Copyright 2019 by Champion Briefs, LLC

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner and the publisher.

The Evidence Standard Jan/Feb 2020

The Evidence Standard

Speech and Debate provides a meaningful and educational experience to all who are involved. We, as educators in the community, believe that it is our responsibility to provide resources that uphold the foundation of the Speech and Debate activity. Champion Briefs, its employees, managers, and associates take an oath to uphold the following Evidence Standard:

1. We will never falsify facts, opinions, dissents, or any other information. 2. We will never knowingly distribute information that has been proven to be inaccurate, even if the source of the information is legitimate. 3. We will actively fight the dissemination of false information and will provide the community with clarity if we learn that a third-party has attempted to commit deception. 4. We will never knowingly support or distribute studies, news articles, or other materials that use inaccurate methodologies to reach a conclusion or prove a point. 5. We will provide meaningful clarification to any who question the legitimacy of information that we distribute. 6. We will actively contribute to students’ understanding of the world by using evidence from a multitude of perspectives and schools of thought. 7. We will, within our power, assist the community as a whole in its mission to achieve the goals and vision of this activity.

These seven statements, while simple, represent the complex notion of what it means to advance students’ understanding of the world around them, as is the purpose of educators.

Champion Briefs 5 Letter from the Editor Jan/Feb 2020

Letter from the Editor

Thank you for your continued support and readership. The 2019-2020 debate season has rolled into the new year with a new topic: “Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenal.” Our latest topic brief looks at an issue that has been debated since the invention of nuclear technologies and especially since the first use of nuclear in 1945. We tried to take a balanced approach to this very broad topic so that the brief could be used by all types of debaters. Our writers researched arguments ranging from traditional ethical philosophy based frameworks, util based policy style ones, and more progressive and critical arguments. We’re now going into the heart of the competitive debate season. There are major national tournaments coming up and local circuits are beginning to host their state and national qualifier tournaments. This is now the time to double down and put in some hard work. Many of your most meaningful tournaments will be coming in the months ahead. Everyone should look at the new year as a new season where your record is blank. Past successes or failures will not matter in the new year; only your attitude and desire to improve will help you succeed in the rounds coming in the near future. Good luck and Happy New Year!

Daniel Shatzkin Editor-in-Chief

Champion Briefs 6 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

Table of Contents

The Evidence Standard ...... 5

Letter from the Editor ...... 6

Table of Contents ...... 7

Topic Analyses ...... 16 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek ...... 17 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin ...... 26 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher ...... 33 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan ...... 42

Affirmative Cases with Negative Responses ...... 50

Aff: Kant AC ...... 51 Consequentialism is inadequate for evaluating the ethics of nuclear weapons...... 52 Even a single nuclear blast poses a humanitarian disaster...... 53 Nuclear weapons rob their victims of humanity, treating them as mere means...... 54 Nuclear deterrence is a social institution, and it must be judged according to whether it produces systematic injustices...... 55 Nuclear deterrence is a form of hostage-taking, which is inherently wrong because it violates the consent of innocent third parties...... 56 Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate---the vast majority of people who get harmed are innocent, and the military's traditional rules for distinction are thrown out the window...... 57 Nuclear deterrence imposes a substantial risk of harm on non-consenting third parties, even if deterrence never fails...... 58 The question of hypothetical consent matters---while some activities, like driving, impose risks on third-parties, people would consent to that practice, yet no one would assent to being demolished in a . ... 59 Even if nuclear deterrence isn't literal hostage holding, the constraints on liberty and production of trauma are still significant...... 60 Merely threatening military targets is also immoral because of the enormous fallout that kills innocent people...... 61 Conventional deterrence solves the disads and avoids systematic, nonconsequentialist rule violations...... 62 Nuclear deterrence violates Kantian ideals of universality and doesn’t hold up having a moral intent...... 63 Credible nuclear deterrence is contingent on the intention to genuinely use nuclear weapons, so it's more than just a bluff...... 64 The idea that deterrence is good because it stops *us* from using nuclear weapons is ridiculous, and eliminating arsenals is the surest way to ensure we never use them...... 65 Nuclear deterrence is immoral because it deliberately risks the murder of millions of people. Consequences matter, but deontologically speaking the wrongness of deterrence resides in the action itself, and not merely its consequences...... 66

Champion Briefs 7 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

A/2: Kant AC ...... 68 Limited uses of nuclear deterrence are just---a maxim permitting low-yield nukes against military targets can be universalized. Threatening massive loss of life is impermissible, and the negative can agree on that point...... 68 Even though bluffing is deceptive, Kant agrees that lying is permitted if it diverts an aggressor...... 70 Kantian 'nonideal theory' permits limited nuclear threats that are proportionate to an initial act of aggression. Deterrence does not require threatening mass destruction against human dignity...... 71 Maxims of nuclear ethics acknowledge the value of self-defense while minimizing harms to the innocent, and reducing long-term reliance on nuclear weapons. This is possible without elimination...... 72 If nuclear deterrence is limited to military targets, the problem of wrongful intentions does not apply...... 73 Nuclear deterrence is far less bad than actually using nukes, and this is because consequences should matter to some extent...... 74 Nuclear deterrence will save millions of lives. States have a duty to pursue it...... 75 Nuclear deterrence doesn't amount to genuine hostage-holding...... 76 Nuclear deterrence means that civilians are being exposed to less harm...... 77 Util is necessary for debates about nuclear weapons...... 78

Aff: International Law AC ...... 79 I Law prohibits weapons of mass destruction use in almost all conceivable scenarios, despite legal ambiguity. . 81 States have a unique legal and political obligation to maintain nuclear--free zones and care for nonstates...... 83 ILaw enforced by the NPT proves at least an obligation to not use or possess nuclear weapons...... 84 All of the main influential international governing bodies maintain the interpretation that use of nuclear weapons is unlawful in almost every instance and pose severe humanitarian threats...... 85 Err aff on legality--determination of proper use of international law is relinquished to the interpretations of international governing bodies like the ICJ...... 86 There's a legal obligation to rule against nuclear weapons once and for all...... 87 Absence of nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent the effects of them and maintain treaty mandates of free zones...... 88 Customary international law covenants prohibit use of in almost all circumstances-- answers enforcement arguments...... 89 Nuclear weapons are morally problematic and threaten states' obligations to respect the well-being of other member states and their citizens...... 90 Nuclear weapons violate requirements for conduct under international humanitarian law--UN Charter proves.92 Situations relating to proportionality are incompatible with the use of nuclear weapons...... 94 The use of nuclear weapons conflicts with the acceptance of international law--if aff wins the framework debate, err aff on offense...... 96

A/2: International Law AC ...... 98 There's no substantive backing for States eliminating nuclear weapons--creates a legal gap...... 98 Can't rule out the lawfulness of holding nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes--UN Charter never specifies weapon type...... 99 AT NPT. Flaws and gaps in NPT enforcement mechanisms...... 100 No backing in international law mandating elimination of nuclear weapons...... 101

Aff: Just Theory AC ...... 102 Nuclear deterrence can't be reconciled with just war theory...... 103 Nuclear deterrence, even if the weapons are never used, rely on credible threats against enemy civilians. This is immoral at its core...... 104 Nuclear weapons policy depends upon the commitment to murder...... 105 Nuclear weapons are fundamentally inhumane and unjust, and global disarmament is a moral obligation...... 106

Champion Briefs 8 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons threaten mass annihilation, and thus can never be rationalized by just war principles. Claims that nuclear weapons are consistent ignore all the uncertainties with escalation...... 108 Just war theory is fundamentally sound, and preferable to a cynical realism that applies no moral standards to war...... 110 Pacifism can't effectively challenge mass murder, or delineate between just and unjust activities, when do break out...... 111

A/2: Just War Theory AC ...... 112 Limited counterforce strikes satisfy criteria of proportionality and discriminating between civilians and combatants...... 112 Absolutist opposition to nuclear deterrence only weakens the general application of moral principles in warfighting...... 113 Just war theory undermines nations' right to self-defense...... 114 Nuclear weapons are actually most compliant with Just War Theory...... 115 While nuclear weapons are capable of violating just war theory, the way the US actually uses them is consistent...... 117 Although nuclear threats are immoral, the threatening of evil in order not to do it is permissible...... 120 Just War Theory masks systemic oppression and rationalizes imperial violence...... 121

Aff: Proliferation Bad AC ...... 123 Proliferation might be slow now, but that's because of the NPT---as more states get the bomb, the regime will unravel, and prolif will get fast and furious...... 124 As more countries proliferate, they'll get attacked by countries like the US, Israel, or Russia---that causes wars...... 125 Keeping nuclear weapons safe from theft is very hard, especially as countries expand their arsenals and new countries acquire the bomb...... 126 Conflict between nations is likely to escalate to nuke war...... 127 Due to status quo development- nuclear conflict is highly probable...... 129 High risk associated with failing nuclear deterrence...... 130 Nuclear resources are scarce...... 131 Nuclear weapons possess dangerous qualities that can cause escalatory war...... 132 India's nuclear program is expanding...... 133 Command and control systems are key to understanding India's capabilities...... 134 Nuclear deterrence is undesirable...... 135 Deterrence isn't successful...... 136 Nuclear deterrence severed the path of peace and creates new points of conflict...... 138 The use of nuclear weapons risks impacts on both sides of the fight...... 140 After-effects of nuclear aggression...... 141 Trump wants more nuclear weapons...... 142 Nuke weapons is a defensive strategy to conflict...... 143 U.S. and Russia are not approaching any nuclear deal, means no restrictions to prevent conflict...... 144 If the US and Russia abandon an agreement designed to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, it will become far more difficult to make non-nuclear states stick to their commitments...... 145 the danger of nuclear war is today much greater than it was in the late 1980s...... 147 Nuclear deterrence was born out of military deterrence and the emergence of nuclear weapons...... 149 Proliferation is destabilizing...... 151

A/2: Proliferation Bad AC ...... 152 US "extended deterrence" is key to preventing prolif...... 152 Attempting to achieve "global zero" actually leads to more prolif...... 153

Champion Briefs 9 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: India/ AC ...... 154 Pakistan’s engaged in brinksmanship, not restraint---they’ll use nukes first...... 155 Indo-Pak nuclear war kills at least 125 million people and risks global starvation...... 156 Nuclear weapons create the stability-instability paradox, which increases the risk of conflict between India and Pakistan...... 157 The risk of nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan is high...... 158 India and Pakistan need to eliminate their nuclear weapons in order to achieve regional and global security. . 159 Deterrence may have worked for the US and Russia, but they didn't share a border. India and Pakistan do, and nuclear use is especially likely as they clash over their border...... 161 Pakistan's conventional deterrence is actually robust now, but the buildup of both conventional AND nuclear forces risks miscalc...... 163

A/2: India/Pakistan AC ...... 164 The plan’s talks will fall apart---Pakistan will couple with the demand for ending conventional imbalances---India will refuse to comply...... 164 Successful elimination for India and Pakistan depends upon normalizing the security relationship first...... 166 Talks will fall through because of Pakistan's concerns with India's conventional superiority...... 167 India and Pakistan will not fight a nuclear war...... 168 India and Pakistan won't fight a nuclear war, and Indian nuclear weapons are conducive for stability...... 169 Neither India nor Pakistan want to escalate, despite rhetoric...... 170 India's not truly capable of implementing the Cold Start doctrine...... 172

Aff: Mining AC ...... 174 Uranium mining for nuclear weapons is a public health disaster...... 175 Disarmament is key---the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires parties to redress the suffering that indigenous people faced due to mining and testing...... 176 The nuclear-industrial complex has disproportionately harmed indigenous people through uranium mining and nuclear testing...... 177 The Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Summit confirmed that nuclear weapons development was harming indigenous people...... 178 Since their inception, nuclear weapons have relied on uranium mining that disproportionately violates the lives and health of indigenous communities...... 180 Compensation programs fail---only nuclear disarmament can ensure that more marginalized people's lives aren't sacrificed for such destructive weapons...... 182 Nuclear weapons impose concrete suffering and harm on indigenous people. The TPNW, or Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, embeds disarmament within humanitarian principles...... 183 Nuclear weapons are primarily held by Western powers, and every nuclear state has tested on sites of indigenous communities who were subsequently harmed...... 185 Techno-strategic scenarios for nuclear war mask the ongoing nuclear war against the Fourth World indigenous nations, carried out by nuclear testing...... 186 Perm, do the counterplan. The CTBT is a catalyst for nuclear disarmament...... 188

A/2: Uranium Mining AC ...... 189 Indigenous and colonized people have to participate in the process of disarmament for it to adequately rectify the damages done...... 189 The Defense Department has stopped increasing its uranium stockpile, and Congress has already responded to demands of indigenous people...... 190 IAEA safeguards mean that the uranium trade won't be a source of prolif...... 192 Counterplan: The federal government should fully fund remediation of abandoned uranium mines. Trump's budget cuts undermine that effort to repair the damage done to Navajo uranium miners...... 193

Champion Briefs 10 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

States should agree to the CTBT and FMCT---solves their offense...... 194 Universal ratification of the CTBT solves their offense...... 195

Aff: Feminist IR AC ...... 196 State focused theories promote hegemonic masculinity in the pursuit of endless war...... 197 Realism’s thinking breeds war – it sees the world as a paranoid, self-help system...... 199 Removing a state centered approach to conflict is key...... 201 Integrating forms of maternal thinking into international relations is key to avoiding military conflict...... 202 A reconfiguration of realism promotes better policy making and more accurate risk analysis...... 204 Discourse of hegemonic masculinity shapes reality...... 206 Realist epistemology makes war inevitable...... 207 Typical IR approaches start from the state – this excludes feminist perspectives and papers over women’s concerns...... 209 Hegemony discourse promotes nationalist narratives that reinforce gender roles...... 211 Current political culture is built on the appearance of acting "tough"...... 212 Feminist IR interrogates the epistemological underpinnings of militarism and masculinist foreign policy, reveals the problems embedded in international affairs...... 214 Individual experience is important for improving foreign policy, key to achieving global solutions...... 216 Diverse gender perspectives are essential to understanding global politics...... 219 The aff is key to challenging the patriarchal assumptions embedded into our nuclear policies...... 220 Militarized security logic prohibits marginalized communities from engaging with the political...... 222 Current rhetoric excludes women's perspectives...... 223 The patriarchy will result in extinction and is the root cause of all impacts...... 224 Only intersectional feminist movements can solve existential militarism...... 226 Squo masculine politics in favor of a politics oriented around the individual – that allows feminist theory to be included in the realm of IR...... 228 Introducing women’s perspectives into security is crucial to solve for the forms of everyday violence they face...... 229 Adopting a colorless mode excludes perspectives that could change the ways conflicts are evaluated...... 230 Hearing from those who experience issues firsthand help guide academia and the future generations...... 232 The political climate creates an environment that excludes certain bodies from having equal representation. 233 Creating a more inclusive international norm mitigates forms of race and gender based violence...... 235 Establishing a forum to understand the manifestation of oppression is key to evaluating any impact...... 236

A/2: Feminism IR AC ...... 237 Localized solutions keep feminism on the fringe – engaging the state is key to solve...... 237 IR feminists vastly over simplify the diverse field of international perspective...... 239 Fem IR recreates oppressive structures within foreign policy...... 240 Avoiding the political just means the structures will still exist post-movement...... 241

Negative Cases with Affirmative Responses ...... 242

Neg: Hobbes NC ...... 243 Nuclear weapons are necessary to prevent major war outbreaks and to deter conflict...... 244 Conflict likelihood drops when nuclear weapons are in play--stability between countries is maintained...... 245 Nuclear weapons give states confidence and means to mutually prevent conflicts...... 246 Nuclear weapons allow nations to be mutually respectful of one another--prevents war and outright monopoly...... 247 Nuclear weapons maintain stability of world order because all parties are fearful of anarchic society...... 249

Champion Briefs 11 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

The US is already developing a major nuclear weapon program that is sufficient, but not realistic for legitimate nuclear war...... 250 States like the US maintain strategic ambiguity on their nuclear arsenals to deter conflict with other countries...... 251 Recent US leadership proves--a Hobbesian approach is strategically sound for maintaining world peace and domestic security...... 252 Nuclear weapon possession is necessary and inevitable for states that value and pursue security...... 253 The Middle East proves--nuclear weapons have been key to stability and non-nuclear states have little deterrence capability...... 254 The approach of people who don't support nuclear weapons are idealist and inherently problematic...... 255 Treaties that seek to eliminate nuclear weapons lead to the opposite of progress in terms of peace and stability- -answers I Law affs...... 256 Nuclear weapons do not embolden states and their leaders, but lead to restraint on behalf of them...... 257

A/2: Hobbes NC ...... 260 Programs that implement expansive use of nuclear weapons could create an arms race that could potentially start wars...... 260 The presence of nuclear weapons is more likely to lead to a state of nature than escape it--fosters a culture of supremacy among states...... 261 The presence of nuclear weapons is more likely to lead to a state of nature than escape it--fosters a culture of supremacy among states...... 262 Hobbesian fear is institutionalized with nuclear weapons present...... 263

Neg: Rawls NC ...... 264 Nuclear weapons are justified to keep outlaw states from harming liberal democracies...... 265 Even though nuclear weapons keep outlaw states at bay, the point of deterrence is to prevent nuclear weapons from being used. My framework agrees that using nuclear weapons against innocent civilians is wrong...... 266 Well-ordered peoples, or communities that respect , have a right to self-defense. This allows for wars in the defense of rights and democratic institutions, but not for the sake of wealth or empire...... 267 Disarmament leaves liberal democracies vulnerable to rogue states...... 268 The military has to prioritize responding to contingencies that are low-probability yet high-magnitude...... 269

A/2: Rawls NC ...... 270 Nuclear weapons are unjust because they put the entire human population at risk--Rawls goes aff...... 270 Rawls overlooks the crucial problem of nuclear despotism---liberal democracies can't possess nuclear weapons without undermining their avlues...... 271 Rawls' defense of nuclear weapons didn't foresee contradictions between nuclear weapons and liberal values--- nuclear weapons rely on a security logic that upends constitutional restrictions...... 272 Liberal democracies have a legal obligation to follow the NPT and disarm...... 273

Neg: Realism NC ...... 274 Prolif risks increase if states abolish nuclear weapons before creating regimes for regular reporting, gradual reductions, and transparency...... 275 Disarmament fails if nations are motivated by security dilemmas---they'll cheat because they can't trust adversaries...... 277 Steps toward nuclear disarmament require states to send costly signals that induce their own vulnerability, which is morally wrong...... 278 The motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons can...... 279 The aff's idealistic critiques of deterrence ignore the realities of an anarchic international system---that breeds complicity in the evil of nuclear aggression...... 280

Champion Briefs 12 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence prevents great power wars, both conventional and nuclear. The impact is millions of deaths...... 281 Nuclear weapons deter Russia and China from carrying out major attacks on the US. Because adversaries don't want to risk armageddon, nuclear weapons ensure crisis stability...... 282 Nuclear weapons may not have coercive effects, but they're still an effective deterrent--[aff cards that cite Sechser and Fuhrmann are misapplying their book]...... 284 Nuclear deterrence is a legitimate means of self-defense and conflict prevention. States have an obligation to protect their citizens...... 285 Nuclear deterrence works even against so-called "irrational" countries...... 286 Nuclear weapons are key to deterrence...... 287 Nuclear deterrence has been one-hundred-percent successful since 1945...... 288 The US uses nuclear weapons every single day: to deter. And it works...... 289 Global zero is an unattainable goal, and nuclear deterrence saves millions of lives...... 290

A/2: Realism NC ...... 291 Deterrence failure is inevitable, and reliance on nuclear weapons makes other facets of less effective...... 291 Deterrence fails---escalation won't be rational...... 292 MAD is outdated now because the precise accuracy of nuclear strikes, with hair-trigger alert, makes their use much likelier...... 293 Deterrence failure is inevitable---there are high risks of accidents, as well as escalation by rogue states...... 294 Realism is inadequate in a nuclear age because nuclear weapons are self-undermining for the state that chooses to use them...... 296 The historical record doesn't prove that nuclear deterrence works...... 297 Nuclear weapons don...... 298 Nuclear weapons are unsuccessful as a coercive measure...... 299 Nuclear deterrence has zero credibility, and the development of smaller, tactical nukes means they'll get used...... 300 Deterrence fails because countries perceive an advantage in striking first...... 301 Deterrence fails for irrational leaders like Trump...... 302 Nuclear weapons may fail at coercing states in territorial conflicts, but they're still effective at deterrence. .... 303 Conventional deterrence solves their offense, and no method for deterrence can stop reckless leaders...... 305 Deterrence claims rely on counterfactual speculation---conventional superiority deters conflict...... 306

Neg: Cyber War Disadvantages ...... 307 Cyber attacks are just as, if not more, dangerous than nuclear attacks--they are even harder to detect and track...... 308 Cyber attacks cause systemic meltdown for affected communities--history proves that they're just as effective as Chernobyl...... 309 Nuclear weapon possession has inherent safeguards--the alternative is uninhibited cyber warfare...... 310 Cyber war impacts can't be ignored--they are at least on par with nuclear grade conflict...... 311 Nuclear weapons provide a response to modern-day threats against our cybersecurity and deter attacks...... 312 Use of nuclear weapons against cyber attacks constitutes a non-physical extreme circumstance--self-defense is morally justified...... 313 Nuclear weapons send a message to other states contemplating cyber warfare--Trump administration proves...... 314 AT ILaw aff. I Law justifies a nuclear response to cyber attacks...... 315

A/2: Cyber War Disadvantages ...... 317 Nuclear weapons systems are just extra fodder for cyber-attacks to work through...... 317

Champion Briefs 13 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons systems uniquely create a pathway for cyber attacks because of the lack of government over their possession...... 318 Maintaining nuclear weapons possession will only worsen the issue--increased technology in the field leads to greater risk...... 319 Deterrence effect from nuclear weapons use is unclear when it comes to cyber attacks...... 320

Neg: Weapons of Mass Destruction Tradeoff Disadvantages ...... 322 Nuclear weapons deter biological and chemical attacks, as well as terrorist actions by a State...... 323 Substitution occurs without nuclear weapons--nuclear weapons deter states from pursuing biological or chemical weapons...... 324 absence of nuclear weapons is the most significant factor in whether or not states pursue other forms of weapons of mass destruction...... 325 The impact of other WMDs is nearly eliminated when states possess nuclear weapons...... 326 The need for bioweapons is virtually zero for states that possess nuclear weapons...... 327 Nuclear weapons can only viably substitute for chemical and bioweapons--never the other way around...... 328 Chemical and bioweapons are worse than nuclear weapons--cause extinction...... 329

A/2: Weapons of Mass Destruction Tradeoff Disadvantages ...... 330 States would be too timid to attempt to develop bioweapons or chemical weapons—turns states into outcasts and pariah states...... 330 Threat of bioweapons and chemical weapons overblown—nuclear weapons are the greater threats...... 331 Too many factors to make bioweapons a threat—unlikely to be effective...... 332

Neg: Arms Limits Counterplan ...... 333 Some nuclear weapons are still necessary---conventional deterrence is insufficient...... 334 Arms limits are key to a minimum deterrent, which solves their offense and avoids the DAs...... 335 towards a "deterrence-only" posture solves for escalation and nuclear war while maintaining minimum, necessary capabilities...... 336 Arms control solves the signals that spur , and thus ...... 338 The US and Russia should commit to New START---that solves stability and avoids the politics DA...... 339 Russia won't follow through with abolition, but they can agree to arms control...... 341 Nuclear arms control, short of going to zero, makes cooperation on conventional weapons easier too...... 342

A/2: Arms Limits Counterplan ...... 343 Arms control is too dependent on broader political relations between countries...... 343 Risks are inevitable so long as nuclear weapons exist. Total disarmament is critical...... 344 The counterplan can't solve NPT-related contentions because the NPT calls for complete disarmament...... 345 The counterplan links to the DAs---arms limits acclimate countries to the inevitability of disarmament...... 346 Arms limits are the first step to eliminating arsenals, because strategic elimination FIRST primes countries for eventually eliminating nukes physically...... 347 Arms limits fail---there's no safety in small numbers...... 348 Arms control is a first step toward abolition. Perm, do the counterplan, then the aff...... 349

Neg: Objectivism NC ...... 350 Only statism makes nuclear weapons dangerous. Nuclear weapons were created by free people and human freedom makes those weapons, as a tool, either good or bad depending on circumstance...... 351 Nuclear weapons are like all other weapons, rooted in coercive relationships. The aff fails to overcome the statist logic that makes violence possible...... 353 Self-defense is an extension of natural rights, specifically the right to life...... 354

Champion Briefs 14 Table of Contents Jan/Feb 2020

The only moral purpose of government is to defend citizens' rights from physical force and other violations. . 355 Nuclear weapons are a legitimate means of self-defense for weaker nations to deter invasion by stronger ones...... 356 Nuclear weapons are vital to a state's self-defense. States should limit their nuclear arsenals to be strictly for retaliating against existential threats to their countries...... 358 Nuclear states aren't suicidal---they'd only use nuclear weapons in self-defense...... 360 Morality and self-interest should be interconnected in order for persons to have value to life...... 362 Life itself is a prerequisite to all other valuations...... 363 Survival is the justification for all values...... 364

A/2: Objectivism NC ...... 365 Objectivism holds that retaliation is only justified against aggressors, yet nuclear weapons harm many non- combatants...... 365 Rights are claims, which Rand's egoistic philosophy cannot adequately justify...... 366 States have many harmful intentions for pursuing nuclear weapons, which cannot be reduced to self-defense...... 368 Rands ethics are inconsistent...... 369 Survival isn’t key to flourishing. Rand’s position on moral values means survival is not the ultimate goal...... 370

Neg: Colonialism Kritik ...... 372 The aff is a nuclear zero utopia...... 373 Controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons already have existed...... 374 Nuclear deterrence is regulated by treaties and organizations...... 375

A/2: Colonialism Kritik ...... 376 Ethical scholarship can critique reckless American interventions while agreeing that dictators shouldn't get the bomb...... 376

Champion Briefs 15

Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek

Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

I’ll admit it – I find the entire history of nuclear weapons to be fascinating. I am amazed, and terrified, at how little scientists knew about the dangers associated with the splitting of the atom, while they were trying to do it, and how close military officials positioned their troops during bomb tests. I have read books and watched movies (check out Atomic Café if you can find a copy) and visited atomic bomb museums in Nevada and New Mexico. I also grew up during the height of the , which meant duck and cover drills when I was in elementary school, tests of the air raid sirens until I was in my teens and a trip behind the Iron Curtain in

1987, when no one really imagined that the end of the Soviet Union was just a few years away.

For me, nuclear arsenals always start with the US and the USSR, although of course, there has not been a USSR since 1991. Many of the treaties which regulate the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia do go back to the time when the USSR still existed, however, and one, the

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was broken in August of 2019 when Donald

Trump pulled the US out, claiming Russia was not following the rules contained in the treaty.

Another treaty, New Start, is set to expire in 2021 and experts suggest that if the US abandons that treaty, a will be the result. Very recently, President Trump has talked about a new treaty, which would replace New Start(?), and which would include China, but the vastly larger US and Russian arsenals makes any sort of three way treaty tough to negotiate, at best, and very likely impossible (which may be what the president actually intends). Meanwhile,

Champion Briefs 17 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

various nuclear powers are modernizing their weapons, allegedly within treaty limits, and some, especially North Korea and China, appear to be enlarging their arsenals.

In short, even though the only two nuclear weapons ever used in war were used nearly

75 years ago, this resolution could not be timelier. There are nine states (meaning, I would argue, nation-states, or countries) which currently have nuclear arsenals. They are the United

States, Russia, England, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Israel has never formally admitted to having nuclear weapons, preferring to maintain a posture of strategic ambiguity, but Israel is usually included on lists of nuclear weapons possessing nations, although it is not clear when, or how, they acquired them. At various times, other states have possessed nuclear weapons, including three parts of the former Soviet Union -- Belarus,

Kazakhstan and the . Given the events of the past few years, the Ukrainians may well be wondering whether they ought to have kept a part of their nuclear arsenal, since when the

Soviet Union collapsed they were the nation with the world’s third largest collection of nuclear devices, and it is unlikely that Russia would have invaded the Crimea if the Ukraine still had nuclear weapons. At the time, however, the Ukraine gave all the devices staged and stored in their territory back to Russia, in exchange for future security guarantees.

Long before that time, one of the most important treaties regulating the possession of nuclear weapons -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- came into force. At that time, only the

United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France and China had nuclear devices. Those five nations promised to “eventually” get rid of their arsenals, and nearly all of the rest of the countries on the planet promised they would never acquire nuclear weapons. Only India, Pakistan, North

Champion Briefs 18 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

Korea, Israel and the South Sudan are not currently parties of the NPT. North Korea did sign and then pulled out, and the other four never signed on. Given how long the five nuclear weapons possessing nations who signed the NPT have waited to get rid of their arsenals (since the

1970s), there are definitely pressures on them to make good on their promises, especially since all the nations who pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons have kept their word (except North

Korea).

Which brings us to the resolution. There are always choices for the affirmative and with this topic the first choice, it seems to me, is whether to take a “Whole Rez” approach, or a less inclusive approach. At the “Whole Rez” level, affirmatives could argue that it is way past time for the five initial nuclear powers to make good on the pledge they gave when they signed the

NPT, and actually eliminate their arsenals for moral and/or philosophical reasons. Presumably, the elimination of nuclear arsenals by the signatories to the NPT could/would motivate nuclear weapons possessing nations that are not signatories to the NPT to get rid of their arsenals as well, and in any case, the affirmative could fiat that they do so, or say implementation does not matter (more on fiat and implementation very soon).

Alternatively, the affirmative could take a “Whole Rez” pragmatic, or Utilitarian approach, and argue that nuclear arsenals pose an existential threat (which mean a threat so serious it endangers the future of all or nearly all life on earth), thereby making elimination of the nuclear arsenals critical to planetary survival. There are several very strong arguments against the possession of nuclear arsenals which I will mention later, but at this point, I should say that I believe an affirmative ought to be allowed to defend the resolution as a concept

Champion Briefs 19 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

without proving there are actual implementation methods in the status quo that could make it happen. At least some of the modern LD world would disagree with me, instead expecting solvency advocates, and actual mechanisms by which the arsenals could be eliminated. I would say that since the resolution says “ought to” that means the affirmative “should” have the leeway to call for the elimination of the nuclear arsenals without solvency mechanisms, but when I think like a negative I will still recommend being well prepared with circumvention arguments, pragmatic concerns about proper disposal of nuclear materials and fears that the materials will fall into the wrong hands. At the same time, I think “fiat” allows affirmatives (or negatives in the case of counterplans) to bring a plan into existence, but I do not believe affirmatives can fiat that their plan will work, which is why, I, as an affirmative, would try to avoid the question of fiat at all on this topic and argue the moral or pragmatic “rightness” of eliminating nuclear arsenals.

Mostly because of the presumed need to prove solvency, in at least some places, I would expect some affirmatives to try to subdivide the resolution, defending the elimination of the arsenals for some nations, but not others, or engaging in various more nuanced (and less inclusive) approaches than the “Whole Rez” approach. Affirmatives might also try to delay the elimination of the arsenals by including extensive phase-in periods or by allowing each state currently possessing a nuclear arsenal to keep a minimal number of devices. I would contend that all of these options are really negative ground, however, and that the affirmative must defend the entire resolution because of the problems inherent in the possession of nuclear

Champion Briefs 20 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

arsenals, but I have sympathy for affirmatives that will want to take on narrower slices of the topic if they debate in places where they will be expected to prove some sort of solvency.

I am honestly not quite sure where I would draw the line on allowing some nations to keep their nuclear arsenals while other nations gave them up, but I suspect any country could presented as the one whose weapons need to go – perhaps Israel on the grounds that strategic ambiguity is dangers and that any nuclear weapons in the Middle East could be catastrophic or perhaps the five nations who signed the NPT promising to get ride of their weapons, when now, decades later they still have them. Since we are only dealing with nine states that have nuclear arsenals, at least the number of possible combinations is fairly limited, but since I do not see any qualifiers in the resolution, I would recommend negatives come prepared to argue that affirmatives must defend the position that all nine states eliminate their arsenals right now, not just some part of that group, or that such affirmatives are not topical.

As for “phase in” approaches, affirmatives would definitely benefit from dragging out the elimination of the arsenals as long as possible in order to answer circumvention arguments like: the countries will cheat, new nuclear states will emerge, devices will fall into the hands of terrorists, etc., but phase out arguments could be problematic if the advantages the affirmative claims (miscalculation, hacking of launch systems, theft of devices, etc.) depend on the elimination of the arsenals (which they probably will). Besides, I think phasing out elimination of the devices, along with allowing each to keep a few of the devices in their arsenals, seems more like counterplan ground than affirmative ground. The topic says states ought to eliminate their arsenals, not hang onto some devices for the foreseeable, or even

Champion Briefs 21 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

unforeseeable, future, and as long as any state possesses nuclear weapons there is the danger that they will accidentally be launched, drawing a nuclear retaliation.

Of course, this last point hinges on definitions, specifically the definitions of “eliminate” and “nuclear arsenals.” Once of my students said in class recently that he had seen a definition of “eliminate” which essentially was “reduce.” I do not know the source for this definition and I personally don’t see states hanging on to some part of their arsenals as affirmative ground when I look at the resolution as a whole, but if someone has said it, people will debate it, and if eliminate can mean reduce, affirmative ground is considerably larger than folks originally thought, and negative ground much smaller. Definitions of “nuclear arsenals” are tough to find and potentially useful for broadening affirmative ground as well since there are definitely things besides nuclear warheads themselves included in nuclear arsenals. Again, I would say the resolution is calling for the affirmative to get rid of it all, but if all an affirmative has to do is reduce certain items that might not even include all of the warheads, the affirmative has a lot of ground, and may be able to avoid at least some of the negative’s solvency arguments.

Let’s be clear, in non-debate settings, I actually believe the world would be better off without nuclear weapons (and nuclear power, as a matter of fact), but defending that position is pretty tough in debate because there really is no putting of the nuclear genie back into the bottle, and if some folks have nuclear devices, some other folks probably need them to deter anyone from using them. is based on decades of interesting literature, and the arguments are good on both sides, which means debaters really have to weigh and evaluate those positions. Although modern interpretations of Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD

Champion Briefs 22 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

tend to ignore the fact that the US and USSR did not lob nuclear missiles in the general direction of one another, and instead focus on the millions of deaths caused in proxy wars between nations supported by the US and the USSR, those proxy wars would likely have happened even if neither nation had nuclear arsenals, since we both sold literal tons of weapons to our respective friends throughout the Cold War, and there is no denying that nuclear devices have never been used in war since the time that more than one country possessed them. So, while it is not true that states possessing nuclear arsenals prevents war (in general) it is true that rough balances of power between East and West (or North and South) have been maintained for decades, without those nuclear devices being used.

It may be true, however, that the 21st century is different. PF is just finishing a topic on

Offensive Cyber Operations and one of the arguments the PFers kept bumping into was the possibility that nuclear command and control systems could be hacked, resulting in the launch of nuclear devices, or resulting in the perception that such devices had been launched, which could have led to retaliatory strikes, when in fact the initial launch was not real. Also, there are more non-state actors these days, who might want to get their hands on nuclear devices. We hear a lot about nuclear terrorism, and while the doomsday prognostications probably make this sound easier and more likely than it actually it, the notion that persons not states might want to get their hands on nuclear devices needs to be discussed. Whether states eliminating their arsenals is better or worse in that scenario is a subject worth debating.

I have said nothing so far about kritiks in this analysis, partly because I hope debaters sometimes discuss nuclear arsenals in a material, not metaphorical sense, and partly because

Champion Briefs 23 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

there is so much to say in every area, but it is important to note that several critical authors do consider the substantial number of nuclear tests, especially the above ground tests, to be a form of nuclear war, specifically against indigenous persons in the United States and in the

Pacific, which means that it also possible for an affirmative to present a K affirmative which rejects nuclear arsenals as neocolonialist or racist. In fact, water sources on Native American reservations are still contaminated by the mine tailings left behind when radioactive elements were taken from the earth, and there has been considerable discussion of Yucca Mountain, a nuclear waste storage facility, located on land sacred to indigenous persons. Beyond that, the topic can be criticized in pretty much the opposite direction as well, because either side could argue that a focus on nuclear arsenals is just a way of whiteness ignoring the ongoing plight of persons of color, because after all, if we are saying that we need to consider nuclear weapons first, even though their use is extremely unlikely, that allows us to ignore the ongoing violence directed at black and brown bodies. While it is true that persons of all races and ethnicities could be harmed by nuclear weapons, the question of how to prioritize the things we discuss is debatable.

In the end, I cannot think of any topic from the list that I would rather see as the

January-February topic this year, also known as the topic that lasts forever. Some late

December tournaments use this topic and the NDCA and TOC still use it in April. As a matter of fact, some states also don’t even bother with March-April. I wish you good fortune and happy researching, and encourage you to look up some things you don’t already know, and cut some new cards, in addition to spending quality discussion time with your Policy and PF teammates.

Champion Briefs 24 Topic Analysis by Sheryl Kaczmarek Jan/Feb 2020

About Sheryl Kaczmarek

Sheryl is about to finish her 35th year of coaching speech & debate. Her career began at

Brookfield Central High School in Wisconsin in the 1982-83 school year, coaching exclusively policy debate (and speech) since LD had not yet spread across the country, and no one had even dreamed of PF. She spent 10 years at Brookfield Central, before spending one year at

Glenbrook North, then moved east to Newburgh Free Academy in New York, where she coached Policy, LD and PF for 21 years. She is now in her third year at Lexington High SChool in

MA, teaching advanced classes in PF, LD, and Policy, in addition to novice classes and managing a team of 130 students. She is also the Lincoln-Douglas Curriculum Coordinator for the

Champion Briefs Institute.

Champion Briefs 25 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin

Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

Comedian and actor Danny DeVito once compared his lawyers to nuclear weapons saying

“Of course I've got lawyers. They are like nuclear weapons, I've got em 'cause everyone else has.

But as soon as you use them they screw everything up.” In many ways this is an accurate summary of the debates that will represent the core of the January-February topic. Many of the debates on this topic will use various justifications to argue two basic points on this topic. The affirmative will essentially be arguing that the existential risk of nuclear weapons makes them a ridiculous tool for states to possess because only the possession of nuclear weapons by one state justifies the possession by other states. On the negative the debates will generally boil down to the necessity of nuclear armed states for the overall security of the world. This topic analysis will look at the various ways in which the aff and neg can make these arguments as well as a few more nuanced arguments that can apply on this topic.

Before going further it’s important to define a couple of terms in the resolution. First is the word eliminate. The debates around eliminate will deal with to what extent does a state have to reduce a nuclear arsenal in order to eliminate it. Merriam-Webster provides two interpretations of the word eliminate that I think are fairly descriptive but also lead to some interesting questions. First they define eliminate as “to put an end to or get rid of” and second as “to remove from consideration” . There are subtle differences in how these two interpretations might change how approach the topic. If you use the first interpretation than you’ll have to deal with the pro’s and con’s of disarmament. This is probably the intended

Champion Briefs 26 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

interpretation of the topic and it’s also what most people’s gut check interpretation of the topic would be. The second interpretation would allow you to argue a more nuanced position that would remove the consideration of nuclear arsenal which means states might not necessarily denuclearize but they would no longer consider using them. It’s a sketchy way to get out of some neg links but it’s still grammatically accurate and solves for many aff impacts.

The other important term to define is nuclear arsenal. Now this is not a term that is generally defined in the literature so it is much easier to define these words separately. Starting with the word nuclear we are left with many questions. In my mind the biggest question that debaters need to answer is what is the bright line for what constitutes the nuclear arsenal. Are radiological weapons nuclear? bullets? Radioactive poisoning? This may be the most complicated question in the topic to unravel and hopefully the following help to provide some clarity. The International Committee of the Red Cross identify a fundamental difference between the two as:

Nuclear agents are radioactive material generated from or fusion, such as those produced by detonation of a nuclear weapon or releases from damaged nuclear power plants. Radiological agents are radioactive material generated as by-products and waste from the mineral processing industries, produced for use in industrial applications and medical therapy, or occurring naturally in the environment.

This interpretation would mean that the topic is limited to traditional nuclear weapons that use either fission or fusion in order to cause their harm while limiting out things such as dirty bombs and non-nuclear radiological threats. Not it’s not to say that there is no way for these

Champion Briefs 27 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

elements to be incorporated into the topic it’s just going to take some grammatical gymnastics in order to allow them into the topic.

One way to do that relies on how you interpret the phrase arsenal. The most appropriate interpretation for arsenal is probably Webster’s second interp “a collection of weapons” but it’s first interpretation should also be analyzed “an establishment for the manufacture or storage of arms and military equipment”. The second interpretation is pretty straight forward and refers to the various types of fission and fusion bombs that various states possess in all their forms from gravity bombs, to ballistic and cruise missiles, and even the so called “suit case nuke” or a nuclear bomb small enough. To fit in a piece of luggage. The first interpretation though would allow for the discussion of a wider variety of issues because it would define the nuclear arsenal to be the storage and manufacturing facilities for nuclear weapons. If we only eliminate the weapons themselves than the process for enriching uranium remains in place so things like potent dirty bombs can still be created, and the byproduct of highly is the deplete uranium that’s used to form thing like depleted uranium bullets. Eliminating the. Manufacturing facilities for nuclear weapons would most likely end the enrichment process as well and therefore solves for both nuclear related harms as well as some radiological harms. Of course there will be other ways to the topic and I suspect. By late February and at the TOC there will be some unique interpretations to allow for small squirrelly affirmatives.

Finally, we need to address the word states within the topic. Currently there are eight confirmed nuclear powers: The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, China, India,

Pakistan, and North Korea with Israel widely believed to also be in possesion of nuclear weapons

. South Africa and a handful of former Soviet Republics once possessed nuclear weapons although

Champion Briefs 28 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

South Africa denuclearized in the early 90’s and the former Soviet nuclear weapons were all supposedly returned to Russia and mostly disposed of. There are couple of way to look at the phrase states. The first interpretation would make the topic encompass all states that possess nuclear weapons while another would allow you to pick and choose multiple states which ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenal. There can also be an argument that the topic doesn’t prevent new states from developing nuclear weapons because it only asks states to eliminate their nuclear arsenal. The wording of the topic seems to imply an effect only on states who already possess nuclear weapons because you cannot eliminate something that does not exist. It might be strategic to use the last argument against utilitarian plan aff’s and when running security based frameworks due to the insecurity created by future nuclearization. Of course the flipside of that argument can also be made in that the topic could be universalized to the point where once any state develops a nuclear weapon they would have to eliminate it but it would make for a very interesting topicality debate.

Moving beyond the interpretations there are many ways to approach arguing this topic.

On the affirmative and negative I’m going to discuss 3 approaches from traditional to more progressive that I think would be really effective on this topic. Of course there are way more than

3 arguments per side that can be run and these are not the end all be all of arguments but these are the ones that I think can be run on most circuits.

When looking at the concept of just war theory you can find several justifications to get rid of nuclear weapons. Classically, the theory prevents the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and can be argued that the radioactive fallout from nuclear use as well as the overall blast radius from a nuclear detonation both violate this principal. The radioactive fallout can harm

Champion Briefs 29 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

anyone in its path and it is completely uncontrollable; the path is dependent on shifting winds and other environmental factors which means it is random and indiscriminate. The other important standard to look at under just war theory are ones that deal with reciprocity. The only way nuclear weapons should be used then would be after another country uses them. Only the possession of a nuclear weapon justifies another states possession so that they could respond in kind to the use of nuclear weapon but if a state has no justification for their use why should they possess nuclear weapons? I can’t think of any justification and the literature is notably lacking many justifications for the use or possession of nuclear weapons outside of a last resort use or their deterrent effect.

Debaters can also look at the topical through a utilitarian lens. These cases can be constructed in a variety a ways. Cases can end all nuclear weapons possession which would eliminate the risk of nuclear war because no one will have the weapons. The other way util cases can be run would eliminate the nuclear arsenal of only certain states while keeping them in others. India and Pakistan are two nuclear powers that could be specified to denuclearize due to the regular military flare ups that occur between the nations. Many scholars argue that an India-

Pakistan war is the most likely scenario for nuclear conflict and therefore represents a unique global threat. The benefit of preserving some nuclear states is that it avoids arguments that would say the mutually assured destruction of nuclear conflict deters lower level conflict as well.

Additionally, debaters can devote affirmatives to the many dangers of proliferation such as increased risk of loose . These cases can be presented with or without a plan depending on how you want to frame the debate but utilitarianism can be a very framework for the affirmative.

Champion Briefs 30 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

Finally, debaters that are looking to argue a more progressive case can discuss various issues related to the practice of uranium mining. Nuclear weapons are the main driver behind the uranium industry therefore eliminating nuclear arsenals would logically help substantially reduce the practice of mining uranium. Potential harms of uranium mining include various environmental impacts as well as harms to multiple vulnerable communities. Uranium mining can be spun into affirmatives with utilitarian framing as well as more progressive case frameworks from structural violence to environmental ethics cases could be a very defensible small aff. It’s important to note that aff’s don’t actually have to disarm in order to deal with uranium mining impacts instead they can use the definition of arsenal discussed above that dealt with the manufacturing process and end that. It’s strategic because you can avoid many neg security impacts while solving for a lot of structural ones.

In the negative debaters have a plethora of arguments at their disposal. On the more traditional side debaters can use Hobbes to justify the topic. Hobbesian based cases would argue that the government has a duty to provide security for it’s citizens and because nuclear weapons and the knowledge to build them exists states have an obligation to possess them. Concepts like mutually assured destruction supposedly further the Hobbesian position by providing essential security to citizens. Similar to Hobbes there are also objectivist justifications for states to possess nuclear weapons. Rand and other objectivists also argue that the only legitimate duty of the state is security and that nuclear weapons represent that security.

Debaters on the negative can also use util and realist international relations based arguments to great success. The absence of nuclear weapons may entice states to invest in other forms of weapons of mass destruction and even if states dismantle their fusion bombs they would

Champion Briefs 31 Topic Analysis by Daniel Shatzkin Jan/Feb 2020

still possess the radiological material. This means that in the worst case scenario there would be an immediate proliferation of radiological bombs that could still cause plenty of harm and may even increase the likelihood of their use. Disposal also presents numerous harms that could work under a util framework as well as many others.

Finally debaters looking for more progressive arguments have plenty to choose from. I think one argument that might find prominence is a form of the militarism k. Most affirmatives will likely argue that the decrease of nuclear weapons will make people safer. Negatives can criticize this mindset because it puts the focus on weapons systems instead of the underlying mindset that has people inventing more ways to kill more and more people. It can utilize many of the same arguments that util cases do for offense while advocating for alternatives ranging from genealogical explorations of conflict to rejection of militaristic mindsets and many others.

The topic provides a lot of different potential argument paths for you to choose from with a substantial literature base for all styles of debate. While seemingly narrow the topic can be interpreted in many ways which would justify a broad range of affirmatives. The arguments discussed above with the exception of the militarism kirtik can be found in the eivdence contained in this brief. However you choose to debate the topic I hope you find this TA helpful as you begin your research.

Champion Briefs 32 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher

Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

Hello everybody, and Happy New Year! 2020 is already off to a great start with the wonderful LD topic of ‘Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.’ In the modern-day news cycle, we hear more and more about the threat of nuclear weapons in the realm of international security. On top of this, as debaters we know a disproportionate amount about the political science behind nuclear weapons and the detrimental effects of the use of them, as many impact scenarios eventually mention the use of nuclear weapons. However, this topic allows us to investigate the issue directly by questioning the existence of nuclear weapons in the first place. That being said, this specific topic is not new to the debate community. In the past, the NSDA has put forth resolutions such as “Resolved: Countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power” (September-October 2016), “Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons” (September-October 2010), and “Resolved: The possession of nuclear weapons is immoral” (both January-February 2000 and March-April 1992). Although this is obviously a rehashed topic, the current state of international affairs will (unfortunately) allow for many original and unique arguments to be deployed for this topic. Having taught this topic at camp this summer, I can personally attest to the fact that it allows for a large spectrum of political and philosophical education. In fact, a lot of the knowledge that you will gain from this topic will be useful during the rest of your debate career as well, especially when you are defending or refuting nuclear war impact scenarios. In this topic analysis, I will go over the LD

Champion Briefs 33 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

“meta” of January and February, analyze the wording of the resolution itself, and discuss some relevant arguments for both sides of the resolution.

January and February are, without a doubt, the most important months for the national circuit of Lincoln-Douglas debate. Some of the biggest tournaments of the year, including

Harvard, Emory, and Berkeley, all take place in January and February. In addition, to allow competitors to have maximum preparation time for the topic, the Tournament of Champions

(TOC) uses the January-February topic even though it takes place in April. At the local and state level, there are many regional and national qualifying tournaments that will use this topic. With all this said, it will be important to prepare an array of strategies that will prepare you for both traditional and progressive rounds, just like on every other topic.

Topic Breakdown

“States ought to”

As usual, this LD topic uses the word ‘ought.’ You may choose to define this word from either a legal or moral perspective. I believe that, unlike other topics, there actually is a decent amount of ground1 under the legal interpretation. It would behoove you to do independent research about the legality of nuclear weapons (especially by states that have been condemned by the international community). While this ground does exist, I predict that the moral interpretation and definition of the word ‘ought’ will be more popular, especially in traditional rounds.

1 Bort, R. (2017). ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ILLEGAL? YES, BUT IT DOESN'T MATTER. Retrieved 8 December 2019, from https://www.newsweek.com/nuclear-weapons-illegal-nobel-prize-679688

Champion Briefs 34 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

This fragment of the resolution also provides it with an actor – ‘states.’ While you may first think of this word to refer to the 50 states of the United States, it is actually referring to individual countries around the world – this distinction is very important, especially considering that the states of the U.S. do not own any nuclear weapons. With this, the debate becomes a question of what governments are obligated to do as both sources of protection for their citizens as well as actors in the global world order.

“eliminate”

If you debated in November or December of this season, you will recall that our last topic also used the term ‘eliminate.’ A common debate on the last topic was whether or not

‘eliminate’ entailed an immediate or gradual elimination of fossil fuel subsidies. Although that specific debate is now behind us, the same problem presents itself for us on this topic: how, and how fast, would states eliminate nuclear arsenals? The literature does not seem to dive deep into this question. Because the ‘Overton Window’ of the international community is pushed so far away from the abolishment of nuclear weapons in the status quo, the idea of total elimination is currently seen as a sort of radical dream that is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Discussion of this proposal is sparse, and individual movements on the international stage in support of it are out of the ordinary and thoroughly noted by the press2 even though it seems like a reasonable idea to the average person. With all that said, unless you dive deep into academic research and discussion (which you should!) you won’t find a ton of information about the specific methods of eliminating nuclear weapons in this topic’s literature.

2 Elimination of nuclear weapons ‘only real way’ to allay fear of a constant threat, Guterres insists. (2019). Retrieved 8 December 2019, from https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047712

Champion Briefs 35 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

“their nuclear arsenals”

Nuclear arsenals are distinct from infrastructure that is used for the production of nuclear power. One dictionary defines ‘arsenal’ as “A governmental establishment for the storing, development, manufacturing, testing, or repairing of arms, ammunition, and other war materiel.”3 That being said, nuclear power infrastructure is obviously excluded from this definition. “Nuclear weapon” is defined by Encyclopedia Britannica4: “[a] device designed to release energy in an explosive manner as a result of nuclear fission, , or a combination of the two processes. Fission weapons are commonly referred to as atomic bombs. Fusion weapons are also referred to as thermonuclear bombs or, more commonly, hydrogen bombs; they are usually defined as nuclear weapons in which at least a portion of the energy is released by nuclear fusion.”

Other

Beyond the wording of the resolution, there are two concepts that are popularly used in the literature of nuclear proliferation research that I think will be helpful for you to know about:

“horizontal proliferation” and “vertical proliferation.” The former refers to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states or actors that previously have not had nuclear capabilities. For example, if Japan were to build a nuclear bomb, it would be classified as horizontal proliferation because a new country has a nuclear weapon. Vertical proliferation refers to the expansion of

3 arsenal. (n.d.) American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. (2011). Retrieved December 10 2019 from https://www.thefreedictionary.com/arsenal

4 Norris, R., & Cochran, T. (2019). Nuclear weapon - Principles of atomic (fission) weapons. Retrieved 8 December 2019, from https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon/Principles-of-atomic-fission-weapons

Champion Briefs 36 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

an existing national nuclear arsenal. If the United States were to build a new nuclear bomb, then it would be considered vertical proliferation because the already existing U.S. nuclear arsenal would increase in size. Vertical proliferation is constantly changing in the international community, and is the type of proliferation that is typically reported on by the media. If you have seen a CNN headline about North Korea’s missile tests, that is an example of vertical proliferation, because it represents North Korea improving and expanding its arsenal. However, there also exists fear about horizontal proliferation – for instance, there has been much discussion recently about the potential for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. The governmental action inherent in this topic involves vertical proliferation and horizontal proliferation because it entails that multiple countries eliminate their nuclear arsenals, which are made up of multiple nuclear weapons.

Affirmative Positions

Russia and United States 1AC

As mentioned, today’s news cycle often references the potential for nuclear conflict between nuclear states. Notably, the relationship between Russia and the United States has been a cause for concern for political analysts for some time now. While Russia retracted itself from offensive actions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has recently begun military adventurism in regions such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia () and Crimea (Ukraine) and the Baltics. As Russia inches closer to NATO’s doorstep, there is increasing worry that a Russian military action would trigger a response from NATO as per its Article V security guarantee. A

NATO response would very likely result in nuclear exchange between Russia and NATO

Champion Briefs 37 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

countries, namely the United States.5 Without a doubt, even a small nuclear exchange would have profound effects on the planet. Beyond the immediate death of hundreds of thousands of people, the use of nuclear weapons would have dire effects for the global climate and possibly trigger an ice age (also known as a “”) as a result of ash blocking sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface.6

The elimination of nuclear weapons would lower tensions between Russia and the

United States, and literally defuse the risk of any nuclear exchange between the two countries, which would prevent the impacts that I previously outlined from happening. This affirmative would work very well with a utilitarianism framework, as it focuses on large-scale impacts.

However, a structural violence framework would also work well with this position. Because a nuclear exchange would have brutal impacts on the environment and human civilization, it is likely that a post- world would be characterized by mass suffering, oppression, and violence. For example, the survivors of the initial fallout would experience poisoning, which causes many health side effects such as cancer. Additionally, the climatic effects of nuclear war would result in crop failure and water poisoning, causing food and water shortages that would affect millions of people around the world. All of these instances of ‘slow violence’ can be articulated under a structural violence framework, or weighed against a

5 Brands, H. (2019). How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics. Retrieved 10 December 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-07/nuclear-war-in-the-baltics-russia-could-force-one

6 Baum, S. (2015). The Risk of Nuclear Winter. Retrieved 10 December 2019, from https://fas.org/pir-pubs/risk- nuclear-winter/

Champion Briefs 38 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

negative position that focuses on oppression or slow violence – even if you use a utilitarianism framework in the 1AC.

Ethics of Love 1AC

This is an affirmative position that I discovered while researching this topic at camp this summer. bell hooks, a renowned intersectional scholar that focuses on race and gender studies, has contributed much effort to a conceptual framework of resolving oppression through the acceptance of love. The implication of this framework is that we should focus on the material conditions of suffering, and align ourselves with political projects that are rooted in care and love for humanity rather than power and hegemony, both of which lead to domination of the oppressed. This framework can certainly be crafted into both a progressive and traditional position. The argument at the contention-level of this affirmative would be that the existence of nuclear weapons is not aligned with the concept of love. Nuclear weapons were invented as a result of the drive for increased securitization of the world and have been used as tools of coercion against other countries. The very purpose of a nuclear weapon is to kill a large number of people in an instant7, which is obviously a morally repugnant action. If you are interested in this affirmative, I suggest diving into the literature of bell hooks, specifically her article “Love as the Practice of Freedom” and her book All About Love: New Visions.

Negative Positions

No First Use CP

7 Acheson, R. (2018). Resisting Nuclear Weapons Means Resisting Injustice and Oppression. Retrieved 10 December 2019, from https://www.thenation.com/article/resisting-nuclear-weapons-means-resisting-injustice/

Champion Briefs 39 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

Aside from the total elimination of nuclear weapons, there are other methods that scholars have proposed as ways to reduce the threat of nuclear annihilation. One of those methods (which has already been used by some countries) is a pledge.8 This is exactly what it sounds like: a pledge from a country that says that it will not use nuclear weapons first in an international conflict. Instead, countries would still have nuclear weapons in their arsenals but would only use them to strike back if another country attacked them with nuclear weapons first. One or multiple countries announcing a No First Use (NFU) policy would alleviate the tension that exists between countries in the status quo, without causing countries to not have a deterrent effect against other nuclear states if either a) a country without a NFU pledge attacked them with a nuclear weapon or b) a country with an NFU pledge breaks it and attacks with a nuclear weapon.

You could also pair this counterplan with a circumvention argument. Even if all states were to eliminate the nuclear arsenals that they have now, there is nothing stopping them from redeveloping their arsenals once they have eliminated their old weapons. However, a NFU pledge is a definite action that countries have a vested interest in upholding. If a country were to back out of such a serious pledge, it would have negative ramifications on its credibility as an ally and partner for other countries.

Bioweapons + DAs

The bioweapons disadvantage would argue that if countries were to get rid of nuclear weapons, they would still want something to ensure their military dominance and safety in the

8 Panda, A. (2018). ‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved 10 December 2019, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons

Champion Briefs 40 Topic Analysis by Charles Karcher Jan/Feb 2020

future. Bioweapons are already a serious threat, and many scholars are concerned about the lethality of a well-planned biological attack.9 If states were to turn to biological weapons as a new form of deterrence in a post-nuclear age, the lethality and effect of their usage may be underestimated in military calculations. This may result in a larger comfort in using them against other countries compared to nuclear weapons.

The same logic follows for . In an increasingly digitalized world, society would be seriously harmed by a cyberattack in any capacity. The effects of a cyberattack include obvious things such as grid failure, as well as less obvious impacts such as economic decline.10 The replacement of nuclear weapons with cyberweapons would increase the likelihood that cyberwarfare would be used for the next global conflict.

Since these arguments rely on the idea that countries will turn to new forms of deterrence in place of nuclear weapons, it would not be a good idea to read either of them alongside the deterrence DA (another disadvantage that you may find on this topic).

Parting Thoughts

Writing this topic analysis has reminded me of how great of a topic this one is. I am very excited to see what arguments will be read during rounds on this topic, as there is a great amount of ground for both sides. It is not often that LD is fortunate enough to get such a great topic – have fun with it! Best of luck going into the last stretch of the season!

9 Manfred S Green, James LeDuc, Daniel Cohen, David R Franz, Confronting the threat of bioterrorism: realities, challenges, and defensive strategies, The Lancet Infectious Diseases, Volume 19, Issue 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(18)30298-6. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1473309918302986) 10 University of Kent. (2018, October 24). At least 57 negative impacts from cyber-attacks. ScienceDaily. Retrieved December 11, 2019 from www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/10/181024112203.htm

Champion Briefs 41 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan

Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

1. Background of Nuclear Arsenals

In this section I shall go through the current quantitative situation regarding state nuclear arsenals, to give brief context.

Overall, states control over 14,000 nuclear arsenals, with the largest percentage of ownership

(90%) concentrated in Russia and the United States11. There is a “Treaty on the

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, under whose terms five states are signed as

“nuclear-weapons states”: the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China12.

2. Affirmative

In this section I shall outline an affirmative strategy which I believe is potent. The point of this strategy is to (a) deal with negative positions and (b) endure, such that they can be adapted based on any situation and can be read throughout the whole topic.

2.1 Power AC

11 “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association, Arms Control Association, 2019, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat. 12 ibid

Champion Briefs 42 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

The first affirmative strategy I would highly recommend would be a critique of power, and the constant desire to “control” things and concepts — be it an abstract notion of sovereignty, people, or even other countries, states can (and have in the past), shown a desire for the power to control.

This can be broken down into the three component parts discussed above, and structured more into a framework of independent justifications rather than that of a linear justification. In other words, a conceptual map of the framework would look like:

State power is wrong in many instances, here are three inter-related scenarios where state power is problematic:

Scenario 1: State power to establish sovereignty is bad

Scenario 2: State power to control people is bad

Scenario 3: State power to expand control to other countries is bad

The affirmative framework would focus, then on, those three instances of state power. This is strategic, as it would mean that negative turns and links would have to link back into one of those three scenarios, and any general turns to the concept of “power” being bad would require the negative to make extra links into the framework. Additionally, any negative framework “takeouts” would have to be specific to these instances of power, and generic framework arguments probably would not disprove the framework in those instances (and even if they did, the negative would have to put in more work to make those arguments).

Champion Briefs 43 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

I will give a brief background as to how I would go about framing the three scenarios, although finding and thoroughly warranting the scenarios would be up to the debaters themselves.

Scenario 1: Here, I would take from literature around cosmopolitanism, and general critiques of sovereignty, although I would make sure not to critique the notion of “sovereignty” in general.

Rather, I think a more potent affirmative would only defend that the “means” of generating sovereignty are bad. In other words, the affirmative doesn’t take a stance on the concept or ideal of sovereignty, but rather would defend that using state power to establish, enforce, or impose sovereignty is problematic (for whatever warranted reasons debaters may find)

Scenario 2: This becomes a little trickier, as although this is probably assumed true in debate nowadays, the method of justification for the affirmative (the exact warrants used) would influence the robustness of any impacts linked back into the framework. I would argue that the affirmative should claim that state power controls people through fear, and that this is extremely problematic for psychological reasons, or because it makes state power inevitable by quelling potential dissent. Again, the exact method of warranting is up to the debater, but centering this argument around the concept of fear would go a long way in making the affirmative a strong argument.

Scenario 3: Here, I would take from literature around colonialism and imperialism, which would warrant this scenario quite well. The crux of this scenario would be that the threat of conquering other states places other states in a similar state to the people in Scenario 2 — even if no actual conquering is conducted, states seting up potential expansion paths is problematic.

Champion Briefs 44 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

The burden structure of this framework, logically, should be that proving any one of these scenarios true should be sufficient to justify that the resolution is a desirable plan of action.

2.2 Offense

The offense here would be pretty clear now that the framework is set up; it would follow the three scenarios discussed above pretty closely, and would link directly back into the framework in those three ways.

Scenario 1: The argument here would be that nuclear weapons are used to establish sovereignty. By creating distance from other states, and bolstering national defense in general, states manage to put their people in a constant state of “potential war.” As such, states are pitted against each other, bucketed into categories of acronyms such as the NWS under the

NPT, and as such manage to maintain their perception of sovereignty because of their nuclear arsenals. Additionally, states are able to create a power structure or global hierarchy through nuclear arsenals that are independantly problematic, both from a power standpoint and from a sovereignty standpoint, as states validate their own existence solely in opposition to the existence of others.

Scenario 2: The argument here would be that nuclear arsenals are maintained in order to keep people in fear. This argument is threefold. First, the claim could be made that nuclear arsenals keep states’ own citizens in check, by giving a foundation to the fear that states might use their nuclear weapons against their own citizens. Second, and more simply, states place other states’ citizens in fear through the constant threat of nuclear power. Third, it arbitrarily gives people

Champion Briefs 45 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

power over entire other states. I’m sure anecdotally debaters can point to scenarios where US

Citizens have claimed, in response to another state’s actions, to “just nuke them,” but finding an empirical or psychological justification for this arbitrarily inflated sense of power would go a long way towards warranting thise more nebulous part of the argument.

Scenario 3: The argument here is quite simple. By having nuclear weapons, states give themselves the power to conquer other states — the simple existence of nuclear weapons creates the global hierarchy we discussed in Scenario 1, and as such proliferates state power over other countries, especially the ability to “conquer” them.

3. Negative

In this section I shall outline a robust negative strategy that is easier to defend and stick to, and probably does not need to be abandoned in the 2NR. It is a strategic option to deal with most affirmatives, and gives room to read counterplans that will probably be prevalent on this topic.

3.1 Pragmatism NC

The best option for the negative would be a “pragmatic” negative case justified by constitutivism. This negative case would deal with the purpose of states (to maintain their sovereignty), and their methods to do so.

3.1 The Framework

This pragmatics framework would consist of many justifications as to why intent based frameworks fail when considering nuclear arsenals. First, the definition of states themselves,

Champion Briefs 46 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

are based on how states are formed in practice — although there is a lot of theory, that theory is validated and additional clauses to state formation and maintanance are created only through how states operate in practice. Separating the two would be incoherent and nonsensical. The negative could also discuss an intent based framework must rely upon pragmatic calculations, such as what actual instances of nuclear arsenal “elimination” look like

(have any states done it in the past, what would “elimination” even consist of). This would function as a side constraint to the affirmative, where it is necessary to fulfill pragmatism to attain whatever abstract idea the affirmative values.

From here, the framework could go two different ways: either a constitutive justification or a pure utilitarian justification (or both, potentially).

The constitutive justification would be more basic, but be better warranted. The argument would go that states have an obligation towards preservation — in essense, this is a pure constitutivism argument: states could not be conceptualized without the sovereignty they hold dear, and as such they must preserve this sovereignty in order to exist as states. Furthermore, even if they have an obligation to their citizens, the concept of citizenry again cannot exist without sovereignty. As such, states have a pragmatic obligation to preserve their existence, which in this case means to preserve their separation from other “states.” Another argument could be made that without state identity, it would be impossible to conceptualize the resolution, which could be another reason as to why the resolution would be false and the judge would be obligated to negate.

Champion Briefs 47 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

The utilitarian argument should be that we have to look at end states to understand pragmatics. This is especially potent as while the framework would function as a side constraint, it is not sufficient to disprove pragmatics as there is also a counter-framework of utilitarianism. Although loosely justified, this argument is more about proving “end-state” calculus rather than defending utilitarianism as a general principle, although if forced to specify it would be strategic for the negative to defend utilitarianism.

