The Ontological Foundations of the Stoic Theory of Identity And

CEU eTD Collection The Ontological Foundations of the Stoic Theory of Identity and oftheStoicTheoryIdentity Ontological Foundations The In partial fulfilment for the degree of Master of Arts. of Master of thedegree for fulfilment In partial Central European University European Central Department of of Philosophy Department Professor Betegh Gábor By Magdolna Nyulászi Budapest, Hungary Individuation Submitted to Submitted Supervisor: 2012 CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection objects inobjects of virtue their qualification. taken together makes it impossible for them to account for the identity and individuation of material objects of conception theirand things existent of all corporeality the to commitment identity of the entities itis supposed to identify.I will conclude that the Stoics’ ontological forindividuation material sinceobjects, its identity own is notany more grounded than the pneuma argue,the Iwill as Nevertheless, uniqueness. qualitative perceptible and their persistence evidence it has been suggested that it isthe it that suggested been has it evidence whatpeculiarbasedbe, available qualitiescould the as on giveto information usany precise do not sources Although forour ina way. object’s perceptible the uniqueness can account conceivethat essential quality of an hardto is sinceit really topeculiar qualities, attributed metaphysical entity in Stoicthe philosophical system could havefulfilled doublethe role ofhavingin virtue isqualities. peculiarHowever, it exactly not kind clear of what way in aperceptible andindividuated are persist objects that they affirmed identity. Instead, isindividuable becausematter notfunction of material and of constitution, theira fleeting in individuated and identified be cannot objects material that view the professed Stoics The Abstract , itself being a material object, cannot serve as a criterion identityof and a principle of pneuma i permeating individuals that accounts for thataccounts individuals permeating CEU eTD Collection Bibliography Conclusion IV. Identifying andindividuating the bodies and Qualities III. II. Material constitution cannot be a criterion of identity or a principle of individuation makesI.What an entity peculiarly qualified? Introduction Contents of Table 4.2. Qualities and dispositions of the pneuma as amaterial object. persist doesit nor baseditsmaterial on constitution Thepneuma beindividuated 4.1. cannot 3.2. Dispositions 3.1. Corporeal and genera four qualities the 2.3. Dion and Theon Matter becannot2.2. aprinciple individuation of 2.1. The Growing Argument of identity 1.2. Groundingidentity – the pneuma as a possible principle ofindividuation and criterion 1.1. Peculiar qualities and in their status Stoic philosophy 1.2.1. The soul being peculiarly the qualified ...... 51 ...... 1 ...... 53 ...... 10 ...... 41 ...... 30 ...... 36 ...... 45 ...... 22 pneuma ...... 6 ...... 44 ...... 37 ii ...... 48 ...... 12 ...... 27 ...... 6 ...... 22 CEU eTD Collection seemingly straightforward relation lies in trying to answer what makesseemingly lies relation straightforward answerit in to what athing trying casethat the trivial matter: of everythingcourse identical is itself.to philosophical interest The of such a thesis. Identity, in very general terms, is a relation something has to itself. This seems problemthe identity to inof be generaland presentaspects of problemthe are relevantmy a that to from material entities theirconstitution. criticismmadeand individuation identity whichatheory them reject derivedthat of the vicious circle: they were not able to formulate a theory that would be immune to the kinds of principle answering qualification forthe of individuals bodies, they as inwere caught a peculiarly qualified.being object the of function a individuation and identity both make instead and But,entities, given the fact that of individuation they and identity for the relevant as constitution material reject had to Stoics conceived of qualities the reasons several different For available. principle incorporeal had also an if they of objects and the ontologicalidentity the for accounted only have could they identity, for constitution material of relevance show in the followings is that given the way the Stoics conceived of bodies, matter, and the to WhatI shall attempt andindividuation. identity has issuesof forthe theory metaphysical failure.doomed to an constructundertaking, to ontology based solely on corporeal wasindeedprinciples, points andthere is in the world. It is arguable whether these criticisms were indeed justified in all of their it is beyond my powers to decide whether the whole Stoic metaphysical philosophersfor positing two Introduction Before proceeding, I would like to make some terminological clarifications concerning clarifications make terminological some like to I would proceeding, Before However, what Ishould like topoint out in the present thesis is the consequences such a The Stoic metaphysical theory has been subject to numerous criticisms by criticisms by later numerous has to beensubject theory The Stoic metaphysical corporeal principles (matter and god) to account for all that 1 CEU eTD Collection distinguish between distinguish differentiateits ownidentity established ongrounds independent from its relation to object.the betweenmore, this metaphysical feature has beto such that can ground the identity of the entity havingproblemsis What identify object. the isto necessary of which identity— existence the for their answer of metaphysical of can pinpointsuch that objects feature a identity to tries philosopher the identity focused around three points. First, I shall Gill,“Individuals and Individuation,” in 2 Zalta, Last modified Sat Nov 7, 2009. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/identity/. 1 canbe objects identical seemingly two which based on Theprinciple time?” a certain given at aredifferent objects makes case that two itthe “What in of differentiation: terms formulated itself atacertain t is time an itto case objectthe identical makes that identity and which are irrelevant. object’s ontological features entails defining which kinds of changes are relevantfor its amongst the a criterion identity diachronic of of singling out changes. Thetask kinds of mightit have gonethrough during thattimesurvive interval. cannot all Obviously, objects t a time at itself to identical is object the that possible view. In diachrony, what is of interest to the philosopher is what feature of the objectmakes it objects. different numerically be two still but properties) their of all (share qualitatively identical be completely identity, and can holdonly between a thing anditself.” total, qualitative or absolute, identity requires “[n]umerical whereas things properties, share makesa thingitself. case itthe What that is identical to Huoranszki, Theodore Scaltsas, David Charles Maryand Louise Gill (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1994), 58. and Ferenc Cf. Max Black’s example of the universe consisting of two identical globes of iron, as quoted by Mary Louise Harold Noonan. “Identity,” in The question of identity can be posed from different points of view and here I shall only Second, the question of identity can be posed from a Modern Metafizika Modern 2 qualitative (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), 221. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) and Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics In synchrony, the philosopher’s concern is to tell what tell is to concern philosopher’s the synchrony, In numerical 2 identity. Qualitative identity requires that requires identity Qualitative identity. 0 and t 1 Itis questionable whetherthings can is itself? In looking for a criterion of synchronic 1, despite the various changes that various changes thedespite and 0. This issue can also be also issue can This diachronic . ed. Edward N. , ed. point of CEU eTD Collection unique, foritis and accounts thisqualitative uniqueness both synchronicthe that and thing,one itneed notbethesame principle basedon which we individuate things. question,is aprinciple A of basically unity. ofunity principle countdetermines as what to What makesWhat “Form and Individuation in Aristotle,” 5 Also, cf. A.C. Lloyd, “Aristotle's Principle of Individuation,” “principle of individuation” and he refers to what I call “principle of individuation” as a criterion of identity.) 4 Possibility of Metaphysics JonathanBarnes, MalcolmSchofield andRichard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1979), 93-94 Lowe,E.J. different canthings evenbeposed two or same thing are the they whether question the makescase that itthe clarify what to 3 things from view logical isa purely of atwoplacepoint does it predicate: notstanddoes or between behas made to individuation, concerning theof relationship andunity. countability Identity, or reidentify them. apart objects object’s identityan defining problem, epistemological an as Whereas consists itself. to identical is an object that in identifying a feature of identity. Asametaphysical problem, identity is about pointing outwhatmakes it casethe that makes it the case that we can tell two in Stoicthe would context. be relevant distinction the that feel not do I because synonymously, them use shall I here individuation, of and identity aprinciple of synchronic between a criterion differentiate authors the called is also other each from distinguished The difference between unified and non-unified objects will be discussed later. bediscussed will objects non-unified and unified between difference The Cf. E.J. Lowe, Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, “The Principle of Individuation,” in Individuation,” of Principle “The Anscombe, M. E. Gertrude The crux of the Stoic theory of identity is that all (unified) objects Besides the different aspects of the question of identity, another terminological remark terminological another identity, of question the of aspects different the Besides aspects epistemological the and between metaphysical the is difference the there Third, a and b. a The Possibility of Metaphysics a unity and In order to be able to establish whether the relation stands or not, first one has , (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 200-201. b a unity or History of Philosophy Quarterly . What makes it the case that there is an there casethat makesthe itWhat 3 , 60-63, 201 (Lowe towhat refers Icall a“principle of unity”as a a and b 3 two things whose identity can be brought into brought be can identity whose things two principle of individuation principle of Mind Articles On Aristotle , 79 (1970): 519 quoted by JenniferWhiting, 3 (1986): 362. , Vol 3. a 5 . Although some arequalitatively and there is a Metaphysics 4 The . ed. b? CEU eTD Collection present the reasons why the Stoics needed to reject material constitution as a criterion of acriterion as constitution material reject to needed Stoics the why reasons present the qualified in virtue of qualified invirtue specific the of portion aforementionedsolution tothe individualsby suggesting difficulties, peculiarly that are same Then,relyingtime. suggestions by literature, on Ishallcontemporary present apossible the at identity of criterion a and individuation of principle a entity same the making from identity.theory will of I therelatedtextual andthedifficultiesevidence discuss stemming regardless whether one makes refinements to the theory or one does not. peculiar fulfilis qualities, to can inthere ascribed universe that role Stoic the the nothing Aristotle’s On soul Aristotle’s that they picture the world as constituted by the intricate fact the and mixture matter of of notion two Stoic the given out, point will As I entities. of distinguishability and recognisability the for accounting also while time; same the at individuation of principle try to find ametaphysical entity in the Stoic universe that could be a criterion of identity and a theory, by suggesting whatkind of emendations have tobemadeit forwork. to Then I shall theory. reallyhelp not their us interpreting does qualities”, by “peculiar meantwhat the Stoics evidence asto haveany direct we barely uniqueness onametaphysicallevel its fact manifestation. perceptible the and Moreover, that criterionthe synchronicof qualitative identity, anddiachronic andnumerical and uniqueness between made relation the are on somespecifications unless feat, animpossible isquite roles ( 6 qualified” ( qualitative uniquenessis expressed inStoic termsby calling individual “peculiarly objects level. epistemological an and metaphysical a both on objects of identity diachronic cf. Eric Lewis, “The Stoics onIdentity and Individuation,” idia poiot In order Inmy to delineate order in Ishall point I with start chapter of the a brief presentation In what follows, first I shall try to sketch a possible way of interpretation of the Stoic Ɲ idi s ). Unfortunately, pointing out a metaphysicalcan fulfil allthese principle that ). Unfortunately, out pointing ǀ s poion 217,36-218,2 (= ) which inthey are virtue ofhaving one (orseveral) peculiar qualiti(es) SVF II.395 = LS 28I). pneuma 4 Phronesis constituting them. In chapter II, I shall I II, chapter In them. constituting 40 (1995): 91.cf. Simplicius, corporeal principles, On 6 This CEU eTD Collection exist andtherefore Stoic justnot identity the theory of does individuation work. and cannot just principle a such things efficient causally all of corporeality the to commitment incorporeal principle in be cannotidentity matter theiravoided for to an on qualities’ dependence wecanpoint unless the Stoic universe. I shallpneuma concludethe principle, active that qualifying the of dispositions givenrather but object, material the or thematter Stoic ontological depend foridentity their on anythingmaterial nature, thus be of configurationsthey cannot of tobe individuateorder able andidentify to entitiesbe have qualities do suchnotto that in matter andconcludethat and bodies qualify the they qualities’ to relationship regards to with special in III, Ishall of Stoic morethe qualities, understanding In chapter detail consider identity individuationandmake aprinciple and of rather identity a function ofqualification. . In chapter IV, I will show that given that the that given that show will I IV, chapter In . 