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U.S. Department of Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice National Institute of Justice R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f Julie E. Samuels, Acting Director May 2000 Issues and Findings The Measurement of Integrity Discussed in this Brief: Research ex- ploring police officers’ understanding of By Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, William E. Harver, and Maria R. Haberfeld agency rules concerning police miscon- duct and the extent of their support for As the history of virtually every police individual approach, sometimes called these rules. The survey also considered agency attests, policing is an occupation the “bad apple” theory of police corrup- officers’ opinions about appropriate that is rife with opportunities for miscon- tion, has been subject to severe criticism punishment for misconduct, their famil- duct. Policing is a highly discretionary, in recent years. iarity with the expected disciplinary threat, their perceptions of disciplinary coercive activity that routinely takes place in private settings, out of the sight This Research in Brief summarizes a fairness, and their willingness to report study that measured police integrity in 30 misconduct. The results of this survey of supervisors, and in the presence of wit- police agencies across the . have important implications for re- nesses who are often regarded as unreli- searchers and policymakers, as well as able. —the of police The study was based on an organiza- for police practitioners. authority for gain—is one type of mis- tional/occupational approach to police conduct that has been particularly prob- corruption. Researchers asked officers Key issues: Until recently, most stud- lematic. The difficulties of controlling for their opinions about 11 hypothetical ies of were based cases of and measured on a traditional administrative ap- corruption can be traced to several fac- tors: the reluctance of police officers to how seriously officers regarded police proach—one that views the problem corruption, how willing they were to sup- of corruption primarily as a reflection report corrupt activities by their fellow of the moral defects of individual po- officers (also known as “The Code,” “The port its punishment, and how willing they lice officers. This research, however, is Code of Silence,” or “The Blue Curtain”), were to report it. The survey found sub- based on the organizational theory of the reluctance of police administrators to stantial differences in the environments police corruption, which emphasizes acknowledge the existence of corruption of integrity among the agencies studied. the importance of organizational and in their agencies, the benefits of the typi- The more serious the officers considered occupational culture. cal corrupt transaction to the parties in- a behavior to be, the more likely they were to believe that more severe disci- Researchers asked officers in 30 U.S. volved, and the lack of immediate victims pline was appropriate, and the more will- police agencies for their opinions about willing to report corruption. various hypothetical cases of police mis- ing they were to report a colleague for conduct, thereby avoiding the resis- Until recently, police administrators engaging in that behavior. tance that direct inquiries about corrupt viewed corruption primarily as a reflec- behavior would likely provoke. The sur- tion of the moral defects of individual Contemporary approaches vey measured how seriously officers re- police officers. They fought corruption to corruption garded police corruption, how willing by carefully screening applicants for po- 1 they were to report it, and how willing lice positions and aggressively pursuing Pioneered by Herman Goldstein, con- they were to support punishment. By morally defective officers in an temporary theories of police corruption analyzing officers’ responses to the sur- to remove them from their positions be- are based on four organizational and vey questions, researchers were able to fore their corrupt behavior had spread occupational dimensions. Each is rank the police agencies according to described below. their environments of integrity. The ca- through the agency. This administrative/ pacity to measure integrity in this way is especially significant for police adminis- trators, who, this research suggests, may be able to influence and cultivate continued… R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings Organizational rules. The first dimen- only among police agencies but also continued… sion concerns how the organizational within police agencies. Particularly in rules that govern corruption are estab- large police agencies, the occupational environments of integrity within their agencies. lished, communicated, and understood. In culture of integrity may differ substan- the United States, where police agencies tially among precincts, service areas, Key findings: Based on officers’ are highly decentralized, police organiza- task forces, and work groups. responses to questions relating to 11 tions differ markedly in the types of ac- hypothetical case scenarios involving tivities they officially prohibit as corrupt Public expectations. The fourth dimen- police officers engaged in a range of behavior. This is particularly true of mar- sion of police corruption that contemporary corrupt behavior, the following con- ginally corrupt or mala prohibita behav- police theory emphasizes is the influence clusions emerged: ior, such as off-duty and of the social, economic, and political envi- ronments in which police institutions, sys- ● In assessing the 11 cases of po- acceptance of favors, small , free lice misconduct, officers considered meals, and discounts. Further complicat- tems, and agencies operate. For example, some types to be significantly less ing the problem, the official of some in the United States serious than others. many agencies formally prohibits such have long, virtually uninterrupted tradi- activities while their unofficial policy, tions of police corruption. Other jurisdic- ● The more serious the officers supported firmly but silently by supervi- tions have equally long traditions of perceived a behavior to be, the minimal corruption, while still others have more likely they were to think that sors and administrators, is to permit and experienced repeated cycles of scandal more severe discipline was appro- ignore such behavior so long as it is lim- priate, and the more willing they ited in scope and conducted discreetly. and reform. Such histories indicate that were to report a colleague who public expectations about police integrity had engaged in such behavior. Prevention and control mechanisms. exert vastly different pressures on police The second dimension of corruption em- agencies in different jurisdictions. These ● Police officers’ evaluations of the phasized in contemporary approaches is experiences also suggest that public pres- appropriate and expected discipline the wide range of mechanisms that police sures to confront and combat corruption for various types of misconduct were agencies employ to prevent and control may be successfully resisted. very similar; the majority of police corruption. Examples include education officers regarded the expected disci- pline as fair. in ethics, proactive and reactive investi- Methodological challenges to gation of corruption, integrity testing, and the study of police corruption ● A majority of police officers said corruption deterrence through the disci- that they would not report a fellow pline of offenders. The extent to which Although many theories can be applied to officer who had engaged in what agencies use such organizational anticor- the study of police corruption, the contem- they regarded as less serious mis- ruption techniques varies greatly. porary organizational/occupational culture conduct (for example, operating an theory has an important advantage over the off-duty security business; accepting The Code. The third dimension of cor- traditional administrative/individual bad- free gifts, meals, and discounts; or ruption, inherent in the occupational cul- apple theory: The organizational/occupa- having a minor accident while driv- ture of policing, is The Code or The Blue tional approach is much more amenable ing under the influence of alcohol. Curtain that informally prohibits or dis- to systematic, quantitative research. ● At the same time, most police courages police officers from reporting the officers indicated that they would misconduct of their colleagues. The pa- Corruption is extremely difficult to study report a colleague who stole from rameters of The Code—precisely what be- in a direct, quantitative, and empirical a found wallet or a burglary scene, havior it covers and to whom its benefits manner. Because most incidents of cor- accepted a bribe or , or are extended—vary among police agen- ruption are never reported or recorded, used excessive force on a car thief cies. For example, The Code may apply to official data on corruption are best re- after a foot pursuit. only low-level corruption in some agen- garded as measures of a police agency’s anticorruption activity, not the actual ● The survey found substantial differ- cies and to the most serious corruption in ences in the environment of integrity others. Furthermore, whom and what The level of corruption. Even with assurances among the 30 agencies in the sample. Code covers can vary substantially not of confidentiality, police officers are un-

