~Lv-LLJ CR.13 (11-64)

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Date: FROM: DE: ?t> ~~, ~lv-LLJ CR.13 (11-64) -

t Mr. Lemieux / with ineOIIing latter

Daar Mr. 'l'aJ'1or, 'fbe cretarJ'-(JeMral hu •a4 • to ae la"-, Vit. tbaD, ncetpt of f'O'U' letter of 21 Much 1966 by Whieb you seat bill copiea ot the •stat..at oa Ulli.tect State• Chi• PalleT' aDd other :pa:pen relat.t t o tbe poa1t1011 lupporte4 'b7 198 aahol.ars of Aataa affa1ra. lf'be 8eCN'tal"J'-0eDeral VCNld ll.1Dt J'O\t to kDclr that be bal read theM pa:pera Y1 th snat i lltar.at.

1Ja If. Miller P1"1nc1pal. Officer

Mr. Harold Taylor Cba.1me lat1o•l eearch 11 CD Puce Stnateg- ~1 Weat 12th St t 1leV York, I.Y. 1001~ NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ON PEACE STRATEGY

HAROLD TAYLOR, Clwlrman 241 WEST 12TH STREET

BETTY I::IOETZ l.ALL., NEW YORK, N.Y. 10014 Vice Chairman OREGON S-3839

MAURICE ALBERTSON

EMILE BENOIT

Le:WIB BOHN

KENNETH BoULOINill

DONALD BRENNAN

URI£ BRONF"ENBRENNER DAVID CAVERB 1...-( .JAMES CROW ( / KARL DEUTSCH

MORTON DEUTSCH

FREEMAN DYBON BERNARD FELO v~· RoiliER FisHER

.JEROME FRANK

ERICH FROMM

Be:NTLEY I::ILABB

HUOBON HDAiliLANO

DAVID INiliLIB

WALTER IBARO

HERBERT KELMAN

RALPH LAPP

ARTHUR LARBON

HAROLD l.ABBWELL

CHAUNCEY LEAKE ROBERT LIF"TON ~ · SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

ROLLO MAY

MARiliARET MEAD

SEYMOUR Me:LMAN

DONALD MICHAEL

WALTER MILLIS

RUBBELL MDRiliAN

HANB MORiliENTHAU

I::IARONER MURPHY

A • .J. MUBTE

ROBERT NORTH

CHARLES DBiliOOO

EUiliENE RABINOWITCH

DAVID RIEBMAN

RomER RussELL

VINCENT RocK

DAVID SINiliER

B. F. SKINNER

RICHARD SNYDER

LEsTER VAN ATTA

ARTHUR WASKOW

BRYANT WEDiliE

ALBERT WILBON

QUINCY WRIIliHT ..

FOR RELEASE March 21, 1966

A Statement recommending basic changes in U.S. policy toward China was

released today by an impressive group of 198 scholars on Asian affairs including

John Fairbank, Harvard University; John Lewis, Cornell University; Mary Wright,

Yale University; Alexander Eckstein, University of Michigan; L. Carrington Goodrich,

Columbia University; and Knight Biggerstaff, Cornell University. Five changes in

United States policy are given and are based on five factors reflecting the current

situation.

The policy changes recommended are:

1 . The United States should cease to use its influence to prevent the admittance of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other international bodies. In the interests of international peace and the national interests of the United States, the government at Peking should be accepted into these institutions, without conditions posed by us or by Peking.

2. The United States Government should announce that it is prepared, while maintaining relations with Taiwan, to enter into negotiations regarding the establishment of full and formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

3. The United States should propose to the People's Republic of China an opening of a new phase of bilateral negotiations at which the following items would be discussed:

a) exchange of diplomatic representation;

b) renunciation of force as an instrument of policy;

c) arms control including problems of the control over nuclear weapons. r •

4. The United States should announce that it is prepared to accept accredited newspapermen, scholars, and others from the People's Republic of China and call upon the People's Republic to reciprocate. American willingness to accept Chinese visitors should not, at least in the short run, depend on reciprocation.

5. The United States should end its total trade embargo with Commu,nist China and permit the importation and exportation of non-strategic materials.

The signers of the statement stated that the "formal China policy of the United

States has long since been out of date." "Changes in this policy," the scholars said,

"will not solve the major political and military challenges to the United States in Asia,

but they can improve the ability of the United States to deal with these problems and

reduce the likelihood that a crisis could turn into a major military confrontation."

The signers stated that the following represent accurately factors on which United

States Policy on China should now be based:

1. The People's Republic of China with its capital at Peking is a reality of interna tional politics, whose importance to the course of international affairs will grow. There is increasing danger in the isolation of the United States from China and of China's relative isolation from other nations and international institutions.

2. The People's Republic of China is now committed to a policy of hostility to the United States and has made opposition to U.S. policies a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

3. In the immediate future the United States is unlikely to persuade Peking that it is not its most implacable enemy. But the United States can hope to convince Peking that, while prepared to respond when challenged, the U.S. is at the same time interested in exploring areas of mutual interest and normalizing relations wherever possible.

4. The government of the Republic of China on Taiwan will be a member of the international community for the indefinite future, but only as the government of Taiwan, and not as a potential government for Mainland China.

the problems are intensified by the existence of an expansionist Communist force in Asia, they arise from factors independent of Communism itself and must be dealt with in the context of' the total situation.

In concluding the state~ent the ~cholars declared: ''We believe that the measures

sugge;c~tl here w'ould only inftiate what must be a l~ni and difficult process, lead~g.

we hope, to the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's.

' RepUblic of Chirla and a reduction of hostilities between the two countries. We believe,

despite the aritagcmism shown by the Chinese government, that it is up to the Onited

States to try to move the Chinese to a greater acceptance of the principles of coexistente

in the emerging wotld community."

The document was drafted by scholars in the field and was circulated' to members

of the Association for Asian Studies . Of over 300 who replied , over 85 percent said

they were sympathetic with the recommended policy changes, including the 198 who

specifically were willing to sign the statement as supporting it in principle o The

signets come from 29 states and about 100 different academic institutions.

Attached are the statement recommending changes, the names of the signers, and

a paper discussing the changes proposed. They have been submitted to the Senate

Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees as additional evidence that

scholars in the field of Asian studies do believe that the United States should change

its China policy .

For information

contact Harold Taylor (212) ORegon 5-3839

or Betty Goetz Lall (212) 988-0773

or Council for a Livable World 1346 Connecticut Ave., N. W. Washington, DoC o 20006 (202) 265-3800 ..

STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

We, the undersigned, submit the following statement for the consideration of the Executive branch, the Congress, and members of the public.

That the formal China policy of the United States has long since been out of date is widely recognized and tacitly accepted even by officials of the American government. Changes in this policy will not solve the major political and military challenges to the United States in Asia, but they can improve the ability of the United States to deal with these problems and reduce the likelihood that a crisis could turn into a major military confrontation.

We believe that the following represent accurately factors on which United States policy on China should now be based:

1. The People's Republic of China with its capital at Peking is a reality of international politics, whose imponance to the course of international affairs will grow. There is increasing danger in the isolation of the United States from China and of China's relative isolation from other nations and international institutions.

2. The People's Republic of China is now committed to a policy of hostility to the United States and has made opposition to U.S. policies a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

5. The major problems for the United States in Asia have to do with establishing stable and mutually satisfactory relations between the United States and Asian national governments, while helping to develop social and economic viability within Asian countries through technical and economic aid programs. Although the problems are intensified by the existence of an expansionist Communist force in Asia, they arise from factors independent of Communism itself and must be dealt with in the context of the total situation.

In the light of these principal factors and others, we urge that the United States govern ment adopt the following policies:

1. The United States should cease to use its influence to prevent the admittance of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other international bodies. In the interests of international peace and the national interests of the United States, the government at Peking should be accepted into these institutions, without conditions posed by us or by Peking. -2-

3. The United States should propose to the People's Republic of China an opening of a new phase of bilateral negotiations at which the following items would be discussed:

a) exchange of diplomatic representation;

b) renunciation of force as an instrument of policy;

c) arms control including problems of the control over nuclear weapons.

4. The United States should announce that it is prepared to accept accredited news papermen, scholars, and others from the People's Republic of China and call upon the People's Republic to reciprocate. American willingness to accept Chinese visitors should not, at least in the short run, depend on reciprocation.

5. The United States should end its total trade embargo with Communist China and permit the importation and exportation of non-strategic materials.

We believe that the measures suggested here would only initiate what must be a long and difficult process leading, we hope, to the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China and a reduction of hostilities between the two countries. We believe, despite the antagonism shown by the Chinese government, that it is up to the United States to try to move the Chinese to a greater acceptance of the principles of coexistence in the emerging world community. ..

Position Paper

Recommendations for a Change in United States Chinese Relations and Policies

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to set forth reasons supporting certain recommended changes in United States policy toward China. It is hoped that. the paper will contribute to a growing consensus within the United States that our China policy should be modified, that our Government should indicate willingness to undertake changes, and that these proposed changes should be debated and discussed increasingly by citizens throughout the country.

There are occasions when policy-makers in government are reluctant to embark on a given policy change because they think such a change would not be supported by the public. With respect to United States policy toward China it appears that this factor is one of those inhibiting United States governmental action. Therefore, it is important, through discussion and sober exchange of views, to persuade the government that there is widespread support for a change in its policy toward China and that the United States, by changing its policy within parameters dictated by its own best interests, can contribute ultimately to an improvement in relations between the two countries.

Background

A policy statement was drafted by a small group of scholars concerned with United States foreign policy. It was submitted to members of the Association for Asian Studies to learn the views of a group considered among the most knowledgeable about China, Asia, and United States relations with nations in that part of the world. The members of this association have varied backgrounds andpossessknowledge about different facets of Chinese life or other parts of Asia. Most of them are members of university faculties; some are serving abroad in various capacities. Of about 2, 700 who were sent the draft statement, over 300 (11%) responded, a much better than the average response to a mailed request for an answer.

The Asian specialists were asked to indicate whether they approved the statement in principle, whether they desired to recommend changes in it, or whether they did not wish to be associated with this effort. Over 85 percent (258) said they were sympathetic with the aims of the statement. Of these 198 were prepared to support it in principle and have their names so designated. (A list of these is available.) The remaining 60 2

said that they would sign the recommended policy changes if certain modifications in wording or concept were made. Since, in most cases this could not be done without resubmitting the statement to all those who had already signed, these names have had to be omitted. Eighteen respondents said they supported the statement but for various reasons did not wish to sign it. Only 19 stated they did not wish to be associated with the statement because they opposed the proposed changes in United States-China policy; in most cases the opposition was not to the statement in its entirety but to parts of it. Five respondents stated that they did not wish to sign the statement, but gave no explana tion of their views .

The large number of signers who are experts in Asian studies is convincing evidence that the changes suggested are grounded in knowledge about China or the surrounding area as well as in recognition of U.S. interests in that part of the world. The general point of view of the Asian specialists, as revealed in comments of those who responded to the statement circulated, is reflected in the following pages. This paper is not necessarily endorsed by the signers of the statement on changes recommended.

General Considerations

The United States has always been opposed to Communist expansionist and aggressive policies. In the past the government has also refused to deal with Communist governments. We have believed Communism to be an anti-democratic force, inimical to the growth of freedom and self-government, and bent on the destruction of those governments whose economic systems were based on a measure of free enterprise and capitalism. At times we assumed that Communist governments wanted to destroy any society or government that was not Communist.

Because of the above considerations the United States waited for 14 years before it established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, and then the fact of recognition in no way implied approval of its government ~olicies, but rather accep tance of the Soviet Union as a government in control of a large population and important territory. After World War II, while the United States never severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, our government, nevertheless, felt that the Soviet Union had to be contained in what we believed were aggressive and expansionist policies. Today the Soviet Union has given indications of changes in its foreign policies and many of its internal characteristics, so much so that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached mutually satisfactory relationships on a variety of subjects. There remain many serious areas of differences and because neither country can be sufficiently certain of continued and improved peaceful relations both expend enormous amounts of funds and resources to continue to build destructive armaments aimed primarily at each other.

In addition to changes in the policy of the Soveit Union there have also occurred within the past ten years important changes in the internal and external policies of other Communist states in Europe; some of them now receive substantial amounts of 3

United States economic aid, and trade between them and the United States has been growing. The United States no longer views the Communist world as a monolithic group of states with respect to all questions .

United States relations with China, in contrast to United States relations with the Soviet Union and Communist states in Eastern Europe, have grown from bad to worse. Whereas shortly after the Communists came to power in China in 1949, the United States stated that it did not intend to take further sides in the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists and appeared to be actively considering recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, today there is increasing hostility between the two countries. Beginning with the Korean War in 1950 it is not difficult for a United States citizen to construct excellent arguments as to why the deterioration of relations with China has been the fault primarily of China, but conversely it does not take a lot of imagination to construct a Chinese viewpoint to the effect that the cause of bad relations has been mainly the responsibility of the United States . If relations are to be improved, and especially if war is to be avoided, it is more important to assess the situation of the present and how it might be dealt with than to arouse increased bitterness by determining blame for past episodes .

With these remarks we can tum to a consideration of the suggested changes in policy.

Recommended Policy Change No. 1: The United States should cease to use its influence to prevent the admittance of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other international bodies. In the interests of international peace and the national security of the United States, the government at Peking should be accepted into these institutions, without conditions posed by us or by Peking.

1. The United Nations ought to be a universal organization. Its main purpose is to maintain international peace and security and its effectiveness to do this will be limited, if not drastically curtailed, as long as important nations are not members . China, the largest country in the world populationwise and one of the great powers in Asia, should be permitted to become a United Nations member and encouraged to assume all the obligations and responsibilities that membership entails .

Some argue that China does not qualify for membership because Article 4 of the United Nations Charter states that:

"Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. " 4

China is said not to be peace loving; the United Nations named China an aggressor for her actions in the Korean War in 1950 and recent promulgated doctrines by her leaders reinforce the belief that the Chinese government advocates violence and revolution throughout the world. Thus, it is held that China does not believe in peace and would not carry out the obligations of the United Nations Charter.

One can indulge in legalistic arguments to claim that Article 4, on two counts, is not relevant to the admission of mainland China to the United Nations. First, Article 4 refers to states which have not already become members by virtue of Article 3 of the Charter which states:

"The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110".

China is one of the original members of the United Nations, having signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, and having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. China's membership status, therefore, is defined by Article 3 and not Article 4 of the Charter.

