By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen

What’s Behind Bush’s Nuclear Cuts?

t is not every day that the U.S. government major portions of the arsenal to make them more “useful,” shifting from high- decides to cut its nuclear-weapons stockpile yield Cold War weapons aimed at the former Soviet Union to “modifi ed,” or in half. Yet, the mainstream media paid new, more accurate, more “credible” nu- I clear weapons that could be used against little attention on June 1 when Linton F. a wider variety of targets including rogue states and terrorists as well as Russia and Brooks, head of the National Nuclear Security China. Brooks’ announcement went a step further by addressing the disposi- Administration, announced that by 2012 the tion of all warhead categories in the stockpile: strategic and nonstrategic, ac- United States would reduce the number of tive and inactive, deployed and reserve (see page 9). nuclear weapons in the stockpile by “about half.” Unfortunately, however, the deci- sion also carried a hidden subtext: the retirement of almost half of the current He suggested that further cuts could in many earlier events that go back at stockpile, a total of more than 4,000 war- be in store in the future. Although the least seven years to a 1997 summit be- heads by our estimate, could help pave exact fi gures are classifi ed, we interpret tween Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris the way to developing and producing a the decision to mean that the current Yeltsin, including the never-completed new nuclear arsenal. Retiring thousands stockpile of more than 10,000 warheads START III, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Re- of warheads will free up funds that can, will be reduced to about 6,000. view (NPR), and the 2002 Strategic Of- the administration hopes, be put to bet- This decision was signifi cant, and fensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). ter use. This includes a series of programs Congress should be commended for The total size of the active strategic for constructing a “responsive infrastruc- pushing the Bush administration into arsenal refl ects cuts fi rst proposed for ture,” or “modern infrastructure,” that taking this important step. Still, it came START III and later crystallized in SORT, includes, among other things, building more than a decade after the end of the while the underlying motive behind the a Modern Pit Facility to manufacture Cold War, and the weapons retired from decision is evident in the NPR. The NPR plutonium parts for nuclear weapons; the stockpile will not be fully disman- called for retaining a nuclear arsenal supporting the scientists and engineers tled for another decade or more. Also, large enough to deter any country from at the weapons laboratories to design the cuts were less of a leap than it might challenging U.S. nuclear preeminence. and develop new or modifi ed nuclear seem; in fact, they had been prefi gured At the same time, it envisions retooling weapons; and reducing the time it takes

Robert S. Norris is a senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in Washington, DC. His most recent book is Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (2002). Hans M. Kristensen is an ex-

ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004 ARMS CONTROL TODAY pert on nuclear weapons issues and is currently a consultant to NRDC.

6 to resume nuclear testing. Potentially, this bombs and sea-launched cruise missile unaffected, except for a small number could mean the resumption of testing and warheads intended for use in tactical or that are disassembled each year for rou- the building of a new and different nu- battlefi eld scenarios. All told, today’s tine analysis and examination. clear arsenal. Any additional future cuts stockpile includes more than 10,350 Still, eight years from now, more than would only come, Brooks indicated, if this warheads of nine basic types in 15 dif- 20 years after the end of the Cold War, infrastructure were up and running.1 ferent versions. Their yields range from the United States under current plans 0.3 kilotons to 1.2 megatons. Each de- will retain approximately 6,000 nuclear The Current livery platform (submarine, land-based weapons in its arsenal, almost all of them And Future Stockpile ICBM, or bomber) can accommodate at active with as many as 2,200 operation- Although the stockpile plan submitted least two different types of warheads. ally deployed. to Congress remains classifi ed, it is pos- The stockpile is far more than the 6,000 Moreover, the number of warheads sible to estimate what warheads will be warheads declared under START as many in the active arsenal in 2012 will differ retired and what warheads will be kept of the additional warheads have been in little from that planned under START II and thus project what the stockpile will inactive status, having been retained for reached with Russia and the proposed look like in 2012. We base our estimates the last decade in storage as a “hedge” START III. In setting a framework for on our long experience following trends against a Russian nuclear revival. START III negotiations, Clinton and and developments in the U.S. stockpile We conclude from our knowledge of Yeltsin set a goal of each country pos- and on some newly obtained informa- U.S. stockpile trends that Brooks’ an- sessing no more than 2,500 accountable tion, which makes us confi dent that the nouncement of plans to cut the stock- strategic warheads. The START III pro- fi gures below are very close to the actual pile by “almost half” means that some posal also included important guide- numbers. 4,325 warheads of six types are slated lines on transparency and verifications The current stockpile includes war- for retirement and disassembly. Some and other arms control restrictions that heads for the three legs of the old Cold warhead types will be completely re- were not included in SORT. The Bush War triad, that is, submarine-launched tired, such as the W62 and, we assume, administration has ridiculed the com- ballistic missiles (SLBMs), land-based the W84. Of the versions that remain in plexity of those treaties and the time it ICBMs, and bombs dropped from planes. the stockpile, there will be signifi cant took to achieve them. Yet, the crucial In addition, there are some nuclear cuts in six while seven others will be number of weapons in the active arse-