5 pneuma is itself a material object, material a isitself CEU eTD Collection 175. face value; the theory that can be constructed from the available evidence is contradictory. from can evidence available the be that constructed theory the face value; textual evidence scarce the interpret then and doctrines physical weand haveepistemological on debates Academic on the nature of peculiar qualities.refinement I shall of the point theory. further cancontributeaccount, to out into the of which,taken Stoicthe philosophical doctrine, that, In takenwhat follows,at first I shall give a brief discussion of the Stoic- the otherthe hand. and the reconstruction of Stoic-Academic debates on matters of epistemology and physics on Identity,” David Sedley’s developmental reconstruction of the Stoic theory of identity in his “The Stoic Criterionof 7 of definitions scattered no detailed description of a theory of identity. All the interpretations we have are based on criterion of identity. interpretations, Ishall suggest fora plausible candidate aprinciple individuation of anda modern Finally, by again helpinto consideration theory.will taking acoherent constructing that some emendations to possible I shall point literature, offeredbycontemporary solutions of light the in elaboration, further need that theory the of points the Enumerating have. we and the contradictions that follow from an unreflected interpretationI. What makes anentity peculiarly qualified? of the textual evidence In pointing out the importance of these debates between the Academy and the Stoa, I am mostly relying on relying I ammostly Stoa, the and Academy the between debates ofthese importance out the pointing In Amongst the evidence reporting on Stoic philosophy that was transmitted to us, there is 1.1. Peculiar qualities and their status inStoic philosophy In the present chapter I shall give a detailed description of the Stoic theory of identity, Phronesis 7 Besides this more or less direct evidence, interpretations rely on other tenets other on rely interpretations evidence, less direct more or this Besides 27 (1982) and his commentaries on chapter 28 “The first and second genera” of LS 172- peculiar qualities and peculiarly qualifiedindividuals 6 on the one hand one the on CEU eTD Collection as they want to make sure that if the eggs swap places they would still berecognizable. still would they places swap eggs the if that sure make to want they as Stoics the to interest ofno is property) arelational is (which solution place the eggs, different a occupy eggs the that problem the to indistinguishable oftwo example standard the wetake If foot”.) a lost “having and one-footed” they might have perceptible results, like “having lost a foot”, but clearly there is a difference between“being memberof a football-team”, “having lost a foot”, etc. These properties are typically non-perceptible, althoughproperties I mean predicates that are true of an entity in virtue of its history, e.g. propertiesare identical: like from“having their point been of view historical and relational properties are not interesting. (By historical entities what they would like to recognizable and prove is that there ofdistinguishable are existence no two the of individuals possibility the whosein interested are Stoics the Since however. 9 40E), different objects, are qualitatively exactly identical? exactly qualitatively are objects, different fact,matter of insteadof with isA.B one presented ButwhatifA and B,whilebeing example, one would never give their assent toan impression reporting“This is B”, when, asa give their assent toan impression that does notreport of the facts of the world as they are. For under no circumstances provide us falsewith beliefs. could tothem, assented and as veridical them have recognized we once These impressions, 8 identical albeit numericallyidenticalby albeit havethen animpression,one could broughtabout distinct) based feature onwhichonecould perceptible if(i.e. tell them A apart and Barequalitatively seeing it andis assent Even supposed to if to. reproducedevery impression detail minute one’s A when of of B when one proposition of mental the truth the guarantee to is” insufficient is “what with encounteringaccordance is” exact with “what even is”) of or “whatreporting with accordance is” exact with “what it, if A andpossible report not having of impressions impression the will (i.e. cognitive are either B are exactly alike and there is no katel by impressions thataffirming such impressions wecanhave (cognitive - have trustworthy,how reliable beliefsabout things arein world.the They supported this view can each of us believed that infallible knowledge.They of possibility the doctrine concerning epistemological on their attacks Academic answer the had to Stoics The Academy. sceptical The terms of qualitative and numerical identity have to be used with some amendments in the Stoic context, DL VII.46 9 (=LS 40C), Cicero Ɲ But if such impressions are possible, then, under ideal circumstances one wouldnever The Stoic theory of identity was shaped by two debates between the Stoa andthe Stoa the between debates by two shaped was identity of theory Stoic The ptikai ) that report “of what is” and are formed in exact accordance with “what is” “what with accordance in formed “of is”report exact andare what ) that Academica II.77-8 (=LS 40D), Sextus 7 9 As the Academics argued, in cases As some Academics argued, the Against the Professors, Against intrinsic , perceptible XI.183 (=LS phantasiai qualities 8 . CEU eTD Collection 16 1077C (=LS 28O, part) respectively. qualities based on which one could differentiate between them). between differentiate could one which based on qualities perceptible intrinsic, had all entities that (i.e. distinctness qualitative to reducible not were that cases of nonumerical distinctness were affirm there to Academy that was by theSceptical posed answer challenge the forway them to One wereexcluded. such cases that make certain 15 of Categories,” Theory 14 13 epistemological theory that has an immediate relevance to the subject-matter. metaphysical and not the epistemological aspect of identity, Iwill only concentrate on the aspect of 12 2.83-5 (=LS 40J) Academicsolution [another challenge,] Growing Argument.” the to be in substances.for qualifiedobjectto and onepeculiarly two substance in one be to objects qualified peculiarly two for impossible both was it that held they qualified: peculiarly being of function is a distinct numerically being that affirmed have of infallible cognition. mistakenly it identifies as something someone or casting elsearealsoon doubt possibility the or entity an recognize not caseswhen does someone context: inproblem adiachronic subjects they should have been predicated of, these processes were essentially impossible. As impossible. essentially of,were processes these have beenpredicated theyshould subjects very the they destroyed by place taking given that argument, the to according as, changes material said of possibility the questioned also it time same the At changes. constitutional due question material puzzleintoto bringing persistence of the objects, their constant 11 ed. Keimpe Algra, JonathanBarnes, Jaap Mansfeld andMalcolmSchofield (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 302-304. in Epistemology,” “Stoic Frede, See Michael theory. Stoic the 10 the object, existing Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 265. Philo, Where substance is apparently understood as a portion of matter, cf. LS 172, cf. and Lewis, Stephen “The Menn,Stoics “The on Identity,”Stoic 90-91. This account of Stoic epistemological theory is overly simplistic. Nevertheless as my thesis deals with the cf. Sextus Empiricus, Sextus cf. Whether “what is” i.e. the cause of cognitive impressions is an object or astate of affairs is left ambiguous by fact Clearly, if they wanted to maintain the possibility of reliable beliefs, the Stoics had to As Sedley points out this solution was already “available to them in the form of their of form inthe them to “available already was solution this out points Sedley As On the Indestructibility of the which object is A and which one is B. is one which A and is object which 10 in exact concordance with how that object is, but still not be able to grasp Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Against theProfessors 12 World 48 (= , 7.402-10 (=LS 40H), Cicero SVF II.397 = LS 28 P) and Plutarch, 8 11 The problem of identification also poses a 17(1999): 221-222 The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 15 Academica 13 Indeed, we know that they 16 This argument was a , 2.57 (=LS 40I), id. On common conceptions 14 CEU eTD Collection 466-467, Lewis, “The Stoics on Identity,”93-95. 21 20 peculiar toan individual, e.g. Diogenes, Socrates.” (DL VII.58) aquality expressing of speech apart is a name whereas orhorse; man e.g. quality, acommon signifying sentence pros 19 little evidence as to how they ground the individuality of entities. how they the individuality ground those of little evidenceasto features), characteristic of each individual such as a hooked nose or baldness. nose or such as ahooked individual of each characteristic features), Categories testimony on are,what peculiar qualities from comes Aristotle’sDexippus’ commentary on common qualities ( qualities common reasons. for obvious bymodern commentators has been rejected qualification interpretation peculiar of 18 17 ( peculiarqualities about weknow all debates, qualities areboth criteria identity of and ofindividuation). principles peculiar (I.e. andpersistbybeingpeculiarly areidentified proclaimed objects qualified. that qualitative distinctness and recognisability was bolstered by a metaphysical also that theory butrather of them being peculiarly qualified. objectsis unstable, not because theiridentity isa function not of theirmaterial constitution compelled counter to argumentthe and they soby did outthat identity pointing the material of felt Stoics the Stoicphilosophy, natural to was aprocesscentral asgrowth Sedley argues, themselves they could accountfor the perceptibleuniqueness of an entity. a certainsuch inbelonging natural usually to kind) not qualitiesthat (e.g. are and of are indispensablefor the entity’s persistence. On the other hand, typical instances of essential be they havepeculiar persist, to factthat the Provided qualities change, and such a change ishardly of kindaffectingthe theidentity of individual.the cf. Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 261, T.H. Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” Dexippus, Diogenes, reporting on the linguistic theory of Diogenes of Babylon, contrasts common nouns (or appellatives, (or nouns common contrasts Babylon, of Diogenes of theory linguistic the on reporting Diogenes, ibid. 266. cf. Simplicius, Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 258-261. Ɲ goria Besides the indirect evidence from the Stoic position taken in the above mentioned above the in taken position Stoic the from evidence indirect the Besides 21 in Greek Being bald or having a hooked noseare Being havingbald ahooked or of an individualtypically features thatcan , which presents peculiar qualities as unique, perceptible features (or asetof (or features perceptible asunique, qualities peculiar presents , which On Aristotle’s Categories ) with names ( koin On Aristotle’s on the Soul Ɲ poiot onoma Ɲ 30,20-6 (=LS 28J) s) by being specific to individual entities, but we have very have we but entities, individual to specific being by ). “A common noun or appellative is defined by Diogenes as part of a , 217, 36- 218,2 (= 17 9 Thus, the epistemological theory of perceptible idia poiot idia Ɲ SVF s ) isthat they are differentfrom Philosophical Perspectives II.395 =LS 28I) essential qualities 18 19 The only actual , such that such , 10 (1996): 20 This CEU eTD Collection epistemological doctrine and the metaphysical requirements themselves, is a central feature of feature is acentral themselves, requirements metaphysical the and doctrine epistemological the by theory metaphysical the on imposed demands the between differentiation by canbemade senseof of qualities nature thatthe contradictory peculiar a Recognizing of identity criterion and individuation between synchronic and diachronic identity criteria on the epistemological level; it is it level; sufficient if they are the same on a metaphysical level.epistemological the on criteria identity diachronic and synchronic between be a neednot correspondence there itsA hasqualification isof peculiar object a function guarantee object A’s identificability t at times objectA’s identificability guarantee a time t Cat from object A’sdistinguishability makesobject that for feature qualitative makes for object A’s distinguishability from object B at a time t a time B at object from A’s distinguishability object for makes distinguishability.Also,as faris asepistemology perceptible concerned, the quality that and recognisability entity’s the for accounts that manifestation visible a has principle that and the persistence of entities based on the same metaphysical principle, and tomake sure that concerned it is sufficient isAs level. farasmetaphysics on epistemological objects the met forpeculiarly qualified for the theory to be able be isto condition only way” inthis unique aperceptible meannot “beingqualitatively need to account for the numerical distinctness principle that is nota function of material constitution. be with indiscord metaphysical condition: essential, an inherentanother being unchangeable, tobolsterorder theStoic doctrine qualitative of perceptible the uniqueness of entities seems to in meet identity to has of criterion the conditions the that is apparent It peculiar qualities. uniqueness,highlighted by Dexippus’ evidence isa chief problem for aninterpretation of 1.2. Grounding identity – the What is important to see however, is that on a metaphysical level, peculiarly qualified peculiarly level, ametaphysical on is that however, see to important is What qualitative supposedperceptible the and thebetween supposedpersistence This conflict pneuma 10 0 and t as a possible principle of 1 . Insofar asthe perceptible quality that 0 need not be the same be the not need 1 or CEU eTD Collection for being both beingfor a criterion both identity and a in individuation, of of principle such all this a way criteria aforementioned metthe could have have inmindthat specific anything Stoics not did on resultsthe ofmodern biology) reallynot does help usin interpreting their Butif theory. the contingent (entirely a possibility such Stoics, the to available were fingerprints of that neither 23 identify individual. to an sufficient also and aregeneticallydetermined latter butimmanentDNA has alsoa unique and fingerprints. perceptible manifestation: our These and persistent asheargues,thetime. uniqueguaranteeing Moreover, through their persistence and person a individuating both for sufficient is such as and unique, and essential is which such and is idea. Ifwe unique not a farfetched it, DNA think the of is a we allhave property thatarepersisting has features identity correspondingmetaphysical that criterion perceptible of a tenet Stoic the that illustrates that science by contemporary provided example couldbeen havecriterion the identity of principleindividuation, of and the but heoffers an to. existence their owe they that principle and metaphysical features the perceptible the between canbemade unique distinction unique perceptible features of an individual might only be perceivable to the trained eye (or ears, mouth, fingers, mouth, ears, (or eye trained etc.) the of to the Stoic sage. be perceivable cf. only Cicero,might individual of an features perceptible unique in Algra, Epistemology,” “Stoic Frede, cf. concepts, certain fortunate external circumstances but also a certain mindset onthe part of individualthe only presuppose (i.e. the not knowledge does of cognition that fact the given Now, circumstances. unfortunate under even entities, would always have cognitive impressions. It would be only him who would recognize the real everyoneidentity can (andof do sometimes) have cognitive impressions, strictly speaking it is only the Stoic wise man who 22 example) onesin the Dexippus’ (like features physical immediately perceptible include just more uniquenesscanbe than asto notion qualitative relaxed perceptible of peculiar bymaking quality the following emendations Stoic tothe theory identity:of (1)the (David Irwin Sedley,T.H. andEric possibleinterpretations Lewis),offer of notion the of discussing identity. issue the authors StoicThe of of the theory discussions contemporary Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 266. The notion of unique perceptible features can be quite broad, given the fact that although the Stoics argued that argued Stoics the although that fact the given broad, be quite can features perceptible of unique notion The Now, there is only one problem with this suggestion. Neither the concept of DNA, As to Sedley, an As to nothe reallyentities) entity in does (or that pinpoint universe Stoic the Academica , 2.57 (= LS 40I) 11 The Cambridge History, 307) it is possible that the 23 22 , (2) a CEU eTD Collection II.311= LS 44C) Calcidius 292 and 293 (= 26 everything in the world: it unifies things, differentiates them and at the same time is their life principle. 