3.2 Offense

The offense for this would follow logically from the framework.

The main thesis of the negative would be that nuclear arsenals are pragmatic, as they allow states to define their sovereignty and protect their borders without necessarily having to hurt anyone. Defining the purpose of nuclear arsenals as to maintain state borders would go a long way towards proving the burden set by the frmaework, especially the constitituve justification.

Second, an argument could be made that nuclear deterrance is the best under an ends-based calculus, as it does not really lead to negative impactful consequences — although there may be a means-based problem with deterrance, ultimately, the existence of nuclear weapons does not necessarily indicate that they are being used willfully.

For these reasons, the negative could easily claim that even if nuclear arsenals arent optimal, they are the best states could do. The alternatives could be much much worse, from states

Champion Briefs 48 Topic Analysis by Shankar Krishnan Jan/Feb 2020

legitimately fighting with each other to a world economic collapse due to a breakdown in trade relations or trade wars.

4. Conclusion

These are all strategies I would utilize if I were debating this topic, and believe that they are adaptable, robust, and durable, which make them applicable to many rounds and allow them to have the same thesis but evolve throughout the topic. I wish you all the best for the topic and hope these strategies can serve you well or can serve as a springboard for your own ideas.

Good Luck!

Champion Briefs 49

AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: Kant AC

This case argues that nuclear weapons constitute an immoral means of ‘hostage taking,’ where states threaten the indiscriminate killing of civilians. This treats innocent people as ‘mere means’ and not ‘ends-in-themselves,’ in the language of philosopher Immanuel Kant. Even where nuclear weapons will never be used because of a presumably effective policy of deterrence, said policy depends upon a credible threat that the possessor state will actually use nuclear weapons in some conditions. If a state reassured everyone that it would never actually drop the bomb, there would be no reason for said state to actively maintain a nuclear weapons program; thus, states must always commit to deliberately producing collateral damage (or from this perspective, murder) in order to justify nuclear weapons’ existence. Although many scholars and politicians believe that the point of having nuclear weapons is precisely to prevent other states from ever using them (“mutually assured destruction”), this case articulates why even contemplating the use of a nuclear weapon should deterrence fail is immoral. The framework for this case could be Kantianism, where the value is morality and the value criterion is consistency with the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has three principles, but the most important here is that one must always treat human beings as independent persons with inherent dignity (rather than as cannon fodder). Kantianism has many problems, such as its formalistic view of morality as rule-following, its reduction of freedom to individual choice, and Kant’s own issue of racism. However, the scholars who apply Kantian thinking to the nuclear weapons topic give you a unique angle that doesn’t rely as much on defending either Kant himself, or even all his opinions about freedom/reason (you could defend the broadest notion of human dignity, though that may get subsumed by other frameworks).

Champion Briefs 51 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Consequentialism is inadequate for evaluating the ethics of nuclear weapons.

Hayashi, Nobuo. "On The Ethics Of Nuclear Weapons." ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series. 2015. Web. December 09, 2019. . Consequentialism has three major limitations, however. First, both you and your opponent rely on alternative histories and rival futures. It is impossible to verify or falsify claims of ‘but-for’ causation13 that are implicit in consequentialist justifications (‘The Cuban Missile Crisis would have triggered a full-scale nuclear war, but for the successful application of nuclear deterrence’). Unfortunately, it is impossible to prove or disprove counterfactual objections to such claims, either (‘The world would not have had to experience emergencies like the Cuban Missile Crisis, if we had not had nuclear weapons in the first place’). Nor, for that matter, do future predictions ever really go beyond the realm of educated guesses, however technically sophisticated they may be. Second, those opposed to nuclear weapons on consequentialist grounds are essentially suggesting that we should deal with the devil we do not know. This is an exceedingly tall order, particularly since you are up against a model of the world that has more or less shown itself to ‘work’. Consequentialism has a built-in bias in favour of the status quo (all else being equal) as long as that status quo sustains itself tolerably well. No matter how deftly you highlight the flaws, dangers and risks of nuclear weapons, doing so does not, in and of itself, validate the supposed superiority of their absence. Third, arguing consequentialism against consequentialism exposes you to being persuaded that nuclear weapons are morally acceptable, if they do contribute to world stability and peace. You are just disputing the evidence that purportedly shows their contribution.

Champion Briefs 52 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Even a single nuclear blast poses a humanitarian disaster.

Hayashi, Nobuo. "On The Ethics Of Nuclear Weapons." ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series. 2015. Web. December 09, 2019. . The use of nuclear weapons would cause vast physical destruction. Alongside blast and heat, intense and harmful is created within the zone of the direct effects of nuclear detonations. Large amounts of radioactively contaminated material would probably be blown into the atmosphere, which would travel long distances and endanger human health far from ‘’. Even one nuclear weapon detonation in a highly populated area would be a humanitarian disaster; the use of many would be cataclysmic. Intuitively, this strongly suggests that any moral justification for using these weapons would have to be grounded on some greater good that they might serve. This is the question with which humanity found itself grappling for much of the Cold War.

Champion Briefs 53 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons rob their victims of humanity, treating them as mere means.

Hayashi, Nobuo. "On The Ethics Of Nuclear Weapons." ILPI-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series. 2015. Web. December 09, 2019. . Key to torture’s condemnation has been the steady erosion of its perceived utility, accompanied by the gradual rise of humanitarian sentiments against it. Today, we are at a stage where our deontological conviction against torture is largely immune to accusations of rule fetishism. Similarly, the end of the Cold War has diminished the weight of its once all- encompassing logic and, with it, the perceived strategic value of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we are rapidly improving our awareness of their terrible humanitarian impacts. These changes in the features of our moral landscape should enable us to free ourselves of the Cold War’s existential, consequentialist yoke. This should, in turn, allow policy makers to see nuclear weapons for what they really are, rather than what purpose they serve. The morally relevant suffering here is suffering per se, not suffering that is necessary or unnecessary for this or that purpose. We categorically reject nuclear strikes because they rob their victims, fellow human beings, of human qualities by subjecting them to unspeakable inhumanity and reducing them to the status of mere instruments for the benefit of the rest of us.

Champion Briefs 54 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is a social institution, and it must be judged according to whether it produces systematic injustices.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . But nuclear deterrence is not, of course, an individual action. It is not an isolated deterrent act but a large-scale, ongoing public policy involving thousands of persons in various roles. It is, in other words, a social institution.4 How can the method of moral evaluation of an individual action be applied as a model in judging the moral status of a social institution? Any institution is liable to involve some isolated violations of nonconsequentialist rules, and when it does, the method of moral evaluation of an individual action can be applied in a straightforward manner: if the institution achieves sufficient social benefit to override the violations, then it may be morally justified despite them. But some institutions involve not merely isolated violations of nonconsequentialist rules but systematic violations of such rules. This occurs when injustice or disrespect for rights, for example, is essential to, or characteristic of, the institution's functioning. In this case the moral objection to the institution on non- consequentialist grounds is so much stronger than when violations are isolated that no amount of social benefit the institution could be expected to achieve would be sufficient to override its nonconsequentialist unac- ceptability. For example, a slave-based economy would not be justified even by great economic productivity. As a result, lack of systematic non- consequentialist rule violations becomes, in practice, a necessary condition for the moral justifiability of social institutions. This idea may be called the principle of the morality of social institutions (PMSI): PMSI: Social institutions are morally justified only if they achieve their social benefit in a way that does not systematically violate nonconsequentialist rules, such as those of justice and respect for rights.

Champion Briefs 55 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is a form of hostage-taking, which is inherently wrong because it violates the consent of innocent third parties.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Without entering into the debate over these two objections, we can see the advantage there would be in a nonconsequentialist argument against nuclear deterrence that avoided them. There is such an argument. It can be found by attending not to the moral status of the intentions involved in the policy of nuclear deterrence but directly to the moral status of the activity that involves having those intentions. This is an activity of threatening, but threatening of a special kind. The threat is largely against innocent third parties, persons who would not be responsible for the actions prompting the nuclear retaliation. The persons whose behavior the threat seeks to control, the opponent's military and political leaders, are for the most part not the persons on whom harm would be visited should the threat be carried out. This kind of threat may be referred to as a third-party threat. The making of a third-party threat is the holding of hostages, and nuclear deterrence, like vicarious pun- ishment, is an institution of hostage holding.8 It is often noted that nuclear deterrence is a policy of holding hostage the population of one's opponent to the good behavior of its leaders, but the moral implications of this have not always been fully appreciated.9 What is morally wrong with hostage holding? The basis of the non- consequentialist objection to hostage holding can be seen in the following terms. Hostages are persons threatened with harm without their consent in order to control the behavior of some other person or group. First, central to the moral wrongness of hostage holding is that the persons threatened are not the same as the persons whose behavior the threatener seeks to control (i.e., the threat is a third-party threat). Those threatened are innocent in the sense that they generally have no control over, nor responsibility for, the behavior of the persons the threatener seeks to control. It is this feature of innocence and not the illegitimacy of the threatener's demands that makes hostage holding wrong. If the tax man threatens your spouse unless you surrender your money, this is just as much a case of hostage holding as if a gunman does the same thing. Second, hostages are persons who are threatened, and the moral wrongness of hostage holding results from the fact that they are threatened, whether or not the threat is carried out. What is wrong with the mere threat is that it imposes a risk of harm on the hostages, whether or not the potential harm is actualized through the threat's being carried out. Otherwise, the moral wrongness of hostage holding would be dissolved by the success of the threat, which is absurd. Just as it is wrong to harm someone who is not deserving of harm, it is wrong to create or increase the risk that such a person will be harmed. Third, hostages are those on whom a risk of harm is imposed without their consent. Third-party threats are morally wrong only insofar as the third parties have not consented to the imposition of the threat. If I pledge someone else's fidelity with my life or put up bail for someone else in jail, I have consented to the threat imposed on me by the authorities to control the behavior of that other person. I am not being held hostage, and there may be nothing wrong with a third-party threat in this kind of case.

Champion Briefs 56 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate---the vast majority of people who get harmed are innocent, and the military's traditional rules for distinction are thrown out the window.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . First, the vast majority of persons whose lives and well-being are threatened by a policy of nuclear deterrence are innocent third parties who have no direct causal with, or responsibility for, the behavior of the political and military leaders that the threat seeks to control. Given the global effects of multiple nuclear explosions, many of the persons threatened are not even citizens of the nation that would be the object of the retaliation. The traditional problem of where one draws the line between innocent and noninnocent persons in military contexts is largely irrelevant since so many persons are likely to be killed in a nuclear retaliatory strike that there would be a very large number of innocent persons among that group on anyone's criterion of innocence. To deny this is to presuppose an unacceptable theory of collective re- sponsibility.

Champion Briefs 57 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence imposes a substantial risk of harm on non- consenting third parties, even if deterrence never fails.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Second, nuclear deterrence imposes on the innocent persons whose lives and well-being it threatens a substantial risk of harm. The risk is real, for the policy is not guaranteed success. It might fail through de- liberation or through accident, and the probability of its failure, even if small, is not negligible. Given the nonnegligible probability of failure and the extent of harm failure would bring to innocent persons, the policy imposes a substantial risk of harm on those persons. This is the same way in which cancer is said to impose a substantial risk to each person: the chances of a given person's getting cancer may be small, but the extent of harm caused if cancer does strike is great. Even if deterrence policy never fails, this would not falsify the claim that it imposes a substantial risk of harm.

Champion Briefs 58 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

The question of hypothetical consent matters---while some activities, like driving, impose risks on third-parties, people would consent to that practice, yet no one would assent to being demolished in a nuclear explosion.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . This response may be met by introducing the notion of hypothetical consent." It may be granted that no institutional policy or practice imposing risk on innocent persons can satisfy a demand for explicit consent from all those persons. But if those persons benefit significantly from the policy, and if it would be rational for them to accept for that benefit the degree of risk the policy or practice imposes, they may be regarded as hypothetically consenting to the risk. Hypothetical consent may be regarded as replacing explicit consent in the justification of the risks imposed by social practices and institutions. Since all persons in a society receive great economic benefit from the practice of automobile driving (whether or not they themselves drive), they may be regarded as hypothetically consenting to the risk the practice imposes on them, and this makes automobile driving justified. But there is no such hypothetical consent in the case of nuclear deterrence. A's policy of threatening nuclear re- taliation against B does not benefit the citizens of B; they would be far better off if A abandoned its policy, for then there would be no nuclear weapons pointed at them.

Champion Briefs 59 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Even if nuclear deterrence isn't literal hostage holding, the constraints on liberty and production of trauma are still significant.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . This whole line of argument, however, would be rejected by some on the grounds that it is incorrect to characterize nuclear deterrence as hostage holding. A hostage, they would maintain, is one whose liberty is constrained, and deterrence does not constrain the liberty of those threatened. But whether constraint of liberty is a necessary condition for someone's being a hostage is an irrelevant, verbal matter. The important point is that it is morally wrong to threaten innocent third parties without their consent, whether or not we label such behavior "hostage holding." Nor does the moral wrongness of this behavior depend on any harm (such as psychological trauma) being caused to the innocent persons by their knowledge of the threat. Constraint of liberty and the causing of psychological trauma are, when present, additional reasons for condemning hostage holding, but it is wrong even in their absence.

Champion Briefs 60 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Merely threatening military targets is also immoral because of the enormous fallout that kills innocent people.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Second, the argument in terms of hostage holding applies even when the retaliatory intention is directed against military rather than civilian targets. Hostages include all innocent persons who, without their consent, are directly put at risk of harm by a threat, whether the threatener's harm of them would be directly intended or merely foreseen (or whether the risk to them is believed by the threatener to be instrumental to the success of the threat). If a terrorist threatens to blow up an airplane, all aboard the plane are hostages even if the terrorist believes that the threat to destroy the plane itself is sufficient for his or her demands to be met. Given the widespread harmful effects of nuclear explosions, even retaliation against military targets would kill a very large number of innocent persons. So a deterrence policy of threatening nuclear retaliation against military targets also holds hostages. The conclusion is that nuclear deterrence involves in its treatment of innocent persons systematic violation of nonconsequentialist moral rules. According to PMSI, then, nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable.

Champion Briefs 61 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Conventional deterrence solves the disads and avoids systematic, nonconsequentialist rule violations.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Despite the indefiniteness of the list of goals of extended deterrence, however, it can be argued that pursuit of these goals is not compatible with clause 2 of PMSI*. For it can be shown that the most important goal of extended deterrence can be achieved at least substantially as well without a nuclear threat, and this provides good reason to conclude that this is the case as well for all the lesser goals, whatever they are. The most important goal of extended deterrence is the deterring of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, but this could be achieved at least almost as well by a conventional deterrent. Even those who presently see a nuclear threat here as necessary argue that it is necessary because Warsaw Pact conventional forces are superior to NATO conventional forces. They would, then, presumably agree that, if NATO conventional forces were sufficiently strong, conventional deterrence of a Soviet con- ventional attack would be achieved. The general point is that the goals of extended deterrence (controlling various forms of the opponent's nonnuclear behavior) can be achieved by nonnuclear means. This is indicated by the conclusion that the most important of these goals, the defense of Western Europe against con- ventional attack, can be achieved by conventional deterrence. Further, nonnuclear means need not involve any systematic nonconsequentialist rule violation. Conventional deterrence, for example, is not systematic hostage holding because it involves a threat against attacking military forces, not civilians on the home front. As a result, the pursuit of the goals of extended deterrence by nuclear means is ruled out by clause 2 of PMSI*. This remains the case even if the nonnuclear means of deterrence are not quite as effective deterrents as the nuclear means.

Champion Briefs 62 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence violates Kantian ideals of universality and doesn’t hold up having a moral intent.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Even this second interpretation of the principle about intentions has its consequentialist aspect. This shows up quite clearly in the way the principle is used by those who interpret it in this way. J. E. Hare and Carey Joynt, for example, see having the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons as bad for the person who has it; thus a person's having the intention is an undesirable state of affairs which, other things being equal, must be minimized. Focusing on the case of the aircraft crews who dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hare and Joynt write that "those men had undoubtedly formed the conditional intention, when they entered the aircraft, to drop the bombs. Their mental health was in a sense sacrificed to the general welfare…. [One] is forced to weigh the wrong to them against the benefits of a deterrence policy in general."6 This passage requires some tidying up: for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not part of a policy of deterrence, the intentions of the crews were not conditional, and the corruption of the crews consisted not just in their intending to drop the bombs but also in their actually dropping them. Nevertheless, the point which this passage makes illustrates nicely the absurdity of the second interpretation of the principle about intentions as it appears in the argument against nuclear deterrence. By picking out the alleged victimization of a handful of war criminals as something which must be weighed against the supposed benefits of the bombings while saying nothing at all about the hundreds of thousands of innocent people who perished in agony under the nuclear fireballs or who later died lingering deaths from mutilation or radiation poisoning, Hare and Joynt display a certain insensitivity to the facts of moral salience. This is not a native insensitivity but an insensitivity engendered by-taking seriously their own theorizing about intentions. The point is that, in this case as in other cases in which the use of nuclear weapons is at issue, the moral corruption of a relatively small number of individuals seems, comparatively speaking, so insignificant as almost not to rate among the morally relevant considerations. The case of nuclear deterrence is no exception. (Benn's claim that nuclear deterrence involves the moral cor- ruption not just of a few people but also of the entire society which practices it is greatly overstated: only a relatively small number of people are required to have the relevant conditional intention in order for the policy to function. For the rest of society, it is sufficient if people simply give no thought to the policy, which is in fact what most people do.) *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 63 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Credible nuclear deterrence is contingent on the intention to genuinely use nuclear weapons, so it's more than just a bluff.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Suppose for the sake of argument, however, that Reagan might wish to bluff, or to remain undecided about the use of nuclear weapons. That would still not be sufficient to enable the United States to run a policy of nuclear deterrence free from the taint of the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons. For nuclear deterrence requires a lengthy chain of command controlling the firing of nuclear weapons, and it is not possible for the policy to function without at least those lower down in the chain of command having the intention to use nuclear weapons if instructed to do so. For an attempt to run the policy on the basis of bluffing or uncertainty at every level would soon be discovered by potential adversaries, and deterrence would be undermined. Hence those in the military chain of command must be selected in part for their willingness to obey orders and trained to fire their weapons on receiving the command to do so. They, at least, must have the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons.10 So, even if a policy of deterrence could in principle be maintained without anyone conditionally intending to use nuclear weapons, there is no actual policy which is maintained in this way. It is, moreover, not practically possible that a policy of nuclear deterrence could be instituted on this basis -at least not in a way that would be compatible with democracy. Politicians could not run for office on a pledge to bluff or to avoid deciding beforehand what they would do in the event of an attack. Nor could it be suggested that officers in the military would be instructed simply not to think about what they would do if they were commanded to fire their nuclear weapons. This would obviously undermine deterrence. Thus, if the citizens in a democracy support a policy of nuclear deterrence, they are necessarily authorizing their political and military leaders to intend conditionally to use nuclear weapons (and also, of course, to use nuclear weapons in certain conditions), and they cannot assume that their leaders will not have such an intention.

Champion Briefs 64 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

The idea that deterrence is good because it stops *us* from using nuclear weapons is ridiculous, and eliminating arsenals is the surest way to ensure we never use them.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . It is sometimes suggested that nuclear deterrence provides the most effective means of ensuring that we will never use nuclear weapons. Thus Michael Walzer writes that "we threaten evil in order not to do it, and the doing of it would be so terrible that the threat seems in comparison to be morally defensible," while Sir Arthur Hockaday claims that deterrence constitutes "the most likely means of securing … that nuclear weapons shall not be used, either by myself or by others."'3 I take these claims to be evidently absurd, for, while deterrence enables us to use nuclear weapons, we could not use them if we were to abandon them and, with them, the doctrine of deterrence. I mention this idea, that deterrence itself prevents us from wrongdoing, only because it is so puzzlingly common. *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 65 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is immoral because it deliberately risks the murder of millions of people. Consequences matter, but deontologically speaking the wrongness of deterrence resides in the action itself, and not merely its consequences.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . While the Deontologist's Argument seems clearly mistaken, the foregoing critique suggests that it may be possible to construct a more powerful argument against nuclear deterrence within a deontological framework. This argument would retain the claim that it would be wrong to use nuclear weapons in the ways that have to be threatened to maintain deterrence but would have as its second premise a principle similar to the "bridge principle" suggested in the last section. This similar principle is that it is wrong, other things being equal, to risk doing that which it would be wrong to do2' and wrong to support a policy which carries a risk of wrongdoing-in particular a policy which makes it possible for wrong to be done in one's name or with one's authorization. The argument's third premise would then be that any policy of nuclear deterrence which it would be possible for citizens in a democracy to support would involve a risk that nuclear weapons would be used with their authorization. It follows from these three claims that it would be wrong for citizens in a democracy to support a policy of nuclear deterrence. This is a powerful argument. It is not in the least implausible to suppose that it is wrong to risk having the horrendous crime of genocide perpetrated by one's representatives, on one's behalf, and with one's authorization-even if the aim is to protect one's own life and liberty. Can we really in good conscience defend our lives and liberty by taking a calculated risk that millions of innocent people will be murdered in our name? The argument also has the right focus. It would not draw a radical moral distinction between the policy followed by Sinceria and that followed by Incertia. Nor would it, in the circumstances envisaged in my second example, rule out my following a policy of bluff (though, paradoxically, it would rule out my citizens being able to support my deterrent policy). The argument would not, moreover, need to be absolutist in form in order to provide a strong objection to nuclear deterrence. Because it would locate the wrongness of deterrence not in the intrinsic wrongness of having certain intentions but in the obviously important fact that the policy risks the deliberate use of nuclear weapons in ways which would be wrong, the objection to nuclear deterrence will remain quite strong even if it is conceded that it is not absolutely forbidden to risk doing what it would be wrong to do. (This being the case, it is also unnecessary to insist that the prohibition on using nuclear weapons should itself be absolute.) Finally, since the second premise need not be interpreted as an absolute principle, the argument does not imply that the pursuit of a policy of deterrence must be equally wrong as the actual use of nuclear weapons. Since the argument is not absolutist, it can, like the nonabsolutist version of the Deontologist's Argument, be challenged by an appeal to consequences. If the expected

Champion Briefs 66 AFF: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

consequences of abandoning nuclear de- terrence would be very much worse than those of carrying on with de- terrence would be, then the deontological constraint on practicing de- terrence may be overridden. Therefore whether it is wrong, all things considered, to risk having nuclear weapons used with one's authorization depends on, among other things, how great that risk is. The argument does not, therefore, allow us to ignore considerations of consequences. Nor would it be plausible if it did so. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the argument itself is strictly deontological in character. It is concerned with what one does rather than simply with what happens. What the argument requires (leaving aside for the moment the question of intention) is that one must not oneself use nuclear weapons, not that one should aim to prevent their use by anyone. That one should aim to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by anyone is also a requirement of morality, but it is not implied by this particular argument.

Champion Briefs 67 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Limited uses of nuclear deterrence are just---a maxim permitting low- yield nukes against military targets can be universalized. Threatening massive loss of life is impermissible, and the negative can agree on that point.

Doyle, . "Kantian Nonideal Theory And Nuclear Proliferation." International Theory. 2010. Web. December 07, 2019. . The same analysis applies to any policy of carrying out deterrent threats solely against population/government centers. However, for Aspirant to carry out deterrent threats solely against military centers seems prima facie consistent with Kant’s view on the right of national defense, and it parallels some applications of just war theory on the problem of limited nuclear warfighting (Ramsey, 1962; Orend, 2000). Once acquired, a lowyield nuclear device might annihilate one or more of Rival’s army divisions, naval task forces, or air-force bases, severely crippling its capacity to continue to aggress. More importantly, a maxim that corresponds to this intention appears to pass the universality test. Aspirant could in principle assent to a rule that permits all nuclear-armed states to threaten and carry out exclusively counterforce nuclear reprisals, much in the same way that nationalist morality permits all states to use conventional force in selfdefense.23 This isn’t to say that Rival can read off Aspirant’s intentions from its nuclear procurement behavior. And this is not to say that in the process of nuclear miniaturization required to produce these weapons that Aspirant might not retain its larger nuclear devices. It is to say, though, that Aspirant’s maxim on this point can be imagined without formal contradiction. Moreover, were Aspirant to miniaturize its arsenal and then verifiably decommission or destroy its larger devices, Rival might come to behave that Aspirant had abandoned any policy of mutually assured destruction in favor of a policy of severely limited counterforce warfare. There are, however, significant constraints on this nuclear defense right. Intending to carry out threats against counterforce targets would be impermissible on Kantian nonideal principles if they led to countervalue strikes or a counterforce escalation that entailed massive collateral damage. In conventional warfighting, the just-war doctrine of double effect permits unintended and limited killing of noncombatants on grounds of military necessity. However, at some point an escalation of counterforce strikes cannot avoid ruining the surrounding eco-systems and in turn injuring or destroying innocent human life. It would then be false to claim that Aspirant only intended to do good by undertaking counterforce strikes of this kind. It would also be false to claim these counterforce strikes were necessary evils, and that the goodness of the outcome made the cost of the counterforce strikes worth it (Orend, 2000: 164). Barring these prohibiting conditions, though, my reading of Kantian nonideal theory suggests that Aspirant’s choice to carry out deterrent threats strictly against military centers of Rival is permissible. Given the special nature of the nuclear threat environment, Kantian nonideal theory permits Aspirant to do all that is consistent with the reciprocity corollary to defend itself. And if Aspirant truly faces a nuclear

Champion Briefs 68 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

threat from Rival, their NPT commitments do not clearly over-ride their national defense obligations. Indeed, the inclusion of Article X into the NPT is evidence that states parties are already committed to this position.

Champion Briefs 69 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Even though bluffing is deceptive, Kant agrees that lying is permitted if it diverts an aggressor.

Doyle, Thomas. "Kantian Nonideal Theory And Nuclear Proliferation." International Theory. 2010. Web. December 07, 2019. . First, we recall that the purpose of lying to criminal aggressors is to deflect or avoid aggression and that lying to liars or assailants is not an injustice to them. If, for instance, North Korea’s nuclear threats are bluffs, they nevertheless are regarded by some to have helped dissuade America (i.e. the Bush Administration) from launching anticipatory military strikes against Pyonyang (Smith, 2006: Ch. 4). This kind of deterrent threat by itself then appears at first glance to be permissible within the bounds of reciprocity. That said, the lie told to the criminal aggressor in Kant’s example does not include a threat of harm. In contrast, the promise of harm that the threat conveys – which is an attitude Aspirant intends to cultivate even though he does not actually intend to carry out the threat – activates Rival’s hostility and the corresponding difficulty in trust building. Such threats are inconsistent with Kant’s nonideal Sixth Preliminary Article that proscribes acts of hostility ‘as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peacey’ (PP, 8: 346). In plain terms, a persuasive nuclear deterrent threat that Aspirant secretly intends to never carry out still inflicts a determinate harm that mere deflection or avoidance of aggression does not, namely the construction of an existential insecurity in the threatened state and, to the extent the threat is made public, the creation of existential fear among people that are ‘ends in themselves’.24 Still, given the kind of anarchy that is in today’s world, it would be a mistake to think that Kant would absolutely forbid the practice of using deception in nuclear deterrent threats. Assuming that Rival previously uttered a credible existential threat to Aspirant, and assuming that Aspirant is not an ally of a country with a nuclear umbrella of its own, a nuclear deterrent lie told to Rival is not unjust, even if it generally increases the tendency to not believe statements of this kind. A credible deterrent lie prevents or deflects aggression without causing further injury. In the same fashion, the reciprocity corollary advanced in fourth Section establishes the possibility that, given a world of nuclear- armed states that have already instituted nuclear deterrent regimes and have made hostile threats of their own, Aspirant might reasonably conclude that advancing persuasive nuclear deterrent lies is necessary for national defense. And to establish the credibility of those threats, it would be morally permissible for Aspirant to acquire nuclear weapons even though the NPT forbids it.

Champion Briefs 70 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Kantian 'nonideal theory' permits limited nuclear threats that are proportionate to an initial act of aggression. Deterrence does not require threatening mass destruction against human dignity.

Doyle, Thomas. "Kantian Nonideal Theory And Nuclear Proliferation." International Theory. 2010. Web. December 07, 2019. . Conclusion Kant believed that necessity could not cancel morality. This is because necessity is itself a nonideal moral principle. However, necessity does not justify any indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in the name of self-defense. Necessity is not amoral nationalism run amok. Kantian nonideal theory permits states to advance and carry out a narrowly aimed deterrent nuclear threat against counterforce targets that would match the degree to which aggression has been or is likely to be committed, but proscribes deterrent threats of mass destruction or annihilation. To carry out these latter threats would violate the ideal and nonideal requirements of human dignity and reciprocity. More interestingly, Kantian nonideal theory conditionally permits the practice of issuing threats of nuclear reprisal that are never intended to be carried out. It follows that Kantian nonideal theory cannot absolutely proscribe Aspirant’s nuclear weapons acquisitions as a means of deterring Rival, but the conditions under which Aspirant may acquire them are significantly restricted. The implications of these conclusions reach into both theory and policy. I cannot discuss any of these at length at this point, and most are worthy of extended examination in their own right. I shall therefore close by briefly discussing three implications. First, I believe this analysis corrects the tendency among Kantian leaning nuclear ethicists to draw exclusively from his ideal theory. If I am right, Kantian nonideal theory accommodates realist concerns without converting to full-blooded realism or moral consequentialism. It retains the emphasis on moral autonomy and the rightness of action independent of mere consequence. More to the point, Kantian nonideal assessments provide the scope conditions for justified nuclear proliferation while requiring both Aspirant and Rival to exercise their rights consistent with reciprocity and the duty to achieve perpetual peace.

Champion Briefs 71 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Maxims of nuclear ethics acknowledge the value of self-defense while minimizing harms to the innocent, and reducing long-term reliance on nuclear weapons. This is possible without elimination.

Doyle, Thomas. "Kantian Nonideal Theory And Nuclear Proliferation." International Theory. 2010. Web. December 07, 2019. . Two compelling counterarguments, however, can be advanced to this point. First, certain prominent scholars have for some time regarded nuclear warfighting and deterrence as topics for moral scrutiny.5 During the Cold War, Nye’s Nuclear Ethics (1986) was the premier monograph on this point. His main focus was American nuclear weapon policy toward the Soviet Union, and one of his main concerns was to correct what he thought was the myopia of two kinds of political moralism. He resisted idealist leaning nuclear ethics that emphasized right action independent of the common good. Nye thus rejected pacifist and Kantian nuclear ethics, along with their calls for unilateral nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, he refused to sublimate moral concerns about nuclear policy entirely to the national interest. Nye argued that individuals and states have important moral obligations to foreigners, especially to reduce the risk of harm to innocent third parties. Nye’s five nuclear–ethical maxims accordingly incorporate duty-based and consequentialist approaches while emphasizing the latter: (1) selfdefense is a just but limited cause; (2) never treat nuclear weapons as normal weapons; (3) minimize harm to innocent people; (4) reduce risks of nuclear war in the near term; and (5) reduce reliance on nuclear weapons over time.6 If Nye and others across the realist–idealist continuum recognized the relevance of nuclear ethics during the Cold War, the case for its relevance to post-Cold War nuclear proliferation can be reasonably made

Champion Briefs 72 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

If nuclear deterrence is limited to military targets, the problem of wrongful intentions does not apply.

Lee, Steven. "The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding And Consequences." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . However, there are other problems with this argument against nuclear deterrence that are not so easily dismissed. Consider two objections. First, the premise that it is wrong to intend what it would be wrong to do may not be acceptable. This premise, which Gregory Kavka has referred to as the wrongful-intentions principle,7 seems especially problematic given that the intention involved in deterrence is conditional rather than cat- egorical. Second, A may deter by threatening to use nuclear weapons in such a way that its intention is not to kill innocent persons. If the weapons are intended for use against B's military targets rather than against its population centers, then, it is argued, A has no intention to kill innocent persons, and the wrongful-intentions principle simply does not apply.

Champion Briefs 73 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is far less bad than actually using nukes, and this is because consequences should matter to some extent.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . It might be thought that this admission undermines the attempted reductio ad absurdum of the Deontologist's Argument. For it concedes to the defender of the argument the reply that, while pursuing a policy of nuclear deterrence is indeed equally wrong as actually using nuclear weapons would be, the two are nevertheless not morally equivalent. Just as killing a hundred people is worse than killing one, so using nuclear weapons would be worse, or more evil, or more culpable, than pursuing a policy of nuclear deterrence is. And, as long as the defender of the argument can thus avoid being committed to the view that conditionally intending to use nuclear weapons and actually using them are morally equivalent, he need not be embarrassed by the implication that the two are equally wrong. For, it might be claimed, the reduction has force only if we illegitimately conflate equal wrongness with complete moral equiv- alence. This reply, while undeniably forceful, cannot rescue the Deontologist's Argument. The act of using nuclear weapons would be worse than the successful pursuit of deterrence because its probable consequences would be worse. It would also be more evil, or more culpable, in that it would indicate a greater degree of moral corruption or depravity in the agent. Both a concern with consequences and a concern with the evaluation of agents are, moreover, certainly relevant to any moral comparison between using nuclear weapons and running a deterrent strategy. These modes of evaluation are accessible to the deontologist and are compatible with his view. But they are extraneous to the core of that view. Deontology, and a fortiori the Deontologist's Argument, are concerned with the intrinsic moral character of action. And in this respect-that is, in terms of their intrinsic natures -using nuclear weapons and running a successful de- terrent strategy are held by the argument to be morally equivalent. This conclusion alone is sufficiently absurd to condemn the absolutist version of the Deontologist's Argument.

Champion Briefs 74 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence will save millions of lives. States have a duty to pursue it.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Should I pursue a policy of deterrence? Pursuing the policy would probably have the effect of preventing my country from being attacked with nuclear weapons. It would thus save the lives of millions of innocent people. Moreover, the pursuit of the policy would not entail a risk that the weapons would actually be used. (Assume that, for whatever reason, whether or not I follow the policy will have no effect on the voting in the later referendum.) In spite of all this, the Deontologist's Argument implies that it would be wrong for me to pursue a policy of deterrence. For the people in the military chain of command would have the conditional intention to fire the nuclear weapons on receiving the command from me. Thus, according to this argument, the policy would inevitably involve the transgression of an absolute prohibition. Again this conclusion seems absurd. For not only does it not seem wrong for me to pursue a policy of nuclear deterrence in these circumstances, but it would also seem to be my duty to do so.

Champion Briefs 75 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence doesn't amount to genuine hostage-holding.

Shaw, William. "Nuclear Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 94:2. January, 1984. Web. December 09, 2019. . On closer inspection, however, this line of reasoning is less conclusive than Ramsey and Lackey think. First, their analogies involve kidnapping, yet "holding hostage" the opposed population with nuclear weapons in no way limits its movement or activities. The mere pointing of French ICBMs at Soviet cities, scary as it may be, restricts no Soviet citizen's liberty. Soviet civilians are not being tied to bumpers or wired to explosives; their lives of joy and sorrow will unfold much the same whether or not they are "held hostage."7 Second, McCoy need not claim a "right" to threaten the Hatfield child (let alone to kidnap him), in the sense of putting Hatfield under an obligation not to remove his child from that threat. Rather, McCoy need only advance the weaker claim that he has no obligation not to threaten conduct harmful to Hatfield's child in order to dissuade Hatfield from an immoral action. Does Hatfield's child have some right, which could furnish the ground of this putative obligation, not to have his life made the basis of a threat directed at his father (indeed the child himself may not know about the threat), or do the denizens of Leningrad have a right not to have French missiles pointed their way? Talk of rights is frequently rather loose these days, but even so it is hard to see what would be the basis of these supposed rights.

Champion Briefs 76 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence means that civilians are being exposed to less harm.

Shaw, William. "Nuclear Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 94:2. January, 1984. Web. December 09, 2019. . Third, does McCoy's threat actually increase the chance of Hatfield's child dying, as Lackey assumes? If McCoy's threat were a bluff, then it would not enhance the child's danger. On the other hand, if the threat is real but deters successfully, then no harm comes to the youngster. Has his chance of dying nonetheless been increased? The answer will obviously depend upon the circumstances, but if the predictable response to Hatfield's actions involves some risk to his family in any case (perhaps they will inevitably be endangered when he is pursued), then McCoy's threat may in fact lower the actual, though perhaps not the perceived, risk to Hatfield's child. Many people assume that the nuclear era has made our lives more perilous, but if it were the case that the American hydrogen arsenal has prevented not just nuclear war, but a conventional conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that would have occurred in a non- nuclear post- II world, then it may actually have increased not only our safety, but the safety of the civilians held "hostage" in the USSR.

Champion Briefs 77 A/2: Kant AC Jan/Feb 2020

Util is necessary for debates about nuclear weapons.

Shaw, William. "Nuclear Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 94:2. January, 1984. Web. December 09, 2019. . Of all the moral issues that face us today, however, nuclear policy is the one that, because of the complex factual issues and number of persons likely to be affected, most cries out to be handled in consequentialist terms. Although it is clearly good even on utilitarian grounds that we have a repugnance to making threats of immoral behavior, even where P6 would condone it, the limits of a narrowly deontological perspective are soon obvious. For one thing, such discussions do not easily integrate finely grained factual issues or questions of probability, such as the chances of a nuclear accident, into their overall moral assessments. Much hangs on the real, historical and political (as opposed to merely game-theoretically supposed), consequences of the contemporary practice of deterrence—nuclear proliferation—and on assessing accurately the feasibility of alternatives to the current arms race. A moral theory with significant consequentialist strands would seem to be necessary to give these sorts of considerations their due. Deontological approaches to nuclear questions have no doubt appeared attractive to many as a result of the poor quality of what passes for utilitarian reasoning in this area. Utilitarianism has unfortunately come to be identified with the so-called strategic reasoning associated with military planners and benighted bureaucrats, the narrowness and jaundiced assumptions of which make it a very mad logic indeed.'8 Utilitarians will have to reexamine their factual premises and move their analyses out of the narrow confines of game theory if they are to assist in the ethical reappraisal of nuclear policy, to which our troubled times have given rise and to which this essay has attempted to contribute.

Champion Briefs 78 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: International Law AC

The International Law aff always fosters a fun debate within any topic that contains a significant grounding for it in the literature. The reason being is that the classic negative responses remain the same across topics, making it generally a very strategic aff case. The argument for international law affirmatives on this topic are that international law covenants support a physical response (specifically a nuclear response) to threats against state security, and that international governing bodies (ICJ and UN) interpret international law to oppose nuclear weapons possession, use, and proliferation. The main consensus of these governing bodies is that use of nuclear weapons is prohibited in nearly all scenarios that may occur, as hardly any of them meet the internationally agreed upon requirements for outright extreme circumstances. If anything, there are other forms of self-defense that would likely be warranted prior to the use of nuclear weapons. Given that, the affirmative argues that this justifies the resolution of eliminating nuclear weapons because international law compels that we don’t possess them, much less use them against other countries in any situation. The main negative response to this aff is going to be one of two case positions. 1. International Law Colonialism kritik—historical uses of international law have been used in colonialist methods of domination and imperialism. 2. Descriptive Standards Bad theory—using a framework model or standard that prescribes action based upon previously inherent or defined principles is wrong. The impact that follows this is that such norms undermine the neg’s ability to debate against what is already defined under things, such as codified law (they can’t say that the law doesn’t state something), which means that they can’t turn the case or debate against the truth of the argument. Other neg responses to this aff will likely be defensive. A smart negative debater will impact defense out as terminal. The aff is strategic because, as mentioned above, there are two main positions to frontline against when preparing this case for tournaments. I would use a lot of framework weighing (reasons why international law and legalism in general are good) and also delve into literature about why international law has been helpful for society and oppressed groups to respond to the colonialism kritik. I would also give reasons why this particular use of

Champion Briefs 79 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

international law is beneficial for societal movements. In regard to the theory argument, it will be important to point out the topic literature that opposes the aff interpretation of international law to prove that there are ways to debate against the aff. For example, they can argue that the ICJ interpretation of things is problematic or that their interpretation can justify the negative competing world.

Champion Briefs 80 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

I Law prohibits weapons of mass destruction use in almost all conceivable scenarios, despite legal ambiguity.

Nystuen, Gro. "A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." Arms Control Association. March, 2016. Web. December 13, 2019. . Regulating the conduct of war, international humanitarian law, sometimes called the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, is arguably the most important legal regime when considering the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. The key instrument is the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in addition to international customary law. Several rules laid down here are of particular importance. The first is the rule of distinction. According to this rule, parties to a conflict may not “employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”7 The terror bombings of Coventry, Dresden, and Tokyo during World War II would not be permissible under this provision. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would equally be ruled out. Several weapons have been explicitly prohibited, in part or in whole, because they have been deemed impossible or difficult to use without violating the rule of distinction. This is the case with biological weapons and chemical weapons, as well as anti- personnel landmines and cluster munitions. Nuclear weapons, however, are not subject to corresponding prohibitions. Accordingly, their use is generally governed by the rules of international humanitarian law. The second norm of particular importance is the rule of proportionality. According to this rule, even if an attack is successfully directed against military objectives, the attack might still be considered unlawful if it causes harm to civilians and civilian objects that “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”8 Due to their fundamental properties, nuclear weapons are difficult to use without causing great collateral harm to civilians and civilian objects. Yet, that does not mean that lawful use is inconceivable. In his dissenting opinion to the ICJ’s 1996 advisory opinion, Judge Stephen Schwebel discussed scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used lawfully. He came to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons “might well be lawful” if used, for example, against a submarine far out at sea.9 The third rule deals with “precautions in attack.” In the conduct of military operations, “constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”10 For example, according to this rule, one must take “all feasible precautions” with a view to minimizing “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”11 In itself, this requirement does not explicitly rule out use of a nuclear weapon. As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) points out, the rule of precautions “does not imply any prohibition of specific weapons.”12 The fourth rule of international humanitarian law of particular importance is the prohibition on means of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. In contrast to the

Champion Briefs 81 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

three rules above, which are designed to protect civilians, this fourth rule protects combatants. The first formulation of the unnecessary-suffering rule in modern international law was expressed in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which states that the “only legitimate object” of war is to “weaken the military forces of the enemy” and that this object would be “exceeded” by the use of weapons that “uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable.” The use of such weapons, so it says, would be “contrary to the laws of humanity.” Nuclear detonations, of course, are more than just big explosions. The resulting ionizing radiation lingers for decades, thus increasing the risk of cancer. The rule on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering contains an implicit requirement of assessing alternatives to the weapon planned for use. As legal scholar Stuart Casey-Maslen argues, “[S]hould a proposed use of nuclear weapons satisfy both the rule of distinction and the rule of proportionality, a further assessment must be made as to whether alternative, less destructive weapons might adequately fulfill the military task.”13 A fifth norm concerns the protection of the natural environment.14 It is generally prohibited for the warring parties to deploy means of warfare that cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment, although it is a matter of dispute between states whether this rule applies to nuclear weapons. France and the United Kingdom, as two nuclear-weapon states party to Additional Protocol I, have formulated reservations regarding its application to nuclear weapons.15 The rules described in the preceding paragraphs make clear that international humanitarian law would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in almost all conceivable scenarios. For example, a tactical nuclear strike against a submarine far out at sea may not be a violation of the rule on distinction, but it could be a violation of the prohibition against superfluous suffering. Short of a specific ban on nuclear weapons, however, it is possible to argue that their use could potentially be lawful. It is theoretically possible to argue that nuclear strikes can be justified as long as the damage to civilians is not excessive in relation to the concrete, direct military advantage anticipated and there is no available alternative weapon that is less destructive. The evidence presented at the conferences in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna demonstrated that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons actually are worse than many had thought. As the ICRC and others have pointed out, this must affect how the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law is assessed.16

Champion Briefs 82 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

States have a unique legal and political obligation to maintain nuclear-weapon-free zones and care for nonstates.

Nystuen, Gro. "A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." Arms Control Association. March, 2016. Web. December 13, 2019. . Contributing to a nuclear weapon-free world is a prominent aspiration of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.17 Covering large geographical areas and a large number of states, such zones represent an often underestimated legal and political dynamic with regard to protecting individuals and the environment against nuclear weapons. At present, more than 100 countries worldwide, covering more than 50 percent of the Earth’s surface, are parties to these treaties. In the southern hemisphere, 99 percent of the land area is part of such a zone. These zones may be separated into three main categories: geographical zones covering uninhabited territory or areas, such as the moon or the seabed; regional zones, consisting of clusters of states or entire continents, including Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and subregions of Asia; and single, self-declared, nuclear-weapon-free countries. The treaty regimes on these zones generally prohibit production, receipt, storage, testing, or use of nuclear weapons, and several also contain a prohibition on dumping radioactive matter at sea or elsewhere. The zones’ potential for defusing the risk of regional nuclear arms races and decreasing the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of nonstate actors is an important factor in international efforts to protect individuals and the environment from nuclear weapons.

Champion Briefs 83 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

ILaw enforced by the NPT proves at least an obligation to not use or possess nuclear weapons.

Nystuen, Gro. "A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." Arms Control Association. March, 2016. Web. December 13, 2019. . The NPT is a global disarmament treaty that aims to prevent or at least limit the potential for use of nuclear weapons. The NPT preamble reflects a key driving force behind the treaty’s negotiation by referring to “the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.” Although certain scholars have questioned the importance of the NPT in curbing proliferation,18 there is general agreement among most governments that the NPT has been an effective brake on the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT has proven less effective with regard to nuclear disarmament. As Irish Foreign Minister Charles Flanagan pointed out at the 2015 review conference, “[N]ot a single nuclear weapon has been disarmed under the NPT or as part of any multilateral process.”19 Often presented as a “grand bargain” between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states, the NPT prohibits states from possessing nuclear weapons, except for the five states that had them by January 1, 1967. In exchange for their special status, these five states, like every other state-party, agreed to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures” for nuclear disarmament (Article VI) and to facilitate the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in non-nuclear- weapon states (Article IV). Yet, in the negotiating history and the subsequent review process of the NPT, disarmament always has played second fiddle to nonproliferation. According to NATO official Michael Rühle, “At the time of the treaty’s signing…, article VI seemed of little significance. The treaty was widely understood as a freeze on the number of existing [nuclear- weapon states], not as a means of disarming them. To put it bluntly, the treaty was supposed to perpetuate nuclear inequality indefinitely (or at least until 1995), and article VI was a way of making this fact a little easier to bear.”20 This can no longer be said to be the case. In its 1996 advisory opinion, the ICJ concluded that there exists “an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.”21 An obligation to disarm, however, does not constitute a prohibition. Thus, although not uncontroversial, the statement of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair that the NPT “makes it absolutely clear” that the UK “has the right to possess nuclear weapons”22 is legally accurate. Comparing the NPT with the regimes on biological and chemical weapons, the most striking difference is that although the latter two contain categorical prohibitions against possession and use,23 the former does not. Given the horrific humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons detonations, this may reasonably be called a legal gap.

Champion Briefs 84 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

All of the main influential international governing bodies maintain the interpretation that use of nuclear weapons is unlawful in almost every instance and pose severe humanitarian threats.

Lito, Melina. "A Global Ban On Nuclear Weapons: Are We There Yet?." ICRC. May 30, 2017. Web. December 13, 2019. . As Lou Maresca noted , “the 7 judges who voted in favor of the Court’s conclusions on this point held that position. Yet, 2 of the 7 dissenting judges […] voted against this part of the Court’s opinion because they felt that it did not go far enough. In their view, the Court should have unambiguously concluded that the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful in all circumstances.” As the ban negotiations move forward, it will be interesting to see what weight the ICJ opinion will receive — will it be recognized in a preambular paragraph or be given more legal authority in an operative paragraph, if at all? It should be noted that there have been several regional treaties defining nuclear free zones among regional communities such as those in Latin America, Africa, South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. Treaties that have come since the ICJ decision have not taken a position on the legality of nuclear weapons per se. There are other outstanding issues that would arguably enhance a prohibition treaty on nuclear weapons. For instance, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere due to environmental considerations, was signed in 1996 but has not yet entered into force. What significance will be given to the CTBT? Similarly, given the enduring legal significance of the NPT, how can a new ban treaty build in good faith on the NPT’s gaps? Alternatively, how can the ban treaty be used to further uphold the commitments established by the NPT? For instance, in the event that a nuclear-armed State joins the ban treaty, how would a timeframe for meeting the treaty’s objectives work? What would the verification systems be, if any? Finally, what weight will be given to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons on food, health, environment, agriculture, economy and other aspects of human development? While the ban treaty rose out of the recommendation of the UN Open Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament, those aspects had previously been dealt with in a series of conferences in Austria, Norway and Mexico on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Similarly, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Conference “expresse[d] its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirm[ed] the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.” Thus, will these consequences be framed as an overarching theme in a preambular paragraph, or be given more of an operational weight, or both? One would argue that not only does the recognition of those humanitarian consequences act in advancement of IHL, but it may also be one of the easier consensus-building issues, especially if preceding conferences have affirmed such humanitarian fears.

Champion Briefs 85 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Err aff on legality--determination of proper use of international law is relinquished to the interpretations of international governing bodies like the ICJ.

Brehm, Maya. "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." ResearchGate. December 01, 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. . Activities involving nuclear weapons are governed by international law. States have placed explicit legal constraints on such activities by way of unilateral undertakings2 and by concluding bilateral agree-ments and treaties of regional and global scope. Nuclear weapons threaten the common goods of humankind and shared values of the international community, such as human health, human rights and human dignity, the environment and peace. For this reason, interna-tional legal norms protecting and promoting these values constrain activities involving nuclear weapons, even if the relevant instruments do not specifically mention nuclear weapons. The legality of nuclear weapons under customary international law remains contested. Whereas treaties generally only bind the parties to them, the rules of customary international law are binding on all states. The precise content of a customary norm is difficult to deter-mine, however, especially when states hold starkly differing opinions on a subject. 2The interpretation and application of legal norms and of the law-making process itself is inspired by another source of international law, ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.4 These principles can be said to ‘reveal the values which inspire the whole legal order and which, ultimately, provide its foundations’, and they disclose the legitimate ends to seek: ‘the common good (of all human beings, and not of an abstract collectivity), the realization of justice (at both national and international levels), the necessary primacy of law over force, the preservation of peace’.5 Indications for the existence of a customary rule or of a general principle can, among other places, be found in formal texts of states or intergovernmental organisations, as well as in international juris-prudence. The Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 is an important reference point.6 Certain aspects of the Opinion are highly controversial, though, and it is an open question to what extent it reflects the state of the law today.

Champion Briefs 86 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

There's a legal obligation to rule against nuclear weapons once and for all.

Brehm, Maya. "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." ResearchGate. December 01, 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. . The legal obligation to eliminate nuclear weaponsFrom the start, the danger posed by nuclear weapons stood at the centre of the United Nations (UN). The very first resolution of the UN General Assembly, adopted by consensus in 1946, identified the goal of eliminating atomic weapons and all other major WMD from na-tional armaments.7 This stated goal of a nuclear weapons-free world remains the ultimate purpose of all nuclear disarmament efforts and it is with this objective in mind that international instruments pertain-ing to nuclear weapons must be interpreted.Over the last decades, many proposals have been put forth to attain the objective of a nuclear weapons-free world, including UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a prohibition on nuclear weapons un-der international law. Yet, whereas biological and chemical weapons have been formally outlawed by international treaties in 1972 and 1993 respectively, after decades of negotiations and declarations that address various aspects of nuclear weapons regulation, there is still no comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons under interna-tional treaty law.

Champion Briefs 87 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Absence of nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent the effects of them and maintain treaty mandates of nuclear weapon free zones.

Brehm, Maya. "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." ResearchGate. December 01, 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. . Towards a nuclear weapon-free worldStates intent on strengthening a world at peace have concluded regional agreements to ‘keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapons’, forming large nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs).× The (1967) prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean;× The Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) in the South Pacific;× The Treaty of Bangkok (1995) in Southeast Asia;× The Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) in Africa; and× The Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006) in Central Asia.NWFZ treaties require the absence of nuclear weapons within the zone, including the production, testing, receipt, stationing, storage or use of nuclear weapons.8 However, NWFZs need to be reconciled with the freedom of the high seas and the right of innocent passage. In this connection, controversies have arisen around how the geo-graphic scope of certain zones might affect rights of nuclear-armed states. In some cases even visits by nuclear-armed vessels to ports and airfields in the zone are not excluded, which raises the question as to when transit becomes stationing.9By ratifying protocols attached to a NWFZ treaty, nuclear-armed states agree not to test any nuclear weapons within the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states parties to a NWFZ treaty. Such ‘negative security assurances’ have, however, not been provided by all nuclear-armed states in relation to all NWFZs, and in some cases, are subject to reservations. Other treaties aim to ensure that spaces beyond national jurisdictions are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. These include:× The Antarctic Treaty (1959), which prohibits any measure of a mili-tary nature, including the testing of any type of weapon, any nucle-ar explosions and the disposal of in Antarctica; × The Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the placing in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other WMD, or to install such weapons on celestial bodies or station them in outer space and× The Seabed Treaty (1971), which prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons or other WMD on the international seabed.It is thanks to states initiating and participating in such multilateral agreements and states unilaterally excluding nuclear weapons from areas under their jurisdiction (as in the case of Mongolia and Austria) that large parts of our world are already nuclear weapon-free.10 In-struments excluding nuclear weapons from certain spaces underline that, ultimately, only the absence of these weapons can effectively prevent their disastrous health and environmental effects. Whilst these instruments make an important contribution to the stigmatisa-tion of nuclear weapons, and to nuclear disarmament, non- prolifera-tion, regional security and environmental protection, they are limited in their territorial scope, and states of the nuclear weapon-free world remain vulnerable to the direct and indirect effects of nuclear weap-ons in the hands of nuclear-armed states.

Champion Briefs 88 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Customary international law covenants prohibit use of nuclear weapons testing in almost all circumstances--answers enforcement arguments.

Brehm, Maya. "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." ResearchGate. December 01, 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. . The testing of nuclear weapons has been increasingly curtailed over the last decades by way of international treaties and other acts deploying legal effects. On the one hand, these measures reveal concern about further proliferation of nuclear weapons and their qualitative development. On the other hand, restrictions on testing aim to prevent further contamination of the environment and the negative immediate and long-term health impacts of nuclear explo- sions. Particularly atmospheric tests have had severe environmental and health consequences.× The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) prohibits all nuclear explosions, whether peaceful or military, in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater (but not underground).11 × The NPT implicitly prohibits ‘non-nuclear weapon States Parties’ from testing nuclear weapons, and NWFZ treaties also contain prohibitions on nuclear testing.× The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) bans all nuclear test explosions and other nuclear explosions. 3The CTBT is global in its scope and, due to its comprehensive nature, its provisions supplant nuclear testing related obligations that states may have assumed under earlier instruments (e.g. the PTBT). However, due to the non-accession of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), , India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States of America (USA), the CTBT has still not entered into force. Pending its entry into force, there is no comprehensive treaty prohibition on nuclear weapon testing. Strictly speaking, therefore, signatories and contracting states are bound by its terms only to the extent that they may not defy the treaty’s object and purpose. Whilst a nuclear weapon test by a signatory or contracting state would likely be seen as a violation of that rule, this view is debatable.In practice, a de facto moratorium on nuclear weapon tests has been observed since the late 1990s.12 It was challenged only by tests carried out by the DPRK in 2006, 2009 and 2013. These tests met with strong condemnation from the rest of the international community, indicating that nuclear weapon testing is seen as unac- ceptable. Furthermore, only the DPRK, India, Pakistan (and recently independent South Sudan) are not bound by any treaty obligation to refrain from nuclear weapon testing. Finally, nuclear tests appear to be increasingly incompatible with legal principles for the protection of the environment and the human person.13 Whilst recognizing that there is debate on this point, the norm embodied in the CTBT argu-ably reflects an emerging norm of customary law against all nuclear weapon testing.14

Champion Briefs 89 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are morally problematic and threaten states' obligations to respect the well-being of other member states and their citizens.

Brehm, Maya. "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." ResearchGate. December 01, 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. . The effects of nuclear weapons and rules for the protection of human health, human dignity and human rights“when a weapon has the potential to kill between one million and one billion people, …, human life becomes reduced to a level of worthlessness that totally belies human dignity as understood in any culture. Such a deliberate action by an [sic.] State is, in any circumstances whatsoever, incompatible with a recognition by it of that respect for basic human dignity on which world peace depends, and respect for which is assumed on the part of all Member States of the United Nations.”36 Whether directly or by way of a degraded environment, nuclear weapon-related activities can threaten the livelihoods and even the existence of individual human beings and entire communities, gravely affecting the enjoyment of a range of human rights, including the right to health and to a healthy environment, the right to food, the prohibition of inhumane treatment, and of course, the right to life inherent in every human being.37 The effects of nuclear weap-ons arguably undermine the very notion of human dignity on which human rights are based.States are under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Not only do they need to refrain from activities that would violate international human rights law (IHRL), they also need to take positive preventive measures. Accordingly, states’ obligation to respect the right to health, involves, inter alia, a duty to refrain ‘from using or testing nuclear … weapons if such testing results in the release of substances harmful to human health’.38 Also with a view to protecting human health, states parties to the International Health Regulations (2005) have assumed a duty to take preventive measures to protect ‘all people of the world from the international spread of disease’ irrespective of its origin. Many activities involving nuclear weapons pose a ‘public health risk’, and the detonation of a nuclear weapon would likely amount to a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ under these regulations. Each state is, further, under a duty to reduce the risk of disasters by taking necessary preventive measures, and states have a duty to cooperate in disaster risk reduction.40 For the Human Rights Committee ‘[i]t is evident that the design-ing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons are among the greatest threats to the right to life’, which confront humankind, a threat that ‘is compounded by the danger that the actual use of such weapons may be brought about’ in the event of war or through human or mechanical error or failure. With a view to the highly uncontrollable effects of nuclear weapons, it is difficult to see how the use of a nuclear weapon could comply with the strict IHRL standards on the use of force.41 In the Committee’s (albeit

Champion Briefs 90 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

con-troversial) opinion, ‘the production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited’.42 It is now almost universally accepted that IHRL continues to apply during an armed conflict, and even ‘in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’, the right to life cannot be derogated from.43 Many of the complex legal issues raised by the parallel application of IHRL and IHL are not yet settled. It is an open question to what extent it would fall to the relevant rules of IHL to de-termine whether the use of a nuclear weapon as a means or method of warfare amounted to an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life in violation of IHRL.44

Champion Briefs 91 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons violate requirements for conduct under international humanitarian law--UN Charter proves.

Brehm, Maya. "The Effects Of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." ResearchGate. December 01, 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. . Use of a nuclear weapon as a means or method of warfare during an armed conflict would need to ‘be compatible with the requirements of … the principles and rules of international humanitarian law’,45 including the following:× The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, and direct attacks only be against the latter;46 × Indiscriminate attacks and disproportionate attacks are prohibit-ed;47× In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians, and each party to the conflict must take all fea-sible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian harm;48× The use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate is prohibit-ed;49× The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited;50 × The use of poison or poisoned weapons is prohibited.51 These rules, widely considered to be of customary nature, are reflected in 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.52 They would seem to prohibit nuclear weapon use in most foreseeable scenarios,53 and declarations made by states to the effect that the Protocol’s ‘new’ rules do not apply to nuclear weapons certainly sug-gest that the concerned states do not believe nuclear weapons could be used in compliance with all the provisions of the Protocol.54 Disagreement also persists about whether the use of a nuclear weapon would violate customary IHL in all circumstances. Whereas some hold that a nuclear weapon could never be used in compli-ance with IHL, and consequently, that nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate and/or cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suf- fering, others contend that the legality of nuclear weapon use needs to be assessed on a case- by-case basis under the rules of IHL, taking into account the circumstances of a particular attack. Arguing that the humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons differ greatly in different scenarios, they reject the argument that nuclear weapons are illegal per se.The ICJ concluded in 1996 (by seven votes to seven, and the Presi-dent’s casting vote) that ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to … the principles and rules of humanitarian law’. However, the Court could not ‘conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake’. The meaning and implications of this phrase have been hotly de-bated ever since. For one, it opens up the disturbing possibility that use of a nuclear weapon that violates IHL may nonetheless be lawful in such a situation.55 A detailed discussion of the complex legal questions raised under jus ad bellum are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to recall that ‘The extent to which the use of nuclear weapons could be

Champion Briefs 92 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

lawful under the [UN] Charter is extremely limited’, and that a threat or use of force by means of a nuclear weapon that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter (self- defence) is unlawful.56It can also be recalled that when determining the full extent of the laws of armed conflict, the Martens Clause provides authority for looking beyond treaty law and custom to consider principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience’.57 Ultimately, though, the ability to recognize massive human suffering and to feel bound by the need to combat it must not depend on whatever chains of reasoning we can produce to support it. We need to be able to say that we know that it is wrong, without having to translate this into ‘the idiom of legal reason’.58

Champion Briefs 93 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Situations relating to proportionality are incompatible with the use of nuclear weapons.

Burroughs, John. "INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. February 28, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Is the first use of nuclear weapons legal under international law? I begin my analysis with broad requirements of necessity and proportionality, applying particularly to the initiation of war but also throughout its conduct. Those requirements are inherent in a rational and lawful approach to war, an approach that seeks to avoid conflict and, when it occurs, to limit its extent and to make possible the restoration of peace. The requirement of necessity in a sense speaks for itself. Military action must involve the application of the least amount of force required for purposes of self-defense. If a less destructive option is available for responding to an attack, it must be chosen. This has obvious implications for the choice between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. Under the requirement of proportionality, the force employed in responding to an attack must not be excessive in relation to the scale of that attack. It must also be rationally related to the purposes of self-defense. When it comes to nuclear weapons, it is especially important that the risk of escalation is part of the proportionality calculus, as the International Court of Justice held in its 1996 Advisory Opinion. The implications are clear for first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed enemy. Next, consider legal requirements applicable to particular military operations. A 2013 Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy submitted to Congress by the secretary of defense stated: “The new guidance makes clear that all plans must also be consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. Accordingly, plans will, for example, apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects. The United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects.” It is certainly to the good that the United States accepts that under the principle of distinction, civilians and civilian infrastructure may not be attacked. But what is missing is an acceptance of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. The essentials of that prohibition are well stated in a 2007 Joint Chiefs of publication: “Attackers are required to only use those means and methods of attack that are discriminate in effect and can be controlled.” (my emphasis). The omission of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks in the above-cited 2013 guidance probably reflects the fact that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nuclear weapons to be used in a way that is “discriminate in effect” and “controlled.” That consideration played a key role in the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion, which stated that under the fundamental principle of distinction, states must “never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” The Court found that “in view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,” their use “seems scarcely reconcilable with respect” for that requirement. In addition to distinction, the 2013 Defense Department guidance also accepts the requirement of proportionality. This should be understood as the

Champion Briefs 94 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

requirement of proportionality in attack, as distinguished from the general requirement of proportionality in the exercise of self-defense I discussed earlier. The requirement of proportionality in attack essentially requires that the collateral injury and damage caused by an attack not be disproportionate to the expected military advantage. Because it involves a balancing of costs and benefits, the requirement of proportionality in attack as such may not be understood to rule out all possible uses of nuclear weapons. Imagine a situation in which an enemy is believed to be on the verge of launching nuclear forces and it is believed that only a preemptive nuclear attack can prevent or limit such a launch. This scenario first of all demonstrates why nuclear-armed states must avoid going to war. From a legal standpoint, it remains the case that even if a proportionality calculus is believed to justify use of nuclear weapons, it is unlawful under the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.

Champion Briefs 95 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

The use of nuclear weapons conflicts with the acceptance of international law--if aff wins the framework debate, err aff on offense.

Burroughs, John. "INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. February 28, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Let me mention other rules significant in this context. They are included in the preamble to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted at a UN Conference in July 2017. The preamble states that the parties base themselves on “rules of international humanitarian law,” which is at the core of the law of armed conflict. In addition to the ones I have discussed, these include the rules on “precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment.” The preamble also reaffirms that “any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.” Those are factors with legal value in international law. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which is very good at advocacy, has emphasized “principles of humanity” in explaining the prohibition of use. The nuclear-weapons-prohibition treaty will enter into legal force when 50 states have ratified it, probably in the next year or two. It will gain increasing authority as a statement of international law binding all states, including nonparties, as its number of parties grows over the years. In conclusion, the first use of nuclear weapons is at least generally contrary to international law. I say “at least generally” to acknowledge that skeptics love to trot out marginal scenarios where use arguably could be justified, as against a rogue nuclear-armed submarine. First use is also irrational—regardless of the particularities of a given situation—because it would open the door to further uses in other situations and promote proliferation. The rules I have discussed here also apply to second use of nuclear weapons. It is sometimes asserted that second use would be justified under the doctrine of reprisals. But what that doctrine permits is more restrictive than is generally understood. The most far-reaching conclusion, which I endorse, is that use of nuclear weapons should never be contemplated in a conflict situation. A more conservative conclusion, in line with existing US doctrine, is that there should be an extremely high threshold for even considering use of nuclear weapons, including with respect to the option of second use. Further, in determining such matters as targets and lethality requirements, minimization of civilian casualties should be an overriding factor, for example by selecting targets in nonurban areas in any second use scenario. What are the implications for presidential first use? I support the approach of requiring congressional approval, both for engaging in war generally and for first use of nuclear weapons. I suggest that the requirement of complying with international law be written into the legislation. In an ongoing conflict, where there may be pressures for quick decisions, as in a preemption situation, involvement of the entire Congress may be viewed as impractical. So

Champion Briefs 96 AFF: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

additional approaches should be considered: for example, a body including the president, some officials, and some members of Congress that would make decisions when speed is deemed necessary. Provision should be explicitly made for the involvement of lawyers charged with upholding compliance with international law.

