Introduction the Politics of Fictive Theories 1

Notes

Introduction The Politics of Fictive Theories 1. See work by Linda Zerilli and Bonnie Honig: Linda Zerilli speaks to the first moment, the epistemological status of political theory when she writes: “Political theory appears to describe ‘things as they are,’ but it actually constitutes meaning and is emphatically performative: it uses language to determine what shall count as a matter of political concern and debate; it uses tropes and figures to bring about certain effects in the reader...,” Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p.2. Bonnie Honig speaks to the second moment of coding and containing the political, which is dependent upon this reification of the constitutive role of fictions, when she claims: “most political theorists [. . .] confine politics (conceptually and territorially) to the juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities. They assume that the task of political theory is to resolve institutional questions, to get their politics right, over and done with, to free modern subjects” Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.4. 2. Luce Irigaray, The Way of Love, trans. Heidi Bostic and Stephen Pluhácek (London: Continuum, 2002), p.vii. 3. Stephen White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.90. White argues that a normative orien- tation does indeed depend upon “weak” ontological commitments that inflect, nuance, or tend toward specific, ethical ways of acting and being in the world. My own commitment to an “ontology of becoming” precludes substantive normative or political claims being made from ontology: political claims are always precisely political, to be defended and judged as such. The utopian “not-yet,” as I go on to argue in particular in chapters four and five, mean that no substantive claim can be deemed above political and temporal (re-)evaluation. I have drawn on Tom Moylan’s argument in “Denunciation/ Annunciation: The Radical Methodology of Liberation Theology,” in, Cultural Critique 20 (Winter, 1991–92), pp.33–64, where he proposes that the “deconstructive” or critical moment of “denunciation” must also contain or create space for the utopian moment of annunciation (pp.44–45). 4. Drawn from Norman Jacobson’s noteworthy book, Pride and Solace: The Function and Limits of Political Theory (Berkley and London: University of California Press, 1978): “the pride of the theorist in the act of creation, the solace of the reader in the act of discovery,” (p.ix). Later in this section, I discuss the hierarchical ordering implicit in this characterization of political theory in terms of its ordering of writers and readers in a legislative paradigm. The play, notably recognized by Foucault, of subject and subjection is implicit here. (To anticipate: such a problematic, as old as Plato, can only be overcome by going through Nietzsche.) The aphorism is taken from Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989), p.59. 172 / notes

5. Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p.3. 6. These comments are informed by Derrida’s writings on the histories of metaphysics, which he never invokes as a unitary, consistent phenomenon: see, e.g., “a work of literary criticism is not, any more than a philosophical discourse, simply ‘governed by metaphysical assumptions.’ Nothing is ever homogenous. Even among the philosophers associated with the most canonical tradition, the possibilities of rupture are always waiting to be effected,” (Jacques Derrida, “ ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’: An Interview with Jacques Derrida,” Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), p.53. There is no one history of metaphysics that is not itself metaphysical. 7. Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), p.xiii; Susan Mendus “ ‘What was left of self, I wonder?’ The Narrative Self in Political Philosophy,” in, Literature and the Political Imagination, ed. John Horton and Andrea T. Baumeister (London: Routledge, 1996), p.59; and Maureen Whitebrook, “Taking the Narrative Turn: What the Novel has to offer Political Theory,” in, Literature and the Political Imagination (London: Routledge, 1996), p.40, respectively. 8. Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” in, The American Political Science Review 63/4 (December 1969), pp.1062–1082. 9. Ibid., p.1078. 10. John Seery, “Political Theory in the Twentieth Century,” in, Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader and Guide, ed. Alan Finlayson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p.42. 11. Adriana Cavarero, “Politicizing Theory,” in, Political Theory 30/4 (August 2002), pp.506–532, 511. 12. Ibid., p.514. 13. Ibid., p.509. 14. Ibid., p.507. 15. John Evan Seery, “Spelunkers of the World Unite!,” in, The Politics of Irony: Essays in Self- Betrayal, ed. Daniel W. Conway and John E. Seery (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), p.8. 16. Jacobson, Pride and Solace, pp.2–3. 17. Ibid., pp.9–10. 18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G.D.H. Cole (London: Everyman, 1993), p.216. 19. Ibid., p.213. 20. Jacobson, Pride and Solace, p.10, p.xii. See also Tracy Strong, who argues that political theory “betrays its ongoing debt to theology,” in, The Idea of Political Theory: Reflections on the Self in Political Time and Space (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p.112. Simon Critchley has argued that modern philosophy begins with a religious “disappointment” in Very Little...Almost Nothing (London: Routledge, 1997). 21. Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation.” Thanks to Ruth Levitas for forcing me to rethink a previous political error of eliding the legislative and substantive modes of theorizing. A utopian political theory worthy of the name certainly, as Levitas has forcefully and elo- quently argued, needs to provide the critical tools of both critique and transformation; transformation necessitates the articulation of substantive visions, and substantive visions need agents and plans: “The dream becomes vision only when hope is invested in an agency capable of transformation. The political problem remains the search for that agency and the possibility of hope,” The Concept of Utopia (London: Phillip Allen, 1990), p.200. In the conclusion, I discuss issues of the relationship between theory, practice, and agency. 22. Jacques Derrida, “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils,” trans. Catherine Porter and Edward P. Morris, in, Diacritics 13 (Fall 1983), pp.3–20, 9. 23. William Corlett, Community without Unity: A Politics of Derridean Extravagance (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989), p.12. 24. Jacques Derrida and Richard Kearney, “Deconstruction and the Other,” in, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p.119. notes / 173

25. Ibid., p.120. 26. Cathy Caruth, “The Insistence of Reference,” in, Critical Encounters: Reference and Responsibility in Deconstructive Writing (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1995), p.1. 27. Ibid., p.5. 28. Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992), p.169. 29. Thomas Keenan, Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.1–2. 30. Derrida and Kearney, “Deconstruction and the Other,” p.120. 31. Michael Shapiro, Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as a Textual Practice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p.17. 32. As Brook Thomas puts it, in “Restaging the Reception of Iser’s Early Work, or, Sides Not Taken in Discussions of the Aesthetic,” in, New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation 31/1 (Winter 2000), pp.13–43, 21. 33. Andrew Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory of Narrative (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p.87. 34. Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, p.43. 35. Michael P. Clark, ed., Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in Theory Today (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.7. 36. In his Scraps of the Untainted Sky (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) Tom Moylan discusses a “readerly” critical and potentially transformative paradigm that certainly maps to the Barthesian moment I draw on here. 37. Barthes, S/Z, p.4. 38. Ibid., p.4, second emphasis mine. 39. Barthes, The Rustle of Language, p.54. 40. Barthes, S/Z, p.5. 41. Ibid. 42. Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.48. 43. Barthes, S/Z, p.5. 44. As Dennis J. Schmidt puts it in his Introduction to Natural Law and Human Dignity, by Ernst Bloch (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987), p.vii. 45. Cited in Melissa Lane, “Interpreting Political Thought,” in, Contemporary Political Thought: A Reader and Guide, ed. Alan Finlayson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p.79. 46. Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978), p.282. Siep Stuurman has written very sensibly on contemporary reorderings of the canon of political thought sensitive to socialist, feminist, and occidental critiques of exclusivity. He suggests we need to replace the concepts of “linearity” with “non-synchronicity,” “great ideas and theories” with contestation and argument, and to extend, open up, the canon. See “The Canon of the History of Political Thought: Its Critique and a Proposed Alternative,” in, History and Theory: Studies in the History of Philosophy, 39/2 (2000), pp.147–166, 166. 47. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p.97. See also Irene Harvey, who writes, “the examples offer us evidence of something more than [. . .] accidental [. . .] That examples are not arbitrary interchangeable but rather integral to the constitution of the ‘as such’ as such is what is at stake here.” See “Exemplarity and the Origins of Legislation,” in, Unruly Examples: On the Rhetoric of Exemplarity, ed. Alexander Gelley (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.249. The examples constitute the possibility of the whole narrative; but their status as “mere” examples problematizes that very construction. This play and ambiguity is evident throughout. 48. Miller, Ethics of Reading, p.11. 174 / notes

49. Wendy Brown, “At the Edge,” in, Political Theory, 30/4 (August 2002), pp.556–576, 574. See also Jon Simons, who argues that “the term ‘fictive theories’ indicates a reaction to excessive epistemological and foundational concerns of Critical Theory, but does not propose in its place the sort of empty relativist skepticism according to which any account of what is going on in this world is as good as any other.” Explaining further with reference to the work of Michel Foucault, he proposes that “the question is not whether his account is adequate to ‘reality’, but whether his perspective is adequate to his resistance to the mode of power that subjects us.” See, “The Critical Force of Fictive Theories: Jameson, Foucault and Woolf,” in, Reconstituting Social Criticism: Political Morality in an Age of Scepticism, ed. Iain MacKenzie and Shane O’Neill (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), pp. 85, 92.

Chapter One Hobbes: Restraining Fictions 1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1968), chapter 13. 2. See Tom Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, for important differences between the utopian, dystopian, and anti-utopian. 3. Samantha Frost gives an analysis of the “Hobbesian subject qua rational actor” in, “Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory,” in, Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 4. Richard W.F. Kroll, The Material Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p.53. 5. Of a kind that Hobbes would thoroughly disapprove of: for example, in the claims that religion can supercede the temporal political authority of the Sovereign, Hobbes writes, “Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign” (p.498); elsewhere, Hobbes compares the epistemic authority of the Pope with the Kingdom of the Fairies (see p.712). 6. Barthes, The Rustle of Language, p.54. 7. Common to both is, I think, a recognition of the artificiality of language and hence intelligibility. See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) where the “post” signifies a critical interrogation of the founding assumptions of modernity. See also Richard W.F. Kroll, who suggests, as “Michel Foucault intuits, neoclassical discourse is conscious of its own artificiality,” The Material Word, pp.3–4. 8. William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.2. 9. See Ronald W.K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.61 for this phrase. Political theorists are still trying to find ways to guaran- tee or underwrite ethical and political action in the loss of a providential worldview. 10. The title of Christopher Hill’s classic text, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1972). 11. See, e.g., Michael Lessnoff, Social Contract (London: Macmillan, 1986) and Social Contract Theory (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). In her exploration of the ways in which generic Man is exclusionary and gendered man, feminist political theorist Carole Pateman also focuses on substantive issues: see The Sexual Contract (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988). In much of this work, the problematic status of nature is elided. One contemporary reply to Hume’s critique, which I refer to below, runs along the following lines: “the idea of the contract seems either historically absurd (if it is based on actual agreement) or morally insignificant (if it is based on hypothetical agreement); however, the contract device and the state of nature could be read not as an ‘anthropological claim about the pre- social existence of human beings,’ but rather as representing a ‘moral claim about the notes / 175

absence of subordination among human beings,’ ” Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.60. This is simply a displacement, or further abstraction, of the problem of the initial claim. None of these critiques or reformulations, such as John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), begins to come to terms with the fictivity inhabiting the very device and the theoretical implications of this. 12. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.51. 13. See David Hume, Theory of Politics, ed. Frederick Watkins (London: Nelson, 1951), p.52; Selected Essays, ed. Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.277. 14. Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism,’ ” in, J. Butler and J.W. Scott, eds. Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992), p.20n1. 15. Anna Yeatman, Postmodern Revisionings of the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p.ix. 16. For alternative accounts of the status of nature, see R. Bernasconi, who argues that “Hobbes is best understood as offering a double account of the state of nature, first as an immemorial past and then as a historical condition of war that always threatens to return,” in, “Opening the Future: The Paradox of Promising in the Hobbesian Social Contract,” in, Philosophy Today 41 (Spring 1997), pp.77–86. Mary Dietz, “Hobbes’s Subject as Citizen,” in, Mary Dietz, ed., Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1990) argues that the state of nature “make[s] quasi-permanent a depersonalized memory of civil war” (p.149n36). When taking the state of nature to be simply chapter 13 of Book One of Leviathan these accounts are accurate; but if the state of nature is taken to be the whole of Book One, as I argue, then the status of nature becomes more complex. In the next chapter, I refer to Rousseau’s critique of this position, encapsu- lated here: “in speaking of the savage, they described social man” (The Social Contract and Discourses, p.50). C.B. Macpherson’s highly influential thesis of “possessive individualism,” reading Hobbes’s natural man as naturalized, bourgeois man, remains one of the most important works in this direction. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 17. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.186. 18. Kirsty McClure “The Issue of Foundations: Scientized Politics, Politicized Science, and Feminist Critical Practice,” in, J. Butler and J.W. Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political, p.341; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968). 19. Sheldon Wolin, “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism,” in, Mary Dietz, ed., Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, p.32. 20. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.81. 21. Ibid., p.82. 22. Ibid., last emphasis mine. 23. Strong continues, “how can this happen, that I find a text in myself, that I (know that I) am a text? How then can I know that you have found the same text and that we have thus found each other, that this text is the same authority and our common community?” See “How to Write Scripture: Words, Authority, and Politics in Thomas Hobbes,” in, Critical Inquiry 20/1 (Autumn 1993), pp.128–178, 143–144. He thus displays those concerns not only with security but also a sympathy for the difficulty of creating it. My own use of text is, however, different to Strong’s. 24. Richard Kroll, The Material Word, p.37. 25. Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings and Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.96; Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harlow: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p.137. 176 / notes

26. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.82. 27. Ibid., p.83. 28. Ibid. 29. Gary Shapiro writes that “Hobbes is a crucial case in determining the interplay of philosophical themes and literary modes,” and also associates Hobbes with the performative mode in philosophy, where “the writer undertakes to perform a certain act,” which is the construction of the “Mortall God.” See “Reading and Writing in the Text of Hobbes’s Leviathan,” in, Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (April 1980), pp.147–157. Hobbes’s “intellectual coercion” has been commented upon by, among others, Miriam Reik, cited by Victoria Silver, who writes of the “almost intellectually coercive” nature of Hobbes’s rhetoric, “The Fiction of Self-Evidence in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” in, ELH 55 (1988), pp.351–379, 351, 372n4. Wolin asks if there is a “correspondence between political structures and theoretical discourse? Is it sufficiently pronounced that we might say that the political structure of a theory intimates/imitates a corresponding form of rule?,” (in Deitz, ed., 1990, p.13). See “Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism,” in, Mary Dietz, ed., Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, p.13. Hobbes’s very acts of imagination and understanding in his political theory are juridical and ostensibly closed: I go on to show the Hobbesian state of nature narratives to be profoundly, if ironically, resistant to closure. Hence, the answer to Wolin’s question is yes, but also no. 30. Silver, “Fiction of Self-Evidence,” p.354. 31. Given Hobbes’s desire for correct definitions, I am here simply following Hobbes while probing definitional limits. All definitions are taken from the OED online: http:// dictionary.oed.com, correct as of June 2001. 32. Silver, “Fiction of Self-Evidence,” p.355. 33. See C.B. Macpherson, Introduction Leviathan, pp.26–27 for a useful summary. 34. King James Bible, Book of Job. 41: 24–25, 33–34. 35. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.669. 36. Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life, p.98. Paracelsus (1493–1541) was an alchemist and physician. 37. For a useful survey of the place of nature within political theory, see John Barry, Environment and Social Theory (London: Routledge, 1999). See Vincent Geoghegan, Ernst Bloch (London: Routledge, 1996) for a utopian understanding of nature, where nature itself is a vital part of a “spectacular cosmology” of becoming. 38. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.97. 39. Ibid., p.689. On debates between the plenists and the vacuists, see, among others, Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 40. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp.428–429. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., pp.429–430. 43. Samantha Frost, “Faking It: Hobbes’s Thinking-Bodies and the Ethics of Dissimulation,” in, Political Theory 29.1 (February 2001), pp.30–57, 31. 44. Frost, “Faking It,” p.34. 45. “The awakened and knowing say: body I am entirely, and nothing else and soul is only a word for something about the body,” Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “On the Despisers of the Body,” in, The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann (New York and London: Penguin, 1976), p.146. 46. Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p.ix. Friedrich Nietzsche, Luce Irigaray, Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault are obviously the crucial influences on body-politics. See also Samantha Frost, “Faking It.” 47. Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p.xi. notes / 177

48. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.85. 49. Ibid. 50. Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p.xii.. 51. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.122. 52. Ibid., p.127. 53. Ibid., p.88. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., p.89. 56. Ibid., p.86. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. William Connolly, Why I Am Not A Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 60. Joshua Foa Dienstag, Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory on Political Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.89–90. 61. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.90. 62. Ibid., p.91. The distinction between being awake and dreaming is an immensely suggestive and rich problem in modern philosophy, from Descartes to Nietzsche. I can only touch on this here, but develop more fully with Nietzsche in chapter five, section two, “hinge two.” Concomitant with this distinction, however, are others: the clarity of daylight and reason versus the irrational, dark dreamtime world (Nietzsche goes beyond this); autonomous and self-conscious subjectivity versus the polymorphous, infinitely desiring id; the world of objectivity and facts, versus the world of illusion, fictions, and narratives. For a brief comparison of Descartes and Nietzsche (who, I stress, are not repre- sentatives of the opposing sides), see Gary Shapiro Nietzschean Narratives (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp.26–27. 63. All definitions are taken from the OED online: http://dictionary.oed.com, correct as of June 2001. 64. William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p.30. 65. Ernst Bloch, “Man as Possibility,” in, Cross Currents 18 (1968), pp.273–283, 281. 66. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Guess and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 67. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.227. 68. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.39–40. 69. Contrast the positivity of the contract with the “something so new, so deep, so unprece- dented, so enigmatic and pregnant with the future came into existence,” Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, pp.65–66. 70. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.99, last emphasis mine. 71. William Sokoloff argues that ghosts troubled Hobbes because “the force of imagined fears might eclipse fear of the state.” So, “Hobbes was troubled by irrational and superstitious fears of non-corporeal bodies to the extent that they could be used as a means to manipu- late the credulous in order to incite a revolt against the secular sovereign”; or, put more pithily, “Hobbes feared ghosts, but only for political reasons.” See “Politics and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” in, Theory and Event 5/1 (2001): online edition, June 2001: http://swets2.nesli.ac.uk/link/access_db?issnϭ1092-311X. As ciphers of temporal complexity as well as a motivating intangibility, I think Hobbes’s fear of ghosts runs deeper than this account suggests. 72. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.109. 73. Ibid., pp.107–108. 74. Ibid., p.96. 75. Ibid., p.109. 178 / notes

76. Hobbes, Leviathan, p.112. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, writes that Hobbes’s state of nature is characterized by an “anarchy of meanings” (p.257): I would agree with this at the individual linguistic stage, but, as I have shown, there is also a pre-linguistic aspect to the natural condition. 77. Christopher Pye, “The Sovereign, the Theater, and the Kingdome of Darknesse: Hobbes and the Spectacle of Power,” in, Representations 8 (Autumn 1984), pp.84–106, 91. 78. Robert Bernasconi, “Opening the Future: The Paradox of Promising in the Hobbesian Social Contract,” in, Philosophy Today 41 (Spring 1997), pp.77–86. 79. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp.120–121. 80. Ibid., p.223. 81. Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” trans. Tom Keenan and Tom Pepper, in, New Political Science 15 (1985), pp.7–15, 10. 82. Philip Pullman, The Shadow in the North (London Scholastic Ltd., 1999), p.62. 83. Kroll, The Material Word, p.7.

Chapter Two Rousseau: Conceiving the Inconceivable 1. Phillip Pullman, Lyra’s Oxford (Oxford and New York: David Fickling, 2003) (preface, NP). 2. Jane Bennett, in The Enchantment of Modern Life, suggests an apt word of caution regard- ing “those ways of marking nature’s internal relation to artifice” that “overstate the earth’s pliability,” such as accounts that stress the “social production” or “linguistic production” of nature. Bennett is rightly concerned that such accounts “tend to write nature as inert matter without a will of its own,” p.191n9. In this book, with Rousseau as well as drawing on Nietzsche’s wonderful rendition of nature as wild, alive, bound by no laws, I suggest the possibility of a rendition of nature that “treads lightly,” attentive to the effects secured in its name, and is thus political in the broadest sense. For more on this, in relation to Ernst Bloch (who, incidentally, was also drawn to Paracelsus), see Vincent Geoghegan on Bloch’s “spectacular cosmological speculations”: “Bloch’s philosophical starting point is the dynamic creativity of the material. It was his conviction that the adventure of the material universe had only just begun” Ernst Bloch (London: Routledge, 1996), p.133). 3. My utopian reading of Rousseau nevertheless differs from the utopian interpretative framework of, e.g., Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) and Jean Starobinski, Jean Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) whose emphasis on Rousseau’s fictions I nevertheless find helpful. 4. Brown, “At The Edge,” in Political Theory 30/4 (August 2002), p.574. 5. Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) p.xvi. 6. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” p.142, emphasis mine. 7. On Rousseau’s catastrophic or discontinuous theory of history see, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology and James Swenson, On Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Considered as One of the First Authors of the Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000). As I explore, this is a crucial notion both in distancing himself from a Hobbesian conception of humans as naturally aggressive, and also in freeing the fictive moment of grounding from closure to plurality and potentiality. 8. M. Lessnoff, Social Contract, p.76. 9. Jean Starobinski, Transparency and Obstruction, p.31. 10. Ibid., p.29. 11. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.181. On the issues of translation and tense, it has been suggested by Cole in the introduction to this edition that “man was born free” is “arguably more accurate. Either translation fits Rousseau’s general meaning, which is both historical and moral” (p.349n2). Both should then be kept in mind, but both the notes / 179

historical and the moral are of dubious status in Rousseau’s narrative. On the issue of the legitimacy of the chains of enslavement and dependency, I read Rousseau’s aims here, not in the sense of making the chains legitimate (which, after all, was the task of the fraudulent liberal or Lockean contract), but in a Marxian sense: “criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers from the chain, not in order that man shall bear the chain without caprice or consolation but so that he shall cast off the chain and pluck the living flower,” “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” in The Marx- Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), p.54. My Rousseau is close to Tracy Strong’s, who finds in Rousseau the capacity to articulate “that idea that one knew what it would be like to live a life that was not exploitative [. . .] the dream that a life would be possible in which one did not have to say no to the human in another human,” Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Inc., 1994), p.xxii. 12. Immanuel Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” in, Kant’s Political Writings ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.228. 13. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.213. 14. Ibid., p.181. 15. Ibid., p.43. 16. Ibid., p.51. 17. Ibid., p.48, emphasis mine. 18. Ibid., p.50. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p.43. 21. Starobinski, Transparency and Obstruction, p.16. 22. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.43. 23. Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), pp.139–140; Eli Friedlander, “Rousseau’s Writings on Inequality,” Political Theory 28/2 (2000), pp.254–272, 254. Friedlander relates this directly to Rousseau’s desire to avoid the confusion of nature and history: a lesson still learned only with difficulty, since, as Roland Barthes would much later put it, “in short, in the account given of our contemporary circumstances, I resented seeing Nature and History confused at every turn, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying, the ideological abuse which, in my view, is hidden there,” Mythologies, selected and translated by Annette Lavers (London: Vintage, 1993), p.11. 24. On the counter-positivity of the utopian mode, see Ernst Bloch who opens the present thus: “the concrete imagination and the imagery of its mediated anticipations are fer- menting in the process of the real itself and are depicted in the concrete forward dream; anticipating elements are a component of reality itself.” And thus, “no absolute objections to utopia can be raised by merely factual analysis.” See chapter five, where I discuss The Principle of Hope Vol. I, translated by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.197. The Frankfurt School also launched powerful critiques of positivist epistemologies. 25. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, pp.50–51. The “facts” that Rousseau explicitly admits throwing aside come from three competing narratives concerning the origins of the species. First, he rejects the scientific biological-historical explanations on the grounds that “comparative anatomy has made too little progress, and the observations of scientists are too uncertain, to afford an adequate basis for any solid reasoning.” Rousseau further comments, “on this subject, I could form none but vague and almost imaginary conjectures,” an ironic comment in the light of Rousseau’s own narrative to say the least! Ibid., p.52. Most importantly, he rejects those accounts that implicitly presuppose what they should explain, that read the contingencies of history into the natural. His examples 180 / notes

are that previous philosophers have inferred ideas of justice, property, and authority as the reasons why institutions based on these concepts came into being without explaining why the concepts themselves came into being; Rousseau suggests that these concepts could not be understood without first being practiced; but that they could not be practiced without first being understood. Third, he rejects the biblical narrative, as the state of nature con- tradicts scripture: “a paradox which...would be very embarrassing to defend, and quite impossible to prove,” ibid., p.50. 26. Ibid., p.44. 27. Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau: A Study of Nietzsche’s Moral and Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.65, emphasis mine. 28. Asher Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature and History (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1987), p.67. Horowitz’s reading of Rousseau is left-Marcusian, and asserts that Rousseau “ceases to oppose nature and humanity,” ibid., p.32. He argues this in order to propose a dialectical and thus dynamic concept of human nature in Rousseau’s work. However sympathetic I am to this general argument, Rousseau does not do this: his fiction of the natural is as Strong puts it: “what kind of book is nature, such that one may read it without risking the kind of representational fixity that is the source of so many errors,” such as Hobbes, or indeed, all natural law philosophers, introduced into the category? See The Politics of the Ordinary, p.31. By arguing that nature does not cause history, contrary to Horowitz’s interpretation, Rousseau achieves the ends of the avoidance of fixity that Horowitz would wish to claim for his argument. Rather, the force of Rousseau’s argument is to make us realize that “human history is in no way an expression of human nature,” Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, p.114. A necessary corollary to this is that future possibilities are radically open if only we do not remain trapped within reified ideological and psychoso- cial structures that are just as “real,” however false, as political institutions. This is one of the most significant consequences of the constitutive fictivity of theorizing, as I discuss in concluding. 29. P. de Man, Allegories of Reading, p.137. Again, the force of Rousseau’s argument is to suggest that the only responsible history is at the same time a fabrication of the future, a task of fabulation, as the discussion of Bloch in chapter five of this book emphasizes. 30. P. de Man, Allegories of Reading, p.136. 31. E. Friedlander, “Rousseau’s Writings,” p.255. 32. Starobinksi, Transparency and Obstruction, p.4. 33. de Man, Allegories of Reading, p.137. 34. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.52. 35. Ibid., p.54. 36. J. Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, p.103. 37. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.62. 38. Ibid., p.62. 39. Ibid., p.216. 40. Ibid., p.62. 41. Ibid., p.64. 42. Ibid., p.64. 43. Ibid., p.70. 44. Ibid., pp.69–70. 45. Ibid., p.83. 46. Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, p.96. 47. Starobinski, Transparency and Obstruction, p.12. 48. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.90. 49. Ibid., p.92 50. Ibid., p.94. 51. Ibid., pp.95, 96. notes / 181

52. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.84. 53. Another Rousseauian maneuver: “hurried on by the rapidity of time, by the abundance of things I have to say, and by the almost insensible progress of things in their beginnings, I pass over a multitude of ages; for the slower the events were in their succession, the more rapidly they may be described,” ibid., p.87. 54. Ibid., p.99. 55. J. Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, pp.96, 105. 56. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p.258. 57. J. Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, p.114. Tracy Strong concurs: for Rousseau there is no “rational or necessary” link between the categories of natural and human (in contrast to, e.g., Hobbes, who uses the natural to invoke a political closure). See The Politics of the Ordinary, p.34. 58. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp.258–259. 59. de Man, Allegories of Reading, pp.140–141. 60. Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp.266–267. 61. J. Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, p.114. 62. Louis Althusser, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx: Politics and History, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1982). See also, e.g., K. Ansell-Pearson, who suggests that Rousseau “loses faith in history,” and thus the social contract is an “attempt to transcend history altogether,” Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, p.77. 63. Judith Still, Feminine Economies: Thinking Against the Market in the Enlightenment and the Late Twentieth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p.3. 64. The classic statement of this reading can be found in J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952). For an excellent critique of this position that generalizes a “natural seeming interpretation” drawing on, e.g., Arthur M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), see Steven G. Affeldt, “The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on Forcing to Be Free,” Political Theory 27/3 (2000), pp.299–333. The basic gist of such interpretations is that individuals owe obedience to the laws of the just political state, which would be that governed by the social contract; and that disobedience to these laws invokes the notorious “forcing” of freedom, hence the paradoxical combination of democracy and totalitarianism. Affeldt contests this reading from a different perspective from the one presented here, but with similar implications for reading and understanding Rousseau. On a similar note, Ansell-Pearson suggests that Rousseau was among the first to articulate “antinomies of modern political life,” such as individual versus society, man versus citizen, autonomy versus authority, freedom versus necessity, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, p.22. Put simply, if this is indeed the case, then Rousseau cannot be read as if he presupposes these antinomies that have now become entrenched in our political vocabulary. The reading I suggest of the social contract, then, negotiates the tensions between these terms, but suggests possible ways of understanding them precisely not as antinomies. 65. Roemer, cited in Angelika Bammer Partial Visions: Feminism and Utopianism in the 1970s (New York: Routledge, 1991), p.15. 66. Irene Harvey, “Exemplarity and the Origins of Legislation,” in, Unruly Examples: On the Rhetoric of Exemplarity, edited and introduced by Alexander Gelley (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.213. 67. The starting point for the social contract is described by Rousseau thus:

I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That 182 / notes

primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.190.

This is clearly disassociated from the narrative of the Discourse, which has already culminated in the fraudulent contract; the supposition is, therefore, that this new contract is set somewhere in the future, after a second state of nature. Given Rousseau’s strong arguments that the first contract is fraudulent, it could be supposed that the illegitimate state that we inhabit is a second state of nature. 68. Ibid., p.191. 69. Ibid., p.192. 70. Ibid., p.198. 71. Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp.4–5. 72. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.216, emphasis mine. 73. J. Swenson, On Jean Jacques Rousseau, p.114. On the paradoxes of the legislator, see, e.g., L. Althusser, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx ; de Man, Allegories of Reading; Geoffrey Bennington, Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction (London: Verso, 1994); and K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau. Althusser invokes the difference between the “real” and the fictional to close the text, whereas I see possibilities for opening; and Bennington, following de Man and Derrida, focuses on the impossibility of the social compact. I am concerned to further this enterprise, and see how the new concepts generated are themselves politically enabling. 74. Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), p.12. 75. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.213. 76. Ibid., p.216. To follow Rousseau here, he cites Machiavelli: “In truth, there has never been, in any country, an extra-ordinary legislator who has not had recourse to God; for otherwise his laws would not have been accepted: there are, in fact, many useful truths of which a wise man may have knowledge without their having in themselves such clear reasons for their being so as to be able to convince others” (from Discourses on Livy, cited in Rousseau, p.216). The truth, for Rousseau, is either unspeakable, or cannot be heard by “common” ears (Nietzsche’s plaint, but in a vastly different context of what that truth consists of and to what ends). Alternatively, the words are false, but the orders and practices they found are entirely valid; or the legislator speaks falsely, and the orders and practices he founds are illegitimate. The legislator is invoked as an answer to these questions and problems of justification and knowledge; but it is more a displacement of the problem if read via epistemologies of the given. 77. J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p.258, emphasis mine. 78. I. Harvey, “Exemplarity,” p.217. 79. Ibid., p.220. 80. Ibid., p.223. 81. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.195. 82. Ibid., p.200. 83. S. Affeldt, “Forcing Freedom,” p.306. 84. T. Strong, The Politics of the Ordinary, p.91. 85. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, pp.191, 194. 86. Ibid., p.266. 87. S. Affeldt, “Forcing Freedom,” p.311. 88. Ibid., pp.313, 318. 89. de Man, Allegories of Reading, p.137. 90. Derrida and Kearney, “Deconstruction and the Other,” pp.122–123. 91. Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, p.2. 92. See Affeldt, “Forcing Freedom.” notes / 183

93. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition trans. Paul Patton (Columbia University Press, 1994), p.147.

