400 Australian Bulletin of Labour ABL Vol 32 No 42006 401 Industrial Relations Victoria (2005), Quality Part-time Work: Working Better CONTRIBUTED ARTICLE for Everyone, Department of Innovation, Industry and Development, Melbourne.

La Valle, I. Arthur, S. Millward, C. Scott, J. and Clayden, M. (2002), Happy Families? Atypical Work and its Influence on Famify Life, The Policy Press, Bristol, UK.

National Competition Council (NCA) (2002), Assessment of Governments' Progress in Implementing the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms, vol. 1, August 2002, Ausinfo, Canberra. Abstract Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) (2002), Babies and Bosses: Reconciling Work and Famify Life, Australia, Denmark and the This paper reviews New Zealand's experience of lockouts over the last near-two Netherlands, vol. 1, OECD, Paris. decades. It employs published and unpublished official (Statistics New Zealand) data plus unofficial data on the following, hitherto ignored, dimensions of lockouts: Presser, H. B. (2003), Working in a 24/7 Economy: Challenges for American (i) employees involved in lockouts, (H) person-days lost due to lockouts and (iii) Families, Russell Sage, New York. the average duration of lockouts. The patterns of lockouts are compared for different New Zealand politico-legislative eras from 1986 to 2004. It is found that Presser, H. B. (1995), 'Job, Family and Gender: Determinants of Nonstandard there has been, over time, a declining trend in the incidence of person-days lost Work Schedules Among Employed Americans in 1991', Demography, vol. due both to strikes and to lockouts in New Zealand. But the relative incidence of 32, pp. 577-598. person-days lost due to lockouts vis a vis strikes rose quite sharply during the 'middle' years of the operation of the union-hostife Employment Contracts Act, Public Service Board (1977), 53rd Annual Report, Australian Government Publishing 1991. Comparisons are made with Australian experience. There are some notable Service, Canberra. similarities in the pattern of lockouts in both countries, including the tendency for the average duration of lockouts to be considerably longer than the average Queensland University ofTechnology (1999), The Work and Family Guide, accessed the duration of strikes. 25/09/2006 from http://www.eguity.gut.edu.au/publications/publications/ workandfamily ltd/family guide/contents.html Introduction

Whitehouse, G. (2001), 'Industrial Agreements and Work/family Provisions: In many countries, including New Zealand and Australia, neo-Iiberallabour market Trends and Prospects under Enterprise Bargaining', Labour and Industry, reforms have been introduced in one form or another in recent years. These reforms vol. 12, pp. 109-130. are designed to enhance the role of individual contractual arrangements between employees and employers and reduce the role of unions and other third parties Wooden, M. (2002), 'The changing Labour Market and its Impact on Employment Relations', in Callus, R. and Lansbury, R. D. (eds), Working Futures: The in determining workplace arrangements. A number of studies have pointed to the Changing Nature of Work and Employment Relations in Australia, Federation rise in the relative importance of lockouts as a possible consequence of these Press, Sydney, pp. 51-69. reforms (Macfie, 1992; Anderson, 1994; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2001; Briggs 2004, 2005). This paper further explores this issue with reference, principally, to New Zealand experience. It departs from earlier studies and commentaries by