Champion Briefs 97 A/2: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

There's no substantive backing for States eliminating nuclear weapons--creates a legal gap.

Nystuen, Gro. "A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." Arms Control Association. March, 2016. Web. December 13, 2019. . The final document of the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference referred for the first time in NPT history to the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and reaffirmed the need “for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”1 The inclusion of this language in the 2010 document was perhaps not particularly significant in itself, as it stated the obvious. Rather, its significance lay in the initiative it licensed. Arguing that the humanitarian dimension required increased attention, the Norwegian government invited all interested states and organizations to a conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo in March 2013. The next year, the Mexican and Austrian governments organized follow-up conferences in Nayarit and Vienna, respectively. Attracting more government delegations than the NPT Preparatory Committee meetings in 2013 and 2014, the series of humanitarian impact conferences appears to have supplied a meeting format that was in demand. At the conclusion of the third and hitherto last of these conferences, the Austrian hosts submitted a document calling on states and other stakeholders to “fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.”2 A few months later, the Austrian government announced that this “Austrian Pledge” would be called the “Humanitarian Pledge,” thus implying a broader ownership of the document. More than 120 states have now formally endorsed it. One might ask what exactly this legal gap is. Although some claim that there is a gap that should be filled by a new legal instrument prohibiting the use and possession of nuclear weapons, others argue that there is no legal gap.3 Some have suggested that the legal gap is not one of substantive law but rather a “compliance gap.”4 This article seeks to bring some clarity to the question of a potential legal gap, investigating the legality of the possession and use of nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law and disarmament law. It concludes that there is a substantive legal gap because unlike chemical and biological weapons—the other categories of nonconventional weapons—nuclear weapons are not explicitly and comprehensively prohibited. Given the magnitude of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, this could be considered a paradox.5

Champion Briefs 98 A/2: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

Can't rule out the lawfulness of holding nuclear weapons for self- defense purposes--UN Charter never specifies weapon type.

Nystuen, Gro. "A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." Arms Control Association. March, 2016. Web. December 13, 2019. . The primary objective of the UN Charter is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” The charter forbids the use of military force against states in general, but makes exceptions for self-defense and for use of force authorized by the Security Council. These rules in the charter apply equally to all use of force against states, irrespective of weapon type. No restrictions are imposed on nuclear weapons as such. In an advisory opinion in 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) responded to the question of whether the use of nuclear weapons could be permitted under international law. The court did not succeed in giving a clear answer, but concluded that it could not rule out the lawfulness of the use of a nuclear weapon in “extreme circumstances of self defence.”6 Because every armed conflict is likely to be perceived by states as an “extreme” circumstance of self-defense, it was unclear whether the court implied that the rules governing the justification for the use of armed force in the UN Charter (jus ad bellum) might set aside the rules governing the actual conduct of hostilities (jus in bello). It seems clear that if one makes the applicability of the rules governing the conduct of warfare (international humanitarian law) dependent on whether the use of force in itself is perceived as legitimate, then the former rules will seldom be seen as applicable because states commonly perceive the enemy’s use of force as unjustified. These two regimes are therefore, as a matter of law, distinct, applying independently of each other.

Champion Briefs 99 A/2: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

AT NPT. Flaws and gaps in NPT enforcement mechanisms.

Nystuen, Gro. "A ‘Legal Gap’? Nuclear Weapons Under International Law." Arms Control Association. March, 2016. Web. December 13, 2019. . On top of this legal gap in substantive law comes a possible compliance gap concerning the lack of nuclear disarmament as mandated by NPT Article VI, the 1995 NPT “extension package,” and the final documents of the 2000 and 2010 review conferences. The 2010 document lays out a 64-point action plan. There is considerable debate on whether, for example, the action plan from 2010 ought to have been undertaken in the five-year review period or whether it was a long-term road map.24 NPT nuclear-weapon states such as Russia and the United States argue that the stockpile reductions they have undertaken over the last couple of decades are more than enough in terms of Article VI implementation, but others argue that full implementation of Article VI requires negotiation of “effective measures” on nuclear disarmament. Article VI applies to all NPT states-parties, thus indicating that such negotiations of effective measures should be multilateral. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Mexican delegation noted that “more than 40 years after the entry into force of the NPT and 20 years after its indefinite extension, the obligation to conduct multilateral negotiations in good faith to fulfil the goal of disarmament, as provided by Article VI of the NPT, is the only one of its provisions that has not been achieved yet.”25 The South African delegation argued that the framework for implementing Article VI “must be the product of an open multilateral process.”26 In fact, the only relevant measure specifically mentioned in the NPT preamble is a comprehensive nuclear test ban.27 Accordingly, the lack of agreement on a test ban treaty was a major source of friction at the first four review conferences. The Conference on Disarmament, having failed to reach consensus, could not adopt the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the treaty was therefore subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996. It has yet to enter into force, however, as it has not been ratified by several so-called Annex 2 states (the 44 states that possessed a at the time of the CTBT negotiations and whose ratification, under the terms of the treaty’s Annex 2, is necessary for the treaty to enter into force), including six nuclear-armed states. Accession by the United States arguably would be a critical factor in securing support from the remaining Annex 2 states. Recent signals that the Obama administration is looking into reopening a debate on U.S. accession to the CTBT are welcome news, but it remains doubtful that the U.S. Senate can be swayed and that anything can be done before a new U.S. president takes office in January 2017.28

Champion Briefs 100 A/2: International Law AC Jan/Feb 2020

No backing in international law mandating elimination of nuclear weapons.

Lito, Melina. "A Global Ban On Nuclear Weapons: Are We There Yet?." ICRC. May 30, 2017. Web. December 13, 2019. . Take the issue of the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons. There is no express provision under international law that nuclear weapons, their use or threat thereof, are illegal per se. The NPT, the landmark treaty that shapes the legal architecture of nuclear disarmament efforts, prohibits the transfer, acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon States. It also prohibits the transfer of weapons by nuclear weapon States (which the NPT defined as the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom). Similarly, under international humanitarian law (IHL), there is no express prohibition for use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Rather, the use of nuclear weapons is ‘regulated’ in so far as it is prohibited if it is likely to cause civilian casualties or environmental impact. As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded at its Council of Delegates in 2011, “it is difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the requirements of international humanitarian law, in particular the rules of distinction, precaution and proportionality.” Under IHL, the rule of distinction “requires the parties to an armed conflict to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.” Second, the rule of precautions in attack “requires that in the conduct of military operations, constant care be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects.” Third, the rule of proportionality provides that “if an attack is to proceed, that the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated outweigh the foreseeable incidental impact on civilians.” Finally, the rule on indiscriminate attacks prohibits the use of weapons that is not directed at a specific military objective. In 1996, the General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to provide its advisory opinion on the threat of use of nuclear weapons. The ICJ held unanimously that nowhere in international law — whether in the conventions or in customary international law — is there a specific authorization on the use or threat thereof of nuclear weapons. It also held unanimously that a threat or use of force that contradicts the UN Charter is not lawful. It held (by eleven votes to three) that international law does not include a specific prohibition on nuclear weapons either. Finally, the ICJ held by seven to seven votes that “in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”

Champion Briefs 101 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: Just War Theory AC

This case argues that nuclear weapons violate the principles for a “just war,” as defined by philosophers and theologians over centuries. The object of “just war theory” as a tradition has been to figure out how states can fight wars, should they break out, while maintaining ethical standards. The strategic value of this Affirmative lies in its unconventional framework, where you would be engaging the literature about morality in foreign policy, which doesn’t arise for other topics like standardized tests or fossil fuel subsidies. Just war theory is non- consequentialist, and it judges intended outcomes more than unintended ones (the “doctrine of double effect”); the two principles which follow from the framework are usually understood as proportionality (that retaliatory force not exceed the initial scope and scale of aggression) and discrimination (that violence not be used against non-combatants and third parties). The thesis of the Affirmative is that nuclear weapons violate both of these principles because the mass destruction that would follow is disproportionate (assuming nuclear weapons were used in response to a conventional invasion, as they’re threatened to do), and also indiscriminate (as many civilians of the “enemy” would die in the blast and fallout). For this case to be effective, you have to read cards explaining why conventional weapons are more just than nuclear weapons, or else the neg will be able to win that the Aff case is non-unique (the aff only eliminates nuclear arsenals, but the problem is with all military action). From a Neg perspective, it’s worth looking at Michael Walzer’s work in Just and Unjust Wars, which is in this brief. He argues that the use and threat of nuclear weapons is evil, yet that if deterrence holds it may be better to threaten evil so that evil is never done. That would be an effective link turn!

Champion Briefs 102 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence can't be reconciled with just war theory.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’

Champion Briefs 103 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence, even if the weapons are never used, rely on credible threats against enemy civilians. This is immoral at its core.

Walzer, Michael. "Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations." Basic Books Classic Series. 1977. Web. December 12, 2019. . It is not difficult, however, to account for the present legal situation. The threat to take reprisals against enemy civilians is a crucial feature of the contemporary system of nuclear deterrence, and statesmen and soldiers are not prepared solemnly to denounce that system. Moreover, though nuclear deterrence rests only on threats, and the acts threatened are of such a nature that moral men and women might well refuse at the final moment to carry them out, no one is prepared in advance to admit to inhibitions. "Any act of cruelty to the innocent," wrote an American jurist of the pre-, "any act, especially, by which noncombatants are made to feel the stress of war, is what brave men shrink from, although they may feel obliged to threaten it." (T.D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, New York, 1908, p. 211.) But can they threaten it effectively if it is known in advance that they will shrink from acting? I will take up the problems of nuclear deterrence in chapter 17. (p. 214, footnote)

Champion Briefs 104 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons policy depends upon the commitment to murder.

Walzer, Michael. "Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations." Basic Books Classic Series. 1977. Web. December 12, 2019. . So far as consequences go, then, deterrence and mass murder are very far apart. Their closeness is a matter of moral posture and intention. Once again, Ramsey's analogy misses the point. His babies are not really the "direct object of attack," for whatever happens on that Labor Day weekend, no one will deliberately set out to kill them. But deterrence depends upon a readiness to do exactly that. It is as if the state should seek to prevent murder by threatening to kill the family and friends of every murderer--a domestic version of the policy of "massive retaliation." Surely that would be a repugnant policy. We would not admire the policeofficials who designed it or those pledged to carry it out, even if they never actually killed anybody. I don't want to say that such people would necessarily be transformed into barbarians; they might well have a heightened sense of how awful murder is and a heightened desire to avoid it; they might loathe the work they were pledged to do and fervently hope that they never had to do it. Nevertheless, the enterprise is immoral. The immorality lies in the threat itself, not in its present or even its likely consequences. Similarly with nuclear deterrence: it is our own intentions that we have to worry about and the potential (since there are no actual) victims of those intentions. Here Ramsey has put the case very well: "Whatever is wrong to do is wrong to threaten, if the latter means 'mean to do'…If counter-population warfare is murder, then counter-population deterrent threats are murderous." No doubt, killing millions of innocent people is worse than threatening to kill them. It is also true that no one wants to kill them, and it may well be true that no one expects to do so. Nevertheless, we intend the killings under certain circumstances. That is the stated policy of our government; and thousands of men, trained in the techniques of mass destruction and drilled in instant obedience, stand ready to carry it out. And from the perspective of morality, the readiness is all. We can translate it into degrees of danger, high and low, and worry about the risks we are imposing on innocent people, but the risks depend on the readiness. What we condemn in our own government, as in the police in my domestic analogy, is the commitment to murder. (p. 272) *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 105 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are fundamentally inhumane and unjust, and global disarmament is a moral obligation.

, Pope Francis. "Nuclear Disarmament Is Possible And Necessary." Arms Control Association. December, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . Dear Brothers and Sisters, this place makes us deeply aware of the pain and horror that we human beings are capable of inflicting upon one another. The damaged cross and statue of Our Lady recently discovered in the Cathedral of Nagasaki remind us once more of the unspeakable horror suffered in the flesh by the victims of the bombing and their families. Pope Francis stands in front of the Memorial Cenotaph as he observes a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the Hiroshima atomic bomb during his visit to the Peace Memorial Park on November 24. (Photo: Carl Court/Getty Images)Pope Francis delivers a speech at the Atomic Bomb Hypocenter Park on November 24 in Nagasaki, Japan. (Photo: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Getty Images)One of the deepest longings of the human heart is for security, peace and stability. The possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is not the answer to this desire. Indeed, they seem always to thwart it. Our world is marked by a perverse dichotomy that tries to defend and ensure stability and peace through a false sense of security sustained by a mentality of fear and mistrust, one that ends up poisoning relationships between peoples and obstructing any form of dialogue. Peace and international stability are incompatible with attempts to build upon the fear of mutual destruction or the threat of total annihilation. They can be achieved only on the basis of a global ethic of solidarity and cooperation in the service of a future shaped by interdependence and shared responsibility in the whole human family of today and tomorrow. Here in this city which witnessed the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of a nuclear attack, our attempts to speak out against the arms race will never be enough. The arms race wastes precious resources that could be better used to benefit the integral development of peoples and to protect the natural environment. In a world where millions of children and families live in inhumane conditions, the money that is squandered and the fortunes made through the manufacture, upgrading, maintenance and sale of ever more destructive weapons, are an affront crying out to heaven. A world of peace, free from nuclear weapons, is the aspiration of millions of men and women everywhere. To make this ideal a reality calls for involvement on the part of all: individuals, religious communities and civil society, countries that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not, the military and private sectors, and international organizations. Our response to the threat of nuclear weapons must be joint and concerted, inspired by the arduous yet constant effort to build mutual trust and thus surmount the current climate of distrust. In 1963, Saint John XXIII, writing in his Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris, in addition to urging the prohibition of atomic weapons (cf. No. 112), stated that authentic and lasting international peace cannot rest on a balance of military power, but only upon mutual trust (cf. No. 113). There is a need to break down the climate of distrust that risks leading to a dismantling of the international arms control

Champion Briefs 106 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

framework. We are witnessing an erosion of multilateralism which is all the more serious in light of the growth of new forms of . Such an approach seems highly incongruous in today’s context of interconnectedness; it represents a situation that urgently calls for the attention and commitment of all leaders. Pope Francis stands in front of the Memorial Cenotaph as he observes a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the Hiroshima atomic bomb during his visit to the Peace Memorial Park on November 24. (Photo: Carl Court/Getty Images)Pope Francis stands in front of the Memorial Cenotaph as he observes a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the Hiroshima atomic bomb during his visit to the Peace Memorial Park on November 24. (Photo: Carl Court/Getty Images)For her part, the Catholic Church is irrevocably committed to promoting peace between peoples and nations. This is a duty to which the Church feels bound before God and every man and woman in our world. We must never grow weary of working to support the principal international legal instruments of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Last July, the bishops of Japan launched an appeal for the abolition of nuclear arms, and each August the Church in Japan holds a 10-day prayer meeting for peace. May prayer, tireless work in support of agreements and insistence on dialogue be the most powerful “weapons” in which we put our trust and the inspiration of our efforts to build a world of justice and solidarity that can offer an authentic assurance of peace. Convinced as I am that a world without nuclear weapons is possible and necessary, I ask political leaders not to forget that these weapons cannot protect us from current threats to national and international security. We need to ponder the catastrophic impact of their deployment, especially from a humanitarian and environmental standpoint, and reject heightening a climate of fear, mistrust and hostility fomented by nuclear doctrines. The current state of our planet requires a serious reflection on how its resources can be employed in light of the complex and difficult implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in order to achieve the goal of an integrated human development. Saint Paul VI suggested as much in 1964, when he proposed the establishment of a Global Fund to assist those most impoverished peoples, drawn partially from military expenditures (cf. Declaration to Journalists, 4 December 1964; Populorum Progressio, 51). All of this necessarily calls for the creation of tools for ensuring trust and reciprocal development and counts on leaders capable of rising to these occasions. It is a task that concerns and challenges every one of us. No one can be indifferent to the pain of millions of men and women whose sufferings trouble our consciences today. No one can turn a deaf ear to the plea of our brothers and sisters in need. No one can turn a blind eye to the ruin caused by a culture incapable of dialogue.

Champion Briefs 107 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons threaten mass annihilation, and thus can never be rationalized by just war principles. Claims that nuclear weapons are consistent ignore all the uncertainties with escalation.

Schaper, Donna. "The Nuclear Reality: Beyond Niebuhr And The Just War." Christian Century. October 13, 1982. Web. December 12, 2019. . The nuclear reality not only takes us beyond Niebuhr and real politics; it also takes us beyond the “just war” as a justification or rationalization for the use of nuclear weapons. is indicted, not vindicated, by the limiting categories of just-war criteria such as due proportion, just means, just intentions and reasonable possibility of success. The burden of proof is on those who would say otherwise. A limited nuclear “just” war can be theoretically conceived of in a textbook scenario, but is it possible in the real world? War is confusion, chaos and hell, not predictable sequences. Even if nuclear weapons were to be used as counterforce, and even assuming that noncombatants could be protected, the question of escalation would remain unanswered -- not to mention long-term environmental or genetic damage. How can we know that any use of nuclear weapons will not result in catastrophic escalation? In 1978, General Creighton Abrams was said to have interrupted a discussion about limited nuclear war “with an expletive, followed … by the statement, ‘One mushroom cloud will be reported as one hundred, and that will probably be the end of the world.’” The technical discussions as to when or whether nuclear weapons can be used without violating just war criteria are irrelevant unless the question of escalation can be answered with certainty. I suspect that a number of these conclusions are shared by many middle-of-the-roaders who have thought of themselves as just- war adherents. Our realization that the just war theory provides no justification for nuclear weapons or nuclear warfare has involved painful reappraisal, a “shaking of the foundations.” However, some of us were prodded and assisted by the cavalier comments of leaders in the current administration. European nuclear protest has been accounted for as “Protestant angst” (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Richard N. Perle) which was “bought and paid for by the Soviet Union” (President Ronald Reagan). On this side of the ocean, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman blamed “a few uninformed and overly idealistic religious leaders.” This trivialization of nuclear concerns was a misreading of the across-the-board struggle taking place with issues of life and death, of the widespread sense that this may be the “last chance” for human civilization. Since our leaders did not have the sensitivity to feel the moral earnestness of literally millions of European and American people, it is legitimate to ask how sensitive they are to the moral issues themselves. In good will we might patiently wait for signs of moral leadership, but the facts of history do not offer us this choice. We were the first and only nation to use atomic bombs in war. It was a presidential decision; the American people were not consulted. Furthermore, in our armed forces schools, military officers in

Champion Briefs 108 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

tactical war gaming make the assumption that nuclear “release” will be forthcoming in any major war. Where did such an assumption come from? *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 109 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Just war theory is fundamentally sound, and preferable to a cynical realism that applies no moral standards to war.

Brown, Gregory. "Just War Theory Isn't Obsolete." The Public Discourse. April 18, 2016. Web. December 12, 2019. . War has been a constant, more or less, for all of human history. Yet many wars are unjust, often gravely and manifestly so. In the face of this injustice, what is one to do? Many people, the realists, accept it. War and its injustices, they reason, are inevitable. If war will ever be overcome, that moment is not presently imaginable. Politicians across the world seem to endorse such realism, even if there is not much to recommend it ethically. In rejecting realism, we must ask, “How can war be just?” Pacifism insists that it cannot be, so all war must be avoided no matter the cost. Just war theory, on the other hand, provides conditions defining the circumstances in which military conflict can occur justly. These conditions could, obviously, take a number of forms, but historically, answers have been relatively stable. The conditions can be divided under two headings restricting the right to go to war (jus ad bellum) and delineating what constitutes right conduct during war (jus in bello). The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides one formulation for just war theory—what it calls “legitimate defense by military force.” There are four necessary criteria for jus ad bellum: -The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain; -All other means of putting an end to [the conflict] must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective; -There must be serious prospects of success; -The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. With regard to the last condition, the Catechism helpfully adds, “The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.” During war, the Catechism demands humane treatment for noncombatants, wounded soldiers, and prisoners, while also ruling out all murderous acts. Moreover, each military action must be necessary and cannot cause disproportionate, even if unintended, harm. Thus the second, third, and fourth criteria for jus ad bellum essentially continue to apply in bello. It isn’t necessary to be Catholic, however, to recognize the independent plausibility of these principles. Is it possible that a war could be justified? Since self-defense and the use of force by some entities, such as law enforcement, are both justifiable, it is hard to imagine an argument that war is unjustifiable in principle, even if the opportunities for just war are exceptionally rare in practice. The question then is, “What would it take for a proposed war to be just?” The principles enumerated above, basically, prohibit wars that are pointless, ill-motivated, or ill-conceived. A war must be a response to something serious; moreover, it must not cause more damage than it averts.

Champion Briefs 110 AFF: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Pacifism can't effectively challenge mass murder, or delineate between just and unjust activities, when wars do break out.

Brown, Gregory. "Just War Theory Isn't Obsolete." The Public Discourse. April 18, 2016. Web. December 12, 2019. . Elizabeth Anscombe on Pacifism Another ambiguity in the conference organizers’ statement is their qualification that “clear ethical criteria are necessary for addressing egregious attacks or threats in a violent world.” This seems intended as a concession, but of what? It admits that the world remains violent and that war must, at least, be worked around. But can these “egregious attacks or threats” be “addressed” with violence, or can they not? If the answer is yes, then clearly we need a just war theory to weed out unjust responses. If the answer is no, then the conference organizers are endorsing some sort of pacifism. This pacifism would reject the idea of a just war and the associated criteria; consequently it is subject to an important argument made by the Catholic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. In 1956, Oxford University awarded President Harry Truman an honorary degree for his role in World War II. Anscombe, then a professor at Somerville College, Oxford, protested his degree on the basis of his repugnant decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in order to elicit “unconditional surrender.” “For men to choose to kill the innocent as a means to their ends is always murder,” she wrote, “and murder is one of the worst human actions.” My concern here is the critique of pacifism that Anscombe develops in the course of her protest. She thought pacifism contributed to Truman’s readiness to drop the bomb and the world’s readiness to congratulate him for it. For those unfamiliar with her pamphlet, this is probably a surprising claim. What worried her was the acceptance of indiscriminate killing in times of war: It is characteristic of nowadays to talk with horror of killing rather than of murder, and hence, since in war you have committed yourself to killing—for example “accepted an evil”—not to mind whom you kill. This seems largely to be the work of the devil; but I also suspect that it is in part an effect of the existence of pacifism, as a doctrine which many people respect though they would not adopt it. The problem, then, is with proposing pacifism as an ideal. Pacifism elides the distinction between killing and unjust killing—murder. Since war is sometimes necessary, those who find pacifism impossible become cynical realists rather than just war theorists—having forgotten the distinction that made the latter intelligible—with deadly consequences for the world. I intend no blanket condemnation of the conference, and I concur with Pope Francis’s opening statement, which repeats the Second Vatican Council’s acknowledgement of a government’s right to legitimate defense. Moreover, nonviolence, whenever possible, is mandated by just war doctrine, so the conference’s inquiry into nonviolence is surely valuable. Alas, not all of the modern world’s problems admit of reasonable nonviolent solutions. Consequently one should be prepared to say which military actions are just and which unjust. To throw out the principles that make this decision possible is to stand on the precipice between pacifism and realism—and from there, it is too easy to fall into the chasm.

Champion Briefs 111 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Limited counterforce strikes satisfy criteria of proportionality and discriminating between civilians and combatants.

McMahan, Jeff. "Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 95:3. April, 1985. Web. December 09, 2019. . Despite these problems, the two criteria seem plausible as rough guides to the limits of permissible conduct in warfare. It also seems clear that most uses of nuclear weapons would violate one or both of these criteria. Certainly a direct, punitive strike against a city would violate the Criterion of Discrimination, and most other uses would be too destructive to be considered proportionate. Yet there are certain uses of nuclear weapons which might not violate either criterion. Limited counterforce strikes against remote military installations might be discriminate, in that they would not be intended to kill noncombatants, and they could con- ceivably be considered proportionate, in that, for example, they could reasonably be expected to lead to a favorable settlement of some military conflict

Champion Briefs 112 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Absolutist opposition to nuclear deterrence only weakens the general application of moral principles in warfighting.

Shaw, William. "Nuclear Deterrence And Deontology." Ethics 94:2. January, 1984. Web. December 09, 2019. . There is, though, a better way of understanding this situation. One could view the obligation not to threaten innocent persons as a prima facie principle, one which is outweighed in the present circumstances by the duty to preserve the lives and liberties of the innocent (assuming, what is widely believed, that reliance on nuclear deterrence has accom- plished this). The difference is that one would be saying that deterrence is justified, all things considered, rather than that criminal conduct is tolerated out of necessity. Given that overridden prima facie duties continue to exert some moral weight, one would still be obliged to endeavor strenuously to extricate oneself from a situation in which the duty not to threaten had to be overridden in order to fulfill a more stringent duty. Walzer's construal of the situation places us, implausibly, in a continual state of moral emergency in which moral norms, rather than being over- ridden by other moral principles, are simply disregarded because of consequentialist considerations that are external to his deontological framework. Moreover, Walzer himself should prefer this characterization of deterrence since an important theme of Just and Unjust Wars is that those who condemn war absolutely leave themselves with no guidelines when they are forced to fight, thus opening the door to all sorts of atrocities. One must not suppose, Walzer rightly argues, that war suspends all moral judgments and thus refuse to draw moral distinctions on the battlefield. Yet to repudiate morally nuclear deterrence, only to tolerate it as a practical necessity, is to countenance too quickly the suspension of ethical principle in this realm. Writers like Kenny and Lackey reject nuclear deterrence as a matter of basic moral principle and do not let it in through the back door on grounds of necessity. To the extent that people find it dangerously un- realistic to cease deterrence and disarm unilaterally and yet are told that this is what morality dictates, they will in fact tend to ignore moral reasoning about nuclear matters altogether. The absolutist argument against de- terrence is thus vulnerable to two criticisms.'7 First, the principle in question leads to counterintuitive results: many will simply see the endorsement of unilateral disarmament as a reduction of the absolutist position. Second, in laying down a moral requirement which is so stringent that people will not in fact obey it, the absolutist only weakens peoples' allegiance to morality in general.

Champion Briefs 113 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Just war theory undermines nations' right to self-defense.

Brook, Yaron. ""Just War Theory" Versus American Self-Defense." Ayn Rand Institute. April, 2006. Web. December 09, 2019. . Given that Just War Theory regards individuals, not as ends in themselves, but as means to the ends of others, what is its view of the right to self-defense, that is, the right of a people to defend its own lives and freedom, not for the sake of a “humanitarian” cause, but for its own sake? While in name Just War Theory claims to uphold a right to self-defense, in substance it denies this right. Self-defense, the theory holds, is a “just cause” for war. This means that if the people of a nation are suffering aggression, oppression, or genocide, and are themselves capable of stopping it, they are morally entitled to respond militarily. But — and this is the crucial part — only under strict conditions. Aggression from another nation is a “just cause,” according to Just War Theory, but only as a “last resort” — and only if the decision to go to war is motivated by “good intentions.” (These qualifications apply to “humanitarian” “just causes” as well, but we will focus on their application to alleged wars of self-defense.) Let us first examine the requirement that war must be a “last resort.” This restriction is often portrayed as a sensible policy that simply entails taking the act of going to war seriously, rather than going to war willy-nilly. But, in fact, war as a “last resort” goes far beyond forbidding wars of whim or aggression; it means that a nation cannot go to war immediately even when there is an objective threat — that is, when another nation has shown the willingness to initiate aggression against it. Because the use of military force involves the harming of others, Just War Theory holds, every other conceivable avenue short of using military force must be tried: appeasement, U.N. resolutions, being persuaded by the crocodile tears of enemy leaders, and anything else that pacifists (or U.N. ambassadors) can muster. What is an innocent nation to do when it knows of a threat that, if left unaddressed, could result in a catastrophic attack on it at some point in the future — such as the knowledge possessed by the U.S. of Iran, a nation that sponsors terrorism, spreads Islamic Totalitarianism, develops nuclear weapons, has attacked U.S. interests in the past, and promises the eventual destruction of America? Such projections are dismissed by Just War theorists as merely hypothetical (“How can we know what the future will hold?”). Projections of future attacks, they hold, are tainted by self-serving motives — that is, too much concern for one’s own life and liberty, too little concern with the consequences of war on others (such as the Iranians) — and thus morally out of the question as a cause for action. For example, in 2002, Walzer told the New York Times: “we don’t have to wait to be attacked; that’s true. But you do have to wait until you are about to be attacked.”8 The requirement that war be a “last resort” is inimical to the requirements of self-defense, which demand that serious threats be stopped as soon as possible. Observe that evil nations and movements do not commit major atrocities out of the blue; they need time to build their forces, gain converts, extract concessions, and win small victories; they need to convince themselves and their followers that they have a chance of success. The earlier their intended victims retaliate, the less damage the thugs can do, and the easier it is to dispose of them.

Champion Briefs 114 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are actually most compliant with Just War Theory.

Dunlap, Charles. "Is The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Immoral?." War on the Rocks, Texas National Security Review. August 02, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . But it is simply not true that “any” use of nuclear weapons would inevitably violate international humanitarian law. As former National Security Council staffer Paul Miller points out, “nuclear bombs come in a wide range of sizes” and certain uses may result in little or no civilian harm. He says: Although any nuclear weapon would have a high likelihood of causing some civilian casualties unless used in open desert or the ocean, the degree of civilian harm might be relatively small if the nuclear warhead is small enough and the location relatively remote (i.e., not a city). If the target is a major enemy asset, such as a tank division, an aircraft carrier, a headquarters bunker, or a nuclear weapons arsenal, the military value might outweigh the potential harm to civilians. In such a scenario, nuclear weapons could meet the Just War theory criterion that the weapon not cause more destruction than the harm it is addressing. And there is more to Just War theory. It also mandates efforts to defend the helpless. In their 2016 book, Necessity in International Law, Jens Ohlin and Larry May point out that “[t]raditional Just War theory argues that some wars can be justified, even required, out of respect for the protection of innocent life.” (Emphasis added.) This comports with Catholic Just War Doctrine, which says: Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others. The defense of the common good requires that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their responsibility. (Emphasis added.) Some ethicists like Michael Walzer argue that ‘[n]uclear war is and remains unacceptable” because the weapons create a “new kind of war.” However, philosopher Alexander Moseley counters with a stronger analysis: Against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare (for example, the timing, range, and potential devastation) they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework: a nuclear warhead remains a weapon and weapons can be morally or immorally employed. Furthermore, the employment of nuclear weapons may actually support another key tenet of Just War theory: To be moral, the use of force must have a reasonable chance of success. Could there be situations in which the use of nuclear weapons is the most feasible way to produce a reasonable chance of military success? Could there be legitimate military targets that actually require nuclear weapons for their destruction? In fact, yes. Imagine that the only way to halt the genocidal depredations of an enemy leader is to neutralize him in his command post tunneled deep into a mountain. In its 2005 study, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, the National Research Council of the National Academies concluded: Many of the more important strategic hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) are beyond the reach of conventional explosive penetrating weapons and can be held at risk of destruction only with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons

Champion Briefs 115 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

may also be the only practical means of achieving the high temperatures needed to assure the timely destruction of a virulent and lethal pathogen that an enemy might develop. Additionally, some believe that nuclear weapons could be the “best answer” to destroy or divert a cataclysmic meteor or asteroid hurtling towards earth. To be sure, the legal and moral use of a nuclear weapon must comply with the targeting principles of international humanitarian law, such as the requirement of distinction (which means that except in the case of belligerent reprisal, you must target combatants and not noncombatants or their property). The law – like Just War theory – also requires strict observance of the principle of proportionality, that is, any civilian losses must not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage sought from the attack. The Department of Defense Manual is in accord, insisting that the “law of war governs the use of nuclear weapons, just as it governs the use of conventional weapons.” Obviously, non-legal but essential real-world considerations such as escalation control have to be taken into account in any contemplated use of nuclear weapons. But the point is that it is wrong to categorically preclude use of the weapons in all cases, even when doing so would be strategically, politically, and ethically prudent, and fully consonant with the law. Moreover, from a moral perspective, ban advocates have to confront this inconvenient fact: As military historian Martin Van Creveld pointed out in 1996, as “the power of nuclear weapons grew—from 20,000 kilotons in 1945 to 58 megatons in 1961—and their numbers increased, wherever they made their appearance large-scale interstate war came to a halt.” The United States, Britain, and France reiterated that point in their recent statement, saying “the ban treaty is incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.” Isn’t a just peace the ultimate aim of Just War theory?

Champion Briefs 116 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

While nuclear weapons are capable of violating just war theory, the way the US actually uses them is consistent.

Lytwyn, Matthew. "Nuclear Weapons And The Just War Tradition." CSIS. May 16, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Critics of nuclear arms often describe them as indiscriminate weapons that would be used to target civilian population centers. This argument ignores the realities of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and planning. While nuclear weapons are magnitudes more destructive than even the most powerful conventional weapons, this does not immediately render them unusable under traditional Just War constraints. In fact, U.S. nuclear planning is deliberately aligned with the moral values that govern the U.S. way of war. Proponents of nuclear disarmament ignore or minimize this point. Nonetheless, the implications are significant: by adhering to its moral principles while developing , the United States enhances the credibility of its deterrent posture. A Renewed Moral Debate Nuclear weapons pose a moral paradox. Despite their role in preserving peace, the ability of nuclear weapons to wreak widespread destruction has raised concerns over their morality since the Cold War. Early weapon systems lacked accuracy and carried high-yield warheads, raising the prospect of civilian deaths on a large scale. Questions of whether such systems could be employed under the Just War tradition were vigorously debated, and various moral frameworks were applied to explain the apparent contradictions of deterrence. Utilitarianism, for example, emphasized the peace that nuclear deterrence enabled, therefore justifying threats against civilians. One of the most high-profile moral pronouncements on nuclear deterrence, the U.S. Catholic Bishops’ 1983 pastoral letter, gave grudging approval to nuclear deterrence but urged the world to quickly move beyond the status quo, noting that deterrence is “a transitional strategy justifiable only in conjunction with resolute determination to pursue arms control and disarmament.” Today, the morality of nuclear weapons has reemerged as a major topic, thanks to dissatisfaction with the perceived slow pace of global nuclear disarmament, concerns about nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, and international efforts to outlaw nuclear weapons. In October 2017, the Nobel Peace Prize went to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in recognition of its promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). To date, 58 nations have signed the TPNW, although none of them are nuclear-armed countries. Among other claims, the treaty asserts that any use of nuclear weapons would be “contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.” Pope Francis has thrown his moral weight behind the treaty, stating that nuclear weapons have “devastating, indiscriminate and uncontainable effects, over time and space.” The head of ICAN, Beatrice Fihn, has said that if “the U.S. nuclear arsenal all went off, it could kill civilization.” On the other side of the debate, the United States has consistently objected to the TPNW as unrealistic and dangerous to the existing nonproliferation regime. The nuclear debate has thus come into sharp relief between those who see a potential for catastrophe if nuclear weapons are used and countries unable to

Champion Briefs 117 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

see a realistic way of moving beyond nuclear deterrence without sacrificing international stability. Just War and Nuclear Weapons Two approaches seek to resolve the paradox surrounding the morality of nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear disarmament, such as ICAN, work to delegitimize and ban nuclear weapons. In contrast, the United States strives to preserve their legitimacy by reserving nuclear weapons for extreme circumstances and even then applying the law of armed conflict when considering their possible use. As former United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) commander General Robert Kehler recently noted, “the law of war governs the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon.” The Just War tradition, which underpins the modern law of armed conflict, breaks the moral analysis of war into two segments: jus ad bellum considerations (when is recourse to war morally justified?) and jus in bello considerations (how can a war be fought in accordance with moral principles?). This article focuses on the criteria for prosecution of a nuclear war in accord with the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality. The principle of discrimination dictates that non- combatants may not be intentionally targeted during a war. Countries are obliged to conduct their war planning to minimize collateral damage to the extent feasible. The quantitatively higher capacity of nuclear weapons to inflict collateral damage makes critical analysis of nuclear targets even more important than those targets to be attacked by conventional arms. According to the most recent report to Congress on U.S. nuclear employment strategy, U.S. forces must retain “significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries.” U.S. strategy “does not rely on “counter-value [i.e. targeting population centers] or “minimum deterrence” strategy.” Critically, the Just War tradition avoids imposing a standard that all civilian casualties must be avoided (something no country could achieve without the risk of losing an otherwise legitimate war). Instead, the tradition levies a more realistic standard that collateral damage must be avoided to the extent feasible while in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Charles Dunlap, a former Staff Judge Advocate at USSTRATCOM, highlights the ability of nuclear weapons to be used discriminately, noting that “by reducing weapon yield, improving accuracy through delivery system selection, employing multiple small weapons (as opposed to a single, large device), adjusting the height of burst, and offsetting the desired ground zero, collateral damage can be minimized consistent with military objectives.” The international community itself has not seen fit to judge all potential nuclear weapons use as disproportionate. The jus in bello principle of proportionality obliges a nation to employ only the amount of force necessary to achieve its military objectives. Assuming that the principle of discrimination is satisfied, proportionality requires the damage likely to be created by an attack to be weighed against the legitimate military objectives to be achieved. This principle goes to the heart of nuclear weapons use, due to the potential destructive power of nuclear weapons and their lingering aftereffects. It is the United States’ sensitivity to the principle of proportionality that has led to a consistent position, included in its most recent Nuclear Posture Review, that the “United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.” As Elbridge Colby has pointed out, “If the destruction of a target is critically important, it may be permitted under classical law-of-war doctrine if the ancillary damage is not intended and its costs do not outweigh the legitimate object achieved.” In addition, the

Champion Briefs 118 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

international community itself has not seen fit to judge all potential nuclear weapons use as disproportionate. The International Court of Justice’s 1996 opinion on the lawfulness of nuclear weapons left open the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used lawfully in a case where the survival of the state was at risk. As a result, a complete analysis of the moral aspects of nuclear weapons begins by separating the devastation nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting from the way in which the United States actually plans to employ them. It also recognizes the tradeoffs inherent in the prudential decisions over retaining nuclear weapons; specifically, whether steps toward nuclear disarmament could prove destabilizing or hold more risk than the continued nuclear deterrence relationships in place today. In addition, a moral analysis of U.S. nuclear planning needs to be grounded in the present historical moment, and acknowledge that U.S. nuclear strategy has changed significantly over time and has evolved to align with the country’s moral values. Conclusion Despite what disarmament advocates claim, nuclear war plans can be consistent with Just War criteria. The U.S. record in applying Just War principles to nuclear planning indicates it will act in a morally responsible way, even if it must consider using nuclear weapons. By doing so, the United States continues to apply decades of deterrence theory that suggests that threats must be credible in order to deter. Potential adversaries could be more willing to gamble that the United States would avoid using its own weapons in a conflict if doing so would create a stain on the United States’ national conscience. As Albert Wohlstetter put it in 1983, “Western nonsuicidal threats against legitimate military targets are more credible than threats to bring about the destruction of civil society on both sides.” By aligning its nuclear war plans with the same moral guidelines that shape its conventional military operations, the United States conveys its resolve to its adversaries and allies.

Champion Briefs 119 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Although nuclear threats are immoral, the threatening of evil in order not to do it is permissible.

Walzer, Michael. "Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations." Basic Books Classic Series. 1977. Web. December 12, 2019. . Against an enemy actually willing to use the bomb, self-defense is impossible, and it makes sense to say that the only compensating step is the (immoral) threat to respond in kind. No country capable of making such a threat is likely to refuse to make it. What is not tolerable won't be tolerated. Hence any state confronted by a nuclear adversary (it makes little difference what the adversary relationship is like or what ideological forms it assumed), and capable of developing its own bomb, is likely to do so, seeking safety in a balance of terror. Mutual disarmament would clearly be a preferable alternative, but it is an alternative available only to the two countries working closely together, whereas deterrence is the likely choice of either one of them alone. They will worry about one another's readiness to attack; they will each assume their own commitment to resist; and they will realize that the greatest danger of such a confrontation would not be the defeat of one side or the other but the total destruction of both--and possibly of everyone else too. This in fact is the danger that has faced mankind since 1945, and our understanding of nuclear deterrence must be worked out with reference to its scope and imminence. Supreme emergency has become a permanent condition. Deterrence is a way of coping with that condition, and though it is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states. We threaten evil in order not to do it, and the doing of it would be so terrible that the threat seems in comparison to be morally defensible.

Champion Briefs 120 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

Just War Theory masks systemic oppression and rationalizes imperial violence.

Westmoreland-White, Michael. "Internal Weaknesses Of Just War Theory." Levellers. August 20, 2006. Web. December 12, 2019. . Pacifists such as myself are not the only critics of Just War Theory. The standard form of JWT has also been criticized from within the tradition by some of the best current minds in moral philosophy. The Jewish philosopher, Michael Walzer, for instance, considers standard JWT to be too ahistorical and not attentive enough to the cultural contexts in which moral reasoning is done. He works to correct these efforts in his classic Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Another internal critic of JWT is Alan Geyer, Professor Emeritus of Political Ethics and Ecumenics, Wesley Theological Seminary, and Senior Scholar at the Churches’ Center for Theology and Public Policy. The following list of weaknesses was compiled by Geyer and his wife, Barbara Green, of the Presbyterian Church USA’s Washington Office. JWT tends to obscure the ambiguities of justice in most conflicts. It’s a rare war in which all the responsibility is on one side. In most cases, there is plenty of blame to go around. Concentration on the justice of one’s own cause tends to make it difficult to be self-critical or to repent for the evil one’s own side has done–and repentance is usually both a pre-condition of reconciliation. Because JWT helps groups and nations avoid repentance, it also encourages group or national delusions of self-righteousness. JWT tends to react to the latest provocation rather than to a whole longitudinal series of historic events. In that respect it is much like a referee in a sport who sees and penalizes one player’s punch, but misses the prior kick that went unnoticed. Very seriously from the standpoint of Christian theology, Just War thinking tends to presuppose a large disjunction between justice and love. This has the effect of both relegating Christian love to individual one-on-one ethics and to “elevate” to a platonic or docetic (i.e., disembodied) ideal–irrelevant for the “real world.” But surely Jesus’ command to love enemies was meant precisely for this real world: we aren’t likely to have enemies in heaven or the Coming Kingdom, after all. JWT tends to define “justice” only in terms of violent resistance to military or terrorist violence against the nation-state or the forces of the status quo. (Notice, for instance, how hard it would be for a “just revolution” to meet the criterion of legitimate authority.) JWT thus tends to neglect the conditions of systemic injustice and oppression that lead to many wars. JWT tends to justify excessive human suffering and death (not to mention ecological degradation), dismissing them with euphemisms like “collateral damage.” JWT appeals to the principle of “double effect,” focusing on the intention of targeting policies and discounting the actual consequences of those policies. Thus, JWT tends to serve as the military ethic of the most powerful nations, rationalizing their policies against weaker powers and tending toward the unacknowledged conceit that “might makes right.” Finally, at least for Geyer and Green, JWT tends to reinforce unilateral decision-making in a world of

Champion Briefs 121 A/2: Just War Theory AC Jan/Feb 2020

multinational realities and the necessity of working for common security. Another weakness of the JWT tradition is the way that the criterion of “last resort” can actually work psychologically to limit the imagination when creative conflict resolution skills are called for. Knowing that “if all else fails” one can always resort to force can result in moral laziness, in a national impatience with looking for alternative “resorts” to war. One issues an ultimatum and then says, “Well, we TRIED diplomacy but they just wouldn’t listen to reason.” If one rules out both appeasement of tyranny and violence from the start, one is forced to find creative alternatives to the “flight or fight syndrome.”

Champion Briefs 122 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: Proliferation Bad AC

This position to be short and sweet is all about the harms the nuclear weapons pose to society. This can be used in a few ways so this position is definitely more flexible than others. A few frameworks that can be used are Útil with a focus on the larger impacts of nuclear war. This affirmative can also use Structural Violence in order to focus on the smaller localized impacts that nuclear arsenals have on marginalized populations. The debate here to be had is why nuclear arsenals are not actually a deterrent and more of a weapon of war that is waiting to be used. Simple answers are finding ways that nuclear arsenals function as a deterrent mechanism or that it’s better than conventional weapons of war. I think that this debate can be very entertaining if the cards are used in the right way. This topic is similar to the nuclear energy topic but I do think there is a line drawn between nuclear arsenals and what is considered nuclear energy.

Champion Briefs 123 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Proliferation might be slow now, but that's because of the NPT---as more states get the bomb, the regime will unravel, and prolif will get fast and furious.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . Shellenberger then goes on to mock the notion of domino proliferation. In fact, I largely agree with him that the risks of rapid domino proliferation are overstated. However, he neglects to place the historical record in context. Proliferation was slow and measured precisely because the Americans and Soviets provided their client states with nuclear and conventional security guarantees. Moreover, proliferation was and is stymied by treaties such as the NPT, which create a normative and legal prohibition against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. But, as a matter of fact, domino proliferation has occurred. Pakistan is certainly a domino proliferator, as are Britain and France. While China is less clear, what is certain is that U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War played a major role in Mao’s calculus to acquire nukes for himself. Now imagine Shellenberger’s ideal world. This is a world in which any country that wants to can, without any restrictions, acquire nuclear weapons. Suddenly the normative, legal, and military framework retarding the rapid spread of nuclear weapons is gone and, as a result, destabilizing domino proliferation and arms racing become far more likely.

Champion Briefs 124 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

As more countries proliferate, they'll get attacked by countries like the US, Israel, or Russia---that causes wars.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . Here’s the other thing, Shellenberger presumably is only advocating for American acceptance of proliferation. After all, forcing other countries to go along with Washington is the exact kind of interference and American bullying he seems to so despise. But not every country will agree. Israel has struck nascent nuclear programs on several occasions, for example, and the Soviets almost launched an attack on the Chinese nuclear program. So, even if nuclear weapons make conflict less likely, attempting to acquire nuclear weapons actually tends to precipitate conflict as potential adversaries try desperately to stop a proliferator before it is too late. This is, after all, the reason the U.S. and its coalition partners invaded Iraq.

Champion Briefs 125 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Keeping nuclear weapons safe from theft is very hard, especially as countries expand their arsenals and new countries acquire the bomb.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . The final argument advanced by Shellenberger is that nuclear powers are hypocritical. They are, but that doesn’t make them wrong. Nuclear weapons are complicated systems that are difficult to secure and safeguard. The history of America’s nuclear weapons program is replete with near misses and close calls, and Soviet history is similarly concerning. Of course, the U.S. and other nuclear powers could still end up accidentally or inadvertently releasing nuclear weapons, but they have now had decades to develop protocols and standard operating procedures designed to reduce the likelihood of this occurring. A new nuclear state would need to develop many of these protocols from scratch. And while established nuclear powers might be able to offer guidance, no country concerned about an invasion by a great power like the U.S. is going to allow that same great power to develop and design its nuclear arsenal’s security features. According to Shellenberger, it is now incredibly easy and intuitive to design safe arsenals because nukes have been around for some time and the U.S. gave some money to Russia back in the 90s to secure the Soviet arsenal. I’m sorry, but the conclusion simply doesn’t follow from the premise. Horses have been around for a long time, but you better believe riding them is not intuitive to someone like me. And nuclear weapons are far more complex than horseback riding. As for Russia, who cares? The fact that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program worked to secure the Soviet arsenal is interesting, but it hasn’t prevented nuclear theft from the former USSR and is totally irrelevant in the context of any country other than the former Soviet republics. It’s also worth noting that nuclear weapons, in and of themselves, are insufficient to deter an attack from the U.S. (see also here). If possessing a handful of weapons was all it took, the Soviets and Americans wouldn’t have continued to build increasingly complex and large arsenals during the Cold War, and the Indians and Pakistanis wouldn’t be doing so now. Shellenberger admits as much, noting that states are currently expanding their arsenals. Correct! But that just proves that nukes aren’t nearly as effective as he seems to assume. And the more complex and variegated the arsenal, the more difficult it is to secure and safeguard.

Champion Briefs 126 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Conflict between nations is likely to escalate to nuke war.

Schlosser, Eric. "World War Three, By Mistake." The New Yorker. December 23, 2016. Web. December 11, 2019. <. https://cyber-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/01/World- War-Three-by-Mistake-The-New-Yorker.pdf>. According to Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear-policy expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, the deficiencies in Russia’s command-and-control system feed the country’s long- standing fears of encirclement by enemies ready to strike. During the twentieth century, Russia was attacked with little warning by both Germany and Japan. “I think the Russian leadership is terrified of a decapitation strike,” Lewis told me recently.” Perhaps some of that is paranoia, but, on the other hand, the United States opened Operation Iraqi Freedom, in 2003, by striking Dora Farm—a failed decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein.” Russia’s fierce opposition to an American missiledefense system in Europe is driven by fear of the role it could play in a surprise attack. During a crisis, Russia’s inability to could raise the pressure on a Russian leader to launch without any warning. The logic of a first strike still prevails. As John Steinbruner, a renowned nuclear theorist, explained more than thirty years ago, shooting first “offers some small chance that complete decapitation will occur and no retaliation will follow…. [It] is probably the only imaginable route to decisive victory in nuclear war.” Vladimir Putin now wields more power over Russia’s nuclear forces than any leader since Khrushchev. Putin has displayed great boldness and a willingness to take risks in foreign affairs. A surprise attack on the United States, given its nuclear superiority and largely invulnerable ballistic- missile submarines, would probably be suicidal. And yet the alternative might appear worse. Putin has described an important lesson he learned as a young man in Leningrad: “When a fight is inevitable, you have to hit first.” For the past nine years, I’ve been immersed in the minutiae of nuclear command and control, trying to understand the actual level of risk. Of all the people whom I’ve met in the nuclear realm, Sidney Drell was one of the most brilliant and impressive. Drell died this week, at the age of ninety. A theoretical physicist with expertise in quantum field theory and quantum chromodynamics, he was for many years the deputy director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator and received the National Medal of Science from Obama, in 2013. Drell was one of the founding members of —a group of civilian scientists that advises the government on important technological matters— and for fifty-six years possessed a Q clearance, granting him access to the highest level of classified information. Drell participated in top-secret discussions about nuclear strategy for decades, headed a panel that investigated nuclear-weapon safety for the U.S. Congress in 1990, and worked on technical issues for until the end of his life. A few months ago, when I asked for his opinion about launch-on-warning, Drell said, “It’s insane, the worst thing I can think of. You can’t have a worse idea.” Drell was an undergraduate at Princeton University when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed. Given all the close calls and mistakes in the seventy-one years since then, he considered it a miracle that no other cities have been destroyed by a nuclear weapon—“it is so far beyond my normal optimism.” The prospect of a new cold war —and the return of military strategies that advocate using nuclear weapons on the battlefield—deeply unnerved him. Once the first nuclear weapon

Champion Briefs 127 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

detonates, nothing might prevent the conflict from spiralling out of control. “We have no experience in stopping a nuclear war,” he said. During the recent Presidential campaign, the emotional stability of the Commander-in-Chief became an issue, with some arguing that a calm disposition might mean the difference between peace on Earth and a nuclear apocalypse. The President of the United States has the sole power to order the use of nuclear weapons, without any legal obligation to consult members of Congress or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ideally, the President would never be short-tempered, impulsive, or clinically depressed. But the mood of the Commander-in-Chief may be irrelevant in a nuclear crisis, given the current technological constraints. Can any human being reliably make the correct decision, within six minutes, with hundreds of millions of lives at stake? *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 128 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Due to status quo development- nuclear conflict is highly probable.

Patrick , Stewart. "The Lingering Specter Of Nuclear War." Council on Foreign Relations. March 07, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . In 2018, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the hands on its Doomsday Clock, created in 1947 to symbolize the risk of nuclear Armageddon, to two minutes to midnight—a proximity matched only once before, in 1953. Last month, the Bulletin chose to keep the hands there. Humanity has traipsed into a “new abnormal,” its editors lamented: Awash in and riven by geopolitical fault lines, the world teeters on the brink of catastrophe. Some critics find admonishments of this sort alarmist and unhelpful. Nuclear weapons have fueled apocalyptic anxieties for decades, as Cato Institute Senior Fellow John Mueller recently noted in Foreign Affairs. An unhealthy obsession with their risks, he suggests, detracts from sensible decision-making. However, the historical record provides ample grounds for concern, given how close nuclear powers have come to using these weapons against one another, both intentionally and inadvertently. The litany of near-misses and false alarms makes for sobering reading. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. President John F. Kennedy assessed the likelihood of nuclear war to be more or less a coin flip. In 1995, Russia misinterpreted a Norwegian rocket launch as a possible attack. And just last year, the State of Hawaii’s Emergency Management Agency erroneously issued an incoming ballistic missile alert. Seth Baum, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, estimates the rate of such incidents at one per year. Magnifying the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear war is uncertainty over the security of command and control structures to manage and use these weapons. In his harrowing 2017 tell-all, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, Daniel Ellsberg (of Pentagon Papers fame) chronicles the pathologies of the early U.S. nuclear apparatus. These included strong incentives to subordinate safety to offensive readiness, as well as “safeguards” against unauthorized use that consisted of little more than a sealed envelope. Given these shortcomings, Ellsberg notes, Stanley Kubrick’s classic satire Dr. Strangelove bore uncanny resemblance to a documentary. The same vulnerabilities may afflict more recent nuclear powers, not least Pakistan and North Korea.

Champion Briefs 129 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

High risk associated with failing nuclear deterrence.

Patrick , Stewart. "The Lingering Specter Of Nuclear War." Council on Foreign Relations. March 07, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . The failure of nuclear deterrence could precipitate global catastrophe. How big a catastrophe would depend on multiple factors, including the number and destructive power of the weapons used and their targets. A significant exchange could kill tens and even hundreds of millions of people in the initial blasts and ensuing firestorms, as well as from dispersed radiation, which is indifferent to national borders. Groundwater contamination, “black rain,” and other localized hazards would add to the devastation. Disruptions to global supply chains would forestall recovery in affected areas and could threaten access to food, medicine, fertilizer, and other essential goods elsewhere. Starvation and exposure to radiation would weaken immune systems and increase susceptibility to disease. All of this would occur in a context of degraded communication networks, hair-trigger military force postures, and rampant fear and uncertainty. The aftermath would be nightmarish by almost any measure. Beyond its devastating short-term impact, a large-scale nuclear exchange could cause significant long-term damage to Earth’s environment, with risks increasing with the number and yields of nuclear weapons used. In 1982, future Nobel laureate Paul J. Cruĵen and John W. Birks published a seminal paper, “The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon,” examining potential climatic effects from the atmospheric smoke and dust generated by a nuclear war and its associated conflagrations. The following year, a group of scientists that included astronomer determined that a major U.S.-Soviet exchange could cause midsummer continental land temperatures in the northern hemisphere to plunge below freezing, and dramatically change local weather and precipitation. The effects would persist for months and threaten global crop yields, producing a “nuclear winter.” The scientific jury on nuclear winter and its more mild form, nuclear autumn, is still out. Recent studies [PDF] suggest that nuclear war would indeed have significant environmental effects. What remains disputed is how widespread and enduring these would be. In 2007 [PDF], some of the same atmospheric scientists who had popularized the nuclear winter scenario found that a regional nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshima-scale blasts would be sufficient to trigger cooling exceeding that of the “LiĴle Ice Age,” which lasted from the early 14th century to the mid 19th century and saw a 0.6 degrees Celsius decline in mean annual temperatures across the northern hemisphere. The resulting decrease in agricultural productivity, which might take up to a decade to attenuate, would put two to three billion people [PDF] at risk of starvation. These findings, however, remain contested, dependent on assumptions about the flammability of modern cities and the amount of soot that would reach the upper atmosphere. A study from 2018 casts doubt on the magnitude of climatic effects from a regional nuclear war.

Champion Briefs 130 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear resources are scarce.

Hiroaki, Kiode. "The Truth About Nuclear Power: Japanese Nuclear Engineer Calls For Abolition." The Asia-Pacific Journal. October 01, 2011. Web. December 11, 2019. . I came here today to offer my candid advice to the Japanese government and its administrators who have managed the country’s nuclear power policy to today. I entered the field of with high hopes and dreams, because I believed that nuclear power was the energy source for the future. Oil and coal would be exhausted some day, but nuclear power was inexhaustible, so I thought nuclear power was the way forward. However, once I entered the field, I realized that nuclear power was actually a very poor energy source. Let me explain why. Shown in the figure above are the remaining non-renewable energy resources on this earth. The largest deposits are of coal. It is known to exist on our planet in enormous quantities. The white square indicates the total reserves. What is known to be commercially exploitable is called proven reserves, the blue part of the square. Now look at the tiny square on the top right corner of the slide. This is the world’s total annual energy consumption. The proven reserves of coal alone can provide 60 to 70 years worth of global energy demand. If we could use the total reserve of coal, it would provide 800 years’ worth of world demand. Next to that, we have reserves of natural gas, oil, and other sources that we are not really using right now, like oil shale and tar sands. I had thought that these fossil fuels would someday be exhausted and nuclear energy was the future, but in fact, the world’s reserve of uranium is only a fraction of that of oil, and a small percentage of that of coal. Uranium is actually a very scarce resource. But when I say this, people in the pro-nuclear camp say that I’m wrong. They argue that what I am talking about is only the amount of fissile uranium resource, which is limited, but by converting non-fissile uranium to , we can make nuclear energy that is recyclable.

Champion Briefs 131 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons possess dangerous qualities that can cause escalatory war.

, The United Nations. "Nuclear Disarmament.". 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence. Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 22,000 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date. Mcmanus, (http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0403-mcmanus-nuclear-danger-20160403- column.html) “The danger of a nuclear catastrophe today is greater than during the Cold War,” Perry said. The danger stems not only from terrorist groups like Islamic State, which would gladly steal or buy on the black market, but also from the huge nuclear arsenals the United States, Russia and other big powers maintain more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War. Those nuclear forces are bigger than they need to be — almost 16,000 warheads in all. And they still include hundreds of missiles on hair-trigger alert. progress toward nuclear disarmament has virtually stopped. Both Russia and the U.S. have launched expensive plans to modernize their nuclear forces, reaffirming the weapons' central role in national security

Champion Briefs 132 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

India's nuclear program is expanding.

Peck, Michael. "India's Nuclear Arsenal Keeps Growing, And That's Bad News For Pakistan And China." National Interest. November 10, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . “India is estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140,” according to Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. “Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities.” In addition, “India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least five new weapon systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems.” Unlike the missile-centric U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, India still heavily relies on bombers, perhaps not unexpected for a nation that fielded its first nuclear-capable ballistic missile in 2003. Kristensen and Korda estimate India maintains three or four nuclear strike squadrons of Cold War-vintage, French- made Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS/IB aircraft targeted at Pakistan and China. “Despite the upgrades, the original nuclear bombers are getting old and India is probably searching for a modern fighter-bomber that could potentially take over the air-based nuclear strike role in the future,” the report notes. India is buying thirty-six French Rafale fighters that carry nuclear weapons in French service, and presumably could do for India.

Champion Briefs 133 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Command and control systems are key to understanding India's capabilities.

Peck, Michael. "India's Nuclear Arsenal Keeps Growing, And That's Bad News For Pakistan And China." National Interest. November 10, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . India’s nuclear missile force is only fifteen years old, but it already has four types of land-based ballistic missiles: the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I, the medium-range Agni-II and the intermediate-range Agni-III. “At least two other longer-range Agni missiles are under development: the Agni-IV and Agni-V,” says the report. “It remains to be seen how many of these missile types India plans to fully develop and keep in its arsenal. Some may serve as technology development programs toward longer-range missiles.” “Although the Indian government has made no statements about the future size or composition of its land-based missile force, short-range and redundant missile types could potentially be discontinued, with only medium- and long-range missiles deployed in the future to provide a mix of strike options against near and distant targets,” the report noted. India is also developing the Nirbhay ground- launched cruise missile, similar to the U.S. Tomahawk. In addition, there is Dhanush sea-based, short-range ballistic missile, which is fired from two specially-configured patrol vessels. The report estimates that India is building three or four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which will be equipped with a short-range missile, or a bigger missile with a range of 2,000 miles. It’s an ambitious program. “The government appears to be planning to field a diverse missile force that will be expensive to maintain and operate,” the report points out. What remains to be seen is what will be the command and control system to make sure these missiles are fired when—and only when—they should be. And, of course, since Pakistan and China also have nuclear weapons, Indian leaders may find that more nukes only lead to an arms race that paradoxically leaves their nation less secure.

Champion Briefs 134 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is undesirable.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 11, 2019. . In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology, one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.After the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’ Thus, nuclear deterrence was born, a seemingly rational arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD, appropriately enough). Winston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’ Importantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of catastrophic retaliation. Even a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny.

Champion Briefs 135 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence isn't successful.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 11, 2019. . Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from without a fight in 1990. In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren’t. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons. It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting. First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable

Champion Briefs 136 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

to be used. Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce vulnerability, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable. Third, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.

Champion Briefs 137 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence severed the path of peace and creates new points of conflict.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 11, 2019. . Finally, there is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons makes money for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will remain obscured. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space. Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the technological accomplishments of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise insecure leaders and countries, then, once again, there is no rational way to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the law of diminishing returns, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’. In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’ The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car. Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the least likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’ (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are substantial risks associated with

Champion Briefs 138 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

escalated conventional war, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or false alarms, which have happened with frightening regularity, and could lead to ‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened. There have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes have been interpreted as a hostile missile launch. The above describes only some of the inadequacies and outright dangers posed by deterrence, the doctrinal fulcrum that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.

Champion Briefs 139 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

The use of nuclear weapons risks impacts on both sides of the fight.

, Michigan Technological University. "More Harm Than Good: Assessing The Nuclear Arsenal Tipping Point." Science Daily. June 13, 2018. Web. December 11, 2019. . To put that number in perspective, the U.S. and Russia each currently have thousands of nuclear weapons. Both nations hew to the concept of nuclear deterrence -- more firepower is intimidating and makes other countries think twice before picking a fight. More than 100 nuclear weapons in a nation's arsenal does more harm than good -- as using them can destabilize the country that uses them even in a best-case scenario. Joshua Pearce, professor at Michigan Technological University, and David Denkenberger, assistant professor at Tennessee State University and director of Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), co-authored an article published today in the journal Safety. In "A National Pragmatic Safety Limit for Nuclear Weapon Quantities"{link/DOI TK}, Pearce and Denkenberger examined direct negative physical consequences of the use of nuclear weapons to the nation firing them, including impacts such as starvation and global supply chain disruption coupled with the cost to maintain an extensive arsenal. To summarize: A nation willing to use its nuclear weaponry against another must determine whether it has the ability to survive the problems of its own making. There are nine nuclear weaponized nations: the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. There are approximately 15,000 nuclear weapons globally. Under the disarmament proposed in the paper, this number would drop to 900 or fewer. "With 100 nuclear weapons, you still get nuclear deterrence, but avoid the probable blowback from nuclear autumn that kills your own people," Pearce says. "Defense expenditures post-9/11 show we care about protecting Americans. If we use 1,000 nuclear warheads against an enemy and no one retaliates, we will see about 50 times more Americans die than did on 9/11 due to the after-effects of our own weapons." Pearce notes this is the first study to quantitatively demonstrate just how dangerous the use of nuclear weapons is even for the aggressor nation that fired off the nukes.

Champion Briefs 140 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

After-effects of nuclear aggression.

, Michigan Technological University. "More Harm Than Good: Assessing The Nuclear Arsenal Tipping Point." Science Daily. June 13, 2018. Web. December 11, 2019. . In the paper, Pearce and Denkenberger write, "No country should have more nuclear weapons than the number necessary for unacceptable levels of environmental blow-back on the nuclear power's own country if they were used." The consequences of environmental blow-back include a significant drop in global temperature because of soot from nuclear blasts blocking the sunlight from reaching Earth's surface, decreased precipitation, a drop in food production because of blocked sunlight and less moisture, increased ultraviolet radiation resulting from a badly damaged atmosphere, and non-functioning supply chains. "We should be clear this analysis represents a severe underestimate on the number of dead Americans," Pearce says. "We assume severe rationing, which is the best way to keep the most people alive when there is this level of food shortage. It means anyone who would die of starvation is immediately cut off from food. "I don't think rationing would go overly smoothly -- a lot more people would die in violence internally than what we estimated based on lack of calories." Putting numbers to the evaluation, Pearce and Denkenberger examined the threat potential of a 7,000-weapon arsenal, a 1,000-weapon arsenal and a 100-weapon arsenal. Playing out a hypothetical scenario, the researchers explain that if the U.S. used 100 nuclear weapons against China's most populous cities, initial blasts would likely kill more than 30 million people. This would kill a higher fraction of the population than even severe pandemics, providing plenty of deterrence to prevent another nation from attacking. Sunlight would decrease 10 to 20 percent and precipitation 19 percent (and in some places, even more). Pearce and Denkenberger, based on previous work, built a model of the burnable material in cities, how much would burn in a nuclear attack, how much of that would turn into smoke, and how much of that smoke would make it into the upper atmosphere. Then they used the result of climate and crop simulations to predict the impact on food supply. They coupled this with food storage to predict how many people would starve. The agricultural loss from this so-called "nuclear autumn" would range from 10-20 percent, enough to cause widespread food shortages in wealthier nations and mass starvation in poorer nations. Starvation could result because nuclear weapons would cause cities to burn, putting smoke into the upper atmosphere and blocking sunlight for years. This could cause lower rainfall and lower temperatures, potentially causing winter-like weather in the summer, called "nuclear winter." Less severe reduction in sunlight is called "nuclear autumn," which could still cause many millions of people to starve. It is clear that even 100 nuclear weapons is more than enough to dramatically reshape the globe, and Pearce and Denkenberger argue it's also more than enough to deter other countries. Maintaining more than that number, the authors state, is not only against the best interest of a nation to protect its people, but also cost a significant amount to maintain.