25 Mixture universe, they too are constituted of a piece of matter and a portion of andaportion of matter the of are constituted of a piece too universe, they by principle. active the differentiated ( 24 behaviour of the individual. Also, it is a modification of the having its very own qualitatively and unique perceptible features aremanifestthat in the as of beconceived can soul the as insofar justified, well is perfectly idea This individual. soul the the of Stoic philosophers: availableto readily a concept qualifiedwith peculiarly the for persistence. their ifodd hadthey only butavague idea ofsome individuals quality individuates makes and that would be of It in rather of several evidence. pieces theirtextual feature philosophy, appearing Clearly, must Stoics by“peculiarhave meantsomething the is asit quality” a ubiquitous on firm grounds. Or at least it is not powerful enough to fend off the Academic arguments. stand not does theory their then possible, andindividuation infalliblemakes recognition that the active principle (fire, principle active the same time. at the objects anddifferentiates of universe,unifies the object and every each permeating principle, ousia DLVII.134 (= The Nemesius 70,6-71,4 (= LS 47J) Galen, pneuma As opposed to David Sedley, Eric Lewis and T.H. Irwin The1.2.1. offer soulbeing thepeculiarlyqualified a solution that identifies The conceivedlivingStoics the universeasanintelligent madebeing, upofmatter and or 224,14-17 (= hul is a mixture of fire and air (the two active elements) a “warm breath” that interpenetrates that breath” a“warm elements) active two (the air and offire amixture is SVF Ɲ ) in itself is andit amorphous is qualitiless, together, moved kept and 24 II.300, part II. 299= LS 44B) Sextus Empiricus SVF II.442, part =LS 47I) logos or god, or on Chrysippeanthe analysis, oron god, or On bodily mass SVF I.88, part = LS 44D and LS 44E, respectively) 26 Individual objects reflect the composition of the 12 7.525,0-14 (= , Against the Professors SVF II.439 =LS 47F), Alexander, pneuma, which, asthe active pneuma pneuma 9.75-6 (= 9.75-6 and it is in it and 25 ). Matter ). SVF On CEU eTD Collection Long, “Stoic Psychology,” in Algra, 100, David Sedley, “Stoic Physics and Metaphysics,” in Algra, 31 Algra, Anthony A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism,” and the soul. Philo, 30 LS 39E). individual, the e.g. psychology,” in Algra, in psychology,” II.458,part = LS 47Q) Origen, differentiated kinds. psychic functions. phusis entities (e.g. animals have a animals (e.g. entities 29 214,24-37 (=LS 28M). formation. soul graduallythrough addition which theseconcept also havearational develops to their own principle of life and growth ( its unity its unity qualification. and common having aunifying tenor ( exist by separation(like an army), by contact (such as a ship), and unified objects which are unified in virtue 28 of http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/. object of objects. Whereas inanimate things are only held together by together held Whereas things areonly of inanimate objects. Philosophy will see this is also an opinion Irwin endorses. Dirk Baltzly. "Stoicism" in Baltzly notes that the pneuma actually has the same role as the substantial form inAristotle’s philosophy. As we have qualities. and thatthey latter are unified of the virtue of the of modification a specific be should it that approaches) modern with also and theory Aristotelian functions of the This differentiation is a function of the intensity of the tensional motioncharacterising the portionof Asa passage by Philo suggests, an animal’s body is both united “externally and internally” by “its owntenor” Philo, The Stoics differentiate betweendifferent levels of unity in objects: they distinguish betweenobjects which The Cambridge History, The soul is a special kind of 28 accounts for its vegetative functions and the cohesion of its body and its and body its of cohesion the and functions vegetative its for accounts pneuma Allegories of theLaws is by unified (Winter 2010 Edition). 29 The different kinds of , namely the soul ( soul the namely , Questions and answers on Genesis pneuma 30 The Cambridge History TheCambridge hexis It is not the case thatmore differentiated kinds of 31 hexis pneuma in an animal keeps together its lifeless parts (bones and sinews), its ), a certain disposition of the On principles that led modern commentators believe (besides an analogy with analogy an (besides believe commentators modern led that 2.22-23(= 563-564. hexis ed. , there are different kinds of The Cambridge History, Edward N. Zalta, Last modified Mon Oct 4, 2010, psuch , a pneuma pneuma SVF 3.1.2-3 (=LS 53A), DLVII.86 (quoted by “StoicLong, phusis II.458, part = LS 47P ), Ɲ , 564) and DL VII.138-9 (=LS 47O) Aetius 4.11.1-4 (= phusis ) that can make the entity the make can that ) Phronesis , characteristic of Although, characteristic animals. every existing are present together also in more differentiated the also together arepresent and a soul) making for different functions of the of functions different for making soul) a and 2.4. ( 13 ), animals have a soul ( 27 (1982): 38-45 and Long “Stoic Psychology,”in pneuma SVF 565-566 cf.Lewis, “The Stoics on Identity,”99- The Cambridge History, II.802 = LS 47R) For the same point see . Simplicius, pneuma 27 On God’s Immutability Itis and qualifying these unifying The Stanford Encyclopedia of hexis pertaining to different pertaining to kinds peculiarly On Aristotle’s , unensouled plants have , unensouled plants psuch pneuma 389. Ɲ qualified beyond ) andhumans, in Categories 35-6 ( subsume less subsume psuch SVF SVF pneuma Ɲ for its II.83= CEU eTD Collection 32 hexis unifiedbya things are respectively) examples are other (the and an army separation aship levelsWhereas or havingdifferentobjects of areonly things unity. bycontact some unified Aristotle’s on commentary from Simplicius’ “fully” “merely” basedonan things, between and excerpt qualified identity and aprinciple ofindividuation. that the peculiar quality is above all a principle of unity andwere propounded by Lewis,Eric and(5)isonly supported by both of them. derivatively a criterion (3)and(4) Irwin’s whereas reconstruction, T.H. and (2)constitute (1) arguments, enumerated of and this qualification is a result of an essential, persisting disposition. From the above (5) By means of psychic the soulsqualities, ofindividuals qualify inthem aperceptible way, identity. diachronic of criterion isa soul the thus it: for condition necessary is a and individual the of existence the with coextensive temporally is existence soul’s The (4) individuation. opposed tootherkinds of opposed essential property of animals, thus it should be definitive for their persistence. (3) The soul (as principle ofindividuation. (2)As soul the is a characteristic feature of animalsitis only, an (and also responsiblefor their qualities) therefore, it should be the criterion of identity and the for (1)Theis animals a of unity soul following the statements.: principle organised around by consideration which issupported author,is butitseveral arguments from to author differ This persistence. and individuality for their makes that creatures is of it soul the that claim also they animals of case in the Moreover, beings. inanimate of identity the of problem Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 470. (the form of the The crux of Irwin’s argument foridentifying the peculiarly qualified with the Modern commentators, mostly focusing on the issue of pneuma Categories pneuma responsible for the cohesion of entities). Both kinds of entities is non-circularly inidividuable, thus it is a principle of a principle is it thus inidividuable, non-circularly is . Simplicius discusses the Stoic differentiation between Stoic differentiation the discusses . Simplicius 32 He draws this conclusion from differentiating 14 personal identity, ignore the ignore identity, pneuma is CEU eTD Collection 38 peculiar qualities apply to (or are) particular individuals (cf. DL VII.58). species” establishing is a connection with an other passage of Diogenes, no thatI has have already that “aspecies quoted stating that and qualities ofpeculiar equation onhis base can Irwin that thing only The context. as Socrates.” (DL VII. 61, Irwin’s translation) It to behas noted that peculiarqualities are not mentioned in this derivatively be andindividuation is of also aprinciple It ofidentity, acriterion erroneous. must unity of a principle that assumption His time. same the at differentiation and unity being ( in genus, the as man is included in animal. The most generic is the thing that being a genus has nogenus, such as statement based on the fact that the From this he infers that the 37 36 humans must be kindthis of humankind of and characteristic only feature anspecific isa soul essentiala (rational) having As belongs. individual part of being human,qualities he concludes have tothat reflect the peculiar the characteristics quality of of the species to which persistence”. of principles and distinctness of the principles derivatively and unity, peculiarly qualified time”. through persistence and a time at distinctness both of basis is the a time at “unity that view the Stoics drawingLocke aparallel with 35 34 toan peculiar correspond takes that qualities the portion of be a also must quality peculiar thatthe concludes of inwhich entities arequalifiedthe andunified: respect 33 unified by a isitinsofar of can asqualities bepredicated can bebut them, only entities the qualified, Ibid. 470-471. Ibid. Here Irwin relies on the following passage by Diogenes Laertius: “The species ( species “The Laertius: by Diogenes passage following the on relies Irwin Here Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Irwin quotes Locke’s 470. Individuals,” “Stoic Irwin Simplicius, hoion to on There are several Hemakes There areseveral identity analysis. anunfoundedIrwin’s with problems From this passage Irwin concludes that in the case of in is it theFrom same things caseof concludesthat the passageIrwin this things unified As the As On Aristotle’s hexis hexis 35 , my addition, M.Ny.). The most specific is the thing that being a species has no species, such Thus it,as he puts peculiar should qualities be“fundamentally of principles that are that qualified in virtue of unifying “fully qualified” entities is a unifying “fullyqualified” of portion entities the Categories 214,24-37 (=LS 28M) cf.footnote 28. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding hexis pneuma 34 (and also with an interpretation of Aristotle), attributing to the to attributing Aristotle), of interpretation an with also (and is the entity’s peculiar quality. He establishes this point by pneuma specific to them. present in an entity is responsible for the object’s the for isresponsible entity in an present 15 having infima species, infima 38 aquality. hexis II. 27.5. 37 33 binding the entity together. entity the binding pneuma he concludes that peculiar that he concludes eidos . Moreover, since he since Moreover, . ) is what is included 36 pneuma , Irwin CEU eTD Collection stresses that these tenors, are marks of a genus, not of individuals. cf. LS 289. enumerated qualities in both The examples reason.” are other some not for unique change (although easy to is it they frequently might but be persistent) concerned; are terms and Simplicius defining actual its actually mark of their genus, though to slighta and relaxed extent, and their tenor persists in asingle conditionso far as which they are specified, by feature the in such defective as are sourgenerically wine, bitter qualified are which almonds, things many that Molossian truth ageneral is It and Maltese easily. change dogs. These all carry the holding to the earth, so tenor samethe has meaning in things which change with of difficulty feature inand those common which single the have but degrees different in rooted are roots with things as Just amark. and part, =LS 47S) “So tenors, forthem are not specified by their durationorstrength, but by a certain peculiarity point of pointof view of epistemology Stoic theiridentifying role isalso questionable). also qualify individuals in a general way, although they cannot individuate them (and from the can they and unity of principles be well very can qualities Common individuals. unifies that Also, from the point of view of qualities: it need not be the case that it is the peculiar quality stone density and in silver whiteness.” and Simplicius, responsible for the quality of each of the bodies which are sustained by tenor; inthat irontenors this are qualitynothing butis currentshardness, inof air: ‘It is by these that bodies are sustained. The sustaining air is way of grounding entities’ individuality and identity. a non-circular for looking is if one sufficient is not this but a lifetime, for persists also that pneuma identified with rationalthe soul of individual,the just doesnot stand. pointpeculiar that qualities need tobeandin fact are“unifying be qualities” and thus need to qualified, or that it is its Self-contradictions isit the exclude rather that cannot the same time need not be an entity’s peculiar quality. 40 39 the differentmodifications of the say that all these functions are performed solely by the (rational) soul, as we have seen that all entities that it are qualified, unitedwould both and(peculiarly) conclusions be to to jumping not sufficient ground its individuality to identity).(and but thisbe: is ofbeing inof anatural be not somethingkind, needa unity token virtue can In support of the view that common qualities are sufficient to unify and qualify Lowe, things cf. see Plutarch, What is more, he does not account in any way for the individuation and identity of the of identity and individuation the for way in any account not he does more, is What Furthermore, whileis itit true that is invirtue havingof aportion of , I gather that he stipulates that each animate creature has a numerically distinct soul hasdistinct anumerically creature each animate he that stipulates gather that , I The Possibility of Metaphysics 1053F-1054B (= hexis or SVF phusis pneuma II.449 = LS 47M) “In his books hexis , 60-63, 201. that unifies it, but it thatunifiesit,butis byitspeculiarly soul.qualified or the or are co-present in animated beings. On this basis basis we On this beings. in animated areco-present On Aristotle’s Categories 16 phusis of the individual that makes it peculiarly it makes that individual the of 39 What entitiesat qualifies andunifies On tenors 237,25-238-20.