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The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program

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The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program A Slippery Slope to New Nuclear Weapons A Report from Tri-Valley CAREs by Dr. Robert Civiak January 2006 ON THE COVER: The cover photograph shows molten plutonium metal in a levitated state inside a crucible. The Reliable Replacement Warhead program, if it moves for- ward as the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, and the weapons labs envision, would involve a major expansion of plutonium activi- ties, including the manufacture of new plutonium “pits” (cores) for newly designed nuclear weapons. Photo credit: Joe Riedel, Los Alamos National Laboratory The text of this report may be reproduced in whole or in part without further permission, with proper credit given to Dr. Robert Civiak and to Tri-Valley CAREs. Tri-Valley CAREs was founded in 1983 in Livermore, California to increase public knowledge of the relationship between peace, social justice and the environment. The organization is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit group that monitors activities in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, with a focus on the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Tri-Valley CAREs Communities Against a Radioactive Environment 2582 Old First Street, Livermore, CA 94551 (925) 443-7148 http://www.trivalleycares.org About the Author Bob Civiak has been doing research and analysis in nuclear weapons policy and related areas for more than 25 years. He received a Ph.D. in physics from the Uni- versity of Pittsburgh in 1974. From 1978 through 1988 he was a Specialist in Energy Technology and Section Head in the Science Policy Research Division of the Con- gressional Research Service (CRS) at the Library of Congress. During the spring and summer of 1988 he was a Visiting Scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Labo- ratory. From November 1988 through August 1999 he was a Program and Budget Examiner with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the Executive Office of the President. At OMB his primary responsibilities included oversight of the national security activities of the Department of Energy, including the Stockpile Stewardship Program. He currently resides in Lebanon, New Hampshire, where he continues to do research and policy analysis on nuclear weapons and arms control is- sues as an independent consultant. This is his fourth report for Tri-Valley CAREs on major issues in nuclear weapons policy. Acknowledgments The publication and distribution of this report is part of Tri-Valley CAREs’ project to expose U.S. nuclear weapons research and development activities. This work is supported by the Ploughshares Fund, Town Creek Foundation, Public Welfare Foundation, Colombe Foundation, the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund, New- Land Foundation, Ben and Jerry’s Foundation, Tin Man Fund, the Victor and Lorraine Honig Foundation, and individual donors. Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 What Is the RRW Program? 3 Administration and Laboratory Views 3 Congressional Views 4 Status of the Program 7 The RRW Program is Counter to U.S. National Security 8 The RRW Program Would Undermine the International Non-Proliferation Regime 8 The RRW Program Could Lead to a Return to Nuclear Weapons Testing 9 The RRW Program Might Reduce the Threshold for Use of Nuclear Weapons 10 There is No Need for an RRW Program 11 U.S. Nuclear Weapons are Highly Capable 11 U.S. Nuclear Weapons are Extremely Safe and Secure 14 U.S. Nuclear Weapons are Very Reliable 16 Today’s Reliability and Safety Can be Maintained with Proper Curatorship 17 The Weapons Labs’ Highest Priority is Maintaining Jobs 20 NNSA Spending on Nuclear Weapons is Exorbitant and Wasteful 20 Weapons Scientists Have Used False Arguments to Maintain Employment 20 The RRW Program Will Require More Funding Increases 23 Conclusion and Recommendations 26 Endnotes 28 vi Executive Summary Executive Summary The United States is poised to embark on a major program that could launch the nation on a “slippery slope” toward developing new nuclear weapons. Promoted by the U.S. Department of Energy and its nuclear weapon design laboratories with an innocuous sounding title, the “Reliable Replacement Warhead” program would actually damage national security. It would also cost billions of taxpayer dollars and could result in the production of new warheads less safe and reliable than those in the current arsenal. Late in 2004, Congress established the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program to “improve the reliability, longevity, and certifiability of existing weapons and their components”1 Exactly what changes Congress envisions for nuclear weap- ons under the RRW program remains vague. However, in each of the past two years, Congress has rejected Bush Administration proposals to design new nuclear weap- ons in favor of improving existing weapons in the stockpile. In contrast, the nuclear weapons laboratories2 want to build new warheads. They see the RRW program as an opportunity to expand their mission “from a program of warhead refurbishment A broad RRW to one of warhead replacement.”3 One recent report calls for the labs to develop a program would new Reliable Replacement Warhead every five years. 