Champion Briefs 141 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Trump wants more nuclear weapons.

Korda, Matt. "No, Mr. Stephens, The United States Doesn’t Need More Nuclear Weapons." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August 17, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . Last week, on the 74th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, many took time to reflect upon the destruction caused by the only uses of nuclear weapons in wartime. But not the New York Times’ Bret Stephens, who took the opportunity to argue in favor of building more nuclear weapons. In an op-ed entitled “The U.S. Needs More Nukes,” Stephens laid out his case against arms control: “the bad guys cheat, the good guys don’t,” and all the while, the US nuclear arsenal is becoming “increasingly decrepit.” It’s a simple narrative; it’s also false. In fact, Stephens’ article is largely littered with bad analogies, flawed assumptions, and straight-up incorrect facts about the nature of nuclear weapons and arms control. As examples of arms control agreements where the “bad guys cheat” and the “good guys don’t,” Stephens cites the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (from which the United States withdrew in 2002), the Iran Deal (which was working until the United States withdrew last year), and the Treaty of Versailles (which famously isn’t an arms control agreement), among others. None of these involved significant cheating on the part of the “bad guys,” unless you count the Trump administration’s violation of the Iran Deal in 2018. Stephens also cites the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as a prime example of an arms control agreement gone wrong. Yes, it appears that Russia likely violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by developing and deploying a banned ground-launched cruise missile; however, as we’ve written previously, Trump’s decision to pull out of the treaty makes the United States needlessly complicit in its demise and frees Russia from both the responsibility and pressure to return to compliance. Contrary to Stephens’ thesis, when someone breaks the law, you shouldn’t throw away the law. And contrary to the title of Stephens’ piece, the United States doesn’t need more nukes. As we explain in our latest US Nuclear Notebook, the Trump administration wants to develop two new ones––a low-yield warhead and a sea-launched cruise missile––both of which are dangerous, and neither of which are necessary. Aside from lowering the threshold for nuclear use, the “low-yield” aspect of the low-yield warhead is a misnomer; it’s roughly one-third the yield of the Hiroshima bomb that killed 100,000 people. And the new sea-launched cruise missile is a concept brought back from the dead: the United States had one until 2013, when the Obama administration retired it because it was pointless, wasteful, and politically controversial.

Champion Briefs 142 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuke weapons is a defensive strategy to conflict.

Korda, Matt. "No, Mr. Stephens, The United States Doesn’t Need More Nuclear Weapons." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August 17, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . In addition to his well-established denialism of issues like systemic hunger, rape culture, and climate change, Stephens is known for his hawkish––and often inaccurate––takes on nuclear issues. In 2013, he claimed that the Iran Deal was worse than Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in 1938. In 2017, he argued in favor of regime change in North Korea. Later that year, he derisively referred to ICAN––the group that won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work to ban nuclear weapons––as “another tediously bleating ‘No Nukes’ outfit.” In June, he wrote that “If Iran won’t change its behavior, we should sink its navy.” Remember, this is coming from a guy who awarded architect Paul Wolfowitz “Man of the Year” in 2003 (The runners-up? Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Tony Blair, and George W. Bush). Furthermore, in last week’s piece, he erroneously stated that Iran repeatedly violated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a claim which the International Atomic Energy Agency—the international organization charged with monitoring Iran’s compliance––has continuously rebutted. Noticeably, Stephens linked to Mark Fitzpatrick’s work to back up his claim, but when Mark tweeted out that his article didn’t say anything of the sort, the link was changed. It now references David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, who is known for his hawkish views on Iran. Stephens’ columns are clearly emphasizing ideology over accuracy. And publishing a pro-nukes article on the anniversary of the Nagasaki bombing––without acknowledging the human cost of nuclear weapons, or even the anniversary itself––demonstrates that he is clearly not guided by empathy. But perhaps most evidently, Stephens’ piece is driven by fear. And understandably so: we’re currently locked into an ever-increasing nuclear arms race with no signs of it slowing down. If you’re not afraid, you’re probably not paying attention. However, crying “more nukes” without articulating any kind of strategic vision isn’t going to get us out of this mess. In reality, the best way to get out of an arms race is by refusing to play. The United States shouldn’t base the size of its nuclear arsenal in response to how other countries are tweaking theirs––this only makes sense if you believe that nuclear weapons are for fighting wars. But to quote Reagan’s old adage, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Instead, as explained in Global Zero’s Alternative Nuclear Posture Review, the United States should move towards a “deterrence-only” nuclear posture, which would allow for sizable cuts to the US nuclear arsenal without changing the strategic balance. Very simply, we need to start enacting ambitious solutions that are equal to the problems that we face. Not just reflexively demanding more nukes.

Champion Briefs 143 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

U.S. and Russia are not approaching any nuclear deal, means no restrictions to prevent conflict.

Mackintosh, Eliza. "Clock's Ticking On One Of World's Most Important Nuclear Treaties. A Dangerous Arms Race May Be Next." CNN. July 20, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. <\https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/20/world/us-russia-new-start-nuclear-weapons- analysis-intl/index.html>. This week, senior American officials traveled to Switzerland to deliver President Donald Trump's "vision for a new direction in nuclear arms control." That vision is to strike a wide-ranging deal that would limit the arsenals of not only the US and Russia, but also China for the first time. At a meeting with their Russian counterparts in Geneva on Wednesday, the US delegation relayed their concerns over Moscow's development of "non-strategic nuclear weapons," the State Department said. Another concern is the fact that China, which did not participate in the talks, has rejected negotiations out of hand. But the President's ambition for an all-encompassing deal is clouded by his track record, and observers are increasingly worried that the unraveling of existing accords under the Trump administration could lead to a more unstable future for nuclear proliferation globally. In May 2018, Trump quit the Iran nuclear deal, sparking an ever- widening rift with Tehran and heightened tensions in the Middle East. In February, the US suspended the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a key pact with Russia that has been a centerpiece of European security since the Cold War, saying Moscow had violated its terms. And as the talks were taking place in Geneva, the clock continued to run down on the last remaining major nuclear deal between the US and Russia, which control 90% of the world's nuclear warheads. The New Start treaty, signed by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, restricts the US and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads across 700 delivery systems. While Russia has signaled an interest in renewing the pact, Trump has previously described it as a "bad deal," and there is no sign that it will be extended beyond 2021, when it expires. If the New Start deal is scrapped, experts fear a return to a world without limits on nuclear stockpiles. The US and Russia could quickly ramp up the number of warheads deployed on sea and on land. With their nuclear ambitions unchecked, it would be almost impossible to convince other nations, like China, to exercise restraint. In the absence of transparency, experts said, worst-case scenario thinking could contribute to an even more hostile geopolitical landscape. With global powers on tenterhooks, the risk of a miscalculation -- and a knee-jerk deployment of a nuclear weapon -- would increase. "This would be the first time since 1972 that the US and Russia, previously the Soviet Union, would not have limits on their arsenals. It would make an already difficult and dangerous relationship all the more difficult to manage, and could cause one or the other side to accelerate their nuclear stockpiles," Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, told CNN. "It would be a world that we have not seen in a long time."

Champion Briefs 144 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

If the US and Russia abandon an agreement designed to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, it will become far more difficult to make non- nuclear states stick to their commitments.

Mackintosh, Eliza. "Clock's Ticking On One Of World's Most Important Nuclear Treaties. A Dangerous Arms Race May Be Next." CNN. July 20, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. <\https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/20/world/us-russia-new-start-nuclear-weapons- analysis-intl/index.html>. In January, Trump announced his intention to seek a new nuclear treaty and offered a vision of what would come next if he couldn't strike a deal. "Perhaps we can negotiate a different agreement, adding China and others, or perhaps we can't," Trump said during an address to the nation. "In which case, we will outspend and out-innovate all others by far." But by all accounts, 19 months is not enough time to negotiate a brand-new agreement -- even if China was on board, which it is not. "We oppose any country's attempt to make an issue out of China on arms control and will not participate in any negotiation for a trilateral nuclear disarmament agreement," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said during a press briefing in May. "This proposal for a trilateral agreement is, in reality, a poison pill designed to provide a pretext to allow for the [New Start] treaty to expire," Kimball told CNN. The presence in the administration of National Security Advisor John Bolton -- a longstanding hawk and critic of arms control agreements -- also has some observers concerned that the White House's true goal may be to find an exit strategy for a nuclear pact it sees as constraining and outdated. President Vladimir Putin, who has suggested Russia would be open to renewing the New Start treaty, has warned that letting the pact lapse could risk an arms race. "The Cold War was a bad thing … but there were at least some rules that all participants in international communication more or less adhered to or tried to follow. Now, it seems that there are no rules at all," he told the Financial Times last month. The ditching of nuclear treaties by the Trump administration has already contributed to the weakening of norms, and casts other multilateral agreements, like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) into doubt, experts said. Under the NPT, one of the world's most important foundational nuclear treaties, nuclear-weapon states -- the US, Russia, China, France and the UK -- commit to ending the arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament, while non-nuclear-weapons states agree to forgo developing or seeking nuclear weapons. But if the US and Russia abandon an agreement designed to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, it will become far more difficult to make non-nuclear states stick to their commitments, according to Tytti Erästö, a researcher for the SIPRI Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Programme. "Without these treaties you can't even speak about violations or limits -- basically anything is allowed," Erästö told CNN. "For new potential proliferators, the weakening of international norms and the legitimacy crisis within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may remove some of the normative restraints to developing nuclear

Champion Briefs 145 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

weapons. I don't think any country would go develop a nuclear weapon just because of this, but it may impact decisions in the future about whether or not to acquire them." *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 146 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

the danger of nuclear war is today much greater than it was in the late 1980s.

Arbatov , Alexey. "Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee Or Threat To Strategic Stability?." Carnegie Moscow Center. March 22, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . The military, technical, strategic, and political trends discussed above are destroying the systems and regimes of nuclear arms control built over a half-century through the great efforts of the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, and others. Scholars have warned about this scenario for years,42 and now the danger has become obvious to everyone. It is clear now that the weakest link in the nuclear arms control system is the INF Treaty. At the same time, the main claims of the parties against each other on compliance issues could be solved relatively quickly at the technical level if there was the political will and strategic interest in solving them. But instead, the Trump administration has officially announced its intention to denounce this historic treaty. The crisis in nuclear arms control is also manifested in the fact that for eight years, Russia and the United States have not discussed how to progress to the next START agreement. This is the longest pause in fifty years for such negotiations. Although both parties fulfilled their reduction obligations under the current New START by the February 2018 deadline (though with certain misgivings from Russia), the treaty will expire in 2021, and this will create a vacuum in strategic arms control. There is little time for the conclusion of a new treaty, given the deep disagreement between the two parties on important issues. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration has been reluctant to extend New START to 2026 (which can be done once under the terms of the treaty) and faces resistance from Congress on such a step. The United States and Russia are therefore on the threshold of a new large-scale arms race and, unlike the Cold War, this nuclear missile race will be augmented by competition in offensive and defensive non-nuclear strategic and medium-range weapons, as well as rivalry in the development of space weapons and cyber warfare. Beginning in the mid-2020s, the United States plans to modernize its strategic triad: new systems to replace the current heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.43 And Russia continues to modernize its triad, deploying and developing two new ICBM systems (Yars and Sarmat), one SLBM system (Borei-Bulava), and two heavy bomber systems (Tu-160M and PAK DA). In addition, the United States is developing the above-mentioned systems for limited nuclear strikes (Trident-2 SLBMs with low-yield warheads, LRSO, B-61-12, and nuclear sea-based cruise missiles). And Russia is developing the strategic systems unveiled in Putin’s March 1, 2018, address (that is, Burevestnik nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missiles, Avangard hypersonic gliders, and Poseidon long-range nuclear super-torpedoes).44 The impact of these weapons on strategic stability requires special analysis, but is unlikely to be positive. In addition, this arms race will be multilateral, involving states such as China, NATO members, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Japan, and others. The start of a nuclear arms race would undoubtedly undermine the norms and regimes

Champion Briefs 147 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2015 ended in failure, and there is a high probability that the same will happen at the next conference in 2020, especially in light of the U.S. from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal. This will likely be followed by the collapse of the CTBT, which for twenty- three years has not entered into force because of the refusal of the United States and a number of other states to ratify it. Nor is there much hope for progress in negotiating the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which has been stalled for more than a quarter-century. Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely join the nuclear club, as may Egypt, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, , Brazil, and other countries. Through them, nuclear weapons will sooner or later inevitably fall into the hands of international terrorists, with all the ensuing consequences.

Champion Briefs 148 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence was born out of military deterrence and the emergence of nuclear weapons.

Arbatov , Alexey. "Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee Or Threat To Strategic Stability?." Carnegie Moscow Center. March 22, 2019. Web. December 11, 2019. . Nevertheless, these concepts, their dynamics, and their dialectical interrelationship create new problems time and again. They give rise to paradoxes that, were it not a life-and-death matter for modern civilization, could be considered intellectually fascinating. But, unfortunately, these concepts concern actual matters of life and death. In the current military and political environment, it is no longer inconceivable that war between the United States and Russia could break out in just a few days in the event of a crisis. Such a conflict might culminate with an exchange of nuclear strikes taking as long as just a few hours. During those hours, hundreds of millions of people in the northern hemisphere would be killed, and everything created by human civilization in the last thousand years would be destroyed. The direct effects would be irreversible, and the secondary effects would likely kill the rest of the world’s population within a number of years, or at least send the remaining population back into a prehistoric existence. The prevention of nuclear war is an indispensable condition for the survival of human civilization, and it is inextricably linked to the concepts of nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation. It might seem that all of the above goes without saying, and that all of this has long been accepted both in theory and practice by politicians, military leaders, civilian experts, and the enlightened public of the world’s advanced nations. Over the past three decades, the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States have been reduced substantially—both in terms of the number of warheads and in terms of total destructive power. Yet despite all of this, the danger of nuclear war is today much greater than it was in the late 1980s. After thirty years of major reductions in nuclear arsenals to strengthen strategic stability, why are Russia and the United States further diverging in their understandings of the principles of stability? For what reasons, after so many years of joint efforts by the two powers to eliminate incentives for a nuclear first strike against the other, is such a scenario more likely today than at any point over the past thirty years? How is it that, after three decades of successful negotiations on the reduction and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the world is entering a period of disintegration when it comes to the entire system of control over these weapons? And, finally, why is the world entering a new cycle of nuclear and related arms races that is both multifaceted and multilateral? In recent literature, much attention has been paid to factors that affect nuclear deterrence and stability from the outside: new missile defense systems, non-nuclear (conventional) high-precision long-range weapons, the influence of third and threshold nuclear states, space weapons, and—more recently—cyber threats.1 These new factors have pushed the core of nuclear deterrence—strategic relations between Russia and the United States—to the background in the public consciousness. Yet

Champion Briefs 149 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

dangerous changes are taking place. This article examines the real and imaginary causes of the current situation and suggests potential ways to reduce tensions that could benefit international security.

Champion Briefs 150 AFF: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Proliferation is destabilizing.

Chilton, Kevin. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. November, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . During the 2016 presidential campaign, a candidate suggested it might be cheaper if Japan and South Korea developed their own nuclear weapons. But we must ask ourselves, would that result in a safer world? Today, several countries hang in the balance between assurance and possible proliferation. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are capable. They could join the nuclear club quickly if no longer assured. If Shiite Iran were to build a nuclear weapon, it is likely Sunni- dominated Saudi Arabia would respond in kind. And if Saudi Arabia went nuclear, would Turkey be interested in doing the same? Egypt? While none of these proliferation scenarios are certain, they are possible, and it is not likely that a world with this level of proliferation would be a safer place.

Champion Briefs 151 A/2: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

US "extended deterrence" is key to preventing prolif.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . Shellenberger then provides a very brief account of France’s quest for nuclear weapons, highlighting de Gaulle’s lack of faith in American extended deterrence guarantees. Extended deterrence is certainly more difficult than primary deterrence, as it is premised on a patron state risking a nuclear attack to defend an ally. Nevertheless, it has historically been effective. After all, no country with a nuclear guarantee from the United States has suffered an invasion by an enemy country. The reason for this is simple and was noted by a British diplomat several decades ago: While the recipient of an extended deterrence pledge needs to be 90% certain that Washington will honor its commitments to be reassured, a potential adversary only needs to be 5-10% certain to be deterred. Moreover, most countries have not acquired nuclear weapons yet seem to be doing fine. During the Cold War, was it really more believable that the U.S. would risk Boston for Bonn than Pittsburg for Paris? No. So it was not, in fact, French vulnerability that led them to acquire nukes, but rather the insecurities of French national security elite. It’s also worth pointing out that France likely acquired nukes as much for its national ego as its national security; it had just been humiliated by Germany and wanted to reclaim its status as a great power.

Champion Briefs 152 A/2: Proliferation Bad AC Jan/Feb 2020

Attempting to achieve "global zero" actually leads to more prolif.

O'Hanlon, Michael. "Is A World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Possible?." Brookings Institution. May 04, 2010. Web. December 12, 2019. . But how to rid the world of nukes? And how to do so safely? A nuclear-abolition treaty could constructively contribute to global stability if done right, but it could be hazardous if done wrong. Among other things, it could make countries that depend on America’s military protection decide they should seek nuclear weapons of their own. Serious consequences could ensue if the Turkeys and Saudi Arabias and Japans and Taiwans of the world interpret the American debate over Global Zero to imply that they can no longer rely on the United States as a dependable strategic partner—a formal ally in the cases of Turkey and Japan, a more informal but still-trusted friend in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Taiwan. The Global Zero movement could wind up sparking the very wave of nuclear proliferation and instability it was designed to prevent.

Champion Briefs 153 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: India/Pakistan AC

This case argues that India and Pakistan specifically should disarm their nuclear arsenals via bilateral talks. Many observers believe that the skirmishes between these countries, who share a border and hold opposing claims to the Kashmir region, pose the most likely chance of nuclear war. The scenario for conflict between India and Pakistan would not be limited to the two countries, as China and even the United States may intervene in response to escalation. From a Negative perspective, India and Pakistan may actually be one of the best examples of “mutually assured destruction” remaining successful: although these countries have fought multiple conventional wars since acquiring nuclear weapons in the mid-twentieth century, none of those conflicts became nuclear. Both India and Pakistan insist on their responsible, rational nuclear policies and promise to pursue peace, yet at other times they’ve used nationalist rhetoric that fanned the flames and claimed nuclear weapons could be used in extreme situations for national defense. Another problem, raised by the evidence in this brief, is that Pakistan perceives that nuclear weapons are needed in the event of invasion by a conventionally superior Indian army. From India’s perspective, Pakistan is engaged in nuclear sabre-rattling and new military doctrines (such as “Cold Start”) are necessary to prevent Pakistan from ever going nuclear. Pakistan may also have much stronger conventional capabilities than previous sources have let on (as some articles will be over ten years old, given how long people have wondered when the India-Pakistan conflict will explode). This Affirmative case is strategic because it allows you to narrow the topic to one of the best examples, while still being topical (because the resolution says “states,” meaning at least two). The weakness is that neg cards will be great, especially because the two countries may have achieved strategic stability despite the apparent signs of chaos.

Champion Briefs 154 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Pakistan’s engaged in brinksmanship, not restraint---they’ll use nukes first.

Wan, Wilfred. "Nuclear Risk Reduction: A Framework For Analysis." United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2019. Web. December 09, 2019. . Escalatory Use Escalatory risk refers to the introduction of nuclear weapons in an ongoing tension or conflict. The category is wide-ranging, and includes use in a strategic context, on the battlefield, in crisis, and in an offensive manner. Escalatory scenarios are often invoked in South Asia today, in light of the long history and simmering conflict between nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan. For instance, a February 2019 attack by a Pakistani-based militant group in Kashmir escalated to an Indian incursion of Pakistani airspace and a tense standoff over a captured Indian air force pilot. Some have argued that such confrontations will persist due to asymmetries in conventional and nuclear capabilities, which has led Pakistan to “posturing bordering on brinksmanship”. 20 Former Pakistani Director General of the Strategic Plans Division Khalid Kidwai once described the State’s nuclear forces as “integrated as a backup force” and an extension of its conventional capabilities.21

Champion Briefs 155 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Indo-Pak nuclear war kills at least 125 million people and risks global starvation.

Toon, Owen. "Rapidly Expanding Nuclear Arsenals In Pakistan And India Portend Regional And Global Catastrophe." Science Advances. October 02, 2019. Web. December 09, 2019. . DISCUSSION India and Pakistan may be repeating the unfortunate example set by the United States and Russia during the “cold war” era: that is, building destructive nuclear forces far out of proportion to their role in deterrence. Should a war between India and Pakistan ever occur, as assumed here, these countries alone could suffer 50 to 125 million fatalities, a regional catastrophe. In addition, severe short-term climate perturbations, with temperatures declining to values not seen on Earth since the middle of the last Ice Age, would be triggered by smoke from burning cities, a global disaster threatening food production worldwide and mass starvation, as well as severe disruption to natural ecosystems. Compounding the devastation brought upon their own countries, decisions by Indian and Pakistani military leaders and politicians to use nuclear weapons could severely affect every other nation on Earth.

Champion Briefs 156 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons create the stability-instability paradox, which increases the risk of conflict between India and Pakistan.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . The next set of arguments in his piece are conveyed via a series of bullet points that attempt to demonstrate just how effective nuclear weapons are at ensuring a country’s security. The first bullet point asserts that no nuclear powers have been invaded. I think this is a pretty misleading statistic because, as a matter of fact, most countries haven’t been invaded since 1945, and this is true irrespective of their nuclear status. The nuclear club is a small one, so it really isn’t surprising they’ve avoided invasion. Furthermore, with the exception of India and Pakistan and the allied countries of China and North Korea, no two nuclear powers share a land border. Therefore, it isn’t surprising they aren’t invading one another. But more importantly, this assertion is just wrong: Israel possessed nuclear weapons during the Yom Kippur War and India had nuclear weapons when it was invaded by Pakistan in 1999. Nuclear weapons can also lead to a phenomenon known as the stability-instability paradox. In short, by convincing leaders that a large-scale war is impossible because of their nuclear deterrents, nuclear weapons can lead to increased conflict at lower levels. So while nukes may have helped keep the peace between New Delhi and Islamabad, they also likely played a role in Pakistani-sponsored terrorists’ attacks on the Indian Parliament and Mumbai in 2001 and 2008, respectively. The second bullet point, that deaths worldwide have declined 95%, is correct, but it fails to prove that nuclear weapons are responsible for this trend. Other factors, such as U.S. hegemony, changes in normative views on war, increased economic interdependence, and more effective international organizations seem to be equally plausible explanations. Shellenberger may be correct that nuclear weapons are the cause of this happy trend, but, as we are frequently reminded, correlation and causation are not equivalent. It’s also worth noting that, given how peaceful and prosperous our world has become, it may be prudent to keep a steady course. After all, we seem to be trending in the right direction anyway. Why, exactly, do we need to change things? The final argument advanced by Shellenberger is that Indian and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories declined 95 percent after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998. But this, again, ignores the stability-instability paradox and doesn’t account for non-nuclear factors like the role of outside mediation and domestic politics.

Champion Briefs 157 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

The risk of nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan is high.

Hallinan, Conn. "Nuclear Powers Need To Disarm Before It’s Too Late." Foreign Policy In Focus. March 11, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . There Are No “Local” Nuclear Wars The folly of this approach was all too clear in the recent India and Pakistan dustup. While both sides appear to be keeping the crisis under control, for the first time in a very long time, two nuclear powers that border one another exchanged air and attacks. While so far things have not gotten out of hand, both countries recently introduced military policies that make the possibility of a serious escalation very real. On the New Delhi side is a doctrine called “Cold Start” that permits the Indian military to penetrate up to 30 kilometers deep into Pakistan if it locates, or is in pursuit of, “terrorists.” On the Islamabad side is a policy that gives front-line Pakistani commanders the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. The possibility of a nuclear exchange is enhanced by the disparity between India and Pakistan’s military forces. One does not have to be Carl von Clausewitz to predict the likely outcome of a conventional war between a country of 200 million people and a country of 1.3 billion people. Pakistan reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first. India has a “no first use” policy, but with so many caveats that it is essentially meaningless. In brief, it wouldn’t take much to ignite a nuclear war between them. If that happens, its effects will not be just regional. According to a study by the University of Colorado, Rutgers University, and UCLA, if Pakistan and India exchanged 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear warheads (15 kilotons), they would not only kill or injure 45 million people, but also generate enough smoke to plunge the world into a 25-year long nuclear winter. Both countries have between 130 and 150 warheads apiece. Temperatures would drop to Ice Age levels and worldwide rainfall would decline by 6 percent, triggering major droughts. The Asian Monsoon could be reduced by between 20 and 80 percent, causing widespread regional starvation. Between the cold and the drought, global grain production could fall by 20 percent in the first half decade, and by 10 to 15 percent over the following half decade. Besides cold and drought, the ozone loss would be between 20 and 50 percent, which would not only further damage crops, but harm sea life, in particular plankton. The reduction of the ozone layer would also increase the rate of skin cancers. The study estimates that “two billion people who are now only marginally fed might die from starvation and disease in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India.” In short, there is no such thing as a “local” nuclear war.

Champion Briefs 158 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

India and Pakistan need to eliminate their nuclear weapons in order to achieve regional and global security.

Nuclear Disarmament, Campaign For. "India And Pakistan.". August, 2016. Web. December 12, 2019. . India and Pakistan possess around 200 nuclear warheads between them, but yet are not recognised as official nuclear weapons states by the international community. This is because they developed their respective nuclear weapons programmes after the entry into force of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. This disarmament treaty does not allow any new states to sign while they are nuclear-armed. Background India and Pakistan share a turbulent history. When the British-controlled India became independent in 1947, two new states were founded – present day India and Pakistan. In the process, over 10 million people were displaced and up to a million killed. Since independence, the two countries have gone to war four times. India began nuclear research pre-independence in 1944, and subsequently strong and divergent views were held as to whether India should develop nuclear weapons or not. By 1965, India – together with Sweden – was leading attempts to halt proliferation and limit the nuclear weapons capability of the nuclear weapons states. Yet conflict with China – which was developing nuclear weapons, with its first test in 1964 – led to a decision to develop a nuclear weapons capacity. In 1974, a nuclear device was tested – code-named Smiling Buddha – a move condemned by the international community. The US imposed sanctions although India did not move at this stage to the production of nuclear weapons. However, in 1998, India conducted further nuclear tests and announced its nuclear doctrine of ‘credible minimum deterrence’, based on ‘retaliation only’. Pakistan started to develop nuclear weapons in 1972 in response to India’s developing nuclear weapons programme and after its defeat by India and the subsequent gaining of independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in the Indo- Pakistani War of 1971. The programme was stepped up after India’s Smiling Buddha test in 1974. By the 1980s, it is believed Islamabad had developed the technology sufficiently to produce a nuclear weapon. After India’s 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan itself carried out a nuclear test. Nuclear Weapon States India formally declared itself a nuclear weapon state in 1998, after two rounds of nuclear tests. A month later, Pakistan retaliated with similar tests and declaration, leading to fears of an escalating arms race. The country has sought to portray itself as a ‘responsible’ nuclear power, even though it is not a signatory to the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For its part, Pakistan has said that it will only sign the NPT and CTBT once India does so. Pakistan is currently blocking negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which is aimed at stopping the further production of nuclear weapon fissile material. Capabilities It is believed that India has between 90-110 nuclear warheads, which can be used with land-based or sea-based missiles as well as on aircraft. Pakistan in turn has between 100-120 warheads for delivery by aircraft and land-based missiles, though neither country has officially confirmed these figures. India does not maintain a nuclear force on high alert and maintains a no first use policy, although the government has stated it could use them in retaliation to a chemical or biological attack, or to protect Indian forces

Champion Briefs 159 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

operating in Pakistan. Islamabad, however, has refused to adopt a no first use policy and maintains it would be prepared to attack India first. It is believed though that Pakistan stores its warheads and delivery vehicles separately in times of peace. Dangerous developments While Pakistan has worked with China on developing its nuclear capacity, India has signed a cooperation agreement with the United States which allows the former to engage in international nuclear trade. India has also concluded a deal on nuclear trade with Canada and Australia. Pakistan has been developing nuclear-capable short-range missiles that appear to be intended for a tactical nuclear attack. This is likely in part to be because of Pakistan’s need to counter India’s growing missile defence system. Concerns have been raised that these nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists operating in the region, as Pakistan is affected by violent Islamist militancy. Conclusion Both India and Pakistan are believed to be modernising and expanding their nuclear weapons arsenals, actions which threaten regional and international peace. While relations between the two countries seem to be gradually improving, the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used in a possible future conflict causes deep unease. India and Pakistan should stop making new nuclear weapons and get rid of the ones they do have. This, alongside becoming non-nuclear signatories of the NPT and CTBT, would be a huge step forward for the security of both countries and for the international community as a whole.

Champion Briefs 160 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence may have worked for the US and Russia, but they didn't share a border. India and Pakistan do, and nuclear use is especially likely as they clash over their border.

Talmadge, Caitlin. "Are Nuclear Weapons Keeping The India-Pakistan Crisis From Escalating—or Making It More Dangerous?." Brookings Institution. March 08, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . The historical record from the Cold War is mixed. Many credit nuclear weapons with keeping the Cold War cold. But the United States and the Soviet Union did have several near-misses— most notably the crises over Berlin from 1958-1961, and in 1962. The two superpowers also fought bloody proxy wars in places as varied as Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East. U.S. and Soviet policymakers profoundly feared nuclear escalation, worried that any conflict could get out of control and devastate both nations. But both sides also tried, at times, to exploit these fears to gain bargaining advantages on issues they really cared about, hoping that the other side might back down. At other times, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. believed that they could safely skirmish through proxies without risking nuclear catastrophe. Usually they were right, although sometimes, such as in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, conventional conflict came closer to the nuclear threshold than expected. Further, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sought various ways to escape from MAD’s limitations. Both pursued military capabilities that could threaten the other’s nuclear forces (not just its cities) and could shield their homelands. As political scientists Austin Long and Brendan Green have shown, the U.S. did this more successfully. But it still never felt confident that it could strike the Soviets without risking devastating retaliation. The U.S. capabilities alarmed the Soviets, however, who believed the U.S. was preparing for attack. This fear could have made crises or wars much more dangerous. Nuclear weapons have a similarly double-edged effect in the India-Pakistan relationship today. India and Pakistan fought three conventional wars—in 1947, 1965, and 1971—before acquiring nuclear weapons. Though they’ve fought one war and had several crises since 1998, all have been smaller in scale. This is probably not a coincidence, as political scientists Devin Hagerty and Sumit Ganguly have argued. Related Books S Status of WTO Legal Instruments – 2019 Edition By World Trade Organization WTO and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD 2019 Tariff Negotiation and Renegotiation By Anwarul Hoda 2018 Competition Policy, Intellectual Property Rights and Trade in an Interdependent World Economy By Robert D. Anderson, Nuno Pires De Carvalho, and Antony Taubman 2018 Nevertheless, the recent crisis shows that even if both sides have robust nuclear arsenals, governments don’t necessarily maintain the status quo—especially when there are poorly controlled militants operating in a border area that both sides consider vital. Just as in the Cold

Champion Briefs 161 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

War, India and Pakistan may try to use the risk of escalation to get the upper hand, hoping the other side will back down. So while it’s true that the fear of nuclear escalation may reduce wars and crises, nuclear weapons also could make such events more dangerous if they happen. Like the superpowers, India and Pakistan may also believe that they can sometimes operate safely below a conventional-nuclear firebreak. But if they disagree on where that threshold lies, all bets are off, as Paul Kapur has emphasized. This sort of thinking is especially worrisome given that India, like the Cold War U.S., may be trying to escape MAD. According to political scientists Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, India is considering developing forces that could attack Pakistan’s nuclear weapons preemptively. If India believes it has this capability, it might try to strike first if it believed Pakistan were poised to use nuclear weapons. But if Pakistan believed India believed that, then of course Pakistan really would have incentives to go first. This is the stuff of nuclear nightmares, especially with the U.S. government sitting on the sidelines. Worse, unlike the U.S. and U.S.S.R., India and Pakistan share a border—and their citizens may be pushing harder for escalation.

Champion Briefs 162 AFF: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Pakistan's conventional deterrence is actually robust now, but the buildup of both conventional AND nuclear forces risks miscalc.

Gady, Franz-Stephan. "Is The Indian Military Capable Of Executing The Cold Start Doctrine?." The Diplomat. January 29, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . Pakistan has taken the threat of CSD seriously, building up its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal on the one hand and shoring up its conventional military response on the other. In response to CSD, the Pakistan military has also adopted a so-called New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF) in order to improve interservice coordination and reduce the mobilization time for the Pakistan Army. Some Indian analysts worry that Pakistan at this stage can mobilize faster than India as a result of NCWF. This assessment is in line with a recent analysis that argues that Pakistan’s conventional military deterrence is more robust than commonly assumed. Should Pakistan indeed be capable of mobilizing its conventional military forces faster than India, the principal purpose behind Cold Start — deploying overwhelming conventional forces across the Pakistani border before the Pakistani military could exploit its defensive and geographical advantage — would be void. It would call into question the whole rationale behind the Indian military leadership’s embrace of a doctrine that not only apparently fuels the buildup of Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear forces, but also ups the chances of political and military miscalculations on both sides in the event of a major crisis.

Champion Briefs 163 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

The plan’s talks will fall apart---Pakistan will couple nuclear disarmament with the demand for ending conventional imbalances--- India will refuse to comply.

Nayyar, A.H. "A Pakistani Perspective On Nuclear Disarmament And Non-proliferation." FES Islamabad. 2008. Web. December 09, 2019. . 9 Pakistan and the nuclear weapons free world Pakistan has always expressed concerns about the asymmetry in military capacity between India and itself. It regards its nuclear weapons as a means to offset asymmetry in conventional weapons. Thus, beyond nuclear disarmament, Pakistan also wants to balance conventional forces. In a recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan laid out its security concerns and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations: • a commitment by all states to complete verifiable nuclear disarmament; • eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime; • normalize the relationship of the three exNPT nuclear weapon states with NPT;. • address new issues like access to WMD by non-state actors; • non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; • universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security assurances to nonnuclear weapon states; • a need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of ABM systems; • strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarization of outer space, including development of ASATs; • tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional weapons; • revitalize the UN disarmament machinery to address international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges; The altruism expressed in the demands aside, this list belies a fear of remaining in a disadvantaged position when a treaty like FMCT comes into effect. One can also discern a desire to offset the disadvantage by buying time to amass a sizeable nuclear arsenal, and also a need to keep nuclear weapons as equalizer in the face of an adversary with an overwhelming conventional force. 10 Conclusions Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international forums like the Conference on Disarmament that it will give up its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states do so, and when disarmament is universal and verifiable. It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part. Although Pakistan has repeatedly offered a regional nuclear disarmament option to India, the offer is inconsistent with the position it has taken in respect of asymmetries in conventional defence and is largely meant to cast Pakistan in a favourable light. Pakistan has a deep fear of the overwhelming superiority that India enjoys in conventional forces. The differential between the conventional forces of the two countries has increased over the decades. Pakistan now regards its nuclear weapons as a deterrent not just against an Indian nuclear attack, but also against a conventional one. Reflecting this fear, Pakistan has started to club together nuclear disarmament with a demand of removal of asymmetries in conventional forces. If this linkage

Champion Briefs 164 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

continues, then it is likely that Pakistan will continue to hinder progress in negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Champion Briefs 165 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Successful elimination for India and Pakistan depends upon normalizing the security relationship first.

Perkovich, George. "Establishing Political Conditions To Enhance The Feasibility Of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . There is some cause for optimism that the Kashmir and Taiwan impediments to nuclear disarmament could be removed in the coming years. India and Pakistan have recently worked to stabilise their relations and identify ways to pacify, if not resolve, the Kashmir dispute. India has traditionally been more prepared to formally accept the status quo in Kashmir than has Pakistan. But the new military leadership of Pakistan under Army Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Kiyani shows signs of recognising that the country’s greatest security imperative is to combat the operation of those prosecuting terrorism and violence against the state and civilians. This is related to the problem of extending central governance to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and stabilising the porous border between these areas and Afghanistan. To the extent that the Pakistani Army and security services concentrate their activities on addressing these largely internal challenges and diminish the historic obsession with confronting India in Kashmir, Indo-Pakistani relations could be normalised, and a formal peace negotiated. Such an outcome is far from clear, but its prospect is better than it has been in decades. As and when the two South Asian powers formally stabilise their security relationship, the possibility of their negotiating nuclear-arms control and further confidence-building measures will become real.

Champion Briefs 166 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Talks will fall through because of Pakistan's concerns with India's conventional superiority.

Perkovich, George. "Establishing Political Conditions To Enhance The Feasibility Of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . In South Asia, the appearance of a strategic partnership between the US and India, including on ballistic-missile defence, advanced conventional weaponry and civilian space and , affects the calculations of Pakistan and China. Even without US backing, India’s growing conventional military advantages induce Pakistan to place higher value on nuclear deterrence. Pakistan would probably seek limits on Indian conventional power before it would agree to reduce its nuclear arsenal. India, in turn, would point to its need to balance both Pakistani and Chinese military power, greatly complicating the task of both nuclear and conventional arms control.

Champion Briefs 167 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

India and Pakistan will not fight a nuclear war.

Sehgal, Rashme. "'India-Pakistan Nuke War Not A Realistic Possibilty', Says Leading Nuclear Expert Ramamurti Rajarama." Firstpost. 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Q: The conflict between India and Pakistan has intensified in the last three years. If the situation worsens, is there a likelihood that India could launch a pre-emptive first strike against Pakistan if it feared an imminent nuclear strike? Of course, this could mean a marked reversal of our no- first use (NFU) policy. On the other hand, if India goes in for more surgical strikes, can Pakistan use a conventional attack as a pretext to attack India? A: The conflict between India and Pakistan during the past three years has been limited to Jammu and Kashmir. These conflicts may continue and may also occasionally intensify. There may also be a lot of heated rhetoric from both sides. But I don’t think there is any realistic possibility of those conflicts developing into a full-scale war, let alone one with any serious chances of a nuclear strike by Pakistan. Notice that there has been no mainland attack by Pakistan based terrorists since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. I feel that this is because Pakistan military and its Inter-Services Intelligence do appreciate the fact that the next time there is an attack of that magnitude, India would have to retaliate in a serious manner. It is true that the Pakistan Army maintains a hostile posture towards India as a matter of policy. But that is done largely for domestic consumption and for maintaining its pre-eminence in the Pakistani power structure. If push comes to shove, the leadership in both countries are too responsible to let matters go anywhere near a nuclear threshold. So, there is no question of India conducting a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan in anticipation of a nuclear attack from them. I don’t think India will reverse its NFU policy, even though some analysts, for the want of anything better to write about, keep harping on it. That would be a very unwise thing to do diplomatically.

Champion Briefs 168 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

India and Pakistan won't fight a nuclear war, and Indian nuclear weapons are conducive for stability.

Karnad, Bharat. "Why Concerns About An India-Pakistan Nuclear War Are Highly Exaggerated." Hindustan Times. March 31, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . However, certain developments in the nuclear weapons sphere do indeed make possible an Indian first strike. Such as the ongoing process of canisterising Agni missiles, including presumably the 700-km range Agni I meant for the Pakistan and Tibet-Chengdu contingencies. It, in fact, provides the country not only with a capability for launch-on-warning but also for striking pre-emptively should reliable intelligence reveal an adversary’s decision to mount a surprise attack. Nuclear missiles in hermetically sealed canisters are ready-to-fire weapons and signal an instantaneous retaliatory punch to strongly deter nuclear adventurism. Thus, all nuclear weapon states keep a part of their strategic forces in ready state, there being no guarantees that a confrontation or conflict with another nuclear power will keep to a sub- nuclear script. Having the wherewithal for pre-emptive action and launch-on-warning then is only a reasonable precaution. Whatever their capabilities to fight nuclear wars, the chances of either India or Pakistan initiating a nuclear exchange for any reason are remote for the very good reason that western governments and analysts rarely acknowledge, because most of them are unaware or wilfully ignore the social context of India-Pakistan tensions, namely, the fact, whether anybody likes it or not, of these South Asian countries being organically linked.

Champion Briefs 169 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

Neither India nor Pakistan want to escalate, despite rhetoric.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "Escalate To Deter The Pakistan Army." Observer Research Foundation. May 05, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . India's reluctance to escalate so far is surprising for two reasons. One is that, logically, it is the stronger state that has the option to escalate. India's conventional military superiority may not be as great as it should be given that India's GDP is almost eight times as large as Pakistan's and India’s military budget is about seven times larger but it is clearly the stronger side in the equation. And in a short offensive with specific territorial targets (such as the Haji Pir pass, for example), India's current superiority should be sufficient, especially since India should be able to gain tactical surprise. The Pakistan army may know that India is gearing up for an attack along the LoC, but it will not know where that attack might come. In short, the stronger side has more options, and a bigger margin for error, and India needs to recognise it. The second is that despite all the rhetoric about Pakistan's propensity to escalate, Rawalpindi has repeatedly chosen not to escalate. In Kargil, when India employed its air force, Pakistan complained and warned of escalation dangers but chose not to escalate. And the Pakistan army simply abandoned its Northern Light (NLI) troops. Similarly, in 2016, India's surgical strike did not lead to any escalation by the Pakistan army, despite almost two decades of constant threats to escalate. In between, there have been repeated artillery duels and cross-LoC raids, not one of which the Pakistan army escalated. If the Pakistan army was really so trigger-happy to escalate, it has had plenty of opportunity. That it has not so far escalated suggests that Pakistan army leadership knows that it will face significant and disproportionate cost if it escalated. Indian military superiority might not be great enough to give it an easy win over Pakistan, but it is difficult to imagine Pakistan winning either. This is the key issue. To the extent that Pakistan cannot win, there is little incentive for the Pakistan army to escalate. Much of the argument about escalation between India and Pakistan is based on the assumption that the Pakistan army will climb all these steps on the ladder, doubling-down on a losing bet until escalation reaches the nuclear level. But each of these steps represent an expensive and irrational gamble, and the Pakistani army leadership is not irrational. They have made bad bets — Operation Grand Slam and Kargil definitely were — but they have shown no propensity to double down when their initial gamble failed. Rather, they have usually chosen to walk away and find another game to play. Pakistan army's behaviour is perfectly rational: as is well-recognised, its domestic legitimacy is built on its role as defender of the Islamic Republic against India. If it cannot perform this basic duty, its domestic legitimacy will suffer, as will its outsized role in national politics, economy and society. It is not without reason that Pakistan disowned the NLI troops in the Kargil war or refused to acknowledge that India had conducted a retaliatory strike last year. More than anything else, the Pakistan army fears defeat at Indian hands. Despite its rhetoric, it fears escalation because escalation carries with it the very real possibility of a just such serious defeat. Much like a war , Pakistan's threats are designed to intimidate but are not actual predictors of behaviour. It is this fear of escalation, which the Pakistan army has masked

Champion Briefs 170 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

behind bombastic threats, that India needs to exploit. It gives India a clear deterrence leverage. But it also requires India to look to the actual behaviour of the Pakistan army leadership rather than assume that Rawalpindi's rhetoric is an indicator of how they will behave.

Champion Briefs 171 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

India's not truly capable of implementing the Cold Start doctrine.

Gady, Franz-Stephan. "Is The Indian Military Capable Of Executing The Cold Start Doctrine?." The Diplomat. January 29, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . Notably, there is very little public evidence that the Indian Army is capable of executing CSD in the event of a new military confrontation between India and Pakistan at the moment or in the near future. Next to the ambivalent results of a number of Indian war games practicing various aspects of CSD in the last years, a cursory look at Indian military hardware reveals major deficiencies and capability gaps that would hinder the current execution of large-scale offensive operations against Pakistan. For example, the Indian Army still lacks a sufficient number of operational modern main battle tanks (MBT), in particular T-90SMs, the most advanced version of the T-90. Also, the majority of indigenously developed third generation Arjun MK-I main battle tanks are currently grounded due to various technical problems and missing spare parts. An upgraded version of the Arjun is currently under development but it is unclear when it will become operational. Furthermore, the Indian Army lacks self-propelled tracked howitzers for close artillery support. Only in May 2017 did the Indian Ministry of Defense decide to go ahead with the purchase of the first batch of 100 modified K-9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber guns. Overall, the Indian Army will need at least 250 self-propelled guns for its strike corps. (The Indian Army took delivery of the first batch of ten K-9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber self-propelled tracked howitzers in late 2018.) In addition, the army lacks advanced mobile air defense systems to cover the advance of armored forces. For example India will only begin receiving its first out of five regimental sets of Russian-made Almaz-Antei S-400 Triumf air defense systems (NATO reporting name: SA-21 Growler) in October 2020. Even more critically, the Indian military has been suffering from a chronic ammunition shortage for the past two decades. Current ammunition levels would only last for about 10 days of high intensity war. The Indian Ministry of Defense has taken steps to address this problem, by, for example, purchasing 66,000 anti- tank shells from Russia in 2014, but new ammunition is only slowly trickling in to replenish depleted stocks. The Indian Army continues to lack 68,000 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) of various types and around 850 launchers. “The Indian Army is looking for stopgap measures to quickly address this capability gap by inducting new ATGM systems as quickly as possible,” I wrote elsewhere. “The service is reportedly pushing for a fast-track procurement of 2,500 third- generation shoulder-fired ATGMs and 96 launchers through a government-government contract.” The ATGM capability gap, however, is expected to persist at least until 2022. Additionally, the Indian Air Force currently lacks the close-air support capability necessary for swift armored thrusts into Pakistani territory. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) Light Combat Helicopter only completed weapons trials this month. The interservice rivalry, partially influenced by the fact that CSD has been developed by the Indian Army, has also made integration and synchronization of air-ground operations challenging (air assets of the Indian Navy only play a minor role in CSD). For example, the Indian Air Force insists that its principal

Champion Briefs 172 A/2: India/Pakistan AC Jan/Feb 2020

mission remains air-to-air combat and strategic bombing, which has caused consternation between the former and the Indian Army Air Corps. “For a number of years, the Indian Army has been engaged in a tug of war with the Indian Air Force over who should operate [a] future fleet of Apache gunships,” I explained. “The Army initially asked for the gunships to be inducted into its ranks, or for the Air Force to at least share the helicopters with the ground forces.” Joint-service warfare as required by CSD also mandates a network-centric warfare capability, that is the ability coordinate geographically dispersed forces, including unnamed aerial vehicles and satellites, with advanced communications technology in a timely manner. However, the Indian military is only slowly building up a robust capability in this field. Indian reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities would also currently not be able to support a full-scale and swift implementation of CSD. Next to the low operational readiness rate of most Indian military hardware and the lack of modern equipment, the perhaps most glaring deficiency is the lack of thousands of trained military officers. The Indian Army alone is short of 7,300 officers, according to the Indian government. Looking at all of these deficiency and gaps, it is perhaps then not unfair to conclude that CSD is still in an experimental phase and remains a “mixture of myth and reality,” as a leaked 2010 assessment by the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi put it. Yet India’s opponent apparently cannot take comfort in that assessment.

Champion Briefs 173 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: Uranium Mining AC

This case argues that nuclear weapons are rooted in a legacy of violence, dispossession, and exploitation against indigenous people. Nuclear weapons since their inception have required uranium mining to extract the raw material for the bomb, and this development has taken place on indigenous land to the detriment of communities’ health. The same kinds of systemic harms have been observed in nuclear testing, such as the tests by the United States from 1946 to 1958. This degradation of indigenous lands is not unique to the US, however, as evidence in this brief confirms that every nuclear state has harmed marginalized communities via testing and mining. The framework for this case would either use the principle of “environmental justice,” which focuses on the disproportionate effects of pollution on vulnerable populations, or argue for a full-fledged critique of settler colonialism. The contentions would establish the harm areas described above, and argue that only nuclear disarmament can provide redress for indigenous people. Native communities have participated in grassroots anti-nuclear conferences articulating this idea, and the currently-drafted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has provisions for the remediation (cleaning up) of abandoned uranium mines and acknowledgement of natives’ suffering at the hands of nuclear weapons. From a Negative perspective, you could argue from a variety of angles: (1) The abolition of nuclear weapons is a colonial measure to prevent poorer countries from protecting themselves against great powers like the US or China, (2) Efforts like remediation and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can solve the Affirmative’s impacts without abolishing nuclear weapons, and/or (3) the environmental justice movement can’t resolve the original problem of land rights.

Champion Briefs 174 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Uranium mining for nuclear weapons is a public health disaster.

Dewar, Dale. "Uranium Mining And Health." Canadian Family Physician 59(5). May, 2013. Web. December 12, 2019. . Conclusion Uranium mining has widespread effects, contaminating the environment with radioactive dust, radon gas, water-borne toxins, and increased levels of background radiation. Uranium mining is the first step in the generation of both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Nuclear power plants produce routine radioactive emissions in air and water, produce nuclear waste, and create conditions for disasters similar to Chernobyl and Fukushima. Physicians should be concerned about the health effects of the uranium continuum. As advocates for the health of our patients, we have a duty to advocate for an environment free of radioactive waste and to insist on representation in environmental and policy decision making in cases in which health might be affected. We should press for baseline health studies at future uranium mining sites. We should be demanding independently funded research on the effects of uranium—and the effects of all radionuclides—on health. There are no boundaries for air and water; the addition of long-lived radioisotopes anywhere in the environment eventually affects the health of everyone.

Champion Briefs 175 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Disarmament is key---the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires parties to redress the suffering that indigenous people faced due to mining and testing.

Urwin, Jessica. "Uranium Mines Harm Indigenous People – So Why Have We Approved A New One?." The Conversation. May 01, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . But even in the face of significant complaints, mining applications are more often than not approved. This has led to people mobilising internationally. And in 2017, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) negotiated with the United Nations to create a treaty banning nuclear weapons. The treaty, adopted on July 7, 2017, recognised the disproportionate impact nuclear material has on Indigenous communities around the world. It includes the mining and milling of uranium. The treaty warns that parties should be: mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons, [and recognise] the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples.

Champion Briefs 176 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

The nuclear-industrial complex has disproportionately harmed indigenous people through uranium mining and nuclear testing.

Healey, Laicie. "To Make And Maintain America's Nukes, Some Communities Pay The Price." PRI. January 30, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . But communities around the uranium mines and test sites needed for the production of nuclear weapons — places which are often socio-economically disadvantaged already — have been especially impacted by the health and environmental costs of nuclear weapons production. The Navajo Nation is just one example — where cancer rates doubled from the 1970s to the 1990s due to the impacts of testing, mining and milling in the southwestern US. Mining companies extracted millions of tons of uranium between 1944 and 1986. At the time, Navajo children played in mine debris piles and pools, and livestock drank contaminated water. Some homes were even built with materials from uranium mines and mills. But, some of these issues are still ongoing. While only a handful of active uranium mines remain in the US, more than 160,000 have been abandoned — and thousands of those abandoned mines continue to pollute nearby water supplies. As recently as 2016, the CDC reported that babies are still being born to Navajo parents with traces of uranium in their urine. A second example is the Marshall Islands. Sixty- seven weapons were detonated on Enewetak Atoll and Bikini Atoll between 1946 and 1958. And, despite resettlement efforts, radiation levels in parts of that country are still almost double what has been deemed safe for human habitation. Runit Dome, on Enewetak Atoll, serves as a living reminder of US nuclear testing that continues to threaten the islands today. The 18-inch concrete cap covers 111,000 cubic yards of radioactive debris left behind after 12 years of nuclear tests. Today, scientists fear the effects of climate change could damage the dome, releasing its contents into the ocean. The lands of some indigenous communities still house nuclear waste today. Tribes play host to this waste because their reservations are not subject to the same environmental and health standards as US land. “In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery,” Bayley Lopez of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation told Scientific American, citing examples of companies taking advantage of the “overwhelming poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.” Whether this characterization and those like it are fair, it's an unfortunate fact that the people who live near the hallmarks of the US nuclear industrial complex — like test sites in Nevada and the Marshall Islands, mines in the western half of the US, and the indigenous communities that still house nuclear waste today — have been disproportionately affected by the cost of what it takes to keep the rest of us safe.

Champion Briefs 177 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

The Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Summit confirmed that nuclear weapons development was harming indigenous people.

, Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Summit. "Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Summit Declaration.". September 05, 1996. Web. December 12, 2019. . We, the Indigenous Peoples gathered here for this summit, standing in defense and protection of our Mother Earth and all our relations, do hereby unanimously express our total opposition to the nuclear power and weapons chain and its devastating impacts and deadly effects on our communities. The Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Summit brought together a network of Indigenous Peoples from different areas of Mother Earth that are negatively impacted by the nuclear chain. These impacted areas of the nuclear chain include: Uranium mining in the Grants Mineral Belt, that has had devastating health and environmental impacts on Navajo and Pueblo peoples in New Mexico; The uranium mining industry has actively targeted northern Saskatchewan where the mining exploration process has already had negative implications on the culture of Chipewyan, Metis, Dene, Blood, and other Indigenous Peoples in the region; Conversion fuel fabrication, and enrichment have impacted Indigenous Peoples in Oklahoma who live near the Sequoyah Fuels Uranium Processing Plant, and among Indigenous people, whose way of life depends upon the Columbia River where Hanford Nuclear Reservation is located (Washington/Oregon); Power plant operation at the Prairie Island Power Plant has manufactured deadly waste impacting the Mdewankanton Dakota; and Storage has been a tool of divide and conquer among Indigenous Nations targeted for the United States Department o Energy’s Monitored Retrievable Storage proposals. Although we are varied in language and beliefs, we have the common ground of being Indigenous Peoples who have no desire to give up the traditional laws that the Creator gave us and accept the deadly, unsustainable ways the colonists have tried to force upon us. We are not asking anyone else to accept our ways, however, we are exercising our right to live our sustainable lifestyles in our own lands. The nuclear industry which has waged an undeclared war has poisoned our communities worldwide. For more that 50-years, the legacy of the nuclear chain, from exploration to waste has been proven, through documentation, to be genocidal and ethnocidal and a most deadly enemy of Indigenous Peoples. United States federal law and nuclear policy has not protected Indigenous Peoples, and in fact has been created to allow the nuclear industry to continue operations at the expense of our land, territory, health and traditional ways of life. This system of genocidal and ethnocidal policies and practices has brought our people to the brink of extinction and amongst some Indigenous Peoples it is believed that if they die, all life on Earth will stop. Therefore, we demand an immediate stop to these crimes against our peoples, communities and future generations by the nuclear industry, their stockholders, and nuclear governments including the United States, Japan, France, Canada and China. We demand all levels of governments, including tribal, state, national and international, to do whatever

Champion Briefs 178 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

possible to stop all uranium exploration, mining, milling, conversion, testing, research, weapons and other military production, use, and waste disposals onto and into Mother Earth.

Champion Briefs 179 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Since their inception, nuclear weapons have relied on uranium mining that disproportionately violates the lives and health of indigenous communities.

Wilson, Ward. "The Human Cost." Outrider Foundation. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . To make nuclear weapons, you need to mine uranium. Uranium mines are dangerous for the workers digging out the radioactive substance, and for people living nearby. The history of uranium mining is rife with exploitation: time and again, communities native to uranium-rich areas have suffered from the effects of mining without sharing in the profits. Work Camps in the Congo A lot of the uranium that fueled the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs came from the Congo. When the Belgians colonized the Congo in the 1870s, they discovered a wealth of natural resources and minerals. They converted much of the land into mines and forced the native Congolese to live in work camps and mine their own land. Shinkolobwe was the major uranium mine in the Congo. A 1943 U.S. intelligence report called it “the most important deposit of uranium yet discovered in the world” because the uranium it yielded was so pure. At Shinkolobwe, few precautions were taken to protect laborers from the radioactive materials they handled, and they were paid next to nothing. The United States stopped sourcing uranium from Shinkolobwe in 1960. But deformities, birth defects, and severe illness from uranium exposure still happen today in the community around the mine. Exploitation in Navajo Country Uranium mines in the United States have an equally dark history. Large deposits of uranium lie beneath the American West in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. Many of these deposits are in the Colorado Plateau, home of many indigenous communities, including the Navajo. Between 1944 and 1986, 30 million tons of uranium ore were mined on Navajo land. Most of the miners were Navajo men, paid minimum wage or less to dig uranium out of their land. Unaware of the dangers of uranium, many brought their families with them and settled near the mine. When they came home from work, radioactive debris came home with them. Their children played in radioactive waste piles. When the US accelerated its uranium exploration in the 1950s, many mining companies switched from underground mining to open-pit mining, which is more environmentally violent and makes the land more susceptible to contamination. Uranium mining also complicated the land rights of indigenous communities in the region, since it opened the land to industry and private prospectors. Though the U.S. government knew well the dangers of uranium mining, the workers were not warned and were not given protective equipment that would have mitigated the risk. Between the 1970s and 1990s, cancer rates doubled in the Navajo Nation. Studies showed that 27% of the Navajo people had high levels of radioactive uranium in their body—five times higher than the U.S. average. Some Navajo babies were born with uranium already in their systems. In 1990, the U.S. government admitted responsibility for the mistreatment of uranium miners and paid compensation to miners with diseases related to their mining work. Today, more than 500 abandoned uranium mines remain

Champion Briefs 180 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

on Navajo tribal lands—land that is still contaminated. The Environmental Protection Agency is still trying to clean up the area.

Champion Briefs 181 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Compensation programs fail---only nuclear disarmament can ensure that more marginalized people's lives aren't sacrificed for such destructive weapons.

Wilson, Ward. "The Human Cost." Outrider Foundation. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . In 2000, the federal government implemented the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program. Ostensibly, the program helps employees at plants like Pantex pay for medical treatment. But there are often extended delays in payment, and some claimants have argued that the government is purposely delaying paying benefits until after the sick nuclear worker has died. Paying a death benefit is cheaper than paying for extensive, ongoing medical bills. IV At what cost? To this day, the U.S. government puts people’s lives at risk to build and maintain nuclear weapons. Is it worth it? Their goal is to build the most powerful, most advanced, and widest variety of nuclear weapons. They do it in the name of national security. But strategists admit that nuclear weapons really only serve one purpose: to prevent other countries from using their nuclear weapons against us. From what we now know, it’s not clear that an expansive arsenal of nuclear weapons—and the casualties incurred in its pursuit—has ever been necessary. History shows us that it’s rarely the people calling the shots who are put in harm’s way. It’s the ordinary working people, the politically powerless, and the marginalized that suffer for our nuclear arsenal. If we don’t move decisively towards disarmament, more lives will be put on the line for the sake of weapons we hope never to use.

Champion Briefs 182 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons impose concrete suffering and harm on indigenous people. The TPNW, or Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, embeds disarmament within humanitarian principles.

Rietiker, Daniel. "Wind Of Change In Nuclear Disarmament: The Treaty On The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons As A New Exa." Suffolk University Law Review Online. 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Human rights law particularly recognizes the special vulnerability of certain groups that are in need higher protection, as evidenced by the special treaties in their favor.26 The TPNW reflects these protections. The preamble stresses the unspeakable human suffering of victims of the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 (so-called “hibakusha”) and the testing of such weapons, thereby singling out the special vulnerability of female individuals of all ages and indigenous people.27 The internationally community further recognizes that armed conflict, in general, and the radiation from nuclear weapons, in particular, impact those groups disproportionally.28 For indigenous people, the treaty mentions two aspects of nuclear weapon use on this group–namely their special relationship to their lands that is heavily affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons and the impact of such testing on the physical and mental health of those people. Regarding the first aspect, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed, on several occasions, the special relationship between indigenous peoples and their traditionally owned lands that goes much beyond both a modern and Western concept of possession, ownership, and production: The culture of the members of the indigenous communities corresponds to a specific way of life, of being, seeing and acting in the world, constituted on the basis of their close relationship with their traditional lands and natural resources, not only because these are their main means of subsistence, but also because they are an integral element of their cosmology, their spirituality and, consequently, their cultural identity.29 For instance, the United States carried out sixty-seven nuclear tests on the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958, most of them at the Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. The total explosive yield was approximatively 100 megatons, the equivalent to more than 7000 Hiroshima bombs.30 These tests displaced the indigenous people of the Marshall Islands, disconnecting them from their lands and their cultural and indigenous way of living. Laurence Carucci, a professor of anthropology, testifying before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal: [The] Enewetak people were distraught, heartbroken, and in general state of mental and emotional trauma when they were forced to leave their homeland. Their very embeddedness in a place in the world, the very process through which the community had scratched their being into the physical contours of the earth, and the historied place that gave them a sense of meaningful connection with their communal past, were gone.31 Regarding the impact of nuclear testing on the health of indigenous peoples, the tests caused hundreds of additional cancer cases in the Marshall Islands, and provoked psychological trauma in the local population when they

Champion Briefs 183 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

witnessed the explosions and were forced to relocate for their physical protection. A UN report details this impact.32 Additionally, Calin Georgescu, who undertook a mission to the Marshall Islands to study and report on the lasting effect of the nuclear tests, stressed the compelling testimony of survivors of the tests about their psychological trauma from witnessing explosions; the local population’s increased stress and anxiety due to the nuclear tests are legitimate and serious health concerns.33 It is therefore only fair to mention the special vulnerability of indigenous peoples in the new treaty, which prohibits the use and testing of nuclear weapons and imposes the duty to assist victims of these activities. V. CONCLUSION The TPNW will create momentum for nuclear disarmament, increase the pressure on states possessing nuclear weapons, bring the debate positively at the forefront of international relations and constitute a new tool for civil society to push disarmament forward. The TPNW exemplifies the trend towards a humanitarian approach to arms control, catalyzed by the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions because the treaty provides the first example within the domain of nuclear weapons. This new treaty links arms control and human rights and, by placing the victims of use and testing of nuclear weapons at the center, illustrates that nuclear weapons inflict concrete suffering and harm. Maybe the new instrument will trigger debate and stimulate ideas on how to better address past injustice and discrimination caused to certain groups of people by the use and testing of nuclear weapons, in particular indigenous peoples. As usual in international relations, the treaty’s success and impact will depend on the good faith of states parties in the implementation of the TPNW, in particular regarding the clauses on victim assistance and environmental remediation. It is hoped that the states will honor their commitments and engage with the same enthusiasm and spirit of cooperation as shown during the preparatory phase.

Champion Briefs 184 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are primarily held by Western powers, and every nuclear state has tested on sites of indigenous communities who were subsequently harmed.

Fihn, Beatrice. "Beatrice Fihn: “As Long As We Have Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear War Will Always Be An Option.” Equal Times. September 16, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . Take the US, for example. There is no country that needs nuclear weapons less than the US. It is by far the biggest military power in the world. So, what we are really talking about here is the power to destroy everything very, very quickly, and to say: “I should have the power but you shouldn’t”. If you say that we should all have nuclear weapons – which I disagree with, of course – then at least that would be logical. But if you say that it is very important that the US should have these weapons to protect itself but that North Korea or Iran can’t have them, that’s hypocritical, and it comes from this idea that there are some governments that are better than others. That with these arms some governments are more reasonable and more restrained and responsible than others, and if you look at the countries that have nuclear weapons, it is mainly western governments. Some of the decision-making around South Africa giving up its nuclear programme [in 1989], was because it was at the end of the apartheid regime, and things were going to change. It is on the record that the apartheid regime did not want a black government to have nuclear weapons. Also, if you look at the nuclear testing. Where did all these countries test their weapons? They tested them on their colonies, on the land of indigenous people – not outside Paris, or in the suburbs where the rich elites live. Every nuclear armed state has tested its weapons on communities that are not adequately represented, and the legacy of that is still harmful.

Champion Briefs 185 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Techno-strategic scenarios for nuclear war mask the ongoing nuclear war against the Fourth World indigenous nations, carried out by nuclear testing.

Kato, Masahide. "Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, And Nuclear War Via The Strategic Gaze." Alternatives 18. 1993. Web. December 12, 2019. . Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth.28 The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192 times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times).29 The primary targets of warfare ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times).30 Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations.Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the

Champion Briefs 186 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's Nuclear Playground, which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere … were global in effect The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself. Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkable study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive /obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis. *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 187 AFF: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Perm, do the counterplan. The CTBT is a catalyst for nuclear disarmament.

, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Or. "COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN-TREATY (CTBT) PLAYS KEY ROLE IN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMA.". 2007. Web. December 12, 2019. . CTBT as catalyst for nuclear disarmament Tibor Tóth, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, stressed the character of the CTBT as a catalyst for nuclear disarmament and asserted that the Treaty provides a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing, thereby curbing the development of new types and designs of weapons. Tóth told participants that the Treaty is an example of democratic and transparent verification and a strong confidence- and security-building measure among nuclear-weapon States as well as in regional contexts.

Champion Briefs 188 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Indigenous and colonized people have to participate in the process of disarmament for it to adequately rectify the damages done.

Abolition 2000 Conference. "Moorea Declaration.". January 25, 1997. Web. December 12, 2019. . This conference reaffirms the commitments and the vision of the Abolition 2000 Founding Statement initiated in 1995 – the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombing of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – to work for the definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons, and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty two years of nuclear weapons usage, testing, and production. However, this meeting, held in Te Ao Maohi a year after the end of French nuclear testing, has highlighted the particular suffering of indigenous and colonised peoples as a result of the production and testing of nuclear weapons. The anger and tears of colonised peoples arise from the fact that there was no consultation, no consent, no involvement in the decision when their lands, air and waters were taken for the nuclear build-up, form the very start of the nuclear era. Colonised and indigenous peoples have, in the large part, borne the brunt of this nuclear devastation – from the mining of uranium and the testing of nuclear weapons on indigenous peoples land, to the dumping, storage and transport of plutonium and nuclear wastes, and the theft of land for nuclear infrastructure. The founding statement of Abolition 2000 states that “the participation of citizens and NGO’s in planning and monitoring the abolition of nuclear weapons is vital.” We reaffirm this, in spirit and action, but also state that indigenous and colonised peoples must be central to this process. This can only happen if and when they are able to participate in decisions relating to the nuclear weapons cycle – and especially in the abolition of nuclear weapons in all aspects. The inalienable right to self-determination, sovereignty and independence is crucial in allowing all peoples of the world to join in the common struggle to rid the planet forever of nuclear weapons. Therefore this conference agrees that this Moorea Declaration becomes a supplement to the Abolition 2000 Founding Statement.

