONNEL POLICIES 1. Reinforce the National Commit- 7. Establish and Implement Plans on ment and Fortify the Sense of a Priority Basis for Replenishing Mission. Essential Technical Workforce needs in Critical skills. B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 8. Provide Contractors with greatly 2. Complete an Integrated, Long- expanded latitude and flexibility in Term Stockpile Life Extension Personnel Matters. Program Plan. 9. Expand training and career plan- 3. Strengthen the DOE - Depart- ning programs, which are adapted ment of Defense (DoD) Relation- to the dramatically changed ship. workforce environment. 4. Take Immediate Steps to Achieve 10. Expand the use of former nuclear Greater Laboratory Coordination. weapons program employees. 5. Expedite Improvements and Ef- D. OVERSIGHT ficient Use of the Nuclear Weap- ons Production Complex. 11. Create a permanent Defense Pro- grams Advisory Committee. 6. Establish Clear Lines of author- ity within DOE. 12. Enhance Congressional Over- sight.

B-2 Appendix C Bibliography

1. FY 1994 National Defense Authorization 12. “Supplement to the 1953 Agreement for Act, Public Law 103-160. the Development, Production, and Stan- dardization of Atomic Weapons between 2. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan the Department of Energy and the De- (NWSP), FY 1998. partment of Defense,” September 5, 1984. 3. “Nuclear Posture Review,” Department 13. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law of Defense, January 1995, http:// 83-703. www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html. 14. FY 1987 National Defense Authorization 4. FY 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 99-661. Act, Public Law 104-106. 15. Title 10, United States Code, Armed 5. FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Forces, December 1996. Act, Public Law 106-65. 16. “Nuclear Weapons Production and Plan- 6. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, http:// ning Directive (P&PD) 2000-0,” U.S. www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ Department of Energy, October 1999. starthtm/start.html. 17. “Joint DoD-DOE FY00 Requirements & 7. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II, http:/ Planning Document,” Nuclear Weapon /www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ Council, July 16, 1999. starthtm/start.html. 18. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, http:// 8. “Report of the Quadrennial www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ Defense Review,” May 1997, ctbtpage/trty_pg.html. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/. 19. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, http:// 9. “An Agreement between the AEC and the www.state.gov/www/global/arms/trea- DoD for the Development, Production, ties/abmpage.html. and Standardization of Atomic Weapons,” March 21, 1953. 20. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III, U.S. Department of State, in process. 10. “A Memorandum of Understanding be- tween the Energy Research and 21. FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Development Administration and the De- Act, Public Law 104-201. partment of Defense on Nuclear Weapons Development Liaison Procedures,” Sep- 22. “Report to Congress and the Secretary tember 4, 1975. of Energy, Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Exper- 11. “Memorandum of Understanding between tise,” March 1, 1999. the Department of Defense and the De- partment of Energy on Objectives and 23. “FY 1999 Report to Congress of the Panel Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Se- Activities,” January 17, 1983. curity of the United States Nuclear Stockpile,” November 8, 1999.

C-1 24. “Final Report of the Select Committee on 27. “DOE Defense Programs Complex Infor- U.S. National Security and Military/Com- mation Security Action Plan, Volume I, mercial Concerns with the People’s ISecM, Report of the Integrated Cyber- Republic of China,” U.S. House of Rep- Security Management Task Force,” resentatives, January 3, 1999. October 15, 1999, LA-CP-99-235. 25. “Joint Review of DOE’s Stockpile Stew- 28. “Project Management Plan for DOE De- ardship Program, Manufacturing fense Programs Integrated Security Infrastructure Overview,” presented to the Management Plan (ISecM),” November Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and 15, 1999 (draft). Safety Committee, October 25, 1999. 26. “Final Programmatic Environmental Im- pact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management,” DOE/EIS-0236, Sep- tember, 1996.

C-2 Appendix D Acronyms

ACM Advanced Cruise Missile IBM International Business Machines ACRR Annular Core Research Reactor ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ADAPT Advanced Design and ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion Production Technologies IHE Insensitive High Explosive AGEX Above Ground Experiment INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear AHF Advanced Hydrodynamics Forces Treaty Facility IS Inactive Stockpile ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile APT Accelerator Production of LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory Tritium LANSCE Los Alamos Neutron Science ASCI Accelerated Strategic Center Computing Initiative LEO Life Extension Option ASN Agency Secure Network LEP Life Extension Plan ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode LLCE Limited Life Component Exchange AWE Atomic Weapons Establishment LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory CDU Capacitive Discharge Unit LRPA Long-Range Planning Assessment CLWR Commercial Light-Water Reactor MC Military Characteristics CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty MESA Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications DARHT Dual-Axis Radiographic MLNSC Manuel Lujan Neutron Scattering Hydrodynamic Test Center DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board NIF National Ignition Facility DoD Department of Defense NPR Nuclear Posture Review DOE Department of Energy NSDD National Security Decision DSW Directed Stockpile Work Directive DTRA Defense Threat Reduction NTS Nevada Test Site Agency NWC Nuclear Weapons Council DVC Data and Visualization Corridor NWCSSC Nuclear Weapons Council Standing & Safety Committee EOS Equations of State NWRWG Nuclear Weapons Requirements EUCOM European Command Working Group NWSP Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory OSD Office of the Secretary of HE High Explosive Defense Programs HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

D-1 P&PD Production and Planning SST Safe Secure Trailers Directive START Strategic Arms Reduction PA&E Office of Program Analysis and Treaty Evaluation STRATCOM Strategic Command PAL Permissive Action Link STS Stockpile-to-Target Sequence PBX Plastic-Bonded Explosive SUTI Sensitive Unclassified Technical PCP Product Change Proposal Information PDD Presidential Decision Directive PEIS Programmatic Environmental TLAM-N Tomahawk Land Attack Impact Statement Missile–Nuclear POG Project Officer Group TSD Transportation Safeguards Division QDR Quadrennial Defense Review TSRD Top Secret Restricted Data

RTBF Readiness in Technical Base UGT Underground Test and Facilities UK United Kingdom USAF United States Air Force SFI Significant Finding Incident SGT SafeGuard Transporter VIEWS Visualization and Interactive SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Environment for Weapons Missile Simulation SLEP Stockpile Life Extension Process SNL Sandia National Laboratories SNM Special Nuclear Material SRD Secret Restricted Data SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program

D-2 Appendix E Site Descriptions

Los Alamos National Laboratory

MISSION J Weapons Research & Development J Stockpile Support J Pit Manufacturing J Reconfiguration / Rapid Reactivation J Other Defense Programs J Environmental Restoration/Waste Mgmt. J Nonweapons Work

Location Los Alamos, NM Contractor University of California Established 1942 Area 29.6k Acres

UNIQUE ASSETS – KEY TO DEFENSE TA-55 plutonium R&D facility, due to termi- PROGRAMS: nation of the nuclear weapons missions at the Rocky Flats Plant. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (CMR) TA-55 provides chemical and metallurgi- cal processes for recovering, purifying, and The CMR Building was completed in the converting plutonium and other actinides as early 1950s to house research and experimen- well as providing a number of other capabili- tal facilities for analytical chemistry, plutonium ties in nuclear material handling, and applied and uranium chemistry, and metallurgy, as well research in plutonium and actinide chemistry. as some engineering design and support func- (See Processes and Technology section.) tions. In 1960, an addition (Wing 9) was constructed to support programs requiring hot- Pit fabrication includes all activities nec- cell facilities. The facility also houses some essary to fabricate new pits, to modify the other materials-related functions, including internal features of existing pits (intrusive some uranium and other actinide research, fab- modification), and to recertify or requalify pits. rication, and metallography activities, and Nonintrusive modification pit reuse, which is destructive and nondestructive analysis. an inherent capability of the Pit Fabrication Facility, includes the processes and systems TA-55 Plutonium Facility necessary to make modifications to the exter- LANL is responsible for the design of the nal features of a pit, if necessary, and to nuclear explosive package in many of the U.S. recertify the pit for reuse in a weapon. Exist- weapons. In addition, since the end of the Cold ing equipment has been retained as much as War, LANL now conducts the pit surveillance possible, but some equipment has been and program and limited pit fabrication using the will continue to be upgraded.

E-1 Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Site. The TA is a restricted area surrounded (WETF) by a security fence with several additional lay- ers of security at each of the Kivas. LACEF, WETF is located in Buildings 205 and which has operated since 1946, is the last gen- 205A in the southeast section of TA-16 out- eral-purpose nuclear experiments facility in the side the explosive area. Building 450 (Neutron US. It supports a variety of programs that Tube Target Loading, NTTL) is in the final range from national security programs, such stages of construction and upon startup will as the Emergency Response program, Strate- be included as part of the WETF facility. gic Defense Initiative research, and Strategic WETF is in a secured area patrolled by armed Arms Reduction Treaty verification research, guards. Building 205 was specifically designed to development of instrumentation for nuclear and built to process tritium safely and to meet waste assay and high-explosives detection. user needs and specifications. Planning for (See Processes and Technology section.) WETF began in 1981 to replace an aging tri- tium-processing facility located at TA-33. Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Construction began in 1982 and was completed (LANSCE) in 1984. WETF began operation in 1989. The LANSCE comprises a high-power, 800- ORR for Building 450 is expected to be com- MeV proton linear accelerator (linac); a Proton pleted in late FY 2000. Storage Ring (PSR); neutron production tar- Sigma Complex gets at the Lujan Center and the Weapons Neutron Research (WNR) facility; a proton The Sigma Building (Building 66) and three radiography facility; a high-power materials other main buildings [Building 35 (Press Build- irradiation area called the Los Alamos Spalla- ing), Building 141 (Beryllium Technology tion Radiation Effects Facility (LASREF); an Facility, formerly the Rolling Mill Building), and isotope production facility (IPF); and a vari- Building 159 (Thorium Storage Building)] make ety of research spectrometers. up the Sigma Complex, which is enclosed by a security fence and to which access is con- With the ability to produce protons and trolled by a guard station. The complex, which neutrons using the world’s most powerful pro- 2 2 encompasses over 200,000 ft (60,960 m ), ton linac, LANSCE is ideal for research in was constructed in increments during the 1950s radiography, condensed-matter science and and 1960s and has been used for a variety of engineering, accelerator science, and nuclear nuclear materials missions. Building 141 has science. LANSCE uses these research capa- been refurbished and is expected to be fully bilities to contribute to the Department of operational in late FY 2000. Today, the facility Energy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Program is primarily used for synthesizing materials and and to support a National User Program open for processing, characterizing, and fabricating to scientists from universities, industry, and metallic and ceramic items, including items federal laboratories. Within LANSCE, DP made of depleted uranium (DU). In the past, assumes management, operation, and mainte- Sigma Complex processed all isotopes of ura- nance responsibility for all facilities, except for nium; therefore, much of the equipment is the Manual Lujan, Jr. Neutron Scattering Cen- radioactively contaminated at very low levels. ter (MLNSC). The MLNSC facility is Nonradioactive hazardous materials used in- operated as a National User Facility. Man- cluded a number of chemicals and metals such agement, operations, and maintenance as beryllium. This facility includes specialized responsibilities at MLNSC are shared by DP laboratories, a rolling mill, and a 5,000-ton press and DOE’s Office of Science based upon their programmatic usage. TA-18 Balance of Plant: TA-18 is referred to as the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF). It is The Laboratory occupies 43 square miles also known as Pajarito Laboratory or Pajarito (111 km2) of land owned by the DOE, which

