The State of Environmental Migration 2011
HURRICANE SANDY IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY: EVACUATION, DISPLACEMENT AND ADAPTATION FANNIE DELAVELLE
INTRODUCTION for future projects, particularly the option of relo- cation as an adaptation strategy (Part III). “Maybe things like this happen in New Orleans, places like that. But never here, not in a million years.” 1. HURRICANE SANDY AND NEW V. Baccale, YORK’S VULNERABILITIES Vinny Baccale’s family had lived on Staten Island for generations, starting with a small holiday .. Hurricane sandy, a record bungalow to building a permanent home on the breaker seaside. This area was hit particularly hard by the storm. Like thousands of New Yorkers, Baccale, his Hurricane Sandy was a record breaker in many wife and two small kids were forced to evacuate ways. On October , its central pressure when their seaside home was partially destroyed reached millibars, the lowest-measured by the storm. Despite their strong roots in the area, barometric level for an Atlantic hurricane. It also they are now considering relocating to a safer caused a record surge of water for New York City, neighbourhood (J. Rudolf, ). with a water level of . meters at Battery Park on Hurricane Sandy was a shock for many New October th (Drye, ). Furthermore, Sandy Yorkers who had to admit their vulnerability to was much wider than previous storms, with hurri- environmental disasters. Vinny Baccale’s remark cane-force winds spreading over a diameter of underscores the persisting perception in many hundred kilometres around its eye. developed countries that such disasters only hap- In the afternoon of October th, Sandy brought pen in other places, to other people. Hurricane strong winds and rains from Washington D.C. Sandy, as Hurricane Katrina before it, reversed northward. It was downgraded to the post-tropical this idea, showing that developed and relatively cyclone category before it hit Southern New Jersey wealthy metropolises like New York City are at around p.m. EDT, near Atlantic City, with winds risk, and that environmental displacement is a of km/h (Sharp, ). Sandy moved its way concern for all countries, no matter their level of up to New York, where its surges topped seawalls development. at the Battery and flooded Lower Manhattan. The This paper begins by analysing the characteris- storm’s massive size caused flooding, rain and tics of the storm itself, and by evaluating New York high winds to continue affecting New York and City’s vulnerabilities to environmental disasters New Jersey throughout the night. On October th, (Part I). It then assesses the evacuation process as Sandy had left New York, although its tail-end was well as the forced displacements, with an empha- still causing considerable damage on the North- sis on the authorities’ management of the crisis east. The storm started to weaken in the afternoon both in the short and middle term. A special sec- of October th and dissipated on October st over tion is dedicated to the impact of the storm on the Pennsylvania. Sandy caused the death of peo- elderly and on low-income persons (Part II). Fi- ple in the United States, including in New York nally, the report addresses the issue of New York’s City (Drye, ). adaptation to environmental disasters, evaluating The most destructive characteristic of the hur- previous efforts and putting forward proposals ricane was the storm surge, that affected parts of
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Map 1. Sandy’s track: September 9-17, 2012.
Source: Wunderground (2012) the Northeast, which is home to per cent of the to natural and man-made forces like erosion that US population (Murphy, ). A combination of reduce the amount of offshore sand. By , several factors magnified the damaging effects of experts have predicted, through the approach of the floods. the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, that the sea level will rise in the New York area .. Short and long term by - cm in the best case scenario and .-. exacerbating factors: the full meter in a rapid-ice-melt scenario (Khan, ). moon and sea level rise Although the range of these projections remains very broad, they point out that hurricane of the First, Sandy made landfall during the full moon, same strength will provoke more intense damage while the tide was per cent higher than usual as the surges are worsened by the higher baseline (by about cm) (Khan, ). Although the sea level (Avent, ). initial waves were not as high as in previous storms, the high tide caused the water levels .. The New York Bight to flow over sea walls and other protections. Second, the impact of the full moon combined The hurricane’s unusual path led its strongest with the longer-term phenomenon of sea- winds –on its front and right-- to hit the angle level rise. Although the storm itself might not between New Jersey and Long Island that forms be directly connected to climate change, the a tip called the New York Bight. This sharp curve damaging power of the floods partly was. Since on the open coastline significantly magnified the , as a consequence of the ocean’s thermal impacts of the hurricane, as the waves composed expansion and of the melting of ice caps in the of ocean water and rain accumulated in the New Arctic, the sea level in the New York region has York harbour. The high surges were boxed in, and risen of about c m–twice as fast as water levels pushed onshore into the flood zones (Murphy, of coastal regions in other states (Khan, ). ). This mechanism was amplified by the rela- New York and New Jersey are particularly vulner- tive shallowness of NYC waters that made the able to the effects of sea-level rise, principally due surge go even farther onto land.
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Map 2. Population density in New York region
Source: Centre For International Earth Science Information Network – Earth Institute, Columbia University (2012)
Sandy’s destructive power was thus amplified by .. Demographic and a combination of short-term climatic phenomena, infrastructural vulnerabilities gradual environmental evolutions and the intrin- sic geographical vulnerabilities of the region. The damage Sandy provoked was further exac- erbated by the demographic and infrastructural Map 3. New York Bight characteristics of the East Coast. New York City is particularly densely populated on its extensive km of coastland (Jones, ). According to the New York City Office of Emergency Management, about . million persons would be in high-risk if a Category hurricane hit the area --three-times the combined potentially vulnerable population in New Orleans and Miami. In addition to its demographic density, New York’s infrastructural characteristics make it espe- cially vulnerable to hurricane damage. The many suspension bridges added to New York’s wind vul- nerability, forcing authorities to close all bridges to avoid their collapse. These closures reduced the Source: Murphy, OEM/City Limits (2012) number of evacuation routes (Silverman, ).
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Third, New York’s subway system is quite prone Figure 1. Hurricane Irene (top) and Hurricane Sandy to flooding. When it was designed over a century (bottom) ago, authorities did not anticipate the impacts of hurricanes causing subway grates to be flooded. City officials/transportation authorities made few changes since the initial construction to provide a better protection of urban subways, mainly due to inadequate funding. As Lower Manhattan was flooded, underground networks were immediately filled with water despite the sealing off procedures that had been developed.
