#93 21 Aug 2001

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Air University Air War College Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt. Col. Michael W. Ritz, CPC Intelligence/Public Affairs or JoAnn Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953- 7538 or DSN 493-7538.

The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

Baltimore Sun August 18, 2001 Nations To Continue Talks On Biological Weapons Ban GENEVA - Major powers have agreed to more talks on strengthening a ban on biological weapons despite Washington's rejection of a draft protocol at negotiations in Geneva, the negotiating committee chairman said yesterday. The Bush administration dashed hopes of clinching a verification agreement when it announced last month that the draft protocol, produced after 6 1/2 years of negotiations, was "unfixable."

Washington Post August 18, 2001 Pg. 10 Scientist Challenges Censorship Agencies Bar Part Of Weapons Book By Associated Press ALBUQUERQUE, Aug. 17 -- The government has cleared for publication 85 percent of a book written by Danny Stillman, a former Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist, about China's nuclear program, Stillman's attorney said today. Stillman headed the lab's intelligence division for nearly 14 years before retiring in 1993. He wrote his 500-page book, "Inside China's Nuclear Weapons Program," based on nine trips he made to China from 1990 to 1999. "I was not operating as an intelligence officer or agent of the United States," Stillman said in documents filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. "I was merely a loyal American citizen who served as a voluntary source of information" in debriefings after returning from China. Stillman, 67, said he wrote the book in a way that would exclude classified information. Stillman's attorney, Mark Zaid, has asked the court to order a public evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Defense Department, Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA have the right to withhold the remaining 15 percent of the book.

New York Times August 21, 2001 Pg. 1 U.S. Balks On Plan To Take Plutonium Out Of Warheads By Matthew L. Wald WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 - A program conceived by the Clinton administration to rid the world of 100 tons of American and Russian weapons-grade plutonium is likely to be abandoned by the Bush administration, according to people who have been briefed about the project. Under the plan, which was first proposed in the mid-90's, 50 tons of American plutonium and 50 tons of Russian plutonium would be taken out of nuclear weapons and either converted into fuel for nuclear reactors or rendered useless for weapons by mixing it with with highly radioactive nuclear waste, a process known as immobilization. When the plan was drafted, Clinton administration officials said the program would reduce the risk that the plutonium would fall into the wrong hands, where it could easily be turned into weapons. By reducing the availability of weapons-grade plutonium, the project had the added benefit of bolstering treaties between the United States and Russia to cut the number of nuclear warheads deployed by each side, by making it harder to turn plutonium from decommissioned weapons back into warheads. Bush administration officials deny the program is dead, but acknowledge that it has difficulties, primarily financial ones. ``The issue is under review,'' said an administration official who would speak only if not identified. ``We've made no secret of that. But no decisions have been made.'' But the official continued, ``It's no secret that there are a lot of equities to balance here.'' One major equity, he said, is money. Early this year the Energy Department predicted a cost of $6.6 billion, about triple the initial estimates, to convert the American stocks to fuel for civilian nuclear reactors. It put Russia's cost at $1.76 billion, which is money Russia does not have. The expectation under the Clinton administration was that the United States and other rich countries would help pay, but no concrete pledges were ever made. In 1999 the Clinton administration did agree to pay a consortium of power companies $130 million to use plutonium that the government would convert into fuel. But the conversion factories are not yet built, and the conversion itself was contingent on an agreement with the Russians to take similar steps to dispose of plutonium from their weapons. Despite the program's expected benefits, the Bush administration's proposed Energy Department budget this spring did not include the money needed to mix some of the plutonium with nuclear waste. The second path - converting it to fuel for American nuclear reactors, the strategy the Clinton administration hoped would induce the Russians to do the same - also appears likely to be dropped soon. sv29,2if,,v29 ``There is no enthusiasm for it whatsoever,'' said a Congressional aide who was briefed by officials of the National Security Council, referring both to the current strategy of immobilization and to conversion to reactor fuel. The issue of what to do with plutonium from decommissioned nuclear weapons has haunted policy makers for years. One particular fear is that the material from Russian weapons would be bought or stolen by terrorists or a ``rogue'' government who could construct a nuclear bomb. In recent years, the security of bomb materials in Russia has been improved markedly by joint Russian-American efforts, administration experts say. Bush administration officials insist they share the goal of disposing of American and Russian plutonium. ``There's no philosphical shift that says suddenly we're perfectly fine with surplus plutonium laying around - we're not,'' said an administration official familiar with the Clinton-era program. But, he added, conversion to fuel for existing reactors or mixing with waste are ``not the only options for disposing of it safely.'' As an alternative, the Bush administration appears to be considering a variety of untested technical options, including a new generation of nuclear reactors that could burn plutonium more thoroughly. ``They're trying to improve on it by giving up on getting started any time soon,'' said Matthew G. Bunn, a nuclear expert at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, who was an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Clinton administration. He and other experts are skeptical that a new generation of reactors, which was also mentioned in President Bush's energy plan as a way to dispose of nuclear waste, would ever be built. Construction on the last nuclear plants built in the United States country was begun more than 25 years ago. ``We're back at Square 1 with the program, and they're looking at imaginary options, like advanced reactors,'' said Tom Clements, executive director the Nuclear Control Institute, a nonprofit group that opposes the use of plutonium for reactor fuel. ``For financial reasons, it's not going to be viable.'' Though the administration is considering dropping the program to convert or immobilize weapons- grade plutonium, a separate Russian-American program to reduce the inventory of another Russian bomb fuel, highly enriched uranium, is continuing. In fact, uranium that was intended for Russian bombs now meets more than half the needs of American power reactors. But diluting uranium to the type used in power plants is technically far simpler and cheaper than the process required for plutonium, which must be converted from the metal form used in weapons to a plutonium-uranium ceramic used in American power plants. In fact, enriched uranium has economic value as reactor fuel, while converting plutonium appears to be a money- losing proposition. Even so, Russian officials have said repeatedly that they view plutonium as an asset and would like to build new breeder reactors, so named because they produce plutonium faster than they consume the other main reactor fuel, uranium. The end of the plutonium program would be mixed news for groups concerned with proliferation. For example the Nuclear Control Institute has pushed vigorously for immobilization and against converting plutonium to reactor fuel, which is known as mixed oxide, or MOx. Officials of the institute say conversion to MOx is very expensive and would encourage international commerce in weapons material.

Washington Times August 21, 2001 Pg. 1 Missile-Shield Test Site Gets Pentagon OK Alaska base to house facility By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times The Pentagon has given the go-ahead for construction to begin in the next few weeks on a missile-defense test site in Alaska. A $9 million contract for clearing trees and building roads and utilities in central Alaska was awarded Friday, Pam Bain, a spokeswoman for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said yesterday. "The site preparation will be limited to clearing and grading of the site and installing preliminary utilities and road structures," Miss Bain said in an interview. Land clearing will begin "within a week or so," she said. The construction was judged legal under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by Pentagon lawyers in charge of treaty-compliance decisions, she said. The United States currently has no defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty bans the building of nationwide missile defenses and limits construction of strategic missile defenses those capable of knocking out incoming long-range missiles -- to a single site. The construction decision was made public Wednesday -- the day after Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld returned from talks in Moscow with Russian officials on missile defenses and strategic arms cuts. Russia is opposed to scrapping the ABM Treaty. The Bush administration has said it will seek changes in the pact, or withdraw from it, in order to be allowed to build effective missile defenses. Mr. Rumsfeld was asked last week in a Los Angeles television interview why the Pentagon was moving ahead with the missile defense despite opposition from Russia and some European nations that want to preserve the ABM Treaty. "There isn't any particular rush, except that we're engaged in a testing system, and the ABM Treaty prohibits testing in certain types of modes, and therefore we would not be able to experiment and do the research and development necessary to try to develop the ability to do that," Mr. Rumsfeld said. The ABM Treaty may have made sense during the Cold War, but should now be "set aside" because there is a need for a system capable of countering missiles fired by rogue states, he said. Victoria Clarke, the assistant defense secretary for public affairs, also said missile defenses are needed. "We have several rogue states that are developing weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery such as ballistic missiles," she told WAAM radio in Ann Arbor, Mich., on Friday. "It's a real threat -- it's a growing threat -- and it's a real obligation for us to try to develop a system to protect us from those threats." The official construction announcement for the testing facility at the Army's Fort Greely, Alaska, base was published in the Federal Register on Wednesday. The notice stated that construction on a portion of the 661,000-acre military base would begin without a final Pentagon decision on the exact type of missile-defense system that will be built. Also, congressional appropriations for final construction of the system have not been approved, the notice said. Still, the Pentagon decided to go ahead with the Alaska construction because "the Department of Defense has determined that it is prudent to proceed with site preparation, and without congressional budgeting." The notice also said the Bush administration authorized the building of the test site after finding that "there is a ballistic missile threat to the United States, and that developing an effective missile defense system is dependent upon operationally realistic testing of [its] elements." "Fort Greely is a potential deployment location in Alaska for ground-based interceptor silos, battle management command and control facilities, and other support facilities for the Ground Based Midcourse Element, formerly called the National Missile Defense system," the notice said. The notice said that "in the event of a missile attack on the United States, the test bed at Fort Greely could potentially be used for ballistic missile defense." However, there are no plans at present to test-fire an interceptor from the site, it stated. The native Alaskan company Aglaq Construction Enterprises Inc. was awarded the contract, Miss Bain said. The company is located in Point Hope, in northeastern Alaska on the Chukchi Sea. The company also won part of a $7 million contract in July to help build the Cape Lisburne Long Range Radar Site by 2003. A spokesman for Aglaq could not be reached for comment. Fort Greely, a former Army base, is located in central Alaska about 100 miles southeast of Fairbanks. According to the official notice, the company will install two water wells and clear trees and debris for future construction of a single missile field and a main access road. The testing site will allow the Pentagon's missile-defense office to find out whether interceptor missiles fired in a salvo against an incoming warhead will interfere with each other. It also will be used to test communications between components of the missile-defense system and to test for fuel degradation in an arctic environment, the official notice stated. The Pentagon has proposed spending $8 billion on missile defense in its latest budget proposal.