Excursus “Mere High-Flown Fantasy . . .”? (Kant on Holiday) 1. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, p.47; Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973), p.232, and throughout. 2. Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol. 2, p.874. 3. Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life, p.42. 4. Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” in, Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. Gary Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p.3. 5. Ian Hunter, “The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant’s Groundwork as Intellectual Paideia” in, Critical Inquiry 28 (Summer 2002), pp.908–929, 908. 6. Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.342–343. I have insisted that this book is neither “pro-foundationalism” nor “anti-foundationalism,” since to organize this field into camps—to create the foundationalist moment as singular and monolithic—is to miss the moment of rupture that comes from reading foundations. To be simply anti-foundationalist is to presuppose and work to create the very monolith of foundationalism. I would rather, as I have suggested already, maintain the status of the “always already” fictive quality of foundations; this nevertheless means occasionally drawing on the kinds of characterizations such as Fish provides. 7. I am concerned, especially with Nietzsche, to think political theory, and the possibility of answering its questions, when this position is no longer available. As Arthur C. Danto puts it in relation to Nietzsche, “it is plain that God did not die on order that something else should take his place; rather, he meant for the place to die with the occupant.” See “Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals,” in, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht (London and California: University of California Press, 1994), p.47. What happens when structures of foundation and transcendence, which function in similar ways (Nietzsche encapsulates this history in “How the True World Finally Became a Fable”—I discuss this in chapter four), collapse into one plane? 8. This is particularly important in demarcating the reconfigured field within which utopianism, as a creative epistemology of the possible, works, as I suggest in chapter five and in concluding. 9. J. Hillis Miller is acutely aware of this in opening his The Ethics of Reading with a chapter on Kant: Already that choice involves a complex set of moves or placements, even “political” commitments, if not ethical choices, in the sense that we speak of academic “politics.” To put all I have to say under the aegis of Kant by choosing to speak of him first, as though all I have to say might flow from what I have to say about him, or from what he said himself, is so far from innocent that it involves me in a whole set of complicities at once, whether I wish them or not, am aware of them or not, complicities which I might require a more or less interminable analysis to untangle. (p.13) Notleast of the “complicities” involved here is the acceptance of Kant as pivotal, enlightenment, rational, modern figurehead, which I want to neither confirm nor deny, but simply put on hold for the pages of this excursus. 10. As described by Allen Wood, Introduction, The Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals in, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.xxi. Wood locates the text as satire of Herder’s work on human nature and social development, which it undoubtedly is; however, my own contextualizing of the 184 / notes

“Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” with other state of nature narratives is also relevant. Although not described by Kant as a satire, Wood’s perhaps off-hand comment is worth pausing over, particularly when considering the status of the theoretical act. See Michael Seidel, who writes, “the satiric representation or fiction refuses to entertain notions of the accommodating, idealizing lie”; it is, in fact, the “monstrous” that gives birth to “terrible knowledge.” See, Satiric Inheritance: Rabelais to Sterne (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.3, 5. For Kant, however, it is clear that his satire is indeed intended to ground what Nietzsche would later refer to as such monstrous and idealizing lies: this would be an interesting characterization of the theoretical enterprise to say the least. 11. Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History,” in, Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.228. 12. “Conjectures . . .,” p.226; Rousseau, Social Contract and Discourses, p.196. 13. “Conjectures . . .,” p.221. 14. Ibid., p.221. 15. Ibid., p.221. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Groundwork, p.50, emphasis mine. 19. Derrida, “Before the Law,” in Acts of Literature, pp.190–191. 20. Kant, “Conjectures...,” p.227. Kant, then, correctly understands Rousseau’s “appar- ently contradictory” statements on the dialectic of nature and culture, and how it is only via culture that autonomy can be achieved, in contrast to those romanticists who would read Rousseau as yearning for a return to the unadulterated simplicity and immediacy of nature (“Conjectures . . .,” p.227). In this respect, both Rousseau and Nietzsche have been seriously misread, one as yearning for the noble savage, the other for the blond beast. See chapters two and four of this book. 21. Ibid., p.223. 22. “If we are not to indulge in wild conjectures, we must begin with something which human reason cannot deduce from prior natural causes—that is, the existence of human beings. These human beings must also be fully developed, for they have no mother to support them, and they must be a pair in order that they may reproduce their kind” (“Conjectures . . .,” p.221). Although this conjecture is necessarily due to the biblical text Kant is using as a map (it is obviously Adam and Eve), it reads strangely as though the very existence of humans is a leap of faith for Kant. This postulate is mirrored in the deduction of the categorical imperative, where the existence of human beings as ends in themselves forms the supreme principle on which it rests. 23. Ibid., p.223. 24. Ibid., second emphasis mine. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. See the epigraph to chapter four of this book, from Andrei Warminski: “on the one hand, knowledge is that which can invent the fable; but on the other hand, this knowledge is itself an invention—it is invented just like the fable, but in the fable.” See, “Towards a Fabulous Reading: Nietzsche’s ‘On Truth and Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense,’ ” in, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 15/2 (1991), pp.93–120, 112. In Kant’s fable, each opening is followed by a closure, or a securing of the new territory; Nietzsche does not provide such a closure, making him somewhat more dangerous. 28. Kant, “Conjectures . . .,” p.224. 29. Ibid., p.224, emphasis mine. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. notes / 185

32. Ibid., pp.224–225. 33. Ibid., p.225. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid., p.228n. “The individual therefore has cause to blame himself for all the ills he endures and for all the evil which he perpetrates; but at the same time, as the member of a whole (of a species), he has cause to admire and praise the wisdom and purposiveness of the overall arrangement” (“Conjectures . . .,” p.227). The shift wrought by rationality awakening, then, while beneficial to the species in Kant’s teleological account, can actually be detrimental to the individual. 36. Ibid., p.225. 37. Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life, p.42. 38. Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, p.23, emphasis mine. 39. Since the Groundwork, although short, is a remarkably dense text, and since this is merely an excursus, I have taken the liberty of bypassing the vast amounts of secondary literature on Kant. However, I must acknowledge my debts to the following accounts: Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Miller, The Ethics of Reading; Paul Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Honig (1993), Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics; Kimberley Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics (London: Routledge, 1996); Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Andrew Kaufman, “Reason, Self- Legislation and Legitimacy: Conceptions of Freedom in the Political Thought of Rousseau and Kant,” in, The Review of Politics 59/1 (Winter 1997) pp.25–52. 40. Groundwork, p.43. 41. Ibid., p.44. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., p.77. Kant’s concern here with the purity of morality in the face of corruption and contempt can be read unsympathetically, as an attempt to sterilize, make hygienic, the human. However, when these concerns are read alongside the epigram I have chosen from Observations . . ., we see a different face of Kant, a yearning, sad, perhaps lost face that provokes in this reader at least a greater degree of sympathy. 44. Groundwork, pp.47, 63. 45. Kant insists upon universality and transcendence for the moral law: see, e.g., “everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as the ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity” (p.44); and, “the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances in which he is placed; but a priori simply in the concepts of pure reason; and that any other precept, which is based on principles of mere experience—even if it is universal in a certain respect—insofar as it rests in the least part on empirical grounds, perhaps only in terms of a motive, can indeed be called a practical rule but never a moral law” (ibid., p.45). 46. Ibid., p.45, emphasis mine. 47. Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, ed. Maudmarie Clark and Brian Leiter, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Preface, 5. 48. Each of the three sections of the Groundwork, then, could be read by a different audience: the first section, entitled, “Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition” being the most basic and most readily understandable—and thus practical—to a “common” understanding. 49. Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: Vintage, 1974), IV, 108. 50. Groundwork, p.50. 51. Ibid., pp.50–52. See, for examples, Groundwork, pp.45, 56, 63, 79, 81, 95. 186 / notes

52. Hunter, “The Morals of Metaphysics,” p.922. 53. Groundwork, pp.51–52. 54. Ibid., pp.53–54. 55. Ibid., pp.56, 55. This is, of course, a classical statement of a deontological ethics: “For, the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori principle, which is material, as at a crossroads; and since it must still be determined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of volition as such when an action is done from duty, where every material principle has been withdrawn” (p.55). 56. Ibid., p.53. 57. Ibid., p.57. 58. Ibid., p.55. 59. Ibid., p.62, emphasis mine. 60. On this classical account of positive and negative freedom, where to be positively free is to be governed by the rational self, see Isaiah Berlin’s essays on liberty: Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). While dealing with the problems this account generates is beyond the confines of this book, I would simply like to note that Kant seems to confer agency on rationality and willing that is beyond the boundaries of the self. 61. Groundwork, p.73. 62. The Ethics of Reading, p.29. 63. William Sokoloff, “Kant and the Paradox of Respect,” in, American Journal of Political Science 45/4 (October 2001), pp.768–779, 770. 64. Groundwork, p.73. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida (London: Penguin, 1987), I.i.57–58. 68. Gibson, Towards a Postmodern Theory of Narrative, p.88. 69. Groundwork, p.76. 70. Ibid., p.78. 71. Ibid., p.81; Rousseau, Social Contract and Discourses, p.196. 72. Groundwork, p.81. Will, for Kant, is not “merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and just because of this first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)” (p.81). Again, this is impersonal, and the volition comes from those concepts not contained within or by the self (rather, the relationship is the other way round). This clearly maps to Rousseau’s work; if, however, the legislator was necessarily fictive, what is the status of Kant’s “causal” factors here? 73. Ibid., p.97. 74. Ibid., pp.97, 98, emphasis mine. 75. Ibid., pp.99–100. 76. Ibid., p.72. 77. “On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy,” cited in Sokoloff, “Kant and the Paradox of Respect,” p.774. 78. Groundwork, p.108. 79. Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996), p.31. 80. “Before the Law,” in, Acts of Literature, pp.190–191. 81. Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life, p.89. 82. See chapter five, and the discussion of The Principle of Hope, p.197.

Chapter Three Stirner (With Marx and Derrida) Neither Material Nor Utopian? 1. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in Collected Works Vols. I, III, V (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), p.130. Hereafter cited as MEGA, volume number and page reference. notes / 187

2. Saul Newman has argued that Stirner’s politics of insurrection begin with “a rebellion of the subject against himself, against his subjectified, ideologically constructed identity.” I appreciate the value of this, but the problem of singularity remains. See, “Specters of Stirner: A Contemporary Critique of Ideology,” in, Journal of Political Ideologies 6/3 (2001), pp.309–330, 327. 3. Thanks to Andrew Robinson for this formulation. Private correspondence. 4. The core of the Stirner-Marx debate, which for Marx (and Engels) forms the bulk of their The German Ideology, revolves around Stirner’s “presupposition” and Marx (and Engels) “premises”: this will prove to be crucial in defining the “real,” and thus “what can be done.” These textual beginnings, logical starting points, are by no means unproblematic, however, even apart from the heated and occasionally disingenuous diatribe Marx launches against Stirner. 5. Roy Bhasker draws distinctions between the empirical, the actual, and the real, “where the latter is conceived as a stratified structure of powers manifested in sequences of events (the actual) which may or may not be experienced by human subjects (the empirical).” Cited in Alex Callinicos, Theories and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.40. His point, expressed by Callinicos, is that Marx’s materialism does not rely on the real as self-presence. As I argue later on, language and consciousness preclude this. 6. The ‘real’ can thus be shown to function at both the level of the speculative and the level of the material, important in terms of the Young Hegelian debate. 7. MEGA, V, p.30. The full citation, later in this chapter, links the project of The German Ideology directly with that of Thesis Eleven; in terms of my own concerns here, it directly links questions of knowledge and meanings to questions of justice. 8. MEGA, I, p.491, emphasis mine. This is taken from Marx’s doctoral dissertation, completed in 1839. The excerpt continues, “That is the carnival of philosophy, whether it disguises itself as a dog like the Cynic, in priestly vestments like the Alexandrian, or in fragrant spring array like the Epicurean. It is essential that philosophy should wear character masks” (emphasis mine). Despite Althusser’s rather disparaging dismissal of the dissertation in his For Marx as “still the work of a student” in his own thesis that Marx was “never strictly speaking a Hegelian,” I still find this a fascinating and incredibly suggestive passage suggesting not simply the extent to which the real is in need of being made intelligible, but also on the ambiguous and equivocal relation between truth, knowledge, and action (bearing in mind the epistemological implications of the phrase—the real): see For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1996), p.35. For an opposing view to Althusser’s, which reads the dissertation in ironical terms as an attempt to work out how to break from the philosophical past “when that past includes a series of attempts to break from the past,” see John Evan Seery ‘Deviations: On the Difference Between Marx and Marxist Theorists’, in, History of Political Thought 9/2 (Summer 1988), pp.301–325. 9. See, e.g., on utopian and scientific socialism, Zygmunt Bauman Socialism: The Active Utopia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), Lawrence Wilde Ethical Marxism and its Radical Critics (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), and essays by Kellner and Longxi in, Whither Marxism? Global Crises in International Perspective, ed. Bernd Magnus and Stephen Cullenburg (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). 10. MEGA, V, p.5. 11. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.51. 12. Ibid., p.147. 13. Ibid., p.139. 14. Richard Rorty, “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,” in, Deconstruction and Pragmatism ed. Chantal Mouffe (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p.45. Rorty does not follow through on his provocative epistemological insights in this critique of deconstruction. See my introduction, where through Barthes, I suggest textuality is an epistemological proposition, and thus related to questions of authority and intelligibility; 188 / notes

and thus to reading practices (not, as Rorty implies, through the choices of particular novels to read). 15. MEGA, V, p.30. 16. See the Symposium in Radical Philosophy 75 ( January/February 1996), articles by Kate Soper “The Limits of Hauntology,” pp.26–31, and Alex Callinicos “Messianic Ruminations: Derrida, Stirner and Marx,” pp.37–41, for examples of the elision of Marx and “politics proper.” (Some of these pieces express a “proprietorial” claim on Marx, without the ironic self-awareness exhibited by a similar expression of possessiveness by Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak’s “Ghostwriting” in Diacritics 25/2 (Summer 1995), pp.65–84). 17. Koch articulates a typical concern about what happens when politics is no longer foundational: “if politics cannot be grounded around truth because it lacks transcendental grounding, and politics cannot be organized around justice because its representation reflects the interests of those who define it, then politics is reduced to an expression of power.” However, if foundations have always already been expressions of power, then Koch’s concerns no longer provide the rhetorical force to persuade us to remain within the boundaries of foundationalism. See: “Poststructuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism,” in, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23/2 (September 1993), pp.327–351, 335. 18. L.S. Stepelvich, “Max Stirner as Hegelian,” in, Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985), pp.597–614, 597. 19. See Kathy E. Ferguson, “Saint Max Revisited: A Reconsideration of Max Stirner,” in, Idealistic Studie 12/3 (1982), pp.276–292, and Stepelvich, “Max Stirner as Hegelian.” As I argue, it would be difficult to show Stirner justifying the upholding of the institution of private property, capitalism, or, indeed, any other institution. 20. David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.130. 21. Althusser, For Marx, p.34. 22. David McLellan, “Marx and the Missing Link,” in, Encounter 35 (November 1970), pp.35–45, and Nancy Love, Marx, Nietzsche and Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 23. Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” in, The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition (London: Verso, 1998), p.22. 24. N. Lobkowicz, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” in, Demythologizing Marxism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969). Seery’s argument, however, does not preclude Lobkowicz’s: Seery simply suggests the fictive nature of the break, stresses the political and politicized function of “historical materialism” rather than its supposed epistemic or ontological status (which can be de-politicizing). 25. For a much wider reading and historical analysis than I have space for, see, e.g., Louis Dupré, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); Lobkowicz, Demythologizing Marxism; George Lichtheim, From Hegel to Marx and Other Essays (London: Orbac and Chamber, 1971); Ronald K.W. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); John Carrol, Break-Out from Crystal Palace: The Anarcho-Psychological Critique (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); Margaret Rose, Reading the Young Marx and Engels: Poetry, Parody, and the Censor (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978); Z. Jind¸rich, The Logic of Marx, trans. Terrell Carver (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); James D. White, Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins of Dialectical Materialism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). The importance of this debate in my context is that it is precisely a debate over the location of “the real,” and the function of philosophy. 26. Lobkowicz, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” p.85. 27. Ibid., p.83. 28. Rubel, cited in Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, p.116, emphasis mine. Rather interestingly, in a letter from Engels to Marx, Engels is enamored of Stirner to the extent that he writes that they were communists first of all because they were egoists in Stirner’s sense. notes / 189

