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Notes Political Decay in : 1. S. Touval, : Inter- natiml Politics and the Driwfor Unity in From Personal Rule to Warlordism the (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963): 52. Daniel Compagnon 2. R. Beachey, The WarriorMulluh (London: Bellew Publishing, 1990): 41,159. 3. Colonial Office, "Report of the Somali- The Somali people's high expectations The rapacity of the political land Protectorate Constitutional after SiadBarrelsoppressive regime was entrepreneurs and their impatient drive Conference Held in London in May overthrown in January 1991 have since to secure state power at any cost, added 1%0" (London: Her Majestf s Stationery turned into bitter disillusionment and to the preexisting factors of political Office, 1960): 2. mass suffering. According to some UN decay and clan-based factionalism, are 4. Touval, Somali Nationalism. reports, 4.5 million people in Somalia are all part and parcel of Siad Barre's legacy. 5. Ibid., 78. facing a food shortage and 1.5 million 6. I.M. Lewis, A Modem Nistoy of Somalia: will starve in the coming months. In May The Bitter Legacy of Personal Rule Nation and State in the Horn of Africa and June 5,000 children under the age of (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988): 14. five died daily1 and 7,000 people died in The analytical notion of personal rule is 7. R Gorman, Political Conflict on the Horn of Baydhaabo in June. The case of the designed to capture a contemporary Africa (New York Praeger, 1981): 133. interriverine region exemplifies how the style of governance well represented in 8. Colonial Office, Report of the is a direct outcome of political Africa3that combines authoritarian rule, Protectorate Constitutional Conference, 2. internal strife and lawlessness: the a low level of institutionalization of 9. Touval, Somali Nationalism, 103. farmersinterviewed in the Bardeera area political processes (including decision 10. Ibid., 112. explained that the Mareehaan militias of making), concentration of power in the 11. S. Mohamed, "Les Politiques du Siad Barre looted their herds, water hands of the ruler, and private Developpement en Somalie: Les Facteurs pumps and sowing seeds several times, appropriationof state resources through Socio-Economiques." Doctoral disserta- while those of Baydhaabo said they were corruption, patronage and prebends? tion, Ecole desHautes Etudes en Sciences looted by (USC) Siad Barre's regime evolved from an Sociales, Paris, 1983,27. gunmen as weL2This human disaster is original pattern of bureaucratic- 12. Touval, Somali Nationalism, 113. probably the largest one in Somali authoritarian rule in the early 1970s 13. L. Pestalozza, The Somalian Revolution history and beyond anythtng that could towards personal rule in the 1980s and (Paris: Societe &edition Afrique Asie, have been foreseen even two years ago eventually into its corrupt variety called Amerique Latin, 1974): 207. when Siad Barre was still in power. "sultanism" (i.e., when the ruler makes 14. Gorman, Political Conflict, 211. Those who bear the main responsi- no attempt to restrain from the abuse of 15. Ibid. bility are the of the various f~rce).~This type of governance had factions who cultivate warfare and 16. M. Hassan, "Status of Human Rights in major negative effects in Somalia and Somalia," Horn of Africa 3, no. 2. mafia-type behaviour. The lack of provide the background of the current concern shown by foreign powers, crisis. 17. P. Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to despite their involvement in Somali Peace (London: McMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991): 155. politics during the last thirty years, Economic Ruin Through accounts for the international 18. Africa Watch, "Somalia: A Government Patrimonialism at War With Its Own People," (Africa community's low-scale initiatives, Watch, 1990): 76. especially in contrast with the attention This patrimonial dimension6developed 19. S. Mohamed, "Siyad's Vendetta Against focused on other parts of the world under Siad Barre's regime to an extent the North," New Africa no. 240 (Yugoslavia or Cambodia). But it is also unknown in the 1960s, and the (September 1987): 21. quite clear that the lack of far-sighted war might have been a turning point in 20. I.M. Lewis, "The Ogadenand theFragility leadership and political planning on the this respect? Embezzlement of public of Somali Segmentary Nationalism," so-called "liberation fronts" are crucial funds, corruption of ministers and civil Horn of Africa 13, no. 1 and 2 (1990). factors in the Somali crisis. In addition, servants in connection with public 21. Africa Watch, "Somalia: A Government historical as well as sociological factors, markets and development projects: at War With Its Own People," 3. some of them deeply rootedinthe Somali baksheeshes at all levels of the 22. Africa Watch, "Somalia: No Mercy in social fabric, have to be taken into bureaucracy, illegal trafficking by Mogdisho, the Human Cost of the consideration. relatives or friends of the president-4 Conflict and the Struggle for Relief," these were tightly linked to a direct access (Africa Watch, March 1992): 4. Daniel Compagnon teaches at the Centre du to state power. These were the spoils of 23. P. Biles, "Going It Alone," Afrca Report recherches et d'itudes pour Afrique orientale, personal rule. Patron-client ties were (January-February1992): 59-60. Paris, France. built between those who had that access