Table 1 Cold War (1990)

U.S. Stockpile Levels 1990-2012 START I (2001)

START IIa

START III (projected)b

SORT (2012) 7,970 21,680

8,000 6,000 6,000 4,600 20,000 7,000 5,000 4,000 6,000 5,500 5,260 15,000 5,260 5,000 4,000 3,000 3,500 2,550

10,500 4,000 ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004

10,000 3,000 10,000 2,500 2,000

3,000 2,200 2,000 6,000 5,960 2,000 5,000 1,000 700 1,000 700 1,000 b

Actualc Active Accountable Inactive a START II was ratifi ed by Russia and the United States but never entered into force and was abandoned because of a U.S.-Russian dispute over U.S. plans for a ballistic missile defense system. b As part of the Helsinki Summit of March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin negotiations on a START III Treaty, but this never occurred. The only proposal to survive was the number of strategic warheads. We assumed a similar total stockpile size given the almost equal strategic force levels of START III and SORT. c Totals may not add due to rounding. 7 The Evolution of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

n the 45 years following the 1945 such a large reserve was the uncertain- bombings of Hiroshima and Naga- ty over how to maintain the reliability nuclearweaponarchive.org Isaki, the United States built about of the stockpile over the long run. In 70,000 nuclear warheads of 65 types September 1992, the United States for 116 kinds of delivery systems.1 conducted its last nuclear explosive Very few bombs were built in the test; and on Sept. 24, 1996, President fi rst several years after World War II, Bill Clinton was the fi rst world leader but after the Soviet Union conducted to sign the CTBT. a nuclear test in August 1949, the U.S. In the absence of testing and with nuclear weapons complex was ex- The Mk-6 (pictured above) was the no new nuclear weapons coming off panded and the stockpile grew rapidly. fi rst nuclear weapon to be produced in the production line, the Department An intense interservice rivalry among quantity after World War II with about of Energy was charged with develop- the Air Force, Navy, and Army drove 1,100 bombs entering the stockpile ing a program to ensure the reliability between 1951 and 1954. The Mk-6 was the U.S. side to outpace actual and of the existing warheads indefi nitely. phased out between 1957 and 1961. imagined Soviet capabilities, produc- The result, lavishly funded at levels at ing a mighty action-reaction engine or above those of the Cold War, was that fueled the arms race. Adding to heads on ballistic missiles and better the so-called Stockpile Stewardship the intensity was a fi erce competition guidance systems, rather than ever Program, an ambitious effort to offset between the national laboratories at increasing numbers characterized the the loss of data from underground Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore 1970s and 1980s. In many instances, nuclear weapons test explosions with to design new and improved warheads it has been the professional military above-ground nuclear experiments of every shape and size. that pushed to get rid of nuclear weap- and massive increases in computation- The U.S. stockpile grew by leaps and ons, especially the nonstrategic ones. al capability. Tens of billions of dollars bounds, from less than 500 warheads A high point of this trend came when have been committed to maintaining in 1951 to more than 22,000 a decade President George H. W. Bush on Sept. an “enduring stockpile” by building a later, fi nally reaching a peak of about 27, 1991, ordered the withdrawal of all variety of large facilities at the three 32,000 in 1967. There was never a ra- nuclear artillery shells and short-range weapons labs, Los Alamos, Livermore, tional process to determine how many missiles from overseas bases, along and Sandia, to further the develop- ICBMs, submarines, or nuclear artil- with several types of naval tactical ment of a comprehensive capability to lery shells should be built to serve the weapons and bombs. After the unilat- assess and simulate the nuclear explo- goal of deterrence or, if that failed, to eral cuts and treaty reductions, there sive performance of the warheads in fi ght a war. In fact, the process was were close to 11,000 warheads left in the stockpile. (See ACT, MMayay 22004.)004.) exceedingly arbitrary and capricious. the active stockpile by the mid-1990s. Confi dence in the stockpile has not The size and scale of each weapon Those cuts, along with the strategic eroded, and the responsible offi cials system was determined in part by the arms treaty known as START I, the from the Departments of Defense and turbulent congressional authorization planning that went into START II and Energy have certifi ed each year that process, in which the White House START III, and the Comprehensive Test the nuclear warheads have a high and the Pentagon requested new pro- Ban Treaty (CTBT), set the stage for the probability of working as intended. grams that were then fi ltered through June 2004 decision. Warheads removed key committees and powerful mem- from missiles and bombers to comply ENDNOTES bers who were subject to pressures by a with START I were placed in storage 1. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: military-industrial complex anxious to as a “hedge,” able to be redeployed The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear win contracts. All sides in the debate if the geopolitical competition with Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, DC: invoked the Soviet threat as well as Russia were somehow rekindled. This Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 42; new enemies and competitors such as “lead and hedge” policy, adopted by Robert S. Norris, Thomas B. Cochran, and China.2 the Clinton administration in its 1994 William M. Arkin, “History of the Nuclear Stockpile,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, By the 1970s, the military’s enthu- Nuclear Posture Review, resulted in a August 1985, pp. 106-109. siasm for nuclear weaponry began to large reserve of warheads that had to wane, and the decade saw the overall be maintained, serviced, and guarded. 2. J. Ronald Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Har- stockpile decline by almost 20 percent The result was that the size of the total vard University Press, 1974); Jacques S. due to the phaseout of several nuclear stockpile did not decline all that much Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge, missions. Qualitative improvements, under START I. MA: MIT Press, 1990). such as placement of multiple war- Part of the rationale for maintaining ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004 ARMS CONTROL TODAY