Unfortunately, Marx’s reply is not preserved; however, it seems that Marx was the first to notice the radical nature of Stirner’s “egoism” that threatened the very communism Engels thought it could support. Engels, however, initially saw the need to bring together Stirnerian “insurrection” and communist revolution. See Lobkowicz, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” p.70. For Stirner and Marx, this is impossible. There is a fuller discussion of this later in the chapter. 29. We came across the term “inaugural” in the excursus on Kant, where I read Kant’s categorical imperative as inaugural rather than representative. The difference here is that Stirner would explicitly invite this reading in an anti-Kantian maneuver. Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, ed. by David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.5. 30. Ibid., p.7. 31. Ibid., p.38. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., p.36. Stirner’s text is constructed around a “genealogy” of the modern, with a tripartite division of experience into historical (world history and “a human life”) and logical categories (coterminous and stratified): the world of the ancients, of childhood, and of realism; the Christian world, idealism, and youth; and the egoistic future. I am mainly concerned with his analysis of idealism and egoism, and therefore have erased the references to the ancients in this extract. 34. The use of “in-itself” here suggests an “essentialist” Stirner: I argue later that this cannot be the case; the “in-itself” then holds a similar epistemological status to the “inaugural ‘I.’ ” 35. Ibid., p.37. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., p.36. 38. Fredric Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter,” in New Left Review 209 (1995), pp.75–109, 101. 39. In chapter four, I discuss Nietzsche’s contention that the self is an “embodied error”: we have incorporated, Nietzsche argues, the false and ascetic divisions of life-negating philosophies. Nietzsche argues that the incorporation of new boundaries, different limits, is the task of the free spirit. See chapter four. 40. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, p.61. 41. Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p.95. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., p.96. 44. Ibid., p.97. 45. I am using Althusser’s phrase, by which he designates the working of ideology as power, drawing on the dual meaning of “subject” as both that with intentionality, creativity, and agency, and that which is subjected to a higher authority. See “Ideology and the State,” in, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). Carrol, in Break-Out from Crystal Palace, also draws parallels between Stirner’s work and the work of the Frankfurt School on, e.g., the “authoritarian personality” thesis. 46. The Ego and Its Own, p.105. 47. Ibid., p.275. In 1872, Marx can be read as agreeing with precisely this point:

equal right is still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation. The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labor. But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time, and labor, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker [. . .] It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like 190 / notes

every right. Right, by its very nature can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard in so far as they are brought under an equal point of view, taken from one definite side only, for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another not [. . .] To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal would have to be made unequal. See, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” in, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), pp.530–531. I return, then, to Rubels point, that it is because Stirner and Marx both sought the same end, which is a society of free individuals, that they conflicted so radically. 48. The Ego and Its Own, p.59. 49. Ibid., pp.129, 121. 50. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, p.61. The final stage in Nietzsche’s “How The ‘True World’ Finally Became A Fable” deals exactly with this movement: I do not think Stirner achieves this moment, precisely because of his dependence on a residual reality of the self, whereas I argue in chapter four that Nietzsche does, because of his willingness to concede the fiction of the self in its entirety—but, without losing it. See chapter four throughout. 51. The Ego and Its Own, p.41. 52. Ibid., p.40. 53. Cited in Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, p.94. 54. The Ego and Its Own, p.135. 55. Ibid., p.133. 56. Ibid., p.146. Rereading and rewriting the structures that have disciplined, constrained, and negated the self, Nietzsche/Zarathustra obliquely tells us, “I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves” (Thus Spake Zarathustra, I, “Prologue,” 5). 57. The Ego and Its Own, p.143, first emphasis mine. 58. Ibid., p.282. 59. Ibid., p.223; Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p.84. While Stirner would balk at the collectivist implications of Rousseau, here, I argue that Stirner’s property cannot be “fixed” on the basis of his “I,” which has at most a fictional or ghostly coherence; Rousseau also shows, in his fictional originary narrative, the sheer contingency of property ownership. 60. The Ego and Its Own, p.263. 61. Ibid., p.227. 62. P. Thomas, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” in, Political Theory 3/2 (May 1975), pp.159–179, 169; Ferguson, “St. Max Revisited,” pp.282–283. 63. Raoul Vaneigem, Revolution of Everyday Life, trans. Donald Nicolson-Smith (London: Left Bank Books and Rebel Press, 1983), p.154. 64. As I read Hobbes, this secured and centered self was created by coercive means, however, a reading that Stirner would possibly agree with, since the self is secured by being inhabited or possessed by Hobbes’s very own reading of its capacities. See chapter one. 65. David Leopold, Introduction, The Ego and Its Own, p.ix. 66. The Ego and Its Own, pp.279–280. 67. Ibid., p.280. 68. Ibid., p.280. 69. Vaneigem, Revolution of Everyday Life, pp.102–103. 70. MEGA, III, pp.196–197. 71. See also Thomas, who writes, Marx

attempted to demonstrate that communism and individuality, properly understood, are anything but incompatible, despite Stirner’s conviction that the two were notes / 191

incommensurate; and that his own critique, far from condemning the present or its Young Hegelian vindications in the light of some abstract categories or principles, was embodied in the real movement of history itself. Marx further aimed to demonstrate that history as a rational process transcends all purely philosophical critiques and standards, and that communism transcends the Kantian is/ought distinction that Stirner, in his bizarre way, had resuscitated. See “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” p.160. Since I read Marx’s materialism only insofar as it constitutes a response to Stirner, I focus on The German Ideology. 72. Lobkowicz, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” pp.94–95. 73. MEGA, III, p.182. 74. MEGA, I, pp.220–221, last emphasis mine. 75. MEGA, V, p.23. 76. Ibid., p.127. 77. Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter,” pp.101–102. 78. MEGA, V, p.185; ibid., p.130. 79. Ibid., p.171. 80. Ibid., p.127. Marx labors this point throughout the section on Stirner, as when he writes, “he actually believes in the domination of the abstract ideas of ideology in the modern world; he believes that in his struggle against ‘predicates,’ against concepts, he is no longer attacking an illusion, but the real forces that rule the world” (ibid., p.237). It is precisely in the laboring of this point that the “break” with the philosophy of the Young Hegelians can be seen, and as I show later, Marx also believes he has found the “premise” of their “premises.” 81. Ibid., p.120. 82. Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter” p.102. 83. Jind¸rich, The Logic of Marx, p.160. 84. MEGA, V, p.191. 85. Ibid., p.434. 86. Ibid., p.30. 87. “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” p.94. 88. MEGA, V, p.31. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., p.36. 91. Ibid., pp.36, 37. 92. Ibid., p.36. 93. Ibid., p.37. 94. Even the language of The Holy Family still works along the lines of the proletariat needing to become conscious of its historical mission, thus still leaving a place for the philosopher: “as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy” (MEGA, III, p.187). As Lobkowicz comments, “When he read Stirner’s denunciation of ideals, Marx probably became aware of the fact that his only possible defense consisted in describing the proletariat’s salvific deed as completely independent of philosophical ideas,” “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” p.88. 95. MEGA, V, p.49. 96. Ibid., p.47. 97. Ibid., pp.44–45. 98. A “dual” voice in Marx has been recognized by many writers: I have already mentioned Hobsbawm, Love, and Althusser. Robert Tucker stresses the mythic elements in the Marxist grand narrative of alienation and salvation, and argues that while earlier scholars concerned themselves with the question of whether Marxism was true, important questions have to be asked about its status as a set of ethical questions; see, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). Louis K. Dupré (1966) argues that Marx’s “scientific socialism” was the “realistic” solution to Hegel’s “romantic” 192 / notes

problem; The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966). Andrzej Walicki updates this narrative, depicting Marx as a “social scien- tist and gnostic mythologist,” arguing that “despite his own conviction that historical materialism provided a scientific base for communism, Marx’s final idea could not be derived from historical materialism as a method and a theory of history.” See Marxism and the Leap into the Kingdom of Freedom (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.97. Kellner and Longxi (both in Magnus & Cullenburg Whither Marxism? ), among others, argue that Marxism as a normative force—consisting of a method, perspectives, values and vision—is the “spirit of Marxism” that can be retained. Where my perspective differs is in a close reading of the grounding of materialism in one particular text, and the suggestion that the opposition that all these readings rely upon cannot be secured: that materialism cannot be made intelligible via the determinist route; and that Marxism can thus exist as an opening “between” materialism and utopia. 99. Seery, “Deviations,” p.320, emphasis mine. 100. MEGA, V, p.43. 101. Ibid., p.43, emphasis mine. 102. Ibid., p.446. 103. Andrzej Warminski, “Hegel/Marx: Consciousness and Life,” in, Hegel After Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p.32. 104. See Terrell Carver’s insistence on Marx as a political writer: The Postmodern Marx (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 105. Seery, “Deviations,” p.324. 106. See, Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity; Christopher Voparil, “The Problem with Getting It Right: Richard Rorty and the Politics of Antirepresentationalism,” in, Philosophy and Social Criticism 30/2 (2004), pp.221–246, 222. 107. Simon Critchley, “On Derrida’s Specters of Marx,” in, Philosophy and Social Criticism 23/1 (1995), pp.1–30, 5–6. 108. In Positions, he says, “We cannot consider [Marx’s, Engels’s, and Lenin’s] texts as completely finished elaborations [. . .] In saying this I am not advocating anything contrary to ‘Marxism,’ I am convinced of it. These texts are not to be read according to a hermeneutical or exegetical method which would seek out a finished signified beneath a textual surface. Reading is transformational [. . .] But this transformation cannot be exe- cuted however one wishes. It requires protocols of reading. Why not say it bluntly: I have not yet found any that satisfy me,” trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1981), p.63. Untimely, then, in that this dialogue has been demanded a long time ago; untimely, also, since Marx is dead (again); and thus for this very reason timely: “To the rhythm of a cadenced march [a new hegemony and dogmatics] proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourse, its theories and its practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live the market, here’s to the survival of eco- nomic and political liberalism!” (Specters, p.52). See also p.88, where he writes, invoking questions of a sedimented authority “What is certain is that I am not a Marxist, as someone said a long time ago, let us recall, in a witticism reported by Engels. Must we still cite Marx as an authority in order to say ‘I am not a Marxist’? What is the distinguishing trait of a Marxist statement? And who can still say ‘I am a Marxist’?” 109. Specters, p.92. 110. Ibid., p.59. 111. Ibid., p.174. 112. Ibid., p.63. 113. Ibid., p.33. 114. Ibid., p.37. In my reading of Kant, I suggested that the space of the categorical imperative was not merely high-flown fantasy. I return, in chapter five, after Nietzsche and with utopias and Ernst Bloch, to a further articulation of this complex territory. notes / 193

115. John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp.119–120. 116. Throughout Derrida’s oeuvre a similar movement can be analyzed in terms of différance, the logic of the trace, supplementarity, iterability, and so on: my concern here is solely with Specters. 117. Specters, pp.38–39, 47. 118. Ibid., p.89. 119. Ibid., p.170. 120. Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, p.231. 121. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.223. 122. Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp.6, 25. 123. Specters, p.xix. 124. Ibid., p.85. 125. Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p.79. 126. Geoffrey Bennington, Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction (London: Verso, 1993), p.194. 127. Fraser, Unruly Practices, p.6. 128. “Deconstruction and the Other,” pp.119–120.

Chapter Four Epiphany and/or Politics? Nietzsche 1. Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze, p.48. 2. Douglas Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically (London and New York: Guilford Press, 1999), p.3. 3. Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.7. 4. J. Hillis Miller, “The Disarticulation of the Self in Nietzsche,” in, The Monist, 64, 2 (April 1981), pp.247–261, 261. 5. Nietzsche, Daybreak, II, 103. 6. Angelika Bammer, Partial Visions, p. 133. 7. Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, p.31. 8. My reading is therefore compatible with, e.g., Ofelia Schutte’s reading, which traces the ways in which “whenever Nietzsche followed the authoritarian mode of reasoning, both the resentment and the nihilism that he sought to overcome become reinstated in his own thoughts and teachings.” See, Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p.4. A central concern of much of the literature on Nietzsche is the coexistence of two such irreconcilable faces: see also Tracy Strong Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, expanded edition, with a new introduction (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Mark E. Warren Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988); Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, and An Introduction to Nietzsche. 9. Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy and/as Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) argue that Nietzsche’s work is “self-consuming,” but my reading of this is a productive one. 10. See, e.g., Ecce Homo (“Why I am a Destiny,” 7, 8, 9) [Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1992)]. On the Genealogy of Morality: “Do you follow me? Have you been following?...Certainly not! Sir! ” (III, 1). The emphasis can be different: melancholy, lonely, arrogant, demanding, challenging, exacting, insistent, or coaxing; even slippery, devious, cunning, or perhaps surprised... 11. Nietzsche, Daybreak, preface, 5. 194 / notes

12. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 289. The context of this quotation is also telling, as I explore in section three of this chapter. To stay within this context, however, in Human, All Too Human, he writes, “a philosophical mythology lies concealed in language,” Human, All Too Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), “Wandered and his Shadow,” 11): contextually, this also relates to the self as an embodied error, and as such, I defer discussion of this aspect of language until section two. 13. Daybreak, preface, 5. 14. Human, All Too Human, “Assorted Opinions and Maxims,” p. 128, emphasis mine; Human, All Too Human, preface, 7. 15. Later in this chapter I refer to the “political economy of the gift.” This is connected to dispersal. In the wake of, e.g., Derrida, Irigaray, and Cixous, to name the most prominent and important theorists here, these methods have been characterized respectively as the economy (or logic) of the proper/gift: conceptualizing, naming, restricting, or engaging in the play or multiplicity of identities and language beyond an either/or logic (gift/proper) cannot, however, be understood themselves in terms of oppositions, as I imply. On this, see Derrida, who writes, “But—if the form of opposition and the oppositional structure are themselves metaphysical, then the relation of metaphysics to its other can no longer be one of opposition,” Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles/Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.117–119. That Nietzsche gives rise to thought in this area almost goes without saying: particularly in Zarathustra, a concern with “holding on” versus “letting go” can be sketched that parallels the above schematic and that can be traced through a series of thoughts (the comedy that results after the death of the paradigm of tragedy; the Dionysian, or the abyss that is productive after the destructive impact of the “death of God” is worked through) all of which point toward the ways in which the economy of the gift plays a crucial a-foundational role in thought after Nietzsche. Zarathustra also calls “unnameable” the “gift-giving virtue” (Thus Spake Zarathustra, III, “On the Three Evils,” 2). These concerns are especially prevalent in “continental” feminist approaches, which tend to engage at an epistemological level. It is with regret that I do not engage with the work of Georges Bataille—that would have to be a project for a different time. However, he is another exemplar of the rethinking of the status and task of theory: as Arkady Plotnisky writes, “Nietzsche’s revolutions—his ‘reeval- uations of all values,’ and his ‘reasons other than hitherto’—can serve and have served as a ‘model,’ interactively, for theoretical and political subversions, for a complex and exu- berant, and at times dangerous, play. The ‘model,’ however tentative and preliminary, is also powerful and productive. In the intersection of Nietzsche and Marx, Bataille’s vision remains perhaps the greatest, if in turn a not always unproblematic example of a theory— general economy—of the intersection of the political and theoretical, and the artistic or Dionysian,” Reconfigurations: Critical Theory and General Economy (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1993), p.191. See also note 45 to this chapter. 16. Walter A. Kauffman Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, World Publishing Company, 1956), pp.62, 204. “Monodialogic” is defined to “crystallize the tendency of each aphorism to be self-sufficient while yet throwing light on almost every other aphorism.” An interesting characterization, which does justice to the interrelated and juxtaposed concerns of Nietzsche, but avoids the “problem of the order of rank.” I suggest that this problem is not resolved by the single principle of will to power acting as foundation. 17. See Magnus et al., Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy and/as Literature, pp.35–46: an important aspect of those readings that presuppose, argue for, or constitute a single ontological “text”/argument is the reliance on Nietzsche’s unfinished, indeed, unwritten text, The Will to Power. To anticipate my own position, I do not use this work, put together as it was by Nietzsche’s sister after his death. notes / 195

18. Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, p.125. Precisely “inventive”: Derrida’s thesis is that there is no meaningful hermeneutic horizon within which Nietzsche’s text(s) can be interpreted; yet his own reading traces this thought meaningfully and creatively. This is not to say that Derrida’s reading is contradictory, but that he recognizes, like Nietzsche, the investment made in meaning; which is to say: Derrida performs meaning as process. 19. Ibid., p.133: “I have forgotten my umbrella.” As Derrida explains, “these words were found, isolated in quotation marks, among Nietzsche’s unpublished manuscripts. [. . .] There is no infallible way of knowing the occasion of this sample or what it could have been later grafted on to” (p.123). Another way into the question of meaning, “proper” meaning. 20. Diana H. Coole, “The Politics of Reading Nietzsche,” in, Political Studies 46 (1988), pp.348–363. Reviewing: Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, Ansell-Pearson Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, An Introduction to Nietzsche; and Daniel Conway, Nietzsche and the Political (London: Routledge, 1997). 21. Jean-Michel Rey, “Commentary,” trans. Tracy B. Strong, in, Nietzsche’s News Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics, ed. Tracy Strong and Michael Gillespie (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp.91–92n2. “Classical commentary” in my reading is equivalent to “coherent existential meaning,” which is the reconstruction of a particular narrative logic of beginnings and endings into which Nietzsche in no way fits. In On The Genealogy of Morals, to point out just one instance, the very idea of beginnings and ends is subject to a complex genealogical critique (itself a form of reading and rewriting). The “violence” for which I argue in reading Nietzsche does not mean coercing him into the very paradigm he is questioning, probing the limits of, effectively deconstructing. 22. Schacht, “Introduction,” Human, All Too Human, p.xi. 23. Gary Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), p.3, emphasis mine. 24. Ibid., p.49. 25. Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze, p.115. Lorraine is here referring to the work of Irigaray and Deleuze; but both these thinkers, as Lorraine extensively comments, and as I turn to my section on the thought of eternal recurrence, presuppose Nietzsche, and are themselves influential commentators (readers/writers) of/on and with/against Nietzsche. 26. Kelly Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche: Philosophy’s Relation to the “Feminine” (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p.20. 27. Genealogy of Morality, III, 28. The double question, then, is both of suffering and of the prior question of why. These two strands are picked up again in section 2(ii), on the “grammar” of causality and explanation, the implicit and pervasive epistemology that under- lies sense-making with punitive effects, and in section 3(ii), on the politicized context of ressentiment and redemption that Nietzsche tries to push us beyond. I introduce this problematic here because in the very reading practices Nietzsche encourages (and which have been, as I have suggested, radically misunderstood by those commentators who thought Nietzsche could have said what he wanted to say in a different, more “coherent” manner) are already disrupting the causal, punitive, dissociative epistemology. Even a sensitive commen- tator like Conway can write that Nietzsche “did virtually everything in his power to encour- age confusion and misunderstanding,” Nietzsche and the Political (p.119). See Warminski “Towards a Fabulous Reading,” p.96 in particular, on the refusal to “read” Nietzsche. 28. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, “On Reading and Writing.” 29. Again, I explore this term further throughout the chapter. An important aspect of Nietzsche’s work is that he never rests content with a single definition, but rather opens his readings up to the plural motivations of meanings. The ascetic ideal, to anticipate, is a form of negating “life,” where life connotes, for example, sensuality, which is, Nietzsche suggests, bound to fail, because something must affirm in order for denial to exist at all: as he ends the essay: “man would rather will nothingness than not will at all . . .,” (Genealogy 196 / notes

of Morals, III, 28). Asceticism is itself an interpretative frame, however, a mode of evaluation that would only allow one story; so reading this is necessarily plural, or else the reading of asceticism is itself ascetic. 30. Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990), p.173. 31. Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche, pp.18, 20. 32. Twilight of the Idols, “ ‘Reason’ in Philosophy,” p.5. 33. John Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p.50. 34. Genealogy of Morals III, 12, first emphasis mine. 35. Strong, Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, pp.71–72. 36. Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze, p.115. 37. Magnus et al., Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy and/as Literature, p.11, emphasis mine. 38. Thus Spake Zarathustra, I, “On Reading and Writing.” 39. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1984), p.83. 40. The extent to which we must “feel differently,” to which language is somehow inadequate, dull, flattening of this experience is captured, paradoxically richly, at the end of Beyond Good and Evil: Alas, and yet what are you, my written and painted thoughts! It is not long ago that you were still so many-coloured, young and malicious, so full of thorns and hidden spices you made me sneeze and laugh—and now? You have already taken off your novelty and some of you, I fear, are on the point of becoming truths: they already look so immortal, so pathetically righteous, so boring! [. . .] no-one will divine from these how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved—wicked thoughts! (9, 296). See also The Gay Science: “I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin it down lest it fly away again. And now it has died of these arid words . . .” (IV, 298). 41. Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche, p.20. 42. The Gay Science, I, 11. 43. Arthur C. Danto, “Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals,” in, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, p.39. 44. Douglas Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically, p.5. 45. Schrift relates this to Cixous’s concern with the possibility of “writ[ing] and liv[ing] within a textual/libidinal/political economy freed from the constraints of the law of return.” See, “On the Gynaecology of Morals: Nietzsche and Cixous and the Logic of the Gift,” in, Nietzsche and the Feminine, ed. Peter Burgard (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1994), p.216. 46. Magnus Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy and/as Literature, p.22. Nietzsche is not read, or deci- phered, interpreted, understood, as if his writing style was simply, as Strong puts it, a “con- tainer for his ‘message,’ in, Nietzsche’s News Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics, ed. Tracy Strong and Michael Gillespie, p.167. 47. Barthes, S/Z, p.5. 48. Bammer, Partial Visions, p.70. 49. Gary Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, p.2. 50. Interestingly, in the same passage as he writes about Wisdom as a woman who “loves only a warrior,” and about “learning by heart,” and which has often been interpreted and disregarded as a statement of an “illiberal” elitism, Nietzsche writes: It is not always easily possible to understand the blood of another: I hate idling readers. Whoever knows the reader will henceforth do nothing for the reader. Another century notes / 197

of readers—and the spirit itself will stink. That everyone may learn to read, in the long run, corrupts not only writing but also thinking. Once the spirit was God, then he became man, and now he even becomes rabble. (Thus Spake Zarathustra, I, “On Reading and Writing”) I suggest, however, that this passage be read in the spirit of Barthes: a reading that does not question, does not confront or engage with the text, but approaches it as a discrete coherent object containing “answers” (approaches the text humbly as one would approach the authoritative legislator) is precisely what Nietzsche despised, as this does not even begin to pose the questions that would enable us to confront the nihilistic situation that Nietzsche saw us facing. And, in a sense, it does not matter which reading Nietzsche “intended”; I simply want to counter a stultifying “elitist” reading with one that is far more provocative, that opens, rather than closes. Further, I see no reason to castigate Nietzsche for not providing us with answers that we can work through ourselves; this goes for each of the theorists I encounter in this book. 51. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, III, “On the Spirit of Gravity,” 2). “I am a railing by the torrent: let those who can, grasp me! Your crutch, however, I am not” (Ibid., 1, “Pale Criminal”). This succinctly yet allusively expresses the possibility of controlling the chaotic flux of existence without reinstating an external authorial figure. 52. “You revere me; but what if your reverence tumbles one day? Beware lest a statue slay you” (Ibid., I, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” 3). The link with Stirner is particularly evident here, in the dangers of setting up another ideal (idol) with which to negate, divide, deny, or subjugate the self. 53. The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, preface, 3. “Strange,” uncanny, alien are all connotations of the German term Nietzsche uses. See The Birth of Tragedy, Spiers, Introduction, p.6n10. 54. The Birth of Tragedy, preface, 6. See also The Genealogy of Morality, where Nietzsche admits to beginning his critique on the origins of “moral prejudice” “without my own particular language for these particular things” (preface, 4). Perhaps this language is impossible; but Nietzsche does, as Derrida writes of Beckett, “make the limits of our language tremble.” See, “That Strange Institution Called Literature,” in, Acts of Literature, p.60. 55. Daybreak, preface, 1. 56. Magnus et al. express this strikingly, with the tale of Plato’s “promissory note”: “among all the competing self and world descriptions one and only one could be picked out as the vocabulary reality would itself choose to describe itself, if it could. And yet, although that promissory note remains uncashed, the binary oppositions of knowledge/opinion, logic/rhetoric, truth/persuasion, derive their force entirely from the assumed value of the promissory note” (Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy and/as Literature, p.18). But the real, as we have seen, cannot tell its own story—and why, as I have stressed via Barthes, only one? 57. Human, All Too Human, preface, 1–2, second emphasis mine. 58. As I explore in section 2, however, Nietzsche always conceives of “knowledge” as predicated on error, fiction, or falsehood. The ways in which his “wisdom” differs is in its self-conscious nature, and in his reconfiguration of what knowledge is for. 59. My use of the term “conceptual space” must be qualified by both the fictive aspects, and the critique of conceptuality that rests on a subject/object opposition, as explored earlier. I stress again here that my use of the term fictive also denies a fiction/theory or fiction/true hierarchical opposition. 60. Human, All Too Human, preface, 2. 61. Ibid. 62. Frances Oppel, “ ‘Speaking of Immemorial Waters’: Irigaray With Nietzsche,” in, Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (London: Routledge, 1993), p.92, emphasis mine. 63. Beyond Good and Evil, II, 34. 198 / notes

64. Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, p.3. 65. Hence, as previously suggested, “interpretation is always being challenged at the same time it is being enabled, until the very possibility of understanding in the conventional sense is itself contested,” Magnus, Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy and/as Literature, p.22. 66. Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, pp.3–4, emphasis mine. 67. The Gay Science, preface, p.3. 68. The Birth of Tragedy, 7, pp.40, 15, 75. 69. The Genealogy of Morality, preface, 1. 70. Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically, p.3. 71. Ibid., p.34. 72. Human, All Too Human, I, 34. The soothsayer in Zarathustra is emblematic of this response to nihilism as a lack of meaning and necessity. 73. Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, p.13. On this point, see Warren’s illuminating discussion of Adorno’s recognition that Nietzsche reformulated the terrain of nihilism by his radical grasp of it. As I suggest, nihilism disrupts the movement of the conventional definition, from theory to practice from what is essentially an anti-epistemological claim, which grounds a nonmoral type of action. As Adorno implies, Nietzsche uses the term in such a way as to problematize the “metaphysical standards to which nihilism is linked,” and not as a simple inversion (p.13). As such, Warren’s discussion of nihilism as “a symp- tom of dissolving subjectivity, disintegrating power, failing mode[s] of living and acting, [and] an increasingly untenable relation between the basic tenets of western culture and modern experience” (ibid.) is important and noticeably influences the reading presented here. However, while, as Warren also argues, the “root cause of nihilism is not the loss of a metaphysically grounded realm of truth” (ibid., emphasis mine), the disorientation between being and doing, knowing and acting (which does not exist in the above definition) has implications for the epistemology of morality and the political that need to be explored. 74. Mitya, in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, puts it thus: “how is man to fare [. . .] without God and without a life to come? After all, that would mean that all things are lawful, that one may do anything one likes,” trans. David McDuff (London: Penguin, 1993), p.679. 75. The Birth of Tragedy, preface, 2. 76. de Man, Allegories of Reading, p.123. 77. The Birth of Tragedy, preface, 1. 78. Ibid., 7, p.40. 79. I unpack these terms directly no further—they stand, like Life, Wisdom, even the “death of God,” as figures of that which cannot be immediately approached, unproblematically or singularly named. 80. The Birth of Tragedy, 15, p.75. 81. Ibid., 5, p.33, and 24, p.113. 82. de Man, Allegories of Reading, p.93. When this same phrase recurs in The Gay Science, the opposition is not to a terrible existence, but to those other fictions that I unpack through the second “hinge” section here: thus, there is no ontological questioning later, as there is here; metaphysics is broached and breached. 83. “In tragedy, even though the ultimate truth is Dionysian destruction, Apollonian ‘appear- ances’ offered individuation and beauty so that man could find temporary meaning in the midst of a terrible truth. [. . .] individuation and form allow life to be meaningful and beautiful; but within individuation is a formless flux which persists as a continual destruction of form”: see, Lawrence Hatab, “Laughter in Nietzsche’s Thought: A Philosophical Tragicomedy,” in, International Studies in Philosophy 20/2 (1988), pp.67–79, 69. These tropes negotiate both the creation and the dispersal of meaning. 84. “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” p.147. There’s an implicit reference to Democritus; and coincidentally, the bee was one of Marx’s referents too. notes / 199

