Nuclear Scholars Initiative a Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative

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Nuclear Scholars Initiative a Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative Nuclear Scholars Initiative A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative EDITOR Sarah Weiner JANUARY 2014 Nuclear Scholars Initiative A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative EDITOR Sarah Weiner AUTHORS Isabelle Anstey David K. Lartonoix Lee Aversano Adam Mount Jessica Bufford Mira Rapp-Hooper Nilsu Goren Alicia L. Swift Jana Honkova David Thomas Graham W. Jenkins Timothy J. Westmyer Phyllis Ko Craig J. Wiener Rizwan Ladha Lauren Wilson Jarret M. Lafl eur January 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofi t or ga ni za tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affi liated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to fi nding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive offi cer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specifi c policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). About the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues Many of the most pressing national and international security challenges are tied to nuclear weapons. The need to reduce the prevalence of nuclear weapons globally and prevent their use by states and nonstate actors runs parallel with the need to maintain certain nuclear capabilities and the intellectual assets that support them. Both tracks present long- term challenges that, to be managed, will require sustained effort by talented and dedicated professionals. The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) seeks to help improve the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear strategy and policy through professional development and networking activities that target the next generation of leaders in the fi eld. PONI maintains an enterprise- wide membership base; hosts four major conferences and several smaller events each year; maintains an online blog; holds live debates on critical nuclear weapons issues; runs a six- month academic program for young experts; organizes bilateral exchanges involving young experts from the United States and abroad; and distributes regular news and event announcements to members. More information can be found at www .csis .org /isp /poni . © 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978- 1- 4422- 2797- 2 (pb); 978-1- 4422- 2798- 9 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefi eld 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202- 887- 0200 | www.csis.org 301- 459- 3366 | www .rowman .com Contents Introduction and Ac know ledg ments v A Gentleman’s Agreement 1 Isabelle Anstey Beyond New START: The IAEF Initiative and the New Dynamism of Nuclear Policy 15 Lee Aversano Societal Verifi cation: Past and Present 28 Jessica Bufford Climate Change and the Middle East: A Security Perspective 41 Nilsu Goren Russian Strategic Nuclear Modernization (1991– 2013): Capabilities and Motivations 51 Jana Honkova Failure to Ignite: The Absence of Cascading Nuclear Proliferation 80 Graham W. Jenkins The CTBT and the Nuclear Testing Moratorium: Technical Perspectives and Po liti cal Challenges 95 Phyllis Ko Squaring the Circle? The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, Iran, and the Challenge of Compliance 108 Rizwan Ladha Arguing in Perfect Harmony: A Search for Order among U.S. Nuclear Force Structure Evaluation Criteria 122 Jarret M. Lafl eur Potential LEU Encumbrances and Alternatives for the U.S. Production of Tritium for National Security Purposes 143 David K. Lartonoix | III A Better Debate on Nuclear Disarmament 162 Adam Mount Red Lines or Green Lights? U.S. Extended Deterrence in Pacifi c Maritime Disputes 174 Mira Rapp- Hooper Naval Nuclear Propulsion: A Feasible Proliferation Pathway? 188 Alicia L. Swift The Zero Straw Man: A Rhetorical Analysis of Nuclear Policy Proposals (2007– 2009) 203 David Thomas Test Results: Surveying U.S. Responses to Nuclear Testing Over Time 215 Timothy J. Westmyer The Feasibility of Uranium-233 as a Proliferation Pathway for Nuclear Aspirant States 245 Craig J. Wiener Between the Lines: The B61 Life Extension Program 261 Lauren Wilson IV | SARAH WEINER Introduction and A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s ddressing an increasingly complex array of nuclear weapons challenges in the future Awill require talented young people with the necessary technical and policy expertise to contribute to sound decisionmaking on nuclear issues over time. To that end, the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) runs a yearly Nuclear Scholars Initiative for graduate students and young professionals. Those accepted into the program are hosted once per month at CSIS in Washington, DC, where they participate in daylong workshops with senior government offi cials and policy experts. Over the course of the six- month program, Schol- ars are required to prepare a research paper. This volume is a collection of those papers. PONI owes many thanks to the outstanding Nuclear Scholars Class of 2013 for their dedication and outstanding work. Special thanks are due to Dr. Clark Murdock, Dr. Richard Wagner, and Ms. Amy Woolf for providing valuable feedback to the Nuclear Scholars about their research and to Amb. Linton Brooks for chairing several meetings and serving as a consistent mentor to the Class of 2013. PONI would also like to thank all the experts who came to speak to the Nuclear Scholars during their workshop sessions. The Nuclear Scholars Initiative could not function without the generosity of these knowledgeable individuals. Lastly, PONI would like to thank our partners, especially the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration, for their continued support. Without them, the Nuclear Scholars Initiative would not be possible. This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration under Award Number(s) DE- NA0000344. Disclaimer: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, complete- ness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or pro cess disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specifi c commercial product, pro cess, or ser vice by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessary state or refl ect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. | V A Gentleman’s Agreement Isabelle Anstey1 his paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of Tmultilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. Focusing on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), this paper identifi es six key pressures that shape the form and behavior of multilateral nuclear export control regimes. A deeper understanding of these pressures and how they resulted in the NSG offers a more nuanced backdrop against which to consider future policies for nuclear export control. Introduction This paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of multilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. The primary mechanism during this time was the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) formed in 1975, a voluntary, secretive, elite club of countries that offered nonbinding guidelines for national nuclear supply practice. Very little has been written to date on the history of multilateral nuclear export control regimes, and even less specifi cally on the NSG itself. This gap was recognized by leading nuclear studies scholar Scott Sagan in his 2011 article surveying the fi eld.2 The majority of work that exists focuses on ways to improve multilateral mechanisms and/or national export controls. It is therefore forward- looking and policy proscriptive in nature, rather than historical and analytical. Researchers, in evaluating the nuclear export control regime, have identifi ed the nonbinding, voluntary nature of the guidelines as fundamental fl aws, and some have called for a nuclear export treaty or similar universal, binding, verifi ed regime to control
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