(= he [Chrysippus] he again says pneuma 40 So Irwin’s SVF On Stoic in them II.393 CEU eTD Collection 45 44 43 CambridgeCompanion to Stoics,the Identity,”97. 7.234 = LS 53F, Calcidius 220 = LS 53G, Nemesius 78,7-79,2= LS 45D, quoted by Lewis, Stoics “The on = does not separate from from body separate not the does individualstatement (a)by long lives the of thinkersstatingevidence Stoic that ashissoul as existence. into come has soul his before exist not does individual the (b) that supports his statement by showing that (a) the soul persists aslong as the individual does, and persistencethe for necessary is soul a having of since that is animateestablish to he attempts What individual. the of beings, it is the soul that is the criteriondifferentways willbe disposeddifferently and thus they will be qualitatively unique. of identity for animals.animate beingsHe can evertwo no sametime, at the position spatial same the occupy entitiesever can Astwo no soul. have the exact same impressions. Their corporeal souls, altered in possibility that the the same mental contents. On the Stoic view impressions ( viewimpressions On Stoic the contents. samemental the given theory Stoic the perceptionjust itof be cannot individuals possible that two everhave individuality from uniquenessthe of mental contents the individualthe has.As he argues, having of aparticularvirtue of combination 42 soul. of the individuation of the account possible criteria of identity are not convincing, but for the moment I shall disregard this and concentrate on his 41 of combination of While heindividuated. thatentities accepts arequalifiedinvirtue of having a particular kind One ofhis main isarguments thatasopposed to otherthe kinds of TheStoic definition of deathbeing the soul’s separationof body,the SextusEmpiricus Lewis, „The Stoics on Identity,” 97-99. Lewis, Stoics „The onIdentity,”107-108. Oron the Chrysippean account, alterations ( Lewis, “The Stoics onIdentity,” 100. His arguments to exclude the SVF I.58, VII 227-30, VII 372-3 = Lewis’s other main argument concerns the soul’s role in accounting for thepersistence in soul’s the role accounting concerns main argument Lewis’s other He constructsa very ingenuous theory for individuating the soul, deriving its Lewis has different arguments in favour of the soul as a candidate for quality. peculiar of as acandidate soul infavour the arguments different Lewis has hexis hexis, phusis hexis, or the or SVF phusis ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 62. 45 and and that the individual survives as their soul as long as their II.56. (quoted by Robert J. Hankinson “Stoic Epistemology,” In of individualthe could have individuating powers. psuch heteroi Ɲ ǀ , and individual that entities are in individuated sis 17 ) cf. SextusEmpiricus, hexis, phusis hexis phantasiai and and phusis Against theProfessors Against pneuma psuch ) are imprints ) are of an individual as Against theProfessors Ɲ , he refuses the he refuses , , the soul , the can be 44 Hesupports 43 42 VII.230 on the on 41 The CEU eTD Collection 49 Cosmology 48 47 with providewith not existencethe of soul’s individual,the any Lewisdoes for evidence (which would be question-begging). uniqueness of soul the derivingor from itbeing the soul of a peculiarly individualqualified numerical the stipulating just either without way, inanon-circular individuality soul’s were present in the seed, the embryo and the grown-up adult are not relevant for its identity. that first traits character the that prove individual, shouldconvincingly existence of one the able to confirm that the Stoicsbe to in the embryo. plant-like its Inorder already mightbe identity)present are grounding were sortal essentialists and seed from the soul that the soul is necessary for the just in their physical properties but also in their character traits, character in their also but properties physical in their just not parents after their takes offspring the since transmitted, genetically are psychic qualities that affirmed Stoics Considering the that not. factthat they did the supports rather ontogenesis have evidenceno thathave they espousedsuchatheory. their If of doctrine anything, of the individual presupposes some kind of sortal essentialism on the part of the Stoics, but we statement (b). His inference that the formation of the soul is a necessary condition for the birth exists, since no animal exists at all.” 46 air. (notably meeting cold the of effectoutside factors birth upon upon the under environmental a soul develop only and stage, embryonic inthe life-form aplant-like as exist animals that stating ontogenesis, of theory from Stoic the it(b), hederives statement As to soul persists. Hierocles Tertullian, Lewis, “The Stoics on Identity,” 99. Hierocles, 46 As he argues, it is clear from this that “Prior to being ensouled no individual animal individual no ensouled being to “Prior that this from is clear it he argues, As Still, besides trying to demonstrate that the soul’s existence is temporally coextensive is temporally existence soul’s the that demonstrate to trying besides Still, the for account can he that Irwin’s over advantage genuine the has analysis Lewis’s Although his arguments for statement (a) are completely justifiable, I have doubts about , (Ohio State University Press, 1977), 4. Elements of Ethics, Elements of Ethics On the Soul 49 we can suppose that the defining character traits of the individual of the (that traits definingthe character that wecansuppose c.5. (= , 1.5-33, 4.38-53 (=LS 53B), Plutarch, ibid. SVF I.518), cf. I.518), 47 SVF 2.792, Quoted by David Hahm, E. 18 On Stoic self-contradictions 48 and that they derived the The Origins of Stoic , 1052F. CEU eTD Collection the person: the their virtues, behaviourtheir andlife. their way of infeatures of account forofthe virtue distinguishability the individual the psychicunique of individualitythe of animatebeing.the Thisindividuality can bemade perceptible and thus soul the might beindividuable its basedmental on unique contents and thuscan for account time. over individual intuitive exactly thatcangroundthe persistence aprinciple, beyondthe our of convictions puzzles aboutthe problem material of constitution and identity. What wearelookingis for metaphysical of host a exist there still life, one’s throughout body same the numerically have not does one that doubt also would we is concerned intuition as far As intuitively. true 51 50 distinguishable and re-identifiable. Theindistinguishability inanimateof entities poses a clear is it identity, that of theory a theyestablishing for wantedmotivations epistemological totheir maintainconsider we if that all kinds Stoics. tothe First, such beattributed view that a could Idoubt Nevertheless, unprecedented. of entities, whetherthat does ensoulednot ascribe definite identity conditions to some kinds of orindividuals not,is not havepower of the to be individuation of inanimate beings. the of problem the mention to not way, in any for answered not is individuals of persistence believe otherwise.” to thesis we havelives, numerically samesoul it our throughout the yet bizarre beauniquely would “Wematter which isthat: that text no have claims he on the All time. over says persistence Lewis, “The Stoics on Identity,” 91-92, Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 471. Lewis,“The Stoics on Identity,” 97. It seems like all we could establish, based on the analysis of Irwin and Lewis is that This latter isThis latter indeedindividuating aserious we limit If problem. identifying and the pneuma to the soul, then plants, sticks and stones cannotbe individuated. A view 50 But this statement does just not stand, even if it seems to be 19 51 But on this account the account this on But CEU eTD Collection specify what makes that portion makesportion of that specify what However, forHowever, the moment issue putthisinvestigate aside Ishall whetherand makingthe inits waythanstipulation. anyother either,account for persistence uniqueness andIcannot peculiarly qualified in function portionof the of are entities that say rather should we Instead, modified. slightly be should account this soul, as to what concerns Irwin’smetaphysical However, inherentprinciple. numerically forunique, byapersistent, accounted and Lewis’ suggestion idea, namely important beindividuals perceptible of should uniqueness the qualitative that that this a very principle out pointed interpretations All modifications. some with shouldIrwin and Lewis Sedley, be the entity’s not individuation does accountjust of work. Otherwise thisderivative from various then perspectives, again, the identity of impressorsthe should be determined. byimpressions from objects various has itindividuated experiencing received different the of things. havenot fixed identity,safely Stoics a the affirm cannot trans-worldthe sorts identity of any a causal ischain affect likely theto identity of other elements,any thus if inanimate things do of element any of identity the in A change world. each in place take things how in role causal of individuals preserve placetake by ineachensure populated individuals,world, had all they that same the to kinds their identities. Inanimate entities, besides animate ones also play a 52 ones. animate of indistinguishability problem asseriousjust for Stoicthe doctrine of cognitive impressions asthe This point has beenbrought to my attentionby GáborBetegh. Taking all this into consideration, I would suggest to accept the accounts providedby My third point concerns Lewis’ account of the uniqueness of the soul. If the soul is Second, provided the cyclic worldview of the Stoics, and their idea that the sameidea the events that andtheir Stoics, the of worldview cyclic provided the Second, 52 pneuma 20 unique,besides stipulating its numerical pneuma in them. At this point I cannot really cannot I point At this in them. CEU eTD Collection in the framework of in Stoic metaphysics. framework the pneuma a principle of individuation and a criterion of identity is a justifiable theoretical move theoretical justifiable a is identity of criterion a and individuation of aprinciple 21 CEU eTD Collection matter they are made of is constantly changing. constantly ofis made are they matter “The Stoic Criterion,” 255) Material objects are unstable things that do not really exist, given the fact thatputs it,the this versionof the argument Sedley is As meant to debt. illustrate else’s thesomeone repay to “radicalbe expected instability cannot thus and of money physicalthe the borrowed who world.”has (Sedley,individual the not is he before, day the since changed has matter composing his that fact the provided that creditor argument appears in a comic setting: a debtorwho is not in the position to repay his debt tries to convince his 53 In changing. is made of constantly they are matter the factthat the given time, through persist Argument (GA). According to the argument Growing the retaliate needed to they that was qualification peculiar of function a identity 2.1. TheGrowingArgument Theon. and Dion mysupport for interpretation byprovidingan thesis concerning thoughtexperimentthe of account for identity cannot constitution material why present shall I or follows what individuationIn other. each from different on the Stoic view, thenqualities matter makeand up andinan object, what sense are these principlestwo similarI and will give some further textualforhow do important understanding isalso of ontological the objects structure particular in matter of role the clarifying Second, limitations. theoretical its on light sheds it time same behind the Stoic doctrine reveals the conditions their identity theory has to satisfy, while at the motivations First, the understanding accounts. several on theory Stoic understandingthe of material Such inquiry between isand identity. qualification an forconstitution, crucial abetter ofindividuation principle II. Material constitution cannot be acriterion of identity or a The GA was a philosophical puzzle first propounded by the comedy-writer Epicharmus. In his formulation, the formulation, In his Epicharmus. comedy-writer by the propounded first puzzle philosophical a was GA The As we have seen earlier, one of the reasons why the Stoics developed a theory that made of relationship the treatment more Stoic the indepth Ishallinvestigate In thischapter 53 22 material objects are unstable things that cannot material are that things unstable objects CEU eTD Collection 56 is, orit it from it it grows subtracted (that or isaddedto aparticle identity time every its changes object a material If in (c). is formulated it diminution, and growth of processes the ever-changing identity of material objects is presented in (b). As to the attack on the reality of its the conclusion identity. concerning This and thereby object, material the the of constitution receive particles, theiridentity is unstable, for the arrival and departure of particles changes composition”. its material function of is“strict a identity object’s a physical is that argument, isasfollows: version Plutarch’s Stoics. to the heattributes solution gives the he also where byPlutarchversion with we arepresented inhis argumentthe of 55 54 of as incoherent” nature of a process. growth “philosophically the demonstrating interest added with the was reiterated argument the material objects, of existence identity and fleeting the concerning point previous the besides debate, of Stoic-Academic the context the Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,”255-256. John Plutarch, The assumption, characteristic of both formulations of the GA, but not included in the included not but GA, the of formulations both of characteristic assumption, The Bowin,“Chrysippus’ Puzzle about Identity,” of abody which serves asa substrate and persists. affections are diminishing and growing whereas else, something into is it what from rather they should calledbe generation and destruction, since they transform the thing (c) the prevailing convention is wrong to call these processes of growth and decay: transformed; be to substance the cause remain butbecomethe same different asthe aforementioned arrivals and departures not do from subtracted or to added are these which quantities and numbers the (b) themselves and receiving others which reach them from elsewhere; (a) All particularsubstances are in flux andmotion, releasing some things from On common conceptions, 56 But, since physical objects are in constant flux and motion as they release and 1083A-1084A (=LS 28A) Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23 55 On CommonConceptions , 24 (2003): 241. 54 This is the , CEU eTD Collection 62 Motion Philosophy 61 60 1083A-1084A) whereas Irwin translates it as„subject”“Stoic (Irwin, Individuals,” 459). 