MARX AND MORALITY by Vanessa Christina Wills Artium Baccalaurens in Philosophy, Princeton University, 2002 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2011 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Vanessa Wills It was defended on August 26, 2011 and approved by John McDowell, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy Peter Machamer, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science Tommie Shelby, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of African and African-American Studies, Harvard University Dissertation Director: Michael Thompson, Professor of Philosophy ii Copyright © by Vanessa Wills 2011 iii MARX AND MORALITY Vanessa Wills, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2011 Several influential interpretations of Marx claim his theory of social change is amoral, that Marx had only an incoherent moral conception, or that Marx had moral commitments early in his career but abandoned them, perhaps at the writing of The German Ideology but certainly before Capital. I argue that none of these is correct. Morality, for Marx, is thoroughly historical: it is produced through human activity; whether particular actions or social arrangements are moral or immoral varies at different historical stages; and its realization in human practice and the closure of the gap between "is" and "ought" would lead to the abolition of morality as the theorization of that gap. Marx determines what society would be best for human beings and which existing forces and historical processes could realize it. He morally evaluates social systems, theories, and human actions with respect to whether they promote or inhibit the increase of human beings' rational control over their own environment and social development, and the historical emergence of "rich individuals". Famously, Marx refers to morality as "ideology". Interpreters of Marx have assumed that ideology is always reactionary or misleading. However, ideology plays an important role in the development of revolutionary consciousness. Ideology can serve as a bulwark of reaction; however, Marx shows that the proletariat must develop its own ideology to theorize social iv contradictions and determine how they can be overcome to allow for a conscious, democratic, and rational control over human beings' social existence. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I provide a detailed overview of Marx's moral theory and its basis in his conception of human nature and alienation. The remainder of the dissertation follows the development of Marx's moral thought chronologically, starting with Marx's early works including The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology, continuing with the period including works such as The Communist Manifesto and On the Poverty of Philosophy, and ending with Marx's late work including the Grundrisse and Capital. I conclude by drawing together the study's main themes and suggesting avenues for further research. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. VIII 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 2.0 MARX’S MORAL THOUGHT IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1840 TO 1847 ...... 35 2.1 MARX AND INDIVIDUALITY ...................................................................... 39 2.1.1 Marx on Epicurus and the Swerve ........................................................... 45 2.1.2 Marx's Treatment of Individuality in The German Ideology ................ 51 2.1.3 Conclusion of Section on Individuality in Marx's Early Writings ........ 59 2.2 ALIENATION.................................................................................................... 61 2.3 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS ................................................................. 74 2.4 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF SEVERAL DOMINANT MORAL THEORIES: CHRISTIANITY, KANTIANISM, AND UTILITARIANISM ...................................... 82 2.4.1 Marx on Christian Morality ..................................................................... 86 2.4.2 Marx on Kantian Morality ........................................................................ 93 2.4.3 Marx on Utilitarianism ............................................................................ 101 2.5 UTOPIANISM AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM ....................................... 107 2.6 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO .......................................................... 113 3.0 MARX'S MORAL THOUGHT IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1847 TO 1857 ..... 116 3.1 IDEOLOGY AND MORALITY .................................................................... 122 vi 3.2 MARX'S MORAL CRITIQUES OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY AND BOURGEOIS MORALITY ............................................................................................ 136 3.2.1 Marx on Capital Punishment .................................................................. 152 3.2.2 Conclusion of section on Marx's moral critiques of bourgeois society and bourgeois morality ............................................................................................ 156 3.3 INDIVIDUALS AND INDIVIDUALITY ...................................................... 158 3.4 ALIENATION.................................................................................................. 166 3.5 MORALISM, SACRIFICE AND UTOPIA .................................................. 173 3.6 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER THREE ...................................................... 178 4.0 MARX'S MORAL THOUGHT IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1858 TO 1883 ..... 181 4.1 THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM IN MARX'S MATURE WORK ............................................................................................................ 183 4.2 MARX AND INDIVIDUALITY .................................................................... 197 4.2.1 The Development of “Rich individuality” ............................................. 202 4.3 ALIENATION.................................................................................................. 209 4.4 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS NOTIONS OF RIGHTS, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY ....................................................................................... 215 4.4.1 Marx on Utilitarianism ............................................................................ 226 4.5 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................... 238 5.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 244 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 252 vii PREFACE I am greatly indebted to many who have inspired, encouraged, and assisted me along the path that has led so far to the production of this document, a work of which I am quite proud. I am extremely grateful to have had the means and the opportunity to create it. My dissertation committee—Michael Thompson, John McDowell, Peter Machamer, and Tommie Shelby—were always very positive and encouraging about my work as it progressed in draft form, a kindness that has been invaluable to me since to write a dissertation is a notoriously nerve-rattling process. My committee provided thoughtful feedback, guidance, and support while giving me a great deal of freedom, space, and trust to pursue this project in my own way. In the course of my studies, I have also benefited from the kindness and encouragement of other present and former faculty at Pitt, both within the Philosophy Department and outside of it. Among these are Laura Ruetsche, Andrea Westlund, Anil Gupta, Nicholas Rescher, Joe Camp, Lucy Fischer, and Uwe Stender. I would like to thank Olúfémi Táíwò at Seattle University, who has really touched me with his warmth and encouragement, and John Bennett at the University of Rochester, with whom I engaged in a number of interesting and extended conversations about moral philosophy and of course, about my dissertation project, in particular. Olúfémi and John both generously provided careful and detailed feedback on earlier drafts of the second chapter of this dissertation, and helped to make my arguments sharper and clearer with their questions and criticisms. Any faults that remain, of course, are entirely my own. viii John Clendaniel has had a large part to play in the process that has resulted in this work. He read countless drafts, gave a wealth of thoughtful feedback, and we spent many hours in conversation with one another. This dissertation is a work that is deeply personal in the sense that it represents some of my most important convictions as well as countless hours of difficult contemplation, writing, and research; I also think it is a work that I was uniquely positioned to produce. At the same time, it could not have been the same without the efforts of John who encouraged me to be at my very best. John is not only my key philosophical interlocutor, but he is also my husband, and shows me an astonishing level of love and support. I know I am incredibly lucky that, at the University of Pittsburgh, I studied philosophy with peers who are brilliant, kind, and supportive. I have learned a great deal from them and always felt that my fellow graduate students were cheering me on. One of the things I am most glad of