Target audience: researchers and policymakers, legis- lators, police administrators, police officers, and educators. 2 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f likely to be willing to report their own seriously officers regard misconduct, responses to the survey questions or another officer’s corrupt activities. how amenable they are to supporting suggests that all six integrity-related punishment, and how willing they are questions measured the same phe- Unlike the administrative/individual to tolerate misconduct in silence. nomenon—the degree of police intol- approach, an organizational/occupa- erance for corrupt behavior. tional culture approach to the study of In an effort to measure the occupational police integrity involves questions of culture of police integrity, a systematic, Offense seriousness. The 11 case fact and opinion that can be explored standardized, and quantitative survey scenarios fall into 3 categories of per- directly, without arousing the resis- questionnaire was designed and pre- ceived seriousness. Four cases were tance that direct inquiries about cor- tested. The survey sought information not considered very serious by police rupt behavior are likely to provoke. in key areas that constitute the founda- respondents: Case 1, off-duty opera- Using this approach, it is possible to tion of an occupational/organizational tion of a security system business; ask nonthreatening questions about culture theory of police integrity. At the Case 2, receipt of free meals; Case 4, officers’ knowledge of agency rules and same time, the survey responses could receipt of holiday gifts; and Case 8, their opinions about the seriousness of be used to satisfy certain basic informa- coverup of a police accident that in- particular violations, the punishment tional needs of practical police admin- volved driving under the influence of that such violations would or istration. The survey attempted to alcohol (DUI). The majority of police actually receive, and their estimates of answer the following questions: respondents, in fact, reported that the how willing officers would be to report operation of an off-duty security sys- ● Do officers in this agency know the such misconduct. rules governing police misconduct? tem business (Case 1) was not a viola- tion of agency policy. Respondents Moreover, sharply different goals and ● How strongly do they support those considered four other cases of miscon- visions of police integrity characterize rules? duct to be at an intermediate level of these two approaches to understanding ● Do officers know what disciplinary seriousness: Case 10, the use of exces- corruption. The administrative/indi- sive force on a car thief following a vidual theory of corruption envisions threat they face if they violate those rules? foot pursuit; Case 7, a supervisor who the police agency of integrity as one offers a subordinate time off during from which all morally defective indi- ● Do they think the discipline is fair? holidays in exchange for tuning up his vidual officers have been removed and ● How willing are they to report personal car; Case 9, acceptance of in which vigilance is maintained to pre- misconduct? free drinks in exchange for ignoring vent their entry or emergence. By con- a late closing; and Case 6, receipt trast, the organizational/occupational For a more detailed description of the of a kickback. Respondents regarded culture theory envisions the police survey methodology and samples, see the remaining three cases—those that agency of integrity as one whose culture Survey Design and Methodology. The involved stealing from a found wallet is highly intolerant of corruption. actions taken to enhance the legitimacy (Case 11), accepting a bribe of the survey results are discussed in Methodologically, the consequences of (Case 3), and stealing a watch at a Validity of Survey Responses. these two visions are critical. For ex- scene (Case 5)—as very serious ample, although it may be possible to offenses. Survey results use an administrative/individual ap- Discipline. In general, police officers proach to measure the level of corrupt The results of the survey, reported in thought that the four cases they re- behavior, the number of morally defec- exhibit 1, show that the more serious garded as not very serious warranted tive police officers, and an agency’s a particular behavior was considered little or no discipline. Officers thought vigilance in discovering misconduct, by police officers, the more severely that the four cases involving an inter- the obstacles to doing so are enormous. they thought it should and would be mediate level of seriousness merited a Using an organizational/occupational punished, and the more willing they written reprimand or a period of sus- culture approach, by contrast, modern were to report it. The extraordinarily pension, and that the three very seri- social science can easily measure how high rank-order correlation among the ous cases merited dismissal.