E-2 is divided into 47 separate, currently active bilities, which include samples, and components Technical Areas (TAs). TA-3 is the main tech- fabrication for R&D, pit surveillance, materi- nical area, where almost half of the personnel als science and technology development, of the Laboratory are located. TA-0, the town- materials stabilization, pit rebuild and fabrica- site, contains leased facilities located on Los tion, neutron source recovery, and other Alamos County land. Only one TA—TA-57, missions and activities. the Fenton Hill Site, which lies approximately LANL is currently planning and actively 28 miles (45 km) west of Los Alamos—is non- pursuing upgrades to several nuclear facilities, contiguous. The Laboratory currently consists some of which are decades old. The planned of approximately 2,043 structures. Of these, upgrades will allow the facilities to continue to 1,835 are buildings, which contain 7.3 million support R&D capabilities needed for ongoing square feet. The other structures consist of missions and to continue providing the neces- meteorological towers, water tanks, manholes, sary plutonium technologies and capabilities small storage sheds, electrical transformers, essential to the management and refurbish- etc. As explained above, part of the resources ment of the stockpile. These maintenance and of the Laboratory are the specialized facilities upgrades are independent of the pit manufac- that have been built and maintained at Los turing assignment, full implementation of which Alamos over the last 50 years. Most of these would call for some additional facility modifi- facilities have been designed and built to handle cations or enhancements. hazardous energy sources. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Build- Facilities & Infrastructure: ing (See “Unique Assets” Section) Nonnuclear Facilities This building is approximately 45 years old The directed fabrication of nonnuclear and is beyond the expected life cycle. Up- components associated with the LANL Stock- grades will be required for this facility to pile management program included the operate in a safe, secure, and compliant mode manufacturing of detonators, detonator simu- for the next decade. Subsequently plutonium lators, pit mockups, beryllium parts, operations will require a replacement facility. calorimeters, and tritium loading of neutron tube TA-55 Plutonium Facility (See “Unique As- targets. The missions for these components sets” Section) were transferred to LANL as part of the non- nuclear component of the Complex 21 TA-55 is now over 20 years old. Several Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration of the systems of the building need upgrading, Program initiated in 1991, and formally imple- and components approaching the end of their mented as part of the construction line item useful life need to be replaced. Planning is project 93-D-123, Complex-21 Nonnuclear continuing on a Capability Maintenance and Consolidation (NNR). The overall NNR Improvement Project (CMIP) to refurbish project was initiated to downsize the non- safety systems, to make the modifications re- nuclear manufacturing component of the quired to support limited-scale pit nuclear weapons complex while maintaining manufacturing, and to maintain the ability to neutron generator production capacities at the continue with present assignments, including START II level, as predicated by the Bush- the non-weapons activities such as the MOX Yeltsin agreement announced June 17, 1992. fuel efforts. The near-term part of the CMIP will focus on the safety infrastructure and the Nuclear Facilities replacement of safety items such as the air- Fundamental to current and future nuclear supply ductwork, the uninterruptable power programs at LANL is the maintenance and supply, the backup electrical generator, and the augmentation of the capabilities and facilities continuous air monitors. In the short term, the infrastructure required to support the complete LANL small-scale pit manufacturing efforts range of LANL’s existing nuclear responsi-

E-3 will also benefit from upgrades and improve- capability is now being designed and fabri- ments to the trolley system and to equipment cated, for installation at the existing WETF of facility provisions for operations such as facility, TA-16, with WR qualification to be radiography, foundry, metal preparation, ma- completed in May 2001. chining, assembly, waste management, In addition, processes and technologies at analytical chemistry, and material control and TA-55 provide chemical and metallurgical pro- accountability. cesses for recovering, purifying, and Design work is in progress on the Nuclear converting plutonium and other actinides into Materials Security and Safeguards Upgrades many compounds and forms. Additional ca- Project, which will provide an updated and fully pabilities include the means to safely and integrated security control system, associated securely ship, receive, handle, and store nuclear alarm systems, and other items for TA-55 as materials, as well as manage the wastes and well as other nuclear materials facilities at residues produced by TA-55 operations. A core LANL. capability is basic and applied research in plu- tonium and actinide chemistry. Core The TA-55 Fire Loop project involves the competencies are maintained in the Plutonium replacement of the Plutonium Facility’s exter- Facility for each type of plutonium processing nal water piping that supplies the fire activity. Extensive plutonium recovery pro- suppression systems inside the buildings. The cesses are maintained including the ability to project includes anchoring existing water tanks convert the recovered material to plutonium and installing seismic upgrades to aboveground metal. A separate portion of the facility is dedi- lines in the water pump houses. cated to fabricating ceramic-based reactor Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility fuels and to processing 238Pu used in radio- isotope heat sources. In addition, analytical Following upgrades scheduled for comple- capabilities, materials control and accountability tion in FY00, the facility will begin lending techniques, and a substantial R&D base are support to TA-55 special recovery line, which available to support these core capabilities. A processes tritium-contaminated objects. sophisticated nuclear materials measurement Processes and Technology: and accountability system is used at TA-55. The system includes nuclear materials ac- The vast majority of all the process equip- counting, nuclear materials management and ment and process technologies currently in use modeling, a measurement support operation, in the LANL nonnuclear production facilities operation of a nondestructive assay labora- (Beryllium Technology, High Power Detona- tory, nuclear materials packaging and transfer, tor, Neutron Tube Target Loading, Pit Support, and nuclear materials storage. All nuclear and Calorimetry facilities) were transferred materials that are in process or are stored to LANL under the NNR construction project onsite are monitored to ensure that material and Complex 21 Reconfiguration Program. As balances are properly maintained and inven- such, they are either new or have been up- toried on a real-time basis. The graded to the state-of-the-art standards at the nuclear-materials-packaging and transfer op- time they were installed and made operational. eration receives nuclear material into the Additional neutron tube target loading ca- facility and transfers shipments out of the fa- pacity and capability to support the START I cility. The nuclear materials storage operation production requirements have been included provides a safe storage location for the ac- in the Rapid Reactivation Project and will re- tinide materials at the Plutonium Facility. The flect state-of-the-art technologies and maintain Plutonium Facility has extensive capabilities complete compatibility with the process equip- for treating, packaging, storing, and transport- ment and technologies installed as a part of ing the radioactive waste produced by TA-55 the NNR project. This additional capacity and operations. Liquid wastes are converted to

E-4 solids or are piped to the RLWTF at TA-50. The facility will provide a dynamic envi- Some solid TRU wastes are immobilized in ronment for approximately 300 nuclear cement, others are consolidated in drums or weapons designers, computer scientists, code are packaged in waste boxes. Low-level developers, and university and industrial sci- wastes are also packaged at this facility. Solid entists and engineers to collaborate to extend wastes of all types are stored at TA-55 until the cutting edge of simulation and modeling they are shipped to Laboratory waste storage development in support of nuclear weapons or disposal locations, primarily at TA-54. stockpile stewardship requirements. These scientists and engineers will work together, Processes and technologies at TA-18 pro- with support personnel, in simulation laborato- vide capabilities in the areas of design, ries (approximately 200 in classified and 100 construction, research, development, and ap- in unclassified areas). The facility will be lo- plication of critical experiments. In addition to cated in Technical Area 3 (TA-3) at the Los criticality work, technologies at TA-18 include Alamos National Laboratory. teaching and training related to criticality safety and applications of radiation detection and in- A Design/Build contract has been signed strumentation. The TA-18 complex provides for the construction of the main facility. A processes and technologies to DOE’s nuclear separate contact to construct the utilities was facilities and nuclear materials programs with signed with the JCINM. criticality safety support for specific facility Project 99-D-132 Nuclear Materials Safe- process operations and for facility safety guards and Security Upgrades Project, analysis. Critical assembly experiments are LANL performed to access the safety and perfor- mance of individual production operations and The Nuclear Material Safeguard and Se- devices and to validate the results of calcula- curity Project (NMSSUP) replaces the existing tional methods. Operations, support, and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) supervisory personnel throughout DOE re- security system, addresses Special Nuclear ceive criticality safety training at the facility. Material (SNM) facility requirements, and addresses malevolent vehicle threats at key Workforce: nuclear facilities. Los Alamos is currently in the process of Project 99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation, hiring and training WR qualified production Various Locations staff to meet projected Pit production workload and is developing a trained workforce in the This project will increase the complex’s non-nuclear component area. capability to protect START I (START II with Hedge) requirements. Minor facility modifi- Construction: cation and additional equipment is required, and Project 00-D-105, Strategic Computing therefore, included under this line item, to in- Complex, LANL crease capacity to provide START I (START II with Hedge) requirements. Mission/Scope/Status: Los Alamos National Laboratory: Neutron The SCC will be a three-story structure Tube Target Loading with approximately 267,000 gross square feet which will house the world’s largest and most The LANL subproject consists of design- capable computer (initially 30 TeraOPS, or 30 ing, constructing, and installing a third target trillion floating point operations per second) in loader within the existing space of the a specially designed 43,500-square-foot com- Neutron Tube Target Loading Facility puter room. This room will be supported by (NTTL) electrical and mechanical rooms in excess of 60,000 square feet.