Birmingham (AL) News August 17, 2001 Incinerator Report Spurs Siegelman Warning By Rose Livingston Myers, News staff writer ANNISTON -- Gov. Don Siegelman pounced on a watchdog agency's findings that Anniston is not prepared for a chemical weapons incinerator, repeating a warning that he will not support next spring's start-up unless safety measures are in place. The governor wrote President Bush on Thursday after being briefed on a General Accounting Office study that said Calhoun County is hamstrung in its efforts to prepare by tight purse strings in the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA officials dispute the study's conclusions. The governor has the power to block the burning of chemical weapons because he must sign off on the incinerator before it is allowed to begin operation. "I cannot support the Army's efforts to begin the destruction phase of the chemical demilitarization program until all critical preparedness and safety issues for our state are resolved," Siegelman wrote. His letter was read during a press conference called by Calhoun County commissioners. They've been seeking financial help while warning that an accident with the $1 billion incinerator that will be burning tons of lethal nerve agent at the Anniston Army Depot could mean disaster for the 75,000 people living around it. They called on federal agencies to take immediate action to correct the safety shortfalls. "Now is not the time for feel-good public relations campaigns or more studies," said Mike Burney, director of the county emergency management agency. County leaders were especially angry that the GAO found $41 million intended for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program sitting in a federal account. FEMA has refused requests for staffing, software and equipment based on a lack of money. "Over and over, we were told no because the federal government didn't have the money. Now we know that that is just not true. They were sitting on $40 million," Commissioner Robert Downing said. Commissioners estimate their needs at about $100 million, including $10 million for protective hoods for 35,000 residents living and working near the incinerator and $70 million to improve evacuation routes. Their list of needs includes staff to keep the EMA open 24 hours, upgraded software and money for to over-pressurize hospitals, schools, nursing homes and day-care centers to keep tainted air out in case of a leak. "One morning we are going to wake up, if we do wake up, and there's going to be thousands dead and we'll be standing around pointing fingers," said David Baker, head of the group Community Against Pollution. But county officials don't expect the GAO report to produce a miracle. Even if more money starts flowing now, Burney said, it would take until 2003 to finish preparations he believes are needed. FEMA officials in Washington on Thursday disputed the GAO's conclusions. The agency's response to the report contained a typographical error and should have read that FEMA does not concur that Calhoun County is "far from being fully prepared," said Russell Salter, director of FEMA's technological hazards division. The data in GAO's report show that 13 of 19 critical items for emergency response have been met in Alabama, four are partially met and two are unmet. "That shows there is a much better picture than what was presented in the narrative section of the report," Salter said. The two unmet criteria affect Calhoun County. Five other Alabama counties that could be affected by a leak are fully ready, FEMA officials said. However, FEMA's written response also said, "While FEMA does concur with GAO that readiness may still be advanced in a number of communities, the ability to protect the public health and safety is currently present in all communities, except for Calhoun County, Alabama. FEMA is focusing resources and attention on Calhoun County." News Washington correspondent Mary Orndorff contributed to this report.

InsideDefense.com August 20, 2001 E-2C Hawkeye Successfully Tracks Ballistic Missile Target A Navy E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft equipped with a new infrared sensor last month successfully detected and tracked a theater ballistic missile target launched from White Sands Missile Range, NM, Northrop Grumman said today. The company, which produces the aircraft, is part of a team developing the Surveillance Infrared Search and Track (SIRST) sensor, which also includes the Navy and Raytheon. The July 9 exercise was the first live-fire test of the SIRST sensor, Northrop Grumman said in a statement. The heart of the SIRST system is a small infrared sensor located on the nose of the E-2C. Processors, controllers and displays inside the aircraft provide the detection and tracking information to the E-2C mission crew, the company said. "We went into this first test knowing it would perform well because of the successful number of simulated missile detections when evaluated against our Universal Missile Simulator," said Philip Teel, Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems vice president for airborne early warning and electronic systems. To support the SIRST Phase, Northrop Grumman developed the Universal Missile Simulator, a hardware-in-the- loop simulator that allows a variety of calibrated, simulated moving targets to be presented to an infrared search and track sensor for testing. The simulator presents an image of a missile through a projection telescope so that it appears to be at a great distance. "The missile launch scenario could be exactly repeated many times, and parameters varied, to generate confidence in a statistical probability of success of the SIRST, as shown by this first live-fire test," according to a company statement. "SIRST performed even better than expected when confronted with an actual missile launch," Teel said. The program goal is the development of a fleet-wide missile detection and tracking capability for the "Advanced Hawkeye," the next generation of the E-2C that is expected to follow after the current production Hawkeye 2000. "The data from this successful test will be analyzed and applied along with data from the other program phases to further improve the system," the Northrop Grumman statement reads. Other phases of the program, some of which are ongoing, have analyzed the use of different missile-tracking sensors and the placement of sensors on the aircraft. The Navy is leading the team and conducting the flight test program. Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Systems business unit is responsible for SIRST system integration with the E-2C, vehicle installation, control interface, as well as supporting ground- and flight-testing. Raytheon Systems of El Segundo, CA, is responsible for the subsystem design and integration. The Navy programmed funds for five Hawkeyes in its fiscal year 2002 defense budget request. The service is asking Congress for $96 million for the E-2C radar modernization program to provide the Navy with a capability for overland surveillance for air defense against over-the-horizon surface-to-air missiles, Inside the Navy reported last month. -- John Liang

