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ASSESSMENT of U.S. READINESS to DESIGN, DEVELOP and PRODUCE NUCLEAR WARHEADS: Current Status and Some Remedial Steps

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ASSESSMENT of U.S. READINESS to DESIGN, DEVELOP and PRODUCE NUCLEAR WARHEADS: Current Status and Some Remedial Steps National Institute for Public Policy ASSESSMENT OF U.S. READINESS TO DESIGN, DEVELOP AND PRODUCE NUCLEAR WARHEADS: Current Status and Some Remedial Steps THOMAS SCHEBER JOHN R. HARVEY Foreword By: JOHN S. FOSTER, JR. Assessment of U.S. Readiness to Design, Develop and Produce Nuclear Warheads: Current Status and Some Remedial Steps © National Institute Press, 2015 The views in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, or the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 • Fairfax, VA 22031 • (703) 293- 9181 • www.nipp.org. © National Institute Press, 2015 Assessment of U.S. Readiness to Design, Develop and Produce Nuclear Warheads: Current Status and Some Remedial Steps Table of Contents Foreword ................................................................................................................................... vii Preface ...................................................................................................................................... ix Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... xi Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 The Importance of Sustaining a Nuclear Weapon Development Capability ................................. 3 Credibility of Deterrence and Assurance ............................................................................... 4 Adaptability and Resilience ...................................................................................................4 Reduced Stockpile Size ........................................................................................................5 U.S. Post-Cold War Nuclear Weapon Policies and Readiness Posture ....................................... 7 Clinton Administration (1993-2001) ....................................................................................... 7 Bush Administration (2001-2009) ..........................................................................................8 Obama Administration (2009-Present) ................................................................................ 10 Lessons from an Effort to Constrain Nuclear Weapon Development Capabilities ................ 13 Summary Findings from U.S. Nuclear Weapon Policies in the Post-Cold War Era .............. 15 Numerous Studies Over the Past Two Decades Cite the Need for and Shortcomings of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Readiness Capabilities .................................................................................. 17 Revitalize the Intellectual Infrastructure ............................................................................... 17 NNSA/DOE Nuclear Warhead Development Skills are Not Being Exercised .................... 17 DoD Nuclear Expertise is Declining .................................................................................. 18 Improvement is Needed in NNSA-DoD Coordination and Integration ............................... 19 Nuclear Facilities are Outdated and Need Modernization ................................................. 19 Conclusions from Two Decades of Studies ......................................................................... 19 Current State of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise ............................................................. 21 Recent Problems ................................................................................................................. 22 The “3+2” Vision for the Nuclear Stockpile .......................................................................... 23 Warhead Life Extension Options ......................................................................................... 24 Assessing the Current Readiness Posture of the Nuclear Enterprise ........................................ 27 Ensuring Weapons Design and Engineering Development Skills for the Long Term ........... 27 Recommendations to Retain Needed Future Capabilities for Nuclear Weapon Design and Engineering ................................................................................................... 28 Importance of Experiments with Advanced Diagnostics ...................................................... 29 Recommendations to Bolster Experimental Programs for Training a New Generation of Stockpile Stewards ........................................................................................................... 32 Infrastructure Recapitalization ............................................................................................ 32 Recommendations Regarding the Manufacturing Infrastructure ....................................... 33 Summary of Findings and Conclusions ..................................................................................... 35 Appendices Appendix A. Bibliography ................................................................................................... 37 Appendix B. Excerpts on Nuclear Readiness from Relevant Studies over the Past Two Decades ........................................................................................ 43 Appendix C. Critical Elements of a Resilient Nuclear Warhead Posture ............................. 49 Appendix D. Notes from Interviews with Current and Former Senior Officials .................... 51 Appendix E. Technical Issues in Warhead Life Extension and Certification ....................... 55 Appendix F. Nuclear Weapons Designer Commentary on Warhead Design Skills .................................................................................................. 57 Appendix G. About the Authors .......................................................................................... 61 Notes ........................................................................................................................................65 Foreword This report should be a wake-up call for U.S. leaders in the executive branch and in Congress. Given the dynamic, uncertain security environment of today, the U.S. nuclear infrastructure—in particular the intellectual nuclear infrastructure—should expect to be surprised, perhaps even shocked, sometime in the future by unforeseeable events that demand a U.S. response. Prompt action could be needed to develop and produce nuclear warheads in a timely manner to strengthen U.S. deterrence and assurance missions. Currently, the U.S. nuclear infrastructure is not ready to respond effectively to such surprise. This situation has developed over several administrations. U.S. leaders, while aware of the need to sustain U.S. nuclear warhead development capabilities, have not assigned sufficient priority to this task. In the early 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, this was viewed as an important but not urgent task. That is no longer the case. As this report documents, the need for the United States to improve, maintain, and periodically exercise the full set of nuclear warhead design, engineering, and production capabilities has been a consistent conclusion from studies conducted over the past two decades. This task demands more than just modernizing the production infrastructure—it requires revitalizing the intellectual infrastructure and developing critical skills and expert judgment in the next generation of nuclear- skilled personnel. It is time for U.S. leaders to address this long-standing capability shortfall with the urgency demanded by the complex threat environment facing the United States and its allies. The report calls for specific actions and a bipartisan, long-term commitment to this goal. I heartily endorse that goal. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. Preface This assessment was initiated out of deeply held concerns that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise has not achieved the proper balance between ensuring the safety and reliability of today’s nuclear stockpile, and providing the capabilities, personnel skills, and production infrastructure needed to respond to future adverse contingencies. Of particular concern is the atrophy in readiness to design, develop, and produce new nuclear warheads if required in the future. Numerous studies over the past two decades have documented this atrophy but their recommendations have not received priority attention from national leadership. This report identifies important capability shortfalls of the current U.S. nuclear enterprise—in particular, the intellectual capital on which the health of the current and future U.S. nuclear deterrent depends— and offers recommendations to address these shortfalls. Our goal is to stimulate debate on this critical national security issue and provide a foundation for follow-on assessments. The authors are indebted to Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. and Dr. Keith B. Payne who served as senior reviewers for this report. In addition, Mr. Kurt Guthe, Director of Strategic Studies at National Institute, reviewed earlier drafts of this work and provided valuable suggestions on the presentation of assessment findings and recommendations. The authors are fully responsible for the content of this final report. The authors also wish to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for its generous support, without which this assessment would not have been possible.
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