.. Winter storm Athena aggravates Sandy’s damages
The damage caused by Hurricane Sandy was aggravated by a second storm, which hit the New York area from - November . This early winter storm brought up to cm of snow and rain across regions that had been significantly affected by Hurricane Sandy (Hydrometeorological Predic- tion Centre, ). The storm also caused high waves of .m, flooding many coastal roads and stalling post-Sandy repairs. An additional , households lost power in New York and New Jersey, adding to the , still without power after Sandy (The Associated Press, ). Source: NASA (2012)
.. Hurricane Irene increased new york’s vulnerability 2. EVACUATION AND DISPLACEMENT: to hurricane sandy WHEN THE UNBELIEVABLE Before it made landfall, Sandy was widely compared BECOMES REALITY to Hurricane Irene that had hit the same region in late August . Irene was ranked the seventh cost- .. The multiple waves liest hurricane in the history of the United States, of evacuation with an estimated total cost of USD billion, and caused deaths (Fischetti, ). However, it did Over a week after Hurricane Sandy hit, New not impact the New York area as authorities and York City authorities stated that the number of the media had anticipated, because it weakened displaced persons ranged from , to ,. from a Category storm at sea to a tropical storm The lowest figure corresponds to the number of at landfall in New Jersey, with km/h winds. The people who registered in public shelters, where an highest recorded rainfall measurements in New official count could be made. Any number above York barely reached cm, in comparison with the this is a broad approximation, as many people did Sandy floods that were measured in meters. The not go to shelters, and as part of the population in relatively low damage it inflicted compared to the evacuation zones did not evacuate (Jones, ). predicted disaster led many to criticize the authori- Furthermore, the numerical estimation is compli- ties’ “overreaction.” Indeed, in its preparedness, cated by the multiple waves of evacuation. the city had evacuated , people and had On Sunday, October th, Mayor Bloomberg shut down subways, airports and buses hours issued evacuation orders for low lying areas, in- before the storm was expected to hit (Barron, ). cluding sections of lower Manhattan, parts of Although the mayor argued he based his decisions Staten Island and Brooklyn, Coney Island and the on the side of caution, the criticisms partly led the Rockaways in Queens. These areas, populated by authorities to adopt a slightly less cautious atti- , people, represent the city’s evacuation tude during Sandy, which proved to be much more “Zone A” (Gupta, ). The first wave of evacua- devastating (Nye, ). tion was therefore mostly composed of the inhab- itants of Zone A who followed Mayor Bloomberg’s
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Map 4. SLOSH Model of evacuation zones
Source: New York City Office of Emergency Management (2012) order.The three evacuation zones A, B and C had evacuation zones that had not yet obeyed the may- been designed by NYC’s Office of Emergency Man- or’s order, as well as households in other areas agement in the late s, on the basis of a SLOSH who were either forced out of their houses by the model that showed the areas of the city vulnerable unexpected damage of Sandy, or voluntarily left in to flooding. precaution. Further evacuations took place after Hurricane In the following days, evacuations continued as Sandy hit New York City on Monday October th in many households were forced to move out of their the evening, as New Yorkers began to feel Sandy’s houses because of the prolonged power outages. A destructive power. This second wave of evacu- week after the storm, . million people remained ations included households in the mandatory without power, and it was weeks before electricity was restored in some areas, while the already low . Zone A represents the lowest-lying areas of the city, winter temperatures continued declining (Maze- most vulnerable to surges. Zones B and C represent the lis, ). regions that are expected to be flooded by hurricanes From November th to November th, winter of higher intensity. The order to evacuate Zone A corre- sponded to the predictions that the hurricane’s intensity storm Athena prompted further evacuations as was decreasing, but might still be Category at landfall. snow and rain accumulated in areas that had been
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previously hit by Sandy. The winter storm caused with the zones’ boundaries, many residents were further power outages, forcing individuals out of still unsure which zone they lived in, revealing a their houses to find shelters with heating and elec- lack of awareness of the risks posed by hurricanes. tricity, and amplified Sandy’s damage, as snow ac- The city’s evacuation and early warning proce- cumulated on broken roofs and caused the fall of dures should be improved, particularly by enhanc- further trees. ing the dissemination of information about the These differences in the time and date of evac- endured risks. uations were partly caused by the lack of obedi- ence to Mayor Bloomberg’s evacuation on Sunday .. From short-term th. One explanation for this refusal to follow evacuation to displacement the mayor’s orders is the scepticism of the popu- lation towards the authorities’ warnings after The shelter challenge their “overreaction” after Hurricane Irene in The various evacuations waves can therefore be (Preston, ). This scepticism was amplified by distinguished according to their time of occur- the National Hurricane Centre’s downgrade of the rence, but also, and most importantly, according hurricane to a post-tropical storm before it made to their length. While some evacuees were able landfall, decreasing the population’s risk percep- to return to their homes just a few days after the tion. Furthermore, the authorities added to the hurricane hit, other households were still displaced confusion by announcing that nursing homes in in May . The length of displacement is largely evacuation zones would not be evacuated. Many to be correlated to the damage to the evacuee’s people deduced that the storm would not be much home. Whereas some buildings were only lightly more severe than Hurricane Irene, and decided damaged, many structures were either severely to ride it out (MacDonald, ). The dispersion affected or completely destroyed. In such cases, in the dates of evacuation was also caused by the evacuees turned into displaced persons, as they authorities’ two-fold response. Mayor Bloomberg were unable to return home. It is estimated that first declared that evacuation would not be neces- about , persons became homeless because sary, as the authorities were expecting a slow ac- of Sandy, in New York City alone (Mazelis, ). cumulation of water rather than a sudden surge, In the first few days after Sandy’s landfall, of- as they were comparing Sandy to Irene. However, ficials provided emergency shelters for evacuees, on Sunday th, the day before Sandy hit New usually in public schools (Bernstein N., ). York, the tone completely changed as he ordered While a few successful examples can be highlight- a mandatory evacuation of Zone A, the low-lying ed, such as the opening of recently closed Fort Mon- areas of the city (Preston, ). The late order left mouth for displaced families (Bonamo, ), little time for people to evacuate, causing many provisions for shelters and transitional housing New Yorkers to ignore the order, both because were not adequate. In the weeks following Sandy, they were not psychologically and physically pre- the evacuees had to be relocated several times, as pared to evacuate, and because they considered schools were reopened or as they decided to move that such a late order must be an overreaction. to another shelter in the hope that it would be less Those who did follow the order had so little time overcrowded. Many were moved to drill floors and that they often took few personal belongings with armouries, but the conditions were often precari- them (assuming they would be back after a few ous (Bernstein N., ). Sandy highlighted the days) whereas they were actually often displaced lack of space in New York City, in comparison to its for extended periods of time (Barron, ). dense population, as well as the lack of emergen- Another interesting reason for the refusal to cy preparedness of local authorities. The shelters evacuate is that most New Yorkers had too lit- were usually filled to twice their capacity, and the tle experience responding to hurricanes to have city struggled to find additional spaces to welcome built a response culture. This human factor plays new comers. In response to this situation, the Fed- an important role during evacuation processes, as eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) –in people often measure the risks against similar past coordination with NYC officials- reserved hotel experiences (Monitz, ). As the situation was rooms, sometimes luxury ones, across Manhattan, new for most New Yorkers, many made misjudge- Brooklyn and Queens, as a transitional solution. ments on the ways to respond, for instance, by However, as evacuation centres were progressive- disregarding evacuation orders. In addition to this ly closed to rely only on hotels, officials faced the psychological element, a great obstruction to the new wave of displaced people from houses lack- efficiency of evacuations turned out to be the lack ing heat and hot water, in the cold winter, forcing of knowledge on the evacuation zones. Although them to re-open some shelters and book additional Hurricane Irene had strengthened the familiarity hotel rooms (Bernstein N., ).