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Survey Design and Methodology C ase scenarios. The survey ques- (see exhibit B). Six of these questions were de- ● Two related to severity of discipline— tionnaire presented officers with 11 hy- signed to assess the normative inclination of one addressed the discipline the respon- pothetical case scenarios. Displayed in police to resist temptations to abuse the dent felt the behavior should receive exhibit A, the scenarios cover a range of rights and privileges of their occupation. To and the other addressed the discipline activities, from those that merely give an measure this dimension of police integrity, the the officer felt it would receive. appearance of (Case 1) six questions were paired as follows: to incidents of (Case 3) and ● Two concerned willingness to report (Cases 5 and 11). One scenario (Case 10) ● Two questions pertained to the serious- the misconduct—one addressed the described the use of excessive force on a ness of each case—one addressed the respondent’s own willingness to car thief. respondent’s own view and the other report it, and the other concerned concerned the respondent’s perception the respondent’s perception of other Respondents were asked to evaluate each of the views of other officers. officers’ willingness to report it. scenario by answering seven questions The remaining question asked respon- dents whether the behavior described Exhibit A. Case scenarios in the scenario was a violation of the agency’s official policy. Case 1. A runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours. The incidents described in the scenarios Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value were not only plausible and common from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. forms of police misconduct, but ones that were uncomplicated by details that might Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. introduce ambiguity into either the inter- pretation of the behavior or the motive Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of the officer depicted in the scenario. of food and liquor. Some scenarios were based on published Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed, studies that had employed a case scenario and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes approach.a Others drew on the experience a watch, worth about 2 days’ pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been of the authors. Respondents were asked stolen during the burglary. to assume that the officer depicted in each Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the scenario had been a police officer for 5 owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner. years and had a satisfactory work record Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work with no history of disciplinary problems. during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune up his supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior. Survey sample. The sample consisted of Case 8. At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted 3,235 officers from 30 U.S. police agen- road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He cies. Although these agencies were drawn approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxi- from across the Nation and the sample cated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home. was quite large, it was nonetheless a con- venience sample, not a representative Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to sample. The characteristics of the officers accept a couple of free drinks from the owner. in this sample are summarized in exhibit C. Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an The majority of the police officers surveyed automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending were employed in patrol or traffic units him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both (63.1 percent). The overwhelming majority officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. of respondents were line officers; only one of five police officers was a supervisor. Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to a full day’s pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost The mean length of service for the entire but keeps the money for himself. sample was 10.3 years.