8 nal will remain essentially identical, that “[n]ew capabilities must be devel- other technical simulations to maintain with the minor difference of how many oped to defeat emerging threats such as weapons that were built with “previously warheads would be considered “ac- hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), tested nuclear devices/designs.” But the countable” (see table 1); that difference to fi nd and attack mobile and relocatable DSB recommended another model: us- was not large. targets, to defeat chemical or biological ing the same means to “provide weapons Those negotiations never got off the agents, and to improve accuracy and more relevant to the future threat envi- ground, partly because of opposition limit collateral damage.” More recently, ronment.” The authors recognize that in Congress. START II, on the other Brooks described what a responsive in- the political barriers to changing direc- hand, was ratified by both countries frastructure would look like: “A truly tion are formidable. “[U]ltimately the but never entered into force and was responsive infrastructure would let us fi x issue requires deep White House involve- abandoned because of a U.S.-Russian stockpile problems, modify existing war- ment and the diffi cult creation of a con- dispute over U.S. plans for a ballistic heads if needed, or produce replacement sensus in Congress that can be sustained missile defense system. In ratifying warheads without disrupting ongoing over a number of years if not decades.”4 the pact in 2000, the Russian Duma refurbishments, all much more quickly The Republican-controlled Congress included a provision that its approval than in the past. One part of a respon- turned out to be more difficult to sway was conditional on U.S. adherence to sive infrastructure is the capability to than the Bush administration initially the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) resume underground nuclear testing.” expected. A particular thorn in the Treaty. The United States withdrew Building the case for resuming war- side of the Department of Energy and from that treaty in June 2002. head production was also a prominent the Pentagon has been Rep. David L. feature of a February report from a task Hobson (R-Ohio), chairman of the Sub- A Consistent Philosophy force of the Defense Science Board (DSB), committee on Energy and Water Devel- Meets Congressional Concerns a federal advisory committee established opment of the House Appropriations The Bush plan is infused with an ideo- to provide independent advice to the Committee. For Hobson, the question logical commitment about the appro- secretary of defense. Among the task has been whether the nation could priate role of nuclear weapons crafted force’s chief recommendations were that afford to spend billions of dollars to by a coterie of nuclear policy thinkers the government should shift its focus maintain thousands of warheads in the when they were out of power from in dealing with the nuclear stockpile. enduring stockpile, extend the lives of 1993 to 2001. During the Clinton ad- Right now, the DSB noted, the Stockpile some or all of them, and simultaneous- ministration, a steady drumbeat of vi- Stewardship Program uses computer and ly refurbish the weapons complex to tuperation from this group questioned the wisdom of a nuclear test ban and urged development of a new generation Counting Warheads of nuclear weapons. The most influen- tial group comprised the co-authors of Specifi c terms are used to describe the different categories of warheads in a report entitled Rationale and Require- the nuclear stockpile. ments for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control by the National Institute for Active warheads are maintained in a ready-for-use status with tritium and Public Policy (NIPP).2 The study direc- other limited-life components installed and may be either