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MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE Max Planck Institute for the History of Science 2006 PREPRINT 317 Gideon Freudenthal Definition and Construction Salomon Maimon’s Philosophy of Geometry Definition and Construction Salomon Maimon's Philosophy of Geometry Gideon Freudenthal 1. Introduction .........................................................................................................3 1.1. A Failed Proof and a Philosophical Conversion .................................................8 1.2. The Value of Mathematics ..................................................................................13 2. The Straight Line.................................................................................................15 2.1. Synthetic Judgments a priori Kantian and Aristotelean Style.............................15 2.2. Maimon's Proof that the Straight Line is also the shortest between Two Points ............................................................................................23 2.3. Kant's Critique and Maimon's Answer................................................................30 2.4. Definition, Construction, Proof in Euclid and Kant............................................33 2.5. The Construction of the Straight Line.................................................................37 2.6. The Turn to Empircial Skepticism (and Rational Dogmatism)...........................39 2.7. Synthetic a priori and proprium ..........................................................................46 2.8. Maimon's Law of Determinability, Straight and Curved Lines ..........................51 2.9. Results: The straight line.....................................................................................53 3. The Circle............................................................................................................56 3.1. The Nominal and Real Definition of the Circle ..................................................56 3.2. Kant on the Definition and Construction of the Circle .......................................60 3.3. Maimon's Critique of Kant's Construction of a Circle. Maimon's "Ideas of the Understanding.".............................................................63 1 3.4. Constructing the Circle by Motion......................................................................64 3.5. Rigorous Construction: Circle and Polygon........................................................65 3.6. Kant's Critique of Maimon's "ideas of the understanding" .................................67 3.7. Maimon's Rebuttal of Kant's critique..................................................................69 3.8. Rota Aristotelis. Antinomies...............................................................................75 3.9. Maimon’s View of the Antinomy .......................................................................79 4. The Distrust of Intuition......................................................................................83 4.1. Asymptotes..........................................................................................................83 4.2. A Three-Lateral Figure Has Three Angles: Hic volo, hic iubeo.........................86 4.3. Hypothetical (non-Euclidean) Geometry, Hypothetical Metaphysics ................90 5. Maimon's "Concluding Remark": The Nature of Synthetic Judgments a priori ...............................................................................................94 5.1. Primary and Derivative Geometric Propositions ................................................96 5.1.1. Genuine Primary Geometrical Propositions........................................................97 5.1.2. Pseudo Primary Geometrical Propositions..........................................................100 5.1.3. Conversion of Primary Geometrical Propositions ..............................................102 5.1.4. The Axiom of Parallels: A synthetic Judgment a priori......................................105 6. Maimon's Notion of Construction and the Nature of a Philosophical System....110 7. Conclusions .........................................................................................................117 8. Appendix: Further Textual Evidence that Maimon Changed the Body of the Transcendentalphilosophie After Receiving Kant's Letter .................................123 2 Definition and Construction Salomon Maimon's Philosophy of Geometry1 Gideon Freudenthal Examples are indispensable in speculative treatises, and he who does not sup- ply them, where they are required, raises the just suspicion that perhaps he did not understand himself. But I maintain even more, namely, that only exam- ples from mathematics suit this purpose, since the objects of mathematics are intuitions determined in a precise fashion by concepts. (Salomon Maimon: Kritische Untersuchungen, Dedication to Graf Kalkreuth, GW VII, not paginated, p. VI-VII.) 1. Introduction Mathematics, especially geometry, played a central role in Maimon's thought. Geome- try exemplified in his eyes the best in human knowledge. His detailed discussion of various problems is of high interest in various respects. Here Maimon analyzes what "synthesis" is 1. The work on this essay began in weekly meetings with my colleague and friend Sabetai Unguru. Besides talking about everything between Heaven and Earth, we also read texts of Maimon and discussed my interpretation of them. Sabetail also commented on my first extensive draft of this essay. Without his wide knowledge of the history of mathematics, his uncompromising acumen and his enthusiasm this essay could not have been written. Hans Lausch (Sidney) meticulously and extensively commented on a previous draft of this essay. His suggestions were very helpful. My friend Oded Schechter read the first draft and conributed penetrating comments, Leo Corry (Tel-Aviv) and Michael Rouback (Jerusalem) also read previous drafts and offered valuable comments. I also profited from a long conversation with Daniel Warren (Berkeley), from help offered by Orna Harari and Ofra Rechter (Tel-Aviv) and from suggestions of Herbert Breger (Hannover). My annual stays at the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science in Berlin are always conducive to my work. My stay there in the summer of 2005 proved especially valuable since it allowed me to read rare mathematical works of the eighteenth century. I am grateful to Jürgen Renn, the director of department 1 for the invitation and to the librarians for their great help. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Maimon's works and from Hebrew are my own. 3 and elaborates his notion of "true synthesis." A true synthesis must produce a new object with consequences that do not follow from either of its components. Since in geometry such syn- theses are due to construction and involve both the understanding and intuition, it is here that Maimon investigates the relation of understanding and intuition. Maimon argues in concreto for the impossibility of applying understanding to intuition and that, therefore, we do not have synthetic a priori knowledge in Kant's sense.2 We have apodictic knowledge a priori of the understanding which is not synthetic, and synthetic knowledge in intuition which is not apodictic. The heterogeneity of understanding and intuition generates the "general antinomy of human thought" and finally motivates Maimon to adopt his unique "Rational Dogmatism and Empirical Skepticism." Maimon conceives a synthetic judgment a priori as the predication of an "idion" in the Aristotelean tradition. Kant's key notion of "synthetic judgment a priori" did not improve on Aristotle's notion of "idion" and both remain obscure as long as we do not understand synthe- sis. In fact, Maimon's late criterion of synthetic judgments a priori is verbatim the characteri- zation he knew of "idion" (proprium in the Latin tradition, segula in Hebrew), namely that it is coextensive with the "essence" of the substance but not included in its definition. For example: The definition of a human being is animal rationale, and rationale is, therefore, his constitutive property. However, every animal rationale and only an animal rationale is also an animal riddens. Riddens is hence an idion (proprium, segula) of human beings.3 The ques- tion to be answered is how the proprium is connected to the constitutive property ("essence") of the subject. Concerning mathematics, Kant answered this question with his famous dictum 2. Maimon developed his philosophy of mathematics in a critique of Kant. This was in line with his style of work in general: Maimon elaborated his philosophy in commentaries on other authors. On commentaries as a philosophical genre and Maimon's commentaries in particular, see my "Salomon Maimon: Commentary as a Method of Philosophizing" (Hebr.), In: Da’at 53 (2004), pp. 126-160, and my "A Philosopher between Two Cultures." In: Gideon Freudenthal (ed.): Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic. Dordrecht (Kluwer) 2003, pp. 1-17. It is an irony of history that Maimon is known as a "Kantian." Maimon developed a peculiar philosophy of his won, which is opposed to Kant's in most essentials. 3. The co-extensionality of the "essence" and the "proprium" entails that they may exchange their places in a predication: animal rationale est riddens; animal riddens est rationale. The question, therefore, opens up how we know that "rationale" is the constitutive property and "riddens" the proprium rather the other way around. 4 that it is the construction