Illegitimate Extractive Institutions and the Loss of Legitimacy

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Illegitimate Extractive Institutions and the Loss of Legitimacy ILLEGITIMATE EXTRACTIVE INSTITUTIONS AND THE LOSS OF LEGITIMACY AND SECURITY: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STATE FAILURE by James Shelby Elphick, B.A. A thesis submitted to the Graduate Council of Texas State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts with a Major in International Studies May 2015 Committee Members: Robert Gorman, Chair Omar Sanchez-Sibony Edward Mihalkanin COPYRIGHT by James Shelby Elphick 2015 FAIR USE AND AUTHOR’S PERMISSION STATEMENT Fair Use This work is protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States (Public Law 94-553, section 107). Consistent with fair use as defined in the Copyright Laws, brief quotations from this material are allowed with proper acknowledgment. Use of this material for financial gain without the author’s express written permission is not allowed. Duplication Permission As the copyright holder of this work I, James Shelby Elphick, authorize duplication of this work, in whole or in part, for educational or scholarly purposes only. DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to the men of Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment who steadfastly and diligently fought and worked toward the goals outlined in this thesis and thus provided the necessity and inspiration for my work. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I cannot express enough thanks to the members of my thesis committee for their continued support and encouragement: Dr. Robert Gorman – committee chair, Dr. Omar Sanchez-Sibony, and Dr. Edward Mihalkanin. I am truly appreciative for the opportunity to work with you all. I must also express my deepest gratitude to Michelle Baker, who none of this would have been possible without. You lent a critical eye and supportive attitude throughout the entire process. Your belief in me and words of encouragement kept me going when the times got tough. It was a great relief to know that you were always there with love and support. I must also thank my loving family for their continued support: my father, Jim Elphick and my mother, Diane Stickley. To Nancy Baker for her proof-reading and support throughout the endeavor. I must thank the Texas State Political Science IA’s for their support from both near and far, especially Karina Lovas for sending me all those revisions. I must also thank LTC Dave Buffaloe for his insight and expertise into America’s operations in failed states. Also my longtime friend SFC Andrew Kent must be thanked for his support and expertise in counterinsurgency. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. v LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... viii CHAPTER PREFACE ............................................................................................................................... 1 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2 II.UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STATE FAILURE ................................................................................................................................ 4 Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 4 Defining State Failure ............................................................................................... 6 The Process of Failure.............................................................................................. 9 Colonialism, Imperialism, and Extractive Institutions ...................................... 10 Loss of Security and Destruction of the State through Prolonged Conflict ....................................................................... 18 Consequences of State Failure .............................................................................. 22 III. CASE STUDY: SOMALIA ......................................................................................... 32 Background and History: 1880’s – 1978 .............................................................. 32 From Weakness to Failure: 1978 – 1991 ............................................................. 36 Civil War and the Collapse of the State ............................................................... 38 The Process of Failure: Illegitimate Extractive Institutions ............................. 39 The Process of Failure: Loss of Legitimacy and Security ................................. 42 The Problem of Internal Divisions ...................................................................... 45 A Hard Lesson Learned: The Failed Intervention ............................................. 47 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 50 IV. CASE STUDY: AFGHANISTAN ............................................................................. 51 Background and History: 1747 – 1978 ................................................................ 51 vi From Modernity to Failure: Communism and the Soviet Invasion 1979-1989 ................................................................. 59 Civil War, the Taliban, and War with America ................................................... 65 The Process of Failure: Illegitimate Extractive Institutions ............................. 66 The Process of Failure: The Loss of Legitimacy and Security ......................... 70 The Problem of Tribalism ..................................................................................... 73 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 75 V. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF STATE FAILURE ............................................. 77 Assumptions of the Global System in Regards to State Failure ...................... 78 Addressing Other Arguments and Impractical Solutions ................................. 81 Towards a Solution: The First Step ...................................................................... 84 Lessons Learned: Solutions in Somalia ................................................................ 85 Lessons Unlearned: A Solution in Afghanistan? ............................................... 87 Security Operations ................................................................................................ 88 A Return to Legitimate Rule ................................................................................. 90 The Future of State Building ................................................................................. 96 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 98 LITERATURE CITED .................................................................................................................. 102 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 2-1. Ethnic Groups in Somalia ......................................................................................................... 46 3-1. Administrative Divisions in Afghanistan ................................................................................ 74 3-2. Tribal Divisions in Afghanistan ............................................................................................... 75 viii PREFACE The motivations for this thesis began in the Paktika Province of Afghanistan in the summer of 2003 where I served as an Airborne Infantryman with the US Army in the War on Terror. I soon realized there was much more to the task at hand than simply fighting insurgents; building and rebuilding a society was vital to our military interests. I took a keen interest in how the operations of such a mission were conducted and once I left the military in 2005 my interest continued. As a college student I actively studied the history of revolutions and the politics of international relations. Still keen to aid the global effort in some way I began a Master’s program in International Studies so as to further my understanding of international relations and the world as a whole. The culmination of that effort is found in this thesis. 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In the course of decolonization in the post-World War II era the number of independent legitimate states grew at an incredible rate. The legacy of colonial governments and fights for independence left unstable societies with untested and amateur leaders in control of fledgling states. These new states lacked inclusive political and economic institutions and often times had little incentive to create such institutions. This led to a new phenomenon in the international community; the failed state. With increasing interconnectivity and globalization serious problems such as poverty, human rights, drug trafficking, and terrorism have become more central concerns of the world community.1 Recently, there has been greater outreach to attempt to secure and stabilize failed and weak states as well as increased scholarship on the topic. My thesis is that states fail because governments lose legitimacy vis-à-vis the population through the abuse of extractive institutions, both political and economic; creating the conditions for violent conflict that destroys society and infrastructure causing the state to collapse. Through research and case studies it is possible to better understand the causes and consequences that lead to the failure of a state. To attain the information
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