3-/71 UNITED STATES ARMY SCOUTS: THE SOUTHWESTERN EXPERIENCE, 1866-1890 THESIS Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS By Carol Conley Nance, B. A. Denton, Texas May, 1975 Nance, Carol Conley, United States Army Scouts: The Southwestern Experience, 1866-1890. Master of Arts (History), May, 1975, 156 pp., 4 maps, bibliography, 107 titles. In the post-Civil War Southwest, the United States Army utilized civilians and Indians as scouts. As the mainstay of the reconnaissance force, enlisted Indians excelled as trackers, guides, and fighters. General George Crook became the foremost advocate of this service. A little-known aspect of the era was the international controversy created by the activities of native trackers under the 1882 recipro- cal hot pursuit agreement between Mexico and the United States. Providing valuable information on Army scouts are numerous government records which include the Annual Report of the Secretary of War from 1866 to 1896 and Foreign Relations of the United States for 1883 and 1886. Memoirs, biographies, and articles in regional and national histori- cal journals supplement government documents. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF MAPS . iv Chapter I. THE SOUTHWEST: CONVENTIONAL ARMY, UNCONVENTIONAL ENEMY 17 II. ARMY SCOUTS: CIVILIANS ON THE TRAIL . 2.17 III. ARMY SCOUTS: SET AN INDIAN TO CATCH AN INDIAN ..................... - - - - 28 IV. GENERAL GEORGE CROOK: UNCONVENTIONAL SOLDIER ........................ - -0 -0 -0 .0 68 V. INDIAN SCOUTS: AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSY .......... *........ .100 VI. ARMY SCOUTS: SOME OBSERVATIONS .. o. 142 BIBLIOGRAPHY, . ...........-.-.-. .148 iii LIST OF MAPS Map Following Page 1. The Southwest . 16A 2. Texas . .......... 67A 3. Apache Wars, 1871-1886 . 99A 4. Mexico, 1886 . 141A iv CHAPTER I THE SOUTHWEST: CONVENTIONAL ARMY, UNCONVENTIONAL ENEMY In April 1865 the American people, grateful that the nightmare of civil war had ended, little dreamed that the Army of their reunited nation faced a series of frontier wars just as terrifying to its participants and lasting six times longer than the war just concluded. The western states and territories would become the new battleground as whites and Indians fought for permanent control of the West. Accustomed to enemies who shared common methods of warfare, American soldiers faced Indians whose combat tactics not only differed from those of the soldiers, but who also knew the country for which they battled and could cope with the harsh geographical conditions imposed by nature throughout much of western America. To combat Indian warriors possessing such essential knowledge and skills, the Army needed men who were familiar with Indians and their natural environment. After the Civil War, most soldiers did not meet the require- ments; therefore, the Army employed civilians and friendly Indians as scouts. 1 2 The southwestern region of the United States, in which many Army scouts lived and served, can be described geographi- cally as a series of increasingly elevated plateaus slashed by canyons and ribbed by numerous mountain ranges from the Panhandle and the Trans-Pecos regions of Texas westward to the Colorado plateau of Arizona, and then southward along the Sierra Madre Mountains of Mexico. The ascent of the tablelands begins in the Texas Panhandle. To the east of the generally level Staked Plains, the land is rough and broken, the handiwork of rivers and their tributaries as the watercourses descend from the higher plain. On the Staked Plains, the rivers with their numerous branches continue to carve the surface, the Canadian River sculpting gentle valleys with ample timber, water, and grazing, while the Red River cuts deep canyons into the plains.2 To the west and southwest of the Panhandle, the terrain becomes increasingly harsh and elevated. The Trans-Pecos 1Although the geographical Southwest includes parts of Oklahoma, Colorado, Utah, and Nevada, the area referred to in this work as the Southwest consists only of the territory within the present-day states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 2 Joe F. Taylor, ed., "The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains, 1874-1875," Panhandle-Plains Historical Review 34(1961): 209-211. This source contains the military correspondence pertaining to the Red River campaign found in File 2815-1874, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, in the National Archives. 3 area, the scene of much activity against Indians during the 1870's, contains rough mountain ranges and their adjacent foothills gashed by canyons, gullies, and ravines, thus providing an inexhaustible number of hiding places.3 The land continues to rise across New Mexico and into Arizona to the Colorado plateau. Mountains rising to elevations of 5,000 to 13,000 feet above sea level dominate the landscape. Here, also, rivers carve canyons and valleys into the plateaus.4 Running in a north-south direction in the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua are the Sierra Madre Mountains, rising from 2,000 to 12,000 feet in altitude. In Sonora is located the western slope of the Sierra Madre range, for decades a favorite stronghold of renegade Apaches with its impassable canyons and high precipitous ridges. 