deployed or stored. tor, Keith Payne, issued the report as The active warhead inventory is broken down into deployed warheads, re- the new administration took office in sponsive force warheads, and spares. January 2001. Over the following year as the new administration conducted Deployed warheads consist of operationally deployed warheads (i.e., war- its own NPR, it adopted many of the heads on fi elded strategic forces) and those associated with weapon sys- recommendations of the NIPP’s report. tems in overhaul and fi elded nonstrategic weapons. Payne co-chaired a group that advised ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Responsive force warheads consist of active warheads not on deployed on the NPR, and he ended up in the systems. These are kept in secure storage but are available to be returned to administration.3 the operationally deployed force to meet some contingency. Depending on According to Rumsfeld, the NPR “will the particular weapon system, this may take days, weeks, or months. Under transform the Cold War-era offensive the Bush plan, there will be approximately an equal number of “responsive” nuclear triad into a New Triad designed warheads and “operationally deployed” warheads in 2012. for the decades to come.” The New Triad is composed of the old triad of ICBMs, Spare warheads are part of the active but not operational inventory and are SLBMs, and bomber weapons plus con- the normal amount of extras to support routine maintenance and operations. ventional strike systems; active and pas- sive defensive systems; and a responsive Inactive warheads do not have limited-life components installed and may infrastructure to provide nuclear weap- not have the latest warhead modifi cations. ons whenever needed. The NPR urges 9 prepare the way for a new and different statutory prohibition on research and than one-third) that already have a low- kind of arsenal. Hobson pressured the development that could lead to produc- yield option. Of these, more than 1,000 Departments of Energy and Defense to tion of a new low-yield nuclear weapon (B61-3/-4/-10) have a “very low” yield submit a stockpile plan to resolve this (defined as having a yield less than five option of 0.3 kilotons. Under the new issue and held up funds for certain pro- kilotons). stockpile plan, by 2012, nearly half of grams until it was delivered.5 Other plans to develop a more “robust” all warheads in the stockpile (approxi- It took some time for the Pentagon, earth-penetrating weapon for destroying mately 2,900 of 5,900 warheads) will the Energy Department, and the White chemical and biological weapons en- have a low-yield option, and more than House to work out their differences over countered considerable opposition from 600 of them will have the very-low- these matters. The Pentagon position Congress and the public, and Brooks has yield option of 0.3 kilotons. was to keep almost all of the warheads recently made a special effort in several With such capabilities already in even if many were in inactive status public appearances to disavow any pres- place and expected to remain so in and merely used as a tritium supply for ent intention actually to develop or pro- 2012, the recommendations by the active weapons. duce such weapons. The administration, DSB and others that the United States In practice, this meant that the Energy he avers, only wants to assess their feasi- should develop low-yield warheads Department would be responsible for bility and possible military utility prior need better justifi cation and fuller ex- their routine maintenance and surveil- to any future decision to develop and planation. In many public comments lance and would have to conduct ex- produce such weapons, which could only thus far, some proponents have left the pensive service-life extension programs. occur with the approval of Congress. misleading impression that the United