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The sample has some , including Exhibit B. Case scenario assessment options overrepresentation of particular types of police agencies and particular regions of 1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be? the country. Because it includes no Not at all serious Very serious police agencies, only one ’s agency, 12345 and only one police agency, the 2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be? sample overrepresents municipal police Not at all serious Very serious agencies. The sample also overrepresents 12345 police agencies from the Northeast. Al- 3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency? though the sample does include agencies Definitely not Definitely yes from the South, Southeast, and Southwest, 12345 it does not include agencies from the West, Northwest, or Midwest. 4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow? The sample likely has another because 1. NONE 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY not all agencies that were asked to partici- 2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK 3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL pate in the study accepted the invitation. The reason for an agency’s refusal to par- 5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if ticipate could include a fear of revealing any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow? something untoward. Agencies declined 1. NONE 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY to participate despite assurances that their 2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK participation in the survey would be kept 3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL confidential; that all individual respondents 6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior? would remain anonymous; and that re- Definitely not Definitely yes spondents would be asked about only 12345 their opinions, not any actual misconduct. 7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior? Nevertheless, the sample includes some Definitely not Definitely yes seriously troubled police agencies. Key 12345 contacts in a number of such agencies, including senior officers and high-ranking union officials, exercised sufficient influ- ence to arrange the participation of these agencies in the survey. Exhibit C. Characteristics of the police agency sample a. A number of studies of police corruption Mean have employed a research strategy that asked Agency Size Percentage Percentage Length of police officers to evaluate hypothetical corrup- (number of of National Sample Supervisory Patrol/ Service tion scenarios. These include Fishman, Janet sworn officers) Sample Size Percentage Traffic (in years) E., Measuring Police Corruption, New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1978; Very Large (500+) 59.9 1,937 14.8 64.2 9.18 Martin, Christine, Illinois Municipal Officers’ Perceptions of Police Ethics, : Illinois Large (201–500) 19.7 638 23.2 60.3 12.05 Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1994; Huon, Gail F., Beryl L. Hesketh, Mark G. Frank, Medium (76–200) 9.0 292 29.9 59.0 12.29 Kevin M. McConkey, and G.M. McGrath, Per- Small (25–75) 8.5 275 30.8 66.1 11.70 ceptions of Ethical Dilemmas, Payneham, Aus- tralia: Research Unit, 1995; Very Small (<25) 2.9 93 35.9 64.8 11.29 and Miller, Larry S., and Michael C. Braswell, “Police Perceptions of Ethical Decision- Total/Average 100.0 3,235 19.8 63.1 10.30 Making: The vs. The Real,” American Journal of Police 27 (1992): 27–45.

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Validity of Survey Responses T he validity of the survey’s results service, would make it possible to identify supervisors. Some officers, for example, hinges on the honesty of police officers them. might have been inclined to report that when responding to the survey questions. certain types of misconduct were more In addition, at the end of the survey, Several steps were taken to enhance the serious than they actually thought them each police respondent was asked two legitimacy of the survey results. First, offic- to be. At the same time, however, these questions about the validity of the re- ers were asked only about their attitudes, officers would be unlikely to report that sponses. The first was “Do you think not about their actual behavior or the ac- misconduct should be punished more most police officers would give their tual behavior of other police officers. They severely than they thought appropriate honest opinion in filling out this ques- also were assured that their responses because of the possibility that they might tionnaire?” The second was “Did you?” would remain confidential, although po- one day be subject to such discipline, if In answer to the first question, 84.4 per- lice respondents are naturally suspicious of administrators believed that they were cent of police respondents reported that such promises. recommending it. they thought most officers would an- To further allay officers’ fears that their swer the questions honestly, and 97.8 Furthermore, if any substantial manipula- identities might be discovered, they were percent reported that they themselves tion of answers had occurred, it would asked only minimal background questions: had done so. The responses of the 2.2 have been evident in differences in corre- their rank, length of service, and assign- percent of police officers who reported lation coefficients among the questions ment and whether they held a supervisory that they had not answered the ques- about seriousness, discipline, and willing- position. They were not asked standard tions honestly were discarded when the ness to report. In fact, the rank order questions about age, race, gender, or survey results were analyzed. correlation between all six questions is ethnicity in an effort to assuage fears that The survey questions also were designed extraordinarily high. Indeed, one could disclosing such information, in combination to minimize any temptation for officers to predict with great accuracy the ranking of with their rank, assignment, and length of manipulate responses to create a favor- a scenario on any one of the six questions able impression on the public or on their by knowing the ranking for any other.

To measure how officers perceived four cases, including three that offic- they would report3 a fellow police of- the fairness of discipline, the scores ers considered not serious—Case 2 ficer who had engaged in behavior they on the “discipline would receive” (accepting free meals and discounts deemed to be at an intermediate or high scale were subtracted from the scores on the beat), Case 4 (accepting holi- level of seriousness. on the “discipline should receive” day gifts), Case 8 (coverup of police scale. A difference of zero was inter- DUI), and Case 10 (excessive force on Agency contrasts in the preted to mean that the respondent car thief)—more than 20 percent of culture of integrity thought the discipline was fair. If the police officers believed that the disci- difference was greater than zero pline administered by their agencies Measurements of the inclination of U.S. (positive), the respondent thought that would be too harsh. police to resist temptations to abuse the the discipline was too lenient. Con- rights and privileges of their occupation versely, if the difference was less Parameters of The Code. An exami- are likely to prove useful for academic, than zero (negative), the respondent nation of the parameters of The Code of historical, and cross- of 4 thought that the discipline was too Silence, as revealed in the responses of police. For police administrators, how- harsh.2 In 7 of the 11 cases, the over- police officers in the sample, indicated ever, measurements of the culture of in- whelming majority of police officers that the majority would not report a po- tegrity of individual police agencies are in the sample thought that the disci- lice colleague who had engaged in be- more relevant than national averages, pline that would be imposed was in havior described in the four scenarios which often mask significant differ- the “fair” range. But in the remaining considered the least serious. At the ences among agencies. same time, a majority indicated that