Champion Briefs 189 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

The Defense Department has stopped increasing its uranium stockpile, and Congress has already responded to demands of indigenous people.

Alvarez, Robert. "Uranium Mining And The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program." Federation of American Scientists. August 04, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Moved by the stories, Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz took unilateral action in May of 1967, proposing the first federal standard to limit radiation exposures in U.S. uranium mines. It would reduce the average radon concentrations measured in the mines that year by more than three times. True-to-form, it provoked immediate opposition by the industry and the JCAE, which held 12 days of hearings in an effort to block the Labor Department. Wirtz was undeterred, arguing “ventilation is a cost item. It doesn’t belong on the same balance sheet with cancer.”38) By the late summer the standard was endorsed by the Johnson Administration, but delayed its implementation until 1971. By this time, the Department of Defense declared that its uranium stockpile goals were met and stopped purchasing uranium. Moreover, Congress authorized a cutback on acquisitions. The AEC would no longer guarantee prices for crude ore and cancelled its exploration campaigns. As a result, the demand for uranium slowed and insecurity crept over the mining industry. The United States would never again experience the enormous uranium boom brought on during the first 30 years of the nuclear arms race. Even though there was a significant body of evidence spanning decades of deliberate negligence by the U.S. government, federal courts denied claims by the miners and others exposed to radioactive fallout from Nevada nuclear weapons testing, on the grounds of sovereign immunity stating, “all the actions of various governmental agencies complained of by plaintiffs were the result of conscious policy decisions made at high government levels based on considerations of political and national security feasibility factors.”39) It took more than 20 years and a considerable amount of effort by the miners, their families, before the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act was passed in October 1990. The Act offered a formal apology for sending people into harm’s way and provided a one-time compensation to each victim in the amount of $100,000. Ten years later, Congress passed even more sweeping legislation, known as the Energy Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act. It not only provided compensation for the many thousands of nuclear weapons workers, but also expanded the benefits for uranium miners – increasing the lump sum to $150,000 per person and providing health care. Financial compensation came too little and too late. It would never be enough for an illness and death that could have been prevented. The legacy of U.S. uranium mining lingers on. More than three billion metric tons of mining and milling wastes were generated in the United States.40) Today, Navajos still live near about one third of all abandoned uranium mines in the United States (~1,200 out of 4,000).41) Only after a concerted effort by Navajo activists to spur congressional investigations in 1993 and 2006, has the U.S. government recently promised to complete

Champion Briefs 190 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

remediation of abandoned mines, nearly a century after the first uranium leases were issued on Navajo land.42)

Champion Briefs 191 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

IAEA safeguards mean that the uranium trade won't be a source of prolif.

, International Atomic Energy Agency. "Establishment Of Uranium Mining And Processing Operations In The Context Of Sustainable Development." IAEA Nuclear Energy Series. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . 5.4. INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS Due to the potential use of uranium in nuclear weapons programmes, uranium production is subject to an additional set of constraints not applied to other mineral developments. The IAEA was created to allow countries with nuclear technology to share it with other countries in return for an agreement not to use that technology for weapons development. As a result, international trade in uranium requires that parties agree to IAEA safeguards. Some countries also require bilateral agreements between the producing country and the customer country. The safeguards system requires accounting for all the uranium transferred between countries and between facilities within countries, with periodic physical inspections to verify accountability records.

Champion Briefs 192 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Counterplan: The United States federal government should fully fund remediation of abandoned uranium mines. Trump's budget cuts undermine that effort to repair the damage done to Navajo uranium miners.

Alvarez, Robert. "Native American Uranium Miners And The Trump Budget." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March 30, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . For minimum wage or less, they blasted open seams, built wooden beam supports in the mine shafts, and dug out ore pieces with picks and wheelbarrows. The shafts penetrated as deep as 1,500 feet, with little or no ventilation. The bitter-tasting dust was all pervasive, coating their teeth. They ate in the mines and drank water that dripped from the walls and, sometimes, developed chronic coughs. And much worse. Native American uranium miners were essential to the United States’ efforts to create a nuclear arsenal. From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Indian people dug up approximately four million tons of uranium ore—nearly a quarter of the total national underground production in the United States used in nuclear weapons. As they did so, they were sent into harm’s way without sufficient warning, becoming the workers most severely exposed to ionizing radiation in the US nuclear weapons complex. After more than a century, the legacy of US uranium mining lingers. More than three billion metric tons of mining and milling wastes were generated in the United States. Today, Navajos still live near about one third (approximately 1,200 out of 4,000) of all abandoned uranium mines in the United States. Only after concerted efforts by Navajo activists to spur congressional investigations in 1993 and 2006 did the US government promise to remediate abandoned mines and ascertain their health impacts. But more than a century after the government issued the first uranium mining leases on Navajo land, the Trump administration has proposed deep cuts in the Environmental Protection Agency’s budget—upward of 30 percent overall—putting that cleanup effort in peril. America’s Indian miners were never warned of the hazards of radioactivity in the mines, where they inhaled, ingested, and drank uranium dust. The water in the mines was especially dangerous; it contained high quantities of radon—a radioactive gas emanating from the ore. Radon decays into heavy, more radiotoxic isotopes, called “radon daughters,” which include isotopes of polonium, bismuth, and lead. The alpha particle emissions of radon daughters are considered to be about 20 times more carcinogenic than x-rays. If they lodge in the respiratory system, especially the deep lung, radon daughters emit energetic ionizing radiation that can damage cells of sensitive internal tissues. And of course, the miners brought the uranium dust home, along with their contaminated clothing.

Champion Briefs 193 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

States should agree to the CTBT and FMCT---solves their offense.

Hensman, Rohini. "A Global Satyagraha Against Imperialism." Citizens Action & Ideas for Peace in South Asia. September 30, 2007. Web. December 12, 2019. . The NPT is a discriminatory treaty, in that it subjects non-nuclear weapon signatories to strict safeguards while nuclear weapons states are allowed to get away with a commitment to nuclear disarmament that there is no means of enforcing. Therefore, instead of the NPT we should emphasise the importance of universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans nuclear tests by all countries without discrimination, and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and subject the nuclear weapons states to the verification procedures currently applicable only to non-nuclear weapons states. While not actually measures of nuclear disarmament, these treaties would prevent nuclear weapons states from expanding their arsenals and developing new weapons, pending the introduction of a new a treaty on total global nuclear disarmament, which would be the ultimate goal.

Champion Briefs 194 A/2: Uranium Mining AC Jan/Feb 2020

Universal ratification of the CTBT solves their offense.

Bell, Alexandra. "Civil Society Leaders Demand The Entry Into Force Of Nuclear Testing Ban Treaty." Arms Control Association. September 25, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . The Human and Environmental Effects The CTBT and the de facto global nuclear testing moratoria have also prevented further health and environmental injury from nuclear testing. We can never forget that since 1945, there have been 2,056 nuclear weapons tests by at least eight countries. The United States conducted 1,030 of those tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and underground, while the Soviet Union carried out 715 nuclear test detonations. Not only did these nuclear test explosions fuel the development and spread of new and more deadly types of nuclear weapons, but also hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions more have suffered—and continue to suffer—from illnesses directly related to the radioactive fallout from nuclear detonations in the United States, islands in the Pacific, in Australia, China, Algeria, across Russia, in Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and elsewhere. In Kazakhstan, where the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test 70 years ago, there were more than 450 nuclear test detonations, including 116 in the atmosphere. Large areas of the Semipalatinsk Test Site remain contaminated 30 years after a grassroots movement forced the end of nuclear testing at the site in 1989. Now, in their fourth generation, people living in that vicinity still suffer from poor health, such as cancers, major birth defects, and blood diseases. Many other areas will also remain unusable until and unless the radioactive contamination can be remediated. The government of Kazakhstan estimates that some 1.5 million people were harmed by the Soviet-era nuclear tests. In the Marshall Islands, where the United States detonated massive aboveground nuclear tests in the 1940s and 1950s, several atolls are still heavily contaminated, indigenous populations have been displaced, and some buried radioactive waste could soon leak into the ocean. A 1990 National Cancer Institute study concluded that fallout from nuclear blasts at the may have caused 10,000 to 75,000 thyroid cancers. There were few, if any, Americans in the contiguous 48 states at the time who were not exposed to some level of fallout. Closing the Door on Nuclear Testing Today, the CTBT has 184 state signatories and near universal support. The IMS and the International Data Center are continuously collecting and analyzing data to help detect and deter clandestine nuclear tests. The officials gathered here, and the governments they represent, cannot and must not lose, or forsake, the progress that has been made. Many of today’s statements of support for the treaty were laudable, but they are not enough. They certainly will not hasten the treaty’s entry into force. New, creative, and sustained diplomatic initiatives must replace vague calls to action. Global leaders who know that a return to explosive nuclear testing is not in the security interest of any nation on this planet must work in concert with the esteemed co- chairs of the Article XIV process to meet the challenges facing the CTBT regime.

Champion Briefs 195 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Aff: Feminist IR AC

Coming from a very long history of reading feminist literature in debate, I am very excited that I get to share this concept within the brief as there are very strong links to fem within this topic. The argument I present is centered around a focus on socio-economic issues as well. The framework prioritizes the need for an inclusive method that listens to all lived experiences in order to dictate the best ethical method to solve a problem. This is very similar to the way structural violence functions, however, you need to be able to make a firm distinction that this focuses on everyone having a voice within the process and being able to use all of these lived experiences to make a change that will benefit all individuals. The offense here is very unique because there are several authors that make a very clear and warranted argument that those who identify as female seem to lack access to the political. The argument furthers such claims by exacerbating the problems with gender binaries within international relations. A similar claim can be made to those who experience certain socio-economic disadvantages that prevent them from being able to be prepared for such an egregious nuclear testing environment by international actors. There is so much offense within the topic on the affirmative so even if you choose not to read this you still should definitely read the articles just as a form of out-of-round education. This argument does explain really well why women are less likely to have a voice in policy making while also explaining why our relations require diverse perspectives. This aff is a very important discussion to have since we all have been or are involved with high school debate. In order to make everyone feel like they have a voice I think being able to debate issues like these can allow for some really cool discussions, again even if you aren’t interested in reading this as a position I would definitely take the time to read over some of the arguments just so you can be aware of situations that are currently taking place within the nuclear arsenal realm. I think that nuclear arsenals are a very important debate to be had because it has a huge conflict of interests between nations.

Champion Briefs 196 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

State focused theories promote hegemonic masculinity in the pursuit of endless war.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . Most feminist scholarship on security also employs a different ontology and epistemology from conventional security studies. Reluctant to be associated with either side of the realist/idealist debate, for reasons outlined in chapter l, and generally skeptical of rationalist, scientific claims to universality and objectivity, most feminist scholarship on security is compatible with the critical side of the third debate. Questioning the role of states as adequate security providers, many feminists have adopted a multidimensional, multilevel approach, similar to some of the efforts to broaden the definition of security described above. Feminists' commitment to the emancipatory goal of ending women's subordination is consistent with a broad definition of security that takes the individual, situated in broader social structures, as its starting point. Feminists seek to understand how the security of individuals and groups is compromised by violence, both physical and structural, at all levels. Feminists generally share the view of other critical scholars that culture and identity and interpretive "bottom up" modes of analysis are crucial for understanding security issues and that emancipatory visions of security must get beyond statist frameworks. They differ, however, in that they adopt gender as a central category of analysis for understanding how unequal social structures, particularly gender hierarchies, negatively impact the security of individuals and groups. Challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others stereotypically viewed as "vulnerable," feminists point to the high level of civilian casualties in contemporary wars. Feminist scholarship has been particularly concerned with what goes on during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally. Whereas conventional security studies has tended to look at causes and consequences of wars from a top-down, or structural, perspective, feminists have generally taken a bottom-up approach, analyzing the impact of war at the microlevel. By so doing, as well as adopting gender as a category of analysis, feminists believe they can tell us something new about the causes of war that is missing from both conventional and critical perspectives. By crossing what many feminists believe to be mutually constitutive levels of analysis, we get a better understanding of the interrelationship between all forms of violence and the extent to which unjust social relations, including gender hierarchies, contribute to insecurity, broadly defined. Claiming that the security-seeking behavior of states is described in gendered terms, feminists have pointed to the masculinity of strategic discourse and how this may impact on understanding of and prescriptions for security; it may also help to explain why women's voices have so often been seen as inauthentic in matters of national security. Feminists have examined how states legitimate their security- seeking behavior through appeals to types of "hegemonic" masculinity. They are also investigating the extent to which state and national identities, which can lead to conflict, are based on gendered constructions. The valorization of war through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as

Champion Briefs 197 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

unattainable and unrealistic. Since feminists believe that gender is a variable social construction, they claim that there is nothing inevitable about these gendered distinctions; thus, their analyses often include the emancipatory goal of postulating a different definition of security less dependent on binary and unequal gender hierarchies.

Champion Briefs 198 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Realism’s thinking breeds war – it sees the world as a paranoid, self- help system.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . Following World War Il, an emergent, self-named "realist" school of international relations claimed that the lack of military preparedness on the part of the Allied powers, as well as what it saw as a naive faith in the possibility of international law and institutions on the part of those it termed "idealists," contributed to the war's outbreak. Realists believe that, in an anarchical world of sovereign, self-interested states, war is always a possibility; therefore, states must rely on their own power and capabilities rather than international agreements to enhance their national security. Although their portrayal of IR in the interwar period, which they claimed was captured by "idealist” thinking, was probably more of a move to legitimate realism than an accurate portrayal of so-called idealist thinking, realists questioned idealists' belief in human progress and the possibility of an international society; realists see only an anarchy, characterized by repetitive competition and conflict. 4 The realist/idealist debate in IR comes out of these conflicting worldviews that differ over their belief in the possibility for peace and cooperation. Since 1945, the realist side of the debate has predominated, particularly with respect to analyses of issues related to conflict and security. Peace research, which has attempted to specify conditions necessary for a less conflictual world, has proceeded as a separate field on the edges of the discipline. While neorealism and neoliberalism, more recent iterations of these contending positions, are closer together than earlier realist and idealist positions, neorealism has been the predominant approach in security studies, while neoliberals have been primarily, but not exclusively, concerned with matters related to economic relations between states.5 Neorealists and neoliberals agree that both national security and economic welfare are important, but they differ in the relative emphasis they place on these goals. These tendencies have had the effect of further reinforcing realism's predominance in security studies. Realists define security in political/military terms as the protection of the boundaries and integrity of the state and its values against the dangers of a hostile international environment. Neorealists emphasize the anarchical structure of the system, which they liken to the Hobbesian state of nature, rather than domestic determinants as being the primary contributor to states' insecurities. Skeptical of the neoliberal claim that international institutions can mitigate the dangerous consequences of anarchy where there are no restraints on the self-interested behavior of sovereign states, realists claim that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.6 States, therefore, must rely on their own capabilities to ensure their security. As realists have acknowledged, this self-help system often results in what they describe as a ""; measures that are justified by one state as part of a legitimate, security-enhancing policy are likely to be perceived by others as a threatening military buildup.7 Seeking more scientific rigor, neorealists have used game-theoretic models to explain the security dilemma, which is often characterized as a prisoners-dilemma game.8 States are postulated as unitary actors whose internal characteristics, beyond an assessment of

Champion Briefs 199 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

their relative capabilities, are not seen as necessary for understanding their vulnerabilities or security-enhancing behavior a behavior in which states have been engaged for centuries.9 In an often-cited 1991 review of the literature in the security field a field that he suggested had recently undergone a welcome resurgence realist Stephen Walt claimed that the main focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war: it may be defined as the study of threat, the use and control of military force, and the conditions that make the use of force more likely. 10 During what Walt termed the "golden age" of security studies (which he suggested ended in the mid 1960s), the central question was how states could use weapons of mass destruction as instruments of policy given the risks of nuclear exchange. Heavily dominated by U.S. strategic thinking about nuclear weapons and the security problems of the United States and its NATO allies, the field of national security was based on the assumption that, since nuclear wars were too dangerous to fight, security was synonymous with nuclear deterrence and power balancing. Power balancing is seen by realists as the primary mechanism for enhancing stability. During the Cold War, the balance of power was bipolar, rather than multipolar; certain realists saw this balance as one that afforded increased stability.ll

Champion Briefs 200 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Removing a state centered approach to conflict is key.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . Thus, critical-security studies is not only about broadening the agenda because, as mentioned earlier, this is possible with a realist framework. According to Ken Booth, critical-security is fundamentally different from realism because its agenda derives from a radically different political theory and methodology that question both realism's constrained view of the political and its commitment to positivism. Critical-security studies rejects conventional security theory's definition of politics based on the centrality of the state and its sovereignty. Arguing that the state is often part of the problem of insecurity rather than the solution, Booth claims that we should examine security from a bottom-up perspective that begins with individuals; however, critical-security studies should not ignore the state or the military dimensions of world politics: "What is being challenged is not the material manifestations of the world of traditional realism, but its moral and practical status, including its naturalization of historically created theories, its ideology of necessity and limited possibility, and its propagandist common sense about this being the best of all worlds."40 When we treat individuals as the objects of security, we open up the possibility of talking about a transcendent human community with common global concerns and allow engagement with the broadest global threats." The theme of emancipation is one that runs through much of the critical security studies literature. Emancipatory critical security can be defined as freeing people as individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic, and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.42 A postrealist, postpositivist emancipatory notion of security offers the promise of maximizing the security and improving the lives of the whole of humankind: it is a security studies of inclusion rather than exclusion.4 Yet imagining security divested of its statist connotations is problematic; the institutions of state power are not withering away. As R. B. J. Walker has claimed, the state is a political category in a way that the world or humanity is not 44 The security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be because other forms of political community have been rendered unthinkable. Yet, as Walker goes on to say, given the dangers of nuclear weapons, we are no longer able to survive in a world predicated on an extreme logic of state sovereignty, nor one where war is an option for system change. Therefore, we must revise our understanding of the relationship between universality and particularity upon which a statist concept of security has been constructed. Security must be analyzed in terms of how contemporary insecurities are being created and by a sensitivity to the way in which people are responding to insecurities by reworking their understanding of how their own predicament fits into broader structures of violence and oppression.45 Feminists with their "bottom-up" approach to security, an ontology of social relations, and an emancipatory agenda are beginning to undertake such reanalyses.

Champion Briefs 201 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Integrating forms of maternal thinking into international relations is key to avoiding military conflict.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . Redefining national security is another way in which feminist theory could contribute to new thinking about international relations.23 Traditionally in the West, the concept of national security has been tied to military strength and its role in the physical protection of the nation- state from external threats. Morgenthau's notion of defending the national interest in terms of power is consistent with this definition. But this traditional definition of national security is partial at best in today's world.2A When advanced states are highly interdependent, and rely on weapons whose effects would be equally devastating to winners and losers alike, defending national security by relying on war as the last resort no longer appears very useful. Moreover, if one thinks of security in North-South rather than East-West terms, for a large portion of the world's population, security has as much to do with the satisfaction of basic material needs as with military threats. According to Johan Galtung's notion of structural violence, the lowering of life expectancy by virtue of where one happens to be born is a form of violence whose effects can be as devastating as war. Basic needs satisfaction has a great deal to do with women, but only recently have women's roles as providers of basic needs. and in development more generally, become visible as important components in devising development strategies.26 Traditionally the development literature has focused on aspects of the development process which are in the public sphere. are technologically complex and are usually undertaken by men. Thinking about the role of women in development and the way in which we can define development and basic needs satisfaction to be inclusive of women's roles and needs are topics which deserve higher priority on the international agenda. Typically, however, this is an area about which traditional international relations theory. with its prioritising of order over justice, has had very little to say. A further threat to national security, more broadly defined, which also has not been on the agenda of traditional international relations, concerns the environment. Carolyn Merchant argues that a mechanistic view of nature. contained in modern science, has helped to guide an industrial and technological development which has resulted in the environmental damage that is now becoming a matter of global concern. In the introduction to her book, The Death of Nature, Merchant suggests that, 'Women and nature have an age-old association — an affiliation that has persisted throughout culture. language, and history', v Hence she maintains that the ecology movement, which is growing up in response to these environmental threats, and the women's movement are deeply interconnected. Both stress living in equilibrium with nature rather than dominating it: both see nature as a living non- hierarchical entity in which each part is mutually dependent on the whole. Ecologists, as well as many feminists, are now suggesting that only with such a fundamental change in the way we view the world could we devise olutions that would allow the human species to survive the damage which we are inflicting on the environment. Thinking about military, economic and environmental security in interdependent terms suggests the need for new methods of conflict

Champion Briefs 202 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

resolution which seek to achieve mutually beneficial, rather than zero-sum, outcomes. One such method comes from Sara Ruddick's work on 'maternal thinking'.28 Ruddick describes 'maternal thinking' as focused on the preservation of life and the growth of children; to foster a domestic environment conducive to these goals, tranquility must be preserved by avoiding conflict where possible, engaging in it non-violently and restoring community when it is over. In such an environment the ends for which disputes are fought are subordinated to the means by which they are resolved. This method of conflict resolution involves making contextual judgements rather than appealing to absolute standards and thus has much in common with Gilligan's definition of female morality. While non-violent resolution of conflict in the domestic sphere is a widely accepted norm, passive resistance in the public realm is regarded as deviant. But, as Ruddick argues, the peaceful resolution of conflict by mothers does not usually extend to the children of one's enemies, an important reason why women have been ready to support men's wars.29 The question for Ruddick then becomes how to get 'maternal thinking', a mode of thinking which she believes can be found in men as well as women, out into the public realm. Ruddick believes that finding a common humanity among one's opponents has become a condition of survival in the nuclear age when the notion of winners and losers has become questionable. Portraying the adversary as less than human has all too often been a technique of the nation-state to command loyalty and increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens but such behaviour in the nuclear age may eventually be self-defeating.

Champion Briefs 203 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

A reconfiguration of realism promotes better policy making and more accurate risk analysis.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . In the first part of this article I used feminist theory to develop a critique of Morgenthau's principles of political realism in order to demonstrate how the theory and practice of international relations may exhibit a masculine bias. I then suggested some contributions which feminist theory might make to reconceptualising some important concepts in international relations and to thinking about a feminist epistemology, Drawing on these observations, I will now conclude with a feminist reformulation of Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism, outlined earlier in this paper, which might help us to begin to think differently about international relations. I shall not use the term realism since feminists believe that there are multiple realities: a truly realistic picture of international politics must recognise elements of co-operation as well as conflict. morality as well as realpolitik, and the strivings for justice as well as order.3•' This reformulation may help us begin to think in these multidimensional terms: 1. A feminist perspective believes that objectivity, as it is culturally defined, is associated with masculinity, Therefore, supposedly 'objective' laws of human nature are based on a partial masculine view of human nature. Human nature is both masculine and feminine: it contains elements of social reproduction and development as well as political domination. Dynamic objectivity offers us a more connected view of objectivity with less potential for domination. 2. A feminist perspective believes that the national interest is multidimensional and contextually contingent, Therefore it cannot be defined solely in terms of power. In the contemporary world the national interest demands co-operative rather than zero-sum solutions to a set of interdependent global problems which include nuclear war, economic well-being and environmental degradation. 3. Power cannot be infused with meaning that is universally valid. Power as domination and control privileges masculinity and ignores the possibility of collective empowerment, another aspect of power often associated with feminity. 4. A feminist perspective rejects the possibility of separating moral command from political action. All political action has moral significance. The realist agenda for maximizing order through power and control prioritises the moral command of order over those of justice and the satisfaction of basic needs necessary to ensure social reproduction. 5. While recognising that the moral aspirations of particular nations cannot be equated with universal moral principles, a feminist perspective seeks to find common moral elements in human aspirations which could become the basis for de-escalating international conflict and building international community. 6. A feminist perspective denies the validity of the autonomy of the political. Since autonomy is associated with masculinity in Western culture, disciplinary efforts to construct a world view which does not rest on a pluralistic conception of human nature, are partial and masculine. Building boundaries around a narrowly defined political realm defines political in a way that excludes the concerns and contributions of women. In constructing this feminist alternative, I am not denying the validity of Morgenthau's work. Adding a feminist perspective to the

Champion Briefs 204 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

epistemology of international relations, however, is a stage through which we must pass if we are to begin to think about constructing an ungendered or human science of international politics which is sensitive to, but goes beyond, both masculine and feminine perspectives. Such inclusionary thinking, which, as Simone de Beauvoir tells us, values the bringing forth of life as much as the risking of life, is becoming imperative in a world where the technology of war and a fragile natural environment are threatening human existence. This ungendered or human discourse becomes possible only when women are adequately represented in the discipline and when there is equal respect for the contributions of both women and men alike.

Champion Briefs 205 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Discourse of hegemonic masculinity shapes reality.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . Does the fact that states' national-security policies are often legitimated by appealing to masculine characteristics, such as power and self-help, mean that certain types of foreign-policy behaviors—standing tall, rather than wimping out—are seen as more legitimate than others? Could it be that men who, in the role of defense experts, must employ tough "masculine" language and suppress any "feminized" thoughts when constructing strategic options, come to regard more cooperative choices as unthinkable and co- operative behavior as unlikely?58 Carol Cohn claims that the language we use shapes the way we view the world and thus how we act on it. Her analysis of the language of U.S. security experts, whose ideas have been important for mainstream security studies, suggests that this masculine—gendered discourse is the only permissible way of speaking about national security if one is to be taken seriously by the strategic community. This rational, disembodied language precludes discussion of the death and destruction of war, issues that can be spoken of only in emotional terms stereotypically associated with women. In other words, the limits on what can be said with the language of strategic discourse constrains our ability to think fully and well about national security. In their analysis of U.S. policy on bombing Indochina during the Vietnam War, Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan examine the discourse of U.S. policymakers. They claim it was gendered. 59 When policymakers spoke or wrote about South Vietnam, it was portrayed as weak and feminized, its population as hysterical and childlike; the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, were characterized as brutal fanatics as manifesting a perverted form of masculinity. The authors claim that bombing policy, responding to these gendered portrayals, was different in each case. While not denying the reality of what policymakers do, Milliken and Sylvan, like Cohn, claim that words have power and, therefore, consequences; the way in which policymakers and scholars construct reality has an effect on how they act upon and explain that reality. Gender- differentiated images are often used in foreign policy to legitimate certain options and discredit others. Therefore, Walt’s aspiration for separating the "political" from the "scientific" is questionable. In other words, theories cannot be separated from political practice.

Champion Briefs 206 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Realist epistemology makes war inevitable.

Shepard, Laura. "Victims, Perpetrators And Actors’ Revisited:† Exploring The Potential For A Feminist Reconceptualisa." The British Journal of Politics & International Relations Volume 9, Issue 2. April 17, 2007. Web. December 11, 2019. . Both internal and external sovereignty are central to the conception of the state that informs conventional IR security literature, and the logical corollary of this conception constructs the state system as anarchic. Realist IR theory ‘sees’ the state as its object of analysis and therefore ‘[s]tates are the principle referent objects of security because they are both the framework of order and the highest sources of governing authority’ (Buzan 1991, 22). Within both classical (or ‘political’) realism and neo-realism (or ’structural realism’), the state is represented as a unitary actor.10 Both variants proceed according to the assumption that all human existence is bounded by states, according to the assertion that states are the primary object of analysis. If, as Kenneth claims, ‘[s]tatesmen and military leaders are responsible for the security of their states … no one at all is responsible for humanity’ (Waltz 1959, 416), then states are further assumed to be the object to which security policy and practice refers and humans can only be secured to the extent that they are citizens of a given state. John Herz's conception of the ‘security dilemma’ is explicitly premised on assumptions regarding the potential of human nature, and therefore state behaviour, to provide circumstances of collaboration and co- operation. The ‘human nature’ under discussion is, on closer inspection, the nature of ‘man’ (see Morgenthau 1973, 15–16), and is thus problematic in its partiality as well as its pessimism. Insecurity, according to Herz, “stems from a fundamental social constellation … where groups live alongside each other without being organised into a higher unity … Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world … power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on,” (Herz 1950, 157). The ‘fundamental social constellation’ posited by classical realists is a population of rational, unitary, masculine entities that will never, and can never, be otherwise. The concept of security driving these prescriptions is premised on a particular vision of the social relations between states, and furthermore constructs a particular notion of what is considered to be a security threat within this conceptualisation, as eternal and external to the state. While ‘human nature’ drives state behaviours according to classical realists, neo-realist assumptions concerning the construction of security in an anarchic system appeal to a structural logic of uncertainty. ‘Uncertainty is a synonym for life, and nowhere is uncertainty greater than in international politics’ (Waltz 1993, 58). The necessity of security behaviours is thus derived from the anarchic system and ‘rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace’ (Mearsheimer 1990, 6). Thus threats, reduced to external violences and ultimately war between states, are perpetual, a theoretical move that serves to perpetuate the understanding of security as reducible to military force. This functions to blind those working within a conceptualisation of ‘national security’ to the possibility that threats are variously constructed depending on context. Moreover, the structural context of anarchy that is taken to

Champion Briefs 207 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

be a foundational reality within this conceptualisation prescribes and proscribes certain behaviours that are then never opened to critical scrutiny, a point to which I return in the conclusion of this article. *Ellipses from source

Champion Briefs 208 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Typical IR approaches start from the state – this excludes feminist perspectives and papers over women’s concerns.

Tickner, J. Ann. "A Feminist Voyage Through International Relations.". 2014. Web. December 11, 2019. . The questions that IR has asked since the discipline was founded have typically been about the behavior of states, particularly powerful states and their security-seeking behavior, given an anarchical international environment. Much of the scholarship in international political economy and international institutions has also focused on the behavior of the great powers and their potential, or lack thereof, for international cooperation. These questions are of particular importance for the foreign policy interests of the most powerful states. Most IR feminists have asked very different questions. While they may seek to understand state behavior, they do so in the context of asking why, in so many parts of the world, women remain so fundamentally disempowered in matters of foreign and . Rather than speculate on the hypothetical question whether women might be more peaceful than men as foreign policymakers, they have concentrated on the more immediate problem of why there are so few women in positions of power. 10 On issues of war and peace, feminists have asked why wars have been predominantly fought by men and how gendered structures of masculinity and femininity have legitimated war and militarism for both women and men; 11 they have also investigated the problematic essentialized association of women with peace, an association which, many believe, disempowers both women and peace (Sylvester 1987 ; Tickner 2001 : 59). Rather than uncritically assume the state as a given unit of analysis, feminists have investigated the constitutive features of “gendered states” and their implications for the militarization of women’s (and men’s) lives (Peterson 1992a ; Enloe 2000 ). But the basic question that has most

Champion Briefs 209 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

concerned IR feminists is why, in just about all societies, women are disadvantaged, politically, socially, and economically, relative to men, and to what extent this is due to international politics and the global economy. Conversely, they have also asked in what ways these hierarchical gendered structures of inequality may actually support the international system of states and contribute to the unevenly distributed wealth and resources of the global capitalist economy. Feminist questions are challenging the core assumptions of the discipline and deconstructing its central concepts. Feminists have sought to better understand a neglected but constitutive feature of war – why it has been primarily a male activity, and what the causal and constitutive implications of this are for women’s political roles, given that they have been constructed as a “protected” category. They have investigated the continuing legitimation of war itself though appeals to traditional notions of masculinity and femininity. Working from the discovery of the gendered biases in state-centric security thinking, they have redefined the meaning of (in)security to include the effects of structural inequalities of race, class, and gender. Similarly, on the bases of theoretical critiques of the gendered political uses of the public/private distinction, they have rearticulated the meaning of democracy to include the participation of individuals in all the political and economic processes that affect their daily lives (Ackerly 2000 : 178– 203). While not rejecting in principle the use of quantitative data, feminists have recognized how past behavioral realities have been publicly constituted in state- generated indicators in biased, gendered ways, using data that do not adequately reflect the reality of women’s lives and the unequal structures of power within which they are situated. For this reason they have relied more on hermeneutic, historical, narrative, and case study methodological orientations rather than on causal analysis of unproblematically defined empirical patterns. Importantly, feminists use gender as a socially constructed and variable category of analysis to investigate these power dynamics and gender hierarchies. They have suggested that gender inequality, as well as other social relations of domination and subordination, has been among the fundamental building blocks on which, to varying extents, the publicly recognized features of states, their security relationships, and the global economy have been constructed and on which they continue to operate to varying degrees. Rather than working from an ontology that depicts states as individualistic autonomous actors – an ontology typical of social science perspectives in IR and of liberal thinking more generally – feminists start from an ontology of social relations in which individuals are embedded in, and constituted by, historically unequal political, economic, and social structures. Unlike social scientific IR, which has drawn on models from economics and the natural sciences to explain the behavior of states in the international system, IR feminists have used sociological analyses that start with individuals and the hierarchical social relations in which their lives are situated. 12 While social scientific IR has been quite system-determined or state-focused, feminist understandings of state behavior frequently start from below the state level – with the lives of connected individuals. Whereas much of IR is focused on describing and explaining the behavior of states, feminists are motivated by the goal of investigating the lives of women within states or international structures in order to change them.

Champion Briefs 210 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Hegemony discourse promotes nationalist narratives that reinforce gender roles.

Tickner, J. Ann. "Gendering World Politics: Issues And Approaches In The Post–Cold War Era." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . Since its birth in early modern Europe, the Western state system has constructed its encounters with 'uncivilized" or dangerous others in ways that have justified expansion, conquest, and a state of military preparedness. Such rhetoric is being deployed today with respect to dangers in the South. While I would not deny the very real problem of conflict in the South, such conflicts take on particular identities that render them intractable and often incomprehensible. Newly articulated North/South boundaries between mature and immature anarchies reinforce these distinctions. Anarchy, or the state of nature, is not only a metaphor for the way in which people or states can be expected to behave in the absence of government; it also depicts an untamed natural environment in need of civilization whose wide and chaotic spaces are often described as female. Such language was frequently used during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to legitimate colonial rule over peoples who were deemed incapable of governing themselves.6 It is not only threats from outside against which nationalist ideologies are created. The threats that states pose to their own citizens, issues of importance on the new security agenda, are often exacerbated by the manipulation of nationalist ideologies that pits ruling groups against "outsiders" within their own territory. Frequently, the reassertion of cultural or religious identities, in the name of national unity, may take the form of repressive measures against women. Nira Yuval-Davis suggests that the defining of women as the bearers of culture a practice that often accompanies these movements reinforces women's inequality. When gender relations come to be seen as the "essence" of culture, women who stray outside the definition of "good women" can be punished for bringing shame to their families; besides solidifying ethnic identities, this can be used as a way of legitimizing the control and oppression of women.64 Such behavior is illustrated in the way women have been regulated by the Taliban in Afghanistan. National identities are often used by domestic elites to promote state or group interests and hide race and class divisions. Defining moments in collective historical memories are frequently wars of national liberation, great victories in against external enemies, or the glories of former imperialist expansion. Flags and national anthems are often associated with war. Scholars who study nationalism have emphasized the importance of warfare for the creation of a sense of national community. Not only does war mobilize the national consciousness, it also provides the myths and memories that create a sense of national identity, an identity for which people have been willing to die and kill.65 As Jean Elshtain asserts, societies are, in some sense, the "sum total" of their war stories.66 War stories are often used to gain a society's support for a war; frequently, these stories rely on the portrayal of a certain kind of masculinity associated with heroism and strength. These portrayals can be racialized as well as gendered; as Susan Jeffords notes, all the heroes in Hollywood's 1980s Vietnam War and action-adventure films were white men.67 Rarely do war stories include stories about women.

Champion Briefs 211 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Current political culture is built on the appearance of acting "tough".

Enloe, Cynthia. "The Curious Feminist: Searching For Women In A New Age Of Empire.". 2004. Web. December 11, 2019. . Many observers have remarked on the peculiar American contemporary political culture that equates military experience and/or military expertise with political leadership. It is this cultural inclination that has made it very risky for any American public figure to appear less “manly” than a uniformed senior military male officer. It is a culture—too often unchallenged by ordinary voters—that has given individuals with alleged military knowledge a disproportionate advantage in foreign policy debates. Such a masculinized and militarized culture pressures nervous civilian candidates into appearing “tough” on military issues. The thought of not embracing a parade of militarized policy positions—to launch preemptive war, increase the defense budget, make NATO the primary institution for building a new European security, expand junior officer training programs in high schools, ensure American male soldiers’ access to prostitutes overseas, invest in destabilizing anti-missile technology, justify past crippling but politically ineffectual economic sanctions and bombing raids against Iraq, accept the Pentagon’s flawed policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” and finance a military driven anti-drug policy—would leave most American public officials (women and men) feeling uncomfortably vulnerable in the political culture that assigns high value to masculinized toughness. The result: a political competition to appear “tough” has produced U.S. foreign policies that severely limit the American capacity to play a useful role in creating a more genuinely secure international community. That is, America’s conventional, masculinized political culture makes it unlikely that Washington policy-makers will either come to grips with a realistic analysis of potential global threats or act to strengthen those multilateral institutions most effective in preventing and ending conflicts. A feminist analysis turns the political spotlight on the conventional notion of manliness as a major factor shaping U.S. foreign policy choices. It demonstrates that popular gender presumptions are not just the stuff of sociology texts. Every official who has tried not to appear “soft” knows this. For example, early in his administration, Bill Clinton made known his abhorrence of land mines and his determination to ban them. But by 1998, he had caved in to military pressure and stated, instead, that the United States would not sign the widely endorsed international land mines treaty until the Defense Department came up with an “alternative.” Feminist questioning also produces a more realistic accounting of the consequences of “macho” policies. Despite slight increases in the number of women in policy positions, U.S. militarized policies in the post–Cold War era have served to strengthen the privileged positions of men in decision-making, both in the United States and in other countries. For instance, the U.S. government has promoted NATO as the central bastion of Western security, at least when the United States can be sure of its position as the “first among equals” within NATO. Although it is true that there are now women soldiers in all NATO governments’ armed forces (the Italians were the most recent to enlist women), NATO remains a masculinized political organization. The alliance’s policies are hammered out by a virtually all- male elite in which the roles of masculinity are silently accepted, when they should be openly questioned. Thus, to the extent that the United States succeeds in pressing NATO to wield more

Champion Briefs 212 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

political influence than the European Parliament (where women have won an increasing proportion of seats), not only American women but also European women will be shunted to the wings of the political stage. Consider what feminist analysis reveals about the consequences of militarizing anti-drug policy. In 2000 the American government’s billion-dollar-plus aid package to the Colombian military promised, as its critics noted,2 to further intensify the civil war and human rights abuses. But less discussed was the fact that this policy will serve to marginalize women of all classes in Colombia’s political life. This—the obsession of America’s elected officials and senior appointees with not appearing “soft” on drugs—militarizes drug prevention efforts and, in so doing, disempowers women both in the United States and in the drug producing countries. Women—both as grassroots urban activists in American cities and as mobilizers of a broad, cross-class in Colombia—have offered alternative analyses and solutions to the problems of drug addiction and drug trade. However, their valuable ideas are being drowned out by the sounds of helicopter engines and M16 rifles. This example illustrates a more general phenomenon. When any policy approach is militarized, one of the first things that happens is that women’s voices are silenced. We find that when the United States touts any military institution as the best hope for stability, security, and development, the result is deeply gendered: the politics of masculinity are made to seem “natural,” the male grasp on political influence is tightened, and most women’s access to real political influence shrinks dramatically.

Champion Briefs 213 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Feminist IR interrogates the epistemological underpinnings of militarism and masculinist foreign policy, reveals the problems embedded in international affairs.

Youngs, Gillian. "Feminist Interventions In International Communication." Chapter 3: “Public/Private: The Hidden Dimension of International Communication. 2008. Web. December 11, 2019. . It is interesting, when thinking critically about IC in this way, to consider feminist work on the international in another area of the social sciences, international relations. Feminist IR has been a sphere of analysis that has not only prioritized the “where are the women?” question extensively, but has also confronted one of the hardest ontological and epistemological struggles in doing so. This is partly because the notion of the domestic has a double meaning in the study of IR from a feminist position. It refers to the domestic related to the private sphere, but it also refers to the notion of domestic “politics” when contrasted with foreign affairs, the latter being the prime concern of IR. In IR, women are doubly domesticated, as it were. They are contained within the public of domestic politics, which is dominated by men and masculinist values in the main, but women’s lack of power and presence in this domestic sphere is much more exaggerated once we get to the realm of foreign affairs. So if women’s presence and influence is highly restricted at the domestic level in practice, it is even more restricted in the realm of international politics, which historically has been predominantly an all-male preserve. There are signs of gender change, with figures such as the former UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, the current U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, and as a contender for the Democratic nomination for president of the U.S. While these and other similar developments are significant, they remain the exception rather than the masculinist rule. Feminist perspectives have shed diverse light on the gendered spatial politics of IR; much of this work has been conducted in relation to different processes of globalization, which emphasize cross-border and transnational patterns, focusing on the links between global and local and the need to transcend a purely state-centred orientation. Feminist IR and globalization studies have recognized the missing dimension of women, whether as activists in local and global movements for change; diplomatic or military wives or mothers; sex workers operating around military bases; assembly line operators and sweatshop workers of the global economy; women, especially in the South, carrying triple burdens of work in the home, subsistence farming, and the paid economy; migrant workers, including in domestic and sex work; girl soldiers; and trafficked women. What is often insufficiently recognized in wider IR circles is the deeper ontological and epistemological significance of this research. Feminist research envisages a different kind of IR, one that it can be argued is more complete, particularly in terms of its dynamics, spatial and otherwise, because it does not abstract the public from the private and focus only on the former, and thus largely on the predominantly

Champion Briefs 214 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

masculinist world of decision-making and influence, whether in politics, economics, or the military. Feminist IR presents a new ontology of both public and private, and crucially the interdependence of the two, and thus of gendered identities and processes operating across them.

Champion Briefs 215 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Individual experience is important for improving foreign policy, key to achieving global solutions.

Verveer, Melanne. "Why Women Are A Foreign Policy Issue." Foreign Policy. April 23, 2012. Web. December 11, 2019. . On a trip to Afghanistan in the summer of 2009, not long after my appointment as the U.S. State Department’s ambassador at large for global women’s issues, I stopped for dinner with a group of Afghan women activists in Kabul. One woman opened our conversation with a plea: "Please don’t see us as victims, but look to us as the leaders we are." Those words have stuck with me as President Barack Obama’s administration has endeavored to put women at the heart of its foreign policy. For generations, the United States too often viewed the world’s women as victims of poverty and illiteracy, of violence and seemingly unbreakable cultural traditions — essentially, as beneficiaries of aid. Women’s issues existed on the margins, segregated from the more "strategic" issues of war, peace, and economic stability. Now, in a time of transformative change — from the rise of new economic powers to a growing chorus of voices against repressive regimes in the Arab world — promoting the status of women is not just a moral imperative but a strategic one; it’s essential to economic prosperity and to global peace and security. It is, in other words, a strategy for a smarter foreign policy. In the past, U.S. diplomacy and development efforts were conducted in a manner that was gender neutral at best. The United States regularly supported peace talks that left women out of negotiating rooms and treaty documents, an omission that weakened the chances of forging durable peace agreements. The country designed development programs without consulting women or considering the crucial role they played, whether it was agricultural training initiatives that targeted men even though women often represented the majority of small farmers, or building wells in areas where women could not go, never mind that women were the ones responsible for fetching water. As a growing body of research shows, however, the world’s most pressing economic and political problems simply cannot be solved without the participation of women. That’s why Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is working to ensure that advancing the status of women and girls around the world is fully integrated into every aspect of U.S. foreign policy. As of this spring, with the release of a first-ever secretarial policy directive on gender, advancing the status of women and girls worldwide is officially a requirement in every U.S. diplomat’s job description. As Clinton said in March, the United States will use "every tool at our disposal" to support this crucial cause. Why? This is, as Clinton has called it, a "Full Participation Age," an era when information transcends borders, opinions and ideas scale firewalls, and the world can no longer afford to leave millions of women out of the global community. It’s no coincidence that those countries that deny women basic human rights are some of the poorest and least stable. According to the World Economic Forum, countries where men and women are closer to enjoying equal rights are far more economically competitive than those where the gender gap has left women and girls with limited or no access to medical care, education, elected office,

Champion Briefs 216 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

and the marketplace. As much of the world struggles to climb out of recession, the economic participation of women and their enhanced efficiency and productivity are essential to recovery and growth. Goldman Sachs researchers, for example, found that closing the gender gap between male and female employment would be a powerful engine for global growth, even in the United States and the eurozone, where it could boost GDP by billions of dollars. In fact, the Economist has reported that the increase in employment among women in developed countries contributed more to global GDP growth than China as a whole in recent years. Yet many women still lack access to capital, credit, and training. Laws prevent them from inheriting or owning land. Cultural traditions inhibit women’s participation in the formal economy. In the agriculture industry, to take one example, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that if women farmers were provided the same access to seeds, fertilizer, and technology as men, they could improve their yields by 20 to 30 percent and reduce the number of undernourished people in the world by 100 million to 150 million. This is not just about the economy, though; it’s also about global security. In the 1990s, nearly half of all peace agreements failed within the first five years, according to the Human Security Report Project. These deals are generally struck by a small number of male military and political leaders shielded from war’s impact on daily life. Women, meanwhile, endure much of the residual violence and poverty caused by armed conflicts, and they bear much of the burden of rebuilding families and communities. They are often excluded, however, from both the negotiating table and the governments charged with sustaining peace. Less than 8 percent of the hundreds of peace treaties signed in the last 20 years were negotiated by delegations that included women, and according to the World Economic Forum, women hold less than 20 percent of all national decision-making positions. Excluding women from these negotiations exacts a measurable cost. In 1994, for instance, women were far from the minds of the men who, with U.S. support, signed the Lusaka Protocol that ended two decades of civil war in Angola. The commission established to implement the protocol consisted of 40 men — and not one woman. Women were also left out of demobilization programs for ex-combatants because the definition of "combatant" did not consider the thousands of women who had been kidnapped and forced to work as military cooks, messengers, or sex slaves. Demining efforts focused on roads and failed to target the fields, wells, and forests where women grew crops, fetched water, and gathered firewood. And following a conflict in which rape was used as a weapon of war, the male negotiators granted each other amnesty for the crimes they had committed against women. Just four years later, war began anew. We do not want to see history repeating itself. Last December, the administration launched a national action plan on women, peace, and security, which expands U.S. efforts to include women in conflict prevention, peace negotiations, and reconstruction. Still, the exclusion of half the world’s population continues to threaten many countries. In Egypt last year, women marched on the front lines of the protests, often leading their fathers, brothers, and husbands into Tahrir Square. A year later, the courageous women of the Arab Spring fear not just that progress on women’s rights will halt, but that the rights they currently enjoy will be rolled back. Or consider Afghanistan. Although the number of women attending school and serving in parliament and on local peace councils has increased dramatically over the past decade, the country remains the world’s most dangerous for women in terms of health, violence, and lack of economic

Champion Briefs 217 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

resources. The United States must continue to insist that insurgents who want to reconcile must commit to protecting the rights embedded in the Afghan constitution — including those for women. There may be some who, in the interests of getting a deal done, consider women’s rights negotiable. But this is a red line that cannot be crossed; any peace that is made by excluding more than half the population is no peace at all and will not last. In all circumstances, and especially in the most challenging ones like those in Afghanistan, the United States must remain a vital voice for women and girls not just because it is the right thing to do but because it is the smart thing to do. Give a small-businesswoman access to capital and training, and she can become a powerful contributor to GDP growth. Include women in governments and peace talks, and they can help ensure that ministries are better run and peace agreements are sustained. Educate a girl, and she will be more likely to raise healthier and more educated children — and end the cycle of poverty. Secretary Clinton has championed the use of "smart power": deploying all the tools at America’s disposal to advance national interests — not just military might, but also diplomacy, development, and America’s enduring values. Advocating for women’s full economic, social, and political participation around the world is one of the most potent weapons in America’s smart-power arsenal. And it’s one we shouldn’t even hesitate to unleash

Champion Briefs 218 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Diverse gender perspectives are essential to understanding global politics.

Sjoberg, Laura. "Gender And International Security.". 2010. Web. December 11, 2019. . In the intervening decades, feminist scholars have critiqued and reformulated many of the foundational theoretical assumptions of IR. Still, the productivity of conversations between feminists and other IR scholars has been more mixed than original predictions envisioned. In some areas of IR, scholarship that uses gender as an analytical category has successfully engaged in dialogue with more “mainstream” approaches. In other areas of study, however, feminists have experienced “awkward silences and miscommunications” brought about by a lack of understanding between IR audiences and feminist speakers.5 Security Studies is one area of IR where unsatisfactory encounters “illustrate a gendered estrangement that inhibits more sustained conversations” between feminists and IR scholars.6 As Ann Tickner laments, “feminist theorists have rarely achieved the serious engagement with other IR scholars for which they have frequently called.”7 In many ways, the theory and practice of international security remain a man’s world. Women in privileged positions in international security policy- making remain rare (and are often identified primarily by their gender when they do reach those positions), and entire scholarly texts can be found with no reference to women or gender at all. This lack of communication between the field of Security Studies and feminist scholars exists despite the growing influence of feminist thought and practice in the policy world. The passage and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (which mainstream gender in Security Council operations and oblige member-states to include women in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction), and similar initiatives throughout the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF, show that gender is a salient concern in global governance.8 Furthermore, specific international phenomena all show not only women’s significance in international security, but also the relevance of gender as a factor in understanding and addressing security matters—such as, the increase in female suicide bombers,9 growing evidence of the use of sexual violence as a tool of war in conflicts from South Korea to the Democratic Republic of Congo,10 women’s participation as soldiers in armed conflicts around the globe,11 and women’s activism and protests against conflicts (including the war in Iraq).12 Practitioners interested in peacekeeping,13 the study and management of refugees,14 and protecting noncombatants in times of war15 reveal the increasing importance of gender sensitivity to many of the actors that we study in global politics. As Spike Peterson explains, “‘real world’ events are not adequately addressed by androcentric accounts that render women and gender relations invisible.”16

Champion Briefs 219 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

The aff is key to challenging the patriarchal assumptions embedded into our nuclear policies.

Detraz, Nicole. "International Security And Gender." page 4-5. 2012. Web. December 11, 2019. . There has been a general lack of attention to gender in IR scholarship. More importantly, much IR scholarship continues the assumption that gender differences are deterministic; that men and women really do exhibit dichotomous characteristics. Helen Kinsella (2003- 296) argues “by insisting on a definition of sex and gender as if their conceptions are already settled and natural categories - indeed, empirical categories - one completely misses the politics and power of conceptual definition and the relationship of concepts to under-standing. Categories and concepts are not neutral.” Not all feminists agree on what this means for future scholarship. Where disagreement often comes into play is in discussions of what should be done about this and the consequences that are likely to follow.¶ Gender analysis challenges the reduction of people to simplistic assumptions about their identity based on a set of socially con¬structed expectations. Men are one thing and women are another. This disregards the complexity of individuals. Moreover, it tends to assume that generalizations can be made across cultures with regard to the characteristics and experiences of members of gender groups. Some feminists from the global South in particular have critiqued this position and argued this reduces the agency of women who are often viewed as “victims” (Mohanty 2003; Sedghi 1994). This critique is also extended to feminists who disregard the complexity of experi¬ences across the globe, including differing experiences based on race, class, sexual orientation, etc. Peterson and Runyan (2010: 7) explain that “[i]ntersectional analysis holds that there are no generic women and men; our gender identities, loyalties, interests, and opportuni¬ties are affected by intersecting and cross-cutting gender, race, class, national, and sexual identities. Whereas some parts of our identities may confer privilege, others may serve to disadvantage us. For example, a straight, white, middle-class woman in France can have very different experiences, challenges and perspective than a Arab, lower-class woman in Jordan. To imply the fact that both are¶ the larger group of gender is to deny the¶ women makes them equal in¶ complexity of the world. That being said, gender is an important concept in IR because of its role is shaping inequalities in society. In every society, traits and characteristics associated with masculinities are more highly valued than those associated with femininities. This affects both how institutions in society look, and the differential access of men and women to these institutions. Ann Tickner (1992: 7) claims “gender difference has played an important and essential role in the structuring of social inequalities in much of human history and that the resulting differences in self-identications, human understandings, social status, and power relationships are unjustified” This relates to the concept of patriarchy. Cynthia Enloe (2004: 4) explains “patriarchy is the structure and ideological system that perpetuates the privileging of masculinity.”¶ Many differed types of social structures and institu¬tions can be patriarchal. For example when an institution is said to require people who are "‘rational, level-headed, or decisive, as is the case with many powerful Western institutions including public office,

Champion Briefs 220 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

powerful corporations, etc., the institution is privileging characteristics associated with masculinities. Most feminists discuss patriarchy because patriarchal systems marginalize that which is associated with female, leading to the marginalization of women themselves. Both men and women are instrumental in supporting patriarchal systems and their continuation. Feminist scholars do not argue all men actively support the marginalization of women while women are innocent victims in this process. Patriarchy is a deeply rooted process that works in both seen and unseen ways.¶ In sum, gender refers to a set of socially constructed expectations about what men and women ought to be. Gender is distinct from biological sex, and includes - a set of criteria about how people should be. IR scholarship has been slow to incorporate gender and gender concerns in a significant way. This is unfortunate because of the patriarchy has in structuring institutions in ways that value that which is masculine over that which is feminine.

Champion Briefs 221 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Militarized security logic prohibits marginalized communities from engaging with the political.

Ruiz, Tricia. "Feminist Theory And International Relations: The Feminist Challenge To Realism And Liberalism." CSU Hayward. 2012. Web. December 11, 2019. < https://www.csustan.edu/sites/default/files/honors/documents/journals/soundings/Rui z.pdf>. Tickner argues that IR is gendered to “marginalize women’s voices,” and stresses “that women have knowledge, perspectives and experiences that should be brought to bear on the study of international relations.” For example, Tickner would argue that security, a main topic in IR, should not only be understood as “defending the state from attack,” but should also consider that security for women “might be different because women are more likely to be attacked by men they know, rather than strangers from other states.” 10 In other words, in contrast to traditional IR views that view security as protecting the state from other states, feminists argue the topic of security should address acts of rape and violence, not only from foreign perpetrators, but from their own fellow citizens as well. Feminists would also add that occurrences of rape increase during times of war, and is even used as a method of ethnic cleansing among the rivalries within their state, 11 yet would never enter into typical IR discussions that focus solely on stateto-state interaction, simply because IR discussions traditionally remain focused on states as the key actors. Thus, the topic of security shows how gender consideration, excluded from the very beginning of the discussion, results in policymaking that would be subsequently exclusive of, and likely detrimental to, women. Prior to discussing any IR topic, standpoint feminist IR theory would first challenge those participating in the discussion, and those defining the key terms and issues, by critically asking them if the normative perspectives and working vocabulary are broad enough to effectively accommodate issues affecting women.

Champion Briefs 222 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Current rhetoric excludes women's perspectives.

Ruiz, Tricia. "Feminist Theory And International Relations: The Feminist Challenge To Realism And Liberalism." CSU Hayward. 2012. Web. December 11, 2019. < https://www.csustan.edu/sites/default/files/honors/documents/journals/soundings/Rui z.pdf>. Feminist critiques of liberalism address the economic inequalities inherent to free trade, which disproportionately affect women. Jacqui True argues that “male-centered macroeconomic indicators, such as the Gross National Product” undervalue the work of women.18 True also reports that “on a world scale, women are a disadvantaged group: they own one per cent of the world’s property and resources, perform sixty per cent of the labour, [and] are the majority of refugees, illiterate and poor persons.” (Ibid) This suggests that the capitalist structure is a patriarchal one, effectively marginalizing the participation and contributions of women in the economy, since much of their work is reflected in unpaid illegal or domestic settings that are not included in economic assessments. Indeed, liberalist institutions such as the WTO and multinational corporations have tended to create free trade agreements that weaken state protections on labor rights 19 and public social funds, which has served to negatively affect the large proportion of women in the labor force. This in turn camouflages issues of female exploitation, such as the gendered division of labor and the increase in sex trafficking worldwide

Champion Briefs 223 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

The patriarchy will result in extinction and is the root cause of all impacts.

Nhanenge, Jytte. "ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT.". 2007. Web. December 11, 2019. . The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat- dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public,

Champion Briefs 224 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. …Continued… Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust.

Champion Briefs 225 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Only intersectional feminist movements can solve existential militarism.

Pollard, Irina. "Choose Between Cooperation And Annihilation: A Mental Mapping Project Towards A More Generously Dire." Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 13 44-48. 2003. Web. December 11, 2019. . The hostile actions of war are a deliberate attempt to destroy the ecology that sustains life and is, thus, appropriately categorized as 'ecocide'. Popular forms of ecocide are scorched-earth campaigns aided and abetted by bombing and military ground sweeps in order to completely deforest, depopulate and destroy the environment. Since such brutal actions cause long-term and often irreversible damage to ecosystems, militaristic insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are violations of right conduct at many levels, both within human communities, along boundaries of social and cultural difference, and within our broader biotic communities. International militarism and the deployment of scarce resources on sophisticated, or not so sophisticated, weaponry capable of escalating violence can no longer be tolerated despite awareness that warfare is the inevitable consequence of a multitude of humans forced by poverty, mismanagement, greed and population pressures, into overexploiting their natural resources. It is easy to see the cycle of how the resulting ecological poverty then becomes a primary cause of further aggression. Once war is established, the economy then becomes predatory by consuming its scarce resources to further the conflict, trapping its inhabitants in an increasing cycle of war-related debt and further expanding poverty. The one obvious unifying characteristic of all institutionalized and free-wheeling conflicts is the lack of respect for human and environmental rights. War violates fundamental human decency especially when horrific atrocities are perpetrated under the banner of false justice and mock righteousness. If we do not soon curb our high rates of ecologically unsustainable consumption defended through an ecologically disastrous militarism we, as a species, are destined for extinction. By pointlessly destroying the environment without acknowledgment or reciprocity is a losing evolutionary strategy. Let us remind ourselves again that a mature species takes responsibility for the ecological, social, and personal ramifications of all our actions. In order for our differences to become enriching, we must appreciate and claim our intrinsic value within Nature and celebrate our difference with the larger diversity of life. In this context initiatives like Professor Darryl Macer's east-west dialogue is critical (see Eubios Ethics Institute's website). Importantly, recognizing and valuing other expressions of human diversity that contributes constructively to the richness of the human and ecological fabric, whether cultural, social, religious or spiritual, can only stand us in good stead in overcoming our present environmental dilemma. The spiritual impulse towards meaning and value in friendships has to be extended towards the whole of creation. Only this can spell the difference between a friendly environment and no environment for our descendants. International militarism in the form of war and preparations for war is the greatest ongoing threat and obstacle to sustainability and

Champion Briefs 226 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

survival into the future. The rate of ecologically damaging change of the earth under human influences has accelerated to the point that humanity faces the possibility of causing its own extinction and severely damaging the whole biosphere. By appropriating and fighting over all available resources for ourselves, we are witnessing the last desperate struggle for survival of the unique Quaternary fauna and flora developed over the last two million years of geological time, from the Pleistocene to the present. The Quaternary period was characterized by the flourishing of an astonishing diversity of life, including the appearance of Homo sapiens. Therefore, warfare is a costly losing cooperative venture - poisoning our neighbour and wasting common commodities are not matters of privacy or free marketeering or national sovereignty; they are serious ethical offences against others that demand public regulations and prohibitions. The question of justice also means that resolving the problem of poverty is a critical part of any responsible solution to the problem of pollution, as the poor in both developed and developing nations typically are the most adversely affected and have the least options to avoid the toxic effects of pollution. A basic ethical issue involved here is responsibility to future generations, both human and other kind, that are endangered by human over-appropriation. Ecojustice implies the need to change our way of thinking by challenging inherited values and assumptions, particularly those that have supported ecologically damaging practices. We have to relearn acceptable limits of behavior, but since we are the cutting edge of Nature's experiment in consciousness and thoughtfulness, we can work out what needs to be done. We could follow Gaia's ethic by accepting that the wellbeing of each life form depends on the interdependent wellbeing of the whole. The challenge is to develop a diversity of adaptive interrelationships at all levels of life, including symbiotic microorganisms. Scientific research is giving us the knowledge that, at every level, the biology of the ecosystem is shaped by long-term intimate associations with larger organisms such as animals and plants, and that their complexity is further reflected in their interactions with microorganisms. Valuing natural biodiversity in purely economic or monetary terms is an insult to the Biosphere; as is sickening militaristic behavior which should be outlawed. To establish a workable ethical consensus society must be willing to alter its view in the face of new information. It is a simple fact that nothing remains the same. Evolution is inevitable whether it be slow growth and change through natural evolutionary processes, or rapid through our intervention and technological applications deployed either positively or negatively. Emotional maturity tells us how to choose to be responsible while excuses keep us stuck in the present quagmire - we can choose to be a lost cause or we can choose to adapt and become empowered. In a world where the unit of evolution is the group, biodiversity and cooperation is the evolutionary strategy for success. Just as biodiversity provides ecological stability so diversity of human ideas provides national stability.

Champion Briefs 227 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Squo masculine politics in favor of a politics oriented around the individual – that allows feminist theory to be included in the realm of IR.

Ruiz, Tricia. "Feminist Theory And International Relations: The Feminist Challenge To Realism And Liberalism." CSU Hayward. 2012. Web. December 11, 2019. < https://www.csustan.edu/sites/default/files/honors/documents/journals/soundings/Rui z.pdf>. This paper has argued that feminist theory should not be taken as a separate theory within IR, if one considers its relationships and discussion with the main IR theories of realism and liberalism. In its clear opposition against the overall realist theory, feminist theory aligns itself with liberalist ideals, especially through its view of the role of the individual and its emphasis on a cooperative world. Despite its criticisms of liberal patriarchal systems, feminist theory still relies heavily on liberalist international organizations and liberal pursuit of civil liberties in order to achieve gender equality. As feminism continues to widen perspectives in IR, its basic argument for international cooperation makes it a sub-category of liberalism, 21 and helps to strengthen and enhance the liberalist theory. Certainly, there are strong arguments for the contention that liberalist progress has created disproportionate strife and marginalization for women, and that liberalist institutions themselves are gendered in favor of men. So with this in mind, feminist theory distinguishes itself from liberalist theory. However, in the broader context of liberalist theory, with its emphasis on the individual as the main actor – whether male or female — feminist theory and its critiques have a clear epistemological place within IR when liberalist theory is prevalent; whereas in discussions dominated by realism there is no place for the individual. Additionally, there is room for gender reconstruction of liberalist institutions, especially with the expansion of civil society and when women lead grassroots efforts. Civil society generally provides strong arenas for feminist and liberalist discussion on the importance of the individual, regardless of gender. Of course, theory is not equivalent to implementation, and if in the future, liberalist global organizations do not reflect a more democratic structure inclusive of women’s issues, this may signify what some more radical feminists are already predicting: that gendered institutions cannot be changed, but must be remade, regardless of shared ideals of cooperation. Still, liberalist processes of interdependence and globalization are fairly recent inclusions in IR discussions and continue to be challenged in constructive ways by criticism -- liberalist, feminist, or otherwise. There is hope for a growing recognition of the importance of the individual in a cooperative global system.

Champion Briefs 228 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Introducing women’s perspectives into security is crucial to solve for the forms of everyday violence they face.

Ivanov, Georgi. "Why Feminism Is Needed In International Relations." MIC. August 02, 2012. Web. December 11, 2019. . In respect to conflicts, women are among the most vulnerable groups. Kidnappings, sexual crimes, and violent attacks are the most common and underreported offences against women in a conflict setting, and a look at the statistics can substantiate that picture; for instance, less than 3% of signatories on peace treaties are women. The question then transforms into what role women have in managing and settling conflicts. Security-sector reform (SSR) involves demilitarization, the strengthening of rule of law and establishing civilian control over security capacities. SSR is often a long process, and a sustained effort to incorporate gender perspectives coherently throughout all aspects of security reforms is needed. This means working with police, military and justice institutions to gain recognition of crimes against women, gain ground on equal opportunity and essentially empower women to contribute to good ideas and practices related to security. Feminism offers a gender-based viewpoint on SSR that codifies tolerance, openness in crime investigations, and, by extension, a civil debate on the use of force in the first place.