8 Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) and others, especially busi- Barre's downfall. Interestingly, some of include the diplomatic service since nessmen. With the absolute power to those who benefited financially from the Abderahmaan Jaama Barre became appoint, transfer, sack or even jail, Siad previous regime were in thebest position minister of foreign affairs, cooperatives Barre was the ultimate boss of the whole to make money from the looting. under Warsame Indolleh, finances and network His personal patronage was banking, etc. The state disintegration eagerly sought for and he got his share in State Disintegration began long before the overthrow of the the biggest deals. Somalis used to say ruler. Since 1987 there has only been a that Siad Barre looked at the national Despite prominent officers in the state semblance of a state: not a single public state and economy as "parts of his tea- hierarchy since 1969, from the top down service was working effectively, the shop." This patrimonial behaviour to the remote rural districts, the apparent administration was paralysed by enlarged the group of people who had a backbone of the military regime was factional struggle at its head for the long- personal interest in the continuation of never able to act against the will of Siad awaited succession and also by his devastating rule? Barre, let alone depose him. From the insurgency at the periphery. It alsoimplied that investment capital beginning, he viewed the officers either Hence, the random killings and was predominantly oriented towards as his personal clients or as his personal systematic abuses of the in the speculative trading activities and all foes." North as well as the Ogaadeens in the kinds of illegal trafficking detrimental to The army, whose support was a Jubba area or the in the central the productive side of the economy.1° A crucial political resource for imposing an regions,14 were signs that Siad Barre's stratum of wealthy and corrupt busi- authoritarian state in the 1970s, was regime had reached the stage of nessmen (many of whom were penniless perceived as a threat after the abortive sultanism, a variant of personal rule in the early 1970s)arose from all the clans. coup of 1978. Through purges, characterized by arbitrary violence. By As the economic crisis deepened and the accelerated promotions of Mareehaan the time the opposition fronts were able power circle narrowed down to the and (to a lesser extent) related Darood to take over, there was no state as such to ruler's family, and while the unleashed clan officers, while the military from seize, and they were not prepared to repressive bodies (the National Security other clan families were transferred to provide an alternative to prevent . From the summer of 1988 onwards, By the time the oppositionfin& were able to take over; there was there was a combination of political no state as such to seize, and they were not prepared to provide repression against targeted clans and an altematc've to prevent anurchy. private use of violence by predatory units and individuals of the former "national" armed forces--already in the Service, Hangash, some army units and administrative positions, Siad managed process of disintegration-who used Red Berets) raised the level of violence to keep the potential hostile elements of their power to rape, kill and loot freely. and extortion to such levels that they the armed forces at bay. He never The classic distinction between private provoked a massive displacement of allowed the minister of defence to build illegitimate violence and public coercion populationin the North and the eventual a personal power position.12 The disappeared. Many former military men uprisingin the South,the leadingofficials patrimonial nature of his policy was later joined the clan militias or the armed of the regime completely plundered the exemplified by interferences from W'gs. state budget and the banking system. In members of his family in military this respect, the looters who have been appointments. Colonels and generals Vendetta Politics and the ravaging the capital city since January were part of the president's patronage Exacerbation of Clan Rivalries 1991 are the heirs of Siad Barre and his network; they had to remain loyal to him clique for three reasons: and his close relatives, whether they had Another striking feature of Siad Barre's The first to loot were Siad Barre's a command or were temporarily in the survival tactics in the 1980s, as many RedBerets and other military units at the Cabinet.13 Inclusion in the regular army scholars