E-5 Project 95-D-102, CMR Upgrades Project 96-D-103, Atlas, LANL Project, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mission/Scope/Status: Los Alamos, New Mexico The Atlas facility will provide enhanced The primary purpose of this project is to Los Alamos National Laboratory pulsed power upgrade facility systems and infrastructure that experimental capability to support high energy have been in continuous operation for over 40 above ground experiments, an essential capa- years and are near the end of their useful life. bility requirement for DOE’s stockpile Such upgrading will ensure the continued stewardship program. The scope of work in- safety of the public and Laboratory employ- cludes: ees and increase the operational safety, reliability and security of essential activities. • Design, procurement, assembly, and instal- Increased safety, reliability, and security are lation of the Atlas 45-50 Megampere, 30-36 critical to the continued operation of the Megajoule capacitor bank with associated Laboratory’s Stockpile Management Pro- controls and power supplies in Buildings grams and other national defense programs. 125 and 294 at TA-35. Project 97-D-102, Dual-Axis Radio- • Modification of approximately 34,000 graphic Hydrotest (DARHT) Facility, square feet of Building 125 at TA-35 to LANL support Special Facilities Equipment (SFE) installation and completion of operational Mission/Scope/Status: upgrades to the facility. The DARHT Phase 1 machine has been • Utilization of existing 1,430 MVA genera- completed and is operational. Phase 2 is un- tor in Building 301 at TA-35 for electrical derway. power. Included in DARHT Phase 2 is the sec- • Installation of a power storage equipment ond flash x-ray electron beam accelerator, area of 2,600 square feet in Building 294 which will be necessary to complete the es- and upgrades to the control room area of sential dual-axis configuration of the facility. 1,600 square feet in Building 125 at TA- Their sequential acquisition allowed DOE to 35; also provides power distribution and take advantage of engineering and scientific diagnostic cabling to experiments in Build- advances that have occurred since construc- ing 125. tion of the first machine. In September 1997, the Department selected the Long-Pulse Lin- • Completion of site work and utilities to ear Induction Accelerator because it presented support the use of up to 3 Government- the greatest technological advancement for the Furnished diagnostic trailers and installation lowest cost and least risk for the second ma- of new dielectric oil storage tank adjacent chine. It will be capable of providing four to Building 125 at TA-35. high-quality beam pulses over four microsec- onds with each pulse comparable in quality to the single pulse machine in the first axis. The longer Phase 2 machine made it necessary to increase the size of the west accelerator hall by 1,300 square feet over the original plans.

E-6 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

MISSION J Weapons Research & Development J Stockpile Support J Reconfiguration / Rapid Reactivation J Other Defense Programs J Environmental Restoration/Waste Mgmt. J Non-weapons Work

Location Livermore, CA Contractor University of California Established 1952 Area 1 sq. mile

UNIQUE ASSETS – KEY TO DEFENSE Construction: PROGRAMS: Project 00-D-103, Terascale Simulation • High Explosives Applications Facility – the Facility, LLNL most modern facility for HE research in Mission/Scope/Status: the world. The project provides for the design, engi- • Flash X-ray Facility – this hydrodynamic neering and construction of the Terascale facility has been the most capable in the Simulation Facility (TSF - Building 453) which world. It is now shut down during con- will be capable of housing the 100 struction of the new Contained Firing TeraOps-class computers required to meet the Facility that will house the FXR machine Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative and a reinforced firing chamber for con- (ASCI). The building will encompass approxi- tainment of debris. mately 270,000 square feet. The building will • The Superblock, housing modern facilities contain a multi-story office tower with an ad- for special nuclear materials research and jacent computer center. The Terascale engineering testing. The Plutonium Facil- Simulation Facility (TSF) proposed here is ity supports a number of DP-funded designed from inception to enable the very research efforts. large-scale weapons simulations essential to ensuring the safety and reliability of America’s • The Secure and Open Computing Facili- nuclear stockpile. The timeline for construc- ties meet the needs of programmatic work tion is driven by requirements coming from and serve as a testbed for development of the ASCI within the Stockpile Stewardship high performance computer hardware and Program (SSP). The TSF will manage the software. computers, the networks and the data and vi- • The National Ignition Facility, currently sualization capabilities necessary to store and under construction, will offer unique ca- understand the data generated by the most pability for investigating fusion burn and powerful computing systems in the world. the high temperature and pressure envi- The TSF project will construct a building ronments characteristic of nuclear (Building 453) of approximately 270,000 weapons. square feet located adjacent to an existing (but

E-7 far less capable) computer facility, Building work. Windows are being specially fabricated 451, on the LLNL main site. The building will to meet the accidental detonation blast load contain a multi-story office tower with an ad- criteria. They are expected to be delivered in jacent computer center. The computer center December. will house computer machine rooms totaling Project 96-D-111; National Ignition Facil- approximately 47,500 square feet. The com- ity (NIF) puter machine rooms will be clear span (without impediments) and of an aspect ratio Mission/Scope/Status: designed to minimize the maximum distance between computing nodes and switch racks. The Project provides for the design, pro- curement, construction, assembly, installation, The ceiling height will be sufficiently high and acceptance testing of the National Igni- to assure proper forced air circulation. A raised tion Facility (NIF), an experimental inertial access floor will be provided in order to allow confinement fusion facility intended to achieve adequate room for air circulation, cabling, elec- controlled thermonuclear fusion in the labora- trical, plumbing, and fire/leak detection tory by imploding a small capsule containing a equipment. mixture of the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium. The NIF is being constructed at Project 96-D-105, Contained Firing Fa- the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory cility Addition, LLNL (LLNL), Livermore, California as determined Mission/Scope/Status: by the Record of Decision made on Decem- ber 19, 1996, as a part of the Stockpile This project is a 33,370 square foot facil- Stewardship and Management Programmatic ity consisting of four related structures with Environmental Impact Statement (SSM PEIS). the purpose of providing increasingly safe and environmentally compliant firing of explosive The mission of the National Inertial Con- charges up to a 60-kg limit of energetic high finement Fusion (ICF) program is to execute explosives. This project will be positioned on high energy density physics experiments for the existing firing table site adjacent to B801. the Stockpile Stewardship program, an impor- The four structures are a structurally reinforced tant part of which is the demonstration of Firing Chamber, a Support Facility, a Diagnos- controlled thermonuclear fusion in the labora- tic Equipment Facility, and an Office Module. tory. Technical capabilities provided by the ICF program also contribute to other DOE The Firing Chamber is designed to con- missions including nuclear weapons effects tain the effects of cased high explosive testing and the development of inertial fusion materials used in various laboratory experi- power. As a key element of the Stockpile ments. The high explosive quantities vary in Stewardship Program, the NIF is designed to operational weight up to approximately 60 kg, achieve propagating fusion burn and modest or an equivalent TNT design weight of ap- (1-10) energy gain within 2-3 years of full op- proximately 206.3 pounds. The chamber must eration and to conduct high energy density be protected from shrapnel from explosive experiments, both through fusion ignitions and casings. All major structural elements are to through direct application of the high laser remain elastic to permit repetitive chamber power. The NIF is one of the most vital facili- usage with no structural damage. ties in the stockpile stewardship program. The The two-inch floor plate and four-inch anvil NIF will provide the capability to conduct labo- plate were fitted into place. Approximately half ratory experiments to address the high energy of the wall plate has been installed to date. density and fusion aspects that are important Work on the office module is progressing well. to both primaries and secondaries in stockpile The walls and roof have been completed as weapons. well as the mechanical and electrical rough-in

E-8 Project 90-D-102-01, Site 300 Facilities A 380-foot section of the Main Site Road Revitalization, LLNL was converted to a four-lane road, with shoul- ders, to create a new entrance to Site 300. In Mission/Scope/Status: addition, the intersection of the Main Site Road This project was initiated to provide new and the road to the west of firing area was equipment and facilities and to upgrade exist- reconstructed to add additional lanes. ing roads and utilities around the LLNL Site The Site water distribution was upgraded 300. New facilities included the Central Con- by adding two new 8-inch lines and a new trol Post, the Bunker Support Facility, and the 96,000-gallon storage tank. High Optic Facility. New equipment included Special Facilities and Standard diagnostic Project is progressing as scheduled and is equipment. expected to be completed in December 1999.