Aviation Week & Space Technology August 20, 2001 Pg. 58 Aging Weapons And Staff Strain Nuclear Complex Cash-strapped U.S. strategists ask: Is the nuclear stockpile still a viable deterrent--and can we afford it? By William B. Scott, Washington, Albuquerque and Los Alamos, N.M. The Bush Administration's reviews of U.S. nuclear policies and posture comes at a critical time as senior scientists and government officials express concern about an unacknowledged strategic defense deficiency: the nation may already be close to unilateral nuclear disarmament. Some of those experts believe U.S. nuclear capabilities, while still robust, are far weaker than citizens have been led to believe. As a result, President George W. Bush's offer to shrink the U.S. nuclear arsenal in trade for a beefed-up National Missile Defense system, and his administration's plans to prepare for resumption of underground testing, may be tacit admission of that deficiency. The potential impact of these factors will be assessed by participants in the National Defense Review, Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review. Their recommendations could drastically reshape the nation's nuclear complex. The U.S.' ability to design, build, test and deploy a new nuclear weapon is increasingly at risk, government officials told Aviation Week & Space Technology. An aging workforce and infrastructure, difficulties in recruiting and retaining young scientists and engineers to design and maintain nuclear weapons, and low morale borne of frustration with heavy-handed security policies have had an impact on the nation's nuclear capabilities. Without decisive action, problems will only worsen, they said. Few recruits today, for example, will accept scrutiny of their finances, routine polygraph exams and random drug testing as a condition of employment. MEANWHILE, THE EXISTING arsenal is aging rapidly. National leaders responsible for maintaining and annually certifying the stockpile believe those thousands of approximately 13-year-old (average) weapons are still functional and safe, but signs of deterioration are becoming more evident ( AW&ST May 21, p. 42). Nobody can predict how long existing weapons will last, or how much refurbishment can be tolerated without having to conduct a full-up underground test detonation. Those same leaders are even more worried, however, that the handful of highly skilled scientists, engineers and technicians who embody the nation's core of weapons knowledge--the "nuclear intellectual capital"--is rapidly disappearing (see p. 61). Without them, the stockpile becomes an unknown quantity, no new weapons can be built and the U.S. has effectively unilaterally disarmed. "If the smart people are gone--the ones who designed, built and tested nuclear weapons all their lives--how can we be sure these things will work?" a former Los Alamos executive asked. "In the last 10 years, we chased off those smart people, and they're not being replaced. Without that knowledge [base], we've unilaterally disarmed." If the nation, after careful study and debate, had chosen to rid itself of nuclear weapons, the current situation would be acceptable. But disarmament by default is not, he opined. However, critics of the U.S. nuclear weapons program see little cause for alarm, and suggest these current deficiencies might entice leaders to pursue disarmament more aggressively. "Do we really need nuclear weapons? I don't think we do," declared David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, who has served as an Energy Dept. adviser on nuclear laboratory security. "We have a nuclear test ban in place, and a lot of nuclear weapons were just inherited [from the Cold War]," Albright said. "We're spending a lot of money to maintain them, and there's a lot of waste in the program. And I'm not sure what nuclear weapons buy you in today's world." Even a few retired generals have challenged the need for an arsenal of nuclear bombs and warheads, because the devices are considered "militarily unusable" in a shooting war. Indeed, wargames have repeatedly shown political leaders are reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in a regional conflict--even when the other side does. One ex-USAF four-star general said nuclear weapons also siphon badly needed funds from both tactical and "realistic" strategic systems. Political debate and partisan posturing notwithstanding, the White House, Congress and Pentagon may decide to press ahead with a National Missile Defense system because that may be the only viable long-term option, some nuclear experts believe. Contrary to arguments put forth by NMD critics, the nation's ability to sustain a nuclear- based, Cold War mutual assured destruction (MAD) policy is fast disappearing because its very foundation--a strong nuclear weapons program--is withering. Political arguments about abrogating or honoring the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty have become moot, since both U.S. and then-Soviet nuclear capabilities have changed drastically, a lab scientist said. WHETHER BY DESIGN or through benign neglect, the U.S. nuclear weapons complex suffered greatly under the Clinton Administration. Changing priorities whipsawed the design laboratories, in particular, and steadily undermined a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy for the last 50 years--deterrence through nuclear strength ( AW&ST July 30, p. 26). And the result? The reliability and deterrence value of today's rapidly aging nuclear stockpile is now in a literal race against time, according to nuclear lab officials. To be fair, the downhill slide began under the first Bush Administration, when a decision was made to cease underground testing and production of atomic weapons. Rocky Flats (Colo.), the nation's last facility capable of building plutonium pits--the heart of a thermonuclear weapon--stopped production in 1989. Today, only a small facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), N.M., has that capability. When Bill Clinton's team moved into the White House, it quickly declared that no new nuclear weapons would be designed, built or tested. Administration staffers made it clear that "nukes" were far down on the President's list of priorities. That message was sent--and received--loud and clear in April 1993, when Clinton visited Los Alamos. An advance team was adamant that the new president "not be told anything about nuclear weapons," according to a former lab official. LANL executives were allowed to show Clinton robotics demonstrations and supercomputers, but anything related to nuclear weapons was absolutely off-limits. THIS WAS SOMEWHAT unnerving to executives of a laboratory born during the Manhattan Project, a top-secret World War II program dedicated to building the first atomic bomb. By 1993, LANL still devoted 80% or more of its annual budget to weapons work. In 1995, the Administration launched a new science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) aimed at extending indefinitely the life of existing weapons (see p. 63). The initiative was an astute stopgap compromise conceived by Victor Reis, who was Energy Dept. assistant secretary for defense programs at the time. Reis understood that, with no prospect of new weapons being designed and developed, the national laboratories' scientists, engineers and technicians would not be intellectually challenged and would ultimately leave for more interesting work elsewhere. STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP remains a costly effort to provide those highly skilled experts an opportunity to "do interesting science" while also extending the stockpile's reliable lifetime. To retain "the best and brightest, we need programs that are relevant to weapons in the stockpile--programs that are solving real problems," Reis said when SSP was unveiled ( AW&ST July 17, 1995, p. 24). However, the Administration and Congress never funded SSP adequately, frustrating the Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia laboratories' managers and scientists charged with extending the stockpile's lifetime. White House ambivalence toward nuclear bombs and warheads in the 1990s also reflected the attitudes of many citizens and congressmen who "just wanted nuclear weapons to go away" after the Cold War ended, said a current LANL executive. Such head-in-the-sand mindsets bred many of today's weapons, personnel, infrastructure and morale problems, he and his colleagues claim. Now, a growing number of concerned government leaders are calling for a reversal--although some fear it may be too late. "We have some serious problems in the [nuclear] weapons complex, and they need to be addressed. It's going to take money to address them, too," declared Rep. Heather Wilson (R.-N.M.). "We're always going to have a nuclear stockpile. Once you've stolen fire from the gods, you can't give it back. We can't 'un-invent' these weapons. When you think about the mission of this relatively small complex, for $4-5 billion a year, [the labs] provide safety, reliability and stewardship of the most powerful weapons ever invented by man. That's not a big price to pay." A former U.S. Air Force officer who helped "bed-down" nuclear-armed cruise missiles in the U.K. during the mid- 1980s, Wilson later worked on arms control issues. She leftUSAF in 1989 and served on the National Security Council staff for two years as the European Defense Policy and Arms Control director. Where nuclear weapons fit into a revised national security strategy is the subject of several Pentagon and high-level government reviews launched by the Bush Administration. The trial balloon Bush floated in May--suggesting the nuclear stockpile's size could be reduced by retiring some weapons--provided an early glimpse of how those reviews are progressing ( AW&ST May 7, pp. 66 and 90). Bush's statements did not mean the nation could abandon its nuclear deterrence stance and ultimately scrap the weapons, though. "I personally see the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future . . . [due to] the impossibility of ever 'un-inventing' them or erasing from the human mind the knowledge of how to build such weapons," C. Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories, wrote in a comprehensive white paper earlier this year. His treatise proposed a new nuclear weapons policy tailored to 21st century threats. "Nuclear weapons are going to remain a very vital part of our system of broad deterrence, but some of the approaches may change, and the number of deployed systems may change," predicted John A. Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). "I don't see a lessening of the importance of the [nuclear weapons] mission at all. I've seen no signals from those involved [in reviews] that would suggest that." To underscore that point, Gordon recently asked nuclear lab officials whether the Nevada Test Site was prepared to resume underground testing, signaling that such actions are being contemplated. The NNSA was created about two years ago to oversee nuclear weapons issues in the wake of suspicions that U.S. warhead design secrets had been leaked to China. A retired USAF general who once held positions at the CIA and Sandia, Gordon has strived to get high-profile lab security problems resolved, while simultaneously attempting to put the weapons program on a firm footing. He acknowledges walking a tightrope on security--trying to stop the outflow of technical talent from the labs by mitigating hot-button issues, yet satisfying congressional demands for tight controls. "I THINK WE'RE MAKING slow but steady progress--slower than I would like, but steady and in the [right] direction," he said. "This organization [NNSA] was formed to bring together the military nuclear issues of the country. We need technology and common sense to work for us, [but] there have been rules, regulations and complexities from Washington that made this harder. [Lab employees] are smart people. They know when rules don't make a difference and are just eyewash. They just ask that any new controls and procedures add value to security." Although still part of the Energy Dept., NNSA is considered a semi-autonomous entity focused on weapons activities. Wilson and other members of Congress believe even more autonomy for NNSA is essential to rescuing the nuclear weapons program. Until the Defense Dept.'s national security reviews are completed, though, nobody will predict whether a rescue attempt will be undertaken.