Champion Briefs 229 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Adopting a colorless mode excludes perspectives that could change the ways conflicts are evaluated.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Foreword: Toward A Race-Conscious Pedagogy In Legal Education." S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women. 1994. Web. December 11, 2019. . Minority students across the country have waged a series of protests to draw attention to problems of diversity in the nation's law schools.1 Although the students' bottom line demand is often for the recruitment of more minority faculty and students, the anger and frustration apparent in these protests indicate that the disappointment is not simply over the lack of "color" in the hallways.2 The dissatisfaction goes much deeper-to the substantive dynamics of the classroom and their particular impact on minority students.3 In many instances, minority students' values, beliefs, and experiences clash not only with those of their classmates but also with those of their professors.4 Yet because of the dominant view in academe that legal analysis can be taught without directly addressing conflicts of individual values, experiences, and world views, these conflicts seldom, if ever, reach the surface of the classroom discussion. Dominant beliefs in the objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the conflict by discounting the relevance of any particular perspective in legal analysis and by positing an analytical stance that has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics. I call this dominant mode "perspectivelessness." This norm of perspectivelessness is problematic in general, and particularly burdensome on minority students. While it seems relatively straightforward that objects, issues, and other phenomena are interpreted from the vantage point of the observer, many law classes are conducted as though it is possible to create, weigh, and evaluate rules and arguments in ways that neither reflect nor privilege any particular perspective or world view. Thus, law school discourse proceeds with the expectation that students will learn to perform the standard mode of legal reasoning and embrace its presumption of perspectivelessness. When this expectation is combined with the fact that what is understood as objective or neutral is often the embodiment of a white middle-class world view, minority students are placed in a difficult situation. To assume the air of perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom, minority students must participate in the discussion as though they were not African-American or Latino, but colorless legal analysts.5 The consequence of adopting this colorless mode is that when the discussion involves racial minorities, minority students are expected to stand apart from their history, their identity, and sometimes their own immediate circumstances and discuss issues without making reference to the reality that the "they" or "them" being discussed is from their perspective "we" or "us." Conversely, on the few occasions when minority students are invited to incorporate their racial identity and experiences into their comments, they often feel as though they have been put on the spot. Moreover, their comments are frequently disregarded by other students who believe that since race figures prominently in such comments, the minority students-unlike themselves- are expressing biased, selfinterested, or subjective opinions. The result is that minority students

Champion Briefs 230 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

can seldom ground their analysis in their own racial experiences without risking some kind of formal or informal sanction. Minority students escape the twin problems of objectification and subjectification in discussions when minority experiences are deemed to be completely irrelevant, or are obscured by the centering of the discussion elsewhere. The price of this sometimes welcomed invisibility, however, can be intense alienation. I will elaborate on these dilemmas below.

Champion Briefs 231 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Hearing from those who experience issues firsthand help guide academia and the future generations.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Foreword: Toward A Race-Conscious Pedagogy In Legal Education." S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women. 1994. Web. December 11, 2019. . Referencing Gloria Anzald uá (1990) and other feminist pedagogues, Kathryn Pauly Morgan (1996) asserts that student achievement should happen in the context of an educational community committed to educational equity. It is in this context that students can experience the desired “sense of authenticity … of personal integrity,’’ because, she states, “when we situate ourselves culturally, historically, racially and sexually, we feel … we are being educated in a community where each of us has been fully recognized as a valued, legitimate participant’’ (pp. 108–109). The value of multiple and diverse perspectives in feminist pedagogy can be traced to the works of feminists of color (Davis, 1981, 1989; Lorde, 1984; Moraga & Anzald ua,́ 1984) who have passionately and successfully challenged white feminists’ authority to define feminist theory and practice. The importance of diverse perspectives also is rooted in the feminist concept that the personal is political. One interpretation of this concept is that we cannot gain a full understanding of the systems that oppress us without the personal accounts of multiple and diverse voices. In order to successfully build community among a diverse student body in the class- room, “a democratic educator has to cultivate a spirit of hopefulness about the capacity of individuals to change’’ (hooks, 2003, p. 73). Further, hooks (1994) argues that to build a diverse community in the classroom, there must be “a sense that there is a shared commitment and a common good’’ (p. 40). This is a core goal of the practice of feminist pedagogy, but one that must be constantly addressed, especially given the history of racism and exclusion in previous white feminist movements, and the predominance of white women teachers (Frankenberg, 1993; Maher & Tetreault, 2001). Feminist pedagogy requires that educators create an environment that promotes participatory democracy (Morgan, 1996). This entails attention to content, context, and process, with an egalitarian ethic (Schneidewind, 1983). One of the strongest outcomes of this practice is that by using both affective and cognitive learning methods (Adams, 1997), learning can occur on an exception- ally deep level, and promote “an increased sense of optimism’’ among both agents and targets of oppression *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 232 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

The political climate creates an environment that excludes certain bodies from having equal representation.

Gilson, Hailey. "Women In Politics." The College Voice, Connecticut College's Independent Student Newspaper. September 24, 2018. Web. December 11, 2019. . “The Year of the Woman.” The last time this phrase held significance was in 1992. At the time, only two women were serving in the Senate. Political pundits believed that women were driven to run for government positions as a result of testimony provided by Anita Hill. In 1991 Hill, testified in front of an all male Senate Judiciary Committee accusing Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas of sexual harassment. The committee, as evidenced by its treatment of Hill, did not believe her claims. She was berated and her experience was dismissed without any real investigation, a fact that provoked outrage across the country. hearing gave women an understanding that their interests could not be represented by a largely male Congress. In 1992, white men occupied most government positions. But the hearing inspired a surge of women to run for office. Their shared outrage mobilized them to vote and resulted in a record number of 24 women elected to the House and four women into the Senate. The 1992 elections represented the start of something new. It foreshadowed a more equal representation of men and women in Congress. However, in the years that followed, that hope has not been realized. Today, women make up only 19% of Congress. The 2018 midterms, however, may prove to be a turning point in congressional representation. This year, 468 women are running for the House and 51 women are running for the Senate. Women, enraged by their underrepresentation, understand that Congress needs to look different if things are going to change. In 1992, white women were the primary winners. Today, there is so much more diversity among the candidates, which can potentially create a Congress that actually reflects the demographics of our country. In 2018, Members of the LGBTQIA community witnessed the electoral win of a fellow member Christine Hallquist. Hallquist, a Democrat from Vermont, made history as the first transgender candidate nominated for governorship by a major party. Her nomination is an impressive feat and an important step for LGBTQIA equality. There are many women to watch as this years elections take place. Rashida Tlaib could become the first Muslim woman elected to Congress. She is the daughter of Palestinian parents and understands first-hand the discrimination Arab-Americans face in American society. In local, state, and public offices, more than 90 Muslims individuals have won. Gina Ortiz Jones, a resident of Texas, is also running for a spot in Congress. Jones would not only bring female representation if elected, but would also represent other minority communities as well. She would be the first Filipina-American woman to win, a first generation American, a member of the LGBTQ community, and a Iraq war veteran. Also running for governor is Paulette Jordan of Idaho. If elected, she would become the first female Native American governor. She has spoken about the challenges of running, saying at times that people doubt her abilities and question her decision to run in the first place. These criticisms have not deterred her. Many of the

Champion Briefs 233 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

communities with which these women identify have been struggling in the current political climate. Perhaps by winning, they can be voices for their communities and advocate for policies informed by their diverse personal experiences. The fight for female representation within the government has not been easy. Women face many challenges that men do not. They are constantly under intense scrutiny and work harder to prove themselves. In order to be taken seriously, women cannot let their emotions drive actions. They cannot act aggressively or they may be labeled difficult. They cannot be too soft or they will be perceived as weak. People expect women candidates to be likable to prove that they are qualified, another thing that men do not have to worry about. These stark limitations continue to represent the fine line women navigate through. The voices of women are invaluable. They are essential in the process for attaining equal rights and for enacting laws that deal with issues women face today. Women not running for office have been on the frontlines in their communities through protests and advocacy for the passage of certain laws. Throughout 2018, women of all backgrounds have banded together to become one unifying force fighting for the rights they believe in. History is in the making, and women are at the forefront. 2018 is shaping up to be another “Year of the Woman.”

Champion Briefs 234 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Creating a more inclusive international norm mitigates forms of race and gender based violence.

Larson, Laura M. "The Necessity Of Feminist Pedagogy In A Climate Of Political Backlash, Equity & Excellence In Educat.". 2006. Web. December 11, 2019. . After decades of increasing efforts toward creating multicultural education in the United States, criticism and hostility from white conservatives has created a climate of backlash against the variety of efforts designed to create equity in the classroom. Both Freirean and feminist pedagogies advocate a more just society and personal empowerment by promoting inquiry into individual and collective experiences. As an evolving teaching methodology that is influenced by those who practice it, feminist pedagogy is an essential tool both to deconstruct and to make meaning of the current manifestations of inequality in U.S. society. It provides educators with the means to help students integrate emotional responses to social injustices with cognitive learning. Given the current climate, feminist pedagogy is essential to promoting critical thinking and reflection that leads to transformative learning, student empowerment, and collective action.

Champion Briefs 235 AFF: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Establishing a forum to understand the manifestation of oppression is key to evaluating any impact.

Larson, Laura M. "The Necessity Of Feminist Pedagogy In A Climate Of Political Backlash, Equity & Excellence In Educat.". 2006. Web. December 11, 2019. . One of the core tenets of feminism is that the personal is political (Sarachild, 1978). For feminist pedagogy, this is embodied in the principle belief that every person can contribute to an understanding of how oppression manifests, as well as how the political system perpetuates both systemic and personal oppression (Felman, 2001; Weiler, 1991). In addition, feminist pedagogy proposes that liberation from oppression necessitates that students bring their whole selves to the learning environment. This means that each student brings all of her or his social identities and accompanying histories, feelings about them, understandings, and misconceptions about them. This allows students to engage with the class materials and other participants both cognitively and affectively (hooks, 1994). The manifestation of these beliefs in practice is that feminist curriculum is designed to acknowledge, honor, and call forth students’ emotions, and to view their truths as an inherent part of the learning process. In addition, emotion-based learning is considered to be of equal value as cognitive-based learning (Adams, 1997; Weiler, 1991). Feminist pedagogy validates emotional responses to cognitive-based material, and examines the influence of power and privilege on the perspective of the author. Examples include a cultural anthropology text that omits the voice of those being studied, a biology text that discusses human impact on the environment without identifying the disparate im- pact of pollution on communities of color, or a math text that lacks the perspective of applications in fields that are not male-dominated. We may ask of an English Litera- ture class, “When the author said that he was proud to have made such an accomplishment despite his circum- stances, what feelings came up for you? How does this statement resonate with your own experience of racism? Of white privilege?’’ These questions ask the students not only to respond to the material in a way that includes an emotional reference point but asks them to make mean- ing of the material from the place of that emotional re- sponse. Feminist pedagogy also asks students to contrast their own perspectives with the author’s understanding of his or her experience, especially in regard to social identities. Feminist pedagogy problematizes texts with the goal of helping students understand the complexi-ties of social reality. It provides students with the means of gaining insight into how they (and we) might alter current socioeconomic systems by critically evaluating them and identifying our roles in them.

Champion Briefs 236 A/2: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Localized solutions keep feminism on the fringe – engaging the state is key to solve.

Jaquette, Jane. "Feminism And The Challenges Of The ‘Post-Cold War’ World." International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 5, no. 3. 2003. Web. December 11, 2019. . A second implication of difference is the strategy of autonomy. Feminists differ on whether the state can be made more ‘women-friendly’ ( Jones 1990), and therefore on whether women’s groups should cooperate with the state or keep their distance, and the conditions of politics in many developing countries have led states and political parties to coopt women’s groups, causing them to alter their agendas and lose credibility (Barrig 1994; Price 2001; Yamamoto 2001; Ghodsee 2001). But few feminists defend the state, although it is the only social institution with the legitimacy, scope and credibility to deliver any of the goods feminists seek, from reproductive rights to affirmative action or the recognition that engaging meaningfully in the public sphere provides.25 Those who imagine a new international system based on transnational NGOs and international institutions ignore the fact that norms adopted internationally depend on states to implement them. On the issue of the state and redistribution, in the United States, which plays a critical ideological and financial leadership role in the international system, the term ‘welfare’ has become an epithet. But feminist impatience with the liberal state makes it difficult to counter those who favor ‘market solutions’ to social problems. I fully support efforts to give women greater economic power, but greater access to the market can never achieve anything like parity for women, who remain disproportionately responsible for sustaining families. Despite its very real successes, egalitarian feminism has failed to alter the basic terms of this equation for most women. Difference feminism shows promise in its efforts to address this issue by revaluing care (Folbre 2001; Rothschild 2001; Clement 1998), although it has yet to find a way to make markets respond, and risks adding a feminist rationale to the traditional justifications for a gendered division of labor. Working from either a care or a ‘gender and development’ perspective, however, it is difficult to imagine how to proceed without engaging the state. Local and grass- roots movements can make a difference in women’s lives, both materially and in women’s sense of self-confidence and efficacy. But, in most countries, women’s groups must work closely with governments or remain on the fringe. The devolution of power to local entities is often seen as a boon to women because women’s organizations are often neighborhood based and know local issues well. But local power structures can also be hierarchical, patriarchal, corrupt and even repressive, and in the end it is still necessary to rely on bureaucracies to get things done. Despite criticisms, the experience with ‘women’s machineries’ is not all negative (Sawer 1990; Pringle and Watson 1998), and perhaps it is time to consider systematically how bureaucracies can be made more responsive, rather than assume they are intractable (see Cockburn 1991; Staudt 2001). In countries where there is a strong civil service tradition, the problem with bureaucracies may be as much a result of public ambivalence about

Champion Briefs 237 A/2: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

redistributional policies as a structural flaw of bureaucracies themselves (Cloward and Piven 1998). Where civil service norms are weak and bureaucracies are a primary source of employment, corruption must be addressed before the state can act effectively or legitimately. This suggests an important role for civil society groups. It is precisely in their ability to push bureaucracies into reform, monitor their actions and provide real accountability, and not just as ‘service delivery’ mechanisms, that NGOs have strong roles to play (Yamamoto 2001). In the Nordic experience, Skejie and Siim conclude, a more inclusive citizenship arises from the combination of social activism ‘from below’ and political integration ‘from above’ through political parties and institutions, not one without the other (2000: 357). In Drude Dahlerup’s words (1994), feminists will have to ‘learn to live with the state’.

Champion Briefs 238 A/2: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

IR feminists vastly over simplify the diverse field of international perspective.

Caprioli, Mary. "Feminist IR Theory And Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis." International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197. March, 2004. Web. December 11, 2019. . Conventional feminist IR scholars misrepresent the field of international relations in arguing that IR scholarship as popularly accepted excludes alternative explanations of state behavior, including feminist inquiry, that go beyond structural, state-focused models. Feminist IR theorists, among others, critique the IR field for its state-centric approach and argue that ‘‘a world of states situated in an anarchical international system leaves little room for analyses of social relations, including gender relations’’ (Tickner 2001:146). As a result, they appear to set up a straw man by refusing to recognize the variety within ‘‘conventional’’ IR research. Indeed, as Jack Levy (2000) has observed, a significant shift to societal-level variables has occurred, partly in response to the decline in the systemic imperatives of the bipolar era. Certainly the democratic peace literature, particularly its normative explanation (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), among other lines of inquiry, recognizes the role of social relations in explaining state behavior. The normative explanation for the democratic peace thesis emphasizes the societal level values of human rights, support for the rule of law, and peaceful conflict resolution in explaining the likelihood of interstate conflict. Furthermore, dyadic tests of the democratic peace thesis rely ‘‘on an emerging theoretical framework that may prove capable of incorporating the strengths of the currently predominant realist or neorealist research program, and moving beyond it’’ (Ray 2000:311). In addition, theorizing and research in the field of ethnonationalism has highlighted connections that domestic ethnic discrimination and violence have with state behavior at the international level (Gurr and Harff 1994; Van Evera 1997; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003a, 2003b).

Champion Briefs 239 A/2: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Fem IR recreates oppressive structures within foreign policy.

Stern, Maria. "Feminist Fatigue(s): Reflections On Feminism And Familiar Fables Of Militarization." Cambridge Journal. 2009. Web. December 11, 2019. . In this section we clarify what we mean by the problem of sexgender and how it transpires in the context of feminist narratives within IR – which we will exemplify below with a recounting of a familiar feminist reading of militarisation. To re-iterate, the primary reason for investigating this is that we suspect part of the reason for the aura of disillusionment around feminism – especially as a critical theoretical resource – is connected to the sense that feminist stories repeat the very grammars that initially incited them as narratives in resistance. To explain; one might argue that there has been a normative feminist failure to adequately construct secure foundations for legitimate and authoritative knowledge claims upon which to garner effective and permanent gender change, particularly in regard to women. But for poststructural scholars this failure is not surprising as the emancipatory visions of feminism inevitably emerged as illusory given the attachments to foundationalist and positivistic understandings of subjects, power and agency. If, as poststructuralism has shown us, we cannot – through language – decide the meaning of woman, or of femininity, or of feminism, or produce foundational information about it or her;42 that subjects are ‘effects’ rather than ‘origins of institutional practices and discourses’;43 that power ‘produces subjects in effects’;44 or that authentic and authoritative agency are illusory – then the sure foundations for the knowledge that feminist scholars are conventionally required to produce – even hope to produce – are unattainable. Moreover, post-colonial feminisms have vividly shown how representations of ‘woman’ or ‘women’ which masquerade as ‘universal’ are, instead, universalising and inevitably produced through hierarchical and intersecting power relations.45 In sum; the poststructural suggestion is that feminist representations of women do not correspond to some underlying truth of what woman is or can be; rather feminism produces the subject of woman which it then subsequently comes to represent.46 The implications of this familiar conundrum are far- reaching as the demands of feminism in the context of the knowledge/political project of the gender industry are exposed as implicated in the re-production of the very power from which escape is sought. In short, feminism emerges as complicit in violent reproductions of subjects and knowledges/ practices. How does this recognisable puzzle (recognisable within feminist theory) play out in relation to the issues we are investigating in this article? As noted above, the broad example we choose to focus on to explain our claims is militarisation; partly chosen as both authors have participated in pedagogic, policy and published work in this generic area, and partly because this is an area in which the demand for operationalisable gender knowledge is ever-increasing. Our suggestion is that the increasing requirement47 for knowledge for the gender industry about gender and militarisation re-animates the sexgender paradox which persistently haunts attempts to translate what we know into useful knowledge for redressing (and preventing) conflict, or simply into hopeful scenarios for our students.

Champion Briefs 240 A/2: Feminist IR AC Jan/Feb 2020

Avoiding the political just means the structures will still exist post- movement.

Hooper, Charlotte. "Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, And Gender Politics." Columbia University Press. 2001. Web. December 11, 2019. . The power of such struggles over masculine identities, as I argue, depends to some extent on their taking part in a space that has been naturalized as a masculine space. If the environment is no longer so clearly a masculine one, then some of the imagery loses its genderspecific connotations, while the rest loses the power of naturalization. Cracks in the edifice of masculinism are appearing, not only with the arrival of feminist scholarship and a number of postpositivist fellow travelers who take gender seriously, but also in that gender issues are beginning to be addressed, however crudely, by more mainstream IR contributors.

Champion Briefs 241

Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Hobbes NC

The Hobbes NC goes deep into what Hobbes describes a state of nature in the Leviathan, which outlines a world in which there is absolute anarchy between individuals and between states that house these citizens. The argument in relation to the topic is that nuclear weapons are necessary to keep the world order from falling apart. The main justification for this is that nuclear weapons lead to states practicing mutual restraint from attacking one another. This is because 1. they are afraid for the nuclear response that other states may use against them and 2. state leaders feel that they are ensuring their own security by holding, but perhaps not using, their nuclear arsenal.

This NC is strategic because it can interact well against frankly any aff on the topic. The heavy debate is going to come as to whether or not the deterrence factor is effective in- practice. However, this will be a hard argument to justify on the aff side of things because there aren’t really empirics that prove that. This is good for the negative because the NC will likely rely on heavy philosophy, which can be strategic because this position and the framework can become a short, but strategic outlet to win the round. The aff is somewhat forced to debate against the framework because responses to the contention won’t be as strong, but the neg has the time advantage in the second speech and can devote more time to debating that out or collapsing to something else that was read.

As the affirmative, I think that the best response against this case is to do a lot of impact weighing and try to justify why aff is better under either calculus. I’d also advise the aff to shifting the debate away from the deterrence topic because if deterrence doesn’t matter, then the NC is functionally useless. Perhaps preempts within the affirmative case reading proper may help with this

Champion Briefs 243 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are necessary to prevent major war outbreaks and to deter conflict.

Mansoor, Jibraan. "Questioning Anarchy: Nuclear Weapons As Leviathan." International affairs Forum. Web. December 13, 2019. . The third phase is that of the post-sovereign phase and the post-nuclear weapons phase. Once the sovereign and the social contract are established, the sovereign is left with the major responsibility of preserving each individual and preventing any form of conflict arising between these entities. In international politics, we can see the nuclear weapons acting in the same capacity as that of the Leviathan by preventing the outbreak of any major war. In order to understand how nuclear weapons prevent the outbreak of wars, we first look at the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction which suggests, the usage of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause complete annihilation and hence states try their best to avoid a war which could escalate to such a magnitude.[6] This deterrence caused by nuclear weapons, prevent the states from initiating attacks against others as the costs of such an attack (possible annihilation) highly outweigh the benefits of the same. As seen above in the example of Britain and France, before the presence of nuclear weapons, states took careless actions as the costs of war were less. From that we have a major transformation, wherein states have to make thoughtful decisions and reconsider their decision of going to war as the costs of war are extremely high. This was verified by the incident of the Cuban Missile Crisis wherein Kennedy and Khrushchev rather than directly engaging into war, decided to cooperate and proceed cautiously and hence avoiding a war or mutually destroying each other even though the Tactical Air Command promised that an American strike against Soviet missiles in Cuba would certainly destroy 90%.[7] Another massive example of the nuclear weapons having the capacity to deter even preemptive attacks was seen during the exercise of Able Archer 83 wherein the NATO simulated a conflict escalation program including the training of how to deal with DEFCON 1 Nuclear strikes as well. Operation Ryan of the Soviets led the Soviets to believe that the Able Archer 83 signified that a first strike on the Soviets was inevitable.[8] Yet the Soviets didn't launch a pre-emptive strike even though the situation seemed to follow the dangers in which anticipatory self-defence can be expected which are highlighted in the Caroline Test of 1837.[9] The Soviets seemed to have understood that even with a pre-emptive attack the chances of Mutual Assured Destruction were inevitable. Hence they chose to avoid the attack due to the threat posed by nuclear destruction. Another example of the same is the Norwegian rocket incident.[10] All these incidents show a transformation from carless decisions in a chaotic system where outbreak of wars were extremely likely to thoughtful decisions and prevention of major wars. This transformation is the result of the presence of nuclear weapons. This also reinforces my earlier point of how nuclear weapons act as an overarching structure in preventing major wars and hence can be considered as the Leviathan of International Politics to some extent.

Champion Briefs 244 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Conflict likelihood drops when nuclear weapons are in play--stability between countries is maintained.

Mansoor, Jibraan. "Questioning Anarchy: Nuclear Weapons As Leviathan." International affairs Forum. Web. December 13, 2019. . There might be contentions claiming that Nuclear weapons don't have an absolute power on states due to the stability-instability paradox which allows for low intensity conflicts even with the presence of nuclear weapons and hence the nuclear weapons can’t be considered as the Leviathan due to absence of absolute control. A quantitate research conducted by the Journal of Conflict Resolution on the effects of nuclear weapons verified the presence of the stability instability paradox. But the research added that when a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, where one state has nuclear weapons and their opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. In contrast, when there is mutual nuclear weapon ownership with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of even low intensity conflicts drop precipitously.[11] Hence it brings about a possibility of reduced number of low intensity conflicts if nuclear weapons are increased horizontally. Empirically this can be shown by Jack S Levy’s data in the War in the Modern Great System which claims that the number of wars have dropped down drastically from 1945-1990 which can be attributed to being as the nuclear weapons era as well. Europe through 1945-1990 saw only one major war between a ‘great power’ and a minor power’ while it witnessed a total of 55 wars from 1792-1945. The assertion that countries do not wish to go to wars with other countries possessing nuclear weapons can be clearly argued using the document, titled “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence” taken out by Policy Subcommittee of the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) of the United States Strategic Command. The document acknowledges the Mutual Nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia and then goes onto claim that if any country (which poses a threat to the United States or its allies) has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons from its nuclear technology, that country will be met with a pre-emptive strike. If we go by the words of the document, we would have seen a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Iran which can allegedly easily possess nuclear weapons at 90% Uranium Enrichment from its current nuclear enrichment or we would have seen a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As far as the idea of low scaled conflicts goes, the mere refrain which the United States of America has shown by not launching an attack on Iran in spite of the constant threats issued by Iran on blocking the Strait of Hormuz showcases the fear each country has of the possibility of a low scaled conflict escalating into a nuclear war and ipso facto avoiding conflicts as much as they can.

Champion Briefs 245 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons give states confidence and means to mutually prevent conflicts.

Mansoor, Jibraan. "Questioning Anarchy: Nuclear Weapons As Leviathan." International affairs Forum. Web. December 13, 2019. . Waltz in his paper, titled “Structural Realism of the System” claims that the presence of nuclear weapons merely is a change in the system and not a change of the system. Through this discourse, we have seen the parallels between the Leviathan and Nuclear Weapons wherein both act as coercive powers preventing conflicts. We have also seen the transformation of a system where carefree decisions could be made, wars could break out without major costs being prevalent to a system where thoughtful decisions have to be made and the chances of major wars breaking out are extremely low. Hence this paper shows that we as a society post the presence of nuclear weapons have undergone a systematic change wherein the nuclear weapons just like the Leviathan prevents major wars from breaking out.

Champion Briefs 246 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons allow nations to be mutually respectful of one another--prevents war and outright monopoly.

GALLAROTTI, GUILIO. "The Enduring Importance Of Hobbes In The Study Of IR." E-International Relations. January 10, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . Who could say this is not relevant in today’s relations among nations. There is in fact no definitive rule of law in international relations because there are no overarching governing institutions among nations that can guarantee a nation’s security. Nations are all indeed sovereign, which means each holds a monopoly on the use of force domestically, but no institution or actor can claim a monopoly on the use of force over nations themselves, i.e., there is no international 911. There are actors and institutions that can function like an international 911: international organizations, superpowers, and alliances. Many of these de facto 911s have indeed interceded to impose and/or maintain order and law over recalcitrant nations (NATO in the Balkans, UN peacekeepers in numerous places, the US in Kuwait, etc). The list is quite long, but there is no actor or institution that you can call which can guarantee your safety. It is one thing to say that there is a high likelihood that the community of nations will intervene to prevent egregious acts of violence against nations or groups of people, but quite another to say that such intervention is guaranteed. Even a high probability is still not 100%. And it is precisely this element of uncertainty that drives nations to behave in a manner that we glean from the logic of Hobbes in his famous passages on anarchy from the Leviathan. Many scholars talk about a more civilized world in which the use of force is waning (deterrence, interdependence, etc—see below), but just because the large-scale use of force is not as useful does not mean it cannot be used. It is interesting to see that dominant nations that hold a near monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons are frightened over the possibility of smaller nations owning even one nuclear device. Needless to say that it is inconceivable that such new nuclear powers could ever envisage using such a device against a better armed opponent (which would be suicidal), yet nations that are fairly invulnerable to the treat feel the need to eliminate even that one out of 10,000 chance that such a device could be used. Nations still have to be prepared to help themselves, or what the realist catechism refers to as “self-help.” This puts a great deal of emphasis on the possession of material resources (i.e., hard power) that can be used to protect a nation against acts of violence. And in fact, we see that virtually every nation that can field an army indeed does so. Those nations that do not are either under the security umbrella of larger nations, or are of a size that fielding an army would not serve as a viable protective strategy, i.e., could not adequately protect themselves (e.g., Palau, , Liechtenstein, Grenada, Tuvalu, Nauru). Those that like to speak of the proximity of the international system to a system of law will highlight modern-day restraints against barbaric uses of violence. Indeed it is a fact that there are some acts so egregious as to be considered unlikely. But realists would call attention to the mass genocides which have occurred recently

Champion Briefs 247 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

and are occurring today in this modern-day system that embraces human rights and the sanctity of law. Indeed, what is more inconceivable than a system of powerful nations allowing one million Rwandans to be slaughtered when it could have been prevented at a modest cost economically. The reference here is to the famous Dallaire faxes to the UN, which definitively warned of a planned genocide against the Tutsi population of Rwanda. Dallaire pleaded for months to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to deploy a force to prevent the bloodshed. But no action from the UN was forthcoming and hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were slaughtered soon afterward.

Champion Briefs 248 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons maintain stability of world order because all parties are fearful of anarchic society.

GALLAROTTI, GUILIO. "The Enduring Importance Of Hobbes In The Study Of IR." E-International Relations. January 10, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . So why is life not nasty brutish and short in anarchy? While the behavioural manifestations of the Hobbesain state of nature are quite visible (no guarantees of protection from other nations, self-help) among nations, the predicted systemic outcomes among groups of individuals in Hobbesian state of nature are far from visible on a widespread scale in the community of nations. Indeed the world system is not pervaded by a war of all against all, nor is it mired in a generally brutish and nasty environment with respect to the use of violence. And for nations life is not short. While many critics would say the reason for this disjuncture between anarchy in the world polity and Hobbes’ state of nature among individuals is the fallacy of composition: behavioural properties among groups of people cannot be imputed communities of individuals comprised in the nation-state.[12] But the answer is more complex, because indeed nations have governments that conceptualize national interests with respect to the nation as a unit. And because governments often act as if the nation itself such is a sacred unit, the thought process of surviving in a world without a guarantor should be functionally similar whether the actor is a state or individual (i.e., governments frame their policies as representing the nation- unit). So if indeed anarchy promotes fear among individuals in a state of nature, it should also promote some fear among nations even if nations themselves are less physically vulnerable relative to individuals. Aside from the rationales of realists defending the analogy of Hobbesian states of nature to the international system (war cannot go on constantly, alliances of convenience account for much cooperation, etc), still there is still a large error term in the realists’ predictive model. There is far more restraint and far more substantive cooperation in the international system that can be accounted for by visions that predicate behaviour on rational actors in seeking to assure prosperity and security in an anarchic environment. A number of changes in the world have tempered the pernicious nature of anarchy among states. Nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, globalization and the proliferation of international organizations have injected a great deal of restraint in international relations today. The changes have been so significant that Jervis (2002) identifies a new era among great powers, one in which the idea of large-scale war is unthinkable. Indeed, within the global state of nature, we now have a pronounced “security community.” Even within the ranks of realist scholarship, there is a disproportionate allegiance to a more restrained vision of realism, i.e., defensive realism. In this strand of the theory states are seen as seeking to maintain their positions in the system rather than being engaged in an endless quest for territory (Snyder 1991).

Champion Briefs 249 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

The US is already developing a major nuclear weapon program that is sufficient, but not realistic for legitimate nuclear war.

, PressTV. "Trump." PressTV. February 03, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . The administration of US President Donald Trump has recently revealed Washington’s new approach to nuclear weapons and their role in US . The newly released 75-page strategy, known as the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), emphasizes the development, deployment and expansion of low-yield atomic weapons on the premise that they are more usable than older generation nukes, which are much more powerful and destructive, but are never really an option when it comes to actual warfare. The review also calls for a complete overhaul of the US nuclear weapons infrastructure. The document then outlines its “tailored approach” against what it calls hostile and threatening nations, namely Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.

Champion Briefs 250 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

States like the US maintain strategic ambiguity on their nuclear arsenals to deter conflict with other countries.

, PressTV. "Trump." PressTV. February 03, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Hobbesian nature of Review Renowned 17th century British political philosopher Thomas Hobbes viewed the human condition in the state of nature -- where no government, no civilization or no common power to restrain human nature exists -- as a situation where humans are each other’s wolves and life is “solitary, nasty, brutish and short.” According to Hobbes, with the advent of government, such a situation is largely alleviated inside countries; however, the state of nature exists at all times among independent nations. The preface to the NPR written by US Defense Secretary James Mattis is by definition a Hobbesian approach to the overall issue of international relations and the specific issue of weapons development and probably the most significant revision of US nuclear strategy since the Cold War. "We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be," the defense secretary said in his preface accompanying the report. "Given the range of potential adversaries, their capabilities and strategic objectives, this review calls for a flexible, tailored nuclear deterrent strategy." Based on a realpolitik approach to international affairs, not one based on moral or humanitarian principles, Mattis writes that the new strategy actually encourages “adversaries that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly than they can tolerate, it in fact raises that threshold." In the document itself, alarming statements can be found that could concern any country that finds itself at odds with the US for any given reason. For example, the NPR clearly states that “it remains the policy of the United States to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a US nuclear response.” Thus the document leaves the door open to use nuclear force as the US president pleases disregarding any international convention or law. Given past conduct of the US in Japan and recent breaches of international law in Iraq, such wording is at the very least disturbing.

Champion Briefs 251 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Recent US leadership proves--a Hobbesian approach is strategically sound for maintaining world peace and domestic security.

, PressTV. "Trump." PressTV. February 03, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . In a final analysis, Mattis reveals the Hobbesian approach of the Trump administration’s foreign policy by emphasizing that global security is not necessarily the product of international cooperation or international law, but is the byproduct of a nuclear armed peace, one that rests on the nuclear capabilities of the United States: “This review rests on a bedrock truth: nuclear weapons have and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future. US nuclear weapons not only defend our allies against conventional and nuclear threats, they also help them avoid the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals. This, in turn, furthers global security.”

Champion Briefs 252 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapon possession is necessary and inevitable for states that value and pursue security.

Fadaie, Shakiba. "CONTENDING THEORIES: REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE NUCLEAR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY." UBC. December 05, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Historical roots of realist way of thought are deduced from prominent thinkers Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. In particular, deterrence theory occurs from the act of balancing power capability. Pursuit of self interest within the Hobbesian state of anarchy is analogous to to the current nature of state interaction. Written in 1651, Thomas Hobbes asserted that the lack of international authority fabricates a “state of nature” where the life of man is “solitary, poore, nasty, bruttish, and short.”[4] The continual fear and the looming danger of violent death pushes man to constantly seek self-interest, such as material gain, self security, and ultimately, survival. Given the lack of global governance today, I infer that nuclear weapon attainment increases security for a state by inciting fear in opposing nations. Cover of the Leviathan, 1651. (Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, 1651. Menston: Scolar P.) For realists, the anarchic nature of humans (and thus the international system) is presented as the foundation affecting all behaviour and thus largely accounts for the structural logic of state interactions. Hobbes’ creation of Leviathan, a sovereign power possessing ultimate control, offers an escape from the state of nature. The lack of such a sovereign in the international realm today forces states to pursue security through material capability, such as the possession of nuclear weapons. The disproportionately immense levels of funding invested in military and weapons capability among great nation-states is attributed in their strive for security and survival. Adoption of the realist viewpoint, in sum, inexorably leads to the conclusion that all states that can go nuclear, should go nuclear – and the sooner the better.[5] Nuclear proliferation, through the lens of realism, is thus inevitable.

Champion Briefs 253 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

The Middle East proves--nuclear weapons have been key to stability and non-nuclear states have little deterrence capability.

Fadaie, Shakiba. "CONTENDING THEORIES: REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE NUCLEAR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY." UBC. December 05, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . It is for similar reasons Kenneth Waltz argues Iran should be allowed to possess nuclear weapons capability. For realists, states are analogous to billiard balls interacting with one another. What occurs within the billiard balls themselves (domestic or internal politics) are of little concern to realists. The reasoning follows: If states such as Israel, US, and France can possess nuclear weapons, why shouldn’t Iran? With nuclear weapon attainment, Waltz argues Iran can effectively put an end to Israel’s regional monopoly and achieve stability in the Middle East.[6] Neorealist theory rests primarily on three assumptions: all states are rational actors, states operate in a state of anarchy, and the international arrangement begets a self-help system.[7] Although intuitive and forthright, the realist perspective runs into trouble as they are often accused of offering nothing “but a naked struggle for power.” [8] They also fail to account for the numerous states that have the ability to go nuclear, but still have not made the transition. It is estimated that only one-fifth of the states with the capacity for building nuclear weapons have done so.[9] Moreover, the pace of nuclear proliferation has been essentially unaltered since the 1950s, begging the question of the deterrence rationale behind nuclear non-use.

Champion Briefs 254 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

The approach of people who don't support nuclear weapons are idealist and inherently problematic.

Fadaie, Shakiba. "CONTENDING THEORIES: REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE NUCLEAR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY." UBC. December 05, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . While the realist camps attribute nuclear non-use to theories of deterrence and mutually assured destructive capabilities, idealists would emphasize the role of international organizations in their efforts to stop nuclear proliferation and use. States are part of a “community” where common norms, and values are shared, leading to stability and peace through ongoing negotiations. This fosters a reduction of uncertainty by providing information and generating narratives of mutual identification.[14] The nuclear counter culture that followed in the 1950s, resulted in procession of anti-nuclear weapon treaties suggesting success of idealist theories of cooperation. After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, America saw an upsurge in protests against nuclear weapons testing. The looming fear of the outbreak of a nuclear war persisted and ushered the beginning of a counterculture era. It wasn’t long before the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists created the Doomsday Clock in 1947, which illustrated that the “closer to midnight” we were, the higher the risk of a nuclear war breakout. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Freeze Movement, the Nevada Desert Experience and Russell-Einstein Manifesto were all parts of a colossal effort to eliminate nuclear weapons. In particular, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) gave social movements a platform to operate upon. Established in the 1970s, the NPT aims to control nuclear proliferation through active verification, transparency, and irreversibility.[15] In efforts to promote disarmament, international relations theorists suggest the NPT has successfully established the non-use of nuclear weapon as a norm. While realists and idealists alike recognize the harsh realities of the anarchical world, liberals place emphasis on treaties like the NPT, contending that states are able to cooperate and reach mutual gains. Through the obedience of norms and institutions that promote collective security, the NPT aims to stabilise the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Champion Briefs 255 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Treaties that seek to eliminate nuclear weapons lead to the opposite of progress in terms of peace and stability--answers I Law affs.

Fadaie, Shakiba. "CONTENDING THEORIES: REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE NUCLEAR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY." UBC. December 05, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . At first glance, nuclear weapon treaties such as the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty and Iran Deal may appear pioneering and fruitful. However, upon deeper analysis, the NPT only binds its signatories, therefore, non-signatories such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Sudan are not bound by the treaties provisions. Additionally, since coming into force in 1970, the NPT has been unable to restrain non-nuclear weapons states from developing nuclear weapon capability. A prime example is North Korea, Iraq, and Iran prior to the JCPOA. Article six of the NPT states “all states party to pursue negotiations in good faith toward three specified ends: (1) ending the nuclear arms race at an early date; (2) achieving nuclear disarmament; and (3) achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament.”[18] However, the reality of the nuclear stalemate persists: no nuclear armed states have fulfilled their commitment to disarmament. To date, the nuclear weaponized states that signed the NPT still possess the same amount of nuclear weapon arsenals, if not more. Although the IAEA has a legal right to inspect suspicious countries, subsequent UN action is uncertain. In conjunction with weak enforcement mechanisms and little change in current arsenals, the regressive realities of the NPT only become clear upon consideration of the minimal effects it has on nuclear proliferation in the long term.

Champion Briefs 256 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons do not embolden states and their leaders, but lead to restraint on behalf of them.

Cohen, Michael D. "Fear And Loathing: When Nuclear Proliferation Emboldens." Journal of Global Security Studies. 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Conclusion The Soviet and Chinese cases provide strong support for the hypotheses that new nuclear powers are initially emboldened to act assertively and only exhibit restraint after leaders experience fear of imminent nuclear war. Contrary to what rational deterrence theory suggests, costly signals are insufficient to generate restraint. Khrushchev learned from his own cognitively available Suez experiences that nuclear weapons threats can yield geopolitical dividends. The ALF model developed here explains Soviet assertion and why Khrushchev later authorized a restrained foreign policy in the face of a still dangerous security environment. The ALF model explains assertiveness toward the US position in Berlin from 1959, when Khrushchev developed what he thought was a survivable deterrent, and is indeterminate regarding Soviet assertion in the Middle East in 1956.While rational deterrence theory can explain why Khrushchev was emboldened to revise the status quo, it cannot account for the importance of fear of imminent nuclear war in deterring him from later aggression. As mentioned above, costly signals did not result in deterrence, even when perceived probabilities of war and the costs of nuclear escalation remained constant. These findings challenge the common narrative surrounding the deterrence impact of costly signals. Only fear of imminent nuclear war retrained the actions of Khrushchev and Mao. Policymakers tend to view emboldenment of new nuclear powers as a serious threat. However, proliferation debates have not accounted for the tempering effect of experience with nuclear weapons, and more specifically with nuclear brinkmanship. The theory developed here fills this gap in the literature by focusing on how experience with nuclear coercion tempers nuclear emboldenment over time. By considering the impact of fear of nuclear war, I found empirical support for the claim that inexperience with nuclear weapons and, more specifically, nuclear crises leads to emboldenment, while experience at the nuclear brink tempers this. The availability of personal successes with nuclear threats explains why a country might persist with nuclear coercion, but such boldness is eventually mitigated when such threats cause a nuclear crisis. Costly signals that do not cause fear of imminent nuclear escalation were insufficient to moderate new nuclear power aggression. Paradoxically, nuclear proliferation is dangerous when leaders believe nuclear assertion to be safe—and nuclear weapons become safe when leaders learn that nuclear assertion is dangerous. One might counter that Khrushchev’s replacement in October 1964 by the less erratic Brezhnev actually supports Hymans’ thesis related to the importance of individual ideology because policy change correlated with leadership change. But policy change occurred in late 1962, after the Cuban Missile Crisis and two years before the Soviet leadership change in late 1964. Any personality-driven explanation must explain why Khrushchev

Champion Briefs 257 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

persistently strove to get his way between 1959 and 1962, but accepted the earlier untenable status quo between November 1962 and October 1964. A skeptic may also counter that, if new nuclear powers tend to be conflict-prone and experienced nuclear powers do not, the development of nuclear weapons is much more important than learning about leveraging them in foreign policy endeavors.6 But this argument cannot explain the correlation between leader experiences and policy preferences. Later leaders who also experienced the crisis will tend to authorize restrained policies; other leaders in experienced nuclear powers may develop beliefs that cause them to authorize nuclear assertion, but this should be rare. Leonid Brezhnev directly experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis as presidium chairman and, consistent with my theory, authorized mostly restrained foreign policies when he subsequently came to power. When Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met President Johnson after Khrushchev’s ouster, the Russian was quick to point out that he had been ordered to inform Johnson that Soviet policy “remained unchanged” and that Moscow would “adhere steadfastly” to “the pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the relaxation of tensions” (Humphrey and Sampson 2001, 55). The US Ambassador pointed out that Moscow’s policy statements “essentially repeats the previous coexistence line” (Humphrey and Sampson 2001, 57). Deputy Premier Kosygin also emphasized policy continuity to the US Ambassador, noting in particular his desire to “preserve all existing channels of communications with President Johnson” (Humphrey and Sampson 2001, 63). By March 1965, Moscow had grown alarmed by Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War. Despite again raising the problem of European security and a German peace settlement, Moscow did not take advantage of Johnson’s preoccupation with Southeast Asia to take another potshot at West Berlin. McGeorge Bundy noted in November 1965 that Dobrynin, two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, “referred nostalgically to the period in which there was intimate communication with President Kennedy” (Humphrey and Sampson 2001, 141). Leaders’ direct experience with the benefits and limitations of nuclear coercion has an independent effect on foreign policy. This effect becomes clear when examining the actions of successors who may not find the earlier nuclear crises cognitively available. Experienced nuclear powers might authorize assertive policies if their leaders perceive nuclear coercion as safe. It is questionable whether Khrushchev and Mao’s lessons of nuclear assertion from the 1960s have been passed on to Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, who have revised their regional status quos amid substantial nuclear force modernizations. The case of Richard Nixon also points to the independent effect of leaders’ beliefs about nuclear weapons. He incorrectly learned that nuclear coercion offers significant geopolitical advantages from his personal involvement as Vice President with Eisenhower’s Korean War nuclear threats (Kimball 2003, 15). Nixon proclaimed to the Republican National Convention in 1968 that “what we’ve got to do is walk softly and carry a big stick, and we can have peace in this world” (Kimball 2003, 65). His White House chief of staff recalled that the president “saw a parallel between Eisenhower’s coercive threat to ‘end … the Korean War’ and his own Vietnam War ambitions” (Haldemann 1978, 83). This analysis suggests several lessons for both scholars and policymakers regarding nuclear proliferation, emboldenment, and international conflict. Leaders new to the helm of a new nuclear state will likely be emboldened in the short-term but should tend to behave more moderately over the longer run after they encounter nuclear brinkmanship and specifically a nuclear crisis. If North Korea or Iran develop nuclear missiles, costly signals and moderate

Champion Briefs 258 Neg: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

foreign policies likely will not temper their emboldenment. Indeed, it is likely that Pyongyang and Tehran would attribute restraint on the part of the United States and international community to their own nuclear weapons—furthering their belief that persistence with coercion pays. The United States and its allies must instill enough fear in leaders Pyongyang and Tehran that nuclear escalation is a real possibility while also reducing their incentives to strike first through committing to Iranian and North Korean leaders that their regime will survive if they back down. Striking the balance between destroying offensive military power and credibly committing to live with such weak regimes will be difficult. Nuclear emboldenment may appear to endanger international peace and stability because limited aggression by nuclear powers is often hard to deter, but looks can be deceiving. Nuclear proliferation is dangerous when leaders believe that nuclear assertion is safe, but it becomes safe when leaders find such weapons dangerous. The spread of nuclear weapons may have other effects, but long-term emboldenment is not one of them.

Champion Briefs 259 A/2: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Programs that implement expansive use of nuclear weapons could create an arms race that could potentially start wars.

, PressTV. "Trump." PressTV. February 03, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Will the new Trump strategy work? Reactions to the review have been largely negative, and besides moral and ethical considerations, experts have cited both economic and strategic shortcomings as major obstacles to Trump’s nuclear approach. Security experts have also expressed concern about how the document is “war prone,” saying that constructing more “usable” nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of a nuclear war. Three weeks before the official release of the NPR, James Jatras, a former foreign policy analyst for the US Congress, told Press TV in an interview that the Trump administration’s new policy of constructing more “usable” low-yield nuclear weapons increases chances of nuclear war. It seems Trump is not making the decisions himself, but had been “misled” by “professional” military leaders to make such decisions, Jatras said. He warned that such new measures would escalate an arms race between the US and other major world powers, namely Russia and China the main “adversaries” mentioned in the report, which as a result would develop their own weapons to counter the new US arsenal. Joseph Cirincione, a nonproliferation expert at the Ploughshares Fund, said the new strategy — combined with Trump's volatile approach to international threats — could lower the threshold for employing nuclear weapons. "This strategy gives him a massive rebuild of the current Cold War arsenal, complete with new missions and new weapons, to include responding to a cyberattack with a nuclear bomb," Cirincione said. "This plan, coupled with this president, greatly increases the risk of nuclear war." “President Trump is embarking on a reckless path — one that will reduce US security both now and in the longer term,” said Lisbeth Gronlund, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists. She said the Trump administration was blurring the line between nuclear and conventional war-fighting. Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan anti-nuclear proliferation think tank in Washington, has also warned that the US is "on the cusp of a new era of nuclear proliferation." The financial burden of the new strategy is also a concern for a country burdened with $21 trillion in debt. The price tag of Trump’s new strategy is somewhere in the vicinity of 1.2 trillion dollars. A recent report from the Congressional Budget Office says the cost of a 30-year overhaul is around $1.2 trillion, more than 20 percent higher than earlier estimates. To sum up, while some aspects of the Trump nuclear doctrine, like the expansion of low-yield nukes, might seem necessary in the eyes of Washington in order to curb what it sees as Russian influence, the high cost-benefit of such an approach, coupled with vague declarations in the document and unprecedented levels of nuclear weapons expansion, could fan the flames of an arms race and make the document a potential war starter.

Champion Briefs 260 A/2: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

The presence of nuclear weapons is more likely to lead to a state of nature than escape it--fosters a culture of supremacy among states.

Bull, Hedley. "Hobbes And The International Anarchy." social reasearch - An International Quarterly. 2015. Web. December 13, 2019. . One has only to utter these words to raise the question in every mind: what about the effects of nuclear weapons? Cannot nuclear war today take precisely the form of the single, instantaneous blow that Clausewitz said it never could be? Cannot war now be "absolute in its results," resulting in the extinction of not merely the political entity of the state but the physical existence of a whole people, thus admitting of no possibility of being considered "a passing evil that can be remedied"? Moreover, is not the nuclear weapon system the great equalizer of states in the international anarchy, at least in respect of their vulnerability, and will not the inexorable spread of nuclear weapons throughout the international system have the effect that the conditions which Hobbes attributes to individual persons in the state of nature will be reproduced? If it was once true that the condition of anarchy or absence of government was more tolerable for states than for individuals, is it so any longer? We are still at the beginning of the nuclear era. The system of states is not yet, and may never become, "a unit veto system" in which each state has the capacity for instant and catastrophic destruction of every other. Our experience of nuclear proliferation so far suggests that it does not eliminate inequalities in vulnerability. Whether or not the new factor of nuclear weapons should impel states toward a contract of world government, we have to note that it has not in fact had that effect. On the contrary, the increased vulnerability of states and peoples is widely taken to provide a new guarantee of peace, making the international anarchy not less but more tolerable than it was before. The Hobbesian fear of death that lies behind the system of mutual deterrence has operated to freeze the nuclear powers in their state and posture of gladiators rather than to impel them toward attempts to escape from the international anarchy.

Champion Briefs 261 A/2: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

The presence of nuclear weapons is more likely to lead to a state of nature than escape it--fosters a culture of supremacy among states.

Bull, Hedley. "Hobbes And The International Anarchy." social reasearch - An International Quarterly. 2015. Web. December 13, 2019. . One has only to utter these words to raise the question in every mind: what about the effects of nuclear weapons? Cannot nuclear war today take precisely the form of the single, instantaneous blow that Clausewitz said it never could be? Cannot war now be "absolute in its results," resulting in the extinction of not merely the political entity of the state but the physical existence of a whole people, thus admitting of no possibility of being considered "a passing evil that can be remedied"? Moreover, is not the nuclear weapon system the great equalizer of states in the international anarchy, at least in respect of their vulnerability, and will not the inexorable spread of nuclear weapons throughout the international system have the effect that the conditions which Hobbes attributes to individual persons in the state of nature will be reproduced? If it was once true that the condition of anarchy or absence of government was more tolerable for states than for individuals, is it so any longer? We are still at the beginning of the nuclear era. The system of states is not yet, and may never become, "a unit veto system" in which each state has the capacity for instant and catastrophic destruction of every other. Our experience of nuclear proliferation so far suggests that it does not eliminate inequalities in vulnerability. Whether or not the new factor of nuclear weapons should impel states toward a contract of world government, we have to note that it has not in fact had that effect. On the contrary, the increased vulnerability of states and peoples is widely taken to provide a new guarantee of peace, making the international anarchy not less but more tolerable than it was before. The Hobbesian fear of death that lies behind the system of mutual deterrence has operated to freeze the nuclear powers in their state and posture of gladiators rather than to impel them toward attempts to escape from the international anarchy.

Champion Briefs 262 A/2: Hobbes NC Jan/Feb 2020

Hobbesian fear is institutionalized with nuclear weapons present.

Bull, Hedley. "Hobbes And The International Anarchy." social reasearch - An International Quarterly. 2015. Web. December 13, 2019. . Nuclear weapons are a new factor in world politics, but the behavior of states in relation to them has provided new illustrations of Hobbes's thesis. Since the rise of the strategic nuclear stalemate in the 1950s, the fear of death, the first of the passions inclining men to peace, has galvanized the contending superpowers to practice discipline and restraint and to recognize common interests, even while remaining in competition with one another. Natural reason, suggesting to them how rules of co-existence can be drawn up enabling them to protect these common interests, has enabled them to improvise "articles of peace" in areas such as arms control, the avoidance and control of crises, the demarcation of spheres of influence, where existing positive law and precedent offer little guidance. While the superpowers in this sense follow Hobbes's injunction to seek peace, they at the same time prepare to defend themselves and to deter one another. The relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence, on which our hopes for nuclear peace precariously rest, institutionalizes the Hobbesian fear

Champion Briefs 263 NEG: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Rawls NC

This case argues that liberal democratic states (those with elections, checks-and- balances, bills of rights, free markets, etc.) ought to possess nuclear weapons in order to deter “outlaw states” (those that violate human rights and have no democratic institutions). John Rawls made this brief case for nuclear deterrence, as well as the formulation above of “outlaw states,” in his seminal book The Law of Peoples (1993). Rawls is famous for his book A Theory of Justice (1971), where he argued that an ideal society would guarantee basic, material goods and individual rights, establish democratic institutions, and minimize arbitrary inequalities. He wrote The Law of Peoples in order to apply this basic framework (known as the “Equality Principle” and the “Difference Principle”) to the foreign policies of liberal democratic societies, beyond their domestic concerns. Rawls spends very little time on the subject of nuclear weapons, but in addition to his defense of deterrence he argues that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US in World War Two was unjust. The actual use of nuclear weapons requires the willful murder of civilians, and Rawls also questioned whether nuclear weapons were actually critical to winning the war. Rawls did not reconcile his two points on nuclear weapons so neatly, but one could argue following Walzer (whom Rawls was fond of) that it is better to threaten evil so that it is never done. From an Affirmative perspective, your best bet would be either to critique Rawls’ idea of liberal democracy (because the aff isn’t wedded to any particular political theory), or to focus harder on the deterrence question. The neg has to win that nuclear weapons would actually dissuade outlaw states, yet much of the Aff literature questions whether “rogue states” (North Korea, for instance) can be dealt with rationally.

Champion Briefs 264 NEG: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are justified to keep outlaw states from harming liberal democracies.

Rawls, John. "The Law Of Peoples." Harvard University Press. 1993. Web. December 09, 2019. . I shall only briefly mention the question of controlling nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Among reasonably just liberal and decent peoples the control of such weapons would be relatively easy, since they could be effectively banned. These peoples have no reason for going to war with one another. Yet so long as there are outlaw states--as we suppose--some nuclear weapons need to be retained to keep those states at bay and to make sure they do not obtain and use those weapons against liberal or decent peoples. How best to do this belongs to expert knowledge, which philosophy doesn't possess. There remains, of course, the great moral question of whether, and in what circumstances, nuclear weapons can be used at all (see the discussion in [Section] 14).

Champion Briefs 265 NEG: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Even though nuclear weapons keep outlaw states at bay, the point of deterrence is to prevent nuclear weapons from being used. My framework agrees that using nuclear weapons against innocent civilians is wrong.

Rawls, John. "The Law Of Peoples." Harvard University Press. 1993. Web. December 10, 2019. . (iii) In the conduct of war, well-ordered peoples must carefully distinguish three groups: the outlaw state's leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population. The reason why a well-ordered people must distinguish between an outlaw state's leaders and officials and its civilian population is as follows: since the outlaw state is not well-ordered, the civilian members of the society cannot be those who organized and brought on the war. This was done by the leaders and officials, assisted by other elites who control and staff the state apparatus. They are responsible; they willed the war; and, for doing that, they are criminals. But the civilian population, often kept in ignorance and swayed by state propaganda, is not responsible. This is so even if some civilians knew better yet were enthusiastic for the war. No matter what the initial circumstances of war (for instance, the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Ferdinand, by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo in June 1914; or the ethnic hatreds in the Balkans and elsewhere today), it is the leaders, and not the common civilians, of nations who finally initiate the war. In view of these principles, both the fire-bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities in the spring of 1945 and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all primarily attacks on civilian populations, were very grave wrongs, as they are not widely, though not generally, seen to have been.

Champion Briefs 266 NEG: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Well-ordered peoples, or communities that respect human rights, have a right to self-defense. This allows for wars in the defense of rights and democratic institutions, but not for the sake of wealth or empire.

Rawls, John. "The Law Of Peoples." Harvard University Press. 1993. Web. December 10, 2019. . 13.2 Well-Ordered Peoples' Right to War. No state has a right to war in the pursuit of its rational, as opposed to its reasonable, interests. The Law of Peoples does, however, assign to all well-ordered peoples (both liberal and decent), and indeed to any society that follows and honors a reasonably just Law of Peoples, the right to war in self-defense. Although all well- ordered societies have this right, they may interpret their actions in a different way depending on how they think of their ends and purposes. I will note some of these differences. When a liberal society engages in war in self-defense, it does so to protect and preserve the basic freedoms of its citizens and its constitutionally democratic political institutions. Indeed, a liberal society cannot justly require its citizens to fight in order to gain economic wealth or to acquire natural resources, much less to win power and empire. (When a society pursues these interests, it no longer honors the Law of Peoples, and it becomes an outlaw state.) To trespass on citizens' liberty by , or other such practices in raising armed forces, may only be done on a liberal political conception for the sake of liberty itself, that is, as necessary to defend liberal democratic institutions and civil society's many religious and nonreligious traditions and forms of life.

Champion Briefs 267 NEG: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Disarmament leaves liberal democracies vulnerable to rogue states.

Doyle, Thomas E. "Liberal Democracy And Nuclear Despotism: Two Ethical Foreign Policy Dilemmas." Ethics & Global Politics 6:3. 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . Two implications seem to follow from these arguments. The first is that liberal democracies which eschew nuclear deterrence*i.e. undertake a course of action which the United States, Great Britain, and France have abandoned*would and do not necessarily escape these dilemmas. Such eschewal might preserve for a time the constitutional practices and respect for the rule of international law that are necessary elements of liberal political order. However if Rawls is correct that rogue states have no interest in sustaining a political relationship with their enemies, then a de-nuclearized society of liberal and decent peoples in a post-Hiroshima world is entirely vulnerable to any determined rogue nuclear aspirant. Liberal democracies cannot avoid the decision on how much risk they are willing to assume in order to avoid the path of nuclear despotism.

Champion Briefs 268 NEG: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

The military has to prioritize responding to contingencies that are low-probability yet high-magnitude.

Chilton, Kevin. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. November, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . Skeptics may ask, what are the odds of that happening? The point is no one knows for sure. But thinking about this event and devising ways to prevent or minimize its likelihood is the job of the US military. For “red-zone” events on the classic risk matrix, particularly those with low probability but extremely high consequence, the nation expects the military to pay attention and not simply assume away the risk. When a military capability exists that threatens national survival it is not the role of the military to weigh the odds of its use. History has taught us that when a military capability exists, the will to use it can change in very short order—unless the decision maker is effectively deterred.

Champion Briefs 269 A/2: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are unjust because they put the entire human population at risk--Rawls goes aff.

Leavitt, Neal. "The Foreign Policy Of John Rawls And Amartya Sen." Lexington Books. September 25, 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . As discussed in the introduction, Rawls offers clear answers to this question in The Law of Peoples. He notes that the ideal democracy must possess nuclear weapons to deter outlaw states. He also notes that the civilians of an outlaw regime can be targeted in a supreme emergency--when the existence of a democracy is directly threatened. However, in A Theory of Justice, the situation is a little harder to read. Rawls references nuclear weapons only once in this text. In particular, Rawls cites the text Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience-- published in 1965, three years after the Cuban Missile Crisis--as an example of a critical stance an individual can take up towards nuclear war as a strategy of defense. A just war, the authors argue, cannot involve the total destruction of human life on the planet. A form of pacifism--in regards to nuclear war--is affirmed. And while Rawls himself does not explicitly identify nuclear war in the main body of A Theory of Justice, he does make the following statement: "The aim of war is a just peace, and therefore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and mankind in jeopardy." (italics mine) In the quote, Rawls makes the same argument the authors of Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience make. Any strategy that is based on "assured destruction" is not a just strategy of national defense. The means pursued in national defense cannot end humanity or put humanity as a whole at risk. In this way Rawls shows his distance from the policies of the Cold War--and the rapid construction of thousands of nuclear weapons that took place during this period.

Champion Briefs 270 A/2: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Rawls overlooks the crucial problem of nuclear despotism---liberal democracies can't possess nuclear weapons without undermining their avlues.

Doyle, Thomas E. "Liberal Democracy And Nuclear Despotism: Two Ethical Foreign Policy Dilemmas." Ethics & Global Politics 6:3. 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . The foregoing suggests that Rawls is committed to the claim that a liberal democracy’s nuclear weapons are necessary for national security and that they do not threaten its constitutional practices or its commitments to international law and the rule of law generally. However, Daniel H. Deudney challenges this claim by arguing that nuclear weapons are intrinsically despotic: Whatever their formal constitutional principles, all nuclear-armed states have become ‘monarchical’ because decision making about nuclear use has devolved into the hands of one individual, creating what has been termed a ‘‘nuclear monarchy’’ or an ‘‘absolute monarch.’’ Nuclear explosives are intrinsically despotic for three related reasons: the speed of nuclear use decisions, the concentration of the nuclear use decision into the hands of one individual, and the lack of accountability stemming from the inability of affected groups to have their interests represented at the moment of nuclear use. Nuclear despotism increases the possibilities of nuclear use because of the inherent fallibility and corruptibility of the lone individual.25

Champion Briefs 271 A/2: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Rawls' defense of nuclear weapons didn't foresee contradictions between nuclear weapons and liberal values---nuclear weapons rely on a security logic that upends constitutional restrictions.

Doyle, Thomas E. "Liberal Democracy And Nuclear Despotism: Two Ethical Foreign Policy Dilemmas." Ethics & Global Politics 6:3. 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . The rest of LP does not contain remarks that permit a definitive prediction on Rawls’s likely response to the foregoing analysis. Given his reliance on Michael Walzer’s account of just war doctrine,31 I believe Rawls might have argued that liberal democracies facing hostile nuclear- armed powers must be prepared to put physical security before concerns for constitutional devices and liberties. After all, nuclear aggression is probably the most severe case of ‘supreme emergency’ imaginable and constitutional devices are worthless if liberal society has been destroyed.32 If I am right on this point, it is likely that the context surrounding the various nuclear threats to liberal society is enmeshed in contradictory normative pulls. However, it also means that Rawls did not foresee two important implications of his view*i.e. how the implementation of liberal nuclear deterrence can ensnare liberal peoples with an illiberal and immoral appetite for nuclear retaliation and how the need to secure the country against rogue state and terrorist leads to the weakening of constitutional liberties.

Champion Briefs 272 A/2: Rawls NC Jan/Feb 2020

Liberal democracies have a legal obligation to follow the NPT and disarm.

Doyle, Thomas E. "Liberal Democracy And Nuclear Despotism: Two Ethical Foreign Policy Dilemmas." Ethics & Global Politics 6:3. 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . The second argument is that liberal democratic NPT Article VI commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament, as well as respect for the rule of international law generally, have been undermined by the nuclear-armed democracies’ indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. This indicates a conflict between competing ethical requirements. On the one hand, liberal nuclear- armed democracies within the NPT regime are legally and ethically bound to nuclear disarmament and, on the other hand, to secure liberal society from rogue state (nuclear) threats. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and some other nuclear-armed democracies have maintained that Article VI disarmament obligations are no longer binding. Instead of honoring those obligations, these democracies have transformed the NPT regime from the collective pursuit of nuclear arms control and disarmament to a disciplinary institution in which the nuclear haves can effectively disregard their legal obligations and where the nuclear have-nots are punished if they entertain nuclear aspirations. However, the nuclear- armed democracies are wrong that the duty of nuclear abolition is objectively dissolved. Rather, they have attempted to evade the dilemma by subverting the NPT regime. Similar to the first argument, then, this choice to retain nuclear arms and transform the NPT regime does not dissolve the dilemma, even though it might be perceived that way by some.

Champion Briefs 273 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Realism NC

This case argues that nuclear weapons are necessary for states’ security in an international order with the following characteristics: (1) There is no central authority (or world government), so states can only rely on themselves for protection, (2) No state can verify with 100% accuracy the intentions of other states, (3) ‘Revisionist’ states will believe its in their self- interest to over-take other countries unless they’re deterred by stronger states, and (4) cooperation and diplomacy are inadequate, and conflict is inevitable. This is a cursory summarization of the ideas of John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar known for his theory of ‘offensive realism’ in The Tragedy of Great-Power Politics. Whereas ‘classical realism,’ popularized by Hans Morgenthau, said that states have a moral obligation to become stronger and act selfishly, Mearsheimer believed that states are unavoidably (or tragically) locked into the aforementioned dynamics if they want to survive. The framework would have a standard of “maximizing relative state power,” and the contention argues that nuclear weapons are necessary for a state’s self-defense via deterrence (as nuclear weapons prevent large-scale conventional wars, in addition to nuclear war, other WMD attacks, etc.). You can also read a contention about state’s legitimate motivations for having nuclear weapons, and argue that even if nuclear weapons have problems (accidents, nuclear terrorism, potential deterrence failure) states should make their own decision as to whether nuclear weapons improve their security. From an Affirmative perspective, your best bet is to show that your contentions already engage with the pragmatic questions of this case, and also to defend a theory of ‘defensive realism’ (states don’t want to rock the boat, they prefer win-win outcomes from diplomacy, global disarmament is feasible and makes the world more secure).

Champion Briefs 274 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Prolif risks increase if states abolish nuclear weapons before creating regimes for regular reporting, gradual reductions, and transparency.

Doyle, Thomas. "Moral And Political Necessities For Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied Ethical Analysis." Strategic Studies Quarterly. June, 2015. Web. December 07, 2019. . Many experts and security scholars believe that nuclear disarmament requires a gradual series of preliminary confidence-building measures undertaken by the NWS and key NNWS. These measures are considered crucial for decreasing mistrust among rival NWS—rewarding their cooperation, and thereby making it more likely that the NWS’s verbal commitments to nuclear disarmament will be enacted. The 13 steps outlined in the Final Report of the 2000 NPT Review Conference comprise the most succinct and authoritative list of such measures.18 The 13 steps were the product of intense lobbying of the NPT NWS by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) states, which formed in 1998 and were originally comprised of the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, , Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden.19 The NAC 1998 declaration claimed that the NPT NWS had made insufficient progress on their NPT Article VI disarmament commitments in the three years following the 1995 indefinite renewal of the NPT and the time had come to specify concrete measures that would count as good faith efforts to honor those commitments. As evidenced by the 2000 RevCon Final Report, the NAC succeeded in convincing the NPT NWS to commit to the 13 steps, which are: 1. immediate and unconditional commitment to a CTBT; 2. verifiable moratorium on all nuclear testing until the CTBT’s entry into force; 3. immediate effort within the Conference on Disarmament to bring into force a treaty on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices in a reliable and verifiable manner, otherwise known as the FMCT; 4. immediate effort to establish the mandate for nuclear disarmament within the Conference on Disarmament; 5. commitment by all states to applying a principle of irreversibility on nuclear disarmament; 6. “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI”; 7. immediate undertaking to advance the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties between the United States and Russia, and the strengthening of the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty which had been in force since the Cold War period; 8. completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); 9. taking of concrete steps by all NWS toward nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and security, such as a. unilateral nuclear arms reductions, b. increased transparency in the same, c. continued reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, stocks, d. de-alerting of nuclear weapons, e. diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, and f. engagement by all NWS in good faith negotiations toward nuclear disarmament; 10. placement by all NWS of fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA verification protocols; 11. reaffirmation by all NWS of the ultimate objective of nuclear abolition; 12. regular reports by all

Champion Briefs 275 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

NPT states parties on the progress in implementing Article VI; and 13. further development of verification capabilities that will ensure compliance by all to their NPT obligations.20 The reader might notice the apparent redundancy in this list, insofar as points 4, 6, 9, and 11 repeat the nuclear abolitionist demand in different ways. Clearly, the NNWS sought to emphasize that each step counts as an important indicator of the NPT NWS’s commitments to nuclear disarmament. Yet, at least some NWS are as reluctant to commit to the 13 steps as they are to ascribe to nuclear abolition itself. Thus, it should be emphasized that the most important preconditions of nuclear disarmament actually precede the realization of the 13 steps. Indeed, realizing the steps or nuclear abolition prior to instantiating these preconditions would be morally and politically irresponsible, leading to a reinvigoration of nuclear proliferation among the great powers.