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E-10 Sandia National Laboratories

MISSION J Weapons Research & Development J Stockpile Support /Weapons Production J Other Defense Programs J Environmental Restoration/Waste Mgmt. J Nonweapons Work

Location Albuquerque, NM Livermore, CA Contractor Lockheed-Martin Corporation Established 1948 1956 Area 17.61K Acres 410 Acres

UNIQUE ASSETS – KEY TO DEFENSE Balance of Plant: PROGRAMS: Balance of plant includes additional site In support of nuclear weapon R&D: support activities, not covered previously in Building 870, necessary for SNL to perform • Microelectronics Development Labora- its mission functions. These include such tory. things as explosive-assembly operations, final • Compound Semiconductor Research acceptance testing, packaging for shipment, Laboratory. DOE-bonded storage, etc. • Above-ground test facilities (ACRR, SPR, Facilities & Infrastructure: Gamma Radiation Facility, Z-facility, Sat- Existing production facilities at the Sandia urn, Hermes). National Laboratories (SNL) are those prima- • Processing & Environmental Technology rily involved with neutron generator production. Laboratory. These missions were transferred from the Pinellas Plant, Largo, Florida as a part the • Explosive Component Facility. nonnuclear component of the Complex 21 • ASCI “Red” Terascale Computer. Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program initiated in 1991, and formally imple- • Integrated Test Complex. mented as part of the construction line item • Tonopah Test Range. project 93-D-123, Complex-21 Nonnuclear Consolidation (NNR). The overall NNR • Kauai Test Range. project was initiated to downsize the non- nuclear manufacturing component of the SNL also has the mission to support the nuclear weapons complex while maintaining future development and WR manufacturing neutron generator production capacities at the of neutron tubes, neutron generators and START II level, as predicated by the Bush- switch tubes. Yeltsin agreement announced June 17, 1992. - Building 870 is primarily used for most The existing SNL facilities identified to of the processing and assembly operations support the neutron generator production mis- associated with SNL’s production mission sion were appropriately sized and upgraded to of neutron generators. meet all current commercial construction, - Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory DOE ES&H, and security codes, orders, and (located at Pantex) regulations. The SNL NNR project was initi-

E-11 ated in July 1993and construction was com- Workforce: pleted in January 1997. The facilities are now SNL is currently in the process of hiring in production operations. and training WR process qualified production Additional neutron generator production staff to meet the projected neutron generator capability and capacity is currently being de- production workload. However, SNL is ex- signed and constructed within the existing SNL pressing concern that they are not being able production facility complex to support a to hire qualified staff because of operating START II stockpile level while protecting the budget constraints. There is a hiring freeze capability to support a START I level as di- associated with Stockpile Maintenance, Dis- rected by P&PD 97-0. This additional mantlement/Disposal, and Stockpile Support capability and capacity requirement is being for FY00 due to inadequate resources, with a realized through construction line item project prediction that the freeze will continue into the 99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation Project. Started foreseeable future. In addition, there are in- in March 1999, this project is scheduled to be sufficient funds to adequately cross-train the completed in FY 2001. Although not antici- existing technical staff to help compensate for pated in the foreseeable future (through FY the hiring freeze. It is important that adequate 2005), there may be some modifications to and timely funds be appropriated to SNL to current neutron generator designs. However, support and maintain their aggressive hiring it is not anticipated that any major modifica- and training schedule, in support of production tions to existing manufacturing processes or delivery schedules, stockpile maintenance, the facilities will be required. dismantlement/disposal, and stockpile support programs. Processes and Technology: Construction: Processes and technologies were trans- ferred from the Pinellas Plant, beginning in Project 01-D-102, Microsystems and En- 1993. The processes and technologies were gineering Science Applications (MESA) upgraded or replaced as required, as a part of Facility, SNLA the NNR construction project. Detailed Mission/Scope/Status: “Make/Buy” analyses and decisions were made regarding process equipment and pro- The Microsystems and Engineering Sci- cess technology issues associated with the ence Applications (MESA) Facility is proposed existing process equipment residing at the to be a new, state-of-the-art capability at Pinellas Plant prior to initiating transfer to SNL Sandia National Laboratories to capitalize on in the 1994-1995 time frame. As a result, the the advances in microsystems to develop vast majority of all the process equipment and needed weapon technologies by FY 2003. It process technologies currently in use in the will provide essential facilities and capabilities SNL neutron generator production facilities are to integrate: 1) advanced component and sub- new or have been upgraded to the state-of- systems design and stewardship; 2) the-art standards at the time they were computational simulation and engineering; and installed. 3) next generation microsystems development and production to enable a safe, secure, reli- Additional neutron generator process able, and affordable nuclear stockpile, now and equipment being purchased to support the in the future. START I production requirements have been included in the Rapid Reactivation Project and Microsystems devices are microelec- will reflect state-of-the-art technologies and tronic-based chips that embody electronics, maintain complete compatibility with the pro- micromachines, optoelectronics, and sensors. cess equipment and technologies installed as As a result, these devices can sense, think, a part of the NNR project. act, and communicate. As a result of their

E-12 microscopic feature size, they are extremely development to help create design and manu- rugged, and because they are based on mi- facturing productivity environments for the croelectronics-related technology, they are future nuclear weapons complex. The major extremely reliable and inexpensive to fabri- objective of DISL is to bring together these cate. Microsystems devices are expected to technologies to develop a distributed informa- revolutionize many technology applications tion systems architecture that will link the during the next two decades, including improv- nuclear weapons complex of the future. ing the surety of the Nation’s nuclear weapon • Under consideration as an FY 2001 stockpile. new start. The MESA project includes: 00-D-107, Joint Computational Engineer- • Construction of a new heavy-lab (clean ing Laboratory, SNLA room) and associated tooling to provide a Mission/Scope/Status: next-generation replacement of Sandia’s Compound Semiconductor Research The Joint Computational Engineering Laboratory (CSRL). Laboratory (JCEL) will be a new, state-of- the-art facility at Sandia National Laboratories • Re-tooling of the existing Microelectron- for research, development, and application of ics Development Laboratory (MDL). leading-edge, high-end computational and com- • Construction of light laboratories and of- munications technologies. JCEL will provide fices/workspaces for weapons designers, office space and laboratories for 175 people computational and engineering scientists, in a building with a total of approximately 55,200 and microsystems technologists to achieve gross square feet. JCEL will be the center of the effective and timely research, design, Sandia’s computational modeling, analysis, and development, integration, and computa- design community, and will be constructed in tional qualification of microsystem-based close proximity to Sandia’s existing computer devices, components, and subsystems. and communications building, presently occu- pied by part of this community. • Under consideration as an FY 2001 new start. Plan, design, and construct a new, three- story building to accommodate a total of about 01-D-101, Distributed Information Sys- 175 people, which will provide classified and tems Laboratory (DISL), SNLL unclassified space in close proximity. The Mission/Scope/Status: project will provide computer equipment to: display three-dimensional simulations; support The Distributed Information Systems engineers and scientists from other DOE labs, Laboratory (DISL) is a proposed new re- universities, and the private sector; and pro- search facility at Sandia National Laboratories vide video conferencing capability. Computer to develop and implement distributed informa- equipment includes: Interactive Multimedia tion systems for Defense Programs (DP). It equipment; Virtual Reality/Advanced Visual- consolidates at one accessible location all ac- ization equipment; high-end 3D graphic tivities focused on incorporating those systems workstations and printers; and design and to support DP’s Stockpile Stewardship Pro- analysis workstations. In addition, the project gram (SSP). Research at DISL will will move existing furniture and install some concentrate on secure networking, high per- new furniture. Site landscaping, parking, pe- formance distributed and distance computing, destrian access improvements, signage, and and visualization and collaboration technolo- fencing improvements will be provided. gies that do not exist today, yet need

E-13 Project 96-D-104, Process and Environ- 99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation, Various mental Technology Laboratory, SNLA Locations Mission/Scope/Status: This project will increase the complex’s capability to protect START I (START II with The Processing and Environmental Tech- Hedge) requirements. Minor facility modifi- nology Laboratory (PETL) is proposed to be cation and additional equipment is required, and a three story office and light lab building with therefore, included under this line item, to in- a partial basement containing approximately crease capacity to provide START I (START 151,435 gross square feet (79,200 nsf). It will II with Hedge) requirements. focus R&D and production support activities to address ES&H issues in the nuclear weap- Sandia National Laboratories: Neutron ons complex and at Sandia. The facility will Generators Facilities (NGF) collocate activities dealing with materials and The SNL subproject consists of rearrang- process research, materials support for the ing existing space within Building 870, stockpile, analytical support for production of adding additional space to adjacent build- non-nuclear components, and maintenance and ings, and the procurement of additional dismantlement of weapons. production equipment The PETL will provide modern laboratory Project 90-D-102-03, Technology Support facilities and collocate functions that are cur- Center, SNLA rently spread throughout Sandia TA I in temporary or substandard space. Mission/Scope/Status: The building is approximately 65% com- TSC consists of two buildings: 1) Office/ plete. All precast wall panels and most of the Light Lab/Conference Area (O/LL); two-story, windows have been installed. 99,000 gross square feet (44,000 net square feet) concrete framed and concrete masonry The penthouse is completely enclosed. structure with all mechanical and electrical Design activities for the occupancy of the systems and all site improvements. 2) Gamma building have started, including equipment Irradiation Facility (GIF), a single-story, 12,500 move lists and furniture selection and layout. gross square feet (10,000 net square feet) steel 01-D-126, Weapons Evaluation Test frame stucco high bay lab with low-bay ancil- Laboratory (WETL), Sandia National lary spaces. The high bay will house three Laboratories, Pantex test cells and an 18-foot-deep pool. The low bay includes offices, assembly labs and me- This facility will provide a laboratory en- chanical and electrical rooms. vironment capable of supporting the Enhanced Surveillance Program (ESP) through flexibil- When completed, GIF will: 1) Reduce the ity of floor space configuration, appropriate Area V resident population, thereby reducing adjacencies for an optimal work environment, the risk of potential radiation exposure to per- and the mechanical and data infrastructure to sonnel either during normal operations or be dependable and efficient in supporting ad- accidentally; 2) provide a permanent facility vanced test technologies. to replace substandard facilities; 3) separate the GIF from the ACRR; 4) modernize and enlarge the GIF; and 5) relocate the low in- tensity cobalt array (LICA) from AREA I to the GIF.