Aviation Week & Space Technology August 20, 2001 Pg. 63 Nursing Weapons Is Tougher Than Expected By William B. Scott, Washington, Albuquerque and Los Alamos Eight years into the U.S. Energy and Defense departments' Stockpile Stewardship Program, scientists and laboratory managers are cautiously optimistic that they can extend the life of the nation's nuclear arsenal for several years, although doubts remain. Further complicating Pentagon and Energy nuclear policy reviews is a growing constituency on Capitol Hill and within the national laboratories for possible resumption of underground testing. It might not occur in the near-term, but testing may ultimately be necessary to guarantee the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile, some officials believe. A Washington decision to test or not will depend largely on the conclusions of current reviews devoted to assessing how nuclear weapons fit into a 21st century national security policy. Based on today's threats, Bush Administration officials have said shrinking the nuclear stockpile in exchange for a robust missile defense system may be in order. On the other hand, they've also suggested a new round of underground nuclear tests might be needed, both for stockpile assurance and, possibly, development of a new weapon tailored to today's realities. Indeed, John A. Gordon, chief of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), recently asked about the Nevada Test Site's readiness state. THESE MOVES REFLECT Washington's uneasiness with how the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is progressing. So far, results have been mixed, yet encouraging, according to the scientists directly involved. Still, government officials are wondering how long the life of nuclear weapons can realistically be extended without testing. "We don't know whether science-based stockpile stewardship is going to work over the long haul," Rep. Heather Wilson (R-N.M.) said. "There may come a point where the people responsible for that nuclear stockpile will have to go to the President and say, 'We have to test.' We need to accept that [possibility]." "Frankly, that [stewardship] program was not as well defined at the start as it could have been," Gordon noted. "We're now putting it on a project basis--individuals charged with milestones and schedules" as a way to improve SSP's efficiencies and results. Additional money allocated for the program also has helped. Management changes may temporarily mollify critics such as David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, who have challenged the program's costs and objectives. "There's a lot of waste in the [nuclear weapons] program. I think we're spending too much money on stockpile stewardship--things like [the National Ignition Facility] and other big toys for the scientists," he said. "Some of the motivation for those [facilities] was to make interesting science, so people would actually work at the labs." THE STEWARDSHIP EFFORT EVOLVED from a number of factors: *Cessation of U.S. nuclear weapon testing in 1992. *A decision not to build any new weapons. *Shutting down the nation's entire nuclear weapon production complex in 1989. *Significant downsizing of the nuclear stockpile in the 1990s, including the retiring of several weapon types. *Signing of START treaties, which detailed how the U.S., the then-Soviet Union and later, Russia, would reduce the number of weapons and delivery systems. *An aging nuclear-complex workforce. *An aging lab and production infrastructure. Some buildings and facilities dating back to the 1940s and 1950s are literally crumbling, but are still in use (see p. 67). For the first several decades of the nuclear era, the U.S. continually refined its nuclear weapons and replaced old ones with new devices. The average age of a stockpiled "nuke" rarely exceeded about eight years. As the state-of- the-art in missiles and aircraft evolved, "we'd tailor the warheads to the new delivery vehicle. It was a constantly evolving set of designs," C. Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories, said. "When the decision was made to not build any new weapons, and keep an 'enduring stockpile' instead, we had to start worrying about how fast these things age. Now, we have the oldest stockpile we've ever had--about 13 years [average] now. Nobody's said any of these [aging] problems are serious enough that we have to go test, but some doubt in the [nuclear package] is slowly growing." AT THE WORKING LEVEL, scientists at the Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories are dealing daily with both the intrigues and vagaries of stockpile stewardship. In general, their confidence in SSP has grown, but they remain uncertain about its long-term effectiveness and the labs' pool of nuclear-savvy brainpower. "It looks like we are going to need nuclear weapons for decades, so we have to find a way to maintain confidence in their performance and safety. That's a nontrivial problem," explained Gregory Canavan, senior science adviser for physics at Los Alamos. "Can we still do our job of certifying the safety and reliability of weapons? Yes, I think so. There are a lot of issues, but, by and large, we have the people to do that. Attracting the smart young people to continue doing that in the future is a lot harder." The "surveillance" part of stockpile stewardship is hardly new. Even when the U.S. was conducting underground tests of nuclear weapons, about half of them were to evaluate the stockpile. The other half was aimed at "improving our scientific understanding of the physics involved in those devices . . . to get predictability of their function in all sorts of environments," Robinson said. TODAY, THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM relies on regular inspections of weapons pulled from the nation's nuclear arsenal. On average, 11 of each type weapon are scrutinized on a two-year cycle, although the actual number depends on how many of a particular type is in the stockpile. Eleven was chosen for "statistical confidence" reasons. For a given weapon type inspected every two years, "we have a 90% confidence level that we'll catch defects in 10% of the stockpile," said Rick C. Wayne, director of Stockpile Systems for Sandia. The predominantly engineering-oriented Sandia lab handles most of the nonnuclear components in a weapon. The design laboratories, Livermore and Los Alamos, are responsible for the nuclear or "physics package." "So far, we've seen some--not a lot--of age-related defects--but enough to worry us," Wayne said. "Things like epoxy seals are beginning to leak. We've seen energetic materials, like the bridge wire in a detonator, that are corroding, and it's just a matter of time until the wire's gone." He was referring to a gold wire that is heated when a high electrical current passes through it, detonating the nonnuclear high explosive in a weapon. The resulting symmetrical implosion compresses the weapon's nuclear components, triggering a nuclear chain reaction and detonation. Three major weapon refurbishments are now underway as part of a Service Life Extension Program. Sandia is doing most of the work on the W76 and W80 warheads, and Los Alamos is handling the B61-7/11 bomb. For example, Sandia is replacing detonators and a safety device called a "rolamite," a rolling mass inside a tube. The rolamite senses acceleration, activating the weapon only if the proper launch or delivery profile is followed. Leaking epoxy seals could cause rolamites to latch prematurely with unpredictable results. ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM area is semiconductor degradation in the electronics sections of weapons. Some warheads and bombs now in the stockpile are 20+ years old. "There isn't a lot of industry knowledge about 20-year-old semiconductors--and ours sit in close proximity to nuclear material, [exposing] them to low-radiation yields. We're seeing some changes, and we're trying to understand what those changes will do to [weapon] functionality," Wayne said. Inspectors also are finding cracks and voids at semiconductor interconnects, probably due to long-term stress. All organic materials, such as foams, cushions, pads, insulation and certain supports are at risk, because "organics are not infinite-life materials," he noted. WHILE CERTAIN ELECTRICAL and mechanical components can be replaced with a high degree of confidence that a weapon will continue to function as intended, the "nuclear package" is an entirely different story. Scientists are seeing age-related problems in the highly sensitive heart of weapons, and are facing a certainty that the "pit" (a complex assembly of shells containing fissile material) will have to be replaced someday. Unprecedented changes in materials that were never encountered or of concern when underground tests provided the ultimate validation are now subjected to intense scrutiny. In the past, either the weapon worked or it didn't. Today, such certainty is painfully lacking. "Suddenly I'm worried about things that I never considered in the past," Jas Mercer-Smith, a Los Alamos deputy program director and nuclear weapons designer, said. "The things we did then, with testing, are very different than what we do now, without testing. We're now working with--and have to really understand--small differences, because we can't make the grand leap and test. We're relying on calculations in a much more fundamental and integral way than we ever did before. "These [weapons] are very highly optimized systems, so we're going to make the most minimal, small changes possible. Then we have to prove to ourselves that they don't matter," he said. "Ultimately, do we think the 'pit' we're remaking will work? Sure, or we wouldn't be doing it. But proving it will work is really, really hard [without testing]." That refurbished-weapon-proving process--known as "certification" prior to entering the stockpile--is the primary motivator behind Washington officials' consternation about resumption of underground testing--a politically unpopular move guaranteed to inflame both domestic and international antinuclear forces. And yet, certification without testing has put laboratory officials and scientists in a conundrum--having to guarantee weapon performance and safety, but having little on which to base those judgments. Some weapons originally expected to be retired from the stockpile in eight years are already 20-25 years old. "And we're now envisioning lifetimes of 40-60 years or longer," a weapons scientist said. "How can we predict the behavior of high explosives, plutonium, plastics and polymers at lifetimes double what we've experienced?" A few clever accelerated-lifetime tests may answer some of those questions by simulating 45-60-year-old materials, but the results won't be known until 2004-05, at the earliest. Very little is known about plutonium aging, in particular. "Most materials age from the outside in, but plutonium is a unique material. It ages both outside in and inside out," said Joe Martz, Los Alamos' manager for Enhanced Surveillance. As the plutonium-containing pit experiences natural radioactive decay, helium particles and uranium nuclei are released. Helium builds up over time, forming bubbles that cause the plutonium to swell. The uranium decay has an even greater potential impact. One uranium atom can knock about 20,000 plutonium atoms from their sites in a crystal lattice, Martz said. Although most of those return to their original position, dislodged plutonium atoms can cause significant changes in the material's properties--a phenomenon called "recoil damage." TO UNDERSTAND THESE and thousands of other issues related to extending the lifetimes of existing weapons, the stewardship program launched the development of new tools. Computers and software capable of performing trillions of mathematical operations per second have been developed under the Accelerated Computing Initiative (Asci), and faster machines are in the offing. Diagnostic and test systems such as the Dual-Axis Radiographic HydroTest (Dahrt) and Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (Lansce) facilities generate high-energy X-rays and pulsed neutron and proton beams to create detailed internal images of subscale detonations. So far, Asci, Dahrt and Lansce have produced encouraging results. John Browne, Los Alamos lab director, said images obtained through proton radiography are "very exciting." This process uses high-energy protons rather than X-rays to peer inside a detonation. X-rays scatter badly, with only about one of 10 making it through the resulting debris. With protons, 15-20% penetrate the explosion, and the proton beam can be magnetically focused on specific areas of interest. Even "proton movies" can be made, enabling better understanding of a detonation's progression. THESE BIG-SCIENCE FACILITIES needed for SSP can exact a staggering price, though, draining funds from other stewardship efforts. One lightning rod for SSP critics is the massive National Ignition Facility (NIF) being built at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which will cost about $2.5 billion and be completed in 2008. As one of five key elements of SSP, the NIF will feature a laser with 192 beams focused simultaneously on a pea-sized pellet containing deuterium and tritium, two isotopes of hydrogen. The 1.8 megajoules of energy dumped into that pellet will trigger a minute-scale reaction duplicating the extreme temperatures found inside a nuclear weapon detonation (or stars), scientists are quick to point out. The NIF project has attracted criticism from both houses of Congress--although some regional competition is obvious. Last year, Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) warned that NIF must get its programmatics under control this year, or the project could be axed. His district includes both Sandia and Los Alamos labs. In the House, another New Mexico voice, Rep. Wilson, said, "We have a huge problem with the National Ignition Facility in California. Its budget overruns will impact the rest of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It's become very difficult to continue building something that's way over budget, at the expense of other science-based stewardship program [elements]." FOLLOWING SOME management changes and detailed reviews, the NIF program appears to be emerging from those dark clouds, though. "A year ago, the problems were because NIF was being run as a science project that really required some tough, hard-nosed management," NNSA's Gordon said. "We now have superb managers, [and] there's an energy there that's very highly focused." George H. Miller, LLNL's associate director for NIF programs, said NIF is now meeting its new budget and milestones. Badly needed money has been added to the program, and there are no technical showstoppers anticipated, despite some remaining challenges. In countering some scientists' view that NIF money could be better spent elsewhere within SSP, Miller claimed that no other stewardship-related facility could duplicate a thermonuclear weapon's temperatures and pressures. Indeed, Gordon said the facility was "absolutely essential" to the success of SSP. Cost of the entire stewardship program was not only underestimated when it was launched by the Clinton Administration, but it has been chronically underfunded ever since. "I'm not sure the public--or even the full Congress--understood that [banning] nuclear testing was not a 'peace dividend.' It was a 'peace cost.' Stockpile stewardship is not a money-saving operation. It costs a lot more for simulation tools, hydrodynamic test facilities, etc. than it did to do underground testing," Sandia's Wayne said. Rep. Wilson noted that last year's budget was "the first time SSP was made whole" since it began in 1993. Still, the national laboratories, in particular, are struggling to accomplish all they've been tasked to do within their budget caps. THE U.S. DECISION TO EXTEND the life of its existing nuclear weapons indefinitely, without testing, has presented daunting challenges, but scientists also are making discoveries that might never have occurred had it not been for SSP. By having to probe the physics of nuclear detonations in detail, "we're finding that, in a few areas, we were just flat-out wrong in the past," Mercer-Smith declared. "Some of the models we had in the back of our minds--about how these bombs worked, how materials behaved under extreme conditions, for example--were rather naive," he said. "With the [computer limitations] we had then, we were stuck in a two-dimensional world. We had to make terrible approximations and couldn't really resolve any small-scale features. That worked fine--as long as we could test. Still, things didn't work the way we thought they would maybe 15-20% of the time. With the Asci computers today, though, we have the computing ability and memory to start putting in all the details. That computing power allows us to ask questions to a new level of detail. "So, does this mean we're going to be able to continue certifying the stockpile for an indefinite future [without testing]? My answer is: 'I don't know.' The problems are still very, very hard. We've done very well in some areas, and not so well in others," Mercer-Smith concluded.