"Universlty of Technology, Sydney. 402 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 403 analysing official unpublished estimates of lockouts in New Zealand in conjunction During the 1970s and 1980s New Zealand's economy and especially its labour with official published data plus certain unofficial data. These data, available in a market came under increasing strain as the performance of the economy restricted form for the period 1986 to 2004 only, give estimates of workers involved progressively deteriorated. The economic difficulties are well illustrated by New in lockouts and person-days lost due to lockouts. These data have not to date Zealand's unemployment rate. Up until the late 1970s New Zealand enjoyed an been employed anywhere else in analysing the characteristics of lockouts and unemployment rate below - and at times well below - 1 per cent. From around strikes in New Zealand. The use of these data provides a fuller understanding 1978 to 1991, the unemployment rate rose, with only occasional respite, to a little of the shape of lockouts (and strikes) than that offered by officially published over 10 percent in 1991. Of course, most Organization for Economic Cooperation data that is confined to reporting only the number of lockouts while making no and Development (OECD) economies experienced difficult times during these reference to the number of workers involved in lockouts or the number of person- years; but the relative deterioration of the New Zealand labour market was days lost due to lockouts. ' considerably more pronounced than the deterioration that occurred on average for other major OECD economies. Accordingly, this paper sets out (i) to examine the relation, if any, between recent labour market reform and lockouts in New Zealand and (ii) to compare New It was in response to these deteriorating labour-market trends that both minor and Zealand experience with that of Australia. To address these issues the next section major reforms were implemented. As mentioned above, a number of relatively reviews New Zealand's labour market reforms. This is followed by a discussion minor liberalising reforms and amendments to the conciliation and arbitration act of New Zealand's statistics on lockouts and strikes, noting in particular some of occurred over the years (Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Olssen, 1988; Boxall, 1990; the limitations of both the published and unpublished data employed in this study. Deeks and Rasmussen, 2002; Kerr, 2005), but the most significant reform was The penultimate section investigates the possible impact of neo-Iiberal labour introduced in 1991 via the Employment Contracts Act, 1991 [ECA] (Dannin, 1997; market reforms and lockouts in New Zealand and then compares New Zealand's Kelsey, 1997; Walsh et aI., 2004). According to Walsh et al.: 'Rarely has one experience with that of Australia. Conclusions follow in the final section. labour market regime been replaced by another so fundamentally at odds with its predecessor' (p. 67). The legislation was introduced by the National Party in May New Zealand Labour Market Reform Background of 1991 under Prime Minister , Finance Minister and Employment Minister Bill (later Sir William) Birch after the defeat of the Labour For close on a century New Zealand operated under a system of conciliation Party in the 1990 election. The legislation was generally hostile to the interests and arbitration quite similar to the one subsequently established in Australia of unions. The rights and status of unions that had been established under the in 1904. The system of conciliation and arbitration was initially set up in New earlier legislation were demolished. Compulsory union membership became Zealand under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 (Holt, 1986). unlawful. Employers could veto unions from entering their workplaces in order to There were of course numerous amendments and refinements to the system recruit new members. Strikes in support of multi-employer agreements (pattern established in 1894, but the basic system of centralised and legalistic dispute bargaining, in Australian parlance) were outlawed. Union density - the proportion settlement procedures remained largely intact until 1991. of employees who are union members - declined sharply particularly during the New Zealand's reformist Fourth Labour Government, in office from 1984 to 1990, early years of the operation of the Employment Contracts Act. In 1991, 43 percent did dramatically reduce the role of government in the economy by 'cutting subsidies of employees were union members. By 1995 - the mid-point of the life of the to agriculture, privatising state-owned enterprises, reducing tariff protection Act - the density rate was down to 26.7 per cent. Density appears to have more and placing much greater reliance on market forces in general (Wooden and or less stabilised since 1998 at between 21 and 22 per cent (Blackwood et aI., Sloan 1998). It also sought to encourage enterprise bargaining and, accordingly, 2005). Of course, other factors, such as de-industrialisation, increased female introduced numerous legislative reforms designed to inject greater flexibility into workforce participation and increased part-time employment, contributed to the the determination of workplace arrangements. In spite of these initiatives, as Deeks decline in union density. But there seems little doubt that the ECA accelerated and Rasmussen (2002, p. 62) point out: '... the formal- that is, the structural and the decline in union power and influence. institutional - aspects of employment relations did not change very markedly.' There can also be no doubt that the relative bargaining position of unions was 404 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 405 weakened during this period. Not only was there union-hostile legislation in place Between 1996 and 1999, National formed a coalition with the (Macfie 1992), but also unemployment was at a post-World War II (annual average) Party. The coalition proved to be rather fragile, however; and National itself was high of 10.3 per cent during 1991 and 1992 (GECD 2005). Table 1 column (iii) afflicted by internal tensions, reflected in part by a prime-ministerial change in documents this. Column (iv) in the same table illustrates that New Zealand's 1997. During the last three years of National-led government, there was little unemployment rate, relative to the overall average unemployment of the OECD's improvement in New Zealand's unemployment rate, either in absolute terms or Major 7, was at it's greatest during 1991, the year that the ECA was introduced. I in terms relative to that of the OECD's Major 7 (Table 1). By 1996, though still high when compared to New Zealand's experience of the 1950s, 60s and much of the 70s, the unemployment rate was much improved With the re-election of a Labour Party government in 1999, many of the changes relative to the OECD average of that time (Table 1, column (iv». The period 1991 embodied in the ECAwere dropped. The Labour government, headed by Helen to 1996 can be seen, quite reasonably, as one of considerable improvement in a Clark, enacted the Employment Relations Act [ERA] in October 2000. The ERA number of key labour market indicators. Unemployment by international standards restored some of the former status and privileges afforded unions in the pre-1991 had improved. GOP growth increased markedly (column (l) and inflation (column system (Walsh et al. 2004; Rasmussen 2004; Rasmussen and Lamm 2005; Kerr (ii» was considerably lower than was the case in earlier years. 