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When evacuation turns into displacement assistance, but actually used that money to pay for After the urge to find temporary shelter, authori- gas to drive their children to school in their previ- ties were faced with the necessity to provide longer- ous neighbourhoods, to drive to their jobs, to pay term structures for households whose homes the mortgage on their damaged house, and to buy were destroyed or inhabitable, and to launch a food. They, therefore, did not have any funds left recovery programme for damaged houses. In early to find proper lodging or to repair their homes, November, over , households were approved and had lower hopes to return to a stable existence for housing assistance to help them seek a tempo- in the short term. Furthermore, hotel stays were rary living place, or repair their houses, for a also very costly for the displaced families, as they total cost of over USD million (Barron, ). did not have kitchens to cook in and had to order However, the management of longer-term displace- take-out or go to restaurants every day (Associated ments was as debatable as the city’s emergency Press, ). preparedness. Once power was re-established, and The number of displaced people gradually de- individuals who could return to their homes had creased from December to March as many house- left shelters, the authorities started relying almost holds were able to return to their homes after exclusively on FEMA hotel room system as a tran- they were repaired, or as they decided to leave sitional solution for displaced families. However, if FEMA hotels for a more stable situation, such as this option was adequate for transitional lodging, a rented apartment (FEMA, ). A small num- it was not designed as a long-term option. As ber of families whose houses were damaged but weeks and months went by, the authorities discov- had land available opted for FEMA’s “temporary ered that the ‘transitional’ situation turned out to housing units,” which soon became negatively re- be ‘quasi-permanent.’ Three months after hurri- ferred to as “FEMA trailers” (Barron, ). The cane Sandy hit New York and New Jersey, at least fact that some individuals preferred to move to , families remained displaced in hotels, often trailers rather than remain in hotels underscores having to change rooms or hotels as reservations how inadequate FEMA’s hotel housing programme for conferences and parties came up (Zezima, was in the long term. It should also be mentioned ). Hotels close to affected areas were taken that while some households left for other lodging over, such as the Clarion Hotel in Toms River, options, many persons that had not previously where about per cent of the guests were part applied for FEMA financial or lodging assistance of the FEMA programme in January. The expected were forced to request help as their personal cir- cost for FEMA has amounted to tens of millions cumstances evolved. Indeed, in many cases, indi- of dollars, with an estimated rate of USD per viduals received help from relatives and friends room per night on average. for some time, but realized after a few months A positive aspect of the hotel programme is that that this situation could not last any longer (Jones, it enabled most households to remain close to their ). In January, FEMA received about new former living places, thus preventing the need to applications every day for financial and/or lodg- change schools for children, and long commutes ing assistance (FEMA, ). This point underlines to the workplace for adults. However, the families that the situation was constantly evolving, as dis- lived in constant fear regarding their future, as placed people that had not been accounted for yet the hotel stays expired every two weeks (Zezima, stepped out to ask for assistance. Overall, FEMA ). This lack of guaranteed stability was a great has registered over , households, and given source of worry, as the FEMA’s decision to renew over USD million in assistance (FEMA, ). the hotel stays was made on a case-by-case basis However, it is important to highlight that although (Piore, ). Households constantly feared they the displaced households in hotels were the most would lose their right to hotel assistance, for in- visible, the majority of displaced individuals were stance if the FEMA decided that their homes were “invisible,” staying with relatives or friends, rent- safe to come back to, that they had a sound insur- ing apartments, or remaining homeless. As such ance settlement or had received assistance to rent individuals have not been officially registered, it another place (Zezima, ). Although such rea- is difficult to evaluate the number of persons in- sons for the removal of hotel assistance seem rea- cluded in each category (Jones, ). sonable, they added to the psychological plight of displaced households, and were occasionally ap- plied in an arbitral manner, without taking some . FEMA trailers are widely associated with New Orleans’ households’ characteristics into account. This was Katrina victims, as over , FEMA trailers and sometimes the case for low- and middle-income mobile homes were used after the hurricane hit the city in August , becoming part of the city’s landscape. households, who were shut out of the hotel assis- The last FEMA trailer was removed in , over years tance programme after receiving FEMA household after the disaster. (Burdeau, )
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.. Sandy’s long-term displaced Sandy, New York City had the largest population of homeless people, ,, and . per cent of the Five months after Sandy made landfall, over city’s overall population lived in public housing people remained displaced and living in hotels in structures (Huang, ). These buildings were New York, through FEMA’s temporary housing usually quite old and badly maintained, with pre- programme. Most of the remaining displaced house- existing mould problems that were aggravated by holds in hotels were either too poor to pay for their the floods. Evacuation orders were often ignored home repairs or were renters whose landlords had by the people with the least means, because of the not dedicated the necessary funds to repair their high price associated with it. Sandy would have apartments (O’Connor, ). In order to provide required evacuating relatively far away, and some- for this group, on March th, FEMA launched a times moving from shelter to shelter. These factors “Disaster Housing Assistance Programme,” in coop- led many low-income people to try and ride out the eration with the Federal Department of Housing storm. Public transportation had been stopped on and Urban Development, modelled on the one the th in the morning, before the hurricane hit, that was launched after Hurricane Katrina. This removing this cheaper option (Mathis, ). As the programme was designed to help displaced people subway and train systems remained closed or with who were still living in motels find long-term solu- running with reduced frequency after Sandy, many tions, by temporarily paying their rent. It aimed at households were unable to evacuate from their introducing more stability to their lives, by acting as disaster-struck homes, and had to survive without “a bridge from displacement to a permanent relo- power or basic food and health facilities. Another cation in their former houses” as Senator Chuck reason that led lower-income persons to stay in Schumer of New York declared. It was particularly their homes is that the jobs they occupy are usually designed for displaced families in hotel rooms who quite unstable. Missing a work day meant missing could not afford to rent an apartment. Indeed, a day’s salary, which is something that most public after Sandy hit, many real estate firms such as housing residents cannot afford (O’Connor, ). Ashore helped by finding families homes in winter The number of people who filed for first-time unem- rentals. In December, some landlords accepted to ployment insurance benefits after Sandy highlights prioritize displaced people for the rental of apart- the disastrous impact that Sandy had on the poorer ments at market price. Since these rentals were groups: , applications were made in the managed privately, it is not possible to evaluate how period between November th and November th many of those displaced found acceptable housing. only (some of those applications may also have been However, few people (or families) displaced by filed as businesses closed due to damage). Further- Sandy could afford rents at market price. Estimates more, although the most publicized media reports show that per cent of the households that applied after the storm showed the destroyed houses in had annual income