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Does the U.S. Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program Pose a Proliferation Th Reat?

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Does the U.S. Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program Pose a Proliferation Th Reat? ..",' ScIence& Global Security, 1998,Volum~ 7, pp.151-193 @ 1998 OPA (OverseasPublis~ersAssociation) N.V. Reprints available directly from the publisher Published by license under Photocopyingpermitted by license only the Gordon and.Bre~ch Publisherslmpnnt. Printed in India Does the U.S. Science-Based stockpile Stewardship Program Pose a Proliferation Th reat? C,E, Paineo and M.G. McKinzieb - INTRODUCTION The principal nonproliferation benefit of the recently signed, but still largely unratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), is the restriction it imposeson the developmentby additional states of more efficient pure fission weapons,fusion-boosted fission weapons,and two-stage thermonuclear weap- ons. To mitigate the impact of the CTBT on the U.S. nuclear posture, the Departmentof Energy's (DOE's)Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) Programseeks to modelthe performanceof nuclear weaponsfrom "first princi- ples," thereby diminishing and perhaps eliminating the historical dependence of the U.S. weapons program on nuclear test-based empiricism to verify nuclear explosiveperformance and calibrate nuclear design codepredictions with actual test results. While the non-proliferation restraints of the CTBT currently appear robust, dissemination of SBSS nuclear weapons research will tend to erodethe Treaty's security benefits. Past state decisionsto share weaponsinformation (shown graphically in Figure 1) have served to influence the current international system. By and large, the rationale for these acts had beenthe strengthening of an ally. But allianceschange: Moscow, for example, grew to regret its early nuclear weap- ons assistanceto Beijing. Over time, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 has established a consensusthat restricting the number of nuclear weaponstates to the pre-establishedfive, while seekingthe elimina- tion of nuclear weaponsover the longer term, bolsters international security. a SeniorResearch Associate, Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Washington, DC. b ProjectScientist, Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Washington, DC. ~ 152 Paine and McKinzie , -,--~ , : , India ," I , I (6) , \ , ,, --~ '~~---' , -, , , , , , ~ Pakistan : " U..S " (1030) Russia (715) , , " ~_.-' Figure 1: Venn diagram displaying the historical sharing of nuclear weapons knowledge among declared nuclear weapon states (solid circles), undeclared nuclear weapon states (dashed circles), and South Africa, a former undeclared nuclear weapon state. The num- ber of explosive nuclear tests performed is given in parentheses. Area of overlap is not strictly proportional to the degree of knowledge sharing, as this is difficult to quantify. The Russia-U.S. overlap reflects the recent purchase by the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Agency (via a detailed ne~otiated contract) of a large amount of data concerning the former Soviet test program. Transfer of information from nuclear weapon states to non- nuclear weapon states that would assistthe latter "in any way' to acquire nuclear explo- sive devices is prohibited under Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Articles I and II of the NPT broadly prohibit any transfer or receipt of infor- mation "that would in any way assist" a non-weaponstate in acquiring nuclear weapons. The publicly-acknowledgedgoal of the SBSS Program is to developcom- plex computersimulations as a replacementfor nuclear explosivetests of inte- grated weapon system performance. This effort, likened in scope to the Manhattan Project or Apollo Mission, is based on the systematic pursuit of fundamental advancesin each of the constituent disciplines of nuclear weap- ons scienceand engineeiing, including an increased reliance on unclassified ,:' ~ ,~ Does the U.S.Stockpile Stewardship Program Pose a Threat? 153 - , cs;, 0 .g-6 ~68~'O i:'O 'OQ) 2 '- ~~ u-~ :.'~~~§ ~~ *.~ 0 ~ 0>, ~!! c:~ o-~fi:¥o- .,;.9' ~ 6 0> > 0> ~ 0-0 -~TWa. Q)w 0. l::Q) "t; , - 0> ,' 0> -0 Q)~ a. E O.f; '6 z u'o Q;Q) "0 0.-,",I C C 0>0> '-O!!u'" wQ) .g~o_WI: I:W"'Q)Q)Q)O.£ ~o:JC .f;o.-~ C '- 0 '--0- 00. 'O:J CQ)~ E.f;=G' 'Q)O- Q)E 0 0> 0 D 0. If; ~:s j ~ .0 D '0 £ u ~ :2!2 u 8 ~ 8 0> 3 ~ .c C '" Q 0. Q)"5 :!! g ~ § ~ ~ ;:i: .6 ~ ~ ~ " '" 0;> f- 0- -' u~ -:J., "-0 ,...OF' 00 Q)-' w 0> 0. 0> 0.. --0 c" Q).J. 0 '".'! --,,'0. 0 ~:J => -0 --"0'- I '"' ~- ¥!O 0,..Q)"'.g Q)c ox E; C '- > Z 00> cE~.2 Q)c~ Q)"~=?OF' <0 1;;?< III 0 0 ~ '- co o~ ~~ ~;E1J ~~~~g P.~ .2-'. 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