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The Future Can Be Big—Savings

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The Future Can Be Big—Savings The future can be big—savings How repurposing and right-sizing nuclear weapons facilities can and should save $15 billion without sacrificing critical mission requirements. The Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance January 2012 The future can be big—savings How repurposing and right-sizing nuclear weapons facilities can and should save $15 billion without sacrificing critical mission requirements. Unless budget decisions reflect current US nuclear weapons policy, the US will spend more than $15 billion on huge facilities that have no vital mission and be left with little capacity for vital security and nonproliferation programs that are already backlogged at least a decade. Future spending on nuclear weapons facilities should be directed toward critical national security missions, but the funding chain today is stuck in old thinking aimed at expanding weapons production. Advocates of massive budget outlays for new production facilities have settled on “modernization” as the catchphrase for their efforts to expand the nation’s capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but these advocates have not modernized their understanding of the declining role of nuclear weapons in the nation’s future. Right-purposing and right-sizing facilities at Y12 in Oak Ridge requires giving up outdated assumptions and taking a clear look at the future role of nuclear weapons and the infrastructure required to support that role. Revisiting 1990 Assumptions NNSA estimated Building 9212 would require $120 million The proposal to “modernize” the nuclear weapons in maintenance and upgrades to meet current and projected production complex, including the Y12 National Security environmental, safety and health standards; the expense would Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, began more than twenty be partially offset by savings of nearly $40 million in deferred years ago—it was called Complex 21 back then. The United maintenance costs. States had a stockpile of more than 9,500 weapons and In 2011, after completing a Site-Wide Environmental contemplated maintaining an enduring, massive nuclear Impact Statement, DOE/NNSA announced plans to replace deterrent. The production complex in Oak Ridge was slated for Building 9212 with a new facility, the UPF, with the capacity replacement because its buildings were aging and the capacity to produce 80 warheads/year. Estimates of the pricetag for the to produce new nuclear weapon components at Y12 was UPF range as high as $7.5 billion, a number certain to grow questionable. during the decade of construction. Since that time, Y12 has downsized considerably. The poster-child for building deterioration, cited by then-Senator Current operations Pete Domenici for “concrete falling from the ceiling,” Building 9206, has been abandoned, and most if not all production While Y12 has several declared missions, the primary activities have been moved to the Building 9212 complex. focus of work is the production of nuclear weapon secondaries (Over the years, Building 9212 has swallowed up several (the thermonuclear part of the bomb, manufactured from surrounding and contiguous structures.) Highly Enriched Uranium, enriched lithium, beryllium, DOE/NNSA claims about the state and utility of Building depleted uranium, and a host of other materials). The work 9212 are now the heart of the argument for construction of a requires precision machining and other exotic manufacturing new Uranium Processing Facility [UPF] at the equipment and processes. Secondaries are Y12 Nuclear Security Complex in Oak Ridge, produced as part of the Stockpile Stewardship and The capacity Tennessee. While the general public is not Maintenance program (SSM) as well as for the Life allowed into Building 9212, reports that portions requirement for Extension Program (LEP). of the massive facility are in an advanced stage of maintenance, DOE/NNSA says the capacity requirement for decay are widely confirmed. Within the building, surveillance and maintenance, surveillance and life extension of the some areas are scheduled for “early shutdown” life extension nuclear stockpile (the SSM) is approximately 10 and their operations are being moved to other of the nuclear warheads/year. sections of the facility. The Life Extension Program, which replaces aging stockpile is ten Other sections of the building, though, components of some warheads and produces new have been maintained. Major systems have been warheads per year. components for “upgrades” to other warheads, replaced in the last decade, and a $76 million will, by 2024, have upgraded the entire US nuclear budget outlay in this fiscal year will replace weapon stockpile. This includes not only actively critical support systems for ongoing operations. deployed warheads (the 2011 START limit is 1,550 warheads) New equipment is being purchased and installed, including but also a considerable strategic reserve—2,000 W76 warheads new technologies which will reduce space requirements and are scheduled for life extension upgrades, a process which streamline some key operations. As recently as 2007, DOE/ some argue introduces a new military capacity to the warhead. 