inferior to the estimated USD coastal neighbourhood, we have to think about the , needed to qualify (FEMA, ). Although losses proportionally to the person’s assets. Home- FEMA’s Disaster Housing Assistance Programme owners who lost their house surely suffered, but represents a considerable improvement for the life usually had savings or resources to draw upon, in of displaced households, families (or people) still contrast with poorer renters who sometimes lost live in the fear of leases ending, particularly with the everything they owned (O’Connor, ). Almost beginning of the tourist season, when rent prices half of all FEMA registrants indicated their annual usually peak. Indeed, although FEMA will provide income was below USD , (Enterprise Commu- financial support by paying rent temporarily, land- nity Partners, ). Almost per cent of them lords usually want to be assured that they will be were renters, who usually did not have insurance able to keep paying once the assistance is removed for their possessions. Furthermore, in cases when (McKelvey, ). As this programme was only set in the renter’s home was damaged but not completely motion five months after the hurricane, the condi- destroyed, they depended on their landlords’ will tions of displacement were often precarious both and financial capacity for repairs. As landowners in physical, financial and psychological terms for a often lost other large assets during Sandy, these developed city such as New York (Dawsey, ). necessary repairs were not their priority, forcing many poorer households to live in precarious condi- .. Displacement and social tions in terms of health, with increasing mould, inequality - the diverse among other issues (O’Connor, ). outcomes of Hurricane Sandy . As gasoline is expensive, and many of them did not have Low-income people constituted a particularly cars (access to cars in New York is lower than in any other vulnerable group to Sandy’s impact. Before Hurricane city in the United States).
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THE ELDERLY IN THE FACE OF SANDY: elderly people, which is a 48-hour process. Nursing homes were then ordered to increase staffing and to transfer the residents A TALE OF DISPROPORTIONATE who required ventilators to hospitals. VULNERABILITIES In addition to this lack of caution by NYC authorities, the effects of the hurricane on nursing home residents were wors- The intrinsic vulnerabilities of the elderly to environmental ened by the default in emergency preparedness in the facilities. disasters First, emergency backup generators are not legally required to A specific social group, the elderly, was particularly affected by be able to withstand flooding, as health inspectors only check the hurricane’s damage. Approximately 37 per cent of those who that they are functional, but not whether they are protected died in New York City because of Hurricane Sandy were 60 or against flooding. When Sandy hit, the waters rose so quickly older, whereas only 17.2 per cent of the city’s population belongs that the workers in the facilities did not have time to elevate to this age group (Synergy Home Care, 2012). Many elderly peo- them. In Queens and Brooklyn alone, over 23 nursing homes ple drowned within their houses, while others suffered from were severely flooded, leading to heat and power to go outin fatal storm related injuries and hypothermia (Parry, 2013). many cases (Preston, 2012). Elderly people therefore had to The elderly are extremely vulnerable to the effects of storms ride out the storm within the nursing homes, and were later for two main reasons. First, elderly people are often socially on forced to evacuate after the surge, due to the absence of isolated, making them more vulnerable in the case of a natural electricity. In the days following the storm, 6,300 patients were disaster. Although this isolation is sometimes unwelcomed, it evacuated from 47 facilities according to the New York State most of the time stems from a choice: elderly people are more Health Department (Durkin, 2013). These examples highlight reluctant to ask for services or seek their family’s help, because the importance of emergency preparedness of nursing homes of a will to maintain their independence, and out of concern themselves, as facilities where generators were protected from that they will bother others (Parry, 2013). This was often the surges, like Ocean Promenade in Queens, did not have to evacu- case during Hurricane Sandy, when many elderly decided to ate after the storm. Evacuees were taken to other facilities, but “ride out” the storm instead of calling their families or res- also to high schools converted to shelters, often quite far away- cue teams for help. Second, most of the disaster preparedness -even as far as Albany. They were sometimes sent without their procedures are designed for healthy individuals, sometimes medical records or medications, to places that were not special- requiring a walk of a mile to the closest evacuation centre, or ized for nursing home care. Furthermore, the evacuation flows to take crowded buses. Elderly people have a small capacity caused residents from facilities dealing with specific illnesses of adaptation because of their limited physical capability to to be mixed with residents from “normal” nursing homes, caus- leave their home independently (Solecki, 2012). Most elderly ing a great deal of confusion and psychological damage for cannot drive anymore, and find it physically or psychologically many (Preston, 2012). Some of the 160 residents evacuated difficult to take public transports (Parry, 2013). This left them from Bell Harbor in Queens had, for instance, been diagnosed no choice but to stay home or call for help. Many were also liv- with only slight psychiatric illnesses, but during the evacuation ing on the highest floors of buildings. When the power was cut they were mixed with residents who had more severe disorders, off, the elevators often stopped working for days, sometimes and were brought to the Milestone Residence where they were weeks, forcing elderly people to stay home in often precarious obliged to adopt a much more institutional lifestyle (The Associ- conditions. ated Press, 2012). In December, two months later, hundreds of Evacuating nursing homes in the face of Sandy: a tale of mis- nursing home patients were still displaced, living in temporary, management and lack of emergency preparedness overcrowded quarters, sometimes without a regular change of Elderly people living in nursing and care facilities were not clothes. The Bishop Henry B. Hucles Nursing Centre in Brooklyn spared from the hurricane’s damage. A few days before hur- was for instance full at nearly twice its licensed capacity (The ricane Sandy made landfall, Mayor Bloomberg advised 40 Associated Press, 2012). nursing homes located in the mandatory evacuation areas to The confusion was magnified by the fact that the floods cancel plans to move their 3,000 residents to safety (Preston, cut off phone lines, disabling facilities from fulfilling a major 2012). This decision was influenced by the past experience requirement: notifying relatives. Communication continued to of Hurricane Irene in 2011. At that time, officials had ordered be chaotic up to a week after Sandy hit New York, as many fami- evacuation of nursing and adult homes in specific zones. lies still were not aware of where their elderly family members While the hurricane finally caused minor damage, the cost of had been evacuated, or of their health status. No clear indi- evacuation in terms of transportation, health care, and hous- cations had been given as to which phone number should be ing amounted to millions of dollars, leading to broad criticism. called to obtain information, and many relatives were directed Some nursing homes had still not been reimbursed for Irene’s to the wrong shelters (Hallman, 2012). evacuations at the time of Sandy’s landfall. Furthermore, the The disproportionate impact of the storm on the elderly was evacuation of nursing and care homes had proved difficult and caused by this group’s intrinsic vulnerabilities, but also by the dangerous to the physical and psychological health of the resi- insufficient preparedness at the state, local and facility level. dents. However, this time around, the decision not to evacuate The fact that structures designed for this particularly vulner- had disastrous consequences. By the time the intensity of the able group were allowed to be located in low lying areas illus- storm became clear, and the surge projection rose from 1.8 to trate a sense of invulnerability of New Yorkers and authorities 3.4 meters (Wunderground, 2012), it was too late to evacuate to environmental disasters.