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Exhibit 1. Police officers’ perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline, and willingness to report, ranked by officers’ perceptions of case seriousness* Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers Case Scenario Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Mode Score Rank Mode Score Rank Score Rank Case 1. Off-Duty Security System Business 1.46 1 1.48 1 1.34 1 None 1.51 1 None 1.37 1 1.46 1 Case 2. Free Meals, Verbal Verbal Discounts on Beat 2.60 2 2.31 2 2.13 2 reprimand 2.37 2 reprimand 1.94 2 1.82 2 Case 4. Holiday Gifts Verbal Written From Merchants 2.84 3 2.64 3 2.53 3 reprimand 2.82 3 reprimand 2.36 4 2.28 3.5 Case 8. Coverup of Suspend Suspend Police DUI Accident 3.03 4 2.86 4 2.81 4 without pay 3.21 4 without pay 2.34 3 2.28 3.5 Case 10. Excessive Suspend Suspend Force on Car Thief 4.05 5 3.70 5 3.76 6 without pay 4.00 6 without pay 3.39 5 3.07 5 Case 7. Supervisor: Written Written Holiday for Tuneup 4.18 6 3.96 6 3.59 5 reprimand 3.43 5 reprimand 3.45 6 3.29 6 Case 6. Auto Repair Suspend Suspend Shop 5% Kickback 4.50 7 4.26 7 4.40 8 without pay 4.46 8 without pay 3.95 8 3.71 8 Case 9. Drinks to Suspend Suspend Ignore Late Bar Closing 4.54 8 4.28 8 4.02 7 without pay 4.08 7 without pay 3.73 7 3.47 7 Case 11. Theft From Found Wallet 4.85 9 4.69 9 5.09 10 Dismissal 5.03 10 Dismissal 4.23 10 3.96 10 Case 3. Bribe From Speeding Motorist 4.92 10 4.81 10 4.92 9 Dismissal 4.86 9 Dismissal 4.19 9 3.92 9 Case 5. Crime Scene Theft of Watch 4.95 11 4.88 11 5.66 11 Dismissal 5.57 11 Dismissal 4.54 11 4.34 11 * Scores are based on officers’ responses to the integrity-related survey questions.

To uncover these differences and allow of agencies on all 11 cases) to 33 (if it ronments of integrity differ across U.S. comparisons to be made, a system was ranked among the highest third of agen- police agencies, it is useful to contrast devised for ranking the responses of cies on all 11 cases).5 the responses of officers from two of officers in each agency. To determine the agencies in the sample. Agency 2, an agency’s overall ranking on how its These summary scores formed the ba- which ranked 8th in integrity of the officers perceived the seriousness of a sis for placing agencies in rank order 30 agencies surveyed, and Agency 23, particular offense, the mean score of all from 1 to 30 (with 1 being the highest which ranked in a 5-way tie for 24th responses by officers in that agency to integrity rating), making it possible to place, are both large municipal police each of the 11 case scenarios was com- say that an agency ranked “n out of agencies. Agency 2 has a national repu- pared to the mean scores of the remain- 30” in its officers’ perceptions of of- tation for integrity, is extremely recep- ing 29 agencies. The agency was then fense seriousness. This procedure was tive to research, and is often promoted awarded 3 points if its mean score used to calculate a summary score and as a model of innovation. Agency 23 placed it among the top 10 agencies on an integrity ranking for each agency’s has a long history of scandal, and its any question, 2 points if it scored in responses to each of the six questions reputation as an agency with corruption the middle 10, and 1 point if it scored about offense seriousness, discipline problems persists despite numerous re- among the lowest 10. These scores were that should and would be received, form efforts. Although a local newspa- then totaled for all 11 case scenarios. and willingness to report the offense. per once dubbed Agency 23 “the most Using this scaling system, an agency’s Exhibit 2 summarizes those rankings. corrupt police department in the coun- score on its officers’ perceptions of the The environment of integrity in try,” six other agencies in the sample seriousness of the offenses could range two agencies. To illustrate how envi- appear to have integrity environments from 11 (if it ranked in the lowest third that are as poor or worse.