have already noted, was his bottom of the hierarchy and his of the Ogaadeen, Warsangeli and extensive use of clanism15 as a political patrimonial servants at the top. Dulbahante militias to fight against the resource. To secure lasting loyalties, he The country was bankrupt and food Isaaqs in the North and the creation of filled the key positions in the army, shortages had already begun during the units exclusively drawn from the police, diplomacy and security force summer of 1990. For impoverished ur- Mareehaans eventually discredited the with members of three Darood clans ban dwellers and destitute , loot- very idea of a national army. closely related to his own reer: ing became the only means of survival. The military apparatus offers a good Mareehaans, Dulbahantes and There was no moral restraint (the example of Somali institutional decay as Ogaadeens,16 yet the impartance of this Somali crisis is also spiritual)as robbery a result of the state's patrimonialism. alliance should not be exaggerated. became a way of life even before Siad Other examples of institutional decay Contacts with elders and the support of

Refkge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) 9

- some prominent men in the clan do not creating the Somali crisis should not be disintegrative effects of personal rule. necessarily mean that the whole clan is forgotten too quickly. Nonetheless, his Although the SSDF (in 1981) and the behind the regime: other members contenders and successors did not fare SNM (between 1984 and 1987) got closer exiled abroad couldbe engaging in some better. to this objective, their leaders either made opposition activities at the same time." mistakes that ruined the whole plan or Siad Barre played on the segmentary The Deadly Gamble of Political showed that they were just paying lip social organization: while he was Entrepreneurs in the Post-Siad service while calling for unity of the courting a subclan or a lineage that Barre Era opposition. The United Somali Congress received prebends and honours, another (USC) is no exception, since it was branch of the same clan was given a hard According to press reports, Somalia is intended to voice the interests of the time. On the other hand, many Isaaqs confronted with a tribal war, which Hawiyes. Siad Barre's propaganda and Hawiyes served the regime until the suggests atavistic hatreds and endless deliberately fuelled these clan rivalries, late 1980s and were instrumental in the conflicts. It is an inaccurate descriptionof but the fact that these divisions persisted ruleis claim that he was still able, unlike a segmentary society whose clan families after his downfall shows that his the armed opposition, to rally significant are not differentiated along cultural and machiavellianabilities were not the main support among the clans, a crucial point linguistic lines, and in which the factor: there are still very few Somalis for his public image. Clanism also provided a means to weaken the opposition, which was None of these organizations, which claimed they were accused of being tribal-minded. The fighting against a dictatorship and for a democracy, Somali Salvation Democratic Front had a clear vision of what should be done to establish (SSDF) was labelled a Reer Mahamud organization in order to reduce its such a regime and rebuild the country. appeal, so that the regime would gain the support of smaller lineages of the competition between the segments is who have a political vision that extends clan. Siad Barre also played constantly reshaped by shifting beyond asserting their own clan rights on the Hawiyes' resentment of the alliances.20It also falls short of explaining and strength. Another consequence of Majeerteens for their alleged domination the various dimensions of the factional this kind of recruitment was the of the Somali polity in the 1960s. competition for supremacy. If Somalia's formation of military units along the Similarly, the Somali National current upheaval was a traditional feud lines of social segmentationat the level of Movement (SNM) was presented as an between neighbouring clans, it should the primary lineages. This later chauvinist and secessionist group have been possible to end it through the facilitatedthe lineage-based factionalism by Siad Barre's propaganda, skilfully traditional her and ~hir.2~ within the fronts. using some elements of truth to damage There was no coordination of the image of the whole movement. The Shortcomings of the Former activities, especially military cooper- ruler tried several times to stir up the Opposition to Siad Barre's ation, between the armed fronts. Hence, rivalries between the main Isaaq clan^,'^ Regime 22 the Majeerteen resented the lack of in order to diminish the support for the support when they were under attack in SNMin the North. Furthermore, the state From the early 1980s the Somali the Mudughareabetween 1979and1982, was involved in interclan feuds among opposition was divided into rival and the Isaaqs bitterly pointed out the the pastoralists. By