Secondly, the question of mainland China's membership in the United Nations is a question not of the admission of a new member, but of which government should represent the seat held by China, the government at Peking or the government at Taipei. The United Nations Charter does not delineate any procedure for dealing with this question; when one government replaces another, as is happening constantly by constitu tional processes, by revolution, or otherwise by forceful or violent overthrow, the new government replaces the old in United Nations bodies without contest. If there is a contest, the decision regarding the seating of one group versus another group is left to the General Assembly upon recommendation of its Credentials Committee.

Leaving aside the legal argument, the question remains as to whether China is able and willing to abide by the obligations of the United Nations Charter as stated in Article 2. These obligations include willingness to settle disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, a:Ml to give every assistance to the United Nations in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforce ment action.

One cannot be positive to what extent the government at Peking is prepared to abide by these Charter principles. China has stated it should be admitted to the United Nations because it is the legitimate government of China; but the Chinese government has also accused the United Nations of being dominated by the United States. On occasion 5

China has claimed the United Nations should be reorganized and should undertake reforms to rid itself of U.S. control. China, however, does not state these as conditions to its joining the United Nations. Often there is considerable difference between China's rhetoric and its activities. Its future behavior in abiding by the

"A Member of the United Nations <:~.gainst which -preveneve or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Cour.cil. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council. "

Given the importance of universality of membership in the United Nations to maximize chances of maintaining international peace and security, and given improper behavior by United Nations members on occasion toward abiding by the Charter, the weight of the argument is that China should be admitted to membership. Then China's behavior can be judged, as should all nations, on the basis of how she abides by the principles of the Charter once a member.

2. Peace and security in Asia will be more difficult to secure and maintain with China outside rather than inside the United Nations; thus, the security interests of the United States are better served if China becomes a United Nations member.

For some time to come Asia will be the scene of many disputes which are likely to threaten international peace. In many of these China is or will be a party or will have an influence over the outcome. But such disputes cannot be handled by the United Nations effectively so long as China is excluded from that body. India would not ask for United Nations assistance when China attacked and invaded it in 1962 because China was not a United Nations member; the United Nations could not mediate the dispute. This was due to the unwillingness of the Soviets to be put on the spot in the U. N. to support India rather than China in the dispute. The current war in Vietnam cannot effectively be brought to the United Nations becaus e of the exclusion of China from it. If conflict breaks out in Burma, Thailand, or other areas in Asia, and China is a party to that conflict, the United Nations again will be rendered impotent. If the restoration of peace and security in Asia is made difficult or impossible in some cases because China is denied admission to the United Nations to present its case, to negotiate there to end the dispute, or to hear the complaints of others, then the security of the United States, with its widespread commitments in Asia, is also threatened.

There are some who reject these arguments about the need to have China in the United Nations in order to maximize chances for peace and secuiity in Asia, and argue instead that China, if it became a United Nations member, woUld wreck the United 6

Nations by obstructing all of its activities. This argument has been stressed by officials of the United States government. No one can prove or disprove such an argument in the abstract. Chinese statements certainly have been extermely critical of the United Nations; they are couched, however, not at the institution and its aims, per se, but rather at the institution in terms of being dominated by the United States. If membership to the Chinese were open, the Chinese could use this fact alone to claim that the United Nations was no longer dominated by the United States, and hence, membership once again was worthwhile. Furthennore, it is doubtful that the United Nations is so weak that the activities of a single country, even a pennanent member of the Security Council, can destroy it or permanently damage its effectiveness.

Whether the Chinese, once admitted to the United Nations, would do all in their power to wreck it would seem to depend on how such behavior hurt or helped its foreign policy interests . If the Chinese want to win friends among the non -aligned countries of the world they would not act to alienate these countries by improper behavior in the United Nations. If the Chinese want to trade and have nonnal relations with countries in Western Europe and elsewhere they may not want to antagonize them by attempting to obstruct progress in various areas of international cooperation.

United States and Chinese interests in the United Nations, nevertheless, will probably clash on many issues and this would have some adverse effects on the implementation of United States policy in the United Nations. These difficulties must be recognized. The crucial question, however, is what is most conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security, and again the weight of the argument is that the risks of China's obstructing peace by being in the United Nations are not as great as those which exist as long as China remains outside the United Nations.

3. United States interests in the United Nations would be better served if the United States removes its objections to membership for China than if China is admitted over the negative vote of the United States.

Each year since 1961, the first year that the United Nations voted to debate the issue of the admission of China, the vote has moved toward admittance. In 1965 the vote was 47 for admittance and 47 against; 20 abstained. In 1965, 56 voted for the proposition that the Chinese admittance question was an important issue, and hence required a two-thirds vote, and 49 voted that the decision should be taken by simple majority; 11 countries abstained. On both questions it would not be difficult for a few votes to shift, thus assuring a seat for China. For example, if eight countries which had voted that the question was an important one abstain in the 1966 vote, this would mean that only a majority vote would be needed to decide the issue of representation; in 1965 eight countries which voted that the issue was an important one abstained on the final vote on admittance or, in the case of the United Kingdom, voted for admittance. These countries were Chile, Iceland, (Laos did not participate in the vote), Lebanon, Libya, The Netherlands, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United Kingdom. A decision on representation could also be made by a simple majority if some who abstained in 1965 voted that the question was not an important one and, therefore, did not require atwo thirtl.s .vote. 7

Many countries believe China should be admitted but withhold their vote out of friendship with the United States; or, they trade votes with the United States thus obtaining United States support on an issue of special interest to them. For example, Canada has 'tiiplematie and- trade relations with China but voted in the United Nations to regard the question as important and to reject a seat for China. In the absence of special pleading by the United States it is likely that Canada's vote would change. Some countries in Latin America privately believe China should be admitted. Japan is possibly another case in point. The United States would have greater opportunity to negotiate and improve relations with China if the former removed its opposition to United Nations membership. Furthermore, United States relations with other United Nations members would not be subject to so much strain if the United States acquiescedin such a move. The United States pays a heavy price in good relations with some countries by its pressure on them to vote against China. United States interests would probably be better served if it reserved its persuasive power for more important issues.

4. The United States would have a better chance of securing a balanced settlement over the future of Taiwan if it accepted China in the United Nations.

Many countries, especially several in Latin America and Africa, refused to vote a seat for China because the wording of the proposed U.N. resolution simultaneously would have evicted the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan. Had that resolution been worded differently there are some observers who feel that a majority vote in favor of Chinese admission would have occurred.

From the United States point of view it would be desirable to have Taiwan as a separate member of the United Nations . From China's viewpoint Taiwan should become part of China. Many of the native Taiwanese, which the Chinese Nationalists have largely excluded from the Taiwanese Government, would want an opportunity to have a say about the future of the island. Under these circumstances perhaps the best course is to have China, the Nationalists, and the United States, at the time of China's entry into the United Nations, reach an understanding that the future of Taiwan will be left to subsequent negotiation. This would enable the United States, for the time being at least, to continue to recognize Taiwan as a separate state and to work for its continued membership in the United Nations. If the Government of the Republic of China were to change its name to Government of Taiwan and to redefine its territory as encompassing only the island of Formosa this would probably assist in maintaining Taiwan as a separate state. But apart from the native Taiwanese it is unclear whether the Chinese on Taiwan want to remain separate from China; they may prefer to negotiate for Taiwan to become a semi autonomous region within China. Further discussion of this problem is given under Recommended Policy Change No. 3 .

Recommended Policy Change No. 2: The United States government should announce that it is prepared, without prejudice to the maintenance of its relations with Taiwan, to enter into negotiations regarding the establishment of full and formal diplomatic relations with t he People's Republic of China. 8

By indicating that it is prepared to recognize and have diplomatic relations with the present government of China, the United States would be taking a first step toward normalizing its relations with China. China may reject the United States offer, but this is not an argument why it should not be made.

Many Asian experts believe that the United States and China should discuss the question of diplomatic relations before an actual exchange of ambassadors takes place . This is desirable because of the extreme hostility that now exists between the two countries and also because there are issues the two countries should attempt to resolve or about which they should at least reach a greater degree of mutual understanding.

1 . The main reason why the United States should try to have formal relations with China, through recognition of its government, is that world peace will be jeopardized more by the continued hostility and lack of contact between these two countries than by increased contact. While recognition in no way assures a steady improvement of peaceful relations, it would signify that the two countries were attempting to reduce tensions between them .

2. Recognition of China by the United States, if reciprocated by China, would mean that contacts at various levels might be made. While some United States citizens could be permitted to travel to China and Chinese citizens permitted to travel to the United States, this would be very limited if there were no diplomatic relations between the two governments. Contacts at various levels -- scholars, government officials, journalists, scientists, artists, businessmen, and so forth-- would permit renewal of exchange of information about lifep conditions, and thought in the two countries. At the present time when there is almost no contact each side tends to believe the worst about the other. There is a serious degree of ignorance in the United States about what is going on in China; the reverse also is undoubtedly true. Recognition is an almost indispensable step toward the goal of increased mutual understanding and improved relations.

3. Recognition offers a means of conducting business and settling disputes. It provides a channel by which the countries can reach formal agreements about such matters as trade, exchange of persons, and political problems. Some might argue that the United States and China have reached agreements and resolved differences before without resort to recognition; the case most often cited is the negotiation to end the Korean War. Furthermore, some officials argue that the current occasional meetings between a United States and Chinese representative at Warsaw provide a channel through which disputes can be settled. In the first case negotiations were delayed because of lack of contact. (It is even conceivable the Korean War would not have progressed the way it did if there had been recognition because a channel would have existed to minimize miscalcu lations about the behavior and reactions of the governments involved. This may also be the case with respect to the Vietnam War). In the second case it should be noted that the meetings are sporadic, always conducted in secret, and without diplomatic recognition they cannot form the basis of official agreements which become valid before international law. In other words, people outside the government have no knowledge of what issues 9 are discussed or positions taken by the two governments. Any agreements reached in this context )1ave no standing in terms of public support; certainly they would be viewed suspiciously by many in the Congress who object to agreements reached in secret between the U. S. and other goverrunents.

Some who oppose United States recognition of China use the argument that such an act would hurt the security of countries in Southeast Asia having a large Chinese population. The United States act of recognition, it is argued, would cause these Chinese to become more sympathetic to the Communist government in China, thus undermining the stability of governments in Southeast Asia where a large Chinese population exists . This argument has little validity today. The government at Peking is so obviously in control of the mainland that there are probably few Chinese who believe it can be over thrown. The act of United States recognition would not be likely to have any significant adverse impact on the way these overseas Chinese behaved toward the government of the land in which they resided or toward the Peking gover11q1ent. Recognition might even have a salutary effect in that some overseas Chinese who have been sympathetic to their mother country on grounds it is being kept out of its rightful place in world affairs may then be able to view it more objectively.

Recommended Policy Change No. 3: The United States should propose to the People's Republic of China an opening of a new phase of bilateral negotiations at which the following items would be discussed:

a) exchange of diplomatic representation;

b) renunciation of force as an instrwnent of policy;

c) arms control including problems of the control over nuclear weapons.

As stated in the previous section, it is one thing for the United States to state it is prepared to recognize the Peking government and quite another to have a formal exchange of ambassadors. Some discussion and negotiation of outstanding issues will need to precede this exchange .

Discussions on the exchange of diplomatic representatives might include such matters as how each goverrunent was prepared to treat citizens of the other traveling within its boundaries. Some issues left over from 1949, such as economic arrangements, might be usefully treated. Similar talks with generally beneficial results took place between officials of the United States and Soviet governments prior to United States recognition of the Soviet Union ..1 1933. 10

A discussion of the renunciation of force as an instrument of policy is of concern to the United States in view of the implications of the Chinese policy to take Taiwan by force and to support so-called wars of liberation in the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To the United States the Chinese position suggests that the Chinese will be fomenting revolution, subversion, and violence in as many parts of the world as it can. The Chinese, for their part, try to justify such wars on the ground that the people in these countries are being oppressed, usually with the help of the imperialist United States. In the United States view the Chinese government's sanction of force labels it as an enemy of peace and it is the principal reason today for the large United States military presence and involvement in Asia. Before the United States could consider any significant withdrawals of its military power from Asia, it would want an understanding that Chinese policy would not encompass military aid to Communist subversive groups in other areas .

It is unlikely, however, that there is much the United States can do at this juncture to persuade China to drop its policy of supporting, in principle at least, wars of liberation. But what would be desirable is an agreement to the effect that China would not supply arms to revolutionary groups and the United States would not use military force to thwart every attempt to install a Communist government into office.

The United States and China also need to discuss the future of Taiwan. China has threatened the use of force to return Taiwan to China. The United States has interposed its Seventh Fleet between China and Taiwan to prevent a forceful tak~over of Taiwan. If the United States were to agree to remove the Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Strait and the South China Sea as well as to dismantle its military base on Taiwan, China would need to agree to leave the future of the status of Taiwan to negotiation between China and the government and people on Taiwan. Some China experts regard such an arrangement as forming a basis for a settlement of the issue. But the arrangement would need some kind of international or third party guarantee in order to give each of the parties to it confidence it would be respected.

There could be useful discussions between China and the United States on their future relations in various parts of Asia where China has a claim of wanting friendly neighbors (not unlike the United States claim to have friendly neighbors in Latin America) and the United States has treaty commitments with several of the smaller Asian nations. In this connection many would argue that improvement of relations between the United States and China must await the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, but another approach might be that a settlement of Vietnam could be hastened if the United States and China could reach some degree of accommodation about the degree of their involvement in Asian affairs.

Bilateral discussions over arms control issues including the control over nuclear weapons should not be regarded in any way as a substitute for international discussions. Such bilateral discussions are thought to be advisable because they could provide an 11 opportunity for the United States and China to exchange their views on the subject without having them subjected immediately to public reaction. just as private exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union often assist each government to understand better the position of the other, so such an exercise might be helpful between the United States and China.

There are several arms control issues on which it would be useful to have United · States -Chinese exchange of views . One is the question of safeguards and trade in fissionable materials. If the Chinese were to join the United Nations they probably also would be interested in joining the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as the U.N. Specialized Agencies. This Agency has recently taken several steps to initiate a program of safeguards to assure that nuclear materials loaned or sold for peaceful purposes will not be diverted to weapons. The Chinese view of such matters would be useful to know. The United States should also understand more about China's view of the conditions under which it would be willing to restrict its nuclear weapons program. Another subject would be arms control measures covering conventional weapons . This is important in view of the likelihood of continued conflict in Asia in which conventional arms would be used. It is unlikely that any immediate compromise solutions can result from such discussions; nevertheless, the sooner serious and non-polemical discussions can take place the sooner arms control agreements involving the Chinese and the United States as well as other powers might be reached.

