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Marxist Philosophy and the Problem of Value

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Soviet Studies in Philosophy ISSN: 0038-5883 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrsp19 Marxist Philosophy and the Problem of Value O. G. Drobnitskii To cite this article: O. G. Drobnitskii (1967) Marxist Philosophy and the Problem of Value, Soviet Studies in Philosophy, 5:4, 14-24 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RSP1061-1967050414 Published online: 20 Dec 2014. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mrsp19 Download by: [North Carolina State University], [Professor Marina Bykova] Date: 09 February 2017, At: 14:43 Theory of Value Voprosy filosofii, 1966, No. 7 0, G. Drobnitskii MARXIST PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROBLEM OF -*’VXLUr;* * In recent years, the question has been posed fact that things and phenomena in the world con- of the attitude of Marxist philosophy to what is stituting man’s environment have been endowed termed the problem of value. The point is not with such characteristics as worth, good and only that bourgeois axiology, which has been de- evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice. veloping for three-quarters of a century, has to Doubtless, the phenomena of social consciousness be critically analyzed. Central to the question act in some aspect as “spiritual values,” i.e., is whether a Marxist axiology is possible. In they partake of the character of valuation norms. that connection the following is instructive. Finally, all these phenomena may be combined Authors who, with envious consistency, ignore under the single common notion of value. The the history of philosophy and begin to build a question is how to approach the analysis of val- theory of value on the basis of direct generaliza- ues: to take the fact of their existence as a point tion 440fall the known facts” often pose the prob- of departure for theoretical reasoning, or to at- lem of value precisely as it was formulated as tempt to discover the mechanism of their origin; early as the end of the 19th century. to take the standpoint value consciousness and of As we see it, the lesson of bourgeois axiology to describe the world as it looks from that point is not to be forgotten. It is more desirable to of view, or to attempt to clarify the relationship begin examination of this problem not merely of that consciousness to reality, to determine to with a statement of value phenomena and their what degree it is capable in itself of disclosing definition, but with analysis of how the problem the nature of the things it evaluates. We shall arose historically. No one will challenge the attempt to demonstrate that criteria of value __- consciousness are fundamentally unacceptable *This article is published in the context of to a science engaged in rigorously objective discussion. study of reality. The author is a staff member of the Institute Genesis of Bourgeois Axiology of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Questions of the nature of various phenomena, 14 VOL. V, NO. 4 15 which it is now customary to term values, have individual subjectivity might rise to the objec- been discussed in philmophy since ancient times. tivity of the universal. Moreover, scientific cog- But the problem of value as one of the fundamen- nition and becoming accustomed to the logic of tal aspects of philosophy (and axiology) arose universal necessity coincide, in Hegel, with hu- only in the second half of the 19th century. Is it man freedom. In his ethic, Kant proceeds from accidental that this problem was absent in clas- the identity of free will and its rationality, but sical bourgeois philosophy, although even Hume reveals a total disconnection between “natural and Kant had noted certain of its prerequisites? passions” and universal necessity, which is On the contrary, we are able to say that that above nature. Therefore, in him, man appears trend in modern philosophy within which axiology to be internally cloven into the sensory, unfree arose took shape in many respects as antithesis being we see in empirical reality, and the ra- to the leitmotifs of classical bourgeois philosophy tional free being who has perceived, a priori, and, above all, to the ideas of the Enlightenment. the unchallengeable moral law and stands coun- In this context, let us trace the manner in terposed to the world of natural (and social) re- which the problem of human activity and world lationships of man. This law, naturally, cannot view was regarded by the French materialists. be validated by empirical science and does not Man is a part of nature and, consequently, a carry within itself guarantees of practical em- natural being. His nature is such that adequate bodiment in empirical history, The moral view- expression of his essential forces - rationally point (later called that of value) proved to be de- directed interests - reveals complete harmony tached from science and social experience. with the universal laws of nature. Therefore, The further development of bourgeois thought study and practical assimilation of the external on the question under discussion follows the subject of nature as a whole are theoretically course forecast by Kant and not that anticipated identical with the self-knowledge and self-dis- by Hegel. The actual historical development of covery of man. Translated into the language of life under capitalism does not fit into the con- social science, this means that proper effectua- ception of the organic unity of the universal (the tion of the personal interest of each leads to the integral) and the individual, the universal neces- attainment of the common welfare. It follows sity of the universe and human subjectivity, that the solution of all social problems assumes whether it is thought of as given by nature or as an objective knowledge of the nature of man and effected in a historical process of ascent. The the world. Man must find all the root principles subsequent development of bourgeois civilization, of social orientation within himself. True, such particularly in the era of monopoly capitalism, a situation is attained only in a rational society, revealed that the mode of activity inherent in but it must be built on the basis of the objective capitalism is remote from the universality as- of free development of the actual nature of man. cribed to it. In this connection the problem of Universal enlightenment and explanation to peo- man’s life activity demanded reinterpretation, ple of their own interests must become the prin- and the principles of naturalism and historicism ciple of social upbringing. But in that case no were rejected. special problem of value arises. Questions of We may direct our attention to two basic fac- world view, of social program, of choice of life tors of life under capitalism as recorded by the goals and ideals, and of human freedom and hap- bourgeois mentality. On the one hand, the agent piness are resolved by “natural” science and the of activity is transformed from the “free entre- “natural” morality resting thereon. preneur,” implementing his own interests, into As we know, Kant and Hegel criticized this an executor of the goals assigned him from with- naturalist view of man. Pointing out that sponta- out. Correspondingly, the motion of economic, neous natural interest is not yet an adequate ex- political, and other interests in society now com- pression of universal necessity (reason), Hegel prises not a disclosure of the internal nature of nonetheless did not rule out the possibility that man but merely a manifestation of expediency 16 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY external to him. Therefore the view is confirmed “meaning” of history. The latter is capable of that the laws of social activity are incapable of being detected by a fundamentally different mode revealing the sense of human existence as such, of thought, “above science”: the philosophy of and that it is necessary to seek them somewhere history, which is the opposite of sociology. outside social practice. (This idea has been These contradictions of capitalist reality and most clearly expressed in neo-Protestantism.) theoretical consciousness, which became histor- On the other hand, the bourgeois attitude toward ically mature, later became the point of depar- nature is not universal but one-sided: utilitarian. ture for the antitheses, neopositivism and irra- The transformation of nature is by no means a tionalism, but had earlier found interpretation comprehensively creative activity implementing in neo-Kantianism, where they served as the the development of the world in accordance with foundation for posing the problem of value. The its immanent laws. Nature appears only as a Baden school advanced the question of the possi- passive substrate to be processed in production. bility of theoretical examination of the problem “Technical civilization” does not reproduce but of the sense and meaning of human existence and ravages nature, taking its resources and making of the historical process, which subsumed the in- only partial use of them for purposes of economic clusion of each individual phenomenon in the competition, often contradictory to the laws of whole in such fashion as not to cause it to lose the organic development of nature. its uniqueness and irreplaceability. In the opin- Therefore this nature appears to the irration- ion of the neo-Kantians, these problems were alist philosopher as inanimate material to be cut capable of solution only if one abandoned the up and carved again in accordance with utilitarian method of generalization practiced by the natural needs (Bergson). In essence, the positivist sees and by certain of the social sciences (such as the same thing, but from the other side.
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