85. Ibid. 86. Daybreak, I, 90. 87. The Gay Science, IV, 108, 109. 88. Ibid., V, 355. That this is a “task,” as I have described it, can be perceived from an early section of The Gay Science: “But to stand in the midst of this ‘discordant concord of things,’ and of this whole marvellous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the craving and rapture of such questioning, without at least hating the person who questions, perhaps even finding them faintly amusing— this is what I feel to be contemptible” (I, 2). The evaluation, in this instance, is of the self who refuses the estrangement of nihilism. 89. “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in, Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.10; The Gay Science, I, 26. 90. Beyond Good and Evil, I, 19, last emphasis mine. 91. The Genealogy of Morals, II, 8. 92. This is only one aspect of injustice: but, as I return to in the political section, it is an aspect that profoundly destabilizes a “justice” of hierarchy and domination. Many commentators have noted Nietzsche’s profound destabilizing of ontology. Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, De Man, Allegories of Reading, Nehamas, Life as Literature, Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, and Strong, Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, all accept versions of this. However, what is important in my reading is that I begin to stress the problem of judgment and justice as inseparable from the interpretative problem. As Babich puts it, “Judgment is possible—or, better, unavoidable—on this [perspectival] basis, but such judgment is ineluctably interpretive.” See, Babette E. Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Grounds of Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p.94. To a certain extent, this defines Nietzschean “injustice.” 93. The Gay Science, II, 58, last emphasis mine. 94. Bammer, Partial Visions, p.133. 95. Schutte, Beyond Nihilism, p.1. 96. Nietzsche’s contribution to debates on alienation is oblique, but pivotal: in an important sense, he provides the critical vocabulary to articulate what alienation could mean in a context where the “truth” of what it means to be human is not at stake. He also, and crucially, provides a way of talking about temporality and possibility whereby this afoun- dational notion of alienation can be worked through without relying on its conventional opposite. 97. Strong, Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, p.19, emphasis mine. It should be mentioned that Nietzsche does link the “free spirit,” with its fictive, post-metaphysical qualities, directly to a context where alienation is not experienced: “The expression ‘free spirit’ should here be understood in no other sense: a spirit that had become free, that has again seized possession of itself ” (Ecce Homo, 4, Human, All Too Human, 1). Just as Stirner associated “spectrality” with alienation, in a definition Nietzsche would not contest, Nietzsche then goes on to posit his spirit as having taken possession of itself once again. As I have suggested above, Nietzsche’s understanding of what it would be like to not be alienated is complex indeed, and the logic of “spectrality” is an interesting way of approaching this issue. Claire Colebrook, defining the link between alienation, spectrality, authority, and autonomy, writes, “a specter emerges when an activity of the imagination is hyposta- tized and then seen as an authority to which human beings ought to submit.” See, Ethics and Representation: From Kant to Poststructuralism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p.19. Writing here on Blake, Colebrook’s definition applies equally well to Stirner, and also shows the movement of creating ideals as idols that unites Stirner with Nietzsche. However, Nietzsche’s unique contribution are his thoughts the kind of “real” body that is not alienated, not spectral, yet not “real” either. 200 / notes

98. The Gay Science, II, 57. 99. Strong, Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, pp.54, 47. 100. Human, All Too Human, I, 32. 101. Beyond Good and Evil, I, 4. 102. The Genealogy of Morality, III, 11. 103. Ibid., preface, 7. 104. Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, p.87. 105. Ibid., pp.37, 87. Hillis Miller writes, “in question is [. . .] an insight, present in one way or another at all times in our history, into the fact that the self may never have been there in the first place except as a social or linguistic fiction,” (“Disarticulation of the Self,” pp.247–248). Nietzsche’s depiction of the multivalent nature of this fiction is a most disturbing insight. 106. As Kelly Oliver puts it, Womanizing Nietzsche, p.22. 107. Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically, p.34. 108. Twilight of the Idols, “The Four Great Errors,” 7. As I have stressed throughout, Nietzsche’s terms are polyvalent, resist definition: my task, here, is to show that such terms are operative on different “levels,” and the meanings that they hold (psycho-social, epistemological, moral, and so on) will hopefully unfold throughout such discussions as I propose. 109. Miller, “Disarticulation of the Self,” p.249. 110. The Genealogy of Morality, I, 13. 111. Keenan, Fables of Responsibility, p.59. 112. I defer until section three discussion of the inversion performed here, and the value of a value created via reaction. These aspects of ressentiment compound the deep, structural, and indeed, grammatical, punitive “errors” that I unpack in this section. 113. Warminski, “Towards a Fabulous Reading,” p.113. 114. For example: “judgments concerning the value of life, for it or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have value only as symptoms; in themselves, such judgments are stupidities” (Twilight of the Idols, “The Problem of Socrates,” 2). To read Nietzsche in this spirit, the values of strength and weakness are provocative and circular. 115. The Genealogy of Morals, I, 13. 116. Told as a parable, the ass is burdened with false values, the lion roars them away, but it is only the child who can live in a new, knowing innocence. 117. Keenan, Fables of Responsibility, pp.59–60. 118. Human, All Too Human, Wandered and his Shadow, 11. “I am afraid” says Nietzsche, “that we are not yet rid of God because we still have faith in grammar” (Twilight of the Idols, “ ‘Reason’ in Philosophy,” 5). 119. Strong, Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, p.77. 120. Twilight of the Idols, “Four Great Errors,” 2. 121. Ibid., 4. 122. Ibid., 5. 123. Daybreak, iv, 208. 124. Twilight of the Idols, “Four Great Errors,” 7. 125. Daybreak, II, 115. 126. Ibid., II, 119. 127. The Genealogy of Morality, II, 1. 128. Daybreak, II, 103. 129. Magnus et al., Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy And/As Literature, p.74. 130. Beyond Good and Evil, preface, 1. 131. The Gay Science, I, 1. 132. Human, All Too Human, I, 29. 133. Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, p.28. notes / 201

134. Twilight of the Idols, “True World,” 1. 135. Ibid., 3. 136. Ibid., 5. 137. Continuing Nietzsche’s comedy, Magnus et al., Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy And/As Literature, p.131, write,

God took six days to create the world with humankind in it. Philosophy has droned on for over two thousand years, inscribing as wisdom a single error, making humankind miserable in the process. But in a mere six brief paragraphs, figuratively representing only a half-day, Nietzsche overcomes God by creating Zarathustra, prophet and fore- runner of the race which will replace mankind. And while doing this, the author dispatches the problems of Western metaphysics as preserved in philosophy as well. 138. Twilight of the Idols, “True World,” 6. 139. Shapiro: “the final position that would be occupied in the biblical metanarrative tradition by an apocalyptic revelation or in the philosophical one by a Hegelian or Marxist transformation of that into the realization of freedom and knowledge is here filled by the inscription ‘INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA’. That is, just where we might expect a conclusion of the story that would comprehend and make clear all its earlier stages, we get a reference to another story and [. . .] that story will not complete a metanarrative,” Nietzschean Narratives, p.30. 140. The Gay Science, I, 54. 141. As Zarathustra says, “The awakened and knowing say: body I am entirely, and nothing else and soul is only a word for something about the body” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, “On the Despisers of the Body”). This is important; otherwise, Nietzsche would be idealizing our physiological/creative embodied existence; rather than a body/soul duality, Nietzsche posits an embodied (and only in this embodiment, a singular) plurality. 142. Daybreak, IV, 210. 143. The Gay Science, II, 107. 144. Ibid., I, 1. 145. Ibid., II, 107. 146. Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, p.26. 147. The Gay Science, preface, 4. 148. Kathleen Higgins, Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s Gay Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.65. See also Lawrece Hatals. 149. Thus Spake Zarathustra, III, “On Old and New Tablets.” 150. “History for Life,” p.21. 151. Human, All Too Human, preface, 7. 152. Beyond Good and Evil, II, 42. 153. Magnus et al., Nietzsche’s Case: Life And/As Literature, p.9. 154. Zarathustra also links epistemology, temporality, and judgment with a possible place he can be(come?):

Alas, where shall I climb now with my longing? From all mountains I look for fatherlands and motherlands. But home I found nowhere; a fugitive I am at all cities and a departure at all gates. [. . .] Thus I love only my children’s land, as yet undiscovered, in the farthest sea: for this I bid my sails search and search. In my children I want to make up for being the child of my fathers—and to all the future, for this today (Thus Spake Zarathustra II, “On the Land of Education”). 155. http:// struggle.ws / mexico/ ezln/ccri_5_dec_lj_july98 .html accessed 10/06/02; Subcommandante Insurgente Marcos Our Word is Our Weapon: Selected Writings, ed. Juana Ponce de León (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002), pp.158–159. 156. Beyond Good and Evil, VI, 2. 202 / notes

157. Beyond Good and Evil, IX, 257. 158. See, e.g., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I “On the Flies of the Market Place.” 159. The Genealogy of Morality, I, 10. 160. Brown, Politics Out of History, p.56. 161. Reynolds, “Derrida and Deleuze on Time, the Future and Politics,” Borderlands Ejournal 3/1 (2004): http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/reynolds_ time.htm. 162. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “prologue,” 3. 163. Schutte, Beyond Nihilism, p.124. 164. To reaffirm: Irigaray’s description of pre-Socratic speech, with which she aligns Nietzsche’s texts (in particular, Thus Spoke Zarathustra) delineates the space within which Nietzsche works: “Would you say that Zarathustra is fiction? For me, it is absolutely not fiction [. . . but a poetic language] that does not announce the truth but which makes the truth, that acts, but not at all in a fiction/theory hierarchy,” in, Frances Oppel, “ ‘Speaking of Immemorial Waters’: Irigaray With Nietzsche,” in, Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (London: Routledge, 1993), p.92, emphasis mine. 165. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, “On the Love of the Neighbor,” emphasis mine. 166. Human, All Too Human, VI, 354. 167. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, “On the Friend.” 168. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I, “On the Love of the Neighbor.” 169. As I go on to explore, the importance of the thought of eternal recurrence is in the thinking: I thus approach this through a commentary on its various constructions in the relevant literature rather than directly; such an approach misses the dialogue the thought necessarily generates. It is also perhaps more in fitting with the spirit of Nietzsche not to ask “what is the meaning of . . .,” and ask, instead, which meaning? How are these meanings generated, and what are they used for? And of course, my own “reading” is participating in constructing a further set of affects. 170. The Gay Science, IV, 341. “Was that life? Well then! Once more!”: This is perhaps the most bleakly nihilistic moment: it is the impossibility of the “once more” that Nietzsche cannot overcome. With Nietzsche, I do not follow this thought further. 171. A classic statement of eternal recurrence is in the chapter of Zarathustra titled “The Vision and the Riddle.” Many of the comments I make can also be made with reference to that more complex and emblematic chapter. For useful surveys of the relevant literature on eternal recurrence, see Magnus Nietzsche’s Case: Life And/As Literature, and David Wood, “Nietzsche’s Transvaluation of Time,” in Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation, ed. David F. Krell & David Wood (London and New York: Routledge, 1988). 172. Dienstag, Dancing in Chains, p.131; Thus Spake Zarathustra, III, “On Redemption.” I don’t here review cosmological versions of eternal recurrence, but see note 175, for a hint of why it might be interesting to do so in a way that does not assume the return of “the same.” 173. Cited in Shapiro, Nietzschean Narratives, p.87. 174. Ibid., p.90. 175. Kathleen M. Higgins, Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s Gay Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.142. Interestingly, modern science can be seen to be very much aware of its own investment in creating and constructing ontological order. For a non-ontological scientific reading that eternal recurrence seems to have anticipated, see Ferguson: if we were able to travel backwards toward what we have been assuming was the beginning, (the singularity) we would find, just short of reaching it, that (in imaginary time) it would become meaningless to talk about the past at all. In a situation where there are four space dimensions and no time dimension, chronological time—with its well-defined past, present and future—would not exist, and with it would go all the vocabulary for describing chronological time. No more notes / 203

yesterday, or always, or past. Discussion about a beginning or before the beginning would also have no meaning... Kitty Ferguson, Measuring the Universe: The Historical Quest to Quantify Space (London: Headline Book Publishing, 1999), p.286. John McManus directed me to this literature, and helped me understand what is going on here. 176. Phillip Pullman, Lyra’s Oxford (Oxford and New York: David Fickling, 2003). 177. Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze, p.143. 178. Oliver, Womanizing Nietzsche, p.106. 179. Benjamin Bennett, “Bridge: Against Nothing,” in, Nietzsche and the Feminine, ed. Peter Burgard, p.295. This provides an unusual “application” of Stanley Rosen’s argument that “Zarathustra is [. . .] at once a handbook of revolution and a confession by its author that revolutions must always fail,” The Mask Of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.xv. 180. Hugh Tomlinson, “Nietzsche on the Edge of Town: Deleuze and Reflexivity,” in, Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Interpretation, ed. David F. Krell & David Wood, p.159. 181. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), pp.xiii–xiv. 182. Beyond Good and Evil, I, 22.

Chapter Five Bloch’s Utopian Imagination 1. Louis Marin, Utopics: Spatial Play trans. Robert A. Vollrath (London: Macmillan, 1984), p.xxii. 2. The Genealogy of Morality, preface, 7. 3. See, e.g., Marx and Engels of The Communist Manifesto: “The significance of critical- utopian socialism and communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and theoretical justification” (p.74). 4. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.139, emphasis mine; Bloch and Adorno, “ ‘Something’s Missing’: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing (1964),” in, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays, p.11. 5. For debates on utopia as social dreaming and impossibility or more decisively didactic, see, e.g., Levitas, The Concept of Utopia; Moylan Demand the Impossible Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination (New York and London: Methuen, 1986), “Bloch Against Bloch: The Theological Reception of Das Prinzip Hoffnung and the Liberation of the Utopian Function,” in, Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, ed. Jamie Owen Daniel & Tom Moylan (London: Verso, 1997); Lucy Sargisson, Contemporary Feminist Utopianism (New York and London: Routledge, 1996); and Lyman Tower Sargent, “The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited,” in, Utopian Studies 5/1 (1994), pp.1–37. 6. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.3. 7. Sargent, “Three Faces,” p.1. 8. Marcos, Our Word is Our Weapon, p.97. 9. Richard Gunn, “Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope,” in, New Edinburgh Review 76 (1987), pp.90–98, 92. 10. The Principle of Hope, pp.8–9. 11. Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically, p. 3. 204 / notes

12. Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze, p.48. 13. Louis Marin also regards utopia as a fictive discourse: “Utopia is a critique of the domi- nant ideology to the degree to which it reconstructs present or contemporary society by displacing and projecting the latter’s structures into a fictive discourse [. . .] Utopia [. . .] displaces and projects [the ideological and totalizing expression of existing] reality into the form of a non-conceptual fictive totality. . . .” See, “Theses on Ideology and Utopia,” in, Minnesota Review 6 (Spring 1976), pp.71–76, pp.71. Fictive, when understood contra ideology, cannot mean simply fictional, for where is the prior true or real from which it deviates or which it represents? Hence my use of the word “fictive” is epistemologically and temporally disruptive, and can only be understood via the category possibility. It is thus a utopian term. 14. Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p.3; Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p.xii. 15. Roemer, cited in Bammer, Partial Visions, p.15. 16. Ruth Levitas, “For Utopia: The (Limits of the) Utopian Function in Late Capitalist Society,” in, The Philosophy of Utopia, ed. Barbara Goodwin (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p.27. 17. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (New York: Zone Books, 1994), p.220. 18. Cited in Mike Kenny, “Socialism and the Romantic ‘Self’: The Case of Edward Thompson,” in, Journal of Political Ideologies 5/1 (2000), pp.105–127, 107. 19. “Something’s Missing,” p.3. 20. Ibid., p.1. 21. Ibid., p.11. 22. Ibid., pp.3, 3–4. 23. Andrew Robinson (drawing on Herbert Marcuse) in “Constructing Revolutionary Subjectivities,” in, Utopian Studies (forthcoming). 24. Bloch and Adorno, “Something’s Missing,” p.7. Terry Eagleton points to the difficulties of simply opposing disorder to the ordering mechanisms of capitalism: In a mutual thwarting, the anarchic operations of capitalism threaten to undercut the established political, ethical and juridical regime on which they depend; but conversely, capitalism’s creative powers are shackled by that same dispensation. Whichever way round we view the deadlock, we must come to terms with the fact [. . .] that fantasy, desire and disruption are in some sense actually part of the given order. And if this order is structurally self-undoing and plunged in perpetual tumult, how does this affect the idea of rebellion against it? Nevertheless, it is, as I have been concerned to argue, important to desire differently, and to desire without the reification of creativity or the reproduction of power relations. See, “Capitalism and Form,” in, New Left Review 14 (March–April 2002), pp.119–131, 121. 25. Many thanks to Simon Tormey for this Deleuzean reading of the problem within utopia. I return, however, to why I think the second moment is necessary politically, but must always be subject to creative epistemologies, or “deterritorialization.” 26. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, p.53. Part of the problem, however, lies in the way the nineteenth-century utopian socialists have been read and understood, which is via the static rather than via the exploratory, the experimental. See, e.g., Roland Barthes reading of Fourier. Barthes comments, “the detailed inflections of utopian systems return to our world like lamps of desire, of possible exultation. If we could be more alert to them, they would prevent politics from solidifying into a totalitarian, bureaucratic, moralizing system.” Barthes writes that Fourier’s work is “simultaneously arrogant and dilatory”: arrogant in its detail, but dilatory and delaying, slippery and equivocal in its promise. The arrogance of the blueprint (and its potential political dangers of overcoding and territorializing) is then only one aspect of a utopia that is itself disrupted its entry into notes / 205

temporality by deferral, and its own creativity as resolutely fictive: “the work is never anything but the meta-book (the anticipatory commentary) of a future work which, not actually getting written, becomes the work itself: Proust, Fourier only ever wrote Prospectuses’ of this sort.” See Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes trans. Richard Howard (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp.174–175 (translation modified). 27. Simon Critchley, “The Other’s Decision in Me (What are the politics of friendship?),” in, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Levinas, Derrida and Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999), p.280. 28. See, e.g., J.L. Talmon’s The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952) for the “tragic paradox of utopianism” (p.95), and more recently, Yannis Stavarakakis has argued that “the naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realization of this fantasy is attempted. It is then we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatization is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions”: Lacan and the Political (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.100, emphasis mine. I have, of course, been arguing that this is a misconstrual of utopia in the first place. 29. Jack Zipes, Introduction, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, pp.xxvii–xxviii. 30. Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible, p.26. 31. Fredric Jameson, “Progress versus Utopia: Or, Can We Imagine the Future?,” in, Science Fiction Studies 9/2 (July 1982), pp.147–158, 153. 32. Fredric Jameson, “Of Islands and Trenches: Neutralization and the Production of Utopia Discourse,” in, Diacritics 7 (Summer 1977), pp.2–21, 21. 33. Levitas, “For Utopia,” pp.39, 25. 34. Ibid., p.39. 35. Eugene D. Hill, “The Place of the Future: Louis Marin and his Utopiques,” in, Science Fiction Studies 9 (1982), pp.167–179, 169. 36. Bammer, Partial Visions, p.133. 37. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, p.31. 38. Cited in Hill, “The Place of the Future,” p.175. See also Marin, “Theses on Ideology and Utopia.” 39. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.6. 40. Ibid., p.290. 41. Ibid., p.6. 42. Ricoeur’s characterization is instructive and interesting: the utopian image is “productive, an imagining of something else, the elsewhere [. . .] It is always the glance from nowhere [. . .] Utopia has the fictional power of redescribing life,” in, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.266. Nevertheless, I have previously pointed to the limitations of a redescription that is not also politically transformative. 43. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.3. 44. Ibid., pp.10, 8. 45. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.32, 25. 46. Gunn, “Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope,” p.93, third emphasis mine. 47. Thomas H. West, Ultimate Hope Without God: The Atheistic Eschatology of Ernst Bloch (New York: P. Lang, 1991), p.25. 48. Wayne Hudson, The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch (London: Macmillan, 1982), p.53, p.26. 49. Tom Moylan, “Bloch Against Bloch,” p.114. 50. Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, p.21. 51. Hudson, The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch, p.53. 52. Bloch’s utopia is constituted by lack, but its energies are not derived from resentment; rather, it gains meaning and movement from a potential plenitude, from the “no-where.” 206 / notes

53. Friedrich Engels, “Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx,” in, The Marx-Engels Reader, p.681. 54. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, pp.68–69. 55. Ibid., p.69. 56. Ze’ev Levy, “Utopia and Reality in the Philosophy of Ernst Bloch,” in, Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, p.176. 57. Alienation is a fascinating category that does not need any notion of a prior unalienated state from which to make sense; see, e.g., Guy Debord’s commentary: “time is a necessary alienation, being the medium in which the subject realizes himself while losing himself, becomes other in order to become truly himself.” This is not the same as social alienation, which has “forbidden and petrified the possibilities and risks of a living alienation within time” (The Society of the Spectacle, pp.115–116). Nietzsche refers to a similar alienation in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of a History for Life.” 58. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.75. 59. Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, pp.21, 138, 34. 60. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, pp.76, 69. 61. Ibid., pp.74–75. 62. Levy, “Utopia and Reality in the Philosophy of Ernst Bloch,” p.176. 63. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.75. 64. Ibid., p.75. 65. I shall return to the concerns of Ruth Levitas in the final section of this essay, but should clarify here that Levitas’s concern is with hope as concrete utopia, or as Bloch puts it, “a directing act of a cognitive kind ” (The Principle of Hope, p.12). 66. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.193. 67. Ibid., p.69. 68. Vince Geoghegan, Ernst Bloch, p.32. 69. Bloch, “Man as Possibility,” p.281. 70. Gunn, “Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope,” p. 94. 71. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.16. Tom Moylan suggests that the “dialogical tensions in The Principle of Hope indicate [. . .] that Bloch’s method includes the necessary elements for preventing this sort of hypostatization,” (“Bloch Against Bloch,” p.114). 72. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.186. 73. Ibid., p.188. 74. Ibid., p.12. 75. Ibid., pp.129, 127. 76. Ibid., p.116. 77. Ibid., p.13. 78. Cited in Hill, “The Place of the Future,” p.175. 79. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.140. 80. Vincent Geoghegan, “Remembering the Future,” in Not Yet: Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, p.21. Vincent Geoghegan, writing on the possible utopian functions of memory, clarifies the kind of memory that Bloch opposes to this: “Anagnorisis, in contrast, involves recognition, not recollection. In anagnorisis memory traces are reactivated in the present, but there is never simple correspondence between the past and present, because of all the intervening novelty. The power of the past resides in its complicated relationship of simi- larity/dissimilarity to the present” (“Remembering the Future,” p.22). I would like to add to this definition by suggesting that, like utopia itself, these terms be read intransitively rather than referentially: that is, a memory itself cannot be defined as either one or the other “objectively,” but this instead relies upon the performance or activity of remembering, and the hermeneutical intentionality or agency of the subject. 81. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.141. 82. Liliane Weissburg, “Philosophy and the Fairy Tale: Ernst Bloch as Narrator,” in, New German Critique 55 (Winter 1992), pp.21–44, 29. notes / 207

83. Bloch himself writes, “almost every utopia in fact, whether medical, social, or techno- logical, has paranoiac caricatures; for every real innovator there are hundreds of fantastic, unreal, mad ones . . .” (The Principle of Hope, p.88). 84. Thanks are due here to John McManus for the lively and articulate exchanges that led to this formulation. 85. Derrida, Specters of Marx, p.169. 86. Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject of Philosophy, trans. Thomas Trezise (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p.4, emphasis mine. 87. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.75 emphasis mine. 88. Derrida, “Marx and Sons,” in, Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, ed. Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1998), p.223. 89. See Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Claude Lefort puts it thus: “The fact that something like politics should be circumscribed within social life at any given time has in itself a political meaning,” i.e., what counts as politics is itself a political question. See, Democracy and Political Theory, p.13. 90. Derrida’s understanding of messianism is not (simply) theological, just as Benjamin’s understanding of messianism was politically complex. For Derrida, messianism (without a messiah) structures emancipatory thought within the deconstructive endeavor: “what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, [. . .] is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism, an idea of justice...” (Specters of Marx, p.59). This “promise” comes from a suspension of ontology and epistemology: “This not-knowing is not a lacuna. No progress of knowledge could saturate an opening that must have nothing to do with knowledge” (Specters of Marx, p.37). Derridean messianism, then, is intended to evoke an emancipatory promise that rejects the given facts as the only facts, and that also rejects the transcendence or authority of a messiah. It is, then, another way of thinking through the political without lapsing into positivist or authoritarian modes of thought. The constitutive fictivity of the term thus interests me, and suggests an ally with utopian work. Further exploration of “messianism without messianism” lies beyond the boundaries of this book, but interested readers could do worse than refer to Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for Utopian Studies for this clarification. 91. Derrida, “Marx and Sons,” p.248. 92. Ibid., p.248. 93. Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Routledge, 1992), p.164. 94. Derrida, “Marx and Sons,” pp.248–249. 95. Derrida and Kearney, “Deconstruction and the Other,” pp.119, 120. 96. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.146. 97. Thanks to the insights of the other anonymous reviewer for Utopian Studies for forcing me to address more closely the ways in which fictive theories preclude the reproduction of power relations and reification, and so in this way give us ethical and evaluative markers, and for suggesting the link between “dignity” and Heimat. A parallel formulation to that of the Zapatistas might be: “Heimat is struggling so that Heimat might eventually be in the world,” for it is only when humans recognize themselves as the beings who “overhaul [. . .] the given facts” (The Principle of Hope, pp.1375–1376) that the possibility of Heimat illuminating and stratifying the present as not-yet is possible. 98. Marcos, Our Word Is Our Weapon, p.46. 99. John Holloway, “Dignity’s Revolt,” in, Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico, ed. John Holloway and Eloine Peláez (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p.173. 100. http://struggle.ws/mexico/ezln/ ccri1st_dec_real.html, accessed 11/06/02. 101. Holloway, “Dignity’s Revolt,” p.165. 102. Moylan, Demand the Impossible, p.197. 103. http://struggle.ws/mexico/ezln/2001/ccri/ccri_puebla_feb.html, accessed 08/09/02. 208 / notes

104. Marcos, Zapatista Stories, trans. Dinah Livingston (London: Katabis, 2001), p.118. 105. Ibid., p.118. 106. Ibid., p.93. 107. http:// struggle.ws/ mexico/ezln/ccri_5_dec_lj_july98.html accessed 10/06/02; See also, Our Word Is Our Weapon, pp.158–159. 108. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.1371. 109. Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power, p.169, emphasis mine. 110. See Bloch, The Principle of Hope, pp.1375–1376. 111. Gilles Deleuze, “Intellectuals and Power: A conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze,” in, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon (Cornell University Press, 1977), p.208.

Toward a Conclusion 1. Wolin, “Political Theory as a Vocation.” The Concept of Utopia (London: Phillip Allen, 1990), p.200. 2. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (Columbia University Press, 1994), p.147. See also Irigaray, The Way of Love, and the search for a language that “does not speak about something or someone who already exists and for whom a language and representations are somehow available, previously codified. Rather, it tries to anticipate . . .”; this language then, no longer corresponds “to something or someone who already exists, and is already in the past, or put into the past by what is said. The task here is different. It is a question of making something exist” pp.vii, viii. 3. The Revolution of Everyday Life, p.97. 4. Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life, pp.147, 148; Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, p.4; see also Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p.7. 5. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, p.223. 6. Marcos, Zapatista Stories, p.76. Bibliography

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Entries in bold refer to extended discussions of the theorist or concept. agency, 21, 24, 28–9, 71, 93, 119, 127, 155, anticipation, 2, 14, 37–8, 58, 147–8, 153, 172n21, 186n60, 189n45 157–9, 160, 161–2, 167, 169–70 always-already fictive, 3, 5–7, 9, 19–21, becoming, 12, 14–15, 149, 152, 154, 55, 103 155–60, 164, 165 anticipatory thought, 2, 11, 58, 147–8, 153, concrete utopia, 161–5 157–61, 162, 169–70, 205n26; see also emotions as temporal and material, 157 Bloch, Ernst; post-representational hope as cognitive, 159 thought; utopian theory hunger, 155–7 anti-narrative, 13, 39, 51, 117–18, impossibility of programmatic coding of 125–6, 133 political, 2, 147, 151–3, 161–2, 170 Dionysus/Apollonian, 125 Natural Law and Human Dignity, 12, 38 see also narrative; Nietzsche, Friedrich not-yet, 12, 153–61, 163, 165, 170 anti-utopian mode, 12, 20, 28–31, 37, 152, possibility, 148, 149, 151, 152–3, 154, 155, 168, 174n2; see also Hobbes, 157, 158, 161–2, 163, 168–70 Thomas; representation reality as unfinished, 12, 15, 158, artifice, 23–5, 32, 37, 39, 43–4, 46–7, 165, 170 61, 119, 160, 178n2 “social dreaming” (Sargent), 148, 152, artificial bodies, 23–4 203n5 see also Hobbes, Thomas temporality, 149, 155–8 ascetic fictions, 1–2, 58, 68–9, 111–14, 125, transformative, 148, 153, 156, 160, 161, 127–8, 133, 189n39, 195–6n29; 163–5, 167–70 see also didactic and disciplinary see also utopian theory fictions; fictions; Nietzsche, Friedrich bodies, 28–30, 31, 42, 58, 64, 85, 88, 94, 112–13, 130, 168, 201n141; see also Barthes, Roland, 3, 8, 10–12, 21, 114–15, subjectivity 134, 141, 204n26 Brown, Wendy, 14, 37–8 lisible/scriptable (readerly/writerly), 10–12, Politics Out Of History, 14 21, 114 Butler, Judith, 22 see also textuality becoming-other, 10, 33, 52, 139, 157, 170; Caruth, Cathy, 9; see also epistemology: see also anticipatory thought; not-yet; failure of post-representational thought; categorical imperative, 58, 62, 66–72, 73, temporality; textuality; utopia 84, 121, 123, 155, 168 Bennett, Jane, 14, 27, 58, 74, 169, 178n2 “as if” formulation, 62, 69 The Enchantment of Modern Life, 14, circularity of, 71 Bloch, Ernst, 2, 12, 13–14, 32, 38, 58, 74, constraining effects of, 69, 70 90, 99, 106–7, 132, 136, 147–65, creativity of, 58, 65, 69–70, 71–2, 73–4 168–70, 178n2, 179n24 as ethical tale, 69–70 222 / index categorical imperative—continued dreaming, 30–2, 126, 129–30, 131–2, fantastic nature of, 62–3, 66, 73 148–9 imagined differently, 70, 73–4 in Hobbes, 30–2 resists fiction and philosophy, 73–4 in Nietzsche, 126, 129–30, 131–2 as space of alterity, 74 utopias as “social dreaming,” 148–9 as universality, 58, 61, 69–70, 71–2, 73 unthinkable nature of, 70–2 “elsewhere,” 2, 142, 205n42; see also utopian Cavarero, Adriana theory disciplinary conception of politics, 5 epistemologies of “the given,” 1, 4, 5, 12, epistemological hierarchies, 5–6 13, 19–20, 27, 32, 38–9, 43, 49, 54–6, coding the political, 2, 3, 8–9, 38, 40, 50, 59, 78–9, 111–12, 124–5, 149, 150–1, 74, 147, 162, 171n1, 204–5n26; 153, 158, 160, 164, 168 see also anti-utopian mode; metaphysics; epistemological positivism, 2, 78, 131, political theory: programmatic, 151–2, 160, 165, 179n24 legislative, authoritative see also reification Cornell, Drucilla, 9, 162; see also epistemology, 1–15 responsibility; undecidability conservative, 1, 5, 159 creative epistemologies of possibility, 1, 2, failure of, 7, 9, 79, 109, 167 5–6, 12, 13, 14, 19, 27, 38, 49, politics of knowledge-production, 14 55–6, 123, 147–8, 149, 150, 160, see also creative epistemologies of 164, 167, 170 possibility; epistemologies of “the invention, 2, 5, 38–9, 48, 53, 55–6, 66, given”; reification 72, 80, 116, 126–32, 147, 155, 160 critical knowledges, 2–3, 14–15, 22, 37, 44, fabrication, 6–7, 15, 33, 43, 55, 136, 160, 74, 91, 97, 123, 133, 153, 155, 163–4, 165, 170; see also telling stories 167, 170, 174n49; see also fictions deconstruction; utopian theory claims to power of, 1–2, 4, 6, 7, 19–21, 22, 23, 50, 52, 69, 70, 80, 84–6, deconstruction, 2–3, 7–12, 14, 38, 49, 103–5, 126, 168 55–6, 80–1, 97–101, 105, 106, 108, constitutive fictions, 1–2, 5–6, 74, 117, 125, 147–8, 149, 160, 161–2; 88, 149, 158, 160, 165, 170, narratology, 3, 8–13, 55, 60, 105 171n1 see also coding of the political; Derrida, dual work of, 1–2, 5–6, 20, 37, 39, Jacques; foundations; metaphysics; 54–6, 59, 85, 104, 124, 130, 147, responsibility; undecidability 155, 168 depoliticization, 5, 161 fiction/reality binaries, 2, 8, 10, 55, 58, Derrida, Jacques, 3, 7–9, 12, 14, 34, 48–9, 78, 123, 152, 153, 158–60, 167, 53, 55, 62–3, 73–4, 79, 80–1, 97–101, 169–70 109, 157, 161–2 fiction/theory hierarchies, 3–4, 8, 9, 55, hauntology, 98–100 116, 131, 138; see also narrative; messianism, 98–9, 162 oppositional thought New International as unfinished fictive mode of theorizing cartography, 100 alterity, 37, 49, 74, 135, 150, 152–3, see also deconstruction; undecidability 157, 161, 164–5, 168, 169–70 didactic and disciplinary fictions, 5–7, 31–2, as epistemological interruption, 2, 4, 29, 37, 57, 58, 65, 84, 113, 132, 168 31, 39, 58, 88, 114–15, 130–1, 147, différance 162, 168 as alterity and potentiality, 157 and fictions, distinguished, 2, 60 temporal complexity of, 37 as genealogical critique, 1–2 index / 223