Recommended Policy Change No. 4: The United States should announce that it is prepared to accept accredited newspapermen, scholars, and others from the People's Republic of China and call upon the People's Republic to reciprocate. American willingness to accept Chinese visitors should not, at least in the short run, depend on reciprocation. (

k has been stated earlier that the full implementation of this recommended change in United States policy for all practical purposes depends upon the success in negotiations over recognition and an exchange of ambassadors. Some exchanges, nevertheless, could occur while such negotiations were being undertaken or even before they were convened. The United States refused to undertake an exchange of newsmen at a time when the Chinese were receptive to such a step in the mid-1950's. When the United States decided a few years later that this might be a good step, the Chinese retracted their offer. As a result, no Chinese from China come to the United States and practically no Americans visit Cbiila. There is evidence that limited exchanges could now take place prior to diplomatic recognition if this could be done quietly and without extensive publicity. The recent announcement by the United States State Department in late December, 1965, that medical and other similar professionals would be free to visit China is a welcome move and it is unfortunate that the immediate Chinese response was negative. Press reports indicate the United States may take further initiatives in removing travel bans to China. 12

As stated earlier, the main benefit to be expected from exchanges of persons in different fields is that the degree of ignorance about the society in the two countries would be reduced. Increased contact does not always result in improved relations or under standing. but it usually succeeds in reducing misconceptions.

Recommended Policy Change No. 5: The United States should end its total trade embargo with Communist China and permit the importation and exportation of non-strategic materials.

If the United States is to embark upon the long process of improving its relations with the Chinese government and people, one of the early steps to undertake is to pennit increased trade. There are many who doubt that effective distinctions can be made between strategic and non-strategic materials, but what is intended in the recommendation is to use as guide posts distinctions developed by the United States in trade relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The non-strategic items on this list cover a wide variety of goods: food, some raw materials, some machinery, and a large number of consumer goods.

China in the past has supplied the United States with a number of materials not available in ample supply elsewhere: bristles, feathers, and tungsten, for example. China's exports to the United Kingdom include hides and skins, textile fibers, animal and vegetable materials, leather, textile yarn and related products and non -ferrous metals. British exports to China include scientific instruments, machinery, textiles and man-made fibers, iron and steel, aircraft and parts.

In the past few years ten West European countries have sent trade missions to China (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West Gennany). Japan and Canada have also sent missions. The results have not been substantial and it is not likely that a great deal of trade can be developed immediately between the United States and China; a start, however, could be made. This would be another channel for opening up contacts. It might give the United States some leverage in negotiating other items with China since in the first instance there are more goods China would desire from us than we would want from China.

A willingness by the United States to embark upon trade relations with China would also remove a source of friction between the United States and some of its allies ( in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan) and at the same time would remove a disadvantage in which United States businessmen and fanners have been placed with respect to competitors abroad. Increasingly non-Communist industrialized nations have been pressing to trade with China, and the United States has argued against expanded trade relations; the former no longer believe that a total trade embargo has any positive effect on Chinese policy in terms of making it more flexible and less hostile. Many argue that just the opposite has occurred, that Chinese belligerence is fostered because of the continuance of the embargo. 13

Concluding Remarks

The United States, because of its treaty commitments to various Asian countries and its special responsibilities in the United Nations to help maintain peace, has a strong interest in security problems in Asia. None of the recommendations cited in the statement signed by the Asian specialists envisage that the United States should or would abandon these commitments. However, an effort should be made to demonstrate that the United States, by improving its relations with Asia's most populous country, will be contributing to the stability, security, and peace of Asia as a whole, of itself, and of those countries to which the United States is committed to assist in the event they are attacked by China.

In this paper the discussion of tactics to implement the recommendations has been for the most part omitted. Some of those who responded to the statement indicated that certain questions should be left open for negotiation. This is primarily a matter for diplomats and government officials. Citizens outside the government are necessarily more concerned with substantive policy questions than detailed matters of tactics which often shift from day to day. The substantive policy proposals, therefore, have been set forth succinctly in the statement because these are the main changes needed. The sooner they can be adopted as official policy by the United States government the sooner may a process be started along the long and difficult road toward the normalization of relations between the United States and China.

Betty Goetz Lall New York City March, 1966 . ASIAN SCHOLARS SUPPORTING IN PRINCIPLE THE CHANGES RECOMMENDED FOR UNITED STATES POLICY TOWAM CHINA

Arizona

University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona Earl H. Pritchard, Chairman, Committee on Oriental Studies

California

California State College at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California D. F. Fleming, Prof. of International Relations Sam Stanley, Assoc. Prof. of Anthropology

Claremont Graduate School and University Center, Claremont, California Cyrus H. Peake, Prof. of East Asian History

Los Angeles Valley College, Los Angeles, California Mark Naidis, Assoc. Prof. of History

Mills College, Oakland, California Edward Le Fevour

Pomona College, Claremont, California Charles Leslie

San Bernardino Valley College, San Bernardino, California William J. Moore, Chairman of the Political Science Dept.

Stanford University, Stanford, California Harumi Befu, Dept. of Anthropology G. William Skinner, Prof. of Anthropology J. T. Wixted, Dept. of Asian Languages

University of California, Berkeley, California Gerald D. Berreman, Assoc . Prof. of Anthropology James Cahill, Dept. of Art Joseph R. Levenson, Prof. of History J. M. Potter, Asst. Prof. of Anthropology

University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California George 0. Totten, Assoc. Prof. of Political Science

A. Elgin Heinz, High School teacher, San Francisco, California J. F. Richards, Berkeley, California Mrs. Beryl F. Zimberoff, Los Angeles, California -2-

Connecticut

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut Harry J. Benda, Dept. of History Kenneth Scott Latourette, Prof. of Missions and Oriental History, Emeritus Arthur F. Wright, Charles Seymour Prof. of History Mary C. Wright, Prof. of History

John De Francis, Madison, Connecticut

Washington, D.C.

American University, School of International Service Millidge P. Walker, Assoc. Prof. of South East Asian Studies

Howard University Irene Tinker, Asst. Prof. of the Dept. of Government

Barbara Rieman Alperovitz, Arms Control Division, The Bendix Corporation John Melby Andrew E. Rice

Florida

Mortimer Graves, Key West, Florida

Hawaii

Institute for Student Interchange, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii Robert Aitken, Evaluation of Alumni Liaison Officer

University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii Willard D. Keirn, Dept. of Political Science Oliver M. Lee, Asst. Prof. of Political Science Elizabeth Wittermans, Center for Cultu-ral and Technical Interchange Between East and West lllinois

Bradley University, Peoria, Dlinois George E. Stoner, Jr., Instructor in Geography -3-

Knox College, Galesburg, lllinois M. Hane

Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, Illinois James R. Shirley, Dept. of History

Northwestern University, Evanston, illinois James E. Sheridan, Dept. of History

Southern illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois H. B. Jacobini, Prof. of Government

University of Chicago, Chicago, illinois Clifford Geertz, Dept. of Anthropology Benson Earl Ginsburg, Assoc. Dean of the College McKim Mariott, Prof. of Anthropology Manning Nash, Prof. of Anthropology Melford E . Spiro, Dept. of Anthropology

Frederick M . Asher, Chicago, Illinois Douglas Wayne Johnson, Rockford, Illinois Norman J. Parmer, De.ka:lb, Illinois

Indiana

Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana Jackson Bailey, Assoc. Prof. of History

Indiana School of Religion, Bloomington, Indiana Harold E. Hill, Assoc. Prof. of Old Testament Language and Literature

Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Leon M. Zolbrod, Asst. Prof. of East Asian Languages and Literatures

Saint Mary-of-the-Woods College, Bloomington, Indiana Sister Mary Gregory, S. P. , Director of Asian Studies

Iowa

Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa C. Walter Clark, Jr., Political Science Dept.

Barbara Teters, Ames, Iowa -4-

Kentucq

University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky Walter Langlois, Assoc. Prof. of Modern Foreign Languages

Louisiana

Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana Henry Orenstein, Assoc. Prof. of Anthropology

Massachusetts

Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts Amiya Chakravarty, Prof. of Comparative Oriental Relgions and Literature

Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Robert N. Bellah, Assoc. Prof. of Sociology and Regional Studies Jerome A~ ·cohen, Prof. of Law Albert Craig, Dept. of History Rupert Emerson, Prof. of Government Donald W. Klein, East Asian Research Center Ezra F. Vogel, East Asian Research Center Edward Wagner, Assoc. Prof. of Korean Studies

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts William N. Locke, Director of Libraries

Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts Freeland Abbot, Chairman, Dept. of History Allan B. Cole, Prof. of East Asian Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Michigan

Alma College, Alma, Michigan Edwin C. Blackburn, Assoc. Prof. of History

Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan Sheldon Appleton, Assoc. Prof. of Political Science David C. Potter, Asst. Prof. of Political Science

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan J .H. Broomfield, Asst. Prof. of History Jason L. Finkle, Consultant Ford Foundation, Assoc. Prof., Population Planning •

Victor Kobayashi, Asst. Prof. of Education Stephen S. Large, Student of China and Japan Rhoads Murphey, Dept. of Geography

Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan Shanti S. Tangri, Assoc. Prof. of Economics

Westem Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan Chester L. Hunt

Alton L. Becker, Ann Arbor, Michigan Mr. and Mrs. Seymour Kavesky, Madison Heights, Michigan Ronald N. Montaperto, Ann Arbor, Michigan C. P. Paul Siu, Harper Woods, Michigan

Minnesota

Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota Tetsuo Najita, Assoc. Prof. of History Bardwell L. Smith, Assoc . Prof. of Religion Robert E. Will, Dept. of Economics

University of Minnesota, Indianapolis, Minnesota Joseph E. Schwartz, Dept. of Geography

Missouri

University of Missouri at St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri Lyman Tower Sargent, Asst. Prof. of Political Science

Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri N. J. Demerath, Prof. of Sociology; Social SCiences Consultant, Ford Foondation, New Delhi, India Donald A. Gibbs, Asst. Prof. of Chinese

Webster College, St. Louis, Missouri Sister M. Bernard Barbato, S. L., Dept. of History

Nebraska

Robert H. Stoddard, Lincoln, Nebraska -6-

New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire Allen Linden, Dept. of History

W. Findley Guffey Ill, Exeter, New Hampshire

New Jersey

Drew University, Madison, New Jersey Changboh Chee, Director of "Core" program in Western and Non-Western Studies Charles W. Estus, Instructor in Sociology Robert Friedricks, Prof. of Sociology

Newark State College, Union, New Jersey Howard Disbury, Prof. of History

Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey William W. Lockwood, Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey Katharine S. Diehl, Asst. Prof. of Library Science

Charlotte Funh, Princeton, New Jersey Jessie G. Lutz, East Brunswick, New Jersey Lawrence H. Mandel, Parsippany, New Jersey

New York

Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York Brijen K. Gupta, Dept. of History

Colgate University, Hamilton, New York Theodore Herman, Chairman, Dept. of Geography

Columbia University, New York, New York Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Allen, Dept. of Anthropology William R. Bryant, Graduate Student L. Carrington Goodrich, Prof. Emeritus of Chinese Frank Kehl, Graduate Student, East Asian Institute Joan P. Mencher, Research Assoc. , Dept. of Anthropology • -7-

Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Knight Biggerstaff, Prof. of History Alice Cook, Prof. of Industrial and Labor Relations Claire Holt, Research Associate, Asian Studies Lauriston Sharp, Prof. of Anthropology

Dutchess Community College, Poughkeepsie, New York Carolyn C. Landau, Assoc. Prof. of Politica] Science

Hamilton College, Clinton, New York Edwin B. Lee, Assoc. Prof. of History

Long Island University, Brooklyn, New York Khalil A. Nasir, Assoc. Prof. of History and Political Science

New York University, New York, New York James T. Crown, Assoc. Prof. of Political Science

State University College, Oswego, New York Johnson G. Cooper, Prof. of Non-Western History

State University College, Potsdam, New York Luther H. Gulick, Jr., Chairman, Dept. of Geography

State University College, Geneseo, New York Donald Innis, Chairman , Dept. of Geography

State University of New York, Albany, New York Dewitt C. Ellinwood, Assoc. Prof. of History

State University of New York, Stony Brook, New York Charles Hoffman, Prof. of Economics

Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York Herbert C. Jackson, Professor

Edward P. Gottlieb, National Chairman, War Resisters League, New York, No Yo

Thomas L 0 Havill, Syracuse, . New York Chang Hsin-Hai, Great Neck, Long Island, New York Eileen Koppelman, Bronx, New York Prafulla Mukerji, Brooklyn, New York Richard and Elsie Orb, Keuka Park, New York Romesh Shah, New York, New York -8-

North Carolina

Meredith College, Raleigh, North Carolina Lillian Parker Wallace

University of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina W. L. Highfill, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion

Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem, North Carolina Robert G. Gregory, Assoc. Prof. of History

Ohio

Denison University, Granville, Ohio Louis F. Brakeman, Chairman, Dept. of Govt. Maylong H. Hepp, Prof. of Philosophy James L. Martin, Coordinator of Non-Western Studies

Miami University, Oxford, Ohio John H. Badgley, Dept. of Govt.

Ohio State University, Dayton, Ohio Byron S. Weng, Instructor in Govt.