2005). There was, however, only a partial return to the past. The right of unions to enter the workplace to recruit members was restored, as was support for possible multi-employer agreements (pattem bargaining). On the other hand, union Table 1: Selected Statistics for New Zealand: 1986-2004 membership remains a matter of choice and there is no compulsory arbitration. Most observers seem to be of the view that, in terms of outcomes (as opposed Growth in real Unemployment Growth In GOP Unemployment: perhaps to intentions), the ERA had (and has) more in common with the ECA than GOP rate NZ Rate as deflator (%) with the earlier legislation in place during the years of conciliation and arbitration (°4), (%) % pfMalprZ (i) (ii) ... (/II) from1894 to 1991 (Morrison 2003; Anderson 2004; Rasmussen and Lamm 2005 1986 0.6 15.3 4.1 Jeffrey and Foster 2005). 1987 0.8 4.1 Certainly, the proportion of workers in trade unions has not recovered as a result 1988 2.6 7.5 5.6 95 1989 0.6 of the ERA, remaining virtually unchanged since 1998 at a little over 20 per 1990 0.5 3.3 7.8 144 cent of wage and salary earners (Blackwood et al. 2005). Similarly, collective bargaining has not grown in importance during the years of the ERA (Foster et 1992 0.8 1.4 10.3 149 al. 2006; May et al. 2004). Subsequent amendments to the original ERA were 1993 introduced in December 2004; but these changes do not affect our study as its 1994 6.2 1.1 8.1 116 end date is 2004. 1995 It is interesting to note that during the period of the operation of the ERA, the 1996 3.5 2.4 6.1 91 1997 unemployment rate fell each year, both in absolute terms and relative to the unemployment rate for the OECD's Major 7, as Table 1 indicates. Supporters 1998 0.2 1.2 7.5 118 of market-oriented reforms see this as a long-term consequence of the ECA reforms introduced in 1990. Opponents of market-oriented reforms see the recent 2000 3.6 2.6 6.0 105 2001 improvements as evidence that moderate collectivist policies are not inimical to growth and development. It is, of course, well beyond the scope and purpose of 2002 4.6 0.4 5.2 79 2003 this paper to evaluate the macroeconomic effectiveness of the ECA versus the ERA regimes. For a start, the influences on the macroeconomy are multifactorial. 2004 4.4 3.9 3.9 61 Source: GECD (2005) It is of interest to note, however, the pattern of change in labour market conditions 406 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 407 - and the unemployment rate in particular - as labour market conditions can have during which lockouts numbered less than 3. In order to get official numbers for an effect on the likelihood of work stoppages occurring. employees involved and person-days lost, it has been necessary to combine certain years so as to get an aggregate number of lockouts of 3 or more. For The Lawfulness Of Stoppages example, for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, there were 1, 0 and 2 lockouts respectively. Statistics New Zealand provided the unpublished data on workers The regulation of strikes and lockouts had, up until the passage of the Labour involved in stoppages and person days lost due to stoppages for the total of the Relations Act 1987, been governed by a convoluted mix of English common law three years (2002 to 2004). and various statutory provisions originating a century or so back. According to Anderson (1994, p. 124) the effect of this was '... to make almost any form of As a result of these restrictions on the availability of official unpublished data industrial action by workers unlawful. In practice, however, strikes always played and so as to have a sufficient number of years to generate a workable data set a significant role in industrial relations regardless of the law.' [Emphasis added] on lockouts, multi-year comparisons have been made of lockouts and strikes. 4 Also, so as to mesh the available data with different legislative periods (discussed Anderson's observation about the lawfulness of strikes and lockouts is important, below), additional unofficial information on lockouts from Rasmussen and Mcintosh because it indicates that the apparent lawfulness or otherwise of strikes and (1999a, 1999b) are applied.' lockouts has frequently been a minor determinant of whether or not stoppages occur. Other factors, such as union power, general economic conditions (e.g. Finally, it is important to note that Statistics New Zealand employs the convention inflation and the unemployment rate) and government and social perceptions that whether a work stoppage is classified as a lockout or a strike is determined at and attitudes towards unions and the issues in dispute, among other things, often the beginning of the action. Thus, if a dispute that started as a strike subsequently override concerns about the legal status of a strike or lockout. Moreover, it is not transformed itself into a lockout, its original classification of being a strike does uncommon, in the interests of industrial harmony, to settle stoppages without not chanqe.? resort to a full-blown and expensive legal battle. Two approaches are employed in the periodisation of data. The first approach The Labour Relations Act 1987 sought to spell out, for the first time, exactly when slices the data into the three principal politico-legislative periods. These are: a strike or lockout could be classified as lawful or unlawful. Subsequent legislation has similarly identified lawful and unlawful stoppaqes.? The ECA narrowed the • Period 1: 1986-91 Conciliation and Arbitration band of acceptable lawful stoppages and the ERA, on balance, widened the band • Period 2: 1991-2000 ECA (Anderson 1994,2004). • Period 3: 2001-04 ERA New Zealand Lockout Statistics Note the overlap of 1991 for Period 1 and Period 2. This is because the ECA Statistics New Zealand is the body charged with the responsibility of collecting and came into force in May 1991, so that both the era of conciliation and arbitration publlshinq New Zealand statistics. It categorises work stoppages as being either and the contracts era had some impact on 1991. The inclusion or exclusion of strikes or lockouts.' Data on the number of strikes and the number of lockouts are 1991, in one era or the other, does not materially alter the results of this paper. published separately. Between 1986 and 2004, the number of lockouts averaged The data for this approach to periodization are depicted in Figure 1 and will be about 3 per cent of all work stoppages. discussed below.