givingmoney organizations that were politically weak lack of southern solidarity while they and weapons totheclan segmentswhose mainly for the following reasons. They werebeingharassed andlater massacred goodwill he wanted to win, thereby recruited massively from a single clan or by the regime's squads. "Let the noses of weakening lineages hostile to his rule, clan family, thereby limiting their appeal the Isaaqs be bloodied" was later Siad Barre repoliticized lineage to other groups that were automatically countered by the vengeful "Let competition, deliberately breaking with suspicious of alleged clan hegemony. Muqdisho be destroyed as the postcolonial state's long-term efforts The clan factor was always at the core of was."23We can see today how counter- to appear neutral. In the late 1980s to the Somali politics and played an important productive these attitudes were. early 1990s some of these conflicts were role in the factional struggle of the 1950s Significantly, the exception here is the deliberately instigated or encouraged to and 1960s, even within the nationalist agreement signed in August 1990 prevent discontented clans19 from parties. But in theatmosphere of growing between the SomaliNationalMovement, forming a coalition. By doing so, the fear and distrust in Siad Barre's Somalia, United Somali Congress1Aydiid and personal ruler sharpened clan rivalries no single clan could achieve a violent Somali Patriotic Movement 1Ahmed and brought back clan-based faction- overthrow of the regime because they 'Umar Jess. The purpose of this alliance alism as a major factor in Somali politics. had limited constituencies at the fronts. was mainly to preempt and share state The actions of Siad Barre and his aides in The regime actually collapsed due to the power in the event of the fall of the

10 %get Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) regime, especiallyin defiance of the other massacres of Darood civilians and other split of USC dates back to the very groups, the Manifesto, Somali Salvation non-Hawiyes. This can account for the beginning of the organization in January Democratic Front and USC/'Ali rise of a pan-Darood alliance in early 1989 when a group of mainly Abgaal Wardiigley. spring 1991, which came very close to people in exile in the Western countries None of these organizations, which conquering Muqdisho before it was elected 'Ali Osooble Wardiigley as claimed they were fighting against a stopped by USC troops. Clan rivalries chairman. The Sa'ads then decided to dictatorship and for a democracy, had a rapidly evolved into open warfare when stay in the SNM that Wardiigley had just clear vision of what should be done to the state was perceived as an easy prey. left and General Aydiid, long courted by establish such a regime and rebuild the The war between the clans seemed to the SNM leadership, joined them in country. The paucity of their political revive the traditional competition . Then a USC unit was organized programs was probably intended to between lineages for scarce resources, there in the spring of 1990 and from then diminish their leaders' responsibilities which was one of the fundamental on there were two Hawiye guerrilla during the transition period, but it also characteristicsof the precolonial pastoral movements fightingtheregime. Judging denoted a lack of careful analysis of the society. However, differences between from the propaganda war waged outside Somali crisis. The simplistic slogans the current instability and the traditional the country between USC I Aydiid and brandingthe "bloodthirsty " and pattern lie not only in the prizes (state USCIRome, and from the fierce the "bankrupt regime" were indeed useful for mobilizing support, but fell The war between the clans seemed to revive short of providing a model for governance." the traditional competition between lineages for scarce Since the overthrow of SiadBarre, the resources, which was one of the fundamental clan-based politico-military organi- zations appeared exclusively motivated characteristics of the precolonial pastoral society. by the struggle for supremacy and the sharing of the spoils. The war that resources including foreign aid, instead comments made in private onboth sides, devastated Muqdisho from November of pastures and wells) or the weapons one could tell that this factionalrift would 1991 to March 1992, killed as many as (bazookas and artillery, instead of not be easily mended. Both factions are 14,000 and injured twice this number, spears), but also in the role played by based on lineage alliances that formed according to Africa Watch, cannot be political entrepreneurs and merchants. during the fighting--currently Haber explained otherwise. But even in the The case of the self-proclaimed GidirIHawaadle versus Abgall North, where the SNM enjoyed several Republic of Somaliland illustrates the Murursaade--but are cemented more months of peace and unchallenged clan elders' ability to defuse the tensions effectively by personal loyalties and political hegemony, nothing decisive