E-14 Nevada Test Site

MISSION J Test Resumption Readiness J Subcritical Experiments J Facilities Diagnostic Support J DSW Certification Experimental Data

Location Las Vegas, NV Contractor Bechtel NV Established 1950 Area 1,350 sq. miles

UNIQUE ASSETS – KEY TO DEFENSE • A-1 High Bay, A-1 Expansion Bay and A- PROGRAMS: 17 Twin Towers at North Las Vegas Complex. • Nuclear Explosion Test Beds. Facilities & Infrastructure: - Emplacement boreholes (vertical) More than 1,100 support buildings and - Tunnels (horizontal) laboratories are spread across the Nevada Test • Test resumption equipment and personnel. Site. The Nevada Test Site is a unique ex- panse of federally controlled land and facilities • U1a – subcritical experiment test bed (ex- in a remote region of southern Nevada. The plosive experiments with Special Nuclear 1,350 square miles that make up the Nevada Materials). Test Site are surrounded by the Nellis Air Force • Physical size and remoteness from popu- Range and unpopulated land controlled by the lated areas. Arial extent of the NTS, which U.S. Bureau of Land Management. The ge- reduces potential impacts on neighbors– ology, hydrology, meteorology and radiological equivalent to the state of Rhode Island–and environments are well characterized. The infrastructure to support experiments. Environmental Impact Statement for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations in • Infrastructure to support nuclear-weapon the State of Nevada and the associated experiments. Record of Decision allow for the execution of a variety of complex and unique projects • DAF – modern assembly/disassembly fa- and experiments while maintaining protection cility. of the public and the environment. • BEEF – Big Explosive Experiment Facil- The U1a Facility is an underground ex- ity ( high explosive testing ) to 70,000 perimental complex at the U.S. Department pounds high-explosive equivalent. of Energy’s Nevada Test Site. The U1a com- • JASPER – Two stage gas gun for actinide plex supports routine test site activities in which series experiments (Special Nuclear Ma- high explosives are detonated to test the readi- terial) [under construction]. ness of equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel. • Experiment diagnostics for remote field use. E-15 Test data will help maintain the reliability ground nuclear weapons tests, the DAF has of the nuclear weapons stockpile by allowing the potential for other uses, including disas- scientists to gain more knowledge of the dy- sembly of nuclear weapons retired from the namic properties of aging nuclear materials. U.S. stockpile. Of particular interest is data on the behavior The DAF has five assembly cells, four of plutonium that can be used in computer high bays, three assembly bays, five staging calculations of nuclear weapon performance bays, a component testing laboratory, two ship- and safety in the absence of actual under- ping and receiving buildings, two ground nuclear testing. decontamination facilities, three small vaults, The complex is located in Area 1 of the an administration building, alarm stations, an Nevada Test Site, approximately 90 miles entry guard station, and a mechanical and elec- northwest of Las Vegas. The complex, con- trical support building. sisting of horizontal tunnels about one-half mile The main facility is covered with a mini- in length mined at the base of a vertical shaft mum of five feet of earth. The major operating approximately 960 feet beneath the surface, facilities, assembly cells and bays, the radiog- was mined in the late 1960s for an underground raphy bays, and the shipping and receiving nuclear test, which was later canceled. In 1988, building have bridge cranes. The five assem- the shaft was reopened, and a 1,460-foot hori- bly cells have rotating polar bridge cranes. The zontal tunnel was mined south at the 962-foot DAF’s activities will comply with the National level of the shaft. In 1990, the Ledoux nuclear Environmental Policy Act, and all applicable test was conducted in the tunnel. federal, state, and local regulations. Each as- The vertical shaft is equipped with a me- sembly cell is designed and tested to undergo chanical hoist for personnel and equipment an explosion from a maximum high explosive access while another vertical shaft about 1,000 device without injury to personnel outside of feet away provides cross ventilation, instru- the cell. Gravel covers are designed to mini- mentation, utility access, and emergency mize release of nuclear material in the unlikely egress. On the surface, there are several tem- event of an accidental explosion. porary buildings and instrumentation trailers. The Big Explosives Experimental Facility The most distinguishable landmark at the com- (BEEF) is a hydrodynamic testing facility, lo- plex is the white air building, which was used cated at the Department of Energy’s Nevada for experiment assembly during Ledoux. Test Site in Area 4, about 95 miles northwest The 100,000-square-foot nuclear explosive of Las Vegas, Nevada. Device Assembly Facility (DAF) is located in The need for the BEEF site originated Area 6 of the Department of Energy’s Ne- when, due to community encroachment near vada Test Site. Built at a cost of approximately the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory $100 million, the DAF is expected to become (LLNL) facility in Livermore, California, DOE a centerpiece for innovative alternative uses was no longer allowed to perform large high of the test site. explosive experiments at the facilities Site 300, Construction began on the DAF in the Shaped Charge Scaling Project. Therefore mid-1980s when nuclear weapons testing was looking at the Nevada Test Site as a location still in progress. DAF’s original purpose was to continue to perform these large high explo- to consolidate all nuclear explosive assembly sive experiments, two earth-covered, two-foot functions, to provide safe structures for high thick steel reinforced concrete bunkers, built explosive and nuclear explosive assembly op- to monitor atmospheric tests at Yucca Flat in erations, and to provide a state-of-the-art the 1950s, were located and found to be ide- safeguards and security environment. Now ally configured. that America is no longer conducting under-

E-16 The facility consists of a control bunker, a The Nevada Test Site is located within camera bunker, a gravel firing table, and as- 110 miles of large 500 kV transmission lines sociated control and diagnostic systems. The at Eldorado Valley, part of the southern Ne- facility has conducted safely conventional vada hub for several key power transmission high-explosives experiments using a test bed corridors connecting major load centers and that provides sophisticated diagnostics such as generation systems in Utah, California, Ne- high-speed optics and x-ray radiography on vada, and Arizona. the firing table, while operating personnel are Hydrology and Water present in the bunker. Hydrology In order to conduct large conventional high-explosive experiments on the site firing Groundwater movement is one of the most table while operating personnel are present in thoroughly studied aspects of the vast, arid the control bunker, it first had to be certified desert of the Nevada Test Site. Hydrologists, as safe. To achieve this, scientists conducted geologists, and other scientific experts have Popover — a series of high explosive (up to analyzed groundwater at the test site since the 7,800 pounds) tests which were detonated 27- 1970s, and studies continue. The purpose of feet from the bunker’s buried outer wall. their study is to determine groundwater flow rates and directions, the nature and location The test data was used to develop an ef- of aquifers, and other information. fects profile that defined the relationship of the high-explosive charge size and detonation Water point to blast effects, such as overpressure, bunker wall strain, dynamic response (accel- The Nevada Test Site is served by a wa- eration), and noise amplitude. Together these ter system comprising 11 operating wells for results demonstrated that the bunker would potable water and one for nonpotable water provide a safe working environment. (with pumps, boosters, sumps, reservoirs, and chlorinator water softeners), 27 storage tanks, The Big Explosives Experimental Facility 13 usable construction-water sumps, and six will play a large role in accumulating data sup- water transmission systems (100 miles of sup- porting stockpile stewardship, along with a ply and distribution lines). The system also variety of new experimental programs, that serves a variety of domestic, construction, and will expand this nation’s non-nuclear experi- fire-protection water uses. The wells produce ment capabilities. This facility complements more than 6,000 gallons of water per minute, the U1a complex and other DOE nearly 9 million gallons per day. Inactive wells, hydrodiagnostic facilities. if brought on line, could supply an additional 2,200 acre-feet per year. From roads to power transmission systems, the Nevada Test Site has a vast infrastructure Seismic Monitoring to support both large and small projects. For more than 30 years, the Nevada Test Electric Site team has operated an extensive seismic network of remote monitoring stations in Utah, The Nevada Test Site boasts around 265 California, and Nevada. The network records miles of electrical transmission and both earthquakes and nuclear explosions to pro- subtransmission lines. Test site power loads vide information for treaty verification and currently are served from two independent 138 nonproliferation studies. kV transmission lines. In addition, 20 mega- watts of on-site diesel generation is available The seismic program includes a permanent for emergency backup power. The test site 13-station geophone network and other portable transmission system capacity is about 45 data acquisition units. To ensure safety, test site megawatts. technicians use this system to monitor ground motion activity immediately after experiments are

E-17 conducted. The geophone network produces in- reconstructed. Repairs will consist of total re- formation that helps scientist plan re-entry construction of the roadbed and the application activities after an underground test involving ex- of the asphalt pavement. The renovated road plosives, and portable equipment allows will have two-inch-thick overlay; the recon- researchers to provide other locations with site- structed road will have three-inch-thick paving. specific seismic and ground motion information. Aggregate shoulders will parallel each side. Researchers also operate portable strong-mo- All required traffic signs, striping, and mark- tion seismic stations to measure the effects of ers will be included in this project. No buildings ground motion on buildings. or utilities are included in this project. Construction: Project 96-D-102-03, 138kV Moderniza- tion Substation, NTS Project 99-D-108, Renovate Existing Roadways, NTS Mission/Scope/Status: Mission/Scope/Status: This project will modernize one major sub- station (Frenchman Flat Substation), one This project will provide for the renova- switching center (Mercury Switching Center), tion of 37.0 miles of Mercury Highway from and one tap station (Valley Tap) on the 138 the southern boundary of the Nevada Test Site kilovolt (kV) transmission system loop at the (NTS) to the intersection of Rainier Mesa Nevada Test Site (NTS). Road to Area 3. These repairs will consist of removing existing debris from pavement It will also provide for the installation of a cracks, filling cracks with asphalt sealant, in- SCADA fiber-optics communication loop. stalling a stress absorbing membrane, and The Mercury Switching Center serves as applying a new asphaltic-concrete overlay. In a termination point for the incoming power line addition, the 2.3 miles of the Rainier Mesa Road from Nevada Power Company (NPC). from the intersection of Mercury Highway to the intersection of road 4-04 in Area 4 will be

E-18 Kansas City Plant MISSION J Production, Procurement, & Dismantlement of NonNuclear Components J Limited Life Components J Retrofits/Modifications J Evaluation/Surveillance J TSD Support J Stockpile Support Center J Work for Others

Location Kansas City, Missouri Contractor AlliedSignal Corporation Established 1949 Area 122.1 Acres