The number of employees involved in lockouts and the number of person-days lost A second approach to the periodisation of data slices the years of the ECA into due to lockouts are not published. Unpublished data have been made available three sub-periods, roughly corresponding to the three separate periods that in a restricted form, however, covering the period 1986 to 2004. For reasons of National were elected to office while the ECA legislation was in place. These privacy, Statistics New Zealand is not permitted to reveal the number of employees more finely subdivided periods are indicated below. involved in lockouts or the number of person-days lost through lockouts when there are fewer than three lockouts. Between 1986 and 2004 there were 13 years • Period 1: 1986-91 Conciliation and Arbitration 409 408 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry

.. "r'"' ~ ~ Cl L- ~ ~ u::: o rJ) 410 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 411

• Period 2a: 1991-93 EGA Early Stage 2a corresponds to the first three years of the administration of the National Government. National won a clear majority in the election of October 1990. This • Period 2b: 1994-96 EGA Middle Stage sub-period incorporates the aggressively pro-market Finance ministership of Ruth Richardson (1991-1993), who was seen as being a prime driver in introducing • Period 2c: 1997-00 EGA Later Stage market-oriented reforms during these years. • Period 3: 2001-04 ERA Sub-period 2b corresponds to the second three years of the administration of the The data for this arrangement are depicted in Figure 2 and will be discussed National Government. National entered this period with a majority of one (and 35 below. per cent of the vote). During this period Bill Birch acted as Finance Minister; he was perceived to be more moderate than Richardson, his predecessor. During Note that the identification of different periods is in part determined by data this period, as a result of a referendum on voting preferences, a new system of availability. Notwithstanding the limitations placed on the analysis by these voting was introduced that gave a greater voice to minor parties. informational shortfalls, some interesting patterns can be gleaned. Before exploring them, we comment briefly on the various periods and sub-periods identified Sub-period 2c corresponds to the third three years of the administration of the above. National Government plus the year 2000 during which labour was in office while the EGA was in place. During this period, National (which had received 34 per Period 1 incorporates the last years of the old conciliation and arbitration system, cent of the vote) formed a coalition with the New Zealand First Party, headed by and represents most of the years of New Zealand's Fourth Labour Government . This was a politically fragile period as there was considerable under Prime MinistersLange, Palmer and Moore. Labour held office from July 1984 tension between the coalition partners. Birch and Peters shared the Finance to November 1990. Foster et al. (2006, p. 180) refer to the period of the Fourth ministry, more or less." A further indicator of the political tension of this period Labour Government as one of 'transition to collective bargaining'. This period was the switch in 1997 from Jim Bolger as Prime Minister to . was distinctly different from the preceding politico-legislative period, from 1975 to 1984, during which Prime Minister Muldoon pursued a highly interventionist It is important to note that the decision to subdivide the years of the ECA into the approach to the management of labour and product markets, including a wage above sub-periods has been largely determined by data availability, notwithstanding freeze from 1982 to 1984 and a controversial pick-a-winner industry policy. the fact that there are, quite fortuitously, some political aspects of the three periods that might justify this particular arrangement of the data. Period 1 begins with 1986 as there are no data available for the first 18 months of the Fourth Labour Government. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that if data Period 4 incorporates the years of the ERA. The ERA was introduced by New were available for the earlier months, they would change the basics of the story Zealand's Fifth Labour Government, which came to office in December 1999, presented here. It is important to note that 1986 was the year in which the largest under the Prime Ministership of Helen Clark. The ERA was enacted in October number of person-days lost due to work stoppages has ever been recorded in 2000 and was well entrenched during the 2001-04 period. Amendments to the New Zealand; and it was also the year in which the second largest number of ERA were enacted in late 2004, but these changes do not affect our analysis days lost per employee was recorded, the highest reading occurring in 1951. since our end-date is 2004. This needs to be kept in mind when comparing the various periods under review, in that in some ways the work stoppages experience of period 1 incorporates Lockouts and Politico-legislative Eras a relatively exceptional year. Most of the person-days lost during 1986 were In this section we investigate the relation between the pattern of lockouts and attributable to protracted and widespread stoppages in the meat industry (Roth, strikes during the different politico-legislative periods discussed above. Figure 1986a and 1986b). 1 is composed of nine graphs, G1 to G9, that correspond to the various periods Period 2 represents the years of the ECA years. The ECA was in force from discussed in the previous section. Graphs G1 to G3 depict lockouts in terms May 1991 to October 2000. Period 2 is sliced into three sub-periods. Sub-period of (i) numbers, (ii) employees involved and (iii) person-days lost, respectively. 412 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 413 The broadest measure of lockouts is the number of person-days lost (G3). The year (1986) of the entire period under review was unusually high, and this may pattern displayed by G3 indicates a substantial downwards trend in lockouts have magnified the extent of the underlying decline in work stoppages - especially over the timeframe under review. Note that the published data on the number work stoppages caused by lockouts. Nevertheless, the strikes and lockouts of 1986 of lockouts depicted in G1 suggest a rise in lockout numbers during the ECA did happen and it would be entirely inappropriate to in anyway ignore them. period compared to the preceding conciliation and arbitration period (Briggs, Secondly, the data on total person-days lost due to work stoppages is dominated 2005). But the unpublished data on person-days lost due to lockouts, which are by strikes - not lockouts. Strikes account for over 95 per cent of all person-days a broader and superior measure of the overall dimensions of stoppaqes," are lost in New Zealand for the period under review. Even during the Middle Stage of trending strongly downward. the ECA period when lockouts rose considerably in relative importance, lockouts Graphs G4 to G6 in Figure 1 depict strikes in terms of (i) numbers, (ii) employees accounted for less than ten per cent of all stoppages; and total stoppages during involved and (iii) person-days lost, respectively. Graph G6 shows a pronounced this period were relatively low (well below one third of the annual average for the declining trend somewhat similar to the pattern of decline for lockouts in G3. The entire post-World War II period). , overall dimensions of days lost due to strikes is, however, considerably larger Thirdly, the relative importance of lockouts as a source of days lost increased than is the case for lockouts. A declining trend in the patterns of strikes in terms of (i) numbers and (ii) employees involved is also discernible. quite sharply during the middle stage of the ECAperiod, then fell during the later stage. The relative increase in lockouts during the ECA period as a whole - with its Graphs G7 to G9 in Figure 1 depict lockouts as a percentage of strikes in terms disempowering impact on unions (though not necessarily on employees") - might of (i) numbers, (ii) employees involved and (iii) person-days lost, respectively. be expected. The relative rise in lockouts during the ECA period. however, was Graph G7 to G9 have similar shapes, indicating the greater relative incidence of not sustained. lockouts, on average, during the ECA years. Lastly, it can be noted that the general decline in stoppages in New Zealand has Figure 2 depicts the same measures of lockouts and strikes as Figure 1; but been broadly similar to the decline in work stoppages experienced in most other it decomposes the period of the EGA into its three previously-discussed sub- OEGD economies over the last two or three decades (Monger 2005). The decline periods; i.e. the Early Stage (1991-93), the Middle Stage (1994-1996) and the in stoppages in other economies has been similarly (though not exclusively) Later Stage (1997-2000) of the ECA. Key features of Figure 2 are as follows. linked to declining union density, as well as legislative and other broader and First, while the number of lockouts (G1) and the number of workers involved in social and economic changes. lockouts (G2) peaked during the Early Stage of the EGA, the number of person days lost (G3) did not peak until the Middle Stage of the EGA. Second, likewise, Comparisons with Australia while the relative number of lockouts (G7) and the relative number of workers There are no official data on lockouts in Australia. Briggs (2004), however, involved in lockouts (G8) peaked during the Early Stage of the EGA, the relative conducted a survey of Australian lockouts for the period 1994-2003. He found number of person days lost (G9) did not peak until Middle Stage of the EGA. that the absolute and relative number of person-days lost in lockouts was higher Third, during the last four years of the EGA the number of person days lost due in the second half-decade period (1999-2003) than during the first half-decade to lockouts was low both in absolute numbers (G3) and relative to strikes (G9). (1994-1998). During the earlier half decade, lockouts accounted for 1.6 per cent And fourth, strikes have been trending downwards in terms of person-days lost of all person-days lost; in the later period, the proportion was 9.3 per cent. Thus during the years of the EGA (G6). Briggs (2004, p. 107) observes that •... lockouts are still relatively rare but on an A number of general observations can be made about the last near-twenty years upward trend'. for which unpublished data on lockouts have been charted. Briggs attributes the absolute and relative increase in lockouts to the introduction First, there has been a marked declining trend in both person-days lost due to of enterprise bargaining enshrined in the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 lockouts and strikes. To be sure, the peak in lockouts and strikes during the first [IRRA]. The IRRA introduced the right of employers to lockout employees as a 414 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 415