59 Papyrus 3008 (=LS 28 C) Stobaeus, 24,4 (= (even contradictory) descriptions of it, while, at the same time preserving its unity. sametimethe preserving it, while,at of descriptions (even contradictory) the Stoics differentiated between two further levels of existence under which objects canbe objects which under levels furtherexistence of two between Stoicsdifferentiated the qua object describesthe substrate material 58 57 different under individual the in viewing consists is because its persistence changes, amatter of peculiarhaving qualities. individual itself) and survives kinds andallother material growth diminution through of the (basically substrate qualified the constitution, in material survive achange not does substrates) (or subjects different between differentiated They identity. is constitution material that assumption by rejectingthe argumentthe answered theStoics that know diminishes), thevery is notion then “philosophically incoherent”.of growth rendered changes. differentkinds susceptible of thus persistence to havingobject, and criteria, different because is the subject of such apredication elusive. be (or diminution) predicated stage growth of cannot Thus, growingthe anything, process. is different from the body we get as an end process beginning the growing the of at body nosuch thing:the is Butclearly there persists”. result, or for that matter, from the bodiesorder for growth to exist asa process,at there shouldany be “abody which serves as a substrate and Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 258-259. Cf. Irwin “Stoic Individuals”, 459-462, Inna Kupreeva ,“Qualities and Bodies,” and ,“Qualities Kupreeva Inna 459-462, Individuals”, “Stoic Irwin Cf. Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 459-461. The Greek word is word Greek The Plutarch, Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 257. apeculiarly thematerial individual. qualifiedand the qualified Besides aspectof objects, According to most interpretations Based on the evidence , SVF ( Cornell UP: New 1988),87.York, 60 II.374.) (quoted by Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 461.), Anonymous Academic treatise, Oxyrhynchus 25 (2003): 297-298, 302, Sedley, Stoic “The Criterion,” 258-259, Richard Sorabji, Whereas the material substrate, whose identity identity is Whereas whose byits parts defined thematerial constitutive substrate, On common conceptions hupokeimenon LS translates it as „substrate” (LS 28A = Plutarch, = 28A (LS „substrate” as it translates LS Ecl 58 1083A-1084A (=LS 28A), Dexippus, reporting on discussions of processes of material change, we . I.178.10- 179.5 = Posidonius,fr.96 = LS28D). qua 61 , the differentiation between the two substrates two the between differentiation the , a lump of matter, whereas the qualified substrate whereasthequalified matter, alump of 24 aspects , thus being able to provide being , thus able to different On Aristotle’s Categories OxfordStudies in Ancient On common conceptions Matter, Space and , 23,25- 57 59 For in For 62 inthe The CEU eTD Collection this is how Sedley seems to understand it in his “Stoic Criterion,” 270. 65 On Aristotle’s Categories constitution were the sole way to determine identity,determine sole way were the to constitution all the other premises (implicitfunction of material constitution, shows that they found the argument conclusive orand accepted explicit) that thatit comprises. the Stoics They admittedchose thatto refute the argument, by rejecting the assumption that identity is a 64 Plutarch, four.” us of each make they or rather, of us; each to attribute they that substrates four itis since account, their simplifying am “I genera. second the and first the with bematched indeed can substrate qualified and material the that suggests context means matter. Also, Plutarch mentions that besides the two substrates there are other two as well, which object’sthe matter,but rather the object “ as a ‘this’ or more generally, possible threat to their natural philosophy shows that they had the same idea of material ideaof same had thatthey the shows natural philosophy to their possible threat andthus a convincing found the argument Stoics the that fact The material constitution. premises. argument’s the from follow not does becalledgeneration of andand destruction rather should processes growth diminution that stating in (c) presented conclusion the view, this On entity. new in the part a as preserved lose diminutionas to flux,opposed of in and stable process (wheregrowth not the entity the does stressed thatthis conclusion is bynomeans Forall evident. itwe know, couldbe arguedthat a fleeting nature and processes like growth and diminution would not be possible. It has to be relation to something,i.e. relational properties, such as “taller than positioning of handthe as a fist; the comprisessecond featurestheindividual has based itson former includes descriptionsstructural of referringobjects to standing settings the e.g. or the term that I have (along withSedley and Irwin) referred to as “material substrate” is Theory,”222).However, in Plutarch, the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus, and Stobaeus (asquoted above,in footnote 59), 66,32-67,2 ( 63 disposed ( the described: This is how conceivesBowin concept of the of matter inthe GA in his “Chrysippus’ Puzzle,”245-246 also, Cf. Alexanderof Aphrodisias, Menn remarks, that the first any of its constitutive parts) the original entity destroyed.itis the originalremains not entity Rather, anyofits parts) constitutive Now, there is something very important that has to be noted about this solution. The fact The solution. this about noted be to has that important very is something there Now, Whether one accepts the conclusion or does not, depends on how one conceives of conceives one how on depends not, does or conclusion the accepts one Whether SVF II.369, part =LS 27F) Plotinus,and On common conceptions 166,15-29 (= genus Sǀ On Aristotle’s Topics s ekhon ( hupokeimenon) SVF II.403, part = LS 29C) Menn, “The Stoic Theory,”242-243. ) and the relatively disposed ( 1083A-1084A (=LS 28A), 65 , as it appears in Simplicius, Enneads , IV p.181 Ald. P. 360,9 Wal (= 25 6.1.25 ( then material material wouldobjects indeedbe of SVF hupokeimenon II.371) should not be taken to be as x On pros ti p ”, “the husband of husband “the ”, Aristotle’s Categories ”, (Menn, “The Stoic ousia SVF II.379), Simplicius, , which in Stoic ǀ s ekhon if material ). y 63 ”. The 64 CEU eTD Collection it happens with numbers and measures.” (Stobaeus. Posidonius saying „Substance is neither increased or decreased by additionor substraction, but is only altered as 67 66 latter. of individualthe function of persistence the a of the make thepersistence andsubstrate) one thatisbased its identified on qualities and qualified substrate) they (the material (the way essentialist mereological inastrict is defined identity object whose between an they are distinguishing substrate, andaqualified amaterial between argumentthe conception. Lockean along extreme the parts material by qualified,ifidentity be constituted thatwould theirnot were then accepted their entities they that shows identity. clearly of This acriterion as material constitution of rejection present arguments for the possibility of growth, and to choose to refute the GA by a wholesale did not do so, they acceptedhas perished,is not in but thenew presentrather Stoics the asapart individual.But, clearly the conclusion,latter the one, old the with identical not is entity new the otherwisealthough that maintain and growth, they would not have caseof for the GA of the theconclusion reject could one conception Lockean moderate felt the need to conception”. Lockean “extreme the conditions together two the and a mass, of conception” Lockean “moderate atoms.” any other to joined similarly not (ii) and way relevant inthe 'joined' be “(i) should matter of mass the criteria along of can be identity which the matter of a lump composing defined:theparticles material constitutionunderstandways to presenting two Locke, with acomparison draws material constitution, constitutionrelevant from as thethe one point the GA ofoperates view of with. the Irwin,argument. when discussingHe identifies the Stoic two notion of the GA,the so Irwin’s point isbasically same the as mine.(Irwin, “Stoic Individuals, 462-464). extent that they perish if that quantity is changed. Actually what Posidonius is saying herewhich is a he concludesreformulation thatof the Stoics maintained that quantity is essential forthe identity of material objects, to the Irwin proves that the Stoics accepted the „extreme Lockean conception of matter” in another way. He quotes way. another in of matter” conception Lockean „extreme the accepted Stoics the that proves Irwin 462. Individuals,” Irwin,“Stoic It is clear that the argument works with the extreme Lockean conception. Based on the Based on conception. Lockean extreme the with works argumentthe is that It clear 66 He calls the first the concept formulated by the first condition (i) the (i) condition first the by formulated concept the first the calls He Eclogae 26 I.178.10-179.5 =LS 28D) (Irwin’s translation,)from 67 By differentiating in their answer to CEU eTD Collection 70 71 Von Arnim. Cf. Robert B. Todd, “Chrysippus on Infinite Divisibility,” nevertheless the division goes onwithout ceasing.” It has to be noted, that gunky concept of matter. gunky of concept a with possible not is objects material of individuation the approach, essentialist mereological individuated, then wholethe lump willmatter of benot individuablein either. Thus, a purely andif arenot parts, basedparts onwhichwecanindividuate isthen parts, nothing there if nosuchultimate are However, there matter. whole the of lump individuate which wecan on based parts, of parts indivisible ultimate the to get we until on goes analysis mereological also lumps of matter andindividuated based on its mostthus basic parts. This is so, because the parts of a lumpthey of matter are are also individuatedStoic solution to the based GA suggest, on asinterpretations of conditions byits theaforementioned aredefined parts, constitutive the their then on constituents.an ultimateidentity matter’s of lump a If basis. analysis essentialist mereological purely a on objects material theThis lump of matter should be infinitum parts have parts parts, further proper aresucheach matter onwhich aconceptof of philosophy: that material theirobjects proper such out, towhatis basically matter a notion “gunk”corresponds called of incontemporary 69 28B),Sextus Empiricus, each part is divisible to further proper parts and so on and so parts further proper to is part divisible each parts infinitesimal of number infinite an 68 of bodies divisibility infinite actual in the believed They corpuscularists. not were they that is Stoics the individuation of beaprinciple cannot Matter 2.2. Daniel Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” 163. Gunk,” “Stoic Nolan, DL VII. 150. “Hence the further doctrine that matter is divisible Chrysippus says that the division is not And of space and time. Stobaeus 1.142,2-6 (= Such a conception of matter raises difficulties from the point of view of individuating of view of point the from difficulties raises matter of conception a Such An apparent problem with attributing a strict mereological essentialist view of matter to matter of view essentialist mereological strict a attributing with problem apparent An . , but itself infinite; forthere is nothing infinitely small to which the division can extend. But 68 , understandinginfinite divisibility not in such a way bodies arethat composed of Against the Physicists Phronesis ad infinitum 51 (2006): 166-167. II121-126, 139-142 (=LS 50F). SVF 69 , but that bodies do not have ultimate parts, because . II.482,part =LS 50A), DL 7.150-1 (= 71 27 ad infinitum Apeiron ouk eisapeiron 7, (1973): 21. . 70 As Daniel Nolan points Nolan AsDaniel is a supplement by SVF II.482, part = LS ad CEU eTD Collection ‘principle of individuation’ as I understand the term, is a principle that tells us what is to count as gold – ring but that isbecause Ican independently individuate the gold ring as an object itsown in A right. part of gold as, for example, that part of gold which is the sum total of the gold currently composing a certain 75 kind.” given a cannot ever is any principle of individuation forthe items falling under the concept. This is not to say that parts of gold 74 Heavens 73 essentialism. It is not clear why would the GA pose a problem to the Stoics if they indeed 72 either. matter by for an is not them from voideach other option to individuate bybeing couldseparated matter solution chunksthe beindividuated of that everywhere, so a portion of peculiarly qualified which individual is object, latter defined byits qualities imparted to it by relations. continuity certain by or occupies it place the or matter composing is the it which of object the as such principle external some to reference with that on the Stoic worldview the cosmos itself is a continuous its but parts, with impossible.justgunk thisis situationisfurther The complicated by fact the something based individuate its then material on shouldconstitution, enumerate one beable to criterion of diachronic identity but alsoit cannot be a principle individuation.of If one were to qualifying it. also on a metaphysical level,by commonly qualifying itindividuatesand it by peculiarly makingit the object,thus qualitiesa unity hand,itimparts to On matter. portion other the of a out single to sufficient relation, continuousness distinctive a establishs it thus and together, pneuma of portion the namely context, Stoic the in available is readily principle external an such cf. footnotes 40. Cf. Lowe, Galen, Sedley, “Stoic Physics and Metaphysics,” in Algra, But we have not answered our original question so far, concerning mereological If this is so, then it is not only the case that material constitution cannot serve as a Thus, it seems like in and of itself matter on the Stoic view is not individuable but only but individuable not is view Stoic the on matter itself of in and like seems it Thus, 284,28-285,2 ( permeating the object. On the one hand, it unifies the object physically by holding it holding by physically object the unifies it hand, one the On object. the permeating On Incorporeal Qualities be individuated, but only that they are never individuable merely individuable never are they that but only beindividuated, The Possibility of Metaphysics pneuma 75 Thus, a portion of matter can Thus, in aportion virtuematter of be being individuated matter the of a SVF . II.535 = LS49F). , 19.464,10-14 ( , 74. “What we lack in the case of the concept of a mere part of gold SVF The Cambridge History, 28 II.502 = LS49E),Simplicius, as 396. plenum 74 parts of gold. I can individuate a As we have already seen On Aristotle’s On the 72 filled with bodies 73 one instance of instance CEU eTD Collection consist, nor likewise of how many, either infinite orfinite.” (Plutarch, the to questioning their ultimate extend they parts,if But weto. must not, amounted he says, us to input reply problem concede the all any such was things,that for but– must saylimbs and neitheroftrunk what parts we consist, we will operate a distinction. With regard to the inexact questionwe will reply that we consist of head, 77 diminishes.” and increases both particular of the matter the while diminishes, LS 50Cpart)) signify (1) universal or (2) particular ( only that objects had objects only that had parts, the deny objects that not Stoics did byPlutarch, from