UNIQUE ASSETS — KEY TO DEFENSE Study described the overall condition of the PROGRAMS: facility as “good.” A backlog of almost $100M in deferred maintenance exists. Additionally, The Kansas City Plant (KCP) is situated Capital, GPP and Expense Funds are used to on approximately 122 acres of the 300-acre address aging and deteriorating facilities. Typi- Bannister Federal Complex located within the cal projects are roofing replacements, boiler city limits, 12 miles south of downtown Kan- replacements, structural upgrades, air-handlers sas City, Missouri. The plant shares the site replacement, etc. Total facility related expen- with seven other Federal agencies: Federal ditures have not kept pace with requirements. Aviation Administration, Defense Finance and A Ten-Year Site Plan will be developed to es- Accounting Service, National Archives and tablish the future facility investment strategy Records Administration, General Services for the KCP. Administration (GSA), Internal Revenue Ser- vice, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Manufacturing Processes and Technolo- Administration, and the National Logistics gies: Support Center. To assess the short-term (through FY05) The majority of the offices and manufac- status of manufacturing capability and capac- turing areas are under one roof, with additional ity, sixteen production areas/departments were outbuildings for support operations such as compared to the P&PD/SLEP workload. treatment of industrial wastewater, storage of Some capacity issues exist with six of the six- process chemicals, storage of containerized teen production areas/departments. The six waste, and certain other specialized operations. are Detonator Cable Assembly, Fireset As- sembly, Final Assembly (two areas), Case Manufacturing Facilities and Infrastruc- Assembly, and ACORN Technology. These ture: issues can be resolved by either expanding The KCP is housed in a 57 year-old build- physical capacity at minimal cost, or by add- ing. Currently the plant occupies approximately ing additional shifts. 3 million square feet at this site. The SMRI For the long-term, the following Major project will reduce that to approximately 2.4 Technical Efforts (MTE) will be pursued in million square feet. The FY 1998 Maintenance the Nonnuclear Readiness campaign to close

E-19 critical gaps between existing capabilities and current plant profile, substantially reducing the level of performance required in the fu- costs to operate the KCP. The restructuring ture (see table below). initiative consists of changing the existing plant and operational approach in four major aspects: The resources and timelines associated 1) physically reducing the size of the facility, with these MTEs are described in the Non- 2) changing the approach to manufacturing nuclear Production Readiness Program Plan. from product-based to process-based, 3) re- Manufacturing Workforce: ducing the support infrastructure appropriate for the right-sized operation, and 4) further Staffing levels at KCP will need to be ad- justed to match the workload projected for both Project 99-D-125, Replace Boilers and the short and long terms. In general, insuffi- Controls, Kansas City Plant Kansas City, cient funds have been made available to Missouri support all of the activities identified by the This project will renovate and upgrade the M&O as being necessary to accomplish all existing steam generating facility located at direct and indirect objectives. Like other DP the West Boilerhouse. This project removes facilities, the KCP is also concerned about an four 100,000 PPH (Pound per Hour) boilers, aging workforce talent pipeline, and skills mix. boiler control panels and boiler annunciator Construction: panels, water softeners, polisher, pumps, forced draft fans, deaerator, piping, controls, and other Project 99-D-127, Stockpile Management existing ancillary boiler support equipment, and Restructuring Initiative Kansas City replaces them with new equipment including Plant, Kansas City, Missouri new microprocessor-based control panels and The Stockpile Management Restructur- a boiler control room containing annunciator ing Initiative will allow the KCP’s infrastructure panels and system status indicators, in the same to be altered and greatly reduced from the general location.

Goal Major Technical Effort Reduce production responses for required Electronic Component Miniaturization technologies to the shortest time Gas Transfer Systems Productivity possible (with a goal of 19 months) after Improvements final design for all SLEP plans Engineered Materials Supply Chain Assurance Create readiness for unanticipated Science Based Manufacturing emergency hardware replacement Implementation Commercial Components Qualification Lean Manufacturing Streamlining Eliminate existing threats to current Replace Obsolete Testers production capability Modernize Flexible Manufacturing System Upgrade Materials, Analysis, and Testing Sciences Deploy technologies from the ADAPT Weaponize Lasers and Electro-optics Campaign into production readiness Develop and Characterize Microsystems Technologies (LiGA)

E-20 Project 99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation, Various Locations This project will increase the complex’s capability to protect START I (START II with Hedge) requirements. Minor facility modifi- cation and additional equipment is required, and therefore, included under this line item, to in- crease capacity to provide START I (START II with Hedge) requirements. Kansas City Plant: Reservoir Assemblies and Testing The Kansas City Plant subproject consists of rearranging existing space in, and add- ing additional space to, the current Reservoir Assembly Facility, and the pro- curement of additional production/process equipment. Project 97-D-123 Structural Upgrades, Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri This project is required to correct struc- tural overstress caused by gravity loads and will reinforce masonry walls to resist seismic loading within the DOE controlled portion of the Bannister Federal Complex to ensure life safety.

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E-22 Pantex Plant

MISSIONMISSION J J StockpileDismantlement Evaluation and Testing JJ Assembly/DisassemblyInterim Weapon Storage of JTA Units JJ WeaponsPIT Storage Repair/Modification JJ PITWeapons Storage Repair/Modification JJ InterimAssembly/Disassembly Weapon Storage of JTA Units JJ DismantlementStockpile Evaluation and Testing

Location Amarillo, Texas Contractor Mason & Hanger Established 1951 Area 10.2K Acres

UNIQUE ASSETS - KEY TO DEFENSE assembly, pit storage, etc.). Primary struc- PROGRAMS: tures are the weapon assembly/ disassembly cells and bays. The Pantex Plant is located in the Texas Panhandle, approximately 17 miles northeast Balance of Plant: of Amarillo, Texas. The Pantex Plant mission Balance of Plant includes additional site functions include the fabrication of chemical support activities, not covered previously in the explosives; development work in support of zones, necessary for Pantex to perform its the design laboratories; pit storage; and nuclear mission functions. These include such things weapons assembly, disassembly, testing, qual- as: warehousing, water treatment, sewage ity assurance, repair, retirement, and disposal. treatment, TSD support facilities, etc. The bulk of the Pantex operations are located in Zone 4, Zone 11, Zone 12 Nonnuclear and Facilities & Infrastructure: Zone 12 Nuclear. The Pantex Plant was originally con- • Zone 4 is used primarily for the storage structed by the U.S. Army as a conventional of pits and nuclear weapons, primary bomb plant during the early days of World War structures are weapons staging igloos and II and was deactivated and vacated after the magazines. war. In 1949 Texas Technological College purchased the full 16,000-acre site for $1 for • Zone 11 is used primarily for Chemical use in experimental agriculture. However, in explosive operations. It includes activities 1951 the AEC asked the Army to “recapture” such as: HE testing, Analytical and chemi- the main plant and 10,000 surrounding acres cal laboratories, HE staging, test fire, HE for use as a nuclear weapons production fa- synthesis, and HE formulation. cility. Some of the existing facilities are greater • Zone 12 Nonnuclear primarily houses than 40 years old. The average age of the the production and site support staffs and Pantex facilities is 28 years. The older facili- activities in support of the stockpile mis- ties were not built for today’s missions, sions. constructed to today’s standards, nor designed to meet today’s environmental, safety, and • Zone 12 Nuclear primarily houses the health requirements. As these facilities con- nuclear and nuclear explosive activities tinue to age, the maintenance and operating that comprise weapon HE, assembly/dis-

E-23 costs continue to rise and it becomes increas- maintenance backlog, repair facilities and in- ingly difficult (and subsequently expensive) to frastructure that place continued production meet the current ES&H standards. During operations at risk, and establish needed pro- the peak years of weapons production, a sig- duction capabilities/capacities not currently nificant capital investment was made each available. For example, Pantex needs to es- year to upgrade existing facilities and infra- tablish the capability to do pit requalification structure. However, since the end of the cold activities and has proposed that a portion of war in 1989, this capital investment has de- Building 12-86 be modified to allow for the creased significantly causing a growth in the characterization, refurbishment, and reaccep- maintenance backlog, faster-than-expected tance of pits in support of the stockpile rebuild. deterioration in many areas, and quickly in- In the long-term, investments are needed to creasing operating costs. A backlog of greater migrate production operations from aging fa- that $100 million in deferred tasks exist. This cilities into new facilities having appreciable does not include recapitalization and modern- longevity and to augment capacity for long ization capital costs. Capital equipment and term workload. For example, it may be nec- GPP budgets for FY 2000 are zero. A factor essary in the long term to provide for more that also effects the suitability of existing bays and cells to support the production Pantex facilities for nuclear weapons work is workload. the changes that have taken place with re- Processes & Technology: gard to nuclear explosive operations. The tightening of requirements has impacted the Pantex has met and continues to meet di- operating efficiency and suitability of facili- rective schedule work, and is meeting ties. For example, the 12-64 bay complex, ever-increasing needs for more detailed ex- which at one time was utilized for nuclear ex- amination and documentation. However, a plosive operations, is no longer appropriate for number of factors threaten the ability of Pantex such activities without an upgrade to make it to perform its future missions in a safe, timely, suitable for such operations. The change in and cost-effective manner. As with Pantex and addition of new process and operational facilities and infrastructure, many of the manu- requirements have added more than 40% to facturing processes and support equipment are the operating costs in the past 8 years. Pantex aging and in need of repair or replacement. has developed a ten-year site plan to support stockpile requirements identified in the P&PD. In examining the health of Pantex’s manu- However, with a declining budget and increas- facturing processes, there are a number of key ing mission requirements the decline of issues driving the need for an investment in infrastructure has been predictable. these processes. First, there are needs asso- ciated with fulfilling the requirements of the As Pantex prepares to perform its Stock- st Stockpile Life Extension Program. As noted, pile Stewardship mission into the 21 century, Pantex has processes that currently do not it is important to 1) enhance the affordability exist and are needed to support the SLEP of production operations; 2) ensure that plant schedules. Actions are needed to establish operations and facilities continue to meet cur- these processes. An example of this is the rent ES&H standards; 3) optimize the previously mentioned need for a process to manufacturing complex and configuration con- requalify pits in the rebuild process. Secondly, sistent with current NWC requirements; 4) many of the processes in operation today are ensure adequate longevity (e.g. 50 years) for using systems and equipment that are aging. primary facilities and infrastructure; and 5) It is becoming increasingly difficult to operate provide for safe and secure interim storage of these aging processes in ways that are cost pits. This can be accomplished by making both effective, that meet ES&H standards, and that near-term and long-term investments in Pantex meet the process control and quality require- facilities and infrastructure. In the near-term, ments of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. investments are needed that would reduce the For example, one of the milestones of the High