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In both agencies, the correlation of the Exhibit 2. Composite scores on seriousness of offense, discipline, and scores’ rank ordering among the catego- willingness to report, rank-ordered by agency ries was very high, as it was for all 30 agencies surveyed. For every agency, Other Other Summary Own Officers’ Discipline Discipline Own Officers’ Score/ the mean rank order of officers’ re- Agency Opinion of Opinions of Should Would Willingness Willingness Integrity sponses to the six integrity-related Number Seriousness Seriousness Receive Receive to Report to Report Ranking questions was nearly identical. Further- 1 33333 318/1 more, the rank ordering of the scenarios 3 33333 318/1 differed little among the agencies. 4 33333 318/1 6 33333 318/1 Although differences in the rank or- 10 33333 318/1 dering of the scenarios were minimal, both within and between the two agen- 17 33333 318/1 cies, discrepancies in the agencies’ 30 33333 318/1 absolute scores reflected significant 2 32333 317/8 differences (see exhibits 3 and 4). 18 22333 316/9 Estimates of offense seriousness were 7 32223 315/10 consistently higher for Agency 2 than 11 33222 214/11 for Agency 23. The differences were 12 33312 214/11 especially large (between 0.5 and 1.0 5 22232 213/13 on a 5-point scale) for three scenarios: 19 32222 213/13 Case 6 (auto repair shop kickback), 20 32222 213/13 Case 9 (drinks to ignore late bar clos- 29 23212 212/16 ing), and Case 10 (excessive force on 26 32221 111/17 car thief). Police officers from Agency 27 22212 211/17 2 evaluated each of these cases as 24 22112 210/19 substantially more serious than did 21 11231 19/20 officers from Agency 23. 22 11221 29/20 The mean scores for discipline indicate 9 21211 18/22 that, in almost every case, police offic- 16 11112 28/22 ers in Agency 2 not only expected 13 12111 17/24 more severe discipline than did officers 14 11121 17/24 in Agency 23, but they also thought 15 11112 17/24 that more severe discipline was appro- 23 11121 17/24 priate. The differences in perceptions 25 11121 17/24 of discipline were especially great for 8 11111 16/29 the most serious types of corruption, 28 11111 16/29 such as the scenarios described in Case 3 (bribe from speeding motorist), Case 5 (crime scene theft of watch), The most systematic and dramatic dif- they and their colleagues would report and Case 11 (theft from found wallet), ference between Agencies 2 and 23, the behavior described in the seven as well as for Case 10 (use of excessive however, is evident in their attitudes other cases. In Agency 23, however, force). While officers in Agency 2 toward The Code of Silence. In both there was no case that the majority of thought that dismissal would result agencies, few officers said that they or officers indicated they would report. In from the four most serious cases, offic- their police colleagues would report sum, while The Code is under control ers in Agency 23 expected that dis- any of the least serious types of cor- in Agency 2, it remains a powerful in- missal would follow only one scenario, rupt behavior (Cases 1, 2, 4, and 8). fluence in Agency 23, providing an Case 5 (theft from a crime scene). Officers from Agency 2 reported that environment in which corrupt behavior can flourish.

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Exhibit 3. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers’ own perceptions of seriousness of misconduct, discipline warranted, and willingness to report offense

Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 23 (A23) Agency 23 (A23) Agency 23 (A23) Perception of Seriousness Discipline Should Receive Willingness To Report Case Scenario A2 A23 Difference t A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test Case 1. Off-Duty Security -2.82 -3.60 -4.78 System Business 1.57 1.36 0.21 p<.05 1.47 1.24 0.23 p<.001 1.57 1.22 0.35 p<.001 Case 2. Free Meals, -1.80 -2.48 -6.67 Discounts on Beat 3.04 2.85 0.19 p<.01 2.50 2.31 0.19 p<.01 2.42 1.75 0.67 p<.001 Case 3. Bribe From -3.72 -6.28 -16.09 Speeding Motorist 4.94 4.78 0.16 p<.001 5.02 4.44 0.58 p<.001 4.67 3.02 1.65 p<.001 Case 4. Holiday Gifts -2.47 -1.35 -6.24 From Merchants 3.07 2.79 0.28 p<.01 2.73 2.59 0.14 NS* 2.74 2.05 0.69 p<.001 Case 5. Crime Scene -4.21 -12.64 -15.97 Theft of Watch 4.97 4.79 0.18 p<.001 5.85 4.90 0.95 p<.001 4.92 3.36 1.56 p<.001 Case 6. Auto Repair -6.74 -6.47 -15.63 Shop 5% Kickback 4.58 4.02 0.56 p<.001 4.41 3.74 0.67 p<.001 4.38 2.71 1.67 p<.001 Case 7. Supervisor: -1.24 -0.72 -8.68 Holiday for Tuneup 4.16 4.05 0.11 NS* 3.58 3.51 0.07 NS* 3.68 2.66 1.02 p<.001 Case 8. Coverup of -4.32 -2.69 -5.66 Police DUI Accident 3.16 2.68 0.48 p<.001 2.85 2.57 0.28 p<.05 2.67 2.03 0.64 p<.001 Case 9. Drinks to Ignore -9.96 -10.45 -16.02 Late Bar Closing 4.68 3.77 0.91 p<.001 4.10 3.17 0.93 p<.001 4.21 2.48 1.73 p<.001 Case 10. Excessive -10.12 -8.30 -13.42 Force on Car Thief 4.45 3.49 0.96 p<.001 3.97 3.15 0.82 p<.001 4.02 2.53 1.49 p<.001 Case 11. Theft From -6.85 -14.17 -17.41 Found Wallet 4.94 4.55 0.39 p<.001 5.42 4.13 1.29 p<.001 4.74 2.95 1.79 p<.001 * Not significant.