Ohio University, Athens, Ohio John F. Cody, Prof. of History

Western College for Women, Oxford, Ohio T. A. Bisson, Chairman, Dept. of Intercultural Studies Robert Brank Fulton, Assoc. Prof. of Intercultural Studies

Oregon

Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon Hideo Hashimoto, Prof. of Religion

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon Kathleen G. Aberle, Research Assoc. in Anthropology

Pennsylvania

Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania M. Bronfenbrenner, Graduate School of International Affairs ~·

-9-

Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania Thomas Hopkins, Asst. Prof. of Religion

Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania Holland Hunter, Chairman of the Dept. of Economics

Ohio Methodist Theological School, Eastern, Pennsylvania Ernest E. Best, Assoc. Prof. of Theology

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Derk Bodde, Prof. of Chinese F. Hilary Conroy, Prof. of History Leigh Lisker, Prof. of Linguistics Jonathan Mirsky, Oriental Studies, Chinese Donald E. Smith, Assoc. Prof. of Political Science

Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania Roswell G. Townsend, Prof. of Economics

Frederick Gaige, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Tennessee

Memphis State University, Memphis, Tennessee Ram Mohan Roy, Dept. of Political Science

Utah

Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah Paul Hyer, Coordinator of Asian Studies

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah Helmut G. Callis, Chairman of Asian Studies, Prof. of History and Political Science

Vermont

University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont Horace Briggs II, Instructor, Dept. of Political Science

Virginia

Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Virginia Richard C. Rowland, Dept. of English -10-

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia Richard J. Coughlin, Prof. of Sociology Maurice Meisner, Asst. Prof. of East Asian History

Washington

Eastern Washington State College, Cheney, Washington Charles H. Hedtky, Division of History and Social Science

University of Washington, Seattle, Washington Paul R. Brass, As st . Prof. of Political Science Charles F. Keyes, Asst. Prof. of Anthropology

Wisconsin

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Eugene Boardman, Prof. of History Ripley Moor, Asst. Prof. of Indian Studies

Canada

University of Toronto, Canada Donald E. Willmott, Assoc. Prof. of Sociology

Ceylon

University of Ceylon Gananath Obeyesekere, Lecturer in Sociology

France

T. D. Long, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Directorate for Scientific Affairs, Paris, France

India

Margaret L. Cormack, Director of U.S. Educational Foundation in India

Japan

Tokyo University Toshio Ueda, Prof. Emeritus . ~

ADDITIONAL ASIAN SCHOLARS SUPPORTING IN PRINCIPLE THE CHANGES RECOMMENDED FOR UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Ax:izona

Arizona State University, Temple Arizona Guilford A. Dudley, Assoc. Professor of History

California

California State Polytechnic College, San Luis Obispo, California Francis V. Catalina

Stanford University, Stanford, California Mark Man call, Ass 't Prof. of Asian Studies Harold H. Fisher·, Professor of History and Ch., Emeritus Hoover Institute and Library

University of California, Berkeley, California Chauncey D. Leake, University of California, San Francisco Medical Center, San Francisco

University of California, Santa Cruz, California · Bruce D. Larkin, Ass't Professor of Int'l Relations ·

University of California, Los Angeles, California Michael Moerman, Ass't Prof. ofAnthropology Nikki Keddie, Ass 't Prof. of History

Willard P. Norberg, Ackerman, Johnston, Johnston & Mathews, San Francisco, California

Hawaii

University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii John Singleton, Assoc. Dr., Int'l Devel. Fellowships and Seminars., Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West George H. Gadbois, Jr. , Assoc. Dr., Exchange of Persons Programs, Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West . .

-3-

Cornell University, Ithaca, New York John W. Lewis, As soc . Prof. of Government

Union College, Schenectady, N.Y. Malcolm Willison, Ass 't Prof. of Sociology

Pennsylvania

Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pa. John Roger Stemen, Dept. of History

Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania Helen-Lee Jones

A Gutkind Bulling, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Washington

Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington Jack D. Salmon, Ass 't Prof. of Political Science

University of Washington, Seattle, Washington Marwyn S. Samuels, Modern Chinese Studies

Taiwan

Mark Selden, Taipei

TERMINAL TOWER · CLEV ELAND , OHIO 44101

CYRUS S . EATON CHAIRMAN Of THE SOARD

October 19, 1966

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

This October 8th editorial from the highly in fluential Toronto Globe and Mail ought to be pondered by every American statesman concerned over our relations with the communist countries.

For the past fifteen years, I have been seeing a great deal of the leaders of the Soviet Union and of people of importance in China. I have probed deeply with the Soviets on Vietnam and with the Chinese on Formosa, and I am con vinced that the international impasse cannot possibly be broken as long as the United States persists in its present policies.

What steps can we take in the United States to make ourselves adopt the realism that the editorial urges for Canada?

Sincerely yours,

Hon. U. Thant Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017

CE:rk Enclosure •

TORONTO, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1966 It "IS too dangerous to continue voting no

One In every .four human bejngs lives China's he~tvy-handed diplomacy, the In China and is;under the effective con· almost universal revulsion against the trol of the Communist Go'vernmen·t in rampaging Red Guards and Peking's Peking. For thi.s reason alone, it is ab appatent indi-fference to UN member· surd that China is still ~xcluded from ship. its rightful place in the United Nations But even if the Albanian t• eso~ution is and denied diplomatic recognition by again destined to be defeated, this is no · more than half the UN members. In excuse for Canada to· repeat its peren view of China's potential as a nuclear . nial performance. As Secretary·G~n power, and the possibility that it may eral U Thant has warned, both world yet Intervene .in Vietnam, this ab$urdity · peace and the future of the UN itself takes on truly dangerous dimensions.· may depend on Chinals . entry into the Canada is among those nal-ions which world community. have long voted against Chinese mem· Although Peking might scornfully bership, although ·for years various reject an invitation at present, the door Canadian leaders have hinted that we must be opened in an 'attempt to were on the brink of changing our posi· convince Chinese leaders that there is tion. True to this tradition of equivoca· some practical alternative to their poli tion, External Affairs Minister Paul cies of unrelenting hostility to the Martin told the Canadlan·J apanese Un·ited States and deeply Ingrained sus- ministerial meeting this week that Can· ' pi cion of co-operative UN ·action. A ada had still not decided how it would change in the Canadian vote this year vote on the Chinese question ·in this could be crucial in breaking the .im· year's General Assembly. passe - if not now, then by the. 1967 As in the past; Mr. Martin made it Assembly session - because other UN clear that Canada would welcome Pe· members would follow Canada's lead. king's entry. But he again stressed the Nor, in voting against the Chinese difficulties, including China's claim to Nationalists, would we be abandoning Taiwan and its rejection of any ~·Two the people of Taiwan who were forced Chinas~' solution that would retain a al gunpoint, and after fearful slaughter, UN seat for the Chinese Nationalis'ts. to accept the rule of Chiang Kal-shek. It is no help to Canada that the vote It is the U.S. Seventh Fleet, not this year will again be on th'e so-called Chiang's UN seat, that protects the Tai Albanian resolution which calls simply wanese from the Communists and off. for the seating of Peking in both the Se· ers some hope of eventual self-determ- · curity Council and the General Assem· ination for the island. hly and the expulsion from both bodies lt is argued that a Canadian vote for of the "Chiang Kai-shek clique." Last China would arouse Washington's year, there were 47 votes for this reso wrath, and perhaps lead to retaliation. lution and 47 against, with 20 a~sten The time has come to take this risk. tions, aftet· the United Slates had again Patient ..and private Canadian ap pushed throu~h . a provision that the is· proaches to Washington on the UN· sue was an important question, rcquir· ' China queslion have apparently again lng a two-thirds majarity. proved futile. The United States should This year, Washington again seems now be told that in the Interests of real· confident of holding the line, and its ism, self-respect and world peace, Can spokesmen have denied reports that the ada feels obllged to change its stand. United States is considering throwing The Canadian position is hypocfitical , its weight behind a compromise resolu since we do recognize the hard cur tion which would seek to admit the rency with which the Chinese pay for Communists while retaining a scat for our wheat. When the issue is raised in

the 1Nationalists- a compromise that the UN, Mr. Martin this time should both Peking and Taipei would certainly vote in favor of China's admission and reject. The confidence in Washington state that with the vote, Canada is at seems based on several factors: the an last extending diplomatic recognition ger of many Afro-Asian nations over to Peking. G'fl /e.mw cc: Mr . Lemieux (inoom. ) V • N raimhml

~1ti.al ~ t.ba

QQI~LCa of 'a vD..JU.. t tat....

u U,NITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DES ASSOCIATION IN CANADA NATIONS UNIES

PDtr011: National Office- United Nations House His E:K.ccllc.ncy the Rt. Hon. Gen. GEORGES P. VANIER, P.C., D.S.O., M.C., C.D., Governor-General of Canad. Honorary Prrsidrnt 4 ST. THOMAS ST., TORONTO 5. RT. HON. LESTER B. PEARSON. P.C., M.P., O.B.E· (0· Telephone: 925-3243 HOttOrary Vicr-Prrsld.:nts LT. GEN. E. L. M. BURNS, D.S.O., O.B.E. HON. M. J. COLDWELL, P.C. MRS. REX EATON, O.B.E., LL.D. MARVIN GELBER October 26, 1966. HON. HOWARD GREEN, P.C. CLAUDE JODOIN HON. PAUL MARTIN, P.C., Q.C.

PGst Prtsldtnl NORMAN MACL. ROGERS, Q.C.

Prrslt:knt JOHN H. PRICE, O.B.E., M.C., D.C.L.

Honorary Tnoasuur NORMAN J. McLEAN CMirman, Nutiorwl Ext'cUtive Secretary-General U Thant, PROF. D. COLWYN WILLIAMS United Nations, CMirman, Adus/nl:stratlvt' Commillt'l' HERBERT A. MOWAT New York 17, N.Y.

V/cr-Prrsldcnts H. H. EDMISON Dear Mr. Secretary-General: SENATOR M. McQ. FERGUSSON PROF. J. KING GORDON MRS. MARGARET KONANTZ, O.B.E. OORDON SELMAN I thought the enclosed DR. HOWARD L. TRUEMAN PROF. D. C. WILLIAMS ing the position of the United N R. T . Y. YANG Natlott41 Commillrt CluJirmrn

Constitution: Me. JEAN MASSt ... Edwcational Policy: 1. RUSSELL McNEILL - Yours truly, FlnaM"r: DAVlD M. IVISON (. F"rdom.[rom-Hungrr: MRS. A. A. MERRJLEES Human Rights: RANJIT HALL r~ Liaison: MRS. G . A. WRENSHALL Peter Trueman, Our~ras Coruspondrncr: Pl'/m.lb National Director. MRS. F. DOWSETT Polley: Encl. PROF. D. COLWYN WILLIAMS Protrom: MRS. F. D. BAKER Public Rdatlon3: MRS. G. E. M. LIVINGSTONE

R•/111~•s : MRS. W. A. RIDDELL RrsolwtiO#U: PROF. C. B. BOURNE Srmlnar Dlrrctors: PROF. YVES BRETON U,.l,d Natlon1 DGy: NATHAN PHILLIPS, Q.C. UNICEF: MRS. MARGARET KONANTZ. O.B.E., WFUNA. : DAVID FRANKLIN

National Director: PETER TRUEMAN E.ucullvr 0/ficrr: WILLIAM H. MITCHELL, M.C., C.D. Youth aNI Education Srcrrtary TOM SCHATZKY UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DES

ASSOCIATION IN CANADA NATIONS UNIES

ADVANCE TEXT OF AN ADmESS

BY PE'IER TRUEMAN

NATIOOAL DIRECTOR OF THE

UNITED NATIOOS ASSOCIATION IN CANADA

TO A CIVIC UJNCHECN

IN HONOR OF UNITED NATIONS WEEK

CAVALIER ROOM, WESTBURY HO'IEL, OCT. 25, 1966, 1; 00 P.M.

Release time.: 1:00 p.m., October 25.

Please check against delivery. CYRUS S. EATON

CHAIRMAN O F THE BOARD THE CHESAPEAKE ANO OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY C LEV ELAND, OHIO Your Worship, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. At the outset I must express row warmest thanks to Mayor Givens and the City Council for their cooperation and support during this United Nations Week. The rais ing of the blue and white United Nations flag at City Hall yesterday and this

Civic Luncheon today will, I hope, do a great deal to draw Torontols attention to the twenty-first birthday celebration of the United Nations -- an organiza tion too many Canadians take for granted.

This is indeed a novel experience for someone who until now spent his luncheons over there at the press table. I don't know whether Itm equal to the transition, and, moru important perhaps, I don't know whether you are.

If I may abuse Will Rogers for a moment, all I know is what I wrote in the newspapers. And sometimes I wrote rrore than I lmew, or at least more than I knew for certain.

We are meeting here today to honor the 21st anniversary of the

United Nations, an anniversary some people believed it would never reach.

Certainly while I was a correspondent at the United Nations -- in the late fifties and early sixties -- there were many who believed the world organization could not much longer survive. The Congo crisis came in like a lion in the summer of 1960 and went out like a larrio, almost unnoticed, three years later. Nikita Khrushchev banged his shoe in the General Assembly and used language in his speeches that seemed to indicate the Soviets wanted to wreck the UN and all it stood for. Dag Hammarskjold died and the dread word

11 troika 11 became part of the language of survival. During those same years, the UN was forced to relinquish its ultimate responsibility for disarmament, and turn it over to a new .l8-nation committee in Geneva-- a committee doomed to the same sort of snail's pace set by its predecessor. The Soviet Union

is to face problems and crises. Easy successes, quiet times or historical -2-

and France refused to pay their assessments for the Congo operation, and not

once, but several times, the UN faced ignominiousexpiry on a heap of unpaid

bills.

One of our pundits of the time put it this way in a prominent Can

adian newspaper:

11 Ma.ny observers feel that the UN, and through it the world, is at

the last crossroads. It may have to choose one route or the other (this year).

11Either it strikes off boldly up n path which could lead to world

government in a century or two, or it can stumble drunkenly down the same un

realistic, rose-covered roaG to ruin chosen by the League of Nations three

decades ago. 11

That somewhat florid bit of prose was written for New Year's Day,

1961, and you can ~ee that the outlook now is hardly much different. The UN

was supposed to be near death then, and it still is now. I feel that I can

safely jeer ~ bit at the pundit in question, because the pundit in question

was me. I believe I know now that the situation at the United Nations will

always be crucial. But no one year •v.ill be the critical year. We may never

be able to sit down on a given date and say with authority: 11Now we have

arrived at a point of no return. From this day on, we begin to stand, or we

begin to fall 11 •

U Thant, the Secretary-General, put it this way in his UN Day mess

age yesterday:

11Excessive optimism or pessimism are out of place on such an occa

sion. We should try rather to face facts, to see where we stand and to look to the future. The United Nations was born of trouble and its main function

is to face problems and crises. Easy successes, quiet times or historical -3-

miracles are not to be expected by those who work in the United Nations.rr

I'm going to read you some more of the Secretary-General's message,

because, as that last passage indicates, it is extraordinarily free of the

kind of pious platitudes we sometimes expect from public men on such occasions:

He says that 11we must start from the proposition that a further

collapse of peace and order in the world is unthinkable, and then set steadily

about the task of removing the countless obstacles that lie in the way of

peace and order.

'~e must face up to thG lack of confidence and the persistence of

power politics which con+.inuo to dominate international relations. We must

face up to the appalling dangers of nuclear armament and proliferation.