Aviation Week & Space Technology August 20, 2001 Pg. 66 Will National Security Reviewers Propose A New 'Nuke'? By William B. Scott, Colorado Springs Bush Administration reviews of U.S. national strategic policies and plans may produce a startling recommendation later this year: develop, build and deploy a new nuclear weapon, according to Energy Dept. and Pentagon officials. Their predictions are based on Defense Dept. and congressional concerns that the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal, which was tailored to Cold War scenarios, is unsuitable for deterring today's evolving global threats. Many scientists in the nuclear complex firmly believe the U.S. has far more warheads and bombs than it needs, and that building a new weapon to contemporary requirements would enable "tremendous reductions of the stockpile, with the associated cost savings," one said. Smaller-yield weapons are feasible options today, given technology advancements and greatly improved targeting accuracy. Retiring aging weapons that are no longer viable as a deterrent, and replacing a portion of them with a new one, would appear to be compatible with the Bush Administration's policy that it is time to abandon the Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD philosophy. For decades, MAD adherents maintained that global stability is achieved through mutual fear. If a nation was to launch a nuclear first-strike, it is almost guaranteed to be annihilated by a counter strike. MAD is the cornerstone of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but is really only effective in a bipolar world where two nations can threaten each other with destruction, according to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Scientists who designed and built today's nuclear arsenal are acutely aware of the horror those weapons can inflict, but believe their existence has prevented a global-scale war for more than 50 years. However, some claim the overly powerful, aging devices now in the stockpile are no longer a true deterrent and, under the right conditions, should be retired. "Surprisingly, many people in today's military and nuclear lab complex are [receptive] to reducing the stockpile's size. There's a whole class of threats out there that cannot be countered by the nuclear option," one veteran weapon designer said. "But, unless our overall global posture changes, there's still a role for nuclear deterrence--but maybe not on the scale we've had in the past. It certainly deserves a new review, and that's what's happening now." While the politically volatile concept of developing a new warhead or bomb has been the subject of whispers by military officers and weapon scientists for several years, it was made public during confirmation hearings for the new Energy Dept. secretary, Spencer Abraham. A senator asked the nominee whether it was time for a new- generation warhead design, suggesting that the secrets of existing weapons had been lost to China. Abraham sidestepped the question, saying he would work within the new administration to address the issue. No official is ready to say a resumption of nuclear weapon development is in the offing, but carefully worded responses to Aviation Week & Space Technology queries left the door open to such a possibility. "There are individuals in several organizations who believe there are real and specific needs for certain types of weapons," said John A. Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration. "We need to get those views validated--or not validated--through these [Defense and Energy Dept.] reviews." Proponents believe the Bush team has a good chance of convincing Congress and others that a new nuclear warhead or bomb is warranted because it would enable retiring "city-buster" weapons now in the stockpile. "The deterrent force today was never designed for the realities of the 21st century. Every weapon developed in the past was [tailored to] the military requirements and constraints imposed by the nuclear-weapon complex at the time," said a scientist who asked that he not be identified. "Why should it be different now?" An Energy Dept. manager said he believes the Bush Administration will offer Congress a trade for the go-ahead to develop a new-generation nuclear weapon--a willingness to sign the international Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Administration will argue that rather than promoting nuclear proliferation, the new device would give the U.S. enough confidence in its long-term deterrent capability to sign the CTBT. Besides, the manager added, the barrier to nuclear proliferation has always been access to weapon-quality fissile material. By retiring old weapons and only building a limited number of new ones, the overall supply of material should shrink substantially, reducing proliferation risks. The Senate refused to ratify the CTBT two years ago, claiming it was too restrictive and compromised national security, while not adequately curbing nuclear proliferation. President Bill Clinton had made ratification of the CTBT a high priority of his tenure, and had pressured nuclear weapons complex leaders to give the "right" answers during testimony before the Senate. Weapons now in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were designed and built to exacting tolerances and weight limitations. Minimum weight was dictated by the need to carry multiple warheads on a single strategic missile, such as the Peacekeeper and Minuteman III. Many of those constraints no longer exist, thanks to STARTarms-reduction treaty provisions that stipulate missiles will be converted to single-warhead configurations. Weapon designers said a simpler, more-robust warhead could be developed if the Pentagon would relax some no- longer-necessary requirements. "Right now, the biggest constraint we have is weight. If the military would give us another 10-15% of the [launch] vehicle [capacity], we could work wonders in terms of robustness. Right now, we design everything very close to the 'cliffs'--to high tolerances," a national laboratory scientist said. "With the test experience and tools we have now, we could design a new weapon that moves us away from those cliffs." Even those normally on the anti-nuclear side of the fence see benefits to developing a new weapon. "One idea that's been promoted, and that we support, is building a simple nuclear weapon--a gun-type [of device]--that would satisfy our needs," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. "We'd rebuild the entire arsenal over a period of time, but using highly enriched uranium rather than plutonium. That would create fewer environmental problems and be more acceptable to the public. "That would probably require testing of the new weapons," he noted. "We're not supporting [resumption of] testing, but we're intrigued by this idea. We're still afraid it could open up a new nuclear weapons development and production race. But we believe we have to think about this, due to . . . our concern that [existing] weapons are too sophisticated to be preserved far into the future."