Champion Briefs 276 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Disarmament fails if nations are motivated by security dilemmas--- they'll cheat because they can't trust adversaries.

Doyle, Thomas. "Moral And Political Necessities For Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied Ethical Analysis." Strategic Studies Quarterly. June, 2015. Web. December 09, 2019. . The case of Gorbachev is once again illustrative. He had exposure to the new thinking of the Palme Commission and the antinuclear thinking of the Pugwash Conferences.39 In light of the various and severe economic and political challenges facing the Soviet Union at the time, Gorbachev began to see Soviet security not in terms of constantly being against the United States but with it on matters of joint concern. And although Soviet economic decline weighed heavily on his mind, it was this new thinking that enabled Gorbachev to act contrary to conventional national-security wisdom, to initiate conciliatory policies towards the United States at the very time Reagan was undertaking a significant arms buildup, and eventually to persuade Reagan of the necessity of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world.40 The upshot is that it is dangerous and morally irresponsible to compel the NWS’s adherence to the 13 points and ultimately nuclear disarmament in the absence of new security thinking. Any leader who remains committed to the old security thinking is likely to look for opportunities to cheat or subvert an imposed disarmament mandate. In contrast, leaders motivated by new security thinking are not likely to look for such opportunities but rather seek to fulfill their disarmament commitments.

Champion Briefs 277 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Steps toward nuclear disarmament require states to send costly signals that induce their own vulnerability, which is morally wrong.

Doyle, Thomas. "Moral And Political Necessities For Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied Ethical Analysis." Strategic Studies Quarterly. June, 2015. Web. December 07, 2019. . However, each decision about sending costly signals to rivals or enemies and inducing vulnerability of one’s state is made in the context of uncertainty about some future act of reciprocation. Unless several rounds of confidence-building measures have already been completed, it is extremely difficult for a state leader to estimate the risks of betrayal by rivals or enemies if one is the first to send a costly signal. Moral consequentialists who are risk averse would likely argue that inducing state vulnerability by acceding to the CTBT or committing to a principle of irreversibility is politically and morally irresponsible. Consequentialists who are not risk averse would likely argue the opposite. Kantian deontologists might apply one or more of the preliminary articles for perpetual peace to say that state vulnerability is morally required, and yet some measure of prudence must be retained in deciding on the kind of signal sent and the means of sending it.60 Regarding this approach, a costly signal that corresponds with moral responsibility is a function of a nonideal coordination between moral duty and ends-means rationality. Accordingly, suppose an organized and irresistible global antinuclear movement succeeds in raising the political costs of NWS’s disarmament avoidance beyond tolerable levels, and suppose also that not all NWS leaders have begun to exercise security-dilemma sensibility. The political pressures on NWS to induce a virtuous cycle of cooperation or to reciprocate in turn on nuclear disarmament policies will introduce the risks of state vulnerability. Any costly signal that one NWS sends carries the risk that other NWS or key NNWS will not reciprocate in relevant ways. It seems only Kantian deontology can ground an argument that inducing such vulnerabilities is morally responsible. Moral consequentialist arguments most likely will argue that making states vulnerable in such ways is morally irresponsible because the risks of betrayal are too great. Thus, even if these consequentialists accept that a world free of nuclear weapons is morally preferable to a world of nuclear-armed states, the risk of acquiring such a world makes inducing state vulnerability morally irresponsible. This conclusion is decisive if it is true that morality follows rationality.61 It follows from the immediately preceding paragraphs that the question of the morality of inducing state vulnerability for the purpose of achieving conformity to the 13 steps and to the broader moral requirement of nuclear disarmament is morally dilemmatic. Unless a virtuous cycle of cooperation has already been initiated, the chances of moral failure are significant for leaders who take the first step of sending a costly disarmament signal. Additionally, in the absence of reliable future knowledge, the moral arguments for or against inducing state vulnerability might be reduced to questions of risk aversion. At any rate, it cannot be unambiguously argued that compelling state vulnerabilities in the name of compliance with the 13 steps or ultimately nuclear disarmament is morally responsible.

Champion Briefs 278 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

The motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons can.

Doyle, Thomas. "Kantian Nonideal Theory And Nuclear Proliferation." International Theory. 2010. Web. December 07, 2019. . Second, it is a mistake to reduce or confine post-Cold War nonproliferation policy to matters of strategic or technological rationality. Thomas Schelling argued that ‘the emphasis (of nonproliferation studies and policy) has to shift from physical denial and technology secrecy to the things that determine incentives and expectations’ (quoted in Solingen, 2007). If Schelling is right, the focus of American policy should not continue to emphasize the regulation or containment of flows of nuclear materials and technologies to non-nuclear-weapon states. Instead, it should address the state- or regime-level insecurities and humiliations that provide reason for nuclear-threshold states to abandon nonproliferation commitments (see, e.g. Campbell et al., 2004; Hymans, 2006; Solingen, 2007; Doyle, 2009a, b). It should recognize that nuclear aspirant motivations are in turn framed by particular moral psychologies, both religious and secular (see, e.g. Hashmi and Lee, 2004; Hymans, 2006). The values expressed by these beliefs are themselves anchored to diverse ethical commitments about the collective good, natural and political rights, and obligations that attend international legal agreements. The sources of these conceptions are outside the domestic and international law (even if such law expresses them). Likewise, it should recognize that moral beliefs anchor the non- and counterproliferation proposals and policies put forward by countries such as the United States (Doyle, 2009a). It is thus reasonable to recognize that nuclear weapons and/or nonproliferation policy ought to not be framed by this dubious distinction between necessity and morality.

Champion Briefs 279 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

The aff's idealistic critiques of deterrence ignore the realities of an anarchic international system---that breeds complicity in the evil of nuclear aggression.

Doyle, Thomas. "Kantian Nonideal Theory And Nuclear Proliferation." International Theory. 2010. Web. December 07, 2019. . The Wrongful Intentions Principle dictates that it is wrong to intend to do something that it is wrong to do. It is, for instance, wrong to murder or kidnap others and it is wrong to intend to commit those acts. Accordingly, the argument against nuclear deterrence by Kantians during the Cold War is that (1) it is wrong to use people within national defense institutions to carry out nuclear warfare and, hence, (2) it is wrong to issue threats to other countries requiring the creation and administration of institutions to carry out nuclear warfare if deterrence fails (Kavka, 1978; Tucker, 1985). Now, under ideal conditions, the need for nuclear (and perhaps conventional) deterrence would not arise. But, under the kind of anarchy that corresponds to the present world system (Bull, 1977; Wendt, 1999; Lebow, 2003), where a few countries are nuclear-armed and the rest are not, it might seem that the Wrongful Intentions Principle – or the Categorical Imperative itself – is insensitive to the ethical requirement to prevent the evils of nuclear aggression. A rigorous adherence to right action and intention regardless of the outcomes might have the perverse effect of permitting evil outcomes. This is one reason advanced by realists to think that Kantian ideal moral theory is not adequately equipped to deal with the issue of nuclear security threats and the need for deterrence (Nye, 1986).

Champion Briefs 280 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence prevents great power wars, both conventional and nuclear. The impact is millions of deaths.

Huessy, Peter. "The Case For A 21st Century Deterrent." Gatestone Institute. March 22, 2016. Web. December 09, 2019. . A former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations produced a chart some years ago showing annual deaths per capita prior to the nuclear age, in an era when only conventional deterrence existed. Surprisingly, after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the worldwide per capita death toll from armed conflict during the next half-century dropped 80%, and during the next seventy years, by more than 90%.[3] In the half-century before 1945, two conventional world wars were fought, which included the use of chemical weapons and the fire-bombing of cities. Add to that devastation the deaths from the Nazi Holocaust and the mass murders committed in the USSR by Stalin and his successors, and it is clear that hostile behavior by states was the norm even before the nuclear age. Retired General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to two U.S. Presidents, once remarked that the two world wars were a testament to the fragility of traditional conventional deterrence.[4] Since 1945, however, large- scale war between nuclear-armed powers has been avoided. That is not to say that there have been no conflicts between states. The fight between totalitarianism and freedom took the form of a cross-border war in Korea, subversion and guerilla warfare in Vietnam, and state- sponsored terrorism in Africa, Central America and the Middle East, to name just a few. The fight continues today, in the post-Cold War era, despite the "end of history" narrative that promised armed conflict would pretty much end.[5] Potential major conflicts, however, still are prevented by the U.S. nuclear deterrent: on the Korean peninsula; between China and Taiwan; in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. Conflict continues, of course, in the form of Iranian and North Korean terrorist activity, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, continued Russian subversion in Ukraine and elsewhere, and in various terrorist activities in Africa and the Middle East. Those conflicts have not been prevented even by conventional capabilities, let alone U.S. nuclear deterrent forces. Nevertheless, is the prudent response to jettison a significant portion of U.S. nuclear capability? The new post-Cold War era still requires the prevention of any number of possible crises from escalating into armed conflict between any of the nine nuclear-armed nations. The era also requires stopping existing conflicts from becoming wholesale nuclear wars.

Champion Briefs 281 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons deter Russia and China from carrying out major attacks on the US. Because adversaries don't want to risk armageddon, nuclear weapons ensure crisis stability.

Huessy, Peter. "The Case For A 21st Century Deterrent." Gatestone Institute. March 22, 2016. Web. December 09, 2019. . The weapons or military assets of one's adversaries -- the weapons one would need to hold at risk or target -- are precisely the instruments of state power on which these enemies rely for their status as global or regional powers and prestige. Holding such assets at risk gives the U.S. president the ultimate "stick" with which to threaten to take away the adversary's power: his military assets. Today, non-state terrorist organizations also have such assets, as seen from fighting ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hamas Hezbollah, the FMLN and FARC. Thus, holding at risk, or being able to destroy a significant number of, say, Russian submarines, missile silos, bomber bases, and other instruments of military power, thereby leaving Russia unable to act as a major power, is not an attempt to "go first" in a crisis or "get the jump" on one's enemies. Instead, it merely places at risk all the instruments of state power -- consisting of hundreds of militarily critical targets -- upon which, for instance, a Russian or Chinese head of state relies for world power status. This plan requires a nuclear deterrent capable of striking back at an enemy with sufficient surviving nuclear warheads, even after absorbing an enemy's initial strike against one's own military assets. A deterrent strategy such as the U.S. has today leaves nuclear-armed adversaries with only one sound choice in a crisis. Either they risk "Armageddon" and use all their nuclear weapons early in a crisis, to avoid seeing any of their military assets destroyed by the U.S. in a subsequent retaliatory strike; or they stand down, not launching their nuclear weaponry, and instead seek to end any crisis through diplomatically. This is the essence of deterrence. It is one that the late American diplomat Paul Nitze described as the "Not Today, Comrade" option.[10] Today it would be, "Not Today, Jihadi." Such a deterrent strategy, as advocated here and reflected in America's current nuclear modernization plans, stands the test of logic. If an adversary used all its nuclear forces against the U.S. in a first strike, such an attack would invite a massive retaliatory strike from the U.S. that would leave an attacker completely destroyed. But that, of course, requires a survivable U.S. deterrent force to begin with; not one subject to being eliminated by an enemy's first strike because the U.S. deterrent was so small that it was no deterrent at all. According to the Obama administration, to guarantee maximum flexibility in a crisis so that a president can be confident he has a survivable deterrent, a robust deployment of 1550 warheads is required, on a mixture of 12 submarines, 400 ICBMs and 40-60 bombers. Fortunately, this is the number the U.S. can field under the 2010 New Start Treaty with Russia. Having a nuclear deterrent strategically dispersed among over 500 nuclear assets -- submarines, land-based missiles, and bombers -- means that any enemy attempt to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal before the U.S. could use it, would require an unambiguous attack. If an

Champion Briefs 282 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

adversary, such as Russia, were to deploy its entire arsenal against the United States, the attack would involve over fifteen hundred warheads. The U.S. would know from where most of the warheads would be coming: ICBMs flying over the North Pole could easily be seen by U.S. early- warning satellites. U.S. allies also would see preparations, such as weapons platforms moved, for such a strike. Enemy forces would have to be moved from a day-to-day alert status to heightened alert if there were plans to destroy U.S. nuclear forces in their entirety. That is why the U.S. has, and is planning to keep, more than 500 nuclear assets, including submarines, bombers, and silo-based missiles capable of surviving even the most massive strike. Deploying only 250 warheads, however -- all of them on submarines, as many minimal deterrent advocates have proposed -- would make such a secure retaliatory force impossible to maintain. It would also so minimize the size of the U.S. deterrent forces -- to fewer than 10 targets -- as possibly to invite an attack. By contrast, a flexible U.S. nuclear deterrent policy, based on keeping a large deployment of day-to-day survivable forces -- numbering over 500 missiles, submarines and bombers -- leaves the president options. There is no need to act rashly. An enemy could then be informed that any attack, no matter how large, would invite such a massive retaliation that no benefit whatsoever would accrue to the attacker. Such a force also would allow the president, during a crisis, to make the U.S. deterrent even more survivable over time, by putting more U.S. submarines to sea and placing U.S. bombers on alert or in the air. Such a new nuclear force of submarines, bombers and ICBMs, which the U.S. is now beginning to produce (albeit after much delay), would allow the U.S. to threaten the entire range of an adversary's military assets, and not be limited only to striking back at an enemy's cities. These twin capabilities -- having a survivable force day-to-day and an even more highly survivable force over time -- would avoid putting all one's nuclear eggs in one minimalist leaky basket. The strategy is called "crisis stability": giving no nuclear power the incentive to strike first, and providing the world with the stability it needs to avoid Armageddon.

Champion Briefs 283 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons may not have coercive effects, but they're still an effective deterrent--[aff cards that cite Sechser and Fuhrmann are misapplying their book].

Petrucelli, Joe. "Book Review, Nuclear Weapons And Coercive Diplomacy By Todd S. Sechser And Matthew Fuhrmann." Strategic Studies Quarterly 11:3. October, 2017. Web. December 10, 2019. . In their timely analysis of nuclear coercion theory, Sechser and Fuhrmann convincingly argue that in today’s world nuclear states do not possess more coercive power than other nonnuclear states. The lessons they identify in their study of nuclear coercion have important implications, not just for nonproliferation efforts but also for deterrence theorists, particularly in the analysis of nuclear signaling challenges. Importantly, lest any nuclear critics try to use their work as evidence for disarmament, they point out that many of the challenges with coercion are not an issue for deterrence and “it would be a mistake to assume that nuclear weapons are irrelevant just because they do not have coercive effects.”

Champion Briefs 284 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is a legitimate means of self-defense and conflict prevention. States have an obligation to protect their citizens.

Tertrais, Bruno. "In Defense Of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality, And Cost-Effectiveness Of Nuclear Weapons." Security Studies Center. October, 2011. Web. December 10, 2019. . By contrast, deterrence, which aims at preventing major State aggression, can be considered as one of the most ethical conflict prevention devices. At the very least, it can claim the moral high ground. In the name of what should it be considered immoral to prevent the materialization, for instance, of a major biological threat – the effects of which on populations could be as extreme and indiscriminate as a massive nuclear one – by the promise of retaliation? Deterrence and International Law That said, is nuclear deterrence in conformity with international law? The practice of States has made it part of customary law: for several decades, most great powers have assured their security – and that of their allies – through nuclear weapons.45 Nuclear Weapons, Self-Defense and Belligerent Reprisals But what about use? Even though deterrence is about the threat and not the actual employment of nuclear weapons, the legal characterization of such use is not without consequence on the credibility and the political sustainability of nuclear deterrence in Western societies based on the rule of law. Self-defense is part of natural law. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter only recognizes this principle. It specifies that nothing in the Charter should impair this inherent right. Traditional criteria for self-defense include necessity and proportionality. The necessity condition – If faced with a major aggression – whatever the means employed by the adversary – the defending party might have no option other than to employ nuclear weapons to stop it, especially if he is the weaker party from a military standpoint. The necessity condition can thus be fulfilled. If its survival was at stake, international law should not prevent a State from defending itself with nuclear weapons: this is what an ICJ judge has called the “absolute defense” [excuse absolutoire].46 The “Responsibility to Protect” (the principle according to which any UN member has the responsibility to protect its own population) could be used to support the concept of nuclear deterrence.47

Champion Briefs 285 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence works even against so-called "irrational" countries.

Tertrais, Bruno. "In Defense Of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality, And Cost-Effectiveness Of Nuclear Weapons." Security Studies Center. October, 2011. Web. December 10, 2019. . As for deterrence vis-à-vis major powers, a word of caution is in order. Even those who claim that the possibility of a new major threat in the coming two decades is close to nil have to admit that today’s partners can become tomorrow’s enemies in much less time than that. (Libya is, to some extent, a case in point.) The potential adversaries of Western countries may have value systems different from ours, and exercising credible deterrence vis-à-vis them would not be easy. But there is no reason to believe that they are “irrational”. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and China have shown that they perfectly understood the logic of deterrence through the threat of retaliation. Most of the regimes that are possible objects of Western nuclear deterrence (Iran, China, North Korea…) have shown throughout their history that they could, just as the Soviet Union had during the Second World War, bear a very high number of civilian casualties during a conflict. In dealing with such regimes, threatening centers of power is not only a moral choice: it is also a rational one.99

Champion Briefs 286 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are key to deterrence.

Chilton, Kevin. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. November, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . Fundamentally, we have nuclear weapons to deter attack on the United States and our allies. Further, with regard to our allies, the US nuclear deterrent is meant to assure them that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal to deter adversary aggression against them as well. We offer this “nuclear umbrella” so as to strengthen our alliances and also encourage our allies to not develop their own nuclear deterrent. In essence, nuclear assurance is a fundamental and demonstrably effective part of the US nonproliferation policy.

Champion Briefs 287 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence has been one-hundred-percent successful since 1945.

Chilton, Kevin. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. November, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . Historical evidence and reason lead me to believe that the US nuclear deterrent has successfully accomplished its purpose since 1945. In fact, nuclear weapons are the one set of military systems that have been 100 percent successful in their assigned mission. They have deterred attack on the United States and its allies, assured our allies, and, though not specifically called out in US policy, deterred major nuclear powers from engaging in global conventional warfare on the scale we witnessed in the first half of the last century. However, there is no evidence that our selfimposed policies and constraints have constrained any other nucleararmed or nuclear-aspiring power. Simple prudence now demands that we take steps necessary to ensure the continued health of our current nuclear deterrent. We must recapitalize all elements of the triad and make the appropriate investments in the Department of Energy infrastructure and human capital to ensure that presidents in 10, 20, 30, 40 years and beyond have the necessary tools at hand to effectively deter against all existential threats.

Champion Briefs 288 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

The US uses nuclear weapons every single day: to deter. And it works.

Chilton, Kevin. "Defending The Record On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. March, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . The argument presented is this: if we are never going to use nuclear weapons, why are we wasting so much money sustaining them? The reality is the United States uses its nuclear weapons for their most fundamental purpose every day: to deter an attack on the US and to assure our allies. Nuclear deterrence is a 24/7 operation conducted by dedicated professionals in our intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fields, in our command and control centers, and aboard our ballistic missile submarines. Our adversaries see our 24/7 alert postures and consequently assess an attack on the US or its allies to be an unthinkable choice. The United States uses its nuclear weapons every day to do the mission they were designed for: to deter. Of note, the Russians have been using their nuclear capabilities to deter and coerce. Just after invading Crimea, Russia released a video of an exercise showing Pres. Vladimir Putin giving the order to launch a nuclear strike. The next clip shows a ballistic missile launching from a submarine in Murmansk and impacting on the Kamchatka Peninsula 20 minutes later. He was sending a signal using his nuclear capability to warn the world not to challenge his illegal invasion of sovereign Ukrainian territory. Further, after Sweden expressed interest in joining the NATO alliance, Russia conducted a nuclear exercise aimed against Sweden. In a subsequent white paper, Sweden stated that it was stepping back from its earlier interest in NATO membership because it would upset Russia.Again, US nuclear weapons are used every day to deter, while Russia uses its nuclear capability to deter and coerce in support of an expansionist agenda. The differences in these roles for nuclear weapons is profound.

Champion Briefs 289 NEG: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Global zero is an unattainable goal, and nuclear deterrence saves millions of lives.

Chilton, Kevin. "Defending The Record On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. March, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Many talk about global zero as a desirable goal. After all, if we could “put the genie back in the bottle” wouldn’t it be better to have a world without nuclear weapons? Of course, the “genie,” that is, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons, cannot be unlearned and put back in the bottle of ignorance. Alternatively, some suggest we should continue to strive to get all nations to agree to reduce their inventories to zero, eliminate their weapon production capabilities, and submit to a near omniscient oversight authority that could compel compliance and ensure that no one was cheating. The analogy offered is the journey toward nuclear zero is described as climbing a mountain shrouded in clouds. At the top is nirvana—the goal—a world without nuclear weapons. Heading up the mountain, each time one gets to a higher camp more weapons are eliminated. At each camp, the climber pauses to make sure all is right with the world before heading even higher up the mountain and lower in number of nuclear weapons. The thing is, they forget we have already stood on top of that mountain, above the fog, and saw the world very clearly. It was a world where human beings for centuries upon centuries, in war after war, found better and better ways to kill each other—more efficiently, more lethally. Do we want to go back to a world without nuclear weapons? Consider that by most estimates World War II caused the death of between 60 million and 80 million human beings. So let us pick a reasonable number of 72 million dead to make the math easy. World War II lasted six years, which means on average 12 million people died every year of the war—1 million people a month. This equates to about 32,000 human beings dying in armed conflict every day for six consecutive years. Unimaginable. But then, in 1945, it stopped. True, there have been more wars since then: US losses in Korea were equal to one day of deaths in World War II; in Vietnam, one-and-a-half days. Nothing scales like the horror of the Second World War. There is a reason why great powers that own ever more lethal conventional weapons have elected not to fight each other: they have been deterred by nuclear weapons.

Champion Briefs 290 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence failure is inevitable, and reliance on nuclear weapons makes other facets of military strategy less effective.

Doyle, Thomas. "Moral And Political Necessities For Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied Ethical Analysis." Strategic Studies Quarterly. June, 2015. Web. December 07, 2019. . Another precondition of the 13 steps and nuclear abolition is the conviction among policy makers and scholars that nuclear deterrence policies are increasingly likely to fail the longer the deterrence regime lasts. A corollary awareness is that nuclear reprisal strikes are very likely to follow any nuclear deterrence failure. In 1986 Joseph Nye admitted that “even if nuclear deterrence has lasted for nearly four decades, it is difficult to believe that it will last forever.” Moreover, there is an increasing historical awareness that US nuclear deterrence policies often destabilized regions and rivalries more than not. According to Francis Gavin, nuclear weapons frequently “nullified the influence of other, more traditional forms of power, such as conventional forces and economic strength, allowing the Soviet Union to minimize the United States’ enormous economic, technological, and even ‘soft power’ advantages. Nuclear weapons also changed military calculations in potentially dangerous ways. It has long been understood that in a nuclear environment, the side that strikes first gains an overwhelming military advantage. This meant that strategies of preemption, and even preventive war, were enormously appealing.” Gavin’s two-part observation suggests that deterrence failure is multifaceted. First, overreliance on nuclear deterrence can erode a country’s general deterrence posture, leaving it vulnerable to decreases in overall influence and power. In other words, nuclear weapons empower with one hand and disempower with the other. Additionally, Gavin suggests that the conventional understanding of deterrence failure—for example, where US deterrence fails at the point the Russians or another nucleararmed power launches a nuclear first strike—is incomplete. It fails also if the United States succumbs to the temptation to launch a preemptive or preventive nuclear strike to gain the overwhelming military advantage. This latter case does not merely count as a failure of Russia or another country’s nuclear deterrence policy; such a first strike also incentivizes the attacked country’s reprisal strike, which the United States most definitely would want to avoid.

Champion Briefs 291 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence fails---escalation won't be rational.

Lipton, Judith. "We Are Pushing The Nuclear Fire Alarm." Psychology Today. March 30, 2016. Web. December 09, 2019. . Old views of nuclear deterrence based on Cold War models of two adversaries are no longer applicable. There are currently nine nuclear-armed states, and 15, 350 known nuclear weapons. There are no nuclear war modeling scenarios such as the ones developed by RAND in the 1950s (chicken, the Prisoner’s Dilemma) that provide even a semblance of a rational ladder of escalation. A two entity “non-zero sum game” can be modeled easily. A 9 plus x non-zero sum game escapes mathematical capacity. Not that a President facing a nuclear attack would rapidly summon the Cabinet mathematicians. Since nuclear detonations do not come with a return address or bar code, one or more sudden nuclear explosions could easily lead to a flailing response and rapidly escalating mutual “retaliation.” Miniature nuclear weapons can be placed on drones, small planes, or even SUVs. When an atmospheric explosion occurs, it will be difficult if not impossible to assign responsibility or to coordinate any rational response. The known nuclear bombs, many much bigger than the ones that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki, lie in submarine missile tubes, silos beneath the earth, and in aircraft. Once launch orders are given, there is no way to envision curtailing a catastrophic outcome.

Champion Briefs 292 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

MAD is outdated now because the precise accuracy of nuclear strikes, with hair-trigger alert, makes their use much likelier.

Tegmark, Max. "Nuclear War From A Cosmic Perspective.". May 04, 2015. Web. December 09, 2019. . Let me end talking about the impact of new technology on P, the risk of accidental nuclear war. Mutually Assured Destruction worked well when missiles were accurate enough to destroy a city but not accurate enough to destroy a silo. That made it very disadvantageous to launch any kind of first strike. Progress in computerized navigation has enabled much more precise targeting of missiles, reducing the disadvantage of a first strike, increasing P. Having accurate submarine launched ballistic missiles near their targets also improves the prospects for a first strike. Most nuclear missile silos are within 2000 km of an ocean, from which submarine- launched ballistic missiles can destroy them in 7-13 minutes depending on how “depressed” their trajectory is [12]. These shorter flight times give less time for the enemy to react, potentially making decision-makers jumpier, and as a result, both the US and Russia have now further increased P by placing thousands of missiles on alleged hair-trigger alert, ready to launch on warning before a single nuclear explosion has been confirmed.

Champion Briefs 293 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence failure is inevitable---there are high risks of accidents, as well as escalation by rogue states.

Shermer, Michael. "Will Mutual Assured Destruction Continue To Deter Nuclear War?." Scientific American. June 01, 2014. Web. December 09, 2019. . When I was in elementary school in the early 1960s, we were periodically put through “duck and cover” drills under the risibly ridiculous fantasy that our flimsy wooden desks would protect us from a thermonuclear detonation over Los Angeles. When I was an undergraduate at Pepperdine University in 1974, the father of the hydrogen bomb, Edward Teller, spoke at our campus about the effectiveness of mutual assured destruction (MAD) to deter war. He said that by stockpiling many weapons neither side has anything to gain by initiating a first strike because of the retaliatory capability of both to send the other back to the Paleolithic. So far MAD has worked. But as Eric Schlosser reveals in his riveting 2013 book Command and Control, there have been dozens of close calls, from the Cuban missile crisis to the II missile explosion in Damascus, Ark. And popular films such as Stanley Kubrick's 1964 Dr. Strangelove have played out how it could all go terribly wrong, as when General Jack D. Ripper becomes unhinged at the thought of a “Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids” and orders a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. A deterrence strategy like MAD is not a long-term sustainable solution because of escalation, accidents and crazies, and efforts have been made over the past two decades to reduce the world's stockpiles, from a peak of around 70,000 in 1986 to about 17,300 today, only 4,200 of which are operationally active nuclear warheads. Can we get to “nuclear zero”? The original cold warrior himself, Ronald Reagan, thought we could. He considered nuclear weapons to be “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” Also calling for “a world free of nuclear weapons” are such cold warriors as former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former secretary of defense William Perry and former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia in, of all places, the Wall Street Journal. The movement Global Zero has charted a path to reach that goal by 2030. General James E. Cartwright, formerly vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that the U.S. and Russia could reduce their nuclear arsenals to 900 weapons each and still maintain a deterrence peace until, later, they reach zero through diplomatic means. It's worth noting that 185 of the world's 194 countries (95 percent) are doing just fine without nuclear weapons, and more nations have started and abandoned nuclear weapons programs than started and completed them. This is encouraging, but is it fail-safe? To find out, I audited a class called Perspectives on War and Peace at Claremont Graduate University, taught by political scientist Jacek Kugler. His answer is no, for these reasons: One, some states that have nukes, such as North Korea, are unpredictable. Two, rogue states want nukes. Three, states waging conventional wars might escalate to using nukes. Four, if terrorists get nukes, they'll use them. Five, the taboo against using nuclear weapons has not yet

Champion Briefs 294 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

expanded into a taboo against owning them, and so the danger of accidents or unhinged leaders remains. And six, the nuclear genie of how to make an atomic bomb is out of the bottle, which means other nations or terrorists can obtain them and destabilize deterrence.

Champion Briefs 295 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Realism is inadequate in a nuclear age because nuclear weapons are self-undermining for the state that chooses to use them.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "Dreams Of A Just World." The New York Review of Books. November 02, 1995. Web. December 09, 2019. . The failure of both the liberal and the Marxist prophecies seemed to abandon the field to the cheerless tenets of Realism, which holds that the need for order is always threatened by conflicts between states, and that establishing a balance of power takes precedence over the quest for justice.1 Far from stifling the hunger for a philosophy that might offer some picture of a better international society, Realism, rejuvenated since World War II by E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger, exacerbated it. Realism seemed inadequate in a world with nuclear weapons: the struggle for power now risked destroying all the players on the field, and not just some of them. Even Hans Morgenthau concluded that a nuclear world of states without any central power above them had become intolerable, although he had no alternative to it. As the advocates of human rights pointed out in the years following World War II, the very notions of state sovereignty and national self-determination that nineteenth- century liberalism had endorsed were being used by governments and militant nationalists as a shield to protect appalling violations of individual and group rights from being punished or prevented.

Champion Briefs 296 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

The historical record doesn't prove that nuclear deterrence works.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . We should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace. What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco- Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815). Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable. It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it.

Champion Briefs 297 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons don.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . In short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014- present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases. Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs. In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non- nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not. Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries. Deterrence, in short, does not deter. The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non- nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands. US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990.

Champion Briefs 298 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are unsuccessful as a coercive measure.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren’t. Not only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US. All of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons.

Champion Briefs 299 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence has zero credibility, and the development of smaller, tactical nukes means they'll get used.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . It is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting. First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.

Champion Briefs 300 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence fails because countries perceive an advantage in striking first.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce vulnerability, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.

Champion Briefs 301 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence fails for irrational leaders like Trump.

Barash, David. "Nuclear Deterrence Is A Myth. And A Lethal One At That." The Guardian. January 14, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . Third, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd. In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is convinced that war is inevitable, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are especially intense – an irrational act, including a lethal one, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable. When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’ While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him. Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise.

Champion Briefs 302 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons may fail at coercing states in territorial conflicts, but they're still effective at deterrence.

Petrucelli, Joe. "Book Review, Nuclear Weapons And Coercive Diplomacy By Todd S. Sechser And Matthew Fuhrmann." Strategic Studies Quarterly 11:3. October, 2017. Web. December 10, 2019. . Throughout Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, Sechser and Fuhrmann develop and test a theory they call “Nuclear Skepticism.” The key points of this theory are that nuclear weapons do not add to a state’s ability to coerce, nuclear coercive threats are not perceived as credible due to their disproportionate effects, and coercive threats from nuclear states are no more likely to succeed than threats from nonnuclear states. Sechser and Fuhrmann rely on Schelling’s classic definition of a split in coercive diplomacy between compellence (or threats intended to change the status quo) and deterrence (or threats intended to maintain the status quo), with the exception that they use “compellent threat” and coercion interchangeably.3 This differentiation between coercion and deterrence is very significant for their theory because they are not questioning the usefulness of nuclear weapons for deterrence (which has been extensively studied), but instead for compellent actions (which has been relatively neglected). Within their theory, they identify a number of problems with the use of nuclear weapons for coercion, the most significant of which is that, unlike deterrence, the stakes for compellence are not generally high enough to make a nuclear threat credible.4 Coercive threats, in their definition, generally resolve around relatively minor disputes where nuclear usage would be overkill given the stakes, the international costs (via sanctions or military response) are likely too high to be worth a relatively small gain, and signaling nuclear resolve remains difficult. While that may be the case now, they do point out that these international norms and repercussions may not always exist, and it is not hard to imagine a world where the military utility of nuclear weapons outweighs the cost of their usage.5 Examining the historical record quantitatively, Sechser and Fuhrman look at the effectiveness of compellent threats by nuclear and nonnuclear states.6 Through their analysis, they determine that nuclear states have no better success rate than nonnuclear states in issuing successful compellent threats or in territorial negotiations. While their quantitative analysis shows that nuclear states do not have a better success rate than nonnuclear states in coercive diplomacy, their first set of analyses does not directly measure the success rate of nuclear threats. To account for this, Sechser and Fuhrmann conducted a detailed analysis of the 19 cases of explicit nuclear threats throughout the nuclear era, ranging from nuclear alerts to overt nuclear threats. Again, they find success in only 10 of the 19 cases studied which, although higher than the success rate for general compellent threats, does not demonstrate much coercive advantage for nuclear weapons. Through their analysis, they additionally expose some broader definitional and signaling issues. In one particularly illustrative case of failed coercion, President Nixon deployed nuclear bombers to signal resolve against North Korea, but that signal that was totally missed by both

Champion Briefs 303 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

the Soviet Union and North Korea. They also identify that of their 19 nuclear threat cases, a good number of them could be viewed as a deterrent success, vice a coercive action. The most significant of these cases was the Cuban Missile Crisis, commonly viewed as validating nuclear coercion but that could also be seen as a deterrent and bargaining success.

Champion Briefs 304 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Conventional deterrence solves their offense, and no method for deterrence can stop reckless leaders.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . His analogy is also silly because it presupposes that nuclear weapons are the only effective tool for enabling a strategy of deterrence by punishment. In Shellenberger’s telling, deterrence was impossible before 1945, but this is obviously absurd. During the interwar period, aircraft were viewed in a similar way as nukes are today. They were novel, seemingly unstoppable, and could simply bypass the frontlines to rain destruction down on population centers. This may seem preposterous to us now, especially given the air superiority enjoyed by the U.S. and its allies, but people in the 1930s were absolutely terrified of aircraft. Indeed, it’s helpful to read the work of Douhet and Mitchell to get a sense of how powerful people assumed aircraft, particularly strategic bombers, to be. In other words, planes served the role of nuclear weapons, acting as deterrents, and governments treated them accordingly. For example, at the same time Neville Chamberlain was declaring “peace in our time,” he was ordering the Royal Air Force to massively increase its size and capability just in case Hitler turned out to be as megalomaniacal as he in fact did. While I’m less familiar with the French case, and the Armée de l’Air was certainly inferior to the Luftwaffe, the aggregate power of French and British forces still seemed overwhelming. Indeed, the German High Command thought Hitler was a lunatic and strongly cautioned against a war with the Allies. Thus, it is simply wrong to say France lacked a deterrent because, quite frankly, German commanders were convinced that they would suffer egregious losses if they fought the French. The deterrent was ineffective because it failed to convince Hitler, but it did exist. This is important because it highlights the fact that, no matter how credible the deterrent, deterrence can still break down in the face of a reckless leader. And this is true regardless of whether nuclear weapons are involved. Obviously France lacked a nuclear deterrent, as nuclear weapons hadn’t yet been developed, but it did have a conventional deterrent, which in many cases can be just as effective. After all, North Korea’s conventional artillery pieces aimed at Seoul have kept the peninsula quiet for decades, and this is true despite continued provocations from the North and massive force asymmetry in favor of the U.N. Combined Forces Command.

Champion Briefs 305 A/2: Realism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence claims rely on counterfactual speculation---conventional superiority deters conflict.

Blair, Bruce. "The End Of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving To A Deterrence-Only Posture." Global Zero. September, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . This claim is nearly impossible to prove or disprove. There are myriad alternatives that must be rejected if one is going to accept that nuclear weapons were an essential cause of the absence of major conventional war. But if the question cannot be scientifically resolved, the views of key witnesses to the Cold War such as McGeorge Bundy ought to be heard. He wrote: I myself would argue, with Professor John Mueller (Retreat from Doomsday), that the peacekeeping role of the bomb is easy to exaggerate, and that there would not have been a large hot war between the Soviet Union and the West if there had been no bomb at all.13 13 Bundy, “Some Thoughts.” Whatever deterrent benefits accrue from the possession of nuclear weapons, the sobering lessons of history underscore the apocalyptic risks they also carry. These dangers have to be carefully weighed against the putative benefits. Counterfactual historical speculation muddies more than clarifies the balance sheet. For the United States, this debate is largely academic today because U.S. nuclear weapons are not needed to deter or defeat a largescale conventional invasion along the lines of previous world wars. U.S. and allied non-nuclear military power is so formidable that it can effectively parry and thus deter such aggression by any nationstate without invoking the nuclear threat.

Champion Briefs 306 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Cyber War Disadvantages

Cyber War DA is arguing that nuclear weapons are key to deterring attacks against cyber warfare. This is more of a prevalent topic of discussion within the US, so that may be a hot search term to explore if looking for further evidence supporting the DA. The reason for why nuclear weapons may deter cyber attacks is because it’s the only response that would be impactful enough to scare away hackers from other countries that may want to infiltrate technological infrastructure of a nation. The inevitable impact of not having nuclear weapons to deter cyber attacks is extinction or at least an impact that is just as powerful as a nuclear attack.

The key affirmative response to this disad is that nuclear weapons systems are key outlets for hackers to exploit when trying to engage in cyber attacks against another country. With continuing technological advancement, digital warfare is growing increasingly likely and dangerous. Nuclear weapons systems also relies heavily upon technology for successful execution, which means that cyber war can manifest itself through taking advantage of such systems.

Champion Briefs 307 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Cyber attacks are just as, if not more, dangerous than nuclear attacks- -they are even harder to detect and track.

Straub, Jeremy. "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just As Deadly As Nuclear Weapons, Says Scientist." ScienceAlert. August 18, 2019. Web. December 13, 2019. . People around the world may be worried about nuclear tensions rising, but I think they're missing the fact that a major cyberattack could be just as damaging – and hackers are already laying the groundwork. With the US and Russia pulling out of a key nuclear weapons pact – and beginning to develop new nuclear weapons – plus Iran tensions and North Korea again test- launching missiles, the global threat to civilization is high. Some fear a new nuclear arms race. That threat is serious – but another could be as serious, and is less visible to the public. So far, most of the well-known hacking incidents, even those with foreign government backing, have done little more than steal data. Unfortunately, there are signs that hackers have placed malicious software inside US power and water systems, where it's lying in wait, ready to be triggered. The US military has also reportedly penetrated the computers that control Russian electrical systems.

Champion Briefs 308 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Cyber attacks cause systemic meltdown for affected communities-- history proves that they're just as effective as Chernobyl.

Straub, Jeremy. "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just As Deadly As Nuclear Weapons, Says Scientist." ScienceAlert. August 18, 2019. Web. December 13, 2019. . Many intrusions already As someone who studies cybersecurity and , I'm concerned that a cyberattack with widespread impact, an intrusion in one area that spreads to others or a combination of lots of smaller attacks, could cause significant damage, including mass injury and death rivaling the death toll of a nuclear weapon. Unlike a nuclear weapon, which would vaporize people within 100 feet and kill almost everyone within a half-mile, the death toll from most cyberattacks would be slower. People might die from a lack of food, power or gas for heat or from car crashes resulting from a corrupted traffic light system. This could happen over a wide area, resulting in mass injury and even deaths. This might sound alarmist, but look at what has been happening in recent years, in the US and around the world. In early 2016, hackers took control of a US treatment plant for drinking water, and changed the chemical mixture used to purify the water. If changes had been made – and gone unnoticed – this could have led to poisonings, an unusable water supply and a lack of water. In 2016 and 2017, hackers shut down major sections of the power grid in Ukraine. This attack was milder than it could have been, as no equipment was destroyed during it, despite the ability to do so. Officials think it was designed to send a message. In 2018, unknown cybercriminals gained access throughout the United Kingdom's electricity system; in 2019 a similar incursion may have penetrated the US grid. In August 2017, a Saudi Arabian petrochemical plant was hit by hackers who tried to blow up equipment by taking control of the same types of electronics used in industrial facilities of all kinds throughout the world. Just a few months later, hackers shut down monitoring systems for oil and gas pipelines across the US This primarily caused logistical problems – but it showed how an insecure contractor's systems could potentially cause problems for primary ones. The FBI has even warned that hackers are targeting nuclear facilities. A compromised nuclear facility could result in the discharge of radioactive material, chemicals or even possibly a reactor meltdown. A cyberattack could cause an event similar to the incident in Chernobyl. That explosion, caused by inadvertent error, resulted in 50 deaths and evacuation of 120,000 and has left parts of the region uninhabitable for thousands of years into the future.

Champion Briefs 309 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapon possession has inherent safeguards--the alternative is uninhibited cyber warfare.

Straub, Jeremy. "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just As Deadly As Nuclear Weapons, Says Scientist." ScienceAlert. August 18, 2019. Web. December 13, 2019. . Mutual assured destruction My concern is not intended to downplay the devastating and immediate effects of a nuclear attack. Rather, it's to point out that some of the international protections against nuclear conflicts don't exist for cyberattacks. For instance, the idea of "mutual assured destruction" suggests that no country should launch a nuclear weapon at another nuclear-armed nation: The launch would likely be detected, and the target nation would launch its own weapons in response, destroying both nations. Cyberattackers have fewer inhibitions. For one thing, it's much easier to disguise the source of a digital incursion than it is to hide where a missile blasted off from. Further, cyberwarfare can start small, targeting even a single phone or laptop. Larger attacks might target businesses, such as banks or hotels, or a government agency. But those aren't enough to escalate a conflict to the nuclear scale.

Champion Briefs 310 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Cyber war impacts can't be ignored--they are at least on par with nuclear grade conflict.

Straub, Jeremy. "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just As Deadly As Nuclear Weapons, Says Scientist." ScienceAlert. August 18, 2019. Web. December 13, 2019. . Nuclear grade cyberattacks There are three basic scenarios for how a nuclear grade cyberattack might develop. It could start modestly, with one country's intelligence service stealing, deleting or compromising another nation's military data. Successive rounds of retaliation could expand the scope of the attacks and the severity of the damage to civilian life. In another situation, a nation or a terrorist organization could unleash a massively destructive cyberattack – targeting several electricity utilities, water treatment facilities or industrial plants at once, or in combination with each other to compound the damage. Perhaps the most concerning possibility, though, is that it might happen by mistake. On several occasions, human and mechanical errors very nearly destroyed the world during the Cold War; something analogous could happen in the software and hardware of the digital realm.

Champion Briefs 311 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons provide a response to modern-day threats against our cybersecurity and deter attacks.

Sanger, David E. "Pentagon Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks With Nuclear Arms." New York Times. January 16, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . WASHINGTON — A newly drafted United States nuclear strategy that has been sent to President Trump for approval would permit the use of nuclear weapons to respond to a wide range of devastating but non-nuclear attacks on American infrastructure, including what current and former government officials described as the most crippling kind of cyberattacks. For decades, American presidents have threatened “first use” of nuclear weapons against enemies in only very narrow and limited circumstances, such as in response to the use of biological weapons against the United States. But the new document is the first to expand that to include attempts to destroy wide-reaching infrastructure, like a country’s power grid or communications, that would be most vulnerable to cyberweapons. The draft document, called the Nuclear Posture Review, was written at the Pentagon and is being reviewed by the White House. Its final release is expected in the coming weeks and represents a new look at the United States’ nuclear strategy. The draft was first published last week by HuffPost. It called the strategic picture facing the United States quite bleak, citing not only Russian and Chinese nuclear advances but advances made by North Korea and, potentially, Iran. Sign Up for On Politics With Lisa Lerer A spotlight on the people reshaping our politics. A conversation with voters across the country. And a guiding hand through the endless news cycle, telling you what you really need to know. SIGN UP “We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be,” the draft document said. The Trump administration’s new initiative, it continued, “realigns our nuclear policy with a realistic assessment of the threats we face today and the uncertainties regarding the future security environment.” The Pentagon declined to comment on the draft assessment because Mr. Trump has not yet approved it. The White House also declined to comment.

Champion Briefs 312 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Use of nuclear weapons against cyber attacks constitutes a non- physical extreme circumstance--self-defense is morally justified.

Sanger, David E. "Pentagon Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks With Nuclear Arms." New York Times. January 16, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . But three current and former senior government officials said large cyberattacks against the United States and its interests would be included in the kinds of foreign aggression that could justify a nuclear response — though they stressed there would be other, more conventional options for retaliation. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the proposed policy. Gary Samore, who was a top nuclear adviser to President Barack Obama, said much of the draft strategy “repeats the essential elements of Obama declaratory policy word for word” — including its declaration that the United States would “only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” But the biggest difference lies in new wording about what constitutes “extreme circumstances.” In the Trump administration’s draft, those “circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.” It said that could include “attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.” The draft does not explicitly say that a crippling cyberattack against the United States would be among the extreme circumstances. But experts called a cyberattack one of the most efficient ways to paralyze systems like the power grid, cellphone networks and the backbone of the internet without using nuclear weapons. “In 2001, we struggled with how to establish deterrence for terrorism because terrorists don’t have populations or territory to hold at risk. Cyber poses a similar quandary,” said Kori Schake, a senior National Security Council and State Department official during President George W. Bush’s administration, who is now the deputy director general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “So if cyber can cause physical malfunction of major infrastructure resulting in deaths,” Ms. Schake said, the Pentagon has now found a way “to establish a deterrent dynamic.” a

Champion Briefs 313 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons send a message to other states contemplating cyber warfare--Trump administration proves.

Cal, Nerea. "NUCLEAR WEAPONS’ NEW PURPOSE: DETERRING CYBER ATTACKS?." Modern War Institute at West Point. March 19, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Last month, the Trump administration officially unveiled the results of a year-long review of the United States’ nuclear posture and its strategic vision for how to incorporate nuclear capabilities into an overarching security strategy. In the official White House press release announcing the publication of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), President Trump states that this strategy “enhances deterrence of strategic attacks against our Nation, and our allies and partners, that may not come in the form of nuclear weapons.” The NPR makes clear that the American nuclear arsenal serves a deterrent purpose not only against nuclear threats, but also against “non-nuclear aggression,” including cyber threats. It also emphasizes that the United States’ non-nuclear forces, though an important component of its overall deterrent strategy, “do not provide comparable deterrence effects—as is reflected by past, periodic, and catastrophic failures of conventional deterrence to prevent Great Power war before the advent of nuclear deterrence.” Thus, it seems that while the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy considers non-nuclear actions as legitimate causes for retaliation, it sees a nuclear response as the most effective threat against those actions. This reference to the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attacks, and its explicit inclusion of cyber attacks as part of the “unprecedented range and mix of threats” the United States is facing, has sparked speculation that the administration plans to seriously contemplate nuclear retaliation as a potential option against cyber attacks. Indeed, the NPR specifically highlights the cyber threat to nuclear command, control, and communications systems as a vulnerability of considerable concern. If the administration is in fact considering nuclear retaliation against cyber attacks, this approach represents a new role for the American nuclear arsenal and therefore deserves some careful analysis as to its legal and practical merits. First of all, can the United States, according to internationally recognized legal parameters regarding the conduct of conflict, respond to a cyber attack using nuclear weapons? And, if this type of response is available as a theoretically legal option, will it prove effective in practice? The answers to these questions could shape not only the effectiveness of US foreign policy, but also shape the behavior of our allies and adversaries and have significant consequences for America’s reputation and role in the international system.

Champion Briefs 314 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

AT ILaw aff. I Law justifies a nuclear response to cyber attacks.

Cal, Nerea. "NUCLEAR WEAPONS’ NEW PURPOSE: DETERRING CYBER ATTACKS?." Modern War Institute at West Point. March 19, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . The Legal Case for Nuclear Retaliation The United States has long claimed that existing international law applies in cyberspace. The UN Charter serves as the main source of international law for how states should behave in times of war, otherwise known as the “law of armed conflict,” exhorting all members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Nevertheless, it also acknowledges the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” in the face of an armed attack, thus establishing the legal parameters within which the use of force is appropriate. However, neither the UN nor the United States have clarified what constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace. The Tallin Manual, widely accepted by the legal community as the definitive document outlining how the law of armed conflict applies to cyberspace, tries to resolve these questions by treating cyberspace as a physical domain. Therefore, an attack in cyberspace is a violation of sovereignty in the same way as a physical invasion. Thus, according to international law, an attack in cyberspace constitutes an armed attack against which a state has the right to self-defense. Though this sounds rather straightforward, there is no universally accepted understanding of what constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace. Legal scholars have developed a set of three approaches by which to evaluate whether a belligerent action crosses the threshold of an armed attack. The instrument-based approach deems only those attacks using “traditional weapons with physical characteristics” to constitute armed attacks. According to this view, cyber attacks never reach the threshold of an armed attack, regardless of the resulting destruction. The second approach is the target-based perspective and considers the type of system against which the attack is conducted. This approach would consider an attack against any physical structure, especially critical infrastructure, an armed attack. However, this approach does not factor in the severity of the attack and therefore includes acts of espionage against critical infrastructure systems, which are generally accepted as legal according to international law, as armed attacks. This perspective is arguably far too inclusive and creates an unnecessary risk of escalation over relatively minor cyber offenses. While the instrument-based approach is highly restrictive and the target-based one arguably too permissive, the effects-based framework attempts to navigate a middle ground by considering the effects of a cyber attack. The effects-based definition considers a cyber attack to be an armed attack if its effect is “equivalent to that of an armed attack carried out by physical weapons.” A memo published the by Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2011 clarifying terminology for cyberspace operations reflects this. Though the memo does not explicitly identify what constitutes an armed attack, its definition of a cyber attack emphasizes its effects on both “critical cyber systems” and physical infrastructure or command-and-control capabilities. Thus, the US national security apparatus seems to accept the effects-based approach to defining an armed attack in cyberspace. Once an action has been identified as an

Champion Briefs 315 NEG: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

armed attack, the question becomes one of response. An subsequent version of the Tallinn Manuel, Tallinn Manual 2.0, also evaluates the legally appropriate use of countermeasures in response to a cyber attack, stating that “non-cyber countermeasures may be used in response to an internationally wrongful act involving cyber operations, and vice versa.” However, international law still stipulates that the response must be proportional to the attack; that is, the effects of the countermeasure should not significantly outweigh the effects of the original attack. If we combine this view of what constitutes an armed attack and legal response with the ambiguous language of the 2018 NPR, it is not unreasonable to reach the conclusion that a cyber attack on critical national infrastructure could be deemed an armed attack against which the United States could respond with non-cyber means. Currently, the Department of Homeland Security has identified sixteen sectors—including the energy, financial services, information technology, and health and public health sectors—as critical infrastructure. It thus follows that, if the severity of an attack on the financial sector or energy grid were to cause a significant enough amount of damage, it could, theoretically, legally merit a nuclear response.

Champion Briefs 316 A/2: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons systems are just extra fodder for cyber-attacks to work through.

MacAskill, Ewen. "Cyber-attack Risk On Nuclear Weapons Systems 'relatively High' – Thinktank." The Guardian. January 10, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . US, British and other nuclear weapons systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks, according to a new study by the international relations thinktank Chatham House. The threat has received scant attention so far from those involved in nuclear military planning and the procurement of weapons, the report said. It blames this partly on failure to keep up with fast- moving advances, lack of skilled staff and the slowness of institutional change. “Nuclear weapons systems were developed before the advancement of computer technology and little consideration was given to potential cyber vulnerabilities. As a result, current nuclear strategy often overlooks the widespread use of digital technology in nuclear systems,” the authors of the study said. Nuclear weapons systems are at threat from hostile states, criminal groups and terrorist organisations exploiting cyber vulnerabities. “The likelihood of attempted cyber- attacks on nuclear weapons systems is relatively high and increasing from advanced persistent threats from states and non-state groups,” the report said. It cited examples such as a report the US could have infiltrated the supply chain of North Korea’s missile system that contributed to a test failure in April last year. The silos of US nuclear-tipped Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles “are believed to be particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks”. The study also recorded illicit trafficking in Moldova and Georgia of radioactive and nuclear materials; a group in Belgium affiliated to Islamic State monitoring the movements of a nuclear scientist; and German-owned Patriot missiles reported to have been hacked in 2015. The report, Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences, was written by Beyza Unal, a research fellow at London-based Chatham House who previously worked on strategic analysis at Nato, and Patricia Lewis, research director of the international security department at Chatham House. “There are a number of vulnerabilities and pathways through which a malicious actor may infiltrate a nuclear weapons system without a state’s knowledge,” the report said. “Human error, systems failures, design vulnerabilities and susceptibilities within the supply chain all represent common security issues in nuclear weapons systems.”

Champion Briefs 317 A/2: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons systems uniquely create a pathway for cyber attacks because of the lack of government over their possession.

MacAskill, Ewen. "Cyber-attack Risk On Nuclear Weapons Systems 'relatively High' – Thinktank." The Guardian. January 10, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . The authors noted there is a dilemma between needing the private sector in order to keep up with advances in technology and the risks they bring with them. “Many aspects of nuclear weapons development and systems management are privatised in the US and in the UK, potentially introducing a number of private-sector supply chain vulnerabilities.” It added: “Presently, this is a relatively ungoverned space and these vulnerabilities could serve to undermine the overall integrity of national nuclear weapons systems. For example, the backdoors in software that companies often maintain to fix bugs and patch systems are targets for cyber-attacks once they are discovered and become known.”

Champion Briefs 318 A/2: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Maintaining nuclear weapons possession will only worsen the issue-- increased technology in the field leads to greater risk.

MacAskill, Ewen. "Cyber-attack Risk On Nuclear Weapons Systems 'relatively High' – Thinktank." The Guardian. January 10, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . Potential artificial intelligence (AI) applications, while creating new opportunities for cybersecurity, add another layer of complexity for nuclear weapons that could be exploited. The authors criticise military failures to – so far – take the issue seriously. “Military procurement programmes tend not to pay adequate consideration to emerging cyber risks – particularly to the supply chain – regardless of the government regulations for protecting data against cyber attacks. This could be due to constantly lagging behind the fast-moving nature of cyber attacks, a lack of skilled personnel and the slow institutional and organisational implementation of changes.” Digital components, material and software can quickly become obsolete and, without proper updates and patching, “they are subject to intrusion”. The authors cite the UK’s new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, which appeared to be using the same version of Windows in its control room at the outdated system that left the NHS exposed in the WannaCry ransomware attack in May last year.

Champion Briefs 319 A/2: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

Deterrence effect from nuclear weapons use is unclear when it comes to cyber attacks.

Cal, Nerea. "NUCLEAR WEAPONS’ NEW PURPOSE: DETERRING CYBER ATTACKS?." Modern War Institute at West Point. March 19, 2018. Web. December 13, 2019. . The Practical Deterrent Effect Just because an action is legal does not necessarily mean it is effective. Deterrence relies on the belief that the threat of pain can shape an adversary’s behavior by forcing a cost-benefit analysis. If the cost (the threat of pain) of perpetrating an action is higher than the benefit to be gained by that action, the adversary will be deterred from carrying it out. Defense and administration officials should evaluate whether a policy that allows for a nuclear response to cyber attacks will successfully deter our adversaries, taking into consideration the unique characteristics of cyberspace and the current international geopolitical environment. The 2018 NPR claims that “in the absence of U.S. nuclear deterrence, the United States, its allies, and partners would be vulnerable to coercion and attack by adversaries who retain or expand nuclear arms and increasingly lethal non-nuclear capabilities.” As the NPR points out, “U.S. nuclear capabilities have made essential contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression,” as well as the absence of Great Power war. Given the success of nuclear deterrence, it is not surprising that its logic and rhetoric have become firmly entrenched in the strategic and military discourse around cyber warfare. Pick up a book, read an article, or attend a cyber conference and you will inevitably encounter a discussion about how to “deter” in cyberspace and the possible effects of a cyber “arms race.” Indeed, the US government reflects this theoretical bias both structurally and substantively: US Cyber Command was once under the control of US Strategic Command, the Department of Defense’s unified command responsible for maintaining and operating the instruments of US Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy. And while Cyber Command’s ongoing transition to a unified command “demonstrates the increased US resolve against cyberspace threats,” the defense community continues to try to fit the square cyber threat into the proverbially round deterrence hole. In 2017, the Defense Science Board published a report outlining what it views to be the three major cyber deterrence challenges and proposing recommendations for how to respond to them. It seems, at least in national security circles, that the concept of deterrence and cyberspace are inextricably linked. However, the jury is still out as to whether nuclear weapons can effectively deter in cyberspace. The very nature of the domain presents challenges to the effective use of deterrence therein. Two key challenges—that of attribution and how to demonstrate resolve—complicate a state’s ability to use the threat of pain to reshape an adversary’s cost-benefit calculations. Despite advances in cyber forensics, attackers can still mask their identities through a variety of technical and legal means. Moreover, state actors can conceal their involvement by perpetrating attacks through proxy actors. This ability to obscure an attacker’s identity or involvement obviously minimizes the potency of the deterrent threat because the ability to

Champion Briefs 320 A/2: Cyber War DA Jan/Feb 2020

successfully retaliate is greatly reduced. Even if the perpetrator of an attack can be identified, effective deterrence also requires demonstrating the resolve to follow through on a threat. In a recent press conference, Gen. Paul Selva, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, denied that the Pentagon was considering using nuclear weapons in response to cyber attacks. Other defense officials have since expressed similar sentiments. This lack of clarity between a published policy document and its interpretation by those charged with carrying it out does not signal the level of resolve necessary for a deterrent strategy to be effective. Finally, this strategy should take into consideration the likely response of our adversaries. While our Cold War strategy was effective at preventing nuclear war, it led to an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, arguably leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons that set the stage for current security challenges, such as Iran and North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear capabilities. Would the 2018 NPR’s expansion of the United States’ nuclear deterrence strategy truly constrain our adversaries’ behavior or incentivize those with their own nuclear capabilities to mimic our policy by also expanding the circumstances in which they would use them? Arguably, this strategy would be less effective against such states, like Russia and China. As the 2018 NPR outlines, Russia has been modernizing its existing systems and developing new ones, including an undersea autonomous torpedo and a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Similarly, China has been expanding its nuclear capabilities. Though its arsenal remains relatively small, it deployed nuclear-powered ballistic submarines within the last year and is planning to field its next-generation submarines within the next decade. Given that the 2018 NPR considers these states, along with North Korea, to represent the greatest threats to US national security, officials must objectively evaluate whether the proposed strategy will actually help deter them or only further incite them.

Champion Briefs 321 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Weapons of Mass Destruction Tradeoff Disadvantages

WMD Tradeoff DA argues that nuclear weapons are important for preventing a substitution effect for states. Without nuclear weapons, states can substitute to using or pursuing chemical weapons or biological weapons. These weapons can be just as effectyive as nuclear weapons, if not more, thus leading to extinction. The main link justification here is based on complicated empirics that prove that nuclear weapons reduce likelihood of states need or demand to use chemical weapons or bioweapons. Nuclear weapons therefore deter other countries from developing chemical/bioweapons.

The affirmative needs to be prepared to debate against aforementioned empirics and also find flaws in certain studies. Moreover, the affirmative should heavily preempt a deterrence effect in both a utilitarian calculus and under whatever framework mechanism the affirmative is using. Without deterrence, the disad doesn’t carry any weight because the impacts can’t be accessed.

Champion Briefs 322 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons deter biological and chemical attacks, as well as terrorist actions by a State.

Tertrais, Bruno. "In Defense Of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality, And Cost-Effectiveness Of Nuclear Weapons." Security Studies Center. October, 2011. Web. December 10, 2019. . Regarding the chemical or biological threat that may be posed by regional powers, the experience of the First Gulf War (cf. supra.) seems to validate the idea that nuclear deterrence can play a useful role.100 Several countries, including France, the United States and India, explicitly consider that a biological attack, in particular, would entail the risk of nuclear retaliation. (Michael O’Hanlon has a point when he claims that such a response “might possibly be done in a more humane way than the biological attack” 101 Nuclear weapons also play a residual role to prevent a State from using terrorist means to attack vital interests (such as, precisely, an act of nuclear terrorism). Such a role has been publicly stated by the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

Champion Briefs 323 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Substitution occurs without nuclear weapons--nuclear weapons deter states from pursuing biological or chemical weapons.

Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between “Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . Critically, we also find some evidence of substitution in the relationship between chemical and nuclear weapons, as the actual possession of nuclear weapons and biological weapons are both negatively associated with initiating chemical weapons pursuit in models 3 and 4. Once states finally acquire a nuclear or biological weapon, the risk that they will start to pursue a chemical weapon at any given moment in the data drops to virtually zero. This negative relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition and chemical weapons is demonstrated by several nuclear-capable states that have signed the CWC and eliminated their chemical weapons arsenals, including Great Britain, France, India, and the United States. Even Russia is beginning to come into compliance with its CWC obligations by eliminating its chemical weapons arsenal, a task aided by American funding beginning in 1997 with the Nunn–Lugar Act. More generally, these results are consistent with the notion that chemical weapons behave as a ‘‘poor man’s atomic bomb,’’ since nuclear weapons appear to systematically satisfy demand for chemical weapons almost entirely. Also, this relationship has become stronger in recent decades. Early in the cold war, many states possessed both chemical weapons and nuclear weapons—now, most states appear to have decided that nuclear weapons are enough. This could be due to changing norms of acceptability concerning chemical weapons or further evidence concerning the battlefield utility—or lack thereof—of chemical weapons. What may be particularly surprising, however, is that chemical weapons appear to behave as a poor man’s biological weapon as well. Regardless of model specification, possessing a biological weapon reduces the risk of chemical weapons pursuit to virtually zero. This finding in particular is surprising and deserves further investigation.

Champion Briefs 324 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

absence of nuclear weapons is the most significant factor in whether or not states pursue other forms of weapons of mass destruction.

Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between “Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . Figure 2 plots the survival curve for the pursuit of chemical weapons. It demonstrates the dramatic effect of nuclear weapons acquisition on the demand for CBWs. Countries possessing nuclear weapons are at essentially zero risk of initiating pursuit of chemical over time, along with countries that have a biological weapon (these two survivor functions appear as one overlapping line). Countries pursuing biological weapons, on the other hand, still have a large desire for chemical weapons. They ‘‘fail’’ and pursue chemical weapons at a significantly higher rate. The effects of our covariates on chemical weapons pursuit are similar to nuclear weapons pursuit in direction, though they often fall short of significance. For example, there is weak evidence that GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared are positively associated with a greater risk of chemical weapons pursuit (the former is statistically insignificant, while the latter is significant at the 10 percent level). However, no other covariate appears to have a statistically significant effect on chemical weapons pursuit, even though the direction on each variable fits with conventional wisdom. For example, membership in the CWC appears to be associated with a lower risk of chemical weapons pursuit, while a more dangerous external security environment and greater domestic unrest are both positively related to the risk of chemical weapons pursuit.

Champion Briefs 325 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

The impact of other WMDs is nearly eliminated when states possess nuclear weapons.

Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between “Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . Finally, we turn to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical weapons pursuit and acquisition on the risk of initiating biological weapons pursuit in models 5 and 6. These results are equally interesting because they provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical weapons) can also be appropriately considered a ‘‘poor man’s nuclear bomb.’’ Similar to the impact of possessing nuclear weapons on the probability a state pursues chemical weapons, nuclear weapons possession has a strong negative effect on biological weapons pursuit in both models 5 and 6. After holding the underlying level of demand constant in model 6, simply possessing a nuclear weapon appears to decrease the instantaneous risk that a state will pursue biological weapons to virtually zero (1.44 107 ). This is consistent with the understanding of nuclear weapons as so powerful that they make the possession of other types of WMDs less relevant. Even before countries such as the United States abandoned their chemical weapons programs, for example, they abandoned their biological weapons program. The United States eliminated its offensive BW program under a Nixon administration order in 1969 and had shut down the program by the time it signed the BWC in 1972. France and Great Britain similarly eliminated their offensive BW programs. Russia stands in stark contrast to this argument, however. Evidence revealed after the cold war demonstrated that the Soviet Union maintained a vibrant offensive BW program at the Biopreparat complex through the end of the cold war. This demonstrates that grouping CBWs into a single category may not accurately represent the way countries actually think about them. Biological weapons, given their greater theoretical destructive capacity, may be considered somewhat differently. This is a potential path for future research.