1 ~c must face up, whatever our particular views may be, to the fact

that the war in Vietnam is not only a disaster for the Vietnamese people but

also a constant threat to w..:>rld peace . Peaceful solutions must be found to this and to other persistent conflicts.

111t/e must fac0 up to the economic and social facts of our era, which,

despite the efforts of governments and international organizations, are still very far from encouraging, 1:1.nd entail serious risks to the future stability of the world.

11And lastly we must face up to the realities of the United Nations itself. The principles and the aims ar e set out in the charter, but as yet they are far from being the constant guides and regulators of international life ."

U Thant says we must face facts, and at this juncture i n the UNis history, it seems to me, the fact which most needs facing is that the regime of Mao Tse-tung, not that of Chiang Kai-shek, is the government of Chinn. -4-

f. great deal hinges on that fact. Disarmament and world peace depend on it. A settlement in Vietnam is bound up in it. The viability of the United Nations is tied to it. For if the United Nations is not universal, it is nothing. How can the UN provide a meaningful concensus of opinion, when the opinion of eight or nine hundred million Chinese is not an ingredient of that concensus? How can the United States and the Soviet Union take meaning ful steps towards general and complete disarmament when both feel the hot breath of a nuclear Communist China on the backs of their necks. Let us, as

U Thant suggests, face fa cts. There will be no disarmament whatever, even in regard to conventional weapons, until Communist China is brought to the con ference table.

In Canada, our politicians say much the same thing. But what do they do about it? Peking has been the capitol of Chinn since 1949, but official Ottawa ha s not yet recognized the revolutionary regime. \Vhy? Well,

External /:ffairs Minister Paul Martin gave this as an answer earlier in the year:

11 Those who urge diplomatic recognition of Communist China must face the uncomfortable fact that the government of th~t country demands that it be recognized as something vmich it patently is not: that is, the government of

11 the Island of Taiwan •

I do not now intend to ~rgue that point at any length, but I would like to discuss some of the background. Taiwan, or Formosa, if you prefer, has a population of 12 million people. Only four million of them are Nation alist Chinese. The remaining eight million of them are native Formosans, an invasion-prone peoples who in their recent history have been grabbed by the

Chinese , then the Japanese, and grabbed back again. Under terms of the most -5- recent conquest, Formosa was ruled by mainland China, at least until 1949.

And under those terms at least, the Communist Chinese regime would appear to have at least QS much right to Formosa as Indonesia had to West Papua, or

West Irian, as Mr. Sukarno called it. But that point is highly debatable and this is no place to debate it. There are other factors involved, the most important of vmich is the right of the Formosan people to self-determination.

There is no doubt that the si tun.tion is 11 uncomfortable 11 , as Mr.

Martin suggests. But the barriers to Canadian recognition of Communist China are not insurmountable, 1.s Hr. r-t1.rtin trys to suggest.

As Canadians, t•e E'h-:>uld not stand any more shilly-shallying from

Ottawa on this question. The matter has been "under serious consideration"

-- to use a favourite ottawa term -- through three successive Canadian govern ments. And if Ca.na.dians continue to sit on their hands, the China question will be 11 under serious consideration" by the next three governments.

One of the things which makes the situation 11 uncomfortable 11 , as Mr.

Martin put it, is that the United States doesnrt want us to rock the boat.

The situation for the United States is uncomfortable enough without Canada adding to the burden. But the time has come to disregard U.S. advice on this subject, or accept with good grace the charge that we are only U.S. satellites.

I must at this point make it perfectly clear that I have never been one of those Canadians whose patriotism is rooted in anti-Americanism. ~fy father was born in the United States. My three children were born in the

United States. And, like their grandfather, they will choose whether they are to be Canadian or American when they reach the age of 21. I hope they choose as he did - to become Canadian - but I will waste no time trying to dissuade them if they opt the other way. -6-

The United States is a great nation, but it has its weaknesses. And

one of them is its China policy. The American attitude towards China has been

paternal, avuncular, pompous and impossible for the last 100 years. As one

American political scientist has described it, it has been a policy of making

faces or a policy of holding noses.

It has not been a realistic policy, or one useful to the cause of peace.

What is now neaded, as a first step towards bringing China into the world community, is immediate diplomatic recognition by Canada. Recognition is a unilateral action by its very nature - a step taken by one government in regard to another. Conditions may not be imposed by the recipient of the recognition, despite what some of our politicians have been at pains to suggest.

Let us immediately take that action and negotiate the fine print later. We may lose some friends in the process and hurt some others, but it is a small price to pay for self-respect.

Canada has always been proud of her role as a middleman between the great powers, proud of her recognition in the international conummity as an

"honest broker". One of our finest diplomats, Ambassador Chester Ronning, has been a spokesman for the "honest broker" in attempting to bring about a peace ful settlement in Vietnam. Canadian recognition of Communist China would give our diplomats another tool with which to dig a firebreak in Vietnam. And in this time of great crisis, it is criminal to deprive them of any tool that might be useful in that great effort, even if we have to buy it on the installment plan.

A former U.S. State Department adviser in Toronto recently remarked insultingly that Canadian recognition of Communist China would only be a "small footnote in diplomatic history". It might be small, but that wouldn 1t make it -7- any less right and proper. And the probable size of the footnote is only the view of an American, if not an ugly /~meric,".n, then at least an unnattractive one to boot. We don't need a former State Department official to remind us that Ca~tda is small and unimportant. That's the most prominent kind of reminder we 1ve had from the crew in Foggy Bottom for the past five years.

I &1y let's recognize China, and recognize her now. I guarantee we 1ll look a lot bigger to the little men in \llashington. vle might even cost a few of them a few nightst sleep.

Ruc-,gniti)n b0CJ!l3S even m-:>r·J imp::;r~tivv in thv light ')f Ext0rn:cl

,\ff.".irs i1Iinist0r l~hrtin 's rem-ctrks r>.t tho npening of the UN General Assembly in

September. Once again, Canada was facing the annual scramble over the seating of Communist China in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Once again, she faced, ~dis still facing, nn unconditional resolution for China's seating -- a resolution whiCh would simply turf out the Nationalists and re place them with the Peking regime.

Unless I miss my guess, that sort of resolution is as ~~cceptabl~ to Ottawa this year as it 1.fcls last. But Mr. Hartin added to the difficulty of the Canadian position by using bold words which gave another impression.

These were the sentences which gave the Canadian position such a fuzzy flavor. And I quote:

11 ••• I fe~l bound to say that there is a growing opinion in my country that if this organization is to realize its potential capacities, all nations, and especially those which, like continental China, represent a significant portion of the world's population, must be represented here •••

11 A solution to this problem of representation has eluded us for a long time; in spite of impelling reasons, I cannot say whether it will be possible -8-

for us to resolve this question within the next few weeks or within the next

few months. However, universality must remain our objective."

Mr. Martin t s words to the General ,1\.ssembly remind me of a piece of

advice Senator Abraham Ribicoff is reputed to have given a freshman Senator

in order to help him in future elections. Senator Ribicoffts advice for the

young man t. s behaviour in the Senate was simple. Talk liberal and vote con

servative.

I suspect that despite Mr. Martinis speech, Canada is once again

going to vote conservative.

If that is the ca;:;e , it is even more important that we move ahead

with some other part of our China policy, that is, recognition. Otherwise,

after all our robust words, wetre going to look pretty silly.

It is h~ gh time governments caught up with the thinking of the conunon

people. It is unthinkable that governments should lag behind the people in an

age of instant coffee and instant war. I believe most Canadians feel we should

declare officially that Communist China exists. And if it doesntt exist, letts

stop selling our wheat to a country that never was.

I supp~se most of us from time to time get discouraged about the way things tend to pile up on our desks, the way that important things must some

times be left undone for days at a time. But we can take courage from the way

things ~\Ve been piling up on Ottawats desk since the Second World War.

One of the items in Ottawats pile is the need for a complete reassess ment of foreign aid policy -- not just the kind of multilateral aid that is distributed through the United Nations but the all aid.

Economists and aid experts have cursed the day that Barbara Ward invented one percent. Miss Ward, of course, is the distinguished journalist . .

-9-

and writer who warned that unless the developed countries raised their annual

foreign aid budgets to about one percent of their gross national products,

the world was in for starvation, political upheaval and plain trouble on a

scale heretofore unimagined. The aid experts nre leary of Hiss Ward's one

percent because thJ.t innl)Cent figure is capable •Jf s.., m."Uly differcmt inter

pretations. It has caused consider~ble c mfusion. But they approved the idea

in its broad outlines: namely that aid had tl) be pushed 0ut in massive doses

or the developed world would, through its penuriousness, reap a dreadful harvest.

In the last fiscal year, Canada's foreign aid budget was about $225

million, or roughly .5 of her gross national pr~duct. In the next, it is ex

pected to be roughly $270 million, or about .6 percent. I feel we must do

better.

I suspect that the reason we haven't done better is that successive

Canadian governments in ottawa have feared the reaction of the Canadian people.

If Ottawa were to give its aid program a large boost, would there be a kind of

aid backlash, as Congress has experienced in the United States? This, I know,

is a question that is causing our public men a great deal of concern. But

once again, I have a feeling that they are lagging behind the thinking 0f the

general public. Perhaps this is because they have failed to raise the import

ant issues in those disgraceful slanging matches that pass for election cam

paigns. In the next one, foreign aid ought to be an issue. The one percent

concept should be rolled out, and pushed and pummelled in public until the men

who lead this country have some idea of where we stand.

We of the United Nations Association in Canada are often asked what

the United Nations has done for anyone in the past 25 years? When people point

to the world's organizationts failure to come to grips with the conflict in ..

-10-

in Vietnam, fvr instance, our explanations must necessarily be lame. We must

once o.gain admit that the UN is the victim of power politics - that the reali

ties of inter-national life often outstrip the capabilities of the organization,

But it is II\Y C•jnviction that if the United Nati·)ns were not hamstrung by the

other way around.

We in the UN Association are not blind to the organizati·)n's inherent

faults, nor d<) we hesitat e tv admit its many failures.

But we do believe that the United Nations has been the safety valve

th::1.t has saved us from an unthinknble third World War, not just once, but sev

eral times. It has prevented the escalation of armed conflict 21 times in 21

yeA.rs. And we also believe that through the work ·:Jf its A.gencies, the UN ha s

promoted vmrld trade, enhanced global communications and has helped to alleviate

suffering, hunger and ignor~nce in the developing areas.

Perhaps more important than those specifics is what I believe the

United Nations has done for international mJrality. The new morality is not,

I think, simply a r eligious morality, and not exclusively a Christian one. As

a matter vf fact, I feel that the Christian Church, through a tendency to cling

to the narrow missionary concepts of a century past, ha s taken a back seat.

The Hindus, the l~slems, the Buddhists, and other members of great and sophisti

cated religions nre not in need of conversi,n. Their needs a re secular, and it

is those needs that must now be filled.

But I w.:J.S saying that there is a new atmsphere of international

morality. And ther e is. Events that wer e toler at ed even thirty years ago

would not be tolerat ed today. The mo st pr1gressive colonial institutions of

1939 would be the subject of vri.d.:lspread opprobrium in 1966, fnr instance . l.nd ..

-11-

it is not only a question of governmental morality.

When I was a small child in Sackville, New Brunswick, I leQrned a

corrunon playgr•>und rhyme that went like this. 11Eenie, Meenie, Minie Moe,

Catch a Nigger by the Toe. 11 That word for Negro falls ha.rshly on our ears

in this place todny.

It didn't jar anyone anywhere ,Nhen I first learned it. And as chil

dren we certainly didn't use it with any malicious intent. I don't suppose

any of us had ever met a Negro.

I mention that playground rhyme because 20-odd years later, in New

Y•..)rk City, I heard another version. f'.nd bear in mind, please, that with rarv

exceptions, playground rhymes and games are transmitted directly from child to

child, not through adults. ~W four year old ~~ughter came in from the play

gr,mnd to announce she'd learned a new rhyme. '!Eenie, Meenie, f.ilinie, Moe 11 ,

11 11 she began, Catch a Tiger by the Toe •

I cannot prove, of course , that it was the ne1r1 morality of the UN

Charter that seeped intu the sidewalks 0f Ne>-r York P.nd put fresh words into

the mouths of inf.:mts. But I like to think that \-v<:l.S a major factor.

I could not mention the United Nations' achievements during this UN Week, of all UN Weeks, without citing what many people believe to be its great

est work, its efforts on behalf of r efugees. The General Assembly decreed

during i ts l nst session that m~ Day this year should be dedicated to an appre

ciation of the plight of millions of homeless peoples -- the victims of pvlit

ical upheaval, r acial t ensi•)n and man r s cold-blooded treatment of other human

beings, United Nations agencies have resettled 40 million refugees since 1945.

Yes, 40 million. Twice the population of Canada, The United Nations is still

handling more than a million refugees each year. Some ,)f them still displaced ..

-12-

by the ~-r that rolled over Europe in 1939~ Others, the innocent victims of

upheavals in the Middle E~st. Still others, in Africa, forced to flee from

their native states by laws invented for one race by another.

It might b~ useful at this point to try to explain where 1r:e fit in.

l!Jhat is the role of the United Nations J.ssociation in Camda?

In brief, the Associ.

United Nations. The Association also ::tttempts to provide a reservoir of

lmoviledge in internatL)n"l.l field, so that a ft0r study of specific problems, it

can recommend possible courses of action to the country and the government.

And through education, the i\ss,; r.ia tj an tries t ::.> help create a better climate

for intermtional cooperation nnd understanding.

To thc:se ends, we are deeply involved with the n?.tion's youth -

about 25,000 of them ,each year. We are n:~t onl~r in the publishing business

but distribute our own and uther literature as well. Our Inf,_:>rrnation Section

circulates more than a million books, pamphlets and educational aids each year.

We are also charged with pL~ying the watchdog over the government's

UN policy in particular and its foreign policy in general. We do this, and

considerably more that I have not mentioned, with a skelatal staff and a lean

purse. To be perfectly frank, we are in poor financial shape.

Perhaps, in one sense , we have been too successful in our efforts to

generate public support for the United Nations. MOst Canadians ar e generally

in favor of the United Nations, as they ar e generally in favor of motherhood,

peace and a good five cent cigarillo.

So apathy is a major adversa ry. vl.; believe that vague feelings of

goodwill towards the UN ar e no substitute for active , informed support and crit

icism. -.

-13-

!_nother reason we have difficulty in reaching the man on the street,

perhaps, is that our role is so difficult to explC'..in.

We suppurt the United Nations, but we nrcnrt of it.

We support the IDJ's war against disease, hungsr and illiteracy, but

the Association itself isn't on the front line.