evidence the as itis apparent has tobe parts Indeed, derived eventually from indivisiblesome parts. ultimate of identity the of Plus,involvinghavingsupposewithoutobjects. parts identity they can doso the to that of constituting of matter beenobject ashaving constitutive the can beindividuated can evenaccount be further, portionsmatter elaborated indexing; byintroducing of temporal of of matter The figof becomingChrysippus. asthematter apeculiarthe part formulated be can this terms in Stoic lunch, his consumed having after changed has constitution material 76 byapeculiar individuated quality. objects, of objects matter constitutive the to byreference constitution matter. lumps notof does of allowfor theexistence unqualified that theory in of a for framework the be can accounted also of objects matter intheconstitutive changes such commonsensical observations. Andtheyneedhave notindeed, it, doubt had to since of truth the doubted who philosophers of kind the not were Stoics the and day, every observe we is that something matter change fact their that objects the However, material object? a of identity the affect would in components a change that accept to have they would why way, be matter and any cannotidentified components of basedontheir parts the of objects ultimate of matter objects If the of matter qualification. makesa individuation aviewthat espoused “Chrysippus says that when asked if we have parts, and how many, and of what and how many parts they Cf. DL VII.150 “ Both substance ( On the one hand, in a Lowean spirit, the Stoics can account for changes inmaterial for changes canaccount Stoics the in spirit, hand,a Lowean On one the b at time at ultimate parts. t2 etc. On the other hand, the Stoics can alsoformulate material changes ousia epi merous ) and matter ( 77 Parts of entities can either be indivituated by bereference can Partsof indivituated entities either ) substance or matter. The former neither increases or increases neither former The matter. or substance ) 76 E.g. if we take the case of Chrysippus whose 29 hul Ɲ ) are terms used in a twofold sense according as they as according sense a twofold in used terms ) are On common conceptions as the matter of those specific ofthose matter the a at time at 1078E-1080E ( = t1 , then CEU eTD Collection 79 78 up until modern times. obscure and along has with similarexperiments thought been very popular with philosophers Growing [Argument] Dion and Theon,experiment by athought constructed Chrysippus inhis work cannot serve either as a principle of individuation or a criterion2.3. Dion and Theon of identity, is the puzzle of location. temporal spatio- e.g. criteria, further some of specification the of with and parts are they object to the Sorabji, “ Peri auxanomenou” in the Greek. the in auxanomenou” Peri Another important piece of evidence supporting that the Stoics believed that matter believedthat Stoics the that supporting important piece of evidence Another been cut off has collapsed into the defective substance of Theon. And two peculiarly not perished? (6) ‘Necessarily’, says Chrysippus. ‘For Dion, theone whose foot has has amputated been has foot whose Dion, while away, snatched been has off, chopped rather than a speakerthat Theon is the stronger candidate. (5)These words are the of a paradox-monger of truth. For how canamputated.’ (4)Thequestion arisesone which has of them perished, his and claim is it be that Theon, one called Dion, be defective one the who Theon.let Then one of Dion’s feet be has had no part thought of as awhole-limbed and otherthe one minus onefoot. Let thewhole limbed same substance jointly, (3)established that ithe is impossible for two peculiarly qualifiedsays: individuals to occupy the ‘For the sake of argument,Growing [Argument] let one individual(1) Chrysippus, the most distinguished bemember oftheir school, in hiswork Matter,Space and Motion 78 79 , transmitted to us by Philo of tousby , transmitted of Alexandria.notoriouslyisPhilo puzzle The Itgoes the following way: , creates a freak of the following kind. (2) Having first , 105. 30 On the On the CEU eTD Collection 83 82 223 129-139 and Jim Stone, “Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus’s Puzzle,” Burke, “Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle,” Ancient an to Solution Essentialist An Theon: and “Dion Burke, historically accurate and as such are of little interest to us. For the latterexample of interpretations see M. B. 81 80 Dion identical to footed, Theon wasqualitatively from beingmean one apart hethat, rather him? in Ordoes footed to similar way a was one in no elseuniverse one whole the imply that Irwin means bysaying was being that one footed only Theon’s quality. hepeculiar Does identity and thus the destruction of individual,the which indeedseems highly improbable. lossin of can the result is view a Cambridge-change on why because even isso this this The reason of nature. unstable an willmakeidentity extremely qualities construal peculiar of a Dexippean outpoint that isIrwin, to to experiment, the according thought of The point fact peculiarattributes such to the hehasanother being that quality,as probably snub-nosed. is whichIrwin a leftunscathed, change, has undergone actually him. Dion, to who Moreover, Theon loses peculiarthe quality wouldthat have set him although apart, nothinghas happened qualifiedindividuals, Theon’s peculiar quality being Once one-footed. Dion’s footis cut off, the entity from other objects but also unify it. On his view, Dion and Theon are two peculiarly apart only not set thatdo qualities besuch“substantial” only can peculiar qualities idea that features, formulates a criticismresolve of the it. conception Here I will to only attempts several puzzle also of and interpretations the ofdifferent several have been There peculiardiscuss two qualities main lines asof interpretation;a set of unique perceptible Irwin, “Stoic Individuals,” 467-478, 474-475. As suggested by Dexippus. The other interpretations I am acquainted with were either overridden by those of these authors or are not are or authors ofthese by those overridden either were with Iamacquainted interpretations other The Philo, However, I donotHowever, I agreewith interpretation.this of First understandnotall,do what I The first interpretationisforThe firstby provide wasadvancedhis Irwin. to point His support On the indestructibility of the world Dion remains while Theon has perished.’ has Theon while remains Dion qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate. Therefore it isnecessary that 82 and the second one taking the puzzle to be a 48 (= SVF 80 31 II.397= LS 28P) reductio adabsurdum The Journal of Philosophy 81 one suggesting that it Analysis of the GA. the of 62 (2002): 216- , 91 (1994): 83 CEU eTD Collection qualities) but rather takes the premises of the GA to show the argument’s absurdity. theargument’s GAtoshow the premisesthe rather takes of but qualities) formerof peculiar with a definition (like notStoicdoes operate premises experiment thought the latter. the one human body: Dion the whole man and Theon, a portion of Dion,lacking one of the feet of 86 M. E. Reesor,“The Stoic Concept of Quality,” 85 84 interpretations. Philo. implausiblerather notsee Ido sufficient and textual in tosupportitevidence passagethis by beenbegin identical qualitatively almost with. to interpretation ways Ineither the seems another peculiar quality (e.g. a snub nose as Irwin suggests) because then they would nothave tell which one should survive. Thatfurther principle, cannot be however, Dion having identically peculiarly individuals,qualified have weshoulda further appealed to principle to leftwith been two have we would amputation the after then, feet since had, of they number unlikely. be to seems construal this so as Theon’s, way same exact in the was cutoff foot Dion’s whether on specifications any give not does puzzle the but someone, out single to sufficient no two people are one-footed in the same way and aspecific kind of one-footedness should be individuate was someone.thinkbeing footed sufficientto that be it one could Tothis that said perish? consequence, and,asa made hispeculiarqualification lose him of foot loss latter the of and the thus Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 270. For a different interpretationpositing two qualitatively identical, although numerically distinct individuals Sedley, see “The Stoic Criterion,” 268-269. Sedley’s reconstruction differs on two crucial points from Irwin’s and also from from earlier also and Irwin’s from crucial points on two differs reconstruction Sedley’s the for except identical, qualitatively were Theon and if Dion case, second the for As As for first the it case,beenquite thoughtlesswould ontheside have to Stoics of the 85 Second, he sees the puzzle asa puzzle he seesthe Second, 84 First, he points out that the argument is about two individualsis in abouttwo theargumentthat enclosed he out First, points American Journal of Philology 32 reductio adabsurdum reductio 75 (1954) :46-47. of the GA. 86 Thus, the Thus, CEU eTD Collection wants in the substrate of Theon on a mereological essentialist view. essentialist a mereological on ofTheon substrate in the wants 90 Stoic Criterion,” 270). cf.Bowin, “Chrysippus’ Puzzle,” 247, 249. individuals cannot be in one substance, as that was a Stoic principle. As opposed to what Sedley suggests (“The89 88 at the Same Time,” out a part of Dionby enumerating a list of its constituting parts. cf. David Wiggins, “OnBeing at the Same Place 87 absurdity. is an that that and inindividuals one substrate qualified peculiarly is amputation left the two with after that one itisFurthermore also surprisingquite have they would Chrysippus’s that accepted even point be reconsiderthus identity. ideamaterial theirdetermines to forced thatconstitution and conclusion his accept to had have GA the of proponents the would why clear less even according to Chrysippus, that person is Dion. whobesurvivesindividual in the has madeasto oneamputation, adecision and substance to qualified beonepeculiarly canonly As there be an to absurdity. hetakes which substance, Dion’samputated foot we are faced with peculiarly two qualified individuals in samethe having On case. be the cannot that out, points Chrysippus as But, perished. have should destruction: lostin byhaving aleg is substance,and thus diminishing Dion onewho the of and are processes andgeneration be would asgrowth diminution definitely Theon, left. matter is of left,lump one asthereisonly there foot onlyoneperson amputation Dion’s of individuals.” “theindeeddoes argument Academic imply that whole distinctconstitute and part As on this view during growth oldthe individual ispreserved as ina part newthe individual, sense. Lockean in moderate the constitution material taking constitution, material of function At least from the point of view of the argument, otherwise one could identify as many lumps of matter as one qualified peculiarly two that principle the endorsed have not need Academics the out, points Bowin As Sedley, “The Stoic Criterion,” 267-270. single arbitrarily can we because conception, Lockean extreme an with works also puzzle the course, Of Ibid. 90 It is notquite clear why Chrysippusdoes say Dionthat is the surviving one, anditis On Sedley’s the analysis puzzle takes as a starting thepoint idea identity that is a 87 Furthermore, according to the GA the candidate to survive amputation to the candidate GAthe the according to Furthermore, The Philosophical Review 89 As far as a mereological essentialist is concerned, after the 77 (1968): 77 94-95. 88 33 CEU eTD Collection 92 essentialistindividual’s (Dion’s) foot is cut off. After the operation, according to the mereological whole-limbed Then,the lumpview, ofmatter). (onediscrete in substrate one situated constituents) we as understoodshould on a mereological essentialist view (i.e. two pieces of matter with different interpretation is as follows. The beargumentstarts out with (peculiarly two individuals qualified) left with Theon, as a survivor, because his material 91 possible. is cognition infallible then impressors, their of detail minute every preserve can they impressionsbelieved,indeed were qualitatively were suchthat our all distinct entities and latter if, these as Stoics that the to conceded they However, identical. be qualitatively to things distinct numerically two for possible is it that affirmed they so, Arguing distinguished. Academics arguedthatsome identical could things are qualitatively and therefore benot theirbe entities canalso basedon individuated that qualities. suppose they that accepted can for to factors reasons identity.any havethey good Wehave other relevance excluded that change inmaterial constitution entails perishingindividual) the it not meanof the that does a (i.e. identity for definitive is constitution material that maintained have to seem GA the of referan individual a Stoic toalthough thiscase aperson).Second, to (in way proponents the isit besense, in just not Stoic taken the need qualified theterm peculiarly First, consideration. way as a not indiscernible then they are not identical. if are entities that two theprinciple accepted theAcademics that suppose we can consequence, a As it. for necessary not is it if even identity, establish to sufficient is distinctness qualitative It does not only contain premises from the GA. Cf. Lewis, “The Stoics on Identity,” 91, also Cicero, In their with aboutthepossibility infallible debate Stoics the cognition of the into things two upifwetake becleared can confusions these I believethat With these specifications in mind, we can interpret the Dion-Theon puzzleinacoherent interpret the Dion-Theon in mind,wecan With specifications these 91 From this, I believe, it can be inferred that the Academics acknowledged that acknowledged thatAcademics the beinferred believe, itcan From I this, rejoinder (although maybe not as a as not maybe (although 34 Academica reductio adabsurdum 2.83-5 (= LS 40J). ) 92 to the GA. The GA. the to CEU eTD Collection 94 93 qualification would obviously bea better candidate: hence thesurvival of Dion. then persistence, for better can account that qualification or material constitution was it if decide whether had that to one hand,hepresents Dion. other as apartof Onthe Theon for two peculiarly qualified individuals in samethe by substrate, individuatingallowing for aspires makematerial constitution to individuationisa principle itbecauseof absurd, allows in individuating andidentifyingindividuals. the one hand, On heshows atheory that that survives, whereasin makingidentity approach the a matter itof shouldqualification be Dion. who be Theon should it view essentialist mereological the on operation: the of survivor namingwhen to it the comes inconflict, also are persistence establishing for criteria different individuals their two Furthermore, one individual viewandwith on other. the onone two two qualitatively distinct entities that have the same material constitution. individuals. doso,they But if faced impossibility: aretwodistinct amputee they with are an entities are notindiscernible then they are notidentical, they should accept that Theon and the hadnot. one while the other because iscandidate hismaterial identical constitution amputee’s.to the constitution remained intact, whereas Dion’s