Iran-Iraq War(1980-1988) ○ Both US and USSR Support Saddam Hussein

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Iran-Iraq War(1980-1988) ○ Both US and USSR Support Saddam Hussein Week 5: Proxy Wars Non-Ideological Interventions “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” ● Ogaden War (1977-1978) US supports Maoists in Somalia ● Iran-Iraq War(1980-1988) ○ Both US and USSR support Saddam Hussein. Ogaden: Sino-Soviet Split ● Chinese mainland becomes communist in 1949 under Mao Zedong. ● Diverge from Soviet model ○ Still dependent on industrial aid ● Denunciation and split in 1959. Border War in 1969 ● Chinese demand return of border territories. ● China initiates conflict. ● Soviets respond, imply larger war. Chinese Rapprochement with US ● China sees USSR as primary security threat. ● Tacit alliance with US after 1972. Ethiopian Revolution ● Ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie until 1974. ● Selassie overthrown by Army officers (Derg). Internal Fighting in Derg ● Marxists prevail by 1977. ● Seek Soviet aid and support. ● Soviets support Somalia prior to 1977. Why were the Soviets reluctant to support the Derg? What changed their minds? Why were the Soviets reluctant to support the Derg? ● Division in the Derg. ● Support in rival Somalia What changed their minds? ● Mengistu’s rise to power. ● Somali distance. Somalia under Siad Barre ● Took power in coup in 1969. ● Maoist leaning. ● Soviet-backed until 1977. Somalia supports WSLF ● Barre seeks Greater Somalia ● Supports Western Somali Liberation Front in Ogaden in revolt. ● Somali troops join fighting Soviets back Mengistu; US and China support Somalia ● Soviet aid flows to new government in Ethiopia. ● Somalia invades with US and Chinese support The Ogaden War Supported by: Course of the War ● Initial success for Somalia ● Soviet, Cuban and South Yemeni troops intervene. ● Somali troops expelled Post-Ogaden War Ethiopia Somalia ● 15-year civil war ● Barre overthrown after ● Mengistu overthrown in civil war. 1991. ● State collapse and ● Federal state disintegration. established. Ba’athist Iraq ● Secular nationalist Ba’ath (renaissance) Party comes to power in coup. ● Dominated by Sunni Arabs. ● Saddam Hussein absolute ruler by 1978. Saddam’s Rule ● Cult of personality ● Shia opposition ● Soviet client state Iranian Revolution ● Opposition to Shah’s rule widespread. ● Protests in 1977 and 1978. ● Shah overthrown by coalition in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini establishes theocracy Iraq invades Iran; why? Iraq invades Iran; why? ● Threat from Shia theocracy. ● Expansion of territory; oil reserves. ● Uniting domestic opponents. Both US and USSR initially neutral Why? Both US and USSR initially neutral US ● Courted Iran ● Distrust Iraq USSR ● Also, courted Iran Iran recovers; invades Iraq in 1982 Military Support to Warring Parties US and USSR back Iraq; Why? US US and USSR back Iraq; Why? US USSR ● Contain spread of Shia theocracy. ● Hostage crisis in Lebanon. US and USSR back Iraq; Why? US USSR ● Contain spread of ● Anti-communism in Shia theocracy. Iran. ● Retain influence in ● Hostage crisis in Middle East. Lebanon. ● Unrest in Soviet Central Asia + Afghanistan Iran-Iraq War: devastating stalemate ● No territorial changes. ● Almost 1 million dead (soldiers + civilians) Effects ● Emboldened Iraq invades Kuwait. ● Shia uprising in Iraq after Gulf War. ● Regional Sunni-Shia schism. Discussion Did superpowers obtain favorable outcomes from using proxies? Short term? Long term? Are there problems in using proxy armies/states? If so, would these problems have occurred without superpower intervention? Summary ● Ideology dissipates by 1970s and 1980s. ● Both superpowers willing to support ideological antagonists or mutual friends. ● Proxy wars are instrumental Next Week: Military Action: The Good + Proposals due on November 8.
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