at the local level between neighbouring individual rewards. This may explain was achieved. This can be explained by lineages, especially during the first six to why a Salebaan general serves in 'Ali the lack of resources, the lack of coherent eight months of 1991. However, it also Mahdi's forces and a Murursaade plans to rebuild the country, and, above demonstrates their powerlessness in businessman and former politician all, by the factional competition within preventing factional fighting at the supports Aydiid. Although the clans the SNM, which reached a peak during national state level. They are not able to provide young men for the struggle, their the serious fighting in Burao and impose their will on the incumbent elders do not control the whole process. Berbera. leaders who are already largely The political entrepreneurs are discredited. constantly trying to broaden the alliance Rival Entrepreneurs, Merchants Politicalentrepreneurs, whether with on which they rely in order to strengthen and Clan-Based Factionalism a military or a civilian background, rely their autonomy. It is precisely what on clan solidarityand clan chauvinism as Aydiid has been doing since he defeated In May-June 1991 the Manifesto group political tools to achieve their goals. They Siad Barre in late April this year. was an attempt to prevent civil war and use their own clan as much as they serve The merchants also play a key role in clan fighting after the collapse of Siad it (very much like Siad Barre did with the the current upheaval, since they finance Barre's regime, but the group disbanded Mareehaans until he went into exile). the war as well as the physical survival of at the time it was most needed. Also, Although the conflict between Sa'ads the political entrepreneurs and their from the beginning some of its leaders and Abgaals is reminiscent of some cliques. At the same time, they take had their own agenda and the race for politicking in the 1950s when advantage of the scarcity of food or the power began as soon as Siad Barre left ' Abdullaahi lire was mhkkr,itis demand for khat and the large number of the capital city. A national reconciliation still difficult to understand unless one destitute and hungry looters to make government failed to appear because the considers the personal rivalry between huge profits.25 NOW that increased USC, which officially controlled Mahamed Farah Aydiid and 'Ali Mahdi international aid is being delivered, they Muqdisho, was not able to prevent the Mahamed in their bid for power. The dictate their prices for transportation as

-- - -- Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (~ovember-~ecembei1992) 11 well as for military protection. Their they make compromises, it is only for 1990 meeting of the African Studies interest is so closely linked with the state tactical expediency. This political culture Association, Baltimore, Maryland. On of anarchy that they might be more is consistent with Somali traditional the bureaucratic-authoritarian system, willing to support warlords than invest values and with oral poetry that praises see Charles Andrain, Political Change in the Third World (New York: Unwin in peace and reconstruction. Without dominance by force asserted in the Hyman, 1988) 22-30. their money to supply ammunition, buy battlefield and looting of those who are back the loot and selectively feed the defeated.26 For many years, Somali 6. See the theorical debate summarized and updated in Jean-Francois Medard, gunmen, the factions would have been politicians and the majority of scholars "L'Etat n6o-patrimonial en Afrique unable to sustain themselves during emphasized the "democratic" nature of Noire," in Etats dJAfrique Noire, eighteen months of unrest. the pastoral society and neglected this Formations, Mknnismes et Crise, edited by other side of its culture. Sayyid J.F. Medard (Paris: Karthala, 1991):323- Militarization of the Political Mahamed 'Abdulle Hasaan, who was 54. See also the notion of "belly politics" Conflict: Warlordism in the able to build an autocratic system of rule in J.F.Bayart, L'EtatenAfrique LaPolitique Making by using the resources of lineage politics du Ventre (Park Fayard, 1989): 281-315. and religious charisma, definitely 7. See A.K. Galaydh, "Notes on the State of The prolonged political squabble among remains a model for the modern the SomaliState," Horn ofAfrica XIII, nos. various political parties and military warlords. 