counterbalance to the right of employees to strike. The right to lockout employees The New Zealand data presented in this paper do not support the view that the was extended under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 [WRA] ' ... by introducing upturn in the number of lockouts in New Zealand during the 1990s up to 1996 the right to use them [lockouts] as a means of pressuring employees to sign reflects a general increase in lockout activity attributable to the introduction of individual Australian Workplace Agreements' (Briggs 2004, p. 102). the ECA (Briggs 2005). Person days lost in lockouts were far greater during the years of conciliation and arbitration - transitioning to collective bargaining under There appear to be some similarities in the experiences of Australia and New the auspices of New Zealand's Fourth Labour Government - than during the Zealand with respect to the impact of general neo-liberallegislative changes on years of the ECA. Moreover, during the later years of the ECA, lockouts fell both lockouts, notwithstanding the fact that the ECA reforms in New Zealand were in absolute terms and relatively to strikes. conspicuously more comprehensive than the reforms introduced in Australia around the same time. In New Zealand, the introduction of the ECA, which reduced union Some Concluding Thoughts power and increased employer power, coincided with a relative rise in lockouts - though not for a sustained period. In Australia, the effect of the WRA was to There are interesting similarities and differences in the experience of New Zealand reinforce the bargaining power of employers, and this has been associated with and' Australia with regard to lockouts. Both countries have at various times a (delayed) relative increase in the use of lockouts (Sheldon and Thornthwaite introduced legislative reforms that have favoured, to some extent, individual 2001; Briggs 2004). contracting over collective arrangements involving unions and/or other active third party participants. In New Zealand, the ECA of 1991 represented an extraordinary Briggs (2004) found that lockouts in Australia tended to be relatively protracted change in the legislative framework of New Zealand's labour market. In Australia, affairs. Thus during the earlier half-decade period (1994-1998),7.7 per cent of the IRRA of 1993, in conjunction with the WRA of 1996, represented major 'long' stoppages (stoppages lasting 20 or more person days) were accounted changes in the evolution of the legislative framework of Australia's labour market. for by lockouts. But during the later haff-decade period (1999-2003), lockouts In both cases, the legislative changes - accompanied by declining union density accounted for 57.5 per cent of all long stoppages. All in all, these results imply - seem to have spawned, at least for a while, a relative rise in lockouts. In New that the average duration of lockouts in Australia has been high - and, for the Zealand, the relative rise in lockouts was largely confined to the first six years of period in review, trending up. the ECA. In Australia, the relative and absolute rise in lockouts seems to have increased in intensity after some time had lapsed during the currency of the WRA. What of New Zealand? Table 2 gives estimates of the average duration of strikes Indeed, it was not until 2000 that the number of lockouts in Australia increased and lockouts in New Zealand. These data indicate that the average duration of quite markedly. Perhaps there was a period of learning. Perhaps the economic lockouts is about four times greater than the average duration of strikes. These slowdown of 2000 and 2001 motivated some employers to cut labour costs and results for New Zealand are consistent with experience in Australia: namely that, experiment with lockouts to that end. That appeared to be the case in at least on average, lockouts have tended to last longer than strikes." one major lockout (Briggs 2004, pp. 105-106).