had changed. Furthermore, Theon is also abetter Thence: “two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate.” same the occupy cannot individuals qualified peculiarly “two Thence: Cf.Sedley, Stoic“The Criterion,” 269. and Bowin, “Chrysippus’ Puzzle,” 248. The point that Chrysippus makes is that it is impossible to deny the role of qualification of role the deny to impossible is it is that makes Chrysippus that point The understandingsTheir ofindividuation conflict, two becauseto seem they end upwith However, the amputee and Theon differ in one respect: one of them had a foot cut off 93 Given the fact that the Academics accept the idea that if two idea that the accept theAcademics fact that the Given 35 94 CEU eTD Collection individuals. From the point of view of a theory of identity this needs to be so, since if matter if since be so, to needs this identity of a theory of view of point the From individuals. dispositions of the corporeal active principle (the principle active corporeal of the dispositions I have established into accountwhat interpretations investigate Bytaking of several corporeality the qualities. of so far, I will concludeishow it beespecially understood, to inof identity the context and individuation. Ishall that qualitiesqualities and bodies.are First, I shallonly reflect on the Stoic doctrinebodies of the corporeality of qualities: Ishall bodies,in individuate more inthis explore between chapter relationship depth the insofarand identify as both can they whether they i.e. them to attributed role the fulfil are indeed can Stoics, changes.individual asapeculiarly through those the object, matter, persists qualified persistence the object’s place,but only they changesdotake affect material changes in materialobservationeveryday our of explanation an offer To qualification. of constitution,in terms for thataccounted also the matter is persistence that presented I have also Furthermore, object. of the of thequalities to reference objects objects is changing, for theiralthough existence, crucial persist and through of matter, itsfor individuation: objects’ account itself in cannot andof of matter object the our intuition time, I have asundefinedmatter Stoics thatgiventhe In conceive II, chapter that showed gunk, the thatthe despiteStoics these uniqueness for accounts perceptible the of which qualitative uniqueness individual of objects. affirm that the 95 beingvirtue of by permeated of a portion activethe the principle, in and qualified which areunified entities to according I havea theory sketchedI, In chapter Cf .Calcidius, As in restof the thesisthe whetherI shall investigate qualities, asunderstood by the In chapter I and chapter II I have presented two aspects of the Stoic view on identity. III. Qualities and bodies SVF I.86 (quoted by Menn, “The Stoic Theory,”222). 95 cannot be identified in any way on its own except by except own its on way in any identified be cannot 36 pneuma ) and that they are presentas pneuma , the numerical , the qua a lump of parts in CEU eTD Collection 102 101 302. 388, 389.The quoted sources are due to Hahm, 100 360,9 Wal (= 99 claiming that it is the portion of pneuma Sextus Empiricus, dispositions of matter, specifications different give sources Our corporeal. themselves qualities sense are is,in what that are bodiesof too. thisHowever, it needsdefinition: to be clarified how this definition is to somebe meant exactly, formulate the point at issue as qualities being they as causes, they act can Sinceare preferably arethingsthat that of nature causation and beingaffected). qualities such of capable things all (i.e. things existent all of corporeality the to commitment ontological 3.1. Corporeal qualities and the four genera 98 97 ( bodies are corporeal those of incorporeals are incorporeal. Simplicius, incorporeal. are ofincorporeals those corporeal are bodies 96 ( Stoics by the explain exactly andmeant what sense indispositions what arequalities their identity on them.meansby noqualitiesbe matter can dispositions ormaterial bodies, andof for thus depend To support myqualities, then to with but reference beindividuated andcannot ground persistence cannot point, in the second part of the chapter, I will also SVF poiot Plotinus, Enneads VI.I.29. (= Stobaeus 1.138,14-139,4 ( Cf. Sorabji, Cf. That is the qualities of corporeal things. As Simplicius reports, the Stoics believed that while the qualities of On this distinctioncf.Kupreeva, “Qualities and Bodies,”302-303. Plutarch, The Stoics argued that the qualities of corporeal entities are themselves corporeal. themselves are entities of corporeal qualities the that argued Stoics The 2.389,part) (=LS 28L). Ɲ tes The latter view, i.e. that qualities are qualities view,i.e. that The latter The Stoics believed that qualities believedThe Stoics arebodies. that (and thus themselves being ) differentfrom dispositions ( On Stoic self-contradictions SVF Matter, Space and Motion, II.379), Plutarch Against the professors the Against 99 97 SVF some as dispositions of bodies, of dispositions some as and all causes arebodies, and all causes SVF I.89 and 2.336 = LS 55A), Cicero, On II.376), Alexander of Aphrodisias, Common Conceptions pneuma , 1053F-1054B 9.211 ( 91-92. pneumata Sǀ TheOrigins ofStoic Cosmology SVF in entities that is responsible for theirqualification, is responsible in that entities s ekhonta II.341 = LS55B), Aetius 1.11.15 ( 37 ). pneumata, 102 cp.50 p. 1085e.(= 98 ). 96 it is it reasonablesuppose to qualities that This thesis is a necessary result of their 100 Academica Posteriora is in concordance with sources with the is inconcordance On Aristotle’s Categories and some On Aristotle’s Topics , 4, cf. , “Qualities and Bodies,” SVF 101 II.380). SVF as dispositions of the SVF II.377, 380, 381,383, I.39. ( II.340 = LS55G) IV p.181 Ald. P. , 217,32-218,1 SVF I.90), CEU eTD Collection Criterion”, 258-259, 106 normal way as something distinct from the body they belong to. They are just the reason.body That disposed.”body is disposed in various ways, but if we talk of dispositions, wereductionist. should not […] treatFor all that them actually in the exists in the world is a single body, theman’s matter, 105 104 Mixture of. qualities are the taken taken up by authors) subsequent interpretation Irwin’s Sedley’s and on (relying I have GA. explained of the There, context disposition. qualities arethe(a body) object from viewed pointthe viewof of thirdgenus, the wrong, Iwill return to the construal of the doctrine of the four only on level the descriptions.of dispositionsbe andrelativedispositions allidentical this to differing to compound object, the qualities, the the substrate, takes and principle, passive and the theactive mixture of qualities as shouldbe understood objectthe in disposed a certain way ( as an ideashould interms of four understood genera: doctrine the the of formulated be by has been Stoicqualities the advocated view Ashe arebodiesRichard that Sorabji. argues, they can function as principles of individuation and criteria of identity. how understand better andto of qualities ideaa clearer conception get of Stoic the to in order interpretation the as well, other conform to and reconstructions evidence considering textual 103 qualities are that qualities should be as construed qualities being bodies ordispositions ofbodies in the sense passive matter. the motion into bringing and differentiating for makes that principle active the is it since Irwin,“Stoic Individuals,” 459-462, Kupreeva,“Qualities and Bodies,”297-298, 302, Sedley,”The Stoic Sorabji Cf. Sorabji Nemesius 70,6-71,4(= LS 47J) Galen, 224,14-17 (= I believe that this interpretation is mistaken on several beforeI believe ismistaken this But proving interpretation on that several accounts. it The interpretation according to which qualities are but dispositions of material of objects which arebutdispositions to qualities The interpretation according , Matter Space and Motion 104 , Matter, Space and Motion By saying so, he implies that qualities are basically identical to the bodies they 103 SVF Conformingly, in what follows, I shall argue that the corporeality of corporeality the that argue shall I follows, what in Conformingly, pneumata 105 II.442, part =LS 47I). As to what he takes the body to be, I suppose that he conceives it as a and , 89-93. as such , 90:, “The idea aboutqualities, as I understand it, isstrongly 106 On bodily mass that the point of the distinction between the different the between distinction the of point the that corporeal. Nevertheless, Ibelieve itthatis worth 38 7.525,0-14 (= SVF genera II.439 = LS47F), Alexander, , as Iintroduced itin the Sǀ s ekhon pneuma, soul or soul ). That is, That ). On CEU eTD Collection qualified object because the qualified object, as a mixture of mixture passive and the active asa of the object, because thequalified object qualified ( usually translated as substance) and a as and substance) usually translated 108 107 viewed asanentity belonging first the to itis a description. Rather, another qualities under its parts, itis neither identical to alump of matter under one description or a bundle of as abundlesubstrate of qualities. whereas qualified matter, the lump of as an describesunqualified theobject substrate thematerial its aspects: from other inis abstraction presented object the qualified aspect and material qualifyingthe viewunderits passiveprinciple.Onthis thequalitiless and active itself of mixture – a material object the same the entity, to isreferring object genus of the each on the Stoic definition take toSorabji’s Similarly persists. itself it its while identity, to relevant are not that respects of qualities, this changein importantly, aspects,andmore to underother asviewed while same the remaining interpretation of the four genera also suggestspersistence conditions. with of object different the aspects that set apart being to able andthus descriptions different under object isthe viewing substrates, has in it as principle the apassive activea mixture of The and belonging as object thesecond genus). to description a bundle of and firstgenus) qualities(as adifferent belonging under tothe islump complex body, the case (as buta description that one matter under unqualified of poiot ibid. Cf. Menn, “The Stoic Theory,” 222. Ɲ s This is so for several reasons. First, qualities cannot be taken to be identical with the In doing so one can allow for the object to change as viewed under some of its aspects, However, this interpretation is imprecise. As Stephen Menn points out, it is not the is not it out, points Menn As Stephen imprecise. is interpretation this However, ), imparted toitby principle. imparted active the ), parts qualities and unqualified matter respectively, but since it is not identical to identical not is it since but respectively, matter unqualified and qualities 107 poion genus 39 (a qualified thing)in virtue of having quality 108 , in virtue, ofhaving unqualified( matter hupokeimenon (a substrate or a subject) a or substrate (a ousia, CEU eTD Collection (or four) different bodies occupying the same place at the samethe time. sameplace the at bodies occupying four) different (or “unitary object” of aspects same the between differentiating when discussing the Stoic solution to the GA, Plutarch implies that the Stoics, rather than consequence of consequence contemporaneous, of view,namelythatthey this existencethe of two posit object. The Stoics have been severely criticized for whatis judged to be an absurd problems stemming from the supposition that matter and quality are present as parts in the says that: also Stobaeus In substrates. two between the differentiation Stoic dealingthe with either. it, with identical are confirm, qualities in produced” is everything which from innature things two “the as causes and matter by opposing principle, active 112 111 parts. isthe which 117 116 115 114 113 'HG%DV 'HG%DV 110 109 fireandair water, ismadeupof earth, principle Aetius 1.11.15 ( And as such made up of air and fire. Stobaeus 1.177,21-179,17 (including Posidonius fr.96, =LS 28D) Plutarch, Cf. Sedley, Stoic “The Criterion” 259-260. Cf.Lewis, “The Stoics on Identity” 101-106. 222. Theory,” Stoic “The Menn, Plutarch, ibid. Letters 113 Actually, the main reason to reject the interpretation presented by Menn is to avoid the avoid is to Menn by presented interpretation the reject to reason main the Actually, separated in place and not be thought of as even part of it. occupies whereas the same place as it, whateveris calleddifferent from mustsomething be ofin substanceis same,ishand itand part both different that the all fromit,butthe isit other on the Nor substance. constituent its as same the not is thing qualified peculiarly The 65.2 (= LS 55E). Although they are not completely distinct from the whole body, they are not exactly not are they body, whole the from distinct completely not are they Although On common conceptions On Stoic self-contradictions SVF pneuma). II.389.) (The sources are due to Menn “The Stoic Theory” 222). Theory” Stoic “The Menn to due are sources (The II.389.) SVF II.340 = LS 55G) also Seneca implicitly states that causes belong to the realm of the pneumata 112 114 Second, the Stoics indeed believed that qualities are in bodies qualities as are that believed Second, Stoics indeed the Indeed, this is Indeed, this supported by almost all evidence textual the of 1083A-1084A (= LS 28A) 111 , 1053F-1054B, , beingcauses (and assuch parts of activeprinciple,the 40 Simplicius, 109 , whereas, asseveral of our sources On Aristotle’s Categories, f. 56. 