5 3U.S.,Congress, House, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, H. Doc. 1, 46th Cong., 3d sess., Serial No. 1952, 1880, p. 163. 4 Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles (New York: Werner Company, 1896), pp. 440-441; U.S., Congress, House, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, H. Doc. 1, 51st Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 2715, 1889, p'. 186. 5 Britton Davis, The Truth About Geronimo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 76; U.S., Congress, House, Foreign Relations of the United States, H. Doc. 1, 48th Cong., 1st sess., 1883, p. 661. 4 In the arid expanse of plains, plateaus, and mountains adjacent to the Mexican border the United States Army dared to build its forts and to pursue the Indian tribes who called the Southwest their home. Forts abounded in the Southwest, their construction in Indian territory being part of the overall strategy of the Army. The purpose of the forts was to prevent or end raids, but the Army simply did not have enough soldiers to man them.6 If the Army had maintained its numerical strength following the Civil War and had used that strength against the western tribes, the nature of the Indian wars would probably have been radically different. The Army could have overwhelmed the Indians by sheer numbers, thus rendering the contributions of scouts less important. Shortly after the end of the Civil War, the Army began to shrink in size from approximately 1,000,000 men in 1865 to approximately 35,000 in 1870, then to approximately 25,000 in 1874, the size at which the Army remained until after the close of the Indian wars. The number of troops stationed 6U.S.,Congress, House, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, H. Doc. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 1249, 1865, p. 14; Robert M. Utley, "A Chained Dog: The Indian- Fighting Army," American West 10(1973):19. 7 Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Ay, 1789-1903, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902; reprint ed., Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1965), 2:604-615 passim. 5 in Texas and the two territories of New Mexico and Arizona averaged approximately 6,000 in any year between 1869 and 1892. Texas, with its exceptionally long frontier, averaged approximately 3,100 men, and Arizona and New Mexico averaged approximately 1,700 and 1,200 men respectively. The highest levels of troop concentration reached in both territories corresponded with the increased activity of hostile Apaches in the early 1870's and most of the 1880's. Troop concentration in Texas remained high from the beginning of the Reconstruction period to the early 1880's when Indian depredations ceased. In the 25 years following the Civil War, companies from 9 cavalry regiments and 22 infantry regiments served in the Southwest.8 In addition to the limited number of troops available for duty in the Southwest, a major weakness of military strategy was the Army's insistence on using conventional methods in what was in reality an unconventional war. During the 1870's and 1880's, the aim of military campaigns against Indians was to subdue and place them on reservations. To accomplish this aim effectively, the Army depended heavily 8 Information on troop concentration and assignments of cavalry and infantry companies are based on figures included in the Adjutant General's reports in the Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the years 1866 and 1869 through 1892. 6 on surprise attacks on Indian encampments by converging columns of infantry and cavalry. The logistics of a campaign called for the transportation of supplies by wagons pulled by slow-moving mules or oxen.9 To achieve success in the Southwest, the military had to adapt its strategy to meet the problems posed by the extremes of geography, the need for mobility, and the nature of the enemy. Although coveted by the Army, the advantage of surprise belonged to the Indians. By observing military traffic on the plains and in the valleys from safe, incon- spicuous mountain lookouts, Indians could decide whether to attack or hide, then remove themselves to places chosen especially for ambush or refuge. Also, hostile Indians inhabited areas that were usually remote, inaccessible, or unknown to whites,.1 0 Tactics required swift military pursuit, but on foot the infantry was ineffectual in rough terrain. Extremes of heat and cold and scarcity of water and forage exposed the lack of endurance of both men and horses.