Interestingly, New Zealand and Australia appear now to be travelling rather Table 2: Duration of Lockouts and Strikes in New Zealand: divergent paths. New Zealand's Employment Relations Amendment Act 2004, 1986-2004 introduced in December of 2004, has pushed New Zealand further towards past practices of centrally regulated working conditions (Kerr 2005). On the other hand, Period Number of Average Duration in Days of: Ratio of Duration of Australia endorsed in December of 2005 the Workplace Relations Amendment Years Lockouts Strikes Lockouts to Strikes (Work Choices) Bill 2005, which promises to push Australian labour markets 1986-91 6 23.5 5.6 4.2 further down the track of deregulation, decentralisation and individual contracting. 1991-00 10 6.2 2.0 3.1 It will be of interest to learn exactly how these divergent policies affect lockouts 2001-04 4 8.6 2.0 4.4 - provided the data can be found. Source: As for Figure 1 416 Australian Bulletin of Labour Pen)' 417

Endnotes 6 One notable strike that transformed into a lockout was the 1951 waterfront dispute (Bassett, 1972; Deeks and Rasmussen 2002; Grant, 2004). Person-days lost per employee I The OECD Major 7 is made up of the USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and in 1951 was the highest in New Zealand's recorded history, due to this protracted dispute. Canada. The average unemployment rate for the Major 7 is the sum of the numbers According to Woods (2004), the dispute started on 9 February 1951 as an overtime ban, unemployed in all countries divided by the sum of the labour forces of all countries. This i.e. a partial strike, by the Waterside Workers Union. The overtime ban continued for about is effectively a weighted average measure of the unemployment rate, where the weights a couple of weeks until workers arrived '... to find the wharf gates locked against them, are the ratios of each individual country's labour force to total Major 7 labour force. and work on the wharf completely stopped. It was the action of the government not the 2 The short-term impact of the implementation of the Labour Relations Act on stoppages union, that caused that stoppage' (p. 17) is unclear. For example, for the first three years during which the act was operative 7 The role of the Finance Ministry was split into two separate offices. The office and title (financial years 1987/88 to 1989/00), annual stoppages were greater than during the 'Treasurer' was given to Winston Peters; this was seen as a relatively senior position. The last year (1986/87) of when the preceding legislation was in place. Nevertheless, the office and title: 'Minister of Finance' was given to Birch; this was seen as a lesser position; immediate years prior to 1986/87 did produce a relatively high level of industrial disputes, although one opposition politician claimed: 'we are always impressed when Winston Peters particularly 1985/86. answers questions, because Bill Birch's lips do not move' (Wikipedia, 2005). As an aside, 3 'Partial strikes' are included in strike data in this paper. Partial strikes cause a reduction history in some ways repeated itself in 2005 when Winston Peters' New Zealand First in the normal rate of output, and include overtime bans, go-slows and such like. Lockouts Party formed a coalition with the Labour Party. This time round, Peters will be Minister for data include 'partial lockouts'. Foreign Affairs and Racing, though he will not be in the Cabinet. 4 The following years were combined so as to get the required minimum of three or more 8 Cf. Deeks, et al. (1994) and Henning (1995). See also Harbridge (1987) who calls into lockouts and to protect confidentiality: (A) 1987, 1990 and 1995, (B) 1997 and 1998, (C) question the accuracy of the official data collection. 1999 to 2001 and (D) 2002 to 2004. Note that for the combined years of period (A), the 9 Rasmussen and Lamm (2005) point out that during the ECA period there was a sharp aggregated numbers of employees involved and person-days lost were relatively small. rise in personal grievance complaints against employers. Personal grievance claims are So as to compare the pre-ECA period (pre-1991) with subsequent periods, the aggregate quite similar to unfair dismissal claims in Australia. As a consequence, employers needed number for the combined years of period (A) were apportioned (as per the number of to be very careful when seeking to dismiss employees. Certain, at times unclear, protocols lockouts) and assigned to the respective years. Given the very small size of the aggregated needed to be followed (Woodward, 1995). All in all, the possibility of personal grievance number, any inaccuracies associated with the apportioning will be very slight. claims against an employer, had the effect of limiting the prerogative of employers and 5 Further to the preceding endnote, to make the apportionments for period (C) 1999 to management to hire and fire at will. 2001, certain unofficial information on lockouts has been employed. Recall that the ECA era 10 Perry (2006) finds a similar pattern for India. ended with the introduction of the ERA legislation in October 2000. The number of lockouts for 1999, 2000 and 2001 were respectively, 1, zero and 2. According to Rasmussen and References Macintosh (1999a: 215, 1999b: 397) there was one relatively small lockouts during April- Anderson, G. (1994), 'New Zealand', in Blanpain, R. (ed.), Strikes and Lockouts May of 1999. The numbers given and otherwise suggested by Rasmussen and Macintosh in Industrialised Nations, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, YOI. 29, are assigned to 1999, while the balance of the (unpublished) aggregate data recorded pp. 123 - 145 by Statistics New Zealand is assigned to 2001. Note that Rasmussen and Macintosh (1999b: 100) also report that a lockout occurred in October of 1999. This lockout, however, Anderson, G. (2004), 'Part 8 - strikes and Lockouts', Mazengarbs's Employment seemingly started as a strike, before it morphed into a lockout. The Statistics New Zealand Law, Butterworths, Wellington, pp. 550,001-554,306. convention that disputes are classified as strikes or lockouts according only to how they Bassett, M. (1972), Confrontation '51: The 1951 Waterfront Dispute, Wellington, commence, has been applied. Thus the October strike-turned-lockout is excluded from Reed. the tally of lockouts. 418 Australian Bulletin of Labour Perry 419 Blackwood, L., Feinberg-DanieH, G. and Lafferty, G. (2005), 'Unions and Union Jeffrey, G. and Foster, B. (2005), 'Curbs on union influence and activity in New Membership in New Zealand: Annual Review for 2003', New Zealand Zealand: Has anything changed in the last twenty years?', paper presented to Journal of Employment Relations, vol. 30, pp. 1-11. Accessed via Proquest the 13th Annual International Employment Relations Association Conference, 01.08.2006. June 26-29, Aalborg University, Denmark.