Unfortunately, however, Bush’s decision also carried a hidden subtext: the retirement of almost half of the current stockpile, a total of more than 4,000 warheads by our estimate, could help pave the way to developing and producing a new nuclear arsenal.

Sectors within the Energy Department, If President George W. Bush wins a States does not have low-yield weapons however, especially at the weapon labora- second term, however, the new nuclear in the stockpile.7 The DSB report de- tories, did not want to have their budgets weapons issue is likely to reignite. After scribes how the current “legacy nuclear drained by supporting these activities. all, the NPR states that new, more dis- stockpile consists of weapons that were What was more important to them was a criminate, and therefore more “credible” designed and optimized for the world recommitment to their original mission capabilities are needed; the DSB agrees; of massive, arsenal exchange...and had of designing, developing, and producing and the weapons labs are pushing it. the large yields” and other characteris- nuclear weapons. With the submission Yet, the call for weapons with lower tics better suited for the Cold War. By of the stockpile plan to Congress in June, yields ignores the fact that the current contrast, the DSB’s alternate stockpile it would seem as though the Energy stockpile already includes thousands of would include “modifi ed legacy weap- Department has won at least part of the warheads with low-yield options. It has ons (mainly for lower yield),” among battle (see page 8).6 been generally assumed that low yield others, to “produce tailored effects means a yield of fi ve kilotons or less, a at much lower collateral damage.” To Don’t We Already Have threshold stated in the 1993 legislation. avoid future misunderstanding, the Enough Low-Yield Weapons? By contrast, the Pentagon’s defi nitions administration needs to explain why For now, it seems that the upcoming (see box) of yield categories defi ne low the current warheads with existing low- election has prompted the Bush ad- yield as a range between one and 10 yield options are not suffi cient. ministration to put the pursuit of new kilotons, or double that of the Spratt- nuclear weapons on the back burner. Furse Amendment. Ironic Consequences Last year, after a major effort, the ad- Using the Pentagon’s own defi nition, Ironically, a smaller future stockpile ministration succeeded in repealing we calculate that there are some 4,220 may have consequences that could the 1993 Spratt-Furse Amendment, a warheads in the current stockpile (more impede arms control and disarmament efforts. To military planners, fewer war- heads deployed on delivery platforms The Pentagon’s current defi nition of nuclear weapon yields: means that it is more important that each individual warhead that remains Very low yield: Less than 1 kiloton in the arsenal survives. A smaller de- Low yield: 1 kiloton to 10 kilotons ployed stockpile, therefore, requires a Medium yield: Over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons comparatively large reserve of nonde- High yield: Over 50 kilotons to 500 kilotons ployed warheads to safeguard against a ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Very high yield: Over 500 kilotons worst-case scenario such as catastrophic 10 technical failure or a sudden change Stockpile Stewardship Program to verify Table 2 in potential threats against the United and improve weapon capabilities. (See U.S. Stockpile States. To protect against such problems, ACT, MMayay 22004.)004.) By Warhead Type the new stockpile plan requires there 2004 and 2012 be two warhead types for each strategic Conclusion delivery platform, essentially doubling The timeline of the new stockpile plan the number of warheads that might oth- and SORT makes it clear that the goal Warhead 2004 2012 erwise be retained. stated by Bush in May 2001 “to move 10 Type (projected) Also, a smaller future arsenal means quickly to reduce nuclear forces” that each warhead type has to be capa- will not be achieved. Current plans for ICBMs ble of hitting a broader range of targets. implementation mean that almost an- ICBMs and SLBMs already have been other decade will pass before the force W62 730 0 equipped with retargeting features that levels fi rst agreed to in Helsinki in 1997 enable planners to switch warheads to will become a reality. If the Cold War W78 827 400 new