inescapable ground of political theory, social contract, 22, 32, 33–5 1–2, 12, 19, 22, 70, 72, 103–5 status of Hobbes’s fictions, 20–1, 22–3, see also oppositional thought; post- 26, 31, 34–5 representational thought Honig, Bonnie, 55, 65, 161, 171n1 fictive theories human nature, 23, 40, 42–4, 48, 52, 61, politics of, 1–2, 7, 14–15, 54–6, 77–8, 120, 155–6 98–100, 107, 138, 148, 161–5, Hume, David, 22 168–70 Foucault, Michel, 15, 100, 149, 170 idealism, 13, 74, 78, 79, 82, 84–5, 92–3, foundations 95–6, 168 ambiguous, 59–60 ideologies, 82, 86, 91–7, 99, 152, 160, constitutively fictive, 9 168, 170 dissolution of, 9, 81, 106, 116, imagination 119, 134 creativity, 2–3, 9, 14, 48, 63 “outside” of contestation, 3 knowledge, 5–6, 9, 30 see also political theory modes of imagining, 4, 12, 19, 26–7, 55, 57–8, 62, 65, 69, 70, 74 genealogy, 124, 125–6, 133–4 intelligibility, 2–3, 20, 21, 24–8, 31, 32, 37, Geoghegan, Vincent, 158, 159, 178n2 61–2, 65, 91, 94–7, 104, 108, 121, God 122–3, 128–30, 167 death of, 110, 119 Irigaray, Luce, 2, 116, 169, 194n15 God’s grammar, 112, 128, 150 as impossible law-giver, 6, 40–1 Jacobson, Norman, 6–7 living in the shadows of dead God, Jameson, Fredric, 92–3, 152 67, 122 Grosz, Elizabeth Kant, Immanuel, 57–74 corporeal inscription, 29 ascetic subjectivities, production of, 58, see also bodies 68, 69 autonomy/heteronomy in, 61, 62, 70–2 Hobbes, Thomas, 19–35 disciplinary fictions in, 57, 58 anti-utopian mode, 20, 28, 31 ethics and epistemology in, 58, 66 bodies and subjectivity, 26, 28–34 foundational, 58–9, 61, 67, 69, 71–2 corporeal inscription, 29 hierarchical binaries in, 58, 69, 74 counterfeit, 25, 33 narrative, 58–63, 65–6, 70, 73 deviating subjects, 31 philosophy, troubled status, 66 disciplining subjects, 28–31 purposiveness, assumption of, 64, 65, dreaming, 20, 28–33 67–8, 70 foreclosure of possibility in, 28, 32, 33 reason and rationality in, 61, 62–3, 65, ghosts, 20, 26, 28, 32, 33 66, 67, 70–3 juridical metaphors in, 24, 25–6 see also categorical imperative; magic, 27 moral law matter/materialism, 26–32 Keenan, Thomas memory/imagination elided, 27, 30 reading, 9 performative, 19, 21, 25–6, 27, 32–5 removal of foundations as constitutive of promising, 32–3 politics, 9 referential fixity, 33, 35 see also undecidability representational trickery in, 33, 35 resolutive-compositive method and legislator, the making monsters in, 26–7 always-already fictive, 5–7 224 / index legislator, the—continued modernity, 4 creative epistemologies, 5–7, 50, 53, 54, and political theory, 4, 21–2, 23–5, 135–6 39–40, 47–8, 55, 56, 149 epistemic privilege of, 7 moral law, 57–74; see also categorical master trope of political theory, 5, imperative; Kant, Immanuel 79, 134 morality, 39, 40, 45, 57–74, 85, 111, 116, social power of, 7, 52–3 126–30, 137–8 see also Jacobson, Norman; Nietzsche, Moylan, Tom, 152, 155–6, 171n3 Friedrich; political theory; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques narrative, 58–65, 68, 70, 73, 85–6, 104–5, Levitas, Ruth, 150, 153, 172n21 114–19, 125, 128–32, 139, 142, 160 literary theory, 9–12; see also fictions: rational ordering discourse, 4 fiction/theory hierarchies; oppositional and social contract theory, 22 thought theory, 3, 4, 10, 14, 55 Lyotard, Jean-François see also fictions: fiction/theory hierarchies grand récits, 4 natural condition, 21–32, 39–49, 60, 123; see also human nature magic, 27, 32, 35, 64–5 nature de Man, Paul state of nature as determining exterior, problem of reference in Rousseau, 43–4 22–3, 44, 123 see also Rousseau, Jean-Jacques Nietzsche, Friedrich, 103–43 Marcos, Subcommandante, 149, affirmation in thought, 121, 132, 162–4, 170 139–40, 162, 170 dignity, 163–4 always already fictionalizing, 119–21, wisdom, 170 123, 126–32 see also Zapatistas asceticism, 111–14, 125, 127 Marin, Louis, 153, 159 becoming, 114, 127, 133, 139–42 Marx, Karl beyond good and evil, 115–17, 125, 131 as activist, 82, 97 “clever animals” and the fable of epistemological break, 81–2 knowledge, 126–8 post-representational, 97 dissociative logics, critique of, 113, on power, 92, 95, 97 132, 139 see also ideologies; materialism, dreaming, 128–32 intelligibility of eternal recurrence, 138–42 materialism, intelligibility of fetishism, defined, 112–13, 114, 127 in Derrida, 98–100 the fragment, 108–10, 143 in Hobbes, 20, 27–30 the friend, 138–9 in Marx, 82, 93–7 interpretative problems of, 108–17 in Nietzsche, 123 metaphysics, critique of, 112–13, 118, temporal complexity of “matter,” 37, 88, 121, 125 99–100, 157 naturalization and normativity, critique and utopia, opposed, 78–9, 81–2, 83, of, 121–3, 124 91, 94 nihilism, 118–34 metaphysics, 9, 55, 66–9, 74, 112, 117, perspectivism, 112–13, 124–5 118, 121, 126, 152, 160; see also philosophical mythologies, 109, 113, 128 coding of the political post-representational thought, 116, Miller, J. Hillis, 69, 72 123–4, 136, 141 story-telling, contingency of, 14 referential fixity, critique of, 112–14, 116 index / 225

ressentiment, 126, 128, 133, 137 post-representational thought, 2, 11, 20, 32, Stirner, Max, 124, 131 35, 52, 55, 77–80, 90–1, 97, 98–100, textuality in, 105, 108–17 104, 123, 168–70 transformative, 123 emancipatory knowledges, 78–9, 107, wisdom contra knowledge, 111–13 153, 167–70 see also God: God’s grammar, living in politics of, 77–80, 98–100 shadows of dead God; ontology: as transformative praxis, 123, 167–70 errors; slave moralities; subjectivity: see also anticipatory thought; fictive fictive/utopian, reactive theories not-yet, 2, 12, 56, 74, 153–61, 163, 170 power future as alterity, 135–6 ontology promising, 20, 30, 32–4, 53–4, 98, 158; determining exterior, 22–3, 123 see also representation; social contract errors, 125–30 and morality, 123 reading oppositional thought transformational, 9, 11–12, 19, 21, 37–8, fiction/reality binaries, 8, 9, 44, 55, 108–17 78–82, 95–7, 123, 150–3 real, the, 77–101; see also Derrida, Jacques; fiction/theory hierarchies, 3–4, 8, 9, 58, Marx, Karl; Rorty, Richard; 116, 131, 138 Stirner, Max see also fictive mode of theorizing; reflexivity in political theory, 8, 12, 19–20, materialism, intelligity of: and 111–15, 130–2, 165 utopia, opposed reification, 1, 6, 14, 47, 48, 54, 56, 87–9, 93–5, 105, 127, 130, 132, 134, 142, performative 148, 151, 155, 162, 164, 165, 169; Hobbes’s reading as, 19, 21, 24–5, 32, 35 see also epistemologies of “the given”; philosophical atheism, 13, 21, 85, 122 political theory: programmatic, political theory legislative, authoritative canon of, 14, 37–8, 133 representation claims to power of, 1–7, 12, 21–2, 23, 50, referential fixity, 13, 32–3, 34–5, 37, 97, 105, 147, 167, 171n1 48–9, 54, 56, 87–9, 91, 95, disciplinary conception of politics, 1–7 98–100, 107, 110–16, 168 future-oriented imagination, 2, 147 representational stability, 20, 34, 89 haunted, 77, 168 responsibility, 9, 100, 112, 123, 162; programmatic, legislative, authoritative, see also Cornell, Drucilla; 1–7, 22, 23, 26, 55, 79, 90, 103–5, deconstruction 134, 161, 165 Rorty, Richard textuality of, 7–10, 40, 105, 108, 110–11 apolitical, 80–1, 100, 168 see also creative epistemologies of post-representational epistemology, possibility; epistemologies 80–1, 97 of “the given”; fictions, dual work Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 37–56 of; fictive theories; foundations; affective fictionalizing in, 45 legislator, the bad fictives, 39, 44, 47–8 possibility, 2, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14–15, 32, bourgeois dependency, 39, 40, 46–7 37–8, 52, 74, 105, 123, 131–2, catachresis in, 55 135–6, 139–40, 142, 147–65, “catastrophic” theory of history, 39, 48, 167–70 178n7 postmodern, the, 4, 120, 169 “clever animals,” 38–9, 45 226 / index

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques—continued rejection of disciplinary fictions, 83–4, different modes of fictionalizing in, 39, 88–9 44, 48, 55–6 strategies of resistance, 78, 90, 170 epistemological aporias, 39, 41 subjectivity, fictive, 87–8 epistemological disclaimer, 41, 49–50 subjectivity, reactive, 86 fictional status of natural condition, 22, transformative praxis, problems of, 90 42–4 subjectivity fictive mode, 38, 39, 44, 48–9, disciplined, 29–31, 58, 61–4, 69, 84, 86, 50–2, 55–6 89, 113, 127–32 “forcing freedom” (Affeldt), 50, 54 fictive/utopian, 29, 155–61, 170 fraudulent social contract, 47–8 reactive, 86, 137–8, 163 General Will as not reducible to Swenson, James, 48, 49 law, 53–4 history-writing as fabulation, 43–4 telling stories, 7, 23, 69, 104–5, 130, humanity as distortion, unnatural, 39, 160, 169 42–3, 48–9, 52 temporality, 3, 10–11, 15, 29, 33, 37, 55, inequality as unnatural, 46–7 74, 87–8, 112, 123–5, 140–1, 147, inventing the fable of humanity, 39, 56 149, 150–64, 168–70 metaleptic narrative, 45–6, 51 textuality, 10–12, 105, 107, 108–17; natural freedom and compassion, 44–6 see also Barthes, Roland nature vis-à-vis human possibility, 37–8, 42, 43, 47, 48–9 undecidability, 8–10, 74 perfectibility, ambivalence of, 40, 46, 48 condition of possibility of politics, 9 radical innocence of natural see also responsibility humanity, 44–6 utopia social contract, 49–54 as alterity and critique, 49, 150, see also legislator, the: epistemic privilege, 152–3, 158 social power anti-utopian, 20, 28–9, 31, 37, 152, 155, 174n2 Seery, John E., 6, 82, 97 disruptive, 2–3, 51, 148, 150–1, 167 Simons, Jon, 174n49 emancipatory knowledges, 78–9, 107, slave moralities, 111, 135, 137–8, 139 153, 167–70 ascetic fictions, 58, 68, 69, 111–12, good/no place, 43, 150, 152 127–8 as impossibility (productive), 152–3 social contract, see Hobbes, Thomas; and messianism, compared, 162 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques as prefigurative and transformative, 150, specters 161, 165, 170 the spectral, 77, 80, 84–6, 88, 100 as promise, 158 spooks, 26, 61, 78, 84–91 see also Bloch, Ernst; utopian theory see also Stirner, Max utopian method, 153–4 Starobinski, Jean, 40, 44 in Rousseau, 37–8, 43, 49, 51, 52, 55 Stirner, Max, 77–91 utopian theory insurrectionary politics, 90 as metaphysical, 152, 160 logic of domination in, 84–9, 90 programmatic, legislative mode, property, possession distinguished, 50, 150 88–90 utopian ethos, 90, 133, 138, 169–70 referential fixity, critique of, 83–4, 89 see also fictive theories index / 227

Vanegeim, Raoul, 89, 132–3, 156, 169 Yeatman, Anna, 22–3 Young Hegelians, 80–3 Wolin, Sheldon creative epistemologies, 5–6, Zapatistas 167, 169 dignity, 163–4 epic political theory, 5–6 see also Marcos, Subcommandante; world-creation, 19, 23, 28 not-yet