1 Y12 is also responsible for dismantling the secondaries of The DOE/NNSA acknowledge that capacity is minimal—the retired warheads; some are maintained as part of a reserve at “No Net Production” alternative in the Y12 Site-Wide EIS Y12, others enter the pipeline for disposition. was considered sufficient to meet mission requirements; it Y12 also prepares Highly Enriched Uranium for contemplates a capacity of 10 warheads/year. downblending—reversing the process of enrichment to make Since the current US arsenal is reliable, and since current weapons material suitable for use as reactor fuel. Y12 is LEP upgrades are addressing surety and function questions, responsible for about 10% of the downblending that takes place the US will not need large-scale production capacity to in the US today. maintain the stockpile with confidence. Schedule, Cost, Mission Right Size for the Right Job requirements What is the right At the present time, DOE/NNSA are The Uranium Processing Facility as now size for production committed to build an oversized nuclear weapon envisioned will be a production facility, designed operations, and production facility at Y12 to replace Building to have the capacity to manufacture secondaries what is the least 9212 in pursuit of a production capacity of and casings for 80 nuclear warheads per year. expensive way 80 warheads/year. There is no justification or documentation provided by DOE for this When first proposed in 2005, the UPF was to to meet mission come on line in 2016; current estimates are full capacity—it appears simply to have been created requirements? occupation and operation will be completed by to match the projected CMRR-NF capacity to 2024. produce plutonium pits at Los Alamos. The initial cost estimates for the UPF, The first step in determining what to build in 2005, ranged from $600 million to $1.5 billion. By 2007 at Y12 is right-sizing the production mission. the numbers had jumped to $1.5 – 3.5 billion; by 2010 the The second step is determining whether that mission can range was $4.5 – 6.5 billion, and in 2011 the Army Corps of be met in existing facilities for the foreseeable future and at Engineers estimated the pricetag at $7.5 billion—this even what cost. DOE/NNSA modestly acknowledges in the Final though the facility design is around 50% complete. Y12 Site-Wide EIS that the Upgrade-In-Place alternative “could Meanwhile, the mission requirements for the UPF are potentially requires smaller upfront capital expenditures.” diminishing. While construction is pushed into the future, the No careful cost comparison has been made (or at least not life extension program continues to upgrade the US stockpile; released) by DOE/NNSA. But the cost projections for upgrades most if not all upgrades will be completed before the 2024 to Building 9212 to meet current environmental, safety and occupancy date for the UPF. health standards are in the hundreds of millions of dollars—far below the $7.5 billion pricetag for a shiny, new production What the Nation Needs facility. If the nation is to invest in new facilities at Y12 in Oak Funding for future operations at Y12 should not reflect Ridge, it should invest in dismantlement and disposition the 1990 vision of a massive, enduring nuclear stockpile. Given capacity. During the discussion over the course of six years the current appetite for fiscal constraint, any investment in of preparation for the Y12 Site-Wide EIS, some called for a facilities in Oak Ridge should ask these critical questions: redirection of funds to a Dedicated Dismantlement Facility; 1. What does the nation need that Y12 is uniquely others have called for repurposing the UPF, dramatically positioned to provide? down-sizing any production capacity in favor of increased 2. What is the right size for production operations to investment in dismantlement capacity. Both ideas aim to direct maintain the stockpile, and what is the least expensive way we investments toward future needs in a world that will look can meet mission requirements? different than the 1990 projections. There is room for discussion, and for a range of opinions, in the answers to these questions. But the range must fall The Need for Dismantlement within certain parameters if it is to be “real world.” The need for weapons production capacity is decreasing now and will Dismantling our nuclear stockpile achieves three continue to diminish over time; the need for dismantlement important things. capacity is increasing and will continue to increase over the • It sends a powerful message to the world that the US is next 20-30 years. Following on dismantlement, the nation serious about nonproliferation. In a 2008 Carnegie Endowment will also need increased capacity for disposing of weapons report, dismantlement is cited as a key indicator by other materials—downblending HEU into low-enriched uranium is nations of “seriousness about disarmament.” the only current disposition option authorized by the US.
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