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Figure 2. Surge barrier projects
Sources: New York City Office of Emergency Management (2012)
The authority’s reliance on hotels highlights 3. REBUILDING AND that the emergency disaster management and re- ADAPTING: A POLICY PATH covery mechanisms did not take into account the radical impact of income differences on displace- FOR SANDY’S AFTERMATH ment. New York authorities failed to immediately differentiate the needs of the displaced accord- .. Action at various levels ing to their income level, causing a “tale of two Sandys”, with lower-income displaced people Climate change adaptation needs to happen at remaining in precarious living conditions for a different scales. At the household level, it could much longer length of time than households of mean thinking in a vertical manner, a certain higher means. flood requirement level and flood-proofing all the lower floors, with all essential utilities at higher floors (Solecki, ). Building defensive systems is building resilience into public structures. For nearly years, officials have tried to compen- sate the erosion of shorelines due to natural causes by building hard structures such as seawalls and
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Figure 3. Flap-type barrier model
Source: Parsons Brinckerhoff, PBS Newshour (2012). bulkheads. Experts use the term “New Jerseyza- local marine life, while being high enough to act as tion” to refer to such structures now present on a buffer against storm surges of a Category hurri- per cent of the shoreline of New Jersey (Rudolf, cane (Jacobson, ). An advantage of this design ). Although sea walls are particularly well- is that it could be built off site before being laid known for their use in the Netherlands, they down in the river, thereby reducing the costs and can actually be found much closer to New York: economic and wildlife disruptions. However, such in Stamford, a city of , on the East Coast plans would force local areas to build draining sys- (Navarro, ). A five-meter high barrier was tems to deal with water flooding over the banks on built in , protecting an area of about . the sides of the gates (Jacobson, ), amounting square kilometres. The Army Corps of Engineers to an added cost of around USD billion to USD estimated that it helped prevent USD million in billion to shore up the areas on the sides of the damage to houses and businesses (Navarro, ). barriers (Navarro, ). Such successful examples have attracted the In addition to being quite costly, such sea wall attention of engineers and authorities, which have plans also reflect a somewhat short-term adapta- considered applying similar systems to protect tion view. Indeed, even after the debate is won New York. Three main projects were presented in and politicians line up behind the project –Con- at the American Society of Civil Engineers gressional approval will be needed--funding, conference, to protect New York against Category acquiring permits and conducting environmen- hurricanes. One of the designs represented tal studies would be a lengthy process. The con- a rolling gates system, north of the Verrazano- struction would very likely not begin in the next Narrows Bridge connecting Long Island and New two decades, leaving New York vulnerable in the Jersey. The USD . billion project envisaged a meantime (Peltz, ). Furthermore, it would complex system of various gates which could be only provide protection for to years, as closed during a storm to prevent flood surges to sea levels continue rising (Parry, ). Sea wall affect the City and parts of New Jersey, and could construction projects also assume that current sustain a surge of nine meters –twice as high as climate change, sea-level rise and hurricane Sandy- (Jacobson, ). In normal situations, size predictions are accurate. These models are it would still allow the water to pass, in order to debatable because of the global scale and com- limit the disturbance on the ocean’s tides and on plexity of climate change. Indeed, meteorological the heavy commercial boat traffic. estimations of Sandy’s development as it moved A second design proposed, in addition to the towards the East coast have proved to be very previously mentioned sea wall, the creation of a hesitant at best, highlighting that there is still flap-type barrier at the upper East River. The sea- much to improve in this area. One can thereby wall would include a number of panels that would wonder whether sea walls built on current pro- rest flat on the ground below the water, and could jections will still be able to withstand floods and be raised in the case of a surge. This would limit hurricanes that will have evolved in size and the disturbance for boat traffic as well as to the scope in the coming decades.
IDDRI STUDY 09/2013 25 The State of Environmental Migration 2013
The barriers’ limitations are also evident in the participated in the programme received minimal shorter term: an important question is whether ratings from federal agents, which means that they would be socially fair, as they would cause local authorities had implemented the lowest water levels on the other side to rise approximate- level of adaptation measures to prevent flood ly one foot ( cm), possibly worsening flooding damage (Rudolf, ). Floods due to hurricanes in these areas –the water level could be around like Sandy are not just “natural disasters,” they are per cent higher on the other side of the barrier (Na- failures to adopt and implement adequate land use varro, ). Furthermore, barrier plans are likely and building code requirements. to raise objections from industries arguing against Flood-proofing subway and road tunnel systems the large disruption in the city’s waterways, as in coastal areas (Jonkman, ), while adopt- well as from residents objecting to the destruction ing more nature-friendly barrier systems such as of the natural landscapes. Barriers would also re- rebuilding the harbour’s salt marshes and oyster duce the exchanges of New York’s estuarine waters beds, that once acted as softener against storms with the sea, worsening water quality and modi- (Jacobson, and Jonkman, ) could go a fying temperatures and salinity, with potentially long way to increase the city’s resilience. As Mayor negative impacts on rebounding ecosystems and Bloomberg declared after hurricane Sandy: “What local fisheries (Jonkman, ) that benefit the we have to do is learn, and it would be great if you area both economically and in terms of recreation. didn’t put your generators in the basement… The Such policies could create a false sense of security fact that we live close to the water shouldn’t be a that blinds New Yorkers from the increasing risk, surprise to everybody.” (Chaban, ). and thereby prevent authorities from searching for smaller, more flexible and more efficient solutions .. Relocation, the key (Gessner, ). to adaptation?