All of which h~s such a second hand ring about it that it takes ~

gre:J.t denl of effort to convince peopl:-3 that the Associatiun and its members

are an essentinl part of the internatbml corrmrunity, ~s vital to the future

of the United NQtions as Canadian citizens are to the future of Canada.

This is true because the UN's lifeblood is th~t intangible but ulti

mately irresistible element in international politics -- world public opinLm.

Without 1fue moral authority of public opinion, the UN 1 s decisions are

meaningless. I believe it is because tha UN does have c·•nsiderable m..;ral

muscle that it will be spared the fate of tho old Le::tgue.

But we, the peoples of the United Nations, must not only pledge our

determin.1.tion 11 to s.:J.ve succeeding generations from the sc ·urge of war". We

must organize to that end. We must, for instance, put such massive pressure

on Ottawa thn.t she abandons her "lvbdcl T" China policy for a 1966 model.

With your help, and only Hith your help, L:J.dios and Gentlemen, there 111

be some changes made. Thank you. ..

Resolution unanimously adopted by 25 American and Canadian bankers, industrialists, journalists and university repre sentatives who met at McGill University, Montreal, on February 7th, 8th and 9th, 1969:

RESOLVED, that it is the sense of this meeting that early progress for an increased understanding, contact and dialogue by the governments in Peking and Washington is of the utmost im portance to world peace;

That steps should be explored by which these two powers could together formulate a peaceful resolution of their differences over Taiwan, achieve a demilitarization of their present relationship and initiate exchanges of goods and citizens; and,

That to further these ends, additional private meetings on this subject should be convened by our hosts with individuals from the People's Republic of China.

February 9, 1969 (203) 4311·231111 (203) 777·28411

DR. LUNG-CHU CHEN J.S.D., YALE

VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS P.O. BOX S311 UNITED FORMOSANS IN AMERICA FOR INDEPENDENCE NEW HAVEN, CONN . 081104 ' .. 1tniteb jformosans in america for Jnbepenbence

P.O. Box S74. G .C.S. NEW YORK, N.Y. l0017

'f' ~ PRESS RELEASE ~~0 Hew York, I.Y., October~. 1969 (UFAI): As the United Rations begins its annual review or the question ot Chinese participation on

Bovember 3, it is urgent that the real. haue, the tuture ot Taiwan (Formosa), be examined and presented to the public in the proper context. In order to express the shared grievances and genUine aspira-

tiona on behalf ot the 12 million Taiwanese now under the Chiang Kai- shek regime's totalitarian suppression, the United Formosans in America for Independence has scheduled a demonstration on Bovember the 3rd (Monda.y). Taiwanese will picket in tront ot the United Nations from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Thereafter they will picket at the corner ot 42nd Street and Third Avenue in tront ot the Nationalist Chinese Mission to the United Nations, then march northward along the aidev&lk of Fifth Avenue, turn lett at 50th Street, and stop in front ot the RCA Building (the Avenue ot the Americas) where the Nationalist Chinese Consulate General is situated. As stated in the enclosed appeal to members ot the United Bations, UFAI demands freedom and self-determination now tor the people ot Taiwan. You would be rendering a great service to the

public by giving adequate coverage to this crucial matter.

U.F.A.I. i.r dedicated to the establishment of a free, democratic and independent RePublic of Tmwcm (Fornwsa) in accordance with the principle of self-determmation of peoples. We are committed to the fundamental freedoms and human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and therefore repudiate all fonns of totalitarian rule, Chinese Nationalist or Communist. • • • "' .. . 1!tnittb jformosans in ~mtrita for Jnbtpenbtntt

P.O. Box 574. G.C.S. NEW YoRK, N.Y. 10017

APPEAL TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN

Taiwan (Formosa) is an island about one hundred miles off the coast of mainland China. On it there are two million Chinese who fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek when Chinese Communists took over the mainland in 1949, and 12 million Taiwanese whose ancestors migrated about three centuries ago from southeastern China to the island to be free from authoritarian Chinese rule. From its inception Asian and European powers sought to make Taiwan their colony; most recently, the Japanese had ruled it. When Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of his army fled to Taiwan, the 2 million escaping Chinese quickly imposed their control over the 12 million Taiwanese and Taiwan was converted into one of the most efficient and horrifying police states of the post-War period. What Chiang calls free China is in fact an artificially created government staffed by Chinese Nationalist exiles, supported by foreign powers, and dispossessing the native Taiwanese people. Under martial law in effect since Chiang fled to Taiwan, a civilian can be readily and secretly court-martialed. It is utterly impossible to learn what crime a person has actually committed. The Chiang regime has violated practically every single article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Taiwanese have been denied the freedom to express their own true identity both at home and a·broad - they are not even free to say that they are Taiwanese. Indeed, being Taiwanese has itself become a crime. The twelve million Taiwanese are excluded from managing their own affairs - the 85 per cent Taiwanese majority has less than 1% per cent representation in the Con· gressional bodies, one of which elects the President and the Vice President. These bodies, as created on the China mainland and imposed on Taiwan today, are still dominated by the same representatives elected in 1947 and 1948 for a term of three or six years by the electorate on the mainland. They continue in power in Taiwan without any mandate from the people of Taiwan. Denied a government of their own, the genuine aspirations and interests of the 12 million Taiwanese are too often forgotten or overlooked. Primarily this is attributable to the efficiency with which the Chinese Nationalist regime has exploited its monopoly of diplomatic and communication channels, and the rigor with which any attempt by Tai wanese to make their grievances and aspirations known to the world has been suppressed. As the United Nations begins its annual review of the question of Chinese partici pation, it is crudal that the real problems be grasped. There is, in fact, no China prob lem. China exists as a communist sta.te on the mainland. The real problem is Taiwan, whose legal status remains unresolved since formal detachment from Japan. Taiwan is neither free nor China, and the Taiwanese people have no desire to be part of China. The only question of substance is the future of a cohesive but long suppressed people on Tai· wan, a de facto non-self-governing territory under the Chinese Nationalist control. We, United Formosans in America for Independence, urge that the United Nations follow the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and insist upon self-determination for the people of Taiwan. We urge that a U.N. supervised plebiscite be held in 11aiwan to establish institutions which genuinely represent all the people and not just fifteen per cent of the people, and that a U.N. committee be set up to facilitate the performance of these tasks. The people of Taiwan seek to eject no one from the island; they seek only demo· cratic government, a right guaranteed to them under international law. A free Taiwan is in t-he interest of all the world, for a free island clarifies, at last, the true dimensions of the China question. There is only one China: when it fulfills the appropriate conditions em· bodied in the U.N. Charter, it should be seated in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. And there is only one Taiwan. It must be free and independent.

U.F.A .l . is dedicated to the establishmel!t of a free, democratic a11d independent Republic of Taiwan (Formosa) in acc01'dance with the frrillciple of self-determination of peoples. ·. We are C0111111-illed to the f111u!ammtal freedoms and human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and therefore repudiate all forms of totalitarian rule, Chinese NaticmaJist 01' Com-nist. 70-24962 Translated· from Chinese

U 'rHANT, SECRETARY GENERAL, UNl'I' l~ D NA'riONS

PlEASE FORWARD THE FOLLO~HNG h1E SSAGE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 01<,

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chinese Communist regime is an evil regime. During the past week or so, no less than thirty corpses of young people who attempted escape from the mainland have been found in the waters surrounding Hong Kong and Macao. This is conclusive evidence of the tyrannical nature of the -rule and the fact that the regime cannot represent the Chinese people at all. The Chung Cheng Association of Hong Kong, a.s a service and liaison centre for the seven million overseas Chinese Hakka people, is resolutely oppose~ to the admission of the Chinese Communist regime into the United Nations. We hope that all peaceful and freedom-loving members of the United Nations will vote unanimously against the resolution which would grant membership to that regime,so as to uphold the principle of justice.

T_he Chung Cheng Association of Hong Kong

-· thang Fa-kuei, President ~ Huang Shih-hua, Chairman of the Executive Committee Lee Mou-chi,.Chairman of the Supervisory Committee and othei' members of the Association.

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8 Mar 1971

I ackDOVl.edp reoeipt ot 1 letter 4&t h'bl'uar,r with vb1C!b JOU a\ aa.e reoen\ articlu r-.rardi..l:.a Cbina• • toHip rel.atiODa . I ban r t v1 p-eat intereat. Wi\h aat via Your• ain •1'1,

u 'l'b&nt

.... . 'llloM I I. MutoD Dinc\or, Cowltr;r COUDCil.a Tba Aaia 8ooiet7 U2 t 616\l:a even Jw York, •I. • • • THE ASIA SOCIETY

26, February,l971 The Honorable U Thant United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear U Thant:

Attached are some recent articles regarding China 1 s foreign relations. You might be particularly interested in the 'one on Dr. Hoo and the United Nations. •I Please accept my best personal wishes.

Warm regards , ~\ Thomas B. Manton Director, Country Councils

TBM:has

112 East 64th Street I New York, N.Y. 10021 I 212 Pl•z• 1·421 0 -· Tt,IWAN Diplomatic reverses abroad have led to tighter intc;rnal control Jonathan Ungc:.r in Taiwan over potential dissent. The ~;overnrnent has a fc_tir Taipei chance of , surviving the decade provided its economic f boom does not collapse, alienating completely the still resentful native Tai·.vanese frorn their immiBratlt ru lers I 0 I I I ' ilE tired and aging KMT (Knominti:lng) ship of state is charge directly important trading partners with "appease T .sailing an unsteady course in the wake of last <1utumn 's ment". The blame for Peking's diploJllatic successes is laid at simple majority vote at the United Nations ia favour of seat the door of private groups aut! opposition parties in the ing !'eking and the new line-up of nations switching em "defecting" countries. Communists, socialists, and business bassies from Taipei to Pc kinG. men anxious for the China trade arc blamed for lti:lly's The KM1' leadership consists almost entirely of n~jection from the I kuo has emerged as a tough, shrewd and world body. They note optimistically ~ flexible operator. - that West Germany and South Korea do ~ Chiang the Elder was 83 last October very well without UN membership. -..., and is not immortal. An American They hint that trade is what counts. Tai- .·- ---., \ acquaintance who spoke to hi:n at the :/ '\ .)~ wan's trade office in Milan stayed in '- I '.\: 'j end of 1970 felt . the Generalissimo had business after Italy recognised Peking, in become markedly feebler over the pre ( 1': November. A major government-spon vious 12 months. Few doubt his son is sored trade campaign is now in the off. the only heir-apparent. The qu~stion is: ing, aimed in part at nations which have will Ching-kuo take over after the 1972 switched to Peking or are likely to do presidential dectinns or will his father so. step down earlier while still in sufficient The government has been hesitant to , ... /:...... -. / " t · health to stage-manage the transition? .-----.' ( FEBRUARY 6, 1971 FAR EAS1"ERN ECONOMIC REVIEW • -Tf:'c KMT's war-horses, ofta. referred to a:: "Mac.laiile 21 tecn ag ·~ r s from Taiwan's aboriginec Ami tribe had en Chhlng's faction", oppose the GcneraJissinJO's retircmwt. dured three half-starve,! yea1s of captivity in the plant. They know th~t once lie goes, they will be ph:t $cd out. The 111c go\'Crnm ·~nt, intent upon Jm intai;ling tl1e ·flow of Old Guard consists of ChL1ng's eld est [\lltl Jlll!St lnyal.a:;;o .foreign dollars, usually i(;norc-s eo111plain ts. An industri:ll ciatcs. Chiang, partly to protect tlteir iutcr..:s ts, will probably labo ur cxp::rt fwm the Intcrn:1tional Labour Organisation hold on to the post of director general or the KMT party. recently concluded a yc;•r-long study by ta king the 'govern Chiang the Younger became undisputed crown prinee ment to task in publ ic for Toiwan's "dcplora!.Jk ·• working only recently. Chen Cheng, a hero.in Kt\!T hbtory who look conditions. the credit for Taiwan's bnd reforms, w;1s a fonnidabk rival By h:J sin <:; it ~ race for ecouc,mic development on cxrorts, till his death in 19GS . C. K. Yen then ~uccccd~d him as Taiwan is taking :1 calcula ted risk. The island has become premier, but is a man more at home cuttinG rib!J ons t!wn wedded to Jap;mc sc and An1crican markets and sources of maldng decisions. capital. The rcpc·rcussions fro m :Jny extended recession in C. K. Yen will step into the presidency when Ch i:1 ng I~ai either country would be severe. In 1970 tex tile exports to shek goes. Chiang Chii1r,-kuo, at prcswt cl cpuly premier, will the US accounted for 11 % of total s:~lcs overseas and more take over as prime minister. Ching-kuo has carefully than 3% of Taiwa:1's nat ional income. The textile restrictions strengthened his hold on the armed forces, the secret police , the I' •· . . 1 China Youth Corps, the retired scrvicerr.en's associations and vital sections of the bureaucracy. Few doubt the balnn ce of power will shift to the pr(;nticr's office. K. T. Lee, the shrewd finance minister, :~nd Chane Clwn, the G c .ne r a li ~ simo's secre tary, are expected to sh:!~c some of Ching-kuo's authority at least initially. The smart money in Taip?. i predicts the succession will b ~ smooth. Some, however, fore cast th at Chi;:ng Chi ng-kuo's victory will prov.:: a hollow one. They ;neue th at more than 80% of Taiwan's J 5 million people and an equ al fraction of its 500,000 or lllOJC troops arc local Ti! iwnd Chinese . Even some of the mainlandc:rs feel no respect or positively dislike Ching kuo and the corrupt, ill efficient fun<'.tion:\rics he will lead. But Taiwan fears disord c; r most of all. Chiang Chinz· kuo and the K!v!T should be able to muddle through the decade t'', . , • successfully . J.- : ~, . ...:.· .' '::.. ~·- .. -. Very few believe the slogan that for so long has sustained the KMT: that Peking will be retaken. Ironically, the fading of the KMT's mission of reconquest will boo$! the KMT's posi-. tion in Taiwan . Ching-kuo, by pushing economic expansion rather th an military preparedness, has won some standing if - not approval among the indigenous Taiwanese business community. Money is venerated in Taiwan, and the KMT's rule will be safe while the economic boom lasts. Despite govcrnJ].lCllt inefftdcncy and corruption, Taiwan's 1970 Gl:'\P expanded by 10%, :wtl manufaclllring industry registered an impressive 17% grc:wth rate. Behind this upSUf3e is a sizable and rapidly J growing foreign trade. Total trad e for 1970 is estimated at 'l ~-. \ US$3,0'/0 million, an increase of $756 million ove r 1969. ·· · - j Exports rose 40% with a net surplus of £30 million - the To an almost desertt·d 1910 genenl i'SSem[>ly meeting. Vloi T,~ o-rning first ~incc 1964. puts Ta ipei's Ci1$C against Pel:ing'> unuv to the VIOrld IJOcl}'. Massive foreign inves tment iJ1 export industries is spurring which would follow the p:!,s:1;1e by the US Congress of a the galloping trade. In the p :~st year, 68 forcizn companies second l'vlills Rill could trigge r a ril sh of bankruptcies ill the started new projects worth $101 million, SGO million in the texti le industry. • electronics field. Taipei courts foreign investors with q uic t Agriculture, also dependent on overseas marKets, suffered promises of low costs. The govcwment prohibits indepen in 19'70. 13:\Jtana sales to Japan h:!Ve enco untered stiff com dent labour unions and m:~rrngc s to keep a ceiling on w:~ ~.;es. petition, nnd Soutl1 J( oJca and .l :~p:m no lnnger need Taiw:~n Overseas eompanks on the prowl for a cheap, produdivc <~ nd ri..:e. How ev~ r , tltc partial f