4 Thus, while Congress may see significantly harm the RRW program as a limited effort to improve existing nuclear weapons, to others our national it is the holy grail of the weapons labs—a guarantee of jobs designing new nuclear security, primarily weapons in perpetuity. because U.S. pursuit Thus far, funding for the RRW program has been rather modest—$9 million in of an RRW would 2005 and $25 million in 2006. If left unchecked, however, the weapons labs would disrupt international grow the RRW program into a multi-billion-dollar effort to redesign the entire cooperation in stockpile. Nuclear weapon designers would alter the military characteristics of exist- non-proliferation. ing weapons and would add new weapons with new capabilities and new missions. Expensive new facilities would also be needed to build the replacement warheads. A broad RRW program would significantly harm our national security, primarily because U.S. pursuit of an RRW would disrupt international cooperation in non- proliferation. That would diminish pressure on Iran and North Korea to forego their nuclear weapons programs and would disrupt efforts to eliminate clandestine traf- ficking in nuclear materials and equipment. In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) would likely demand that any new warhead, which the RRW program might create, undergo full nuclear explosive tests before DoD accepts it into the stockpile. If the U.S. were to conduct even a single nuclear weapons test, other nations would surely follow suit, which could lead to a new nuclear weapons arms race. The dam- age this would impart to the broad non-proliferation regime would far exceed any conceivable advantage the U.S. could gain from new nuclear weapons. The weaponeers claim the RRW is needed to improve the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile and to reduce the cost of maintaining it. However, a close look at the stockpile reveals that it needs no “improvements.” U.S. Executive Summary nuclear weapons are highly capable, extremely safe and secure, and very reliable. With proper maintenance the reliability, safety, and certifiability of existing weapons can be maintained indefinitely. There is no reason to make any changes to the well-tested, dependable nuclear weapons in the current stockpile. As components age, they can be replaced with identical or nearly identical copies of the original. Only in rare instances, when a component cannot be replaced with an identical copy of the origi- nal design because necessary parts or materials are no longer available, should any modifications be considered. This approach to maintaining the stockpile, called the Curatorship approach, would cost far less than what the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)5 currently spends under its Stockpile Stewardship approach. In addition, by strictly limiting any changes to nuclear weapons, NNSA can avoid The RRW is merely potential degradation in its confidence in the stockpile that might arise from accu- the latest proposal mulating small changes to well-tested warhead designs. to fulfill the top The RRW is merely the latest proposal to fulfill the top priority of the weapons priority of the labs—preservation of funding and jobs. The end of the Cold War has led to fewer weapons labs— nuclear weapons and less development of new weapons. Nevertheless, spending on preservation of nuclear weapons work has increased dramatically. In 2006, the NNSA plans to spend funding and jobs. $6.4 billion on nuclear weapons. Even after adjusting for inflation, that is one and one-half times the average annual spending on nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The weaponeers have achieved this impressive growth by continually inventing new rationales for increased funding. Over the past twenty years, the rationale has shifted from the Cold War competition against the Soviet Union, to the need for expensive underground weapons tests to maintain the stockpile, to a massive aboveground test- ing and simulation program called Stockpile Stewardship, and now to the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Since U.S. nuclear weapons need no improvements and a broad RRW program would damage U.S. security, it would be dangerous to create a new program to pursue even the modest goals for which Congress established the RRW program. We, therefore, believe that Congress should eliminate all funding for the RRW and cancel the program. If Congress is not prepared to cancel the RRW, it should at least give close scrutiny to NNSA plans for the program to head off attempts to design new nuclear weapons. To do so, Congress must get a detailed 5-year plan for the RRW program from the Bush Administration before it acts on spending for 2007. We also recommend that Congress unequivocally prohibit, in law, the use of any NNSA funds to develop new or significantly modified nuclear weapons.
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