Conclusions and implications differences in the environments of makes, administrators have a clear integrity in U.S. police agencies. responsibility to communicate this Redefining the problem of police cor- information to officers. If officers do ruption (i.e., the abuse of police author- The ability to measure environments of not regard certain misconduct as suffi- ity for gain) as a problem of police integrity in police agencies holds great ciently serious, if they regard discipline integrity—the normative inclination potential for academic studies of po- as too severe or too lenient, or if they among police to resist temptations to lice and for practical police adminis- are willing to tolerate the misconduct abuse their authority—enables the di- tration. For researchers, quantitative of their police peers in silence, admin- rect measurement of the proposi- cross-cultural, historical, and national istrators have an obvious obligation to tions of an organizational/occupational comparisons that were previously un- find out why. A police administrator theory of police integrity. The research thinkable have now become feasible. can take specific actions to deal with reported in this Research in Brief dem- each of these problems. onstrates that police attitudes toward Equally important, such measurements the seriousness of misconduct, the dis- have direct implications for practical The survey instrument used in this cipline that should and would result, police administration because each of study was designed to assess only one and the willingness of officers to toler- the propositions of an organizational/ aspect of police integrity. In all case ate misconduct in silence can be mea- occupational theory of integrity im- scenarios but one—the use of exces- sured. Moreover, the measurements plies a specific administrative re- sive force—the misconduct described reported in this national sample are sponse. If officers do not know whether was motivated by personal gain. In relatively easy to collect. At the same certain conduct violates agency policy discussing environments of integrity, time, they demonstrate substantial or what disciplinary threats the agency

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Exhibit 4. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers’ perceptions of how most police would assess offense seriousness, discipline that offense would receive, and whether most police would be willing to report offense

Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 23 (A23) Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 23 (A23) How Most Police Agency 23 (A23) Whether Most Police Regard Seriousness Discipline Would Receive Would Be Willing To Report Case Scenario A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test A2 A23 Difference t test Case 1. Off-Duty Security -1.61 -5.08 -3.12 System Business 1.52 1.31 0.21 NS* 1.70 1.33 0.37 p<.001 1.52 1.31 0.21 p<.05 Case 2. Free Meals, 0.41 -3.27 -3.83 Discounts on Beat 2.53 2.57 -0.04 NS* 2.77 2.51 0.26 p<.05 2.07 1.74 0.33 p<.001 Case 3. Bribe From -4.25 -5.06 -13.89 Speeding Motorist 4.82 4.60 0.22 p<.001 4.90 4.45 0.45 p<.001 4.23 2.90 1.33 p<.001 Case 4. Holiday Gifts -1.10 -1.94 -4.65 From Merchants 2.73 2.61 0.12 NS* 3.07 2.88 0.19 p<.01 2.49 2.03 0.46 p<.001 Case 5. Crime Scene -6.16 -10.33 -14.99 Theft of Watch 4.93 4.62 0.31 p<.001 5.73 4.93 0.80 p<.001 4.63 3.25 1.38 p<.001 Case 6. Auto Repair -6.28 -5.35 -12.51 Shop 5% Kickback 4.31 3.75 0.56 p<.001 4.45 3.91 0.54 p<.001 3.92 2.64 1.28 p<.001 Case 7. Supervisor: 0.04 2.78 -6.80 Holiday for Tuneup 3.85 3.85 0 NS* 3.24 3.52 -0.28 p<.05 3.34 2.60 0.74 p<.001 Case 8. Coverup of -2.61 -4.92 -4.55 Police DUI Accident 2.80 2.54 0.26 p<.05 3.33 2.83 0.50 p<.001 2.40 1.95 0.45 p<.001 Case 9. Drinks to Ignore -9.13 -8.92 -13.89 Late Bar Closing 4.32 3.44 0.88 p<.001 4.11 3.29 0.82 p<.001 3.79 2.35 1.44 p<.001 Case 10. Excessive Force -8.00 -6.86 -9.98 on Car Thief 4.01 3.22 0.79 p<.001 4.11 3.46 0.65 p<.001 3.44 2.38 1.06 p<.001 Case 11. Theft From -8.53 -10.79 -16.20 Found Wallet 4.83 4.24 0.59 p<.001 5.24 4.25 0.99 p<.001 4.38 2.74 1.64 p<.001 * Not significant. therefore, this survey makes no obser- vide any of abusive or dishon- and Manning, Peter K., and Lawrence vation about of discretion in ar- est practices—past, present, or future. Redlinger, “The Invitational Edges of Police rests, order maintenance, discourtesy The survey findings do describe, in a Corruption,” in Thinking About Police, edited by Carl Klockars and Stephen Mastrofski, to citizens, or other police misconduct fairly precise way, the characteristics of New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993: 398–412. not usually motivated by temptations a police agency’s culture that encour- of gain. A second generation of this age its employees to resist or tolerate 2. Note that the notions of “greater than zero survey will explore those problems.6 certain types of misconduct. (positive)” and “less than zero (negative)” are merely shorthand for discipline perceived as too lenient and too harsh, respectively. In other A final note Notes words, because the data are ordinal, positive or negative differences will not be used in any al- This survey does not measure the ex- 1. Goldstein, Herman, Police Corruption: Per- gebraic context. Rather, these differences will tent of corruption in any police agency spective on Its Nature and Control, Washington, be used solely as indicators to classify respon- DC: , 1975; and Goldstein, or institution. Rather, it measures the dents into three groups—those who perceive H., Policing a Free Society, Cambridge, MA: discipline to be fair, too lenient, or too harsh. culture of police integrity—the norma- Ballinger, 1977. See also Sherman, Lawrence tive inclination of police officers to re- W., Scandal and Reform, Berkeley: University 3. The frequency distribution of responses to sist the temptations to abuse the rights of California Press, 1978; Marx, Gary, Surveil- the question about officers’ own willingness to and privileges of their office. The sur- lance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University report a particular offense was analyzed. The Press, 1991; Punch, Maurice, Conduct Unbe- five-point scale of offered answers ranged from vey does not identify either corrupt or coming: The Social Construction of Police Devi- 1=“definitely not” to 5=“definitely yes.” A cu- honest police officers; nor does it pro- ance and Control, : Tavistock, 1986; mulative frequency above 50 percent for 1 and

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2 was interpreted to indicate that police offic- 5. An alternative summary ranking system this research intentionally seeks to blunt any ers would not report the offense. A cumulative could, of course, be based on the full range of false sense of precision by allowing agencies frequency above 50 percent for 4 and 5, on the 30-point rankings for each of the 11 scenarios. to score, in a sense, only “high,” “middle,” or other hand, was interpreted to indicate that the This type of system would create a scale that “low” on any given question. police officers would report the offense. could range from 330 (for an agency that scored the lowest of the 30 agencies on all 6 questions 6. A summary of the of progress with this 4. See, for example, Haberfeld, Maria, Carl for all 11 scenarios) to 1,980 (for an agency next generation of measures of police integrity Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, and Milan that scored the highest of all 30 agencies on all can be found on the videotape of the Research Pagon, “Disciplinary Consequences of Police 6 questions for all 11 scenarios). Such a scor- in Progress seminar “Measuring Police Integ- Corruption in Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and ing system would, however, magnify small and rity,” presented by Carl Klockars at the Na- the United States,” Police Practice and Re- primarily meaningless differences in mean tional Institute of Justice in January 1999. search, An International Journal 1 (1) (2000): scores, creating a false sense of precision. The Copies are available through the National 41–72. ranking system developed for and employed in Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800– 851–3420. Please refer to NCJ 174459.

Carl B. Klockars, Ph.D., is professor The study reported in this Research Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do in the Department of Sociology and in Brief was supported by the Office not necessarily reflect the official position or Criminal Justice at the University of of Community Oriented Policing of the U.S. Department of Justice. Delaware. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Services and NIJ through NIJ grant Ph.D., is a doctoral student at number 95–IJ–CX–0058. The National Institute of Justice is a Harvard School. William E. component of the Office of Justice Harver, Ph.D., is assistant professor Police administrators interested in Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice of social science in the College of applying the approach used in this study to measure the environment of Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Arts and Sciences at Widener Uni- Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for versity. Maria R. Haberfeld, Ph.D., integrity in their own agencies are Victims of Crime. is assistant professor in the Depart- advised to contact Professor Carl B. ment of Law, Police Science, and Klockars, Principal Investigator, This and other NIJ publications can be Criminal Justice Administration at Enhancing Police Integrity Project, found at and downloaded from the NIJ the John Jay College of Criminal Criminal Justice, University of Web site (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij). Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Justice, University of New York. NCJ 181465

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