FAR EASTEHN ECONOMIC R EVIEW FEBRUARY 6,1971 18 • I ~ UN THE PEOPLE OVER THE STRAIT By Louis Halasz

New York: Peking's envoys may not they simply looked through them. But tleman, with tremendous experience show up here for years yet, but this at the time of the scconu Geneva con and encyclopaedic knowledge, he is organisation already is busy making ference, in 1962, the Peking Chinese truly a victim of circumstances beyond room for them in the Turtle Iby build were all smiles, chatting :~miably with his control. Over the years, as the im ing. tlteir UN counterparts and even inviting portance and influence of Taiwan have Secretary General UThant in his recent thern to diplomatic parties. Nobody continued to decline, he has been polite press conference said: "I do not want knows what the third round in New ly demoted. From the important trustee the secretariat to be taken by surprise," York will look like . . . ship . department he was transferred revt:aling th;1t ''tentative preliminary Since the Chinese quota is not filled, in 1955, still as under secretary, to the arrangements have been ma de in the there is room for UN employment for at office of conference services and,' final secretariat to meet any cvcntu:dity". least a score of Chinese who may be ly, in 1962, to commissioner for techni Whether Peking's diplomats will sent from the mainland. cal co-opccation. l appreciate his gesture after all the abuse But, of ,course, as the UN is fully Yet, to this very day he has maintain they have consistently heaped upon him aware, the main interest of Peking is in ed his title as assistant secretary general., is another rmttcr. It is exactly their the top posts, occupied by exalted despite the relatively unimportant post anticipatcu truculence which worries under secretaries, assistant secretaries he still occupies. The reason is simple: the UN secretariat and ha s caused the general and highest-ranking directors. he has continued from year to year with secretary general to try sweeten the \Vhen Peking comes in, it will come in as the urfderstanding that his primary job Chinese we'll in advance. one of the five great "veto" powers, and is to keep the assistant secretary gen t His further remarks indicated two undoubtedly it will insist on equal eral's chair warm for his successor from main areas in which preparations arc status with the others. By tacit agree Peking. ' underway. One concerns the question of ment, the five permanent members all This is a pity; his great talents are t money. Taiwan - as China's reprcsen have their own under secretaries right being wasted. He is not only the oldest t,ative -- currently owes the UN close to under the secretary general . UN hand in terms of tenure (he started US$30 million in unpaid assessments. At the time when the ·UN came into working for the UN in March 1946). but Since they do not know how long they being, the main Chinese interest was in among many other attributes he is the may be able to stick around, obviously the speedy elimination of colonialism. only one who speaks .all the five official they arc in no mood to pay up, now or Thus they got the post of assistant UN languages: Chinese, English, French, ever. And if one thing is certain , it is secretary in charge or the department of Russian and Spanish. A few years b:.~ck that Peking will refuse to assume this trusteeship territories. The mati picked at a luncheon the then Soviet UN am particular financial obligation. In fact, for that post was the much respected Dr bassador, Nikolai Fedorcnko- who had nobody knows if Peking, after en try, Victor Chi-Tsai Hoo, son of the Chinese served in Peking and prided himself on will refuse to pay the yearly Chinese emperor's minister to the Russian Tsar's being a "Chinese scholar" - toasted him as~essment of $5.6 million in converti Court in Petrograd, a graduate of the in weak Chinese. Hoo promptly re- · ble cuncncy. University of Paris, the former head of sponded in impeccable Russian ... The UN itself is in the red to the tune the Chinese delegation to the Le:~glie of There is a delightful anecdote that of nearly $50 million, a sad fact that U Nations, and Chinese vice minister of older UN hands still relate with a Thant never fails to bemoan. Without foreign affairs, in which capacity he chuckle whenever Hoo's name is men doubt, the Chinese membership ques attended all the conferences that had tioned. In 1946, just after the UN's tion cannot but add to the organisa led to the establishment of the UN. transfer from London to New York, tion's financial problems. Hoo, at 77, is still around , well be the organisation's offices were for a The other area has to do with the yond retirc;nent age. An immen sely time located at 630 Fifth Avenue in question of tl1e UN staff. Each member dignified and impeccably cultured gen- Manhattan, while the staffers were put nation has an assigned quota on the up in the Waldorf-Astoria hotel. One staff of international civil servants that day the late secretary general, Trygvc it may fiJI with its own citizens, based Lie of Norway, sent a message to Hoo . upon its scale of financial assessment. that there would be an afternoon meet The "desirable range" for Chinese ing at "630". Thinking that Lie meant among the UN professionals is from 58 room 630 in the Waldorf, Hoo rang the to 78 employees. At prese nt there are bell there at the appointed time . A lady 51 Chinese staffers, nearly all ca reer came out and, seeing Hoo, pushed a bag employees with tenure who cannot be \ , - J of laundry in to his hands. "Madame," dismissed. said Hoo unperturbed, "it may be that All these people have made sure that all laundrymen are Chinese, but I can they do not have an ideo\ogil:al profile. -~~- assure you that not all Chinese are The N:~tionalists . practical as all Chinese \ )l laundrymen . . ." are at heart, have never raised objec· Victor Hoo is undoubtedly one tions. Whether Peking will be similarly _,.-':i -- // - JChines e for whom Peking's entry will be reasonable is another matter. Back in ('-_, \ · ·,~ - -;~.Y I ~ a relief from chores unbecoming a man . 1954, at the time of the first Ge neva of his age and experience. One would conference on Indochina, Peking's l _l;;' ,f i I hope that he will then write his ..... ~.-~.1 , La .A!.~- ...... ,.._ o; diplomats simply refusl!d to h:lVe any Dr Hoo: Peking's advent will b e a relief from memoirs. They should provide most thing to do with the "UN Chinese"; unbecoming chores. interesting reading.

, FEBRUARY 13,1971 FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC R EVI EW -:-:------,....------~~~-- -· -- . -· -· ; JAPAN The pressure against Sato's China policy is growing, with the visit of Toshio .Yoshimura Aiichiro Fujiyama to Peking: But his trip coincides with the Japanese and Koji Nakamura trade delegation's, and could become enmeshed in its problems Tokyo Back Door to Peking

ITH Premier Eisaku Sato for the fir st time referring to tiating the renewal of the memorandum trade agreement W ChJna as the People ~s Republil: in the Diet last month, with China. lie felt his usefulness would be greatest as a and the visit of Aiil:hiro Fujiyama to Peking, the pressure private individual. But Peking, which has been lukewarm whkh has been building up in Japan in favour of nonnalisa about the exclusion of LDP Dietmen from the ·negotiating tion pf links with China looks like bearing some kind of fruit. team, has insistrd on asking him 011 precisely the same date, If, that is, Peking i11lends to allow anything of the kind. and appears to want him deeply involved in the talks. · Fujiyama is hc:Jd of the Dictmen's Leaglle which has ell Wu Hsu-tung, chief of the China-Japan Memorandum listed more than half the n1embers of both chambers to th e Trade office, suggested this quite clearly to Japanese liaison cause of normal diplomatic relations with China .. Witlt this officials in Peking on January 3 I ; he told them China hoped support - which includes 95 members of the ru'ling LDP Fujiyama 's visit would promote trade - on the basis of the (Liberal Democratic Party) - behind him, he carries the most inseparability of politics and economics. Political talks arc an weight of the Japanese political figures involved in new important aspect of the trade talks -and last year involved a approaches to Peking. Previous to his political career, whi ch communique condemning Japanese militarism. Fujiyama began in the Fifties and included four years as forei gn ininis would prefer to remain on the sidelines; Peking's pressure for ter -- when he was responsible for concluding the controver him to identify himself more closely with the delegation sial security pact with the United States - he has had con suggests the success of his mission may be pinned, by the siderable business experience. The inheritor of the enormous Chinese, to his attitude w the sched uled political discussions Nitto industrial combine, he was a president of Nissho with the trade team. (Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry). Fujiyama's six-man lllission left for Peking this week on The government has apparently given its blessing to Fuji the same aircraft as the trade nego tiating team led by Kaheita yama's vi si t, no doubt finding it useful to have a non-partisan Okazaki , head of the Japan-Ch ina Memorandum Trade office spokesman for a mission which has a fair chance of failing. If - not LDP Diet member Yoshimi Furui as in previous years. all g()CS well, sources dose to S:~to indicate he contrmplates Fujiyama plans to stay until early M:~rch - but it was con sending LDP (Librr:~l Democratic Party) leaders to Peking; ceded before he left that his stay might be extendi!d if the Fujiy::11na will have the opportunity to put out feelers on the memorandum trade agreement tal ks ran into difficulties. The subject in his talks with the Chinese leaders. Similarly, Sato Chinese desire that he should be involved in thr trade nego will support plans by non-governmental groups !P invite tiations has been acknowledged - and apparently acceded to. Chinese leaders to Japan and ·- if they occur - will probably In appearance if not in fact , this will make Fujiyama's try to arrange meetings with them. He probably has in mind - visit much more "official", perhaps limiting his room for the advice of th e LDP's foreign policy committee that the manoeuvre. It must also give invitations to Chinese leaders, government approve the visit to Japan by China's Deputy and suggestions for further ge neral interchanges of personnel, Premier Li Hsicn -nie n and a semi-official tinge. At Sato, faced with lobbies backing 1 Yoshikatsu Takeiri, Komcito chair· both China and Taiwan, is happy other "high officials". By I 1e sa me tia:::! • Chin::! will man: Ha has madtJ rep c<~ted, and un· to watch from the viings. acquiescing in principle, he be able to tie the visit to successful, attempts to visit Peking. can blunt the edge of cri- trade, and to make as ticism. But if the Chinese much -· or as little - poli .. decline, through an un tical capital out of it as it offici

welcome ingredient into China, and to maintain I this cautious recipe. Fuji that peace in the rrgion I yama has made no secret depends too much on ... China's policies tow:nds its ... /' ··;of his desire to be invited . . /'/'' · to Peking at a time which neighbours for Japan to \ '• ...... ·: would not totally coincide ignore Peking in the name \ ·.,__ ..'/ I ( "' with the visit of the of its own security. t ( - ~~/ Ja anese team nego· Tomomi . Narita, chair- \ , ·..'.. (';'( •

man of the JSP (JapJn Socialist Party), h:-ts consistently \.!' advocated early recognition ofChin:l, claiming peace dc?ends on Sino-Jap:Ulese friendship. The Komeilo 's ch:-ti rm:lll, Yoshi .•' katsu Takeiri, has nude n.: pcated (and unsuc cessful) attempts to visit Peking. · ·. Each is aw:~re that breaking the current ~t::llenwtc in reb lions with China would be a vote-winning move . Every opinion poll reveals wider support among the J:1panese for living in peace with Peking. Last month an Asal1i ShimlJun survey showed th:~t 21 % of respondents gave priority to good / relations with China, as against only I 0/o I 8 months previ l ·. ... __,_,.. ) ' 'I ~ ously. I . 1 But if LDP leaders still advocate extreme caution in making any changes, th ey can quote the 42% of 1 apanesc who in the same poll were chicOy concerned with maintain- --,.. • J .------···- ---~--- ·