Bollard, A. and Buckle, R. (1987), Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand, Kelsey, J. (1997), The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Wellington, Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press. Adjustmenr?, University Press.

Boxall, P. (1990), 'Towards the Wagner Framework: Change in New Zealand Kerr, R. (2005), 'Lessons from Labour Market Reform in New Zealand', The H Industrial Relations', Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 32, pp 523-543. R Nichols Society's XXVI Conference, 18 March, Melbourne. http://www. hrnicholls.com.au/nicholls/nichv026/kerr.pdf Accessed: 06.12.2005. Briggs, C. (2004), 'The Return of the Lockout in Australia: a Profile of Lockouts since the Decentralisation of Bargaining', Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol. Macfie, R. (1992), 'Employers' use of Lockouts under the Employment Contracts 30, pp. 101-112. Act 1991: A New Balance of Power?', New Zealand Joumal of Employment Relations, vol. 17, pp. 319-331. Briggs, C. (2005), 'Strikes and Lockouts in the Antipodes: Neo-Liberal Convergence in Australia and New Zealand', New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, May, R, Walsh, P. and Otto, C. (2004), 'Unions and Union Membership in New vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 1-15. Accessed via Proquest 01.08.2006. Zealand: Annual Review for 2003', New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, vol. 29, pp. 83-96. Dannin, E. (1997), Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act, Auckland University Press. May, R., Walsh, P. and Kiely, P. (2004), 'Employment Agreements: Bargaining Trends and Employment Law Update 2003/2004'. Presented to Employment Deeks, J., Parker, J. and Ryan, R. (1994), Employment Relations in New Zealand, Agreements Update Seminars, Wellington July 16. Auckland, Longman Paul. Monger, J. (2005), 'International Comparisons of Labour Disputes in 2003', Labour Deeks, J. and Rasmussen, E. (2002), Employment Relations in New Zealand, Market Trends, vol. 113, pp. 159-168. Auckland, Prentice Hall. Morrison, P. S. (2001), 'Employment', Asia Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 42, pp. 85- Foster, B., McAndew, I., Murrie, J. and Laird, I. (2006), 'Employer Attitudes to 106. Collective Bargaining in Regional New Zealand', in Pocock, B., Provis, C. and Willis, E. (eds), 21st Century Work: High Road or Low Road, Refereed Morrison, P.S. (2003), Deregulation of the New Zealand Labour Market, GeoJouma/, Proceedings of the 20th Conference of the AIRAANZ. vol. 59, pp. 127-136.

Grant, D. (ed.) (2004), The Big Blue: Snapshots of the 1951 Waterfront Lockout, OECD (2005), Economic Outlook, Paris. Canterbury University Press, Christchurch. Olssen, E. (1988), The Red Feds: Revolutionary Industrial Unionism and the Harbridge, R. (1987), 'The (In)accuracy of Official Work Stoppage Statistics in New New Zealand Federation ofLabour 1908-1913, Auckland, Oxford University Zealand', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 20, pp 77-92. Press.