.. Learning from the past A longer-term adaptation method would be to while preparing for the future encourage the relocation from low lying areas, to higher regions in Queens and Staten Island that are It can be argued that a series of minor interventions currently scarcely populated. In addition to miti- will lead, over time, to efficient and more natural gating the impacts of future storms, such measures systems to deal with climate change and sea-level would be more cost efficient than to repair struc- rise (Peltz, ). In recent years, the armouring tures after every storm. This could be achieved of the coast against erosion has for instance been through economic incentives, with higher taxes supplemented by beach replenishment systems for businesses and residences in vulnerable areas, (Wald, ). An obvious policy would be to and tax incentives for those who move elsewhere disaster-proof infrastructure, to increase their (Young, ). In the past, many coastal towns such resiliency against natural disasters. A large part of as Long Branch in New Jersey actually granted tax Sandy’s damage could have been avoided by adap- abatements for real estate developers to relocate tive measures such as burying power lines in the there. Hurricane Sandy has sent the clear message suburbs and designing closing doors for subways that this type of policy needs to be reversed. Many (Lind, ). This point highlights that recovering residents in Staten Island for instance have been after Sandy is not enough, the city needs to rebuild seeking government buyouts to be able to relo- in a way that decreases the risks of future damage. cate to higher areas. People whose homes were Populations need to return to a new normalcy, destroyed or badly damaged in flood-prone areas where they are actually in a better situation than are not inclined to stay and rebuild, either out of before. Authorities cannot only learn from the past fear that the increasingly frequent storms will take anymore, they have to take into account climate their houses every time or because they have been change related projections, including those of too emotionally affected (The Associated Press, sea-level rise (Solecki, ). Although efforts to ). This is the case in Oakwood Beach, an area increase resilience have been launched in the past, that has been rapidly developed in the last century, they were usually conducted with a short-term and was particularly hit by the storm. In February, view. The National Flood Insurance Programme Governor Mario Cuomo launched a programme Community Rating System, for instance, was through which homeowners in the area could sell introduced in to encourage local authorities their houses at their pre-Sandy market value. To to upgrade buildings’ structures to decrease the date, In the Fox Beach section of Oakwood Beach, risk from floods, in exchange for deductions on of households have signed up to take a residents’ flood insurance premiums. The large buyout if one becomes available (Kaplan, ). majority of the , communities that voluntarily Nevertheless, as the focus has been on rebuilding
26 STUDY 09/2013 IDDRI The State of Environmental Migration 2011
rather than retreating, residents will have to pres- ). Officials in localities that lacked funds have sure authorities to obtain additional funding for tended to prioritize short-term economic benefits, buy-outs, for instance, through the Federal Emer- especially since many are elected for two-years gency Management Agency’s Hazard Mitigation terms. This lack of action on the part of authori- Grant Programme, that was used after Hurricane ties highlights the tension between the objectives Irene. It remains to be seen whether the will to of development and environmental protection for relocate permanently is reflected in the majority of many localities (Bernstein, ). coastal populations, or if it was solely a short-term post-storm reaction from a small share of coastal residents. CONCLUSION Another method to induce relocation from low- lying areas would be to increase insurance costs. Hurricane Sandy was a partly political disaster, Before Sandy, coastal areas benefitted from low caused by the lack of adaptation and mitigation insurance costs, which gave homeowners a false measures. Authorities had received many warn- sense of security. Increasing the individual costs of ings about the high risks of hurricanes, as early living in low-lying areas would enable to transfer as when environmentalist Suzanne Mattei more of the risk burden to property owners, im- analysed the worst-case scenario of a “combined proving popular risk perception. In , an offi- sea-level rise/storm surge event” (Rudolf, ). cial report by the city’s Panel on Climate Change However, the federal government, the State of highlighted that New York authorities should New York as well as the City generally did not “reduce incentives that increase or perpetuate de- conduct proper adaptation programmes. velopment in high-risk locations.” (Rudolf, ). Hurricane Sandy has shown that economic de- However, this proposal was not adopted by the velopment and environmental protection are not city, that feared that in would lead to a policy of at odds and can be improved together. Political disinvestment and would encourage relocation will needs to be stirred up now, so New Yorkers do away from current urban regions, resulting in not have to live through multiple Sandys before disastrous impacts on the economy. Authorities officials act. Taking projects beyond the research/ underlined that the FEMA’s zone with per cent development phase would allow them to be fully risk of flooding in NYC was populated with over funded and implemented through cooperation be- , persons, and provided for almost , tween federal, state and local authorities, as well jobs (Rudolf, ). as the private sector. The environment cannot be The example of Ocean Country is quite reveal- considered a stable variable in New York’s urban ing. It was one of New Jersey’s most rapidly devel- planning anymore (Funkhouser, ), and migra- oping areas in terms of population density, with tion from low-lying areas would be a particularly a total population growth of over per cent be- efficient adaptation strategy to increasing climate tween and (J. Rudolf, ). Landscapes risks in New York. Resilience, mitigation and ad- that used to act as natural buffers against storms aptation can be combined to protect New Yorkers were destroyed and populated. This county, which from the impact of future natural disasters. In some issued the highest number of coastal residential cases, the cost of staying in low lying areas surpass- building permits in , was also one of the most es the cost of relocating, as households face higher devastated by the flood. Real estate representa- insurance premiums (Holborn, ), and have to tives have a large influence in the politics of New raise their houses higher above sea-level, at an ap- Jersey and New York, as they have been major proximate cost of USD , to USD , for donors to governors and local leaders, ranking the entire house (Harris, ). Although there is among the top contributors to New Jersey Gover- no legal obligation to lift houses in New York City, nor Christie (Rudolf, ). Before Sandy, there it is recommended to elevate them as a protection was no provision in these states laws requiring in- from future storms. Hurricane Sandy has changed depth review of developments on coastlines, nor cost-benefit calculations, and this should be an op- for buildings to meet reasonable storm and flood portunity for authorities as well as communities to resistance standards. Small developments of fewer adapt in a sustainable way. than units in vulnerable areas did not require Although resilience and adaptation are im- any form of state approval, leaving the decision portant objectives, New York authorities and in- to local officials. This was specifically the type of habitants could also improve their preparedness projects that were designed throughout the s, to natural disasters. Responses to all phases of s and s, as local officials were more eager evacuation and displacement can be enhanced, to develop their localities in the short term than in order to avoid the confusion and lack of or- to adopt a sustainable long-term view (Bernstein, ganization that followed Sandy. The authorities’