targets quickly, but the NPR calls is really over and Russia is no longer an for more. Under “life-extension pro- enemy, then there is nothing to prevent W87 555 545 grams” (LEPs), bombs and re-entry vehi- the president from implementing the cles are being equipped with new radars cuts immediately. Total 2,112 945 and fuses to improve their accuracy and Nevertheless, more can and should effi ciency, and efforts are underway to be done. Fifteen years after the end of SLBMs maneuver re-entry vehicles to GPS-like the Cold War, U.S. ICBMs are still on accuracy. The B61, W80, W76, and W87 high alert, able to launch some 1,300 W76 3,195 1,840 warheads are undergoing or will under- warheads on a moments’ notice. Four- go similar life-extension upgrades. teen strategic submarines carry more W88 404 404 Although there will be fewer warheads than 2,200 warheads. Ten are deployed in the future stockpile than today, the at any given time, with four to six on Total 3,599 2,244 Energy Department will still have to high alert. The fl eet continues to deploy spend a considerable amount of money at Cold War levels, with more than 60 Cruise Missiles and resources to maintain them, resourc- patrols a year. Alert levels of either or es that will likely be taken from disman- both of these legs of the triad could be W80-1 1,827 825 tlement efforts. Throughout the 1990s, signifi cantly reduced immediately with- the Pantex plant near Amarillo, Texas, out any loss of credibility in the U.S. *W80-0 304 265 dismantled more than 11,000 warheads nuclear deterrent. from the weapon systems retired by the The administration’s actions do W84 383 0 fi rst Bush administration. With that task nothing to address the issues of trans- now virtually complete, work has shifted parency and verifi cation of the U.S. Total 2,514 1,090 to refurbishment and life-extension up- nuclear arsenal, hindering progress on grades of the warheads that will remain gaining greater knowledge and control Bombs in the stockpile. The fi rst LEP was for the of Russia’s arsenal. SORT requires no W87 warhead on the Peacekeeper missile, verifi cation, and the stockpile plan will B61-7 441 430 with fi rst deliveries to the Air Force in retain a reserve of warheads that are not June 1999. A W88 program is underway, accountable under U.S.-Russian arms B61-11 43 35 and LEPs for the B61, W76, and W80 war- control agreements. The stockpile plan heads are planned to follow. continues a policy of maintaining a sub- B83-0/-1 633 625 The combined LEPs involve thousands stantial reserve of warheads to supple- ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004 of warheads and will have priority over ment the fi elded weapons that was set *B61-3 396 200 dismantling the 4,000 warheads scuttled a decade ago and has proven to be a by Brooks’ announcement.8 Disassembly domestic expense and a foreign policy *B61-4 412 200 rates have already been dropping from as irritant ever since. From the outset, the many as 1,500 warheads per year in the “hedge” aroused suspicions, especially *B61-10 208 180 early 1990s and could drop to as few as among Russian planners who were pro- 300 warheads annually, unless the De- vided ample justifi cation to establish Total 2,133 1,670 vice Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test hedges of their own. Site is tapped to handle the increased The announcement by the admin- workload.9 Additionally, the administra- istration to cut the nation’s nuclear Total 10,358 5,945 tion still plans to construct the smaller stockpile almost in half seems a missed future stockpile using the needlessly opportunity that should have been used * Nonstrategic warheads expensive and elaborate facilities of the to challenge the Russians to follow suit 11 ENDNOTES 1. Linton F. Brooks, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Poli- cies and Programs,” presentation to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, June 21, 2004, p. 6. 2. National Institute for Public Policy, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control: Volume I, Executive Report, January 2001. Among the participants are Linton F. Brooks, Stephen Cambone, Stephen J. Hadley, Robert G. Joseph, and William Schneider Jr. See Stephen M. Younger, Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, LLAUR-00-2850,AUR-00-2850, JuneJune 27,27, 2000.2000. AtAt thethe time, Younger was associate laboratory director for nuclear weapons.