E-24 Explosive Manufacturing and Weapon Assem- standards for quality, safety, and health. Sci- bly/Disassembly Campaign Plan is to ence basis models must be established for the implement improvements to the explosive com- HE manufacturing and weapon assembly/dis- ponent fabrication process to reduce costs and assembly operations and used to develop increase component quality. Thirdly, in the process simulations that drive these operations absence of funding to upgrade aging processes, and allow flexibility to modify them as neces- Pantex has not been able to take advantage sary. For example, one of the milestones of of new technologies which would improve the High Explosive Manufacturing and Weapon quality and efficiency, reduce ES&H risks, Assembly/Disassembly Campaign Plan is to improve mission flexibility and response time, develop 3-D rapid prototype capability for new and align production processes with the de- tooling. Appropriate process data must be mands of a science-based Stockpile collected and transmitted in real time to per- Stewardship Program. For example, one of mit weapon performance and lifetime the milestones of the High Explosive Manu- assessment by the design labs through predic- facturing and Weapon Assembly/Disassembly tive models and simulations in the absence of Campaign Plan is to reestablish formulation nuclear testing. Control of the HE manufac- capability and increase capacity for various turing and weapon assembly/disassembly explosives by moving from Building 12-19 to process stability must be improved, monitored, Building 11-50. and documented to provide assurance that remanufactured weapons remain within the In preparing to support the Stockpile performance envelope previously validated Stewardship Program, Pantex also needs to through nuclear testing. make long-term investments in production pro- cesses and technology. Such investments Workforce: would allow migration into a modern, long last- Like other sites in the complex, the Pantex ing manufacturing complex that is right-sized Plant has an aging workforce. Loss of criti- for current and projected requirements. There, cal skills presents the most immediate risk to production operations would be performed at continued viability of the HE manufacturing lower cost, with tighter process control and and weapons assembly/disassembly in support enhanced quality, and with real time transmis- of stockpile stewardship objectives. Revital- sion of assembly/disassembly data to the design ization of the workforce requires the addition labs (needed for modeling and simulation). For of new technical and craft workers with the example, one of the milestones of the High requisite critical skills. This is significantly Explosive Manufacturing and Weapon Assem- hampered by the inability to fund both experi- bly/Disassembly Campaign Plan is to enced and new workers simultaneously for a implement high-speed data transmission from period of knowledge transfer. The problem is bays and cells. made worse by the cyclical demand for work- Without campaigns, process and technol- ers with particular skills, driven in part by the ogy improvements will not be achieved. mix of materials in each weapon system. Keeping the enduring stockpile active will re- These problems will be minimized through quire improvements in the detection and working with the design agencies to minimize prediction of aging effects before adverse the material mix, by developing workers who safety and reliability impacts occur. Gaps in are multi-skilled, and through the use of reim- the HE manufacturing and weapon assembly/ bursable complementary work to level the disassembly process capability or capacity workload. must be validated and filled through reconsti- The skilled HE manufacturing and weapon tution and improvement of processes assembly/disassembly workforce must be re- previously used, or through the development vitalized through programs that capture and and/or establishment of alternative processes preserve historical knowledge, that enrich skills that meet current design requirements and

E-25 with challenging and load leveling, complemen- • Formulation of a Retiree Corp Program to tary work, and that attract new workers. allow return of critical skills when needed. Through this initiative Pantex will develop a • Development and distribution of a plant- robust, integrated program that has not only wide employee survey; and joint training the proper skill mix but will also include a more initiatives where labor and management proper blend in workforce age. learn together how best to work as a team. Pantex also has responded to the Chiles Construction: Commission recommendations with a plan to improve recruitment and retention in key skill Project 99-D-128, Stockpile Management areas. Specific points include: Restructuring Initiative Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas • Critical skills have been identified. The Pantex Plant Stockpile Management • A “variable pay” program has been de- Restructuring Initiative (SMRI) Project will veloped with options such as lump-sum provide for the design and construction for merit increases, retention bonuses and in- various relocation and upgrades and for the creased base salaries in specialty areas to shutdown of obsolete structures. The project retain critical skills. will help to reduce the plant footprint by con- • Enhancement of the Recognition and solidating functions into fewer and more Awards program. modern facilities. • Development of recruitment strategies in Project 88-D-123 Security Enhancement, partnership with regional universities that Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas target critical skill areas. This project will enhance Pantex’s physi- • Implementation of student work programs cal protection, detection alarm systems, for interns and co-op students. safeguards of Sensitive Nuclear Materials (SNM), access controls, and security training. • Conducting a Benefits Value Study to benchmark Pantex benefits with similar industries.

E-26 Savannah River Plant

MISSION J Loading and Unloading of Reservoirs J Reservoir Surveillance Operations J Reconfiguration J Life Storage Program J Recycle and Recovery of Tritium

Location Aiken, South Carolina Contractor Westinghouse Electric Corp. Established 1950 (Tritium Operations in 1962) Area 13 Acres (Tritium Operations)

UNIQUE ASSETS - KEY TO DEFENSE Balance of Plant: PROGRAMS: Balance of plant includes additional site The mission of the SRS Tritium Opera- support activities, not covered previously in the tions is to provide tritium and non-tritium loaded specific buildings, necessary for SRS Tritium reservoirs to meet the requirements of the Operations to perform its mission functions. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, to These include such things as: office building conduct Reservoir Surveillance Operations for site staff, miscellaneous storage, utility sup- and Gas Transfer System testing, and to man- port buildings, miscellaneous production age existing tritium inventories and facilities support, etc. to support the DOE Weapons Complex. It is Facilities & Infrastructure: the single storage location for bulk quantities of tritium by consolidation of tritium operations SRS was established in 1950 as a nuclear from other DOE sites. materials production site and occupies approxi- mately 198,000 acres south of Aiken, SC. The • Building 232 is primarily used for tritium current DP mission at SRS is to process tri- extraction, tritium recovery, reservoir life tium and conduct tritium recycling and filling storage, weapons materials R&D function in support of nuclear weapons stockpile re- test facility, and He-3 storage. quirements. For the most part, the SRS • Building 233 is primarily used for tritium facilities associated with DP tritium operations recycle, tritium loading, tritium unloading, are relatively new and in good shape. In late reservoir surveillance operations, and He- 1993, the new Replacement Tritium Facility 3 recovery. (RTF), Building 233-H, assumed the tritium functions of Building 234-H. The RTF incor- • Building 234 is primarily used for reser- porates state-of-the-art technology for tritium voir finishing, tritium storage, non-tritium storage, enrichment, and pumping to enhance loading, and as shipping/receiving for the safeguards and security and to prevent sig- tritium operations. nificant tritium losses to the environment. • Building 238 is used primarily for reser- The Complex 21 Nonnuclear voir reclamation and hydraulic burst Reconfiguration project resulted in the move- testing. E-27 ment of products from the Mound plant to Processes and Technology: SRS. Actual construction activities associated The SRS Tritium Operations processes with this project started in FY 1995. The ar- and technologies for the most part are in good eas renovated to accommodate the transferred shape because of the projects described above. product lines were appropriately sized and However, additional capacity will need to be upgraded to meet current commercial con- established in two areas to support future struction, DOE ES&H, and security codes, workload. The existing function testing sta- orders, and regulations. Additionally, modifi- tions are at capacity. Because of the need for cations were made to utilities and support additional function tests associated with Acorn infrastructure as appropriate. production sampling and life storage, additional The Stockpile Management Restructuring capacity must be established. Initiative (SMRI), Tritium Facility Moderniza- Workforce: tion and Consolidation started in FY 1998 will result in further modernization and consolida- Like other sites in the complex, SRS has tion of SRS facilities and infrastructure. The an aging workforce. Loss of critical skills pre- Tritium Facility Modernization and Consolida- sents the most immediate risk to continued tion project will relocate several process viability of tritium operations in support of systems and equipment and/or process func- stockpile stewardship objectives. Revitaliza- tions from Building 232-H into existing buildings tion of the workforce requires the addition of within the Tritium Complex. High and Mod- new technical workers with the requisite criti- erate hazard processes will be located into cal skills. This is significantly hampered by Building 233-H. Low hazard processes will the inability to fund both experienced and new be located to the north end of Building 234-H. workers simultaneously for a period of knowl- The Building 233-H and 234-H service sup- edge transfer. port systems will be upgraded to accommodate the additional loads. Consoli- The skilled Tritium Operations workforce dation of tritium processing activities into must be revitalized through programs that cap- Buildings 233-H, 249-H, and the newer por- ture and preserve historical knowledge, that tion of 234-H will improve the safety of enrich skills with challenging and load level- operations, reduce environmental releases, ing, complementary work, and that attract new improve productivity, and reduce future oper- workers. Through this initiative SRS will de- ating costs. The consolidation of operations velop a robust, integrated program that has into fewer operating buildings will allow for not only the proper skill mix but will also in- the reduction of maintenance, operations, and clude a more proper blend in workforce age. support staffing. The closure of 232-H will Construction: further reduce the DP operating budget. The SMRI project also includes work that was Project 98-D-125, Tritium Extraction Fa- transferred from the Tritium Extraction Facil- cility, Savannah River Site Aiken, South ity project. This provides for increases in Carolina capacities and flows in the primary separation The TEF will provide steady-state produc- system, process stripper/tritium recovery sys- tion capability to the Tritium Recycle Facility tem, and glovebox stripper/tritium recovery (Building 233-H) of as much as 3Kg of tritium system. per year, if needed. Final purification of gases Overall the SRS Tritium Operations fa- containing tritium shall be performed in the cilities and infrastructure are in good shape. augmented process equipment located in the It is not anticipated that any major modifica- Tritium Recycle Facility. tion will be required in the foreseeable future beyond those that are currently underway.