Handshakes Corne First- / ' THE following questions were answer / ed by Aiichiru fujiyama in an exclu ', ' sive inten·iew with Review correspon \ Fujiyama: Connections ' dent Koji Nakamura just before his with business. but \ / departure for Peking for "political . he would prefer to ' steer clear of the consultations" with Premier Chou En ( \ lai and oth.:r leaders. negotiations on trade. ,• ' 0 Q. What is the biggest factor preclud lt.:.. . .. - ·~-- ·------·------_,.. ___ ------···- ..... · . • .• ing the resumption of normal relations bridge between Washington and Pe may be just as much a problem of betll'een Peking and Tokyo? king; they have their own contacts set mentality, a state of mind. 1 strongly A. I think it is the government's pos up in Warsaw. But a change in Japan's feel that these charges of militarism ture, which is heavily influenced by China policy could lead the US to arc largely directed against the social the so-called Taiwan issue. modify its attitude. My colleagues climate of Japan, which is susceptible Q. Why do you think the gOI'ernment have been meeting "doves" in Wash to totalitarianism. Individualism is still takes \\'hat appears to be a minority ington, but I should like to see them in a very young stage here; I think it is view not only in the international deciding policy. for us Japanese to rethink and reap communiiy but in Japan as well, and Q. Wltat is your position on Japanese praise ourselves rather than to refute does it think this policy conforms with recognition of Peking, and its stand on or deny foreign charges. I strongly fear the nationul interest? Chinese represe}'ltation at the UN? the curren L trend in which the younger A. It opcr:1tes, jointly with Taiwan and A. Recognition should be 'the priority generation is increasingly showing in South Korea, within the framework of policy; matters concerning Chinese terest in war, if not accepting it. It is US Asia policy, and cannot deviate membership of the UN are for it to our responsibility to drive home that from this basic line. Some people be decide. Japan should act on the prin war is not a romantic affJ.ir. lieve that to keep China out of spheres ciple tl1at there is oHly one Cl1ina, and Q. 1'l1e so-called San Fmncisco Peace where it might clash with Japan serves that the Taiwan issue is China's domes Treary and the US-Japan Security their own brand of national interest. tic affair. Treaty were prvducts of the Korean Q. What is your view on the supposi Q. What is your view 011 the govern War. Basically, they posflllatc China tion that Sino-Japanese relations are a ment's "two-Chinas" approach to the and the Soviet Union as potentiul ene reflection, so to speak, of US-China re question of representation at the UN? mies. Peking could view Okinawa as lations -- which in tum reflect those of A. "One Taiwan" means Taiwart ruled Washington views Cuba. Are these Washington with Moscow? not by the Taiwanese but by the Na security arrangements necessary and A. Resumption of Tokyo-Peking rela tionalist Chinese regime. The govern do they obstmct Tokyo-Peking rela tions should be conducive to Sino-US ment is aware that such a formula is tions? contacts. Russo-Chinese disputes are totally unacceptable by either party. A. What is most important now for deeper, since they concern differences Our foreign ministry is just following Asia is, I believe, that Japan shake over a single highly-regimen ted poli the Washington line. hands with Peking. Questions related tical doc trine. Developments in one Q. In your talks with the Chi11ese lead to security arrangements can follow, country make a severe impact on the ers, how will you account for the not precede, the normalisation of rela other. I fcci.China is not freed from charges of the rel'ival of Japanese mili tions. China itself docs not deny the the traditional southward vision of the tarism which are bo1111d to come up? necessity of security arrangements per Slavs. Improvement in Sino-US rela A. China has been very sensitive to sc, and has conceded collective securi tions would not necessarily affect Pe foreign domination since the days of ty arrangements rnay sometimes be king's relations with Moscow. Yct such Sun Yat-sen. It has reason -- no coun necessary. We can discuss the matter a development would benefit both try /has suffered more from Japanese I of Asian collective security with China communist giants. militarism than China. Milit:nism may and other countries, after the nor 1 do not feel Japan should be a not1be a state of armament alone . It malisa lion of tics. • . i ing close friendship with the US to justify their stance. Any radical switch in the China policy which incurred American antipathy would far from bene(1t the innovators witl1 the voting public. These factors may have influenced fujiyalllil in the cau· tiousness of his approach to Peking's leaders. He has stressed perso n-to-person contact as his aim, not the discussion of a pl:ln for recognition of China which the left is demanding, talking as an example of asking Kuo Mo-jo, a celebrated ... . , ,. writer educated in Japan, to visit the country again. Peking ,,./ 1' may be concemed to force him out of this neutral attitude, .,-----. .. perhaps to test the genuineness of the political goods these ' . -· interchanges are presumed to augur. The JSP and the Sohyo (General Council of Trade -'.: I l Unions) are meantime organising a new body - the National I i Congress for the Restoration of Japan-China Relations.- to ) pressure the governmen~ . Its inaugural rally is scheduled for / .. Febmary 16 in Tokyo and its expected head, former sccrc· / ~ _ ,: . I tary general of Sohyo Akira lwai, will probably visit Peking .· soon. Its formation will coincide roughly with the visit of J • ,~,/ Fujiyama and of the trade delegation, which is expected to leave for Peking between February 10 and 13. Fujiyama's connections with business may have influ , enced one of Japan's most powerful elite business groupings, '·. the Kcizai Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development), in their request that he sound out in Peking the possibility of sending a top-level business mission to China. Chaired by K:~zutake Kigawada (president of Tokyo Elcc· tric Power, the world's largest commercial power utility firm), Keizai Doyukai numbers more progressive businessmen and industrialists than other similar org:~nisations in Japan. Economic circles generally are moving to support nonnuli sation of Sino-Japanese relations - in the belief that there can be no peace and stability in Asia without it. Of the four leading economic bodies of Japan - Keidan ren (Federation of Economic Organisations), Nikkeircn (Japan Employers' Association), Nissho (Japan Chamber of Commerce and industry) and Keizai Doyukai - the last is best fitted to further dealings with China, because its membership is made up of individuals, not organisations. Also, its leaders have not been so deeply involved in businc~s relations with Taiwan as their counterparts in the three other bodies. It is indicated to be active in raising funds to back the activities of Fujiyama's new body of Dietmcn. In this complex world of ours, times have Up to now, the industrialists' intcre~t in China has been changed. motivated solely by the market potential implicit in the size And Seiko, the world's largest jeweled-lever of its population. If the new trends show greater political watch manufacturing company, has changed time. awareness, business still has every reason to pay attention to They've made it roore accurate. More depend the cash registers. While Japan-China trade clocked up an able. More realistically priced, unprecedented US$820 million in 1970 and continued to Take the Scilw Chronograph, for example. It's hold its place as China's biggest trading partner, it is doubtful automatic, shock-resistant, and water-resistant if this performance can be m a intain~d in 1971. down to 70 meters. With 17-jcwel movement. With the operation of the Chou principles, contracts at Instant date resetting. Tachymeter. Rotating dial the Canton Fair last year dropped to S 140 million as against ring. And Hardlex crystal. 1969's $200 million. Contracts for machinery dwindled in 1970 to a mere $4,700,000 from the previous year's figure of So enjoy the world of Seiko time. $45 million. While foreign ministry officials remain opti You'll love every minute of it. mistic, maintaining China needs Japan "more than Japan needs China", other countries - such as West Germany France, Britain and Canada - arc getting in on the act. Busi nessmen in Japan blame the negative a.ttitude of the govern ment for much of their troubles with Peking. TI1ey realis successful trading must involve willingness to talk politic: Head Office: Seiko Watch-K. Hattori ~· & Co., ltd., Tokyo, Japan. turkey. Whether Peking is ready for any extensive easing c C:a""lce & Information Available From: Sciko Service Centers, Hong ' • • o ...4""' ' I • • ! t · tensions is somethin the visits of both delcoations shou· \'. • • nnd comm;Jndcr-in-chicf of the Vietnam have indc,,cl been studied iu time is no thrcots that preceded Peking's Korean 'I' ~ People's Army -· but tlwt he made them dliUbt the general's ques tion a$ his intervention over two decades ago. last Scptc!llber, nearly six months be cadres, pcasa1its, ancl foot soldiers And, in fa ct, it was not the sense of ' f·~. fore the current South Vietnamese thrash it out with the enemy in the great and imminent danger that propel- [ ~· move into "neutral" L:w~. jungles ancllilu untains of Laos. led Thant into launching a blistering r Giap was addrc s~ ing rcprcscnt:Jtivcs attack on Washington's Vietnam policy, { · from various armed services, militttry his first since the advent of the t~ixon ' institutes and schools, military zones adlllinist ration. and provinces -- and "rrum various bat· No; it was rather an interesting diplo tlcficlds". The context 111ad ~ it clc:rr IW LOUI S W\LASZ matic circumstance. At least as far as that th~ sc were South Vietnam, Cc:nlbo Nc1v York: \\'itlt th e exception of Sene Vietnam is concerned, nobody can dia :mel Laos. Two specific points lll::ck tary General U Th lllnlllllily l1 erc ~o t excited wrong, he has never made any secret of required. fir!'!, his annoum:cmcnt lkrt or apprehcnsi r<' over th e cxtcnsiun of his total. personal disapproval of two org:n1isations (the ~jflit a ry Science the lnclocli ill :! w:n into Laus. The rcnson Wa shington's motivations and actions in Organ and the Military Science Council) for th e curious indifference is the con Indochina. were to be si:JIJS IJ :,vc bc.:en going t:•kcn hin1 on a year ago, nt the time of l I I ordin::tc thci1 activilic~. These duties out of their way to 111ake sure every· the Cambodian incursion, had it not I reflect what Giap calls a nccu for "tu body J;nows wl1 .:! re tl1ey stand . Premier bee n for the Cambodians themselves. ' '- ~- i j giac", or sci f-consciousness , among But Cambod ian Ambassador Khim Tit I cadres in calfying out their responsibili told U Thant that Phnom Penh was l i ties. Read another way, Gi:,p's words in accord with the military move. Since indicntc the cadres a1e lackin;j 7eal in Cambodia, with or without Prince Si 'l facing tltc cncn1y's " s11pcriority in the hanouk, is an independent member state field of military numerical slrc1)gth and of the UN, Thant could not disregard technical equipment". Crilici:; m from that govemmcnt's views. Thus the state- the leadership has been directed at ment that he issued on that occasion cadres frequently in the last year - con tainccl a mild expression of concern particularly since the Cambodi. rna, Titan! did not name Hanoi as one of plished under so many ha nd icaps. This circumsLlncc was keenly noted the guilty parties, although his spokes General Giap would like to etch a by some of the n10re astute diplon1ats, man was instructed to say - if asked - place for Vietn:Jrn in the archives of re who felt that perhaps ~loscow's purpose that North Vietnam was meant to be volutionary wars and leadership in the w~s to let Washington know that the included. pre sent. "The present struggle ~o Laos opera I ion would not court any US S

FEBRUARY 20,1971 FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC R~VIEW / 3e •

···!

241 W.t ,12 · St.rMt New Yodtj N.Y. 10014 April 14, 1t71

Dear U Thant I ·. . ,. . " I W>nder if I IILight take a ~t to ~aiq a CfJMUOft with you about the poaa1b1Uty of some aid from the Secretariat In c:omection with a visit to the Peoplu' Republic of Odna which I would like to make thia COIIl1ng .June. I have been 1nvited by the Aus~alian Scd.ety ror Education 'l'hrough 1'he Arts to make a series of tal.ks in ~aajor q.ues of Australia c1ur1nq May, end during the second and third week in July wiU be' Q01ng to Hel8inlci to the aesaions of the International Peaee Academy 1 with probably e. week az;' so in the Soviet Union jwat beforehand. I believe that wore it poss1blo for me to viait anna during June X aight be able to accomplish aomething use:ful for the international intellectual conmuni ty.

What I l«Nld Uke to do in China 111 to ccnfer wJ. th their educaton end lntellectua.la about the ·progrus of the Chinue educational ~tern, and to establlsh 1nfor:mal or possibly formal relat1onahipa betwsen the Odnese un1Yer8ity people end the International Pea::e Academy 1 Un1verai ties And The Quest Por Peace and acme of our other non-goveo.rnmantal international programs deaigned to bring the Univerai ty intellec:tuala closer toqether. I would also Uko to exp~ the degree of interest on the part_oLthe ~QQ.,in .•.t.he- ..WorW J1.D1.Y§.I.tty ,idea. It seema to me that if it were possible to eatabllah some relationships of an 1nfox.l kind in this interim period tllile studies of the World University are undel:' way, we might be able to make some progress toward Chinese participation later on.

Bac:k in 1959 dur1nQ a vi.ait to Indoneaia, with the hlep of Roeslc Abclulgani I was cleared for a viaa by the Chinese, but unfort\R'lately tbe Un1tecl Jtatea government would. not allow the visit from our side. I· am now ready to help 1n any way I can by 9oing to China, eDd if thore i.e a parUc:ul.ar way in Wd.ch /(6 I abould proceed in order to make that visit possible I would appreciate k:nlnd.ng about lt. I am sorry to heve troubled you with a request of thia kind"'- I know how many other thlngs you have to do, :but I t:h1n1c the possible reaul.ta of ACh a trip m19}\t justify the inquiry.

Your• alncerely, fl~c ~d Taylor I ...... B.A., ..A. 1n pblloaophy, ~ftnity of '!or:onto, 1935/36. Jh.D• 1n phlloeophy, Un1 Yel:'aity ol LondoD, 1938. Jlelmel" of phil.oaophy departllent QUyeraity of Wisc:cuin, 1939-4.5. PJru1dent, Sarah LaMrtmee College, 1945-1959. ·-· ax IIDfttha tour ~ 19\lth Mia, 1959-60, Japan, Inclonena, au:ma, HoD; JC:aag, ~J.Dgapore, India, the Soviet Union to c::cnfer with intellectuals, writera, educatora, atudenta, artiats and othera on poaaihility of cooperation within the liiOC'ld intellectual c:oaanunJ.ty.

Aet1Yit1ea connec:~ with movement teward creating a world intellectual COIIIIIlUld. ty I Editor, the Idea of a World Univers,itx by Michael ZWeig. Director, p.t.lot project for a ~ld college, in coll~ation. with the ~oty of l'r1Mlda, 1963. . . . . Secretaey-Treasurer, Un1 veraities and· tb8 Olest P"or hace; helped organize the Worlcl Conf~ of that organization in 1'1enna in 1969. Conaultant and participant 1n wertc of International feace Academy; attendance at sessions of Academy in Vienna, SUIII1Ier of 1970, also ~ of 19711n Hels1nk1. Membu of Camd.ttee on a Vorld Unlvez:!Bity, World Academy of Art! land Science• .bbu' of Board of 1'ruateea, Institute for Interna~onal

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' .... . TAYLOR ···:

241 West 12 Street ·New York, N.Y. 10014 ..April 14, 1971 ACTI O N. T<[D.R~ .. tY..P RA~tn. ~ 2 ...... The Honorable u Thant 3 ...... Secretary-General' R 16197 r United Nations Hew York, N.Y. ..• Dear ·u Thant: .. I wonder if I might take a moment to raise a question witb .you _about the possibility of some aid from the Secretariat in connection with a visit to the Peoples' Republic of Olina which I would like to make this coming Jl.Ule. I have been invited by the Australian Sbciety Fo~ Education Through The Arts to make a series of -t:alks in major cities of Australia ,during May, and during the second and third week in July will be going to Helsinki to the sessions of the International Peace Academy, w1. th probably a week or so in the Soviet Union just beforehand. I believe that were it possible for me to visit China during June I might be able to accomplish something useful for the international intellectual conmunity. v What I would like to do in China is to confer with their educators and intellectuals about the progress of the Chinese educational system, and to establish informal or possibly formal relationships between the Chinese university people and the International Peace Academy, Universities And The Quest For Peace I· and some of our other non-governmental international programs designed to bring the University intellectuals closer together. I would also like to explore the degree of interest on the part of the Chinese in the World University idea. It seems to me that if it were possible to establish some relationships of an informal kind in this interim period while studies of the World University are under way, we might be able to make some progress toward Chinese participation later on.

Back 1n 1959 durin9 a visit to Indonesia, with the l:!).~p of Roeslan Abdulgani I was cleared for a visa by the Chinese, but unfortunately the United States government would not allow the visit from our side. I am now ready to' help in any way I can by going to Odna, and if there is a particular way in which I should proceed in order to make that visit possible I would appreciate knowing about it. I am sorry to have troubled you with a request of this kind when I know how many other things you have to do, but I think the possible results of auc:h a trip might justify the inquiry.

Yours sincerely, (~ Harold Taylor

Enc. · L . 1 ~ 5! . 75 l 71 7 *