3. Keith Payne is currently a member of the Strategic Advisory Group, a federal committee that serves as a technical and political advi- sory body to the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

4. Defense Science Board Task Force, Future Strate- gic Strike Forces (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2004), p. 6-11.

5. See House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2004, 108th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 108-212, July 16, 2003, pp. 139-143.

6. Although the stockpile plan may have answered some questions, it apparently did not answer them all. In its fi scal year 2005 committee report, Reuters Hobson has requested a report from the secretary of energy that assesses the implications of the president’s decisions on future stockpile size and Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in 1997 set a framework for START III negotiations on nuclear reductions, but those negotiations never took place. composition and what it will mean regarding per- sonnel, facilities, and budgets, to be submitted by April 30, 2005. House Committee on Appropria- and to engage the other nuclear powers stated that there are no plans to resume tions, Energy and Water Development Appropriations in a long-term arms reduction effort. It testing and that they are only “study- Bill, 2005, 108th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 108-554, also could have been used as a way to ing” whether or not a nuclear earth pen- June 18, 2004, pp. 110-111. improve the administration’s standing etrator is feasible. Many of their actions 7. The DSB acknowledges that current Stockpile with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty belie this rhetoric. Stewardship Program work includes “modifying review process. Uncharacteristically, the In May 2001, when Bush fi rst an- some to lower yield.” DSB, “Report of the Defense announcement was low key and need- nounced his plans for future nuclear Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike lessly secretive. Why not disclose the force levels, he said he was “committed Forces,” February 2004, pp. 6-1, 6-2, 6-11, 6-15. exact size and composition of the nuclear to achieving a credible deterrent with 8. Since the scheduled LEP work fl ow at Pantex reductions to pressure other countries to the lowest-possible number of nuclear fl uctuates over the next decade, dismantlements do likewise? The administration has not weapons consistent with our national may occur in the low periods. advanced an argument to justify the con- security needs.”11 With almost 6,000 9. The facility was completed just as the Soviet tinuing secrecy. weapons in the stockpile almost a de- Union dissolved, nuclear explosive testing ended, Perhaps most disturbingly, if Bush cade in the future, he has clearly not and U.S. warhead production ceased. After spend- wins a second term, it is likely that more met that goal. ing almost $100 million, the facility may fi nally vigorous steps will be taken to develop The Bush administration holds out the get some use. Hobson has encouraged the Nation- new or modifi ed nuclear weapons. On prospect of further cuts if they are able to al Nuclear Security Administration to see if the the eve of the election, it is politically build new warheads fi rst. We will have to facility can play a role in expanding dismantle- impossible, both domestically and in- wait to see if that bargain is ever struck. ment capacity. ternationally, to suggest that the United In the interim, it will depend on whether 10. Offi ce of the Press Secretary, The White House, States needs new nuclear weapons, and Bush wins a second term, whether Con- “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty the Bush administration has increas- gress funds the programs, and whether at National Defense University,” Washington, DC, ingly downplayed any such intentions as the American people decide they really May 1, 2001. ARMS CONTROL TODAY October 2004 ARMS CONTROL TODAY Nov. 2 draws near. They have repeatedly want a new nuclear arsenal. ACT 11. Ibid. 12