Henning, J (1995), 'The Employment Contracts Act and Work Stoppages', New Perry, L. J. (2006), 'Lockouts and Strikes: Some Comments on the Experience Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol 12, pp 31-35. of India and Australia', Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol. 32, pp. 74-102.

Holt, J. (1986), Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand: The First Forty Years, Rasmussen, E. (Ed.) (2004), Employment Relationships: New Zealand's Auckland, Auckland University Press. Employment Relations Act, Auckland University Press, Auckland. 420 Australian Bulletin of Labour ABL Vol 32 No 4 2006 421 Rasmussen, E. and Lamm, F. (2005), 'From Collectivism to Individualism in New CONTRIBUTED ARTICLE Zealand Employment Relations', AIRAANZ.

Rasmussen, E. and Mcintosh, I. (1999a), 'Chronicle', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 24, pp. 205-217.

Rasmussen, E. and Mcintosh, I. (1999b), 'Chronicle', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 24, pp. 397-405.

Roth, H. (1986a), 'Chronicle', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 11, pp. 51-59. Abstract Roth, H. (1986b), 'Chronicle', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 11, pp. 141-148. Insider-outsider theories have been advanced to explain a range of phenomena, principally the persistence of unemployment. This paper uses data from the Sheldon, P. and Thornthwaite, L. (2001), 'Employer Matters in 2000', Journal of Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995, and regional labour Industrial Relations, vol 43, pp. 219-242. force survey data, to test this model. The paper also examines how enterprise bargaining influences the relative power positions of insiders and outsiders. Walsh, P., Harbridge, R. and Wilkinson, D. (2004), 'Employment Relations in New The paper finds provisional support for the insider-outsider distinction, and for Zealand: The Role of the State vis-a-vis the Labour Movement', in Verma, the idea that enterprise level wage bargaining enhances insider power at the A. and Kochan" T. A. (eds), Unions in the 21st Century: An International expense of outsiders. Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1. Introduction Wikipedia (2005), 'Bill Birch', http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill Birch Accessed: Insider-outsider models have been advanced to explain a range of phenomena, 06.12.2005, principally the persistence of unemployment. The first purpose of this paper is to Wooden, M. and Sloan, J. (1998), 'Industrial Relations Reform and Labour provide an empirical test of this theory using Australian micro-data. The second Market Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia, New Zealand and the United purpose is to examine the relationship between wage setting institutions and Kingdom', in G. Debelle (Ed), Proceedings of a Conference: Unemployment insider power. Specifically, the paper seeks to establish whether enterprise level and the Australian Labour Market, June 1998, Reserve Bank of Australia wage setting facilitates or restrains insider power. Analysis of the Australian and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, experience is well suited to this task, since this economy has been moving from Sydney, pp 169-203. a centralised, at times corporatist, wage setting system to one based at the enterprise, over the past two decades. The result is a hybrid system of centralised Woods, N. (2004), 'Setting the Scene', in Grant, D. (ed.), The Big Blue: Snapshots and decentralised elements. of the 1951 Waterfront Lockout, Canterbury University Press, Christchurch.

Woodward, S. (1995), 'The Effect of Employee Conduct on Personal Grievance Remedies', New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 20, pp. 183- *Macquarie University. 193. * I am grateful to Bill Junor, Roger Tonkin and Bruce Chapman for comments on the research that went into this paper. I also express my gratitude to participants at a seminar at the Australian Centre for Industrial Relation Research and Training, University of Sydney, for helpful comments; and to two anonymous referees of this journal for their very insightful comments. Any errors are mine. Address for correspondence: Dr Michael Dobbie, Economics Department, Macquarie University, New South Wales, Australia, 2109. Email: [email protected] AUSTRALIAN BULLETIN OF LABOUR

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.Refereeing Procedures: !tis the policy of the editors to send submitted papers to two referees under the standard double-blind procedure, Papers that have been refereed are identified by the heading 'Contributed Article'. The editors may publish papers because of their general interest without submitting them to referees. Contents The Nati relevant to views about any of th~ substantive topics discussed in this numbe Will Older Workers Change Their Retirement Plans in Line With Government Bulletin of Labour. The opinions expressed are those of the identified au Thinking? A Review of Recent Literature on Retirement Intentions N. Jackson, M. Walter, B. Felmingham, A. Spinaze 315

The Changing Contours of Labour Disputes and Conflict Resolution in Australia: Towards a Post-Arbitral Measurement Framework C. Briggs 345

Protecting Employee Entitlements: Corporate Governance and Industrial Democracy in Australia J. Burgess, J. Lewer and P. Waring 365

Voting With Their Feet: Family Friendliness and Parent Employment in Australian Industries, 1981-2001 L.Strazdins, D. Broom, S. Meyerkort, B. Warren 381

Labour Market Reforms and Lockouts in New Zealand L. Perry 401

Insider Power, Outsider Ineffectiveness and Wage Setting Institutions: Evidence from Australia M. Dobbie 421

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