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An Analysis of Public Perception and Response to Hurricane Sandy Lindsay L

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An Analysis of Public Perception and Response to Hurricane Sandy Lindsay L University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 4-16-2014 An Analysis of Public Perception and Response to Hurricane Sandy Lindsay L. Rice University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Meteorology Commons Scholar Commons Citation Rice, Lindsay L., "An Analysis of Public Perception and Response to Hurricane Sandy" (2014). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5114 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. An Analysis of Public Perception and Response to Hurricane Sandy by Lindsay Lauren Rice A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science School of Geosciences College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Jennifer Collins, Ph.D. Hugh Gladwin, Ph.D. Douglas Lunsford, Ph.D. Robin Ersing, Ph.D Joni Downs, Ph.D. Date of Approval April 16th, 2014 Keywords: hurricane, public perception, vulnerability, disasters Copyright © 2014, Lindsay Lauren Rice Acknowledgments The data for this research was made available through a National Science Foundation RAPID grant obtained by Dr. Hugh Gladwin and Dr. Betty Morrow (Florida International University). The grant is titled “Communication and Understanding of Hurricane Sandy Storm Surge Forecast and Warning Information”, NSF # 1322088 CMMI. I would like to recognize my advisor, Dr. Jennifer Collins, for encouraging networking and forging collaborates which allowed me to be involved in this study. I would also like to thank Dr. Jennifer Collins, Dr. Douglas Lunsford, Dr. Robin Ersing and Dr. Joni Downs for their support and expert advice that contributed to the success of this research. Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. iii List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................v Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 1.1 Disasters .........................................................................................................................2 1.2 Vulnerability ..................................................................................................................3 1.2.1 Social and Economic Factors .......................................................................4 1.2.1.1 Poverty .............................................................................................4 1.2.1.2 Social Network Factors ....................................................................5 1.2.1.3 Gender ..............................................................................................5 1.2.1.4 Elderly and Children ........................................................................6 1.2.1.5 Housing Practices.............................................................................7 1.2.1.6 Minorities .........................................................................................7 1.2.2 Evacuation Decision Making .......................................................................8 1.3 Public Perception of Weather Related Risk .................................................................10 1.3.1 Social Media .................................................................................................11 1.3.2 Uncertainty ....................................................................................................11 1.3.3 Public Perception of Hurricane Risk.............................................................13 1.4 Hurricane Sandy...........................................................................................................14 1.4.1 Synoptic Background .................................................................................14 1.4.2 Extratropical Transition .............................................................................18 1.4.3 How Sandy Compares................................................................................18 1.4.4. Storm Surge ...............................................................................................20 1.5 Problem Statement .......................................................................................................21 1.6 Study Objectives and Research Questions ...................................................................22 Chapter 2: Methods ........................................................................................................................24 2.1 Study Area ...................................................................................................................25 2.1.1 Vulnerability of Study Area ..........................................................................27 2.1.1.1 New York City ...............................................................................27 2.1.1.2 New Jersey .....................................................................................29 2.2 Data Acquisition ..........................................................................................................29 2.3 Data Analysis ...............................................................................................................30 i Chapter 3: Results ..........................................................................................................................34 3.1 Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................34 3.2 Measures of Concern and Expectations of Sandy Impacts ..........................................37 3.3 Information Sources Used............................................................................................40 3.4 Vulnerability Assessment ............................................................................................41 3.5 Correlations of Variables .............................................................................................46 3.6 Chi-Square Test of Association for Concern vs. Expected Variables .........................48 3.7 Simple Regressions ......................................................................................................50 3.8 Logistic Regression ......................................................................................................51 3.9 Stepwise Regressions ...................................................................................................52 3.10 Vulnerability Variable Logistic Regression ...............................................................53 3.11 Reasons for Evacuating..............................................................................................55 3.12 Comparison to Hurricane Irene ..................................................................................58 Chapter 4: Discussion ....................................................................................................................59 4.1 Vulnerability Assessment Analysis .............................................................................61 4.2 Analysis of Correlations ..............................................................................................61 4.3 Analysis of Chi-Square Test of Association ................................................................63 4.4 Analysis of Regressions ...............................................................................................64 4.4.1 Simple Regressions Analysis ........................................................................64 4.4.2 Logistic Regressions Analysis ......................................................................64 4.4.3 Stepwise Regressions Analysis .....................................................................65 4.5 Logistic Regression Including the Variable Level .......................................................65 4.6 Qualitative Analysis for Evacuating ............................................................................66 4.7 Hurricane Irene vs. Sandy ............................................................................................68 Chapter 5: Conclusion....................................................................................................................69 5.1 Limitations and Future Work .......................................................................................71 References ......................................................................................................................................74 ii List of Tables Table 1: Descriptive statistics for ethnicity ................................................................................35 Table 2: Descriptive statistics for gender ...................................................................................35 Table 3: Housing Types .............................................................................................................36
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