1 and 2,l-28. fronts did not bring about any lasting The picture is extremely gloomy and 8. The figure of 40 percent of each contract government coalition capable of I tend to believe that the only way out of was put forward in David D. Laitin and reconstructingthe state.The competition the nightmare is to call for a full Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search between political entreprimeurs within intervention of the , not of A State (Boulder: Westview Press, each of the main groups, especially the only to establish peace in the country, 1987): 95. uncompromising stands of the two preserve its unity and save the people 9. The petty corruption developed in the factionsfighting forHawiye supremacy, from famine, but also to preempt the late 1980s as a result of the economic has jeopardized the implementation of power and create a new democratic crisis. It seemed that Siad Barre more or the agreement of July 1991, the less legitimized these practices with the order to preserve equal rights for all the notion of "hawlfududayn" (a "tip" to help most notable effort at national lineages and, if necessary, to quell the civil servants perform their duties).Petty reconciliation. The subsequent months open resistance of the warlords-in other corruption is crucial for securing the of warfare and atrocities deepened the words, establishinganew trusteeship for compliance of large sections of the rift of distrust between the clans and Somalia. rn population, according to intenriews. strengthened the position of military 10. See Norman Miller, "The Other Somalia: strongmen (most of them former army Notes Illicit Trade and.the Hidden Economy," officers) in each camp. American Universities Field Staff Reports: Since there is no credible political 1. See The Montreal Gazette, June 17,1992. Northeast Africa Series 29 and 30 (1981). settlement in sight and because there is a 2. See The NmYork Times, July 19, 1992, 11. Those who failed to comply were among high level of insecurity in all the de facto AFP, July 27,1992. the victims of the political repression autonomous regions, time seems to 3. See R.H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, since 1969. See , favourthe warlords who will try to build Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Somalia: A Long Term Human Rights Crisis their own mini-states in the areas they Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant. Berkeley: (London: Amnesty International, control. As the inevitable partners of the University of California Press, 1982; Max September 1988) 36. NGOs and international relief agencies, Weber, Economyand Society: An Outlineof 12. Salad Gaveire was arrested in 1971, the warlords can extract more resources Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols. Edited by Mahamed' AliSamatarwasfiredin April to reinforce their authority. Ironically, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. 1981 and again in January 1987, while more humanitarian intervention might Berkeley: University of California Press, "promoted" to prime minister. 'Umar 1968; Guenther Roth, "Personal Haaji Mahamed, his successor in 1981, help them consolidate their power. They Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire- was jailed in June 1982, and the too might be able to deliver the goods in Building in the New States," World confident Aadan 'Abdulle "Gabyow" terms of stability and minimum order, Politics XX, no. 2 (January1968): 194-206. received the same treatment in July 1989. but they can scarcely be regarded as 4. See the notion of prebend, as applied to a The president always kept direct control champions of democracy. Even the postcolonial African state, in Joseph of the armed forces-at least until his car North might evolve along the same lines Richard, Democracy and Prebendal Politics accident--and never appointed another if the SNM leadership remainsinefficient in : The Rise and Fall of the Second commander-in-chief. and immobile and fails to reach a Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge 13. In the late 1980s the number of senior consensus. University Press, 1987): 5568. army staff in the senior ranks far The threat of war will remain since 5. See Daniel Campagnon, "Political Crisis exceeded the number of available none of the warlords will voluntarily in Somalia: The Legacy of An Exhausted commanding officer positions in the renounce his claim to state power. When Personal Rule." Paper presented at the active service. For example, in December 1986 twenty-two colonels were

12 Refige, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) promoted to generals at the same time! majority of Hargeysa's population and is See Afrca Confidential 28, no. 7 (May 1, well represented in the Isaaq business 1987). This is an example of class, as well as among the wmdad. Many patrimonialism: many of these officers Habar Awal did not accept the loss of the York University were Mareehaans or MOD. SNM leadership in 1983 and became THE JACQUELINE 14. Africa Watch, Somalia: A Government At critical of Ahmed Sianyo's conduct of War with Its Own People: Testimonies the organization. Siad Barre tried to GREATBATCH MEMORIAL About the Killings and the Conflict in the appease the elders of the clan by FELLOWSHIP appointing ha-Lah-was vice-president North (London: The Africa Watch AND Committee, January 1990).See also other and later vice-prime minister. The latest publications of Africa Watch concerning tricks in this game were the sudden ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN the southern regions. appointment of Mahamed Hawaadle MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP Madar as prime minister on September1, 15. "Clanism," as opposed to "tribalism," 1990 and of 'Umar Arteh Galib in early ACan. $10,000 Jacqueline Greatbatch better describesthe segmentarynature of January 1991, according to inte~ews. Somali society. See I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Memorial Fellowship and a Can. Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and 19. See the analysis of some of these feuds in $10,000Atle Grahl-MadsenMemorial Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Gerard Prunier, "Stuctures de clan et Fellowship have been established by Horn of Africa (London: Oxford pouvoir politique en Somalie," Cultures the Centre for Refugee Studies and the University Press, 1961). On clanism et Dheloppement 17, no. 4 (March 1987): 602-97. See also "Somalia on the Brink of Graduate Program in Law, York under Siad Barre, see Laitin and Samatar, University, Toronto, Canada, to permit Somalia: Nation in SearchofA State, 155-63, Civil War," Horn of Africa 6, no. 3 (1983): and I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of 41; Laitin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation in two individuals to pursue studies Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Search of a State, 161-162; and Said S. leading to Master of Laws or Doctor of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988): Samatar, "An Open Letter to Somali Jurisprudence at the Osgoode Hall 220-22, 250 and Campagnon, "Political Scholars: Should Siad Host the Next Law School. Crisis in Somalia." SSIA Congress? Some Second Thoughts," Horn ofAfrira 13, nos. 1 and 2 The fellowships will be awarded 16. In the mid-1980s the artillery and tank (1990):88-95. annually to the candidates with units surrounding the capital were under excellent academic records in law, and Mareehaan command, as were one-third 20. See I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, the of brigade commandants. In total, 50 major study on the pastoral Somalis. who want to pursue graduate research percent of the police and army 21. The heer is the jural contract that requires in internationalrefugee law or aclosely commandants in the regions and districts lineages to form military alliances or related field. Preference will be given and 80 percent of the military sectors and diya-payinggroups; the shir is the council to applicantswith a demonstratedcom- army divisions were Darood. See of elders that makes decisions on mitment to human rights advocacy or "Somalia: Military Politics," Africa collective issues, including war, at all service to the disfranchised and to the Confidential 27, no. 22 (October 26,1986): levels of society. On this, see Lewis, A advancement of human dignity 1-2; Lewis, A Modem , Pastoral Democracy. through public international law. 256. For diplomacy, see the letter of 22. See Daniel Campagnon, "The Somali Ibrahim H. Addow, published in Horn of In addition to conducting graduate OppositionFronts: Some Comments and Afica 5, no. 1 (1982): 75, and Mahamoud Questions," Horn ofAfica XIII, nos. 1 and research, the Greatbatch and Grahl- Hassan, "Status of Human Rights in 2 (January-June 1990): 29-54; Gerard Madsen fellows will contribute Somalia," Horn of Afica 3, no. 2 (1980): 6. Prunier, "A Candid View of the Somali throughout the academic year to the 17. The Garad 'Ali Garad, of the National Movement," Horn of Africa XI11 work of the Refugee Law Research DulbahanteIFarah Garad primary and XIV, nos. 1,2,3 and 4,107-20. Unit of the Centre for Refugee Studies. lineage, lived in exile in London for many 23. See Samatar, "AnOpen Letter to Somalist years and his heir 'Abdulqaninegotiated Candidates should submit a Scholars" for the first quotation. The an agreement with the Isaaq/Habar Ja'lo curriculum vitae (resumt), academic second comes from interviews. that undermined the ruler's policies. The records and two reference letters to whole clan did not consider Sulayaman 24. The original program of the SSDF was either the LL.M. or D. Jur. program, Daffle as its natural leader. The second more sophisticated with its Marxist together with a statement of intent no Dulbahante member of the SRC phraseology-thanks to the SWP and withdrew in 1983 and several SDLF intellectuals-but did not provide later than January 31,1993 to: Dhubahante officials like 'Ali Khalif concrete plans for recovery. The Director Galaydh defectedin the 1980s, according 25. See Roland Marchal, "La guerre A Graduate Program in Law to interviews. For examples of Mogadiscio," Politique Africaine 46 (June Osgoode Hall Law School, York Mareehaans who suffered from Siad 1992): 120-25. University Barre's personal rule, see A. Sultan's 26. See Said S. Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in 4700 Keele Street, North York, letter in New African (June 1987). Turmoil (London: The Minority Rights ON 18. He wanted to gain the support of the Group, August 1991):33. Canada M3J 1P3 Habar Awal. This clan made up the

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