Aviation Week & Space Technology August 20, 2001 Pg. 78 Nuclear Weapons -- A Role Beyond MAD By G. Paul Robinson Ambassador G. Paul Robinson is president and laboratories director of Sandia National Laboratories. From 1988- 90 he was chief U.S. negotiator with the Soviet Union for nuclear testing talks in Geneva. One of the most important subjects in our lives is also one of the most poorly understood--deterrence. The word's origin is the Latin terre, meaning to frighten. The concept is as old as human history: to prevent the taking of an action by fear of the consequences. During the Cold War, deterrence of a major conflict between the two superpowers--the U.S. and the Soviet Union, each armed with large numbers of nuclear weapons--took on a critical importance. More than a decade since the Cold War ended, we are still in search of a deeper understanding of deterrence, including the role of nuclear weapons in the current world situation. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has warned, "The number of countries developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction is growing. The number of ballistic missiles and . . . countries possessing them are growing, as well." Our challenge is to find ways to reduce the coercive power and military utility of these weapons of mass destruction. In the past decade, many inside and outside government have attempted to "delegitimize" nuclear weapons. At the same time, the failure within our own government to articulate a compelling role and purpose for nuclear weapons has played into the hands of those who believe they should be abolished. It is time for the public again to grasp the essential fact that deterrence through nuclear weapons will continue to be of vital importance in maintaining the peace and preventing world wars. Still, a new approach to deterrence is needed. We can reduce the inventories of the weapons, but we must transform U.S. nuclear capabilities so that they become more credible for deterring major conflicts in any corner of the world. Better yet, we should be seeking to transform our arsenal in ways to help dissuade potential adversaries from ever acquiring weapons of mass destruction in the first place. It is with some pride that I note the evolution of U.S. deterrent policy over the course of several decades to include a fundamental tenet: the U.S. will not directly or systematically target civilians. Although one would hope to be able to continue to deter aggression without having to use nuclear weapons, a future president might someday once again be faced with the choice either to use nuclear weapons, or to sit by and witness huge casualties through an adversary's use of weapons of mass destruction. It would be a shame if, in order to hold at risk an adversary's leadership and military, the lives of large numbers of civilians would have to be placed in jeopardy as well. Thus, it is important to transform some portion of the U.S. strategic arsenal specifically to deter wider threats than the mutual assured destruction (MAD) we contemplated during the Cold War. This transformation of the arsenal to lower yield levels with more precise delivery can reinforce the credibility of the U.S. deterrent force, ensuring that a future president does not have to make such a stark choice. Transforming our deterrent to deal with wider threats will not make the use of nuclear weapons more likely, as critics will undoubtedly charge. It will in fact ensure their deterrent value is not lessened as we face future threats from different corners. In several past crises, U.S. presidents have warned that "unspeakable destruction" could be the consequence for other nations if they should resort to weapons of mass destruction. Although we have been careful not to suggest this would necessarily mean we would use nuclear weapons, we have left it for the aggressor to think hard about whether we indeed might. I suggest that those who believe this is not a proper course of action on our part have the obligation to show how such attacks might be deterred by any other means. As Margaret Thatcher reminded us in 1985, quoting Winston Churchill: "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other means of preserving the peace are in your hands." The creation of nuclear weapons may yet prove to be a blessing to mankind, rather than a curse. Their overwhelming destructive force has proved to be a sobering force that can compel all sides to "come to their senses" before the world again experiences such losses as both world wars produced. I believe we all have an obligation to be certain this remains so.

Canada unprepared for biological attack: Report Department of National Defence evaluation finds forces under-trained CALGARY (CP) — Canada is years behind its allies in its ability to handle a biological or chemical terrorist attack, warns a secret government report. A National Defence evaluation completed in May found that budget constraints have left the Canadian Forces under-trained, vulnerable and scrambling to fix the situation. "Resource shortfalls in (nuclear biological and chemical defence) and medical research and development could have long-term capability consequences," warns the 140-page report, obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act. Evaluators found no long-term plan to equip and maintain the first response team for nuclear, biological or chemical threats. That's despite expectations at all levels of government that the Forces would be able to respond to any such incident in Canada regardless of its size or scope. "Given the amounts of money being spent by allies to develop capability, there is considerable "hype" about the issue," notes the report, which is heavily censored and marked "SECRET: Canadian Eyes Only." "Attack using (nuclear, biological or chemical) weapons could have high consequence." The report says significant work must be done over the next five to seven years to upgrade operations and training. The United Kingdom recently created a joint regiment involving significant training for biological and chemical specialists. The United States has a chemical corps in the army and other specialists available. The Americans have also spent millions training the National Guard for biological and chemical defence and prepared a large reserve component for special duties in the area. In contrast, the report notes Canada has "some efforts underway to make increased use of land and air reserve personnel in certain restricted . . . roles which would be complementary to regular forces." A troubling conclusion is that few Canadian Forces personnel are interested in becoming specialists in chemical or biological defence. "This employment is seen as career limiting (and) outside the mainstream," says the report. It does not say how many people within the army, navy or air force are qualified to deal with chemical or biological threats. Biological agents include infectious diseases such as anthrax and the smallpox virus. It does say individuals sent to the chemical defence unit are rarely qualified. "It would have been expected that individuals posted to this directorate would have the necessary advanced qualifications prior to their arrival," the report says. "With few exceptions, this has not been the case." Evaluators say Canada's armed forces have limited capability to train medical personnel about the risks of chemical or biological risks. They also note that the distribution of protective equipment is fragmented and that no framework exists to measure performance. Improved communication between the different sections of the Canadian Forces is urgently needed. The report says intelligence is not being passed through the chain of command, leaving lower level personnel feeling that they aren't getting enough information. "There is a definite need for better structure," the report says. "This requires the attention of senior level leadership in all departments and agencies if it is to be successful." National Defence officials were not available to discuss the report. But a working group was recently established to review its recommendations and develop an implementation plan. An updated strategy is to be in place by March 2002. That's just months before world leaders are to converge on tiny Kananaskis Country, an hour west of Calgary, for the G-8 summit in late June. Security consultant Alan Bell says the conclusions are no surprise. And he's skeptical the situation will be sorted out within the next year, despite recent warnings from Canada's intelligence agency, CSIS, which highlighted the growing threat of biological and chemical terrorism. "Until something happens and thousands of people die, nothing's going to get done," said Bell, of Toronto-based Globe Risk Holdings. "The Canadian government is not going to spend millions and millions of dollars preparing for a situation that could or probably will not happen. Unfortunately, that is a fact of life . . .(and) any plan that's hastily botched together in the next 10 months before the next G-8 summit will be superficial. It'll just scratch the surface." This is the first evaluation of Canada's defence capabilities in the area since 1985. There are some bright spots. The report praises military researchers in defensive chemical, biological and radiological areas as developing world-class individual protection equipment. It notes scientists at Defence Research Establishment Suffield in southern Alberta have made significant contributions in biological and chemical defence on various NATO committees. However, the report says funding for research and development will be frozen through to 2005. http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=9982 58563876&call_page=TS_News&call_pageid=968332188492&call_pagepath=News/News&col=968793972154