Champion Briefs 326 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

The need for bioweapons is virtually zero for states that possess nuclear weapons.

Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between “Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . Figure 3 plots the survival curve for the pursuit of biological weapons and shows that a similar pattern exists for biological weapons pursuit that exists for chemical weapons. After controlling for the factors that might cause states to seek a WMD the acquisition of a nuclear weapon reduces demand for a biological weapon to virtually zero, such that these states with a nuclear weapon are even less likely to pursue a biological weapon than are states without a WMD of any kind.

Champion Briefs 327 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons can only viably substitute for chemical and bioweapons--never the other way around.

Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between “Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. . These results are also interesting when combined with the nuclear results because they demonstrate that the substitution only goes one way. The fact that acquiring chemical or biological weapons does not decrease the risk of nuclear pursuit, but acquiring nuclear weapons decreases the risk of chemical and biological pursuit suggests that nuclear weapons appear to substitute for biological weapons, but CBWs do not substitute for nuclear weapons.

Champion Briefs 328 NEG: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Chemical and bioweapons are worse than nuclear weapons--cause extinction.

Ochs, Richard. "Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately." Free From Terror. June 09, 2002. Web. December 13, 2019. . Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? IS NOW POSSIBLE.

Champion Briefs 329 A/2: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

States would be too timid to attempt to develop bioweapons or chemical weapons—turns states into outcasts and pariah states.

Katherine Charlet, The New Killer Pathogens: Countering the Coming Bioweapons Threat. April 17, 2018. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/17/new-killer-pathogens-countering- coming-bioweapons-threat-pub-76009

The vast majority of states—180 of them—are parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which bans the development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and production of biological agents for nonpeaceful purposes. Although the treaty is often criticized for its lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism, it has helped establish a global norm that using biological weapons is immoral and unacceptable. Although such norms may not constrain the worst actors’ behavior, they do provide the rationale and motivation for the rest of the world to punish violators. Today, any state that used biological weapons, genetically edited or otherwise, would meet severe reprisal from other states seeking to defend the norm of nonuse. Breaking the status quo, even on a small scale, would turn any country into a pariah. Few would be willing to take that risk, and those most likely to do so, such as North Korea or Syria, already face sanctions and military containment. Were either of these states to use biological weapons, the United States and its allies would almost certainly respond with force. Becoming a “first misuser” of a genetically edited biological weapon could also prevent a state from enjoying the positive applications of the new technologies. Researchers, businesses, and governments worldwide hope to take advantage of advanced biotechnologies in medicine, agriculture, and manufacturing. Countries discovered to be misusing such technologies could end up undermining their own businesses and research institutions and cutting their citizens off from the benefits discovered by others. Of course, if a country were to find that it profits little from the new technologies, then this disincentive would be lessened— one reason why the purveyors of new biotechnological applications should strive to make them affordable and widely available.

Champion Briefs 330 A/2: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Threat of bioweapons and chemical weapons overblown—nuclear weapons are the greater threats.

MIT News, Biological weapons are overrated as a military threat, expert says. October 30, 2002. MIT Tech Talk http://news.mit.edu/2002/anthrax-1030

Despite public fear about the potential use of biological weapons containing germs for diseases like anthrax or smallpox, such weapons never have been considered major arms by military strategists, Senior Fellow Jeanne Guillemin told a colloquium at MIT's Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology on Oct. 22. "I'm not sure biological weapons are on par with nuclear weapons," said Guillemin, a professor of sociology at Boston College. "There was a debate after the war [World War II] about whether biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction. I think we should continue this debate." At the session, titled "Anthrax, Smallpox, and the Invention of the 'Large Area Concept' in the History of Biological Weapons," Guillemin explained that the large area concept developed during the Cold War involved targeting cities and industries, with the major impact on civilian populations. "Biological weapons are more dangerous to civilians than to soldiers," she said, noting that soldiers are vaccinated, trained and carry face masks and other protective gear. Biological weapons - which could contain germs that cause diseases such as anthrax, smallpox, brucellosis or tularemia - are not effective tactical military weapons. They do not immediately harm enemy soldiers on the battlefield, or destroy artillery, tanks or munitions supplies. And each germ has its drawbacks. Smallpox, for example, is highly contagious, so it could harm friendly soldiers. Anthrax is not contagious, but if it gets in the soil for long periods of time, it can kill cattle and other animals.

Champion Briefs 331 A/2: WMD Tradeoff DA Jan/Feb 2020

Too many factors to make bioweapons a threat—unlikely to be effective.

MIT News, Biological weapons are overrated as a military threat, expert says. October 30, 2002. MIT Tech Talk http://news.mit.edu/2002/anthrax-1030

In addition, the efficacy of biological weapons hinges on several factors, including how many germs survive the explosion of the small bomb in which they are contained, whether the wind is blowing in the correct direction and strongly enough to carry the germs over a target, what constitutes a lethal dose, and how many people will get infected or die. Depending on the germ, as few as 1 to 4 percent of the exposed population may get infected, and estimates of mortality rates vary. "If the wind is blowing one way you have a weapon. If not, you don't," said Guillemin. Biological weapons date back to the Middle Ages when plague-ridden bodies were catapulted into castles. In more recent history, during World War II the United Kingdom took a lead role in inventing the first major biological weapons program, putting anthrax and other pathogens into bombs and sprays. The incentive for this program, later shown to be unfounded, was the fear that the Germans were embarked on this same path. "The British coined the large area concept," Guillemin said. "Even before that, U.S. scientists realized that their biological weapons program would be shut down unless they could try to match the scale of nuclear weapons." Until the U.S. offensive program ended in 1969, she said, hundreds of laboratory and field tests were conducted to perfect germ agents for large-scale attacks on cities. In the 1970s, in secret defiance of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the U.S.S.R. created a program on the same - if not greater - scale, Guillemin said. Guillemin was a member of a team of scientists who visited the former Soviet Union in 1992 to interview the families of persons who had died in the 1979 anthrax epidemic in the city of Sverdlovsk. At first, the Soviets blamed the deaths on infected meat, but on the basis of her epidemiological work, an aerosol emission from a nearby secret military facility proved to be the source of the outbreak, the largest of anthrax inhalation in recorded history. An estimated 68 of 5,000 persons exposed died from the 2-3 grams of anthrax affecting the area. This research, published in Science in 1994, provided the first evidence that humans could come down with anthrax as long as six weeks after inhaling the dangerous spores. Consequently, in last year's anthrax postal attacks, persons who had been exposed took antibiotics for as long as three months. Guillemin's book, "Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak," published by the University of California Press in 1999, chronicles how the mystery of the Sverdlovsk epidemic was solved.

Champion Briefs 332 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Arms Limits Counterplan

This counterplan argues that states should establish caps on nuclear arsenals, coupled with other policies such as “no-first-use,” in order to achieve stability without eliminating nuclear weapons. This is mutually exclusive (a fundamental tenet of counterplan competition) because the counterplan relies on a world where nuclear weapons still exist (they cannot be simultaneously eliminated and partially limited); it establishes a middle ground that corrects for the excesses of nuclear weapons policy, like Trump’s idea of building “useable” nuclear weapons, and other countries like Russia or Pakistan actually pursuing those very tactical (small-scale, battle-ready) nuclear weapons. The counterplan is strategic because it allows you to draw from the literature about a ‘minimum credible deterrent,’ or the lowest number of nuclear weapons sufficient to dissuade countries from invading or dropping the bomb. The fewer nuclear weapons in operation, the smaller the risks of either accidents or terrorism, which are additional Aff harm areas. The drawbacks of reading this counterplan are three-fold (although it is absolutely recommended as a negative fallback): (1) With this counterplan, the Neg cannot argue that international negotiations on nuclear issues will fail, or that countries will cheat and lie about disarmament (because the same problems would arise with arms control talks), (2) A lot of the arms control literature hopes that small steps toward reducing arsenals can catalyze eventual disarmament, so the Aff can argue that the counterplan links to Negative offense like deterrence, and (3) If the AC was intelligently written, the Aff can always say that the problems with nuclear weapons are inherent to their existence, and that, as one of the cards in the brief proclaims, “there is no security in small numbers.”

Champion Briefs 333 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Some nuclear weapons are still necessary---conventional deterrence is insufficient.

Chilton, Kevin. "Defending The Record On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. March, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Another argument presented to reduce or eliminate the US nuclear deterrent is the notion that our conventional in quality and size is adequate for the deterrence mission. What was in essence a promise for the future, the Reagan buildup of the mid-1980s is instructive. The United States was to have a 600-ship Navy; today we sail 275. The Air Force was to grow to 40 combat air wings; we have fewer than 20 today. And the Army planned for 18 armored divisions but never achieved that level. Some might argue if given the Reagan build-up level of forces (which is far greater than what we have in our armed forces today), no one would dare challenge us. But, let’s assume for a moment each service had the planned Reagan force levels. In addition, let’s assume there is no sequestration and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have all of the necessary operations, training, and maintenance funds to field a 100 percent trained and ready force. Then, in this unimaginably powerful conventional force scenario let’s take away all US nuclear weapons and give Venezuelan Pres. Nicolas Maduro 30 nuclear weapons with 30 missiles that can range 30 different cities in the United States. Now, who defers to whom in the Western Hemisphere? When economics, trade, or diplomacy are discussed, who has more influence? Who has the greater ability to deter or, worse yet, coerce? This hypothetical scenario highlights the reality that every dollar spent on a conventional force without the underpinnings of a credible nuclear deterrent is wasted. There is simply no conventional weapon equivalency to the power and deterrent effects of nuclear weapons. The checkered history of conventional deterrence among “great powers” over the centuries in contrast to the absence of great power war since 1945 may be a coincidence, but it has important implications. The record since then presents historical evidence that nuclear weapons contribute uniquely to the deterrence calculus. So where should the US spend its first dollar on defense? On the triad.

Champion Briefs 334 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms limits are key to a minimum deterrent, which solves their offense and avoids the DAs.

Gartner, Heinz. "Deterrence, Disarmament, And Arms Control." International Politics 51. 2014. Web. December 12, 2019. . Nuclear deterrence is the main cause of arms races. As long as deterrence goes unaddressed, global zero will be impossible to achieve. Arms control and non-proliferation can create a more stable situation, but they are not sufficient for disarmament. Deterrence of states of concern is more credible and effective using conventional weapons. The suggestions outlined above would not abolish nuclear deterrence right away, but they are steps toward a minimal deterrence. They would mitigate the worst consequences of the concept of deterrence and create the preconditions for nuclear disarmament. Comprehensive deterrence is based not only on one category of nuclear weapons but on a mix of nuclear and conventional arms. Arms control and disarmament efforts should cover all or most of them. This can be done best by a combination of legally binding treaties, political commitments and enlightened self-interest.

Champion Briefs 335 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms control towards a "deterrence-only" posture solves for escalation and nuclear war while maintaining minimum, necessary capabilities.

Blair, Bruce. "The End Of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving To A Deterrence-Only Posture." Global Zero. September, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . The United States, Russia, and China remain committed to policies of mutual nuclear deterrence. Two of these rivals—the United States and Russia—maintain nuclear warfighting strategies that simultaneously rationalize oversized arsenals, stimulate arms competition during peacetime, and fan escalatory updrafts during crises. A more constructive approach to preventing nuclear conflict is to reduce the role, salience, and numbers of nuclear weapons. For the United States in particular, vast opportunities exist for substituting other forms of power for these weapons. Today deterrence and stability flow less from threatening nuclear destruction than from having a broader mix of capabilities, including conventional precision-guided munitions, cyberdefenses and weapons, missile defenses, anti-satellite capabilities, big-data intelligence collection and fusion, nonmilitary power such as economic and financial sanctions, diplomatic clout, and robust alliances with strong allies. The United States has these capabilities in abundance. It could capitalize on them not only to minimize the role of its own nuclear weapons but also to advance the goal of nuclear threat reduction and disarmament. To the latter end, the United States should play a leading role in persuading the nuclear-armed nations to reduce to or cap their arsenals at low numbers of nuclear weapons, take them off of high alert, renounce their first use, and seek comprehensive monitoring arrangements that will eventually provide the basis for accurate accounting and assured security of all weapons and weapon-grade materials. As part of this restructuring of its nuclear posture, the United States should scrap its deterrence-plus-warfighting strategy and thereby eliminate its massive-attack plans enabled by hair-trigger forces inclined for preemption or launch on warning. By adopting a deterrence-only strategy consisting of a mix of nuclear and nonnuclear options, the risks of escalation and inadvertent nuclear war would be drastically reduced, and the United States would need to build only five new ballistic-missile submarines, only three of which would need to be deployed at sea at all times to ensure an adequate response if deterrence should ever fail. The size of the U.S. operational nuclear stockpile would shrink from 2,000 to 650, a two-thirds reduction that could be instituted independent of Russian stockpile levels without any diminution of the deterrent effect. Under this shift, the United States can and should substitute conventional for nuclear forces and largely remove population centers from the crosshairs of U.S. nuclear weapons in responding, at least initially, to enemy nuclear aggression. A deterrence-only strategy is a de-escalatory approach to conflict in contrast to the escalatory and nuclear-dependent character of the current deterrence-pluswarfighting strategy. All other U.S. nuclear forces, current and planned, would become superfluous and should be scrapped,

Champion Briefs 336 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

with the probable exception of 40 heavy strategic bombers that could be assigned to a reserve hedge force if a portion of the submarine force became vulnerable or had to be grounded for technical reasons. This reserve force capable of delivering 450 nuclear weapons combined with 640 operational SSBN warheads would represent a total U.S. nuclear stockpile that is 75 percent lower than today’s stockpile. If the United States remains on its current unwise course committed to its legacy posture of a deterrence-plus-warfighting strategy, it still will not require the triad of forces that are currently deployed or the new triad of forces in the pipeline. This anachronistic strategy can be easily supported with only seven ballistic-missile submarines, five of which would be deployed at sea augmented by conventional forces dedicated to the strategic deterrent mission. If a nuclear hedge force is deemed necessary, 70 heavy strategic bombers capable of delivering 900 nuclear weapons could assume the mission of the submarine force if the latter became vulnerable or technically disabled.

Champion Briefs 337 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms control solves the signals that spur nuclear proliferation, and thus nuclear terrorism.

Blair, Bruce. "The End Of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving To A Deterrence-Only Posture." Global Zero. September, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . A massive U.S. nuclear buildup is not the solution to these disputes. While the United States will need to modernize its nuclear C3 network and replace some of its aging weapons, it can, at no risk to its security, build far fewer weapons than currently planned under deterrence-plus- warfighting and fewer still by moving to deterrence-only. U.S. security and investment in it would be better served through scaling down the U.S. arsenal, negotiating arms limitations, and adopting confidence-building measures that reduce the risks that a nuclear weapon will be used. Large-scale nuclear modernization is also not the solution to the other major nuclear challenges of our age: proliferation and terrorist acquisition of WMD. The nuclear-arms buildups underway around the world—in Pakistan, India, and North Korea, as well as the United States, Russia, and China—in fact send a counterproductive message to nuclear aspirants about the importance of these weapons and present terrorists with more opportunities to get their hands on them as the weapons increase in numbers and are more widely dispersed. U.S. modernization plans should go forward, but on a smaller scale with clearer priorities and a better grasp of their myriad implications.

Champion Briefs 338 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

The US and Russia should commit to New START---that solves stability and avoids the politics DA.

Kimball, Daryl. "Trump’s Aim To Go Big On Nuclear Arms Control Should Begin By Extending New START." Just Security. December 09, 2019. Web. December 12, 2019. . Nevertheless, Morrison complains that New START only limits what it was designed to do — limit strategic deployed nuclear warheads and delivery systems — and does not limit Russia’s arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, which are kept in centralized storage sites. “Extending New START,” Morrison laments, would maintain the distinction between “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons and, as a result, some worrisome types of weapons — nuclear-armed, sea- launched cruise missile, for example — “would continue to not be covered” by any arms control agreement. On this point, Morrison’s logic is deeply flawed. Extension of New START would not “prevent” negotiations to reduce or eliminate other classes of nuclear weapons. Recall that in the 1980s, Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev engaged in negotiations that led to separate agreements on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In fact, discarding New START would only make it harder to reduce the dangers posed by long-range, intermediate-range, and shorter-range (i.e. tactical) nuclear weapons. Talks on mutual verifiable reductions of tactical nuclear warheads are certainly overdue and desirable. Arms control specialists, including myself, have long advocated for serious efforts to eliminate shorter-range, tactical nuclear weapons and proposed that in a future round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control talks for the post-New START era, the two sides should seek far lower, total limits on all types of nuclear weapons. Morrison and others still in Trump administration may be unhappy that New START does not solve every global nuclear arms control problem. (What agreement does?) But it should be obvious to them that until and unless there is a new arms control agreement, it is in our national interest to maintain New START’s verifiable limits on strategic nuclear weapons that can reach targets in the United States in under 30 minutes. Support for New START Is Wide and Deep According to Morrison, there is but a “small, but loud, choir of disarmament advocates in Washington, D.C. as well as an “unelected bureaucracy” that is focused on the New START Treaty. Yes, arms control advocates support New START extension and follow-on talks, as do pragmatic government professionals, but we are hardly alone. So do major U.S. allies, the U.S. military, a growing number of Republican lawmakers, Democratic lawmakers, and the American public. Military and intelligence officials greatly value the inspections that New START requires and its prohibition on interference with national technical means of verification, which provide predictability and promote a predictable nuclear deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia. On Dec. 4, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Mullen testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and argued that New START “contributes substantially to U.S. national security by providing limits, robust verification, and predictability about Russian strategic forces.” We have “high

Champion Briefs 339 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

confidence” Russia is complying with the treaty, he testified. “Without the treaty and its verification provisions, we’d be flying blind.” “It is strongly in the U.S. national interests,” Mullen concluded, “to extend New START for five years so that the United States and Russia can continue to realize the mutual benefits and stability it provides.” In July, Navy Vice Admiral David Kriete, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said that this verification regime provides “great insight” into Russia’s arsenal. “If we were to lose that for any reason in the future, we would have to go look for other ways to fill in the gaps for the things we get from those verifications,” he warned. All major U.S. allies have communicated their support for extending New START to the Trump administration. As Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö said during a joint news conference Oct. 2 with President Trump: “Some of us remember the worst years of [the] Cold War in [the] 1960s. There was no agreement at all. Just Cold War. We can’t let the situation return no agreement at all about arms control. And that is why it is important to try to negotiate new agreements and to continue the New START Agreement.” There is also growing bipartisan support in Congress for the treaty’s extension. In the House, Representatives Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.) and Michael McCaul (R-Texas) introduced the “Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces” (H.R. 2529), which expresses the Sense of Congress that the United States should seek to extend the New START Treaty so long as Russia remains in compliance. In the Senate, Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Todd Young (R-Ind.) introduced a companion bill, which may soon be considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The American public supports the treaty’s extension of the treaty by wide margins. A poll published in May by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland showed that an overwhelming 82 percent of Americans support extending New START. According to the poll, 89 percent of Democrats and 77 percent of Republicans support extension. In addition, 83 percent of respondents said they approve of continuing to have arms control treaties with Russia. Ultimately, a decision to extend New START would represent a significant foreign policy win for Trump and the United States. What Is to Be Done? And Why? Despite his own doubts about the administration’s readiness to pursue talks on a new arms control deal, Morrison advises the President to follow his “instincts” and to hold out for a “better” deal with Russia that also involves China. On an issue this important, however, we can’t afford to rely on Trump’s instincts and the flawed logic of his former advisors. If the president decides to hold out for a more ambitious trilateral deal and he misses the chance to extend New START, there would be no legally binding, verifiable limits on the U.S. or Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time in nearly half a century.If those ceilings expire, Russia and the United States could, relatively quickly, upload hundreds of additional nuclear warheads to their long-range delivery systems. The intrusive monitoring and verification the treaty provides would be lost. Trump will have a chance to clarify his views on nuclear arms control very soon, possibly during Lavrov’s visit to Washington this week. Last week, Putin stated his position quite clearly, saying, “Russia is ready to extend the New START treaty immediately, before the year’s end and without any preconditions.” If President Trump actually seeks to avoid an arms race, maintain a cap on the Russian nuclear arsenal, and create the conditions for follow-on talks with Russia and new negotiations with China on nuclear arms control, he should take up Putin’s proposal and promptly agree with Russia to extend New START by five years.

Champion Briefs 340 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Russia won't follow through with abolition, but they can agree to arms control.

Sinovets, Polina. "Arms Control Is Realistic; General Disarmament Probably Isn’t." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. January 26, 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . Nuclear weapons have a fearful reputation—but conventional weaponry has caused the greatest casualties in the history of warfare. Soon after human beings created nuclear weapons, they came to understand that they stood at the brink of self-destruction, and since then they have managed to avoid using these weapons. One can even argue that nuclear weapons aren’t weapons of war at all, but rather weapons of dialogue. In fact, that may be why Russia imbues them with so much meaning. I say all this only to point out that progress toward nuclear disarmament is possible only when the various parties acknowledge other parties’ thought processes and points of view. South Africa deserves praise for disarming, but other nations live under different conditions and espouse different worldviews. Certainly, Russia can be encouraged to disarm—but from Russia’s perspective, seeking a complete ban on nuclear weapons is a dishonest game aimed at undermining Russian sovereignty. A more realistic goal is to involve Russia in further nuclear reductions and arms control.

Champion Briefs 341 NEG: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear arms control, short of going to zero, makes cooperation on conventional weapons easier too.

Perkovich, George. "Establishing Political Conditions To Enhance The Feasibility Of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . Finally, however, concerns about strategic intentions and conventional force imbalances in a nuclear-disarmed world should not be allowed to justify any US or Russian refusals to reduce nuclear arsenals to low numbers, or a Chinese nuclear build-up—in the event that the ballisticmissile defence problem, treated below, were resolved. As long as each state had survivable nuclear forces capable of threatening each other’s capitals and leadership centres (which could not count on immunity even under doctrines prohibiting the deliberate targeting of civilians), conventional-force imbalances need not be less bearable than they have been historically. Indeed, the implementation of nuclear-arms control and reduction measures by the US, Russia and China—short of going from low numbers to zero—could make the political climate more conducive to the cooperative management of conventional military dynamics.

Champion Briefs 342 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms control is too dependent on broader political relations between countries.

Rumer, Eugene. "A Farewell To Arms…Control." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 17, 2018. Web. December 12, 2019. . Arms control is in trouble. Throughout most of the post–World War II period, arms control has been a continuation of politics. When relations between Washington and Moscow were improving, arms control agreements progressed. When they were deteriorating, arms control suffered. At times, when the relationship was at a particularly dangerous point, arms control talks served as an instrument of reducing tensions. The present standoff between Moscow and Washington promises to be long-lasting, and the atmosphere in both capitals looks as hostile to new arms control proposals as it did during some of the coldest periods of the Cold War, if not more so. There is little on the political horizon in either capital to suggest that arms control talks can once again pave the way to a better overall relationship. If the logic of past such episodes—the Cuban Missile Crisis and the INF deployment crisis of the 1980s—is to be followed, the current U.S.-Russian relationship has to get worse before the situation compels the two sides to return to the arms control negotiating table as a means of stepping back from a confrontation. There is no guarantee, however, that the logic of the past will apply in the future. *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 343 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Risks are inevitable so long as nuclear weapons exist. Total disarmament is critical.

Squassoni, Sharon. "The Need For Global Zero." Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 16, 2015. Web. December 12, 2019. . 4. The world has changed, but nuclear weapons haven’t. Seventy years after their invention, nuclear weapons are still regarded as indispensable and prestigious by some, and atavistic and dangerous by others. They are still the currency of power, despite the fact that influence can be wielded across borders in so many other ways today. Their imperviousness to change stands in marked contrast to, for example, information technology and nanotechnology. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent and connected, the isolation these weapons require (for safety, security, and surety reasons) will become an increasingly difficult burden. Fundamentally, the wider support for deep nuclear cuts and for measurable progress toward disarmament is rooted in the recognition that the world has changed. No longer can we compartmentalize nuclear risks—where there are weapons, fissile material, or facilities, there will be threats and risks. When President Obama called in 2009 in Prague for durable institutions to counter this “lasting threat,” he wasn’t referring to the nuclear disarmament movement, but they readily responded to the call. As nuclear risks rise, their nuclear messaging may become more, rather than less, attractive.

Champion Briefs 344 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

The counterplan can't solve NPT-related contentions because the NPT calls for complete disarmament.

Squassoni, Sharon. "The Need For Global Zero." Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 16, 2015. Web. December 12, 2019. . 1. Nuclear disarmament is not just a movement but an obligation. The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has long served U.S. national security interests by limiting the number of states that acquire nuclear weapons. Under the treaty, the five nuclear weapon states (the United States, the UK, France, China, and Russia) are obliged “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” It is far better to direct a process to develop effective measures than only react to what could be unreasonable or impractical demands from outside.

Champion Briefs 345 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

The counterplan links to the DAs---arms limits acclimate countries to the inevitability of disarmament.

Squassoni, Sharon. "The Need For Global Zero." Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 16, 2015. Web. December 12, 2019. . 2. The nuclear disarmament “movement” is in the game for the long run. The first nuclear disarmament campaigns began after World War II and they have ebbed and flowed with politics and crises. At a global stockpile of over 15,000 nuclear weapons today, we are closer to zero than we were at the height of the Cold War (70,000 nuclear weapons in 1986), but still very far away. Although some advocates of disarmament have called for “timebound” frameworks or conventions to ban nuclear weapons with a pen-stroke, few believe disarmament is quick or easy. Part of the challenge will be to acclimatize keepers of arsenals to lower and lower numbers. This has already happened over the last 30 years in the United States and Russia, as the comfort zone for levels of deployed weapons slowly has dropped from 10,000 to 3,000 to 1,000 nuclear weapons

Champion Briefs 346 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms limits are the first step to eliminating arsenals, because strategic elimination FIRST primes countries for eventually eliminating nukes physically.

Dunn, Lewis. "The Strategic Elimination Of Nuclear Weapons: An Alternative Global Agenda For Nuclear Disarmament." Nonproliferation Review. 2017. Web. December 12, 2019. . This article’s argument for a redefined global agenda for nuclear disarmament that takes as its lodestar the strategic elimination of nuclear weapons by 2045 will be challenged. The nature of those challenges, however, is likely to vary considerably among different critics. For supporters of the new Prohibition Treaty and nuclear disarmament now, strategic elimination by 2045 will not go far enough. To this group, the global goal should be the complete physical elimination of nuclear weapons—if not now, then soon. However, as argued above, the building blocks of the complete physical elimination of nuclear weapons are lacking. Even the building blocks of strategic elimination cannot be fully put in place quickly or, in some cases, without significant changes in the way today’s NWS view their security and the roles of nuclear weapons. For that very reason, the road to the nuclear abolition sought by nuclear-disarmament advocates inexorably runs through strategic elimination. Only once nuclear weapons are no longer seen as essential means of security, policy, and statecraft will today’s NWS contemplate their complete physical elimination.

Champion Briefs 347 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms limits fail---there's no safety in small numbers.

Freedman, Lawrence. "Nuclear Disarmament: From A Popular Movement To An Elite Project, And Back Again?." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . One of the most difficult questions to address, of course, is whether such terrible events become more likely as the number of nuclear weapons gets closer to zero. The essence of the early arms control theory was that disarmament was naïve. Not only would fewer weapons not necessarily mean more peace, but fewer weapons could even make things more dangerous by unsettling the nuclear balance. At some point, a first strike might start to look attractive as a way of imposing unilateral disarmament on the other side; a small advantage in warhead numbers, irrelevant at times of big inventories, might just start to provide additional political muscle. Because even a single weapon can cause serious havoc, there can be no safety in small numbers. With large numbers of weapons, the danger is unquestioned and inescapable, encouraging caution where there might otherwise be temptation. So there is a potentially dangerous crossover point when numbers really start to matter. It is at this point that the smaller nuclear powers would also be required to be part of the arms control process, as they no longer have the excuse that their inventories are dwarfed by the large powers. So for that reason, among others, the negotiations and the processes will be getting more complicated.

Champion Briefs 348 A/2: Arms Limits CP Jan/Feb 2020

Arms control is a first step toward abolition. Perm, do the counterplan, then the aff.

Muller, Harald. "The Importance Of Framework Conditions." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009. Web. December 12, 2019. . The Need for Great-Power Concert We can conceptualize an abolition process in three stages: The first would revive the basic principles and instruments of nuclear arms control and multilateralize them as appropriate in order to establish stability and predictability among the nuclear-armed states; create upper levels for their weapons holdings; install, step by step, transparency to enhance confidence that such upper levels are indeed observed; and keep, throughout this initial process, trust in states’ second-strike capabilities. The second stage would reduce arsenals to very small numbers, possibly around one hundred or slightly below. Sophisticated strategies of deterrence and nuclear use would shrink to “existential deterrence.” Transparency would apply incrementally to the entirety of the nuclear weapon complex. The risk of sudden attack would be further reduced by significant measures of de-alerting (of which we might see some in the first phase as well). The third and last phase, then, would mean going from there to true abolition.

Champion Briefs 349 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Objectivism NC

This case argues that states ought not eliminate their nuclear arsenals because they have a moral obligation to defend their citizens’ lives and liberties. The contention copies largely from cases like the Realism NC, because of the question of deterrence, but offers a different moral perspective. The framework would be rooted in the theory of “Objectivism,” from the libertarian thinker Ayn Rand, who argued that individuals have a moral obligation to serve their own self-interest, or ‘survival’ (in the broadest sense of flourishing as well as staying alive), above the interests of others in a so-called society. While this framework seems callous (and you would not be wrong to think that), the writers who defend ‘rational egoism’ give elaborate arguments for how morality needs to prioritize the ability for self-directed individuals to pursue their own ends and capabilities, all of which depend upon life itself (which is then also the object of all values). If states are just collections of individuals making decisions, and they subscribe to this framework (though it would be tough to explain how an Objectivist could be a public servant), they must promote and extend the longevity of themselves and their nation from attack. To write this case effectively, the neg needs to explain not only why deterrence works, but also how nuclear weapons are legitimate tools of self-defense in the event that deterrence fails. From an Affirmative perspective, unless the Neg explains why self-defense turns the AC, your best bet may be focusing on the framework. Certainly, there are valid Aff responses to self-defense (especially from the Just War Theory perspective), but aside from the deterrence debate the Aff should zero in on the flaws of Objectivist thinking. After all, the motivation for global disarmament is protecting the well-being of people worldwide, not simply ourselves, and the Aff should defend that kind of altruism

Champion Briefs 350 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Only statism makes nuclear weapons dangerous. Nuclear weapons were created by free people and human freedom makes those weapons, as a tool, either good or bad depending on circumstance.

Hudgins, Edward. "Ayn Rand And The A-Bomb." The Atlas Society. August 03, 2016. Web. December 09, 2019. . Here Rand understood that technology, like the bomb, consists entirely of tools created by our minds. It is our morality that determines whether we use our tools for good or ill. THE DANGER OF STATISM Rand asked in her memo, “What is the specific danger of the atomic bomb to mankind?” In the aftermath of Hitler and with Stalinist Russia a growing threat, Rand explained that “the basic issue of the world… is between Statism and freedom. Specifically: between an all-powerful government and free enterprise.” She understood that “Statism leads men to war because of its nature.” Statism by its nature involves the initiation of force by government against individuals. Rand understood that it was Statism that made the bomb dangerous. A system in which individuals deal with one another based on mutual consent would have no need for war and weapons would be for defense and deterrence only. FREE MEN PRODUCED THE BOMB Enrico Fermi chalkboard ARand wanted to make certain that the film did not empower those who argued, “See what a strong government can do? Many people objected to Roosevelt’s use of money for secret purposes—yet look what he gave you!” Rand countered that a film must “present the issue not in superficial, political terms—but in its deeper, essential terms.” To begin with, national defense is a proper function of government; thus, defense spending is valid. But Rand observed that government expenditures were not enough. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had not produced an atomic bomb. It was free men who produced it. (The Soviets only got the bomb later, thanks to secrets they stole from the Americans.) Rand pointed out that the key minds that made the bomb possible were refugees from totalitarian countries—Einstein, Bohr, Fermi, Meitner. And the key scientists who worked on the to produce the bomb were volunteers, invited by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, the civilian scientist who headed up the project. FREEDOM INCLUDES THE FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS Rand interviewed Oppenheimer as well as Gen. Leslie Groves, who oversaw the project for the army. In her notes she observed that the actual day-to-day work to achieve the seemingly impossible task of producing an atomic weapon was done not through orders and directives from authorities that had to be obeyed but, rather, through open exchange. Her notes included, “General Groves was the only boss over Oppenheimer,” and “Scientists given choice of problems. Reasons instead of authority. Free to solve problems.” Rand observed that even scientists who were in the military were “free in the laboratory. Never worked under compulsion.” Groves, a military man, was wise enough to understand that he needed to let scientists use their minds in their own way. Groves thus reaffirmed a keen insight found in all Rand’s writings: the mind cannot be forced! RAND’S MESSAGE: TRUST

Champion Briefs 351 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

TECHNOLOGY ONLY TO A FREE PEOPLE In recent years the decision to use the atomic bomb has come under criticism. But however you come down on this controversy, Rand’s observations can inform your thinking about our future. Free minds create technologies. Moral systems determine how we use technologies. Statist morality—from left and right—would employ technology to force individual choices and minds. Force is the destroyer of minds. Thus, if we want technologies that will benefit us in the future, we need free minds and free societies! *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 352 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are like all other weapons, rooted in coercive relationships. The aff fails to overcome the statist logic that makes violence possible.

Rand, Ayn. "The Roots Of War." Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. 1966. Web. December 09, 2019. . It is true that nuclear weapons have made wars too horrible to contemplate. But it makes no difference to a man whether he is killed by a nuclear bomb or a dynamite bomb or an old- fashioned club. Nor does the number of other victims or the scale of the destruction make any difference to him. And there is something obscene in the attitude of those who regard horror as a matter of numbers, who are willing to send a small group of youths to die for the tribe, but scream against the danger to the tribe itself—and more: who are willing to condone the slaughter of defenseless victims, but march in protest against wars between the well-armed …. If nuclear weapons are a dreadful threat and mankind cannot afford war any longer, then mankind cannot afford statism any longer. Let no man of good will take it upon his conscience to advocate the rule of force—outside or inside his own country. Let all those who are actually concerned with peace—those who do love man and do care about his survival—realize that if war is ever to be outlawed, it is the use of force that has to be outlawed. *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 353 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Self-defense is an extension of natural rights, specifically the right to life.

Rand, Ayn. ""The Nature Of Government.” The Virtue of Selfishness. 1964. Web. December 09, 2019. . The necessary consequence of man’s right to life is his right to self-defense. In a civilized society, force may be used only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use. All the reasons which make the initiation of physical force an evil, make the retaliatory use of physical force a moral imperative. If some “pacifist” society renounced the retaliatory use of force, it would be left helplessly at the mercy of the first thug who decided to be immoral. Such a society would achieve the opposite of its intention: instead of abolishing evil, it would encourage and reward it.

Champion Briefs 354 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

The only moral purpose of government is to defend citizens' rights from physical force and other violations.

Rand, Ayn. "The Virtue Of Selfishness.". 1964. Web. December 09, 2019. . The basic political principle of the Objectivist ethics is: no man may initiate the use of physical force against others. No man--or group or society or government--has the right to assume the role of a criminal and initiate the use of physical compulsion against any man. Men have the right to use physical force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use. The ethical principle involved is simple and clear-cut: it is the difference between murder and self- defense. A holdup man seeks to gain a value, wealth, by killing his victim; the victim does not grow richer by killing a holdup man. The principle is: no man may obtain any values from others by resorting to physical force. The only proper, moral purpose of a government is to protect man's rights, which means: to protect him from physical violence--to protect his right to his own life, to his own liberty, to his own property and to the pursuit of his own happiness. Without property rights, no other rights are possible.

Champion Briefs 355 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are a legitimate means of self-defense for weaker nations to deter invasion by stronger ones.

Shellenberger, Michael. "Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?." Forbes. August 06, 2018. Web. December 09, 2019. . Nuclear Bombs As Weapons of the Weak How does a weak nation-state like France level the playing field with a more powerful adversary like Germany? By obtaining a weapon capable of wiping out its major cities. Twice victimized and humiliated by its neighbor, France after World War II set off to build a nuclear bomb that, had it been available before 1940, would have deterred the German invasion. Can anyone blame France for getting the bomb? Of course not. After all, Germany’s war upon its neighbors resulted in the deaths of 50 million people. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government from trying to prevent France from building a nuclear weapon. Senior Kennedy administration officials in 1962 described France’s nuclear program as “foolish, or diabolical — or both.” How could the U.S. deny France the means with which to defend herself? By promising to protect France with its own nuclear weapons through what is called “extended deterrence.” French President Charles de Gaulle didn’t buy it. He felt that “the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or Lyons,” noted the New York Times, “if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet- American missile exchange.” A nuclear-armed France, U.S. officials warned, “could lead to a proliferation of nuclear powers,” reported Ronald Steel in Commentary, “that is, to demands by other allies, especially Germany, for nuclear status.” The identical argument was later made against China, India and Pakistan, and is now being made against allowing North Korea and Iran to possess nuclear weapons. The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more dangerous the world will be. But is that really the case? I don’t ask this question lightly. I come from a long line of Christian pacifists and conscientious objectors and earned a degree in peace studies from a Quaker college. I have had nightmares about nuclear war since I was a boy and today live in California, which is more vulnerable to a North Korean missile than Washington, D.C. — at least for now. But it is impossible not to be struck by these facts: No nation with a nuclear weapon has ever been invaded by another nation. The number of deaths in battle worldwide has declined 95 percent in the 70 years since the invention and spread of nuclear weapons; The number of Indian and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories declined 90 percent after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998. In 1981, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz published an essay titled, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” In it he argued that nuclear weapons are revolutionary in allowing weaker nations to protect themselves from more powerful ones. International relations is “a realm of anarchy as opposed to hierarchy… of self-help… you’re on your own,” Waltz explained. How do nuclear weapons work? Not “through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish… the message of a deterrent strategy is this,” explained Waltz.

Champion Briefs 356 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

“‘Although we are defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains.’” *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 357 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear weapons are vital to a state's self-defense. States should limit their nuclear arsenals to be strictly for retaliating against existential threats to their countries.

Perkovich, George. "Do Unto Others: Toward A Defensible Nuclear Doctrine." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . All states have the right to self-defense. In exercising this right, states have recognized the interest in creating and upholding norms and rules to limit the destructiveness of warfare. The laws of armed conflict, humanitarian law, and the doctrine of just war have evolved along with technology to create today’s environment, in which the United States takes care to limit even the use of discriminating drone weapons. The principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality are central to this framework. At the same time, any society confronting massive aggression that could destroy much of its population and the social-physical infrastructure on which its security and way of life depend will do whatever it can to deter or defeat such aggression. No state can be expected to deny itself the right and means to defend its people against such threats.28 Any peacetime declaration to the contrary would not reasonably be expected to obtain in the midst of an actual threat to the survival of a state. This probable reality was recognized reluctantly by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.” In a nonbinding judgment, the majority concluded that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” However, the court could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake” (emphasis added).29 Nuclear-weapon states almost certainly would not bind themselves to follow this or any other international body’s judgment that barred the potential use of nuclear weapons. But rule of law is a central pillar, if not the central pillar, of modern civilization and of American and other states’ political philosophies. As power is distributed more broadly in the international political order of the twenty-first century, the United States will have a keen interest in the predictability that comes from widespread adherence to rule- or law-based “regimes” to manage international affairs. The value in relating U.S. nuclear policy to international law is, among other reasons, to hold other nuclear-armed states to similar standards. The most realistic politically and legally defensible formulation that the United States (and any other state) could declare to guide its potential use of nuclear weapons is that it possesses nuclear weapons only to respond to, and thereby deter or defeat, threats to its survival or that of its allies, particularly any use of nuclear weapons. The formulation recommended here would be more restrictive than the declaratory policy of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review but not as restrictive as the leading “sole purpose” alternative. The review states: The United States will

Champion Briefs 358 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring nonnuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. • The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. • The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. There are two major differences between the Nuclear Posture Review and the declaratory policy recommended here. First, the existing policy places the nuclear threshold at “extreme circumstances,” whereas the alternative favored here pegs nuclear use to “threats to the survival of the United States or its allies.” Second, the policy recommended here posits use of U.S. nuclear weapons only in response to existential threats, whereas the Nuclear Posture Review preserves preemptive first-use options against adversaries’ nuclear forces or to defeat extreme non- nuclear threats. Though it does not explicitly mention preemptive first use, perhaps to avoid moral or political debate on the issue, preemption remains central. The policy recommended here, by contrast, would eschew preemptive, disarming nuclear first strikes against Russian and Chinese nuclear forces.

Champion Briefs 359 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear states aren't suicidal---they'd only use nuclear weapons in self-defense.

Perkovich, George. "Do Unto Others: Toward A Defensible Nuclear Doctrine." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2013. Web. December 10, 2019. . Positing, as the United States does, that potential scenarios of nuclear use are limited to conflicts involving other nuclear-armed states, the question becomes whether it makes sense to take an action—starting nuclear war—that would threaten one’s own existence if a threat were extreme but not existential. Threatening to trigger nuclear war to deter less-than- existential harm may be tempting because it could work as a bluff, but actually carrying out the threat of first use would invite a graver risk. Indeed, there’s little reason to think that threatening first use makes deterrence any more effective than the more credible threat of retaliatory use does.32 Nuclear deterrence has not spared the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, and Israel from numerous wars where the stakes were not great enough to make nuclear use credible. Yet, any state contemplating major aggression against a nuclear-armed state would have to assume that there is a very good chance of being hit with nuclear weapons in response. This insight is reflected in the declaratory nuclear policy of Russia. Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine states that “the Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.” In World War II, the Soviet Union lost 26.6 million citizens, constituting 13.5 percent of the 1939 population, but the country survived.33 Yet the scale and horror of that destruction make it almost inevitable that a Russian leadership now faced with a full-scale invasion would strongly consider the use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s current leaders sometimes issue blustery threats that imply a willingness to use nuclear weapons in scenarios in which Russia’s existence is not remotely threatened. But the Kremlin’s historic behavior demonstrates awareness that beneath the muscle-flexing bravado lies an understanding that nuclear war would be suicidal and therefore only credible against aggression of an existential scale, as Russian doctrine says. Similarly, Russia allows for nuclear use in response to chemical and biological attack. But it is nearly impossible to imagine that NATO, the United States, or China would use such weapons against Russia or that Russia would risk the strategic and political consequences of breaking the nuclear taboo in response to a chemical or biological attack that much weaker adversaries could someday theoretically mount. By emphasizing that the only potentially legitimate use of nuclear weapons would be in retaliation for threats to national survival, the United States would be staking a position that Russia could share. And if stray Russian officials were to rattle nuclear sabers in contravention of this policy, other states and international society would have a solid basis for stigmatizing them. Both China and India have no-first-use policies for weapons of mass destruction. Adversaries may question how

Champion Briefs 360 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

faithfully China, India, or any other state would adhere to their declaratory policies in an actual conflict. But both China and India today possess relatively small nuclear arsenals deployed in ways more suited for retaliatory second-strike use than for first use. Both have been notably restrained in issuing nuclear threats, which affirms the sense that their threshold for use is at the level of existential threats of the kind that only other states’ nuclear weapons pose to them. Beijing and New Delhi should welcome a move in this direction by Washington.

Champion Briefs 361 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Morality and self-interest should be interconnected in order for persons to have value to life.

Long, Roderick. "The Winnowing Of Ayn Rand." CATO Unbound. January 20, 2010. Web. December 10, 2019. . Classical liberalism’s “thin” conception of politics is often thought to be at odds with the Greeks’ “thick” conception of ethics. If there is an objectively best way of life, or at any rate a family of best ways, then why should we value, as liberals do, the freedom to choose ways of life that are not the best? Rand offers two answers. One is that being self-directed is an essential part of the good life, so that a way of life forced on someone from without no longer counts as best. But her other and more characteristic answer appeals less to the welfare of the potentially coerced and more to that of the potential coercer; to deal with others by force rather than persuasion is to betray one’s own nature as a rational being, and thus to make not only one’s victim but oneself worse off. (Rand here embodies what Douglas Den Uyl has called the “supply-side” aspect of Greek ethics.) Central to Rand’s ethics is the idea that the nature of our self-interest is something that has to be discovered on the basis a consideration of our nature as rational beings, not something that we can simply read off our desires. Rand’s delineation of the content of our self-interest includes, crucially, both the thesis that there can be no genuine conflict between self-interest and morality, and the closely related thesis that there can be no genuine conflict between one person’s self-interest and another’s. [1] These claims may strike many today as implausible — one of Rand’s recent biographers calls the second thesis “eccentric” — but they were shared by nearly every major thinker in the first two thousand years of moral philosophy, from Socrates, Plato, and Rand’s beloved Aristotle, through the Stoics and Epicureans, and onward through Cicero to the aforementioned Scholastics. [2] But what, in Rand’s view, connects our self-interest with the moral claims of others? For most of Rand’s aforementioned “eudaimonist” predecessors, the requirements of moral virtue were conceived as a constitutive part of the agent’s own interest; the Epicureans were the only major dissidents, regarding virtue instead as an instrumental strategy for attaining this interest (rather like Hobbes, in a way, though the Epicureans are surely closer to the main line of eudaimonism than Hobbes is). Rand appears to waver between these two approaches, treating the individual’s ultimate good sometimes as a robust human flourishing that has virtue as a component, and sometimes as mere survival to which virtue is only an external means. [3]

Champion Briefs 362 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Life itself is a prerequisite to all other valuations.

Den Uyl, Douglas. "Nozick On The Randian Argument." Reading Nozick. 1981. Web. December 10, 2019. . In so far as one chooses, regardless of the choice, one chooses (value) man's life. It makes no sense to value some X without also valuing that which makes the valuing of X possible—: notice that this is different from saying "that which makes X possible"). If one lets X be equivalent to "death" or "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," one is able to have such a valuation only because of the precondition of being a living being. Given that life is a necessary condition for valuation, there is no other way we can value something without also (implicitly at least) valuing that which makes valuation possible.

Champion Briefs 363 NEG: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Survival is the justification for all values.

Mozes, Eyal. "Flourishing And Survival In Ayn Rand:A Reply To Roderick Long." The Objectivist Center. 2010. Web. December 10, 2019. . This aspect of Aristotle’s ethics has been corrected by Rand. Rand’s approach provides a principled criterion, based on the facts, for what is or is not part of the good life; something is part of the good life if it contributes to one’s survival. On Rand’s approach, therefore, value judgments are basically the same as medical judgments and can be argued for and proven the same way: by identifying the evidence for what in fact contributes to man’s survival. In contrast to the approach suggested by Long, there is no need to rely on emotions, or on “experience” without explanation, and disagreements are resolvable by the evidence. Like all objective concepts, the concept of the good life is open-ended; new knowledge can change our understanding of the good life, or even change some aspects of the nature of the good life.4 However, the criterion for the good life, and the basic method for discovering it, remain the same—the good life is what contributes to man’s survival. 2. Determining what is needed for survival How, then, do we determine what is needed for survival? It is easy to see how by the standard of survival, for example, drinking water can be judged as good and walking into the path of a speeding car can be judged as bad. But life as the standard of value does not mean immediate survival as the only goal. As Leonard Peikoff explains: “A self-destroying action need not be immediately fatal….It is possible to deteriorate gradually for years, breathing all the while, but increasingly damaged.” And our judgment of actions causing such drawn-out destruction as wrong is still guided by the standard of survival. “The size and form of the damage are not relevant here. No threat to vitality—no undermining of one’s capacity to deal successfully with the environment—can be countenanced if life is the standard of value. The reason is that no such threat can be inflicted safely on so complex and delicate an integration as a living organism.”5 *Ellipsis from source

Champion Briefs 364 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Objectivism holds that retaliation is only justified against aggressors, yet nuclear weapons harm many non-combatants.

McFarlane, Kevin. "Peter Schwartz's "Libertarianism: The Perversion Of Liberty," A Restricted Critique." Libertarian Alliance. 1994. Web. December 09, 2019. . We start from the assumption (shared by Objectivism) that the retaliatory use of force is justified only against those who initiate it. Modern weapons of mass destruction, conventional as well as nuclear, cannot be targeted solely at combatants. Therefore, the lives of non- combatants are inevitably lost in contemporary conflicts. It is virtually impossible for external wars to avoid the loss of civilian life, so when states intervene they invariably cannot target their retaliatory force solely at the initiators of force. People can oppose nuclear weapons on moral grounds, simply because they cannot be targeted at combatants without harming innocent civilians, even though, personally, they may be extremely hostile to the [former] Soviet Union. I have met people who fall into this category. And they are not all Trotskyists.

Champion Briefs 365 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Rights are claims, which Rand's egoistic philosophy cannot adequately justify.

Zwolinski, Matt. "A Critique Of Ayn Rand's Theory Of Rights.". April, 2014. Web. December 09, 2019. . To have a right is to have a certain kind of claim against others. That claim could be a purely moral one (in which case the right is a moral right), or it could be one enforceable by law (in which case it is a legal right). It could be a claim against others that they perform certain positive actions such as repaying a debt (in which case it is a positive right), or it might simply be a claim that others refrain from performing certain kinds of actions like taking one’s property without one’s consent (in which case it is a negative right). The important point, for our purposes, is that rights are claims on other people. To say that A has a right against B doesn’t say much at all about what it would be wrong or right for A to do. What it says, instead, is that it would be wrong for B to act (or fail to act) toward A in certain ways. If A has a right, then as a matter of moral logic, some other person B must have a corresponding obligation. And this is where philosophers are going to see a gap in Rand’s argument. Where do these obligations come from? Claims about what rights one has, and hence claims about what obligations other people have, do not follow as a matter of logic from claims about what it is morally right for one to do. The fact that your life is a value to you does not logically entail that I have an obligation to allow you to live it. There’s a logical gap there. And it is a gap that, as Michael Huemer notes, seems especially large for a political philosophy built on egoist foundations. For if egoism is correct, then your life is a value to you, but not necessarily any value at all to me. All value is agent-relative, and so we cannot appeal to the impersonal, agent- neutral (or “intrinsic”) value of human life to explain why people have an obligation to respect our right to life. To what, then, can we appeal? There is an obvious strategy for the Objectivist to pursue in response to this question. But it is oddly one that, so far as I can tell, Fred and Adam never mention in the paper. The strategy is this. Rather than saying that person A’s rights follow from facts about A himself – what his values are, what it is right for him to do, etc. – we argue that they follow from facts about person B – the person who has an obligation to respect those rights. So, instead of saying that A has a right to life because A’s life is valuable to A, we say that B has an obligation to respect A’s right to life because doing so is in some way valuable for B himself. This, after all, seems the most natural way of justifying rights in an egoistic philosophy. You have an obligation to respect my rights not (primarily) because it is good for me, but because it is good for you. Such a strategy avoids the worries about equivocation and logical gaps that Rand’s “synoptic statement” seems likely to prompt among academic philosophers. It does, however, raise other questions and difficulties of its own. For instance, if the claim is that B should respect A’s rights because doing so is good for B, one thing we’ll want to hear more about is precisely how it is supposed to be good for B. There seem to be two possible approaches to answering this question, both of which are represented in some of the

Champion Briefs 366 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

things Rand herself had to say about rights.1 On one approach, call it the instrumental approach, B ought to respect A’s rights because doing so is an effective means for B to achieve his own independently-defined set of values. One finds a rather crude version of this approach in Hobbes – the reason one has not to kill one’s confederates in the state of nature is that doing so is likely to get you killed, too. But it is also an approach with some historical precedent in the tradition of Ancient Greek eudaimonism for which Rand professes such respect – specifically in Epicurean approach to interpersonal morality. 1 See, for a brief discussion, Roderick Long’s essay, “The Winnowing of Ayn Rand,” Far more common among the Ancient Greeks, however, was a different approach to thinking about the way in which other human beings ought to figure in to our own rational deliberation. On this more common approach, which we can call the constitutive approach, respect for the rights of others is not merely an effective strategy for pursuing our own independently-defined and agent-relative good. Rather, respect for the rights of others is a constitutive part of our own good. The reason Howard Roark doesn’t cheat his customers isn’t just that he doesn’t want to be caught and punished. It’s because cheating his customers – even if he got away with it – would not be good for him. Whatever money he gained by such cheating would either not be a value for him at all, or at least would not be a value sufficiently great to outweigh the damage his cheating does to his own moral character. When Michael Huemer charges that Rand’s reconciliation of egoism and rights depends upon claims that are “extremely implausible empirically,” I suspect it is because he assumes that Rand must be thinking about the connection between these two ideas in purely instrumentalist terms. And if that really was the only or primary way in which Rand thought about them, then Huemer would have a point! It is unlikely that respect for the rights of others will in all circumstances (even in all social circumstances) be the best means for achieving our own independently defined ends. And at any rate, it doesn’t seem like the kind of principled commitment to respect for the rights of others could or should really depend upon contingent circumstances in the way the instrumental approach requires it to be. Respect for the rights of others might be a good rule of thumb for promoting one’s self interest on the instrumental view. But a rule of thumb is not a moral principle.

Champion Briefs 367 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

States have many harmful intentions for pursuing nuclear weapons, which cannot be reduced to self-defense.

Jablonski, Frank. "Shellenberger Is Wrong About Proliferation." Environmental Progress. August 24, 2018. Web. December 09, 2019. . “Weak Nations” is a bad category. Lumping all non-nuclear armed countries into a category called “Weak Nations” is a “category error” because it obscures important differences between nations without nuclear weapons. Nations, like people, vary. They also do things for their own reasons, not the ones outside analysts might prefer or project. “Weak nations” – those currently without nuclear weapons – are not necessarily motivated to get nuclear weapons for “self-defense”. Nothing prevents a relatively “weak nation” from deciding it “needs” nuclear weapons as a tool to deter rivals that neither have such weapons, nor are positioned to acquire them. It is reasonable to expect that, if barriers are lifted, the first countries to get nuclear weapons would be countries that both have capacity to develop the weapons and that see advantages from doing so. There are advantages other than balancing leverage with an already- existing nuclear power. For example, South Africa’s motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons seems to have been the desire to preserve its internal status quo – the system of racial segregation known as “apartheid”.

Champion Briefs 368 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Rands ethics are inconsistent.

Long, Roderick. "Reason And Value: Aristotle Versus Rand." The Objectivist Center. 2010. Web. December 10, 2019. . There is a deeper objection, however, to the idea that dishonesty is contrary to our self-interest simply because it is too difficult to keep track of all the lies we have told and to keep them all consistent. I challenge anyone to convince himself that that is the reason Howard Roark (in The Fountainhead) does not cheat his customers. Clearly, Roark’s reason for being honest is not that he is insufficiently clever to remember which lies he has told to whom but rather that he does not choose to live by exploiting other people—for which his reason is surely not that he is afraid of being punished (no such fear stopped him from blowing up Cortlandt Homes) but rather that, in the words of Rostand’s Cyrano, he is “too proud to be a parasite.” Or, as John Galt puts it, “You do not care to live as a dependent, least of all a dependent on the stupidity of others.”83 This last could be taken in a Hobbesian-instrumentalist way—it is a bad idea, in instrumental terms, to become dependent—but that is not the spirit of the passage. When asked what advantage he had ever gained for himself from philosophy, Aristotle said, “That I do, without being subject to compulsion, what some do through fear of the laws.”The Randian hero sees parasitism and dependence as undesirable states in themselves, regardless of whether they lead to further punishment from some external source; the spirit is Aristotle flavored with Nietzsche. The spirit of Rand’s novels, then, is decidedly Aristotelian: her fictional heroes are motivated by an outlook that sees immoral action as somehow intrinsically ignoble and unworthy of a heroic human being, regardless of its consequences. But when Rand tried in her nonfiction writing to develop the philosophical foundations of the moral outlook expressed in her fiction, and in particular to make explicit her insight that parasitism was in conflict with self-interest, she made the mistake of thinking of self-interest in instrumental terms, at least implicitly, thus giving herself a much harder job. So it was, I suspect, that the Hobbesian strand began to creep in much more strongly, though always mixed with the Aristotelian strand. In order to justify the strength of libertarian rights as binding constraints, despite her instrumentalist outlook, Rand had either to make implausible causal claims or else bring in the Kantian strand as well. That, I think, is why her ethical theory ultimately collapses into inconsistency.

Champion Briefs 369 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

Survival isn’t key to flourishing. Rand’s position on moral values means survival is not the ultimate goal.

Long, Roderick. "Foundations And Flourishing: A Reply To Miller And Mozes." The Objectivist Center. 2010. Web. December 10, 2019. . Mozes wants to say that it is best for our survival that we commit ourselves to values that might conceivably conflict with our survival; but in that case we need a clearer statement of the relation between survival and self-interest. Suppose I get myself to care about flourishing more than about bare survival, because doing so is the best means to ensuring (indirectly) my bare survival. But now which is to be identified with my self-interest: flourishing, or bare survival? If Rand says that my self-interest remains bare survival, then it seems she is Long: Foundations and Flourishing 111 no longer an egoist, since what she is advising people to pursue is something distinct from, and potentially in conflict with, their self-interest. Of course Rand can say that this shift of focus is itself justified by self-interest; but this seems to make self-interest a mere ladder that one kicks away once one has climbed up it. The person who has inculcated the appropriate values in himself is now more interested in those values than in bare survival; so if survival is self-interest, then such a person is now subordinating the value of self-interest to other values, and cannot truthfully call himself an ethical egoist. He has given up egoism, albeit for egoist reasons; but the egoist reasons for which he gave it up are reasons he had then, not reasons he has now. 23 If Rand instead identifies flourishing with self-interest, then she can consistently preserve her claim to be an ethical egoist—but only at the cost of having to give up her claim to be resting all value on survival. Instead, the concept of selfinterest will have no antecedently fixed content but must instead be constructed through practical deliberation. That would be fine by me; it’s essentially the view of Aristotle and the Stoics. But it is not the position Rand means to defend. In addition to the indirect-egoist arguments we’ve been examining, Mozes offers a strikingly different argument, one that tries to make moral values constitutive of the end after all. Mozes says: “The values and principles that a person has formed, the character traits he has developed, are part of his identity as a living organism.” (p. 97) Hence maintaining oneself in existence involves maintaining these aspects of oneself in existence.24 But surely maintaining oneself in existence cannot be a matter of maintaining all of my properties in existence; otherwise I would be forbidden to lose weight, or learn Arabic, or even get out of my chair. (And if I am wicked then I would be committed to maintaining my wickedness in existence also.) Such traits are not part of my “identity” in any essentialist sense.25 So why should self-preservation involve only the preservation of positive traits? Nor can Mozes reply that the only traits I need to maintain are those that promote my bare survival, because the intent of his argument is to justify preserving values even when they do not promote bare survival. In short, then, I do not think Mozes succeeds in rescuing Rand from the dilemma with which I presented her. Either moral values are worthwhile only for the sake of their contribution to bare survival, in which case it would be mindless rule worship to adhere to

Champion Briefs 370 A/2: Objectivism NC Jan/Feb 2020

moral values when one could get away with breaking them; or else moral values are worthwhile in their own right, and so survival is not the ultimate end.

Champion Briefs 371 NEG: Colonialism K Jan/Feb 2020

Neg: Colonialism Kritik

An aspect that will be quite interesting is this position because it looks at why nuclear arsenals are not as bad as other weapons of warfare. The methods page of this position can yield a framework similar to structural violence or something that focuses on the reconceptualization of war. The offense on this K breaks down the common misconceptions about nuclear weapons. It also addresses the problem with eliminating nuclear arsenals. Snuffing out a country's nuclear capabilities is perhaps even more costly. It requires crippling a country's economy so its government can't invest in nuclear research. It requires destroying factories and laboratories with aggressive bombing or cyber-sabotage campaigns. And it can even require destroying the area around the nuclear arsenal which can hinder the citizens ability to feel safe and secure. To answer this argument I think there needs to be evidence comparisons that focus on whether or not the add assumes we are deconstructing nuclear facilities and also how other weapons compare when it comes to development. I think this argument can play a huge role in determining what and how the aff fiats certain aspects of the plan. It just becomes a matter of how you decide to use to evidence to indict the method that the affirmative is proposing.

Champion Briefs 372 NEG: Colonialism K Jan/Feb 2020

The aff is a nuclear zero utopia.

Biswas, Shampa. " Nuclear Desire : Power And The Postcolonial Nuclear Order." University of Minnesota Press. 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. < http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umw/detail.action?docID=1793914>. Nuclear zero—a world without nuclear weapons—is the utopian dream of a new dystopia. The dystopia, captured in popular culture through tales of terrorists seeking the awesome, terrifying powers of the ultimate weapon, has reanimated fears of nuclear nonproliferation. What if al- Qaeda were to acquire a nuclear bomb? What if a rogue state, such as Iran, were willing to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or the bomb itself to Hezbollah? What level of damage would an undeterrable nuclear terrorist be willing to inflict on a hapless world? It is in this context that concerns about the fraying of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—that also awesome linchpin of efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons during the Cold War—have been revived. Quite remarkably, even ardent believers in the magic of nuclear deterrence at one time have now begun to preach universal nuclear disarmament. And so it came as a surprise to many in the nuclear peace movement when fierce cold warriors in the “gang of four”—George Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn—remade themselves as nuclear abolitionists, together mounting a public relations campaign to persuade current leaders and policy makers of the wisdom of moving to global nuclear zero.

Champion Briefs 373 NEG: Colonialism K Jan/Feb 2020

Controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons already have existed.

Biswas, Shampa. " Nuclear Desire : Power And The Postcolonial Nuclear Order." University of Minnesota Press. 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. < http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umw/detail.action?docID=1793914>. That nuclear weapons are dangerous is a cliché. Their destructive power appears to escape the limits of epistemology. We already know something about the scale of destruction caused when atomic weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although estimates just of deaths still range between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand. But it is not unusual to describe the scale of destruction that the currently existing stockpile of far more potent thermonuclear weapons could visit as “unthinkable” or “unimaginable.” This destructive potential was recognized early. So it wasn’t long after the development of the first atomic bombs that efforts began to control the spread of the technology, materials, and knowhow that could cause such immense harm. Out of these efforts emerged the massive, sprawling, complex, layered regime—the nuclear nonproliferation (NNP) regime—whose architecture I described in chapter 1. The NPT—a near-universal treaty negotiated against many odds—has long had a special and central place within this regime. The NPT exists in close association with a number of other treaties, organizations, agencies, forums, and groups, working not in perfect harmony but in what may be considered an alignment of similar interests. In other words, the NPT is only one, albeit very prominent, node in this vast regime of agreements, associations, and interests that see their collective task as making the world safe from the horrific possible use of nuclear weapons. Instead of focusing solely on the NPT, chapter 1 took on the task of understanding the scope and reach of this larger regime; the massive constellation of actors, institutions, and interests that constitute it; the mechanisms that sustain it; and the criteria by which we may gauge its effectiveness.

Champion Briefs 374 NEG: Colonialism K Jan/Feb 2020

Nuclear deterrence is regulated by treaties and organizations.

Biswas, Shampa. " Nuclear Desire : Power And The Postcolonial Nuclear Order." University of Minnesota Press. 2014. Web. December 13, 2019. < http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umw/detail.action?docID=1793914>. To political realists in the field of IR, the fact that such a massive effort of state and nonstate cooperation across so many transnational borders could occur in the realm of security—that sacred ground of statist high politics—should be something of a puzzle. But for political liberals, well intentioned believers in the possibility of trust and goodwill even under conditions of international anarchy, there is much cause for celebration in this. As the chapter described, the scale, scope, and reach of the NNP regime are truly staggering. The regime includes treaties, institutions, policies, organizations, think tanks, agencies, journals, and newsletters, which are engaged in tracking, monitoring, regulating, and raising public awareness and range from efforts to control and manage possible proliferation through officially sanctioned processes to advocacy efforts that document or suggest the harmful effects of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs. These together form a complex network of scientific and public policy expertise, significant political interests, huge economic stakes, and massive investment of financial, bureaucratic, and voluntary resources, which, although polyvalent in emphases and commitments, are all engaged in the task of making peace in a nuclear world, at its minimum by helping prevent the harms of nuclear possession and use and at its most ambitious by ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

Champion Briefs 375 A/2: Colonialism K Jan/Feb 2020

Ethical scholarship can critique reckless American interventions while agreeing that dictators shouldn't get the bomb.

Seitz, Sam. "The Nonproliferation Regime Exists For A Reason, Let’s Not Tear It Up." Politics in Theory and Practice. August 06, 2018. Web. December 10, 2019. . Shellenberger then argues that nuclear weapons moderate state behavior because “History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable.” (quote from Waltz) This makes absolutely no sense. Either nukes ensure existential security, preventing great power intervention, or they make countries more vulnerable, but to argue that nukes simultaneously make countries more and less vulnerable is almost Trumpian in its incoherence. And sure, maybe nuclear weapons promote foreign policy moderation, but that isn’t the same thing as internal moderation: The Cultural Revolution occurred after China had nuclear weapons, after all. I’m sympathetic to Shellenberger’s appeal for greater U.S. restraint abroad, but sometimes one has to intervene to save lives. I bet Saddam and Qaddafi were terrified of coalition forces, but their people were terrified of them. Why do a strongman’s discomfort and fear outweigh that of his people? Moreover, could anyone imagine how much worse the Syrian civil war would be if Assad had nukes – which, by the way, he attempted to acquire? The same goes for Yugoslavia; is it really worth forgoing even the possibility of military intervention, even when millions are calling out for help, simply to alleviate a dictator’s sense of insecurity? Absolutely not. I think it is clear that the U.S. too frequently intervenes militarily in other countries’ internal disputes. However, it’s a big leap to go from acknowledging American hubris to preventing all humanitarian intervention by allowing strongmen to acquire weapons of mass destruction at will.

Champion Briefs 376