E-28 Project 98-D-123 Stockpile Management Project 98-D-126, Accelerator Production Restructuring Initiative Tritium Facility of Tritium, Various Locations Modernization and Consolidation, Savan- This project is designed to demonstrate nah River Plant, Aiken, South Carolina the integration of high-power operation of the The Tritium Facility Modernization and Low Energy Demonstration Accelerator Consolidation project will relocate several pro- (LEDA) up to 8 MeV; prototyping of key ele- cess systems and equipment and/or process ments of the radio-frequency (RF) power functions from Buildings 232-H into existing system and distribution, beam transport, and buildings within the Tritium Facility. High and beam diagnostics; prototyping of a complete Moderate hazard processes will be relocated superconducting high energy linear accelera- into Building 233-H; Low Hazard processes tor unit; development and prototyping of RF will be relocated to the North end of Building and other high energy linear accelerator com- 234-H; Building 233-H and 234-H service sup- ponents; target/blanket performance and port systems will be upgraded to material studies, including measurements of accommodate the additional loads; and the neutron/proton/tritium data, radiation damage consolidation of Tritium processing activities effects and transport code development; and into Buildings 233-H and 249-H. Tritium separation facility studies to determine processing efficiencies at plant conditions.

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E-30 Y-12 Plant

MISSION J Receive/Storage Uranium, Lithium J Canned Subassemblies (CSA’s) + Manufacture/Rework of Components for Secondaries J Dismantlement of CSA’s J Processing Uranium & Lithium into safe/secure forms for storage J Stockpile Evaluation/Surveillance Operations J Other National Security Programs

Location Oak Ridge, Tennessee Contractor Lockheed-Martin Energy Systems Established 1947 Area 811 Acres

UNIQUE ASSETS – KEY TO DEFENSE Manufacturing Facilities & Infrastruc- PROGRAMS: ture: 9201-1 Can shop The Y-12 Plant was originally built as part of the World War II Manhattan Project, and 9201-5N Depleted Uranium Operations over 70% of the existing facilities are greater 9203 BeO Research and Development than 40 years old. These facilities were not built for today’s missions, constructed to 9204-2 Lithium Operations today’s standards, nor designed to meet 9204-2E Assembly/Disassembly Opera- today’s environmental, safety, and health re- tions quirements. As these facilities continue to age, the maintenance and operating costs continue 9205 Quality Evaluations/Surveillance to rise and it becomes increasingly difficult 9206 Old Enriched Uranium Operations (and subsequently expensive) to meet the cur- rent ES&H standards. During the peak years 9212 Enriched Uranium Operations of weapons production, a significant capital investment was made each year to upgrade 9215 Enriched Uranium Machining/roll- existing facilities and infrastructure. However, ing/forming since the end of the Cold War in 1989, this 9720-5 Warehouse capital investment has decreased significantly causing a growth in the maintenance backlog, 9995 Analytical Services faster-than-expected deterioration in many 9998 Depleted Uranium rolling & Met- areas, and quickly increasing operating costs. allurgy As Y-12 prepares to perform its Stockpile st Balance of Plant: Stewardship mission into the 21 century, it is important to 1) enhance the affordability of Balance of Plant includes additional site production operations; 2) ensure that plant support activities, not covered previously in the operations and facilities meet current ES&H specific buildings, necessary for Y-12 Opera- standards; 3) optimize the manufacturing com- tions to perform its mission functions. These plex through the application of six sigma include such things as: office buildings for site techniques; and 4) ensure adequate longev- staff, miscellaneous storage, utility support ity (e.g. 50 years) for primary facilities and buildings, miscellaneous production support, infrastructure. This can be accomplished by etc.

E-31 making both near-term and long-term invest- questionable whether they can be restarted ments in Y-12 facilities and infrastructure. economically or in compliance with today’s ES&H standards. The gaps associated with In the near-term, investments are needed the need to potentially restart these past pro- that would reduce the maintenance backlog, cesses have been identified as part of the repair facilities and infrastructure that place campaigns and steps to remedy the situation continued production operations at risk, and proposed. A common example of this is re- establish needed production capabilities/ca- lated to special materials processes, which can pacities not currently available. Although, there be addressed through refurbishment of old are current operations underway such as the facilities or through a modernization proposal Stockpile Management Restructuring Initiative as outlined in the previous section (SMRI) and Facilities Assurance Capability Program (FCAP) most of these funds are as- In examining the health of Y-12’s manu- sociated with relocation of existing equipment facturing processes, there are a number of key and safety issues not the re-capitalization issues driving the need for an investment in through purchase of new items. FCAP is now these processes. First, there are significant successfully nearing completion and SMRI is near-term needs associated with fulfilling the just underway. requirements of the Stockpile Life Extension Program. As noted, Y-12 has a number of pro- In the long-term, investments are needed cesses that are needed in the near-term to to migrate production operations from aging support the SLEP schedules that are not cur- facilities into new facilities having appreciable rently operable and have not been for many longevity. Such an investment will allow Y-12 years. Actions are needed to upgrade, replace, to rightsize its manufacturing footprint, shut or restart these processes. These actions rep- down aging facilities, and optimize the plant resent a significant undertaking needed to configuration. In FY 1999, a conceptual effort ensure the reconstitution of these operations was begun to determine the timeframe and in a manner that is both cost effective and requirements for modernization of the Y-12 that meets ES&H standards. Secondly, many plant. This effort is important in that it will tie of the processes in operation today are using into the on going Site Wide Environmental systems and equipment that are aging. It is Impact Statement that is underway and pro- becoming increasingly difficult to operate these vide a foundation for ensuring the ability to aging processes in ways that are cost effec- provide weapon components well into the next tive, that meet ES&H standards, and that meet century. Preliminary indications are that the the process control and quality requirements site modernization construction and process of the Stockpile Stewardship program. Thirdly, qualification could require several billion dol- in the absence of funding to upgrade aging lars and last several decades. processes, Y-12 has not been able to take ad- Manufacturing Processes & Technology: vantage of new technologies which would improve quality and efficiency, reduce ES&H Y-12 has met and continues to meet di- risks, improve mission flexibility and response rective schedule work, and is meeting time, and align production processes with the ever-increasing needs for more detailed ex- demands of a science-based Stockpile Stew- amination and documentation. However, a ardship Program. number of factors threaten the ability of Y-12 to perform its future missions in a safe, timely, In preparing to support the Stockpile and cost-effective manner. As with Y-12 fa- Stewardship program, Y-12 also needs to make cilities and infrastructure, many of the long-term investments in production processes manufacturing processes are aging and in need and technology. Such investments would al- of repair or replacement. In many cases, key low migration into a modern, long lasting manufacturing processes have not been oper- manufacturing complex that is right-sized for ated for more than 10 years and it is current and projected requirements. There,

E-32 production operations would be performed at critical skills. This is significantly hampered lower cost, with tighter process control and by the inability to fund both experienced and enhanced quality, and with real time transmis- new workers simultaneously for a period of sion of manufacturing data to the design labs knowledge transfer. The degrading physical (needed for modeling and simulation). condition of the site, as well as continued reli- ance on old technology, noted earlier, make it Without Campaigns, process and technol- difficult to recruit new technical workers and ogy improvements will not be achieved. is having a pronounced effect on the ability to Keeping the enduring stockpile active will re- retain existing workers. The problem is made quire improvements in the detection and worse by the cyclical demand for workers with prediction of aging effects before adverse particular skills, driven in part by the mix of safety and reliability impacts occur. Gaps in materials in each weapon system. These the manufacturing process capability or ca- problems will be minimized through working pacity must be validated and filled through with the design agencies to minimize the ma- reconstitution and improvement of processes terial mix, by developing workers who are previously used, or through the development multi-skilled, and through the use of reimburs- and/or establishment of alternative processes able complementary work to level the that meet current design requirements and workload. standards for quality, safety, and health. Sci- ence basis models must be established for The skilled secondary manufacturing secondary manufacturing operations and used workforce must be revitalized through pro- to develop process simulations that drive these grams that capture and preserve historical operations and allow flexibility to modify them knowledge, that enrich skills with challenging as necessary. Appropriate process data must and load leveling, complementary work, and be collected and transmitted real time to per- that attract new workers. Through this initia- mit weapon performance and lifetime tive Y-12 will develop a robust, integrated assessment by the design labs through predic- program. tive models and simulations in the absence of Construction: nuclear testing. Control of manufacturing pro- cess stability must be improved, monitored, and 01-D-124, Highly Enriched Uranium Ma- documented to provide assurance that terials Facility, Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, remanufactured weapons remain within the Tennessee performance envelope previously validated through nuclear testing. Materials used to build This project includes one facility with two secondaries currently in the stockpile must be distinct areas, the Highly Enriched Uranium fully characterized and compared to current (HEU) Materials Area and the Strategic Arms production. This will guide the determination Reduction Treaties (START) Materials Area. as to whether current specifications are ap- The new facility will be state-of-the-art and propriate and to support a science-based result in significant cost savings and feature approach to manufacturing. storage in an earthen-bermed structure for enhanced security, an automated inventory Manufacturing Workforce: system which minimizes inventory validation, new Safe Secure Trailer (SST) and SafeGuard Like other sites in the complex, the Y-12 Transport (SGT) shipping/receiving station, a Plant has an aging workforce of which 50 central location near HEU processing facili- percent are eligible to retire within four years. ties, an underground connector to allow direct Loss of critical skills presents the most imme- tie-in to a future Enriched Uranium Opera- diate risk to continued viability of secondary tions (EUO) Modernization Facility which manufacturing in support of stockpile stew- allows a reduced footprint for HEU activities, ardship objectives. Revitalization of the and a small administrative facility to house the workforce requires the addition of new tech- building operators. nical and craft workers with the requisite

E-33 98-D-124, Stockpile Management Re- structuring Initiative Y-12 Consolidation, Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee The primary purpose of this project is to complete the overall downsizing of the Y-12 manufacturing footprint. This project is part of a long-range consolidation plan that began in 1992. Along with previously completed projects and other currently funded consoli- dation projects, SMRI completes the consolidation of manufacturing operations into a smaller footprint area.

E-34