August 19 2001 ECOSSE THE EDINBURGH FESTIVAL Set in Glasgow, the controversial film Gas Attack wants of intolerance and the dangers of biological terrorism, writes Rachel Devine Poison tale of racism and disaster Near a scheme of high-rise flats in north Glasgow, a lone right-wing terrorist releases a canister of deadly anthrax spores on a community of Kurdish refugees. In a matter of weeks people begin to show symptoms usually associated with a bad dose of flu. By then it is too late to successfully treat the epidemic. It sounds like the plot for a far-fetched disaster movie, which in a sense it is, but according to experts this scenario could become a reality. Gas Attack, a new television series by Channel 4, had its premiere this week at the Edinburgh International Film Festival. It depicts an anthrax attack by a single extremist on an area of Glasgow heavily populated by asylum-seekers. The film comes just as racial tension in the city is at crisis point following the murder of Turkish Kurd Firsat Dag a fortnight ago, and another stabbing days later. Gas Attack will cause controversy when it is shown on Channel 4 this autumn, and there were suggestions that a screening at the GFT cinema in Glasgow would be cancelled to avoid inflaming the situation. The screening will go ahead and the filmmakers believe passionately that it will make people aware of some of the stories behind the headlines. Like the 1980s' nuclear-holocaust drama Threads, the film is fiction shot in documentary style. Gas Attack, however, interweaves more fact with the fiction. It follows the story of a Kurdish father and daughter living in a block of high-rise flats in north Glasgow. It is a gritty, fast-paced piece, interspersed with news footage of riots; chilling, silent shots of empty streets and the carcasses of pigs that have died from anthrax. Written by Rowan Joffe (son of film director Roland Joffe) and directed by Kenny Glenaan, who directed BBC2's series Cops, Gas Attack uses 45 non-actors out of a cast of 60 to add a dose of reality. The idea was conceived by Peter Dale, Channel 4's commissioning editor of documentaries. In the wake of the sarin nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo underground and the Soho nail-bomber, it was decided that an act of bio-terrorism by a lone extremist was a terrifying prospect. "Foot and mouth and the environment were the obvious fears," says Glenaan. "Then the idea came up that one individual could put something together and wreak so much havoc. How would we cope with it? Are we putting in place structures that would deal with it? "The United States is pumping millions into its infrastructure because they are convinced that in the next 20 years, somewhere in the western world there will be a major chemical attack. We are spending millions on nuclear defence; maybe we should be looking at the scenario of someone smuggling two canisters of anthrax into the country." There are three forms of anthrax, the least serious of which can be contracted from spores that have lain dormant in farmland or factory sites for years and are then disturbed. There have been only five cases in Britain in the past decade but the horrors of biological warfare were realised when Saddam Hussein gassed the predominantly Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988. More than 5,000 people were killed. Poignantly, some of the cast of Gas Attack are Halabja survivors. The similarities between the film and real life were largely unintended. Glasgow was supposed to represent any city in Europe. As trouble began to swell in Sighthill, reality began to mirror fiction. There are now more than 7,000 asylum seekers in Glasgow and twice that number are still expected. They are housed in the poorest areas of the city, the high-rise flats of Sighthill and Royston. They can find only phantom jobs - work that does not officially exist and is not officially paid. Many claim they earn as little as 80p an hour, cleaning dishes in restaurants or delivering Chinese takeaways. Even these meagre living conditions cause resentment among their white neighbours. Locals are angry that asylum seekers are given food stamps, new clothes and even carpets. The asylum seekers claim local businesses are ripping them off, paying them a pittance for labour and overcharging them for food. Glenaan, from Garelochhead near Faslane, wanted his cast to play roles as close to real life as possible. Real-life refugees play the parts of asylum seekers; a Glasgow nurse was cast as the main doctor and even Scotland's chief epidemiologist Peter Christie stars as himself. Benae Hussan, who plays the part of the young girl, fled Turkey in a locked van and was given sleeping tablets by her father to ease the ordeal. Her story, like many of the asylum seekers who have taken part in the film, was written into the script. She arrived in Glasgow a year ago and spoke no English when she was cast in the lead role. Her lines were taped for her, learned by rote, and are delivered in a foreign-accented but Glaswegian twang. "We wanted to give it the feel of a documentary and reportage. Over the auditions we heard so many stories. By including them, in a way the film became more real." One refugee recalled how he escaped the Halabja gas attack as a young boy because his mother had made charcoal masks for him and his brothers. When the attack came he hid in an underground car park. Days later he emerged to find crying babies lying under the bodies of their dead mothers. Another refugee deserted the Iraqi army but was captured and tortured for two years. He eventually made his way to Edinburgh where he is studying for a PhD. He takes drugs several times a day because his body is so racked with pain. "Because of the current situation in Glasgow, the purpose of the film could be overshadowed," says Glenaan. "A lot of people will think it's all about asylum seekers living in Glasgow and Britain today. That is ingrained in the film but a lot of it has to do with how would we cope in the event of a biological attack. What would happen and who would take control? Above all, the film is about a lack of preparedness." One of the characters investigates how it might be possible to get the information needed to carry out an anthrax attack. She is shown logging on to one of more than 53,000 anthrax-related websites. The site contains advice on how to turn a fire extinguisher into a deadly biological weapon. This is the kind of detail that will have scaremongers penning outraged letters to the ITC. Already there have been mumblings about "responsible filmmaking". "I think if somebody tried to do what we do in the film they would kill themselves, it's too dangerous," says Glenaan. "I don't think we are influencing anyone. If someone was going to do it they would do it whether or not they had seen our film." Robina Qureshi, who works for Glasgow's Positive Action in Housing organisation, plays a part in Gas Attack, similar to her real-life career, that of an asylum-support worker. She compares the situation of Glasgow's asylum seekers to that of the Asian and black immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s. "It's the same as when my father arrived here from Pakistan," she recalls. "The same kind of racism, the same hurtful remarks like 'go home to where you came from'." Qureshi believes the film can have a positive impact in the midst of so much racial violence and hatred. "I want it to alert people to what is really happening in Sighthill, the prejudice and mindless violence. It should also be a warning that something like this [an anthrax attack] could happen if the proper steps are not taken."

Chemical arms report enrages Lankan army TIMES NEWS NETWORK COLOMBO: Sri Lanka's army commander Lieutenant-General Lionel Balagalle on Saturday accused a local newspaper of compromising national security by charging that the military was using weapons with chemical warheads but fell short of a complete denial.

Balaglle had written the letter to the editor of the Sunday Leader paper to deny allegations of corruption in the army made by the publication.

In the letter the army commander blasted the paper for being unpatriotic and helping the Tamil Tigers who are fighting the Sri Lankan military by referring to the procurements they own.

"Your report tried to take umbrage under the fact that details of the equipment in question is available on the Internet," he said.

"Perhaps so. But procurements by Army Headquarters are not posted on the Internet and was therefore not available in the public domain until you chose to reveal it," Balagalle added.

"Must I say this not only compromises the nation's national security interests but also places the lives of our troops, and even our citizens, in jeopardy," he said.

The military and the government have already issued a denial that they possess any such weapons, which was probably why Ballagalle did not re-emphasise it in the letter.

"The government wishes to refute categorically reports that it has recently acquired weapons with chemical warheads. No such procurement has been made and there are no plans to obtain them," a government communique said.

More of Balagalle's emphasis appeared to be over the charges the paper had made against him and two other officers for taking bribes amounting to nearly $500 million.

"I write to strongly deny the wild allegations of corruption made against me, as commander of the army and against two other senior officers," the letter said.

Balagalle said he had asked the defence ministry and bribery commission to investigate the `frivolous" charges and called on the editor to give evidence at the inquiry.