IDDRI STUDY 06/2012 27 The State of Environmental Migration 2013
preparedness and emergency response system was will support the final decision. Everyone having not efficient enough to deal with the immediate a say in the debate makes improves stakeholder human displacement consequences of Sandy, as sense of ownership Third, promoting conversa- shown by the low level of pre-storm evacuations, tions and debates on the issue increases the popu- as well as the precariousness of the shelter system, lation’s awareness of the risks, making them more highlighting the dire lack of space for New York likely to make sound, long-term decisions rather City to welcome displaced persons. As hurricanes than short-term ones based on pre-conceived no- become stronger and more frequent, authorities tions or political inclinations. could also improve their policies targeted at par- Migration–—and more precisely displacements ticularly vulnerable groups such as the elderly and relocations—has been one of the main, and and the low-income households. Services such as yet least-reported, consequence of Hurricane special phone lines for the elderly would be use- Sandy. It has been essential to the short-term re- ful, to enable them to call for help if they do not sponse and remains crucial to the long-term ad- have any family or friends help them to safety. Past aptation process. Technology, high income levels censuses could be particularly used to identify the and stable institutions are likely to mitigate the areas where many vulnerable people live, enabling consequences of disasters. However, the central- authorities to increase their activity and presence ity of migration during and after Hurricane Sandy in such places in the case of a natural disaster – highlights that environmentally-induced displace- particularly before the disaster strikes. ments are not restricted to developing countries or Responses to long-term displacements have yet to lower-income cities like New Orleans, as natural to be created to deal with displaced families whose disasters strike regardless of the level of develop- houses have been destroyed. Many programs were ment. The impacts of Hurricane Sandy further- created after Sandy hit without proper coordina- more underscore that relocation is not necessarily tion or prior reflexion, leading to uneven and of- a consequence of disasters, but should also be con- ten poor responses. The FEMA’s hotel program is a sidered as an opportunity to adapt to a changing perfect illustration. world, through relocation to safer, less vulnerable Finally, the efficiency of preparedness, resilience areas. and adaptation measures relies on the authorities’ communication strategy. In terms of preparedness, Picture 1. After hurricane Sandy enhancing the communication with communities and households would allow for easier and more efficient management of evacuations, through a better awareness of evacuation zones, of the risks involved, and of available means of transporta- tion. Working with local associations, NGOs and religious groups, among others, could prove ex- tremely useful –many households are more likely to be persuaded by their local pastors than by of- ficial messages on T.V. Improved communication with local communities is also fundamental in the adaptation process, for three main reasons. First, locals can prove very useful to develop efficient adaptation measures, as they usually know their locality and its geographical and demographical characteristics very well. Second, involving com- munities in the process and taking their concerns into consideration increases the chances that they Source: Coastal America, 2013.
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Bronars, Stephen, 2012. “70,000 Workers Displaced by Hur- Jaffe, Eric, 2013. “Why New York’s Sandy Commission Rec- ricane Sandy in New Jersey: Unemployment Rate May Reach ommendations Matter”, Mother Jones, January 15th 2013, 11%”, Bronars Economics, November 29th 2012, http:// http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/01/ sbronars.wordpress.com/2012/11/29/70000-workers-dis- new-yorks-sandy-commission-recommendations-matter- placed-by-hurricane-sandy-in-new-jersey-unemployment- climate-change rate-may-reach-11/ Jones, Malcolm, 2012. “What to Do With the Thousands Burdeau, Cain, 2012. “Last FEMA trailer leaves 6 years after Kat- Displaced by Hurricane Sandy?”, The Daily Beast, No- rina”, The Washington Times, February 15th 2012, http://www. vember 8th 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/arti- washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/15/last-fema-trailer- cles/2012/11/08/what-to-do-with-the-thousands-dis- leaves-6-years-after-katrina/ placed-by-hurricane-sandy.html Chaban, Matt, 2012. “When It Comes to Protecting New York Jonkman, Bas, 2012. “A Wake-Up Call to Consider the Op- From the Next Hurricane, Mayor Bloomberg Suggests You tions”, The New York times, November 4th 2012, http:// Fend for Yourself”, The Observer, November 1st, 2012, http:// www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/01/should- observer.com/2012/11/when-it-comes-to-protecting-new- new-york-build-sea-gates/hurricane-sandy-could-force- york-from-the-next-hurricane-mayor-bloomberg-suggests- new-york-to-consider-flood-prevention you-fend-for-yourself/ Kaplan, Thomas, 2013. “Cuomo Seeking Home Buy- Coastal America, 2013. “NOAA, USGS: Climate change impacts outs in Flood Zones”, The New York Times, February 3rd, to U.S. coasts threaten public health, safety and economy”, Coast- 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/nyre- al America A partnership for Action, January 29th 2013, http:// gion/cuomo-seeking-home-buyouts-in-flood-zones. coastalamerica.wordpress.com/tag/hurricane-sandy/ html?pagewanted=all Dawsey, Josh, 2013. “Sandy Victims Still in Hotels By Thou- Lind, Michael, 2012. “Hurricane Sandy and the Case for Ad- sands”, The Wall Street Journal, February 5th 2013, http://on- aptation to Climate Change”, The Breakthrough, November line.