Meanwhile, an airforce MiG 27 aircraft crashed into a two storey house in a residential area close to the Katunayake Airbase killing its Ukrainian pilot and injuring seven other people who were residing in the proximity of the crash. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=1845459839

Taking home a lesson in terror US official learned from 1995 gas attack By Anthony Shadid, Globe Staff, 8/18/2001

ASHINGTON - Just days after followers of an apocalyptic cult released a deadly nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system as it was packed with rush-hour passengers, Dr. Scott Lillibridge arrived with a team of medical experts from the US Centers for Disease Control and the Defense Department. The damage was already done in that 1995 sarin attack. Twelve people would eventually die. Thousands of others staggered from the subway vomiting or complaining of blindness. It was an episode that showed the world the danger of chemical and biological terrorism. Lillibridge's team was there to offer advice to Japanese authorities. In the end, though, Lillibridge took a lesson home with him: He suspected that the United States suffered from the same vulnerability to bioterrorism. ''It was a wake-up call for preparedness,'' said Lillibridge, 49, a veteran of health missions to war-ravaged Africa and natural disasters from the Midwest to Egypt. ''It became clear that readiness in the public health and medical communities was going to be extremely important to protecting our population.'' Starting in October, Lillibridge will have a decisive hand in that preparedness. As a special adviser in the Department of Health and Human Services, he will become the agency's first bioterrorism czar, though he eschews that title, responsible for coordinating the federal government's medical response if human pathogens are ever wielded as a weapon in this country. Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson has said that he expects Lillibridge ''to provide leadership to ensure we can respond swiftly and decisively, should some vicious act of bioterrorism be inflicted upon the American people.'' Congressional reports have criticized the government's lack of preparedness for such an attack, warning that vaccines and antidotes are overstocked in some places and understocked or unavailable in others, while security and oversight are lax. Some critics contend that the threat is exaggerated, akin to the civil defense scare during the early years of the Cold War. Within the government, direction has been lacking. The agencies with roles in responding to any act of bioterrorism range from the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the Department of Defense. Within Thompson's department, there are the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, and the CDC. ''You put all this together, and it's a bewildering group of activities that are out there that somehow need to be brought together in a coherent manner,'' said D.A. Henderson, director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies. Lillibridge, who oversaw a staff of 40 as director of the bioterrorism preparedness program at the CDC, is reluctant to set expectations too high. But the potential is great. President Bush's 2002 budget proposes spending $348 million at HHS on the issue of bioterrorism, an 18 percent increase. Some money will go to states and to private companies for work on vaccines for diseases that have been virtually eradicated. In any act of bioterrorism, HHS would be responsible for detecting the biological agent, investigating the outbreak, and providing stockpiled drugs and supplies. Specialist say that the biggest threat could come from diseases like smallpox, anthrax, and plague, infections that might not be immediately recognized because they have never been seen by health professionals in the United States. Most specialists agree that local authorities would be quickly overwhelmed. Since 1999, HHS has taken steps to address that threat. The CDC has awarded more than $80 million to state and local health departments. Still, specialists are concerned that the approach has been too haphazard. ''I think everyone in government is trying to figure out what agencies have what roles in bioterrorism preparedness and response,'' said Tara O'Toole, deputy director of the Johns Hopkins bioterrorism center. Lillibridge says it is crucial to institute central control of agencies and programs. Some question the need for the job. So far the United States has not had a major incident. The only confirmed attack was the 1984 poisoning of salad bars in Oregon by a religious cult. Hundreds became ill, but no one was hospitalized. An article in the American Journal of Public Health compared the program to preparing for a snowstorm in San Jose, Calif. Some critics argue that effort spent on a possible bioterrorism threat takes away from public health needs such as the estimated 76 million cases of food-borne illness each year. ''There are enormous public health problems, real public health problems in the United States and around the world'' said Victor W. Sidel, a professor of social medicine at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York City. ''Why does he have to spend his talents working on fantasies, working on made-up threats that simply have no backing?'' Lillibridge argues that preparedness is a good thing, whatever happens. ''We live in an era and age where the public health infrastructure, its growth, and its development is extremely critical to our collective health,'' he said. ''There are many new emerging threats that we have to be vigilant for.'' http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/230/nation/Taking_home_a_lesson_in_terror+.shtml

Budget Planning Guidance Goes to Services By Jim Garamone American Forces Press Service WASHINGTON, Aug. 17, 2001 – The services have received guidance from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that sets budget priorities as they shape the fiscal 2003 DoD Budget Request. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. Richard Myers told the press the Defense Program Guidance lays out five priorities for the Department of Defense. The first priority is to protect U.S. bases of operation and to be able to defeat nuclear/biological/chemical weapons and ballistic missile attack. The second priority is the capability to project and sustain U.S. forces to distant lands in face of enemy opposition. The third priority is to be able to deny an enemy sanctuary from American forces. This particularly focuses on long- range precision strike capabilities of various kinds. The fourth priority is to have the capability to conduct space operations and the fifth, is to ensure joint and combined interoperability and integration of long-range strike and deep maneuver forces. "[This] is guidance for the service programmers in developing their Program Objective Memoranda that lay out the Five Year Defense Plan," Wolfowitz said. "… They have to complete that work rather soon, and essentially have it nearly finished by the time the [Quadrennial Defense Review] itself is finished. So this is to give them guidance, and it's an annual document that tells them how to go about building those programs." The document is meant to give the services the latitude to examine the missions ands make adjustments as needed, Wolfowitz said. "On the question about force structure reductions … one of the things we're discussing in both contexts is to what level do you want to specify where those sort of reductions ought to be made and to what extent you want them to come out as a result of other sorts of guidance," Wolfowitz said. The secretary could order certain reductions or he could give the services the latitude to make their own adjustments. ."You could say, 'I want you to have X divisions and Y air wings, no matter what else you do,' or alternatively you could say, 'I want you to have certain capabilities and you pay for them any way you have to,'" he said. If a service believes the best way to get that capability is through cutting some force structure, that's the decision it can make. "I would say, as a general philosophical principle, I think the secretary strongly believes in the whole idea of freedom to manage, of giving people the responsibility for managing their organizations to certain goals; rather than telling them exactly how they should run them, tell them what it is you want them to achieve and then let them figure out how to do it" he said. Wolfowitz said the guidance is less detailed than in the past and it does start the transformation process for the department. "In the long run the most important requirement is the requirement to build capabilities for the future which aren't oriented toward a specific conflict or a specific war plan," Wolfowitz said. "Because they are future oriented, they are by definition against somewhat hazier objectives but nonetheless extremely important. And that's the sort of transformational requirements." http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2001/n08172001_200108175.html

Tuesday August 21 11:26 AM ET Russia, U.S. Hold Arms Talks; No Deal Seen Soon By Peter Graff MOSCOW (Reuters) - A senior U.S. envoy held arms consultations in Moscow Tuesday, keeping up a brisk diplomatic pace forced by an approaching showdown over missile defense. But both sides kept expectations muted, pending the results of a Pentagon (news - web sites) review that will allow Washington to put firm numbers on the table for arms cuts. Undersecretary of State John Bolton was the third senior U.S. security official to visit Russia since presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin (news - web sites) agreed at a summit in Italy last month to put consultations on a fast track. Bolton met Russian arms negotiator Georgy Mamedov, a deputy foreign minister. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in Moscow a week ago, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (news - web sites) visited at the end of July. Mamedov said the sides had agreed not to talk to the press Tuesday. Reporters were permitted to film the start of the talks, which began in an amicable mood at a Moscow mansion with large delegations on each side. Smiling, Mamedov reached across a long conference table to shake Bolton's hand. ``We are commencing a new, serious business,'' RIA news agency quoted him as saying before the talks. Washington wants Moscow to agree to ditch a 1972 arms treaty banning a missile defense shield Bush wants to build. Russia has not budged from its opposition to the shield and seeks a firm commitment to reductions in both sides' nuclear stockpiles, with the right to verify the cuts. Washington is wary of written agreements on cuts and verification. WASHINGTON'S SCHEDULE FORCES PACE The pace of the talks is being forced because Washington says its tests will conflict with the provisions of the Anti- Ballistic Missile treaty during the next year. If it does not reach an agreement with Russia to ditch the pact, the Bush administration says it will withdraw unilaterally, which requires six months' advance notice. But the Bush administration says it will not be able to put a firm number on possible missile reductions until the Pentagon finishes its review in the next few months. Bush and Putin agreed to discuss missile defense and cuts in offensive arsenals in parallel when they met in Genoa in July, and many described that agreement as paving the way for a comparatively quick compromise. But statements from both sides have since been more cautious about the prospects for a deal in the short term. Rumsfeld said last week his talks in Moscow showed Russia remained ``captured to a certain extent by the old Cold War mentality, fear and apprehension and concern about the West.'' And Russian officials have been quoted as saying no progress was likely until the Pentagon review was finished and Washington put numbers on the table for offensive weapons cuts. ``It is useless to expect real movement from Bolton's visit,'' the daily Kommersant wrote Tuesday. ``There is no chance of convincing the United States to turn back from building a missile shield,'' it said. ``But it is also not convenient for Russia to retreat from its conditions when the United States is not ready to substantively discuss limits to offensive weapons.'' http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010821/pl/arms_russia_usa_dc_7.html