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873249002045782864 2nd 2012, http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/voices/ 82091427450.html. michael-lind/hurricane-sandy-and-the-case-for-adapta- Drye, Willie, 2012, “A Timeline of Hurricane Sandy’s Path of tion-to-climate-change/ Destruction”, National Geographic, November 2nd 2012, http:// Mathis, Sommer, 2012. “Hurricane Sandy Provokes the newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/02/a-timeline- Largest Preemptive Public Transportation Shutdown in of-hurricane-sandys-path-of-destruction/ U.S. History”, The Atlantic Cities, October 29th 2012, www. Durkin, Erin, 2013. “City officials defend decision not to evacu- theatlanticcities.com/commute/2012/10/hurricane- ate hospitals and nursing homes before Hurricane Sandy”, sandy-provokes-largest-preemptive-public-transportation- Daily News, January 24th 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/ shutdown-us-history/3727/ new-york/officials-defend-move-evacuate-hospitals-sandy-arti- Navarro, Mireya, 2012. “Weighting sea barriers as protec- cle-1.1247397 tion for New York”, The New York Times, November 7th 2012, Fischetti, Mark, 2012. “Sandy versus Katrina, and Irene: Mon- http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/nyregion/after- ster Hurricanes by the Numbers”, Scientific American, Octo- hurricane-sandy-debating-costly-sea-barriers-in-new-york- ber 29th 2012, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article. area.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&. cfm?id=sandy-vs-katrina-and-irene MacDonald, Jeffrey G., 2012. “Defying Hurricane Sandy Gessner, David, 2012. “Sandy recovery: Walls won’t stop su- evacuation orders prompts moral debate”, NOLA, Novem- th perstorms“, Salon, November 6th 2012, http://www.salon. ber 15 2012, http://www.nola.com/hurricane/index. com/2012/11/06/sandy_recovery_walls_wont_stop_super- ssf/2012/11/defying_hurricane_sandy_evacua.html storms/ McKelvey, Wallace, 2013. “Families displaced by Hurricane Gupta, Prachi, 2012. “Mayor Bloomberg orders mandatory evac- Sandy face competition for housing as summer visitors ar- th uation for 375,000 New York City residents”, Salon, October 28th rive”, Press of Atlantic City, March 16 , 2013. 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/10/28/mayor_bloomb- Nye, James; Stebner, Beth, 2012, “Here comes Sandy! erg_orders_mandatory_evacuation_for_375000_new_york_ State of emergency declared across New York as Halloween city_residents/ ‘Frankenstorm’ roars towards East Coast”, The Mail Online, th Hallman, Ben, 2012. “After Sandy, Communication Break- October 26 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ down Hampered Efforts to Find Evacuated Seniors”, article-2223047/Hurricane-Sandy-Forecasters-warn-pre- Huffington Post, November 16th 2012, http://www.huff- Halloween-perfect-storm-strike-East-Coast.html ingtonpost.com/2012/11/16/sandy-communication-evacuat- O’Connor, Julie, 2012. “After Hurricane Sandy, understand- ed-seniors_n_2141699.html ing a disaster’s worst impacts: Q&A”, New Jersey News, th Harris, Elizabeth A., 2013. “Going Up a Few Feet, and Hoping to November 11 2012, http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_ Avoid a Storm’s Path”, The New York Times, April 15th 2013, http:// page/2012/11/after_hurricane_sandy_understa.html www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/nyregion/after-hurricane- Parry, Wynne, 2013. “Future Disasters: 10 Lessons from sandy-homeowners-elevate-property.html?pagewanted=all Superstorm Sandy”, LiveScience, January 28th 2013, http:// Jacobson, Rebecca, 2012. “Engineers Consider Barriers to www.livescience.com/26640-future-disasters-lessons-su- Protect New York From Another Sandy”, PBS Newshour, No- perstorm-sandy.html vember 20th 2012, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/run- Parry, Wynne, 2013. “Why Disasters Like Sandy Hit the El- down/2012/11/engineers-draw-barriers-to-protect-new-york- derly Hard”, LiveScience, March 8th 2013, http://www.lives- from-another-sandy.html. cience.com/27752-natural-disasters-hit-elderly-hard.html
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Peltz, Jennifer, 2012. “NYC Sea Barrier Could Have Stopped Traub, James, 2012. “Adapt or Die,” Foreign Policy, No- Surge During Hurricane Sandy, Say Experts”, The Huffing- vember 2nd 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/arti- ton Post, November 1st 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost. cles/2012/11/02/adapt_or_die?page=0,0 com/2012/11/01/nyc-sea-barrier-could-have-stopped- Wald, Matthew, 2013. “Storm Panel Recommends Major surge_n_2057981.html. Changes in New York”, The New York Times, January 6th Preston, Jennifer, 2012. “Behind a Call That Kept Nursing 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/nyregion/ Home Patients in Storm’s Path”, The New York Times, De- new-york-state-storm-panel-recommends-major-changes. cember 2nd 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/ html?_r=1& nyregion/call-that-kept-nursing-home-patients-in-sandys- Zezima, Katie, 2013. “For thousands displaced by Hur- path.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 ricane Sandy, anxious lives in hotels and motels”, Press of Rosenthal, Sandy, 2012. “Should Flood Survivors of Hur- Atlantic City, January 25th 2013, http://www.pressofatlan- ricane Sandy Relocate?”, Huffington Post, November 2nd ticcity.com/news/breaking/for-thousands-displaced-by- 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sandy-rosenthal/ hurricane-sandy-anxious-lives-in-hotels/article_550a1ece- should-flood-survivors-of_b_2067613.html 6745-11e2-9b70-001a4bcf887a.html Rudolf, John, 2012. “Hurricane Sandy Damage Ampli- fied By Breakneck Development Of Coast”, Huffington W Post, November 12th 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2012/11/12/hurricane-sandy-damage_n_2114525. FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/ (Consulted in December html?ncid=txtlnkushpmg00000040 2012, February 2013 and April 2013) Sharp, Tim, 2012. “Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http:// th Frankenstorm”, Livescience, November 27 2012, http:// www.noaa.gov/ (Consulted in December 2012, January www.livescience.com/24380-hurricane-sandy-status-data. 2013 and April 2013). html NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/ (Consulted in January, Feb- Silverman, Rena, 2012. “Why New York City Is the Worst ruary and April 2013). Place for a Hurricane”, National Geographic, Novem- ber 1st 2012, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ New York City Office of Emergency Management, http:// news/2012/11/121101-new-york-city-sandy-hurricane- www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/home/home.shtml, (Con- bight-science-environment-nation/ sulted in November, December 2012, January, March 2013) Synergy Home Care, 2012. “Hurricane Sandy Hurts Sen- Weather Undergound, http://www.wunderground.com/ iors”, Synergy Home Care Official Blog, http://www.syn- hurricane/at19034.asp (consulted on April 17th 2013) ergyhomecare.com/blog/index.php/2012/11/hurricane- sandy-highlights-vulnerability-of-senior-population/ Tollefson, Jeff, 2012. “Hurricane sweeps US into climate- adaptation debate”, Nature, November 6th 2012, http:// www.nature.com/news/hurricane-sweeps-us-into-climate- adaptation-debate-1.11753
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