115 117 , supposed , supposed existencethe two of On commonconceptions 116 A passage by 110 , CEU eTD Collection which is which 122 second genera, this corporeal relationship is that of immanence: that is objects are a is objects immanence: that of isthat relationship corporeal second genera,this entities. corporeal between in interaction of an virtue being true as of predications bodies. between interaction a causal of infunction true maintained that only bodies can act ascauses and thustheyconceived of predications as being terms.” abstract and concrete between […], observe they which distinction sharp the “from hand other the on and hand, one the on beings all of corporeality tothe commitment ontological from Stoic the genera four of the doctrine ( three other the to opposed is entirely dependent of the substrate they are the dispositions of. This is so because as of dispositions becausebodiesis of qualities erroneous notonly by areaboutbrought portion the Dispositions 3.2. hastobean betaken the to absurdity. theory holon ( blending complete of theory Stoic the given However, object. andthe each other coextensivebutnotare both occupy within with extensions object it, spatial different they do 121 120 119 118 bodies. spatially coextensive SVF Menn, “The Stoic Theory,”217-221. Cf. Stobaeus 1.138, 14-139,4 ( 217. Theory,” Stoic “The Menn, Cf. Sedley, “Stoic Physics and Metaphysics,” in Algra, Sorabji, pneuma II.341= LS 55B) Clement, ) and their belief in the indivisibility of not think of thisthat consequence bodies, Ido belief indivisibility in of ) andtheirthe While in the case of predicates, characterising objects viewed under the firstandthe viewedunder the objects characterising While in caseof the predicates, the of development the derives who reconstruction, Menn’s from clear becomes This As to Sorabji’s interpretation of the corporeality of qualities, his idea that qualities are Sǀ Matter,Space and Motion present in the object, but also because on the Stoic construal on identity Stoicthe construal butdispositions’ also because in the presentobject, s ekhon . genera Miscellanies SVF 118 Although the Although , 85. I.89 and II.336 = LS 55A) Sextus Empiricus, , something 8.9.26.3-4 (= LS 55C) 119 pneuma Sǀ 41 120 s ekhon The CambridgeHistory, Since the Stoics were corporealists, they and the matter are present as parts in the 121 is only by determined itself objectthe Thusthey reduceall aimed to kinds 391. Against the Professors 122 krasis di’ krasis 9.211 CEU eTD Collection 126 224-5. and not a body, but some other nature. “Plotinus, nature. other some but body, a not and But if the they are saying that soul and God are nothing other than matter, and everything is a name, and this alone exists. nothing. But if it is nothing, there is only Plotinus points out the entity the out points Plotinus body.the given But corporeality Stoicthe commitment to becannot justthis the case. As ekhon pneuma principle. any account forother structural byappealing the to entities Stoics of positioning cannot disposition of. isdisposed identity it byis in substrate’s only changes determined the theobject the the However, object. external an in a change to due change can disposed relatively the in the a change dueto change can qualified the changes, matter presentas a part in in can objectif its the change identity component substrate the Thematerial forobjects. theiridentity well thefourth aredepend on several one corporeal as necessarily making structured bodies identical to the bodies constituting the structure. reduce itselfso, they have structure the to thebodies thus constitutingto structure, the certain way), they attempt to account for structural arrangementin a corporeal way. But doing i.e. in virtue of the relationship between the parts of the body, themselves being bodies. body different way. Objects are case of the case of 125 124 123 hupokeimenon cf. Menn, “The Stoic Theory,” 245. “If they say that not every Ibid, 242-243. This is apparent from the more illustrative examples given for the third genus,such fist. as a Ibid, 234-236 123 To thisitcouldbe saidthe that It is apparent from this that objects viewed under the first and firstsecond the the viewedunder objects from that is this It apparent , whereas they are , whereas they skhesis 125 Sǀ Since they exclude incorporeal Since exclude form principles they structuring(e.g. a in theentity a is soul, then they must say s ekhon and a is a being and is something else beside else something andis abeing is poion and the and pneuma Sǀ in of virtue having aportion of pros ti pros s ekhonta pros ti pros Sǀ is soul (since there are countless are there (since soul is s ekhon pneuma either that this Sǀ Sǀ invirtue of disposedthe structural body’s arrangement, s ekhonta Sǀ s ekhon, , and the Enneads is nothing more than the entity itself, because the because itself, entity the than more isnothing s ekhon 42 [para] Sǀ 4.7.4.11-21 quoted by Menn, “The Stoic Theory”, in virtue of an external relation to another to relation external an of virtue in Sǀ this corporealist account was formulated in a wasformulated account corporealist this is structuresby determined that structure the s ekhon s ekhon the subject and the matter… it would be a and this skesis is some being, or that it is is a name: and in this way it will follow that pneuma pneumata ousia and qualifying the object, and object, qualifying the without soul), but that the but that soul), without poiot Ɲ s in them; in the in in them; genera 126 124 logos p as ǀ s CEU eTD Collection pneumata should be the should it. identical asit This with has becomeprinciple, from far,have clear so established we what virtue of the presence of an additional principle inthe body, which is part of the body, but not in thebody conceivedispositionsmaterial bodies.as qualifying weshould Rather them of uniqueness of entitiesthe they are supposed toidentify individuate.and then identity their beand uniqueness anywould not more stable then identity the and unindividuable and fleetingof If nature. qualities werebutdispositions ofmaterial objects, But if identity so, then was this istheir itself was partly defined bysomething that then matter, identity atleasttheirby partly was composing matter determined the object. the ifforidentify.identity their acompound were of qualities dependenton Second, identity since they themselves would dependforidentity their they on what are supposedto they qualify, then they could not fulfil their role of accounts.principle First, if qualities were dependent for theirof identityindividuation on matter and the material objects several and on criterionimpossible is this But body. very that of of identity the by be determined would On all these accounts I believe that we should exclude the possibility that qualities are Thus if qualities butdispositions were bodiesthey of the qualify,identity then their . pneuma . Qualities shouldbeas . Qualities understood 43 pneumata , ordispositions of pneuma and CEU eTD Collection available in metaphysical Stoic the framework. not is option that but principle, incorporeal be an to have would it or identification of in need object be amaterial itself would principle that sinceeither isnosuch there principle, that nature. Ishallconclude material of something its identity depend does on not for that is possible to identifyis the possibleand to individuate I shallpart of itself.it chapter itfirst the should be individuated Inthesecond whether explore of its qualification. For it to be able to account for the pneuma persistence and uniqueness of entities, of objects. and persistence the anything material, we face the task to explain how the how explain to face task we the material, anything in of but virtue depend and theirqualities, qualities those identity that their for cannot on andpersist cannot be individuated objects Stoicsaccording material tothe Considering that airitis andfire, material alsoequivalent although definitely a not tomatter. object, The individuation. of principles pneuma fardiscusseditHowever,object. so exactly Ihavenot means what (andthe thatqualities qualification should be understood as a function of the presence of a portion of IV. the individuating and Identifying In what follows, first I shall show that in respects of individuation and persistence, the persistence, and individuation of in respects that show I shall first follows, what In From what I have established in chapters I and III it has become clear that isjustlike material any itother object: has to beindividuated and in identified virtue ) are corporeal and how can corporeal entities serve as criteria of identity identity and of ascriteria entities serve can corporeal how corporeal and ) are pneuma is a corporeal is is asit andinsofar entity, a corporeal amixture of pneuma 44 , whether there is a principle qualifying it qualifying is, whether aprinciple there pneuma pneuma can account for the uniqueness the for account can pneuma inthe CEU eTD Collection juncture, each original mixture. mixturepreserving in theirFusion is qualities the athorough is a kind of mixture,in which componentsthe arearranged side by side and joined by of mixture: juxtaposition mixture: of the by isThis interpenetration pictured asaform Stoics the inmixture of which ingredients, the Cambridge History, divisible. infinitely are mixture) resulting the (andalso if thecomponents all place, can only take Inwood entities are differentiated and held together by the portion of portion bythe together held and differentiated are entities before, explained have As I contrary. the for evidence definitive is some there divisible, 129 the bodies. material to principle the limit not do and place), and time (and general in bodies about talk they divisibility infinite of doctrine itself.”Alexander of Aphrodisias, On mixture 216,14-218,6 (= breathwhich pervades it all, and by which the universe is sustained and stabilized and made interactive with 128 opposed to bodies. omissions =LS 50C), Galen, howeverstates that the Stoics affirmed that qualities were not infinitely divisible, as infinitely divisible. To begin with, the with, begin To divisible. infinitely becomes contestable. kinds of other entities individuate to capacity its thus and individuability own its then divisible, isinfinitely matter, to similarly the that out turn might if it so way, essentialist mereological in a individuated does it persist asamaterial object. 127 4.1. The Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” 171-172, Michael, J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology),” “Chrysippus has the following theory of blending: he first assumes that whole the substance is unified by a Stobaeus 1.142, 2-6 ( pneuma pneuma , TheCambridge Companion According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Stoics differentiated between three kinds As a matter of fact we have several reasons be can it that excludes this divisible toinfinitely is entity if an seen, have we As believe that the 129 pneuma and are matter, blended.thoroughly , although a body, is radically different from matter and as such not infinitely On incorporeal qualities 390-392. cannotbe individuated basedon its material norconstitution SVF II.482, part) (=LS 50A), Plutarch, (parathesis) 147-148. Sedley, “StoicPhysics and Metaphysics,” inAlgra, 10 Vol XIX p. 483K (=SVF II. 381), , fusion pneuma 127 What is more, even if we were to maintain that (sunkhusis) 45 128 is a body, and when the Stoics state their As I will show below, this kind of blending SVF On common conceptions II.473 =LS 48C) and blending( pneuma interpenetrating them. interpenetrating krasis) , 1078E-1080E, (with pneuma . Juxtaposition The pneuma is also is in , CEU eTD Collection 133 Inwood, 132 the water from the wine since the water runs up into the sponge.” another artificially. If one dips an oiled sponge into the wine which has beenblended with water, it willconstituents separate persist in such blendings is quite evident from the fact that they are frequently separated from one 131 1078B-D (=LS 48E). Natural Philosophy,” in Inwood, in Philosophy,” Natural 130 in any from mixture can be attime. point the extracted commingled,in ingredients the persist mixture,the preserving theirown they that soqualities, mixture we take, it will contain all of the components of the mixture. While being completelypartake ofeverything not[…]” does that part of is nothem “there where point tothe each other, interpenetrate completely components the mixture, a such In mixtures. of kind above the of both of qualities the combines new substance of constituentsthe in which they both perish andlose their original givingqualities a way to characterised by different qualities. Blending is the kind of mixture that correspond to nothing else but juxtaposition,correspond tonothing elsebut as defined above. would a mixture of suchkind but, qualities, preserve their own thecomponents particle-wise commingling of component-substances, particles composing the in of two the which case by constituted indivisible Thusparticles. blending in these conditions is eitherthe corpuscularist theory we areof able to identify them, as parts of the mixture.matter. In mixtureindeed in with be a inthe all preserved thenthereshouldtheir which qualities, way such a theoryis constitutedthe components byare sothoroughly blended isthere that nopartof whichthemixture to we couldto that point either ofof thethe elements wouldHow it be possible thatboth elements of mixture mixturethe arepreservedin the blend,if they and willnot by thebe mixture itself? If the entities were indeed through and through to the point that component particles were not preservedcomponentnot anymore that particles were point the to andindeed through through cf., “Stoic Physics and Metaphysics,” in Algra, Cf. Alexanderof Aphrodisias, Stobaeus 1.155,5-11 (SVF 2.471, part) “[Reporting Stoicthe doctrine] That the qualities of blended Alexander of Aphrodisias, The Cambridge Companion, Clearly, the concept of blending cannot be interpreted in the framework of of a framework in the beinterpreted cannot blending of concept the Clearly, But, these two characteristics of blending seem to be in contradiction with each other. each with in contradiction be to seem blending of characteristics thesetwo But, On Mixture The Cambridge Companion On mixture 148. 216, 1-2 (=SVF 2.470= LS 48C, part) (quoted by “StoicWhite, , 220, 37-221,15 quoted by White , “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” in 130 The Cambridge History, This means that no matter how little a part of the 46 , 147. Cf. Plutarch, 132 131 390. 133 On common conceptions Or if the mixing were mixing if the Or CEU eTD Collection in a similar way to breath. is body the substance”through of is that it propagated medical)view, vaporous a“warm point multifarious functions and differentiations not the case. The is this is However, far constitution material concerned. body,its as insidethe unchanged as individual’sassume soul, thatdespite to be it its would one nature tempted corporeal remains 136 inhalation it with enter of parts air change: is in constant individual of soul the case, then the and of the drawninto body the by inhalation through windpipe.”the individual is its “natural breath” As change. the constant in is composition material its and object, material a is it fire, and air of Therefore the soul is found to be natural breath.” Calcidius 220 (= 220 Calcidius 138 breath.” natural be to found is soul the Therefore with natural breath. (3) Therefore we live as well with the same breath. (4) But we live with the soul. (5) 137 135 134 blend which has parts of originalthe blended substances amongits ownparts.” maintain that “[…] any continuousitself that is only constituted by regionone of the components. On the other hand itis also possibleof to the blend is wholly havesubstanceof both as to components the having without parts, in partany continuous occupiedthe for by possible hand a one piece the on is it then divisible, of infinitely are therather but constituents, have not ultimate do of mixture the components the If interpretable. readily becomes blending own qualities would beviolated. the mixture,characteristic the preserving condition components the then resultingof their of in new formed mixture particlesbythe the qualities were butrather characterised Long, “Stoic psychology,” in Algra, Galen, “(1)Chrysippus says: “Itis certain that we breathe and live with and one samethe thing. (2)But we breathe Algra, in psychology,” “Stoic Long, Nolan, “Stoic Gunk,” 171-172. pneuma Besides being unindividuable, the As opposed to this, on the non-corpuscularist theory of the Stoics the notion of On Hippocrates’ Epidemics Hippocrates’ On is aninnerin principle present body the alsothat serves as the substance of the pneuma , although not reducible to the breath of reducible its breathof tothe individual, given the not , although 136 Indeed, the Stoics were reported to argue that the soul of the VI 270,26-8 (= The Cambridge History 137 The Cambridge History and as such “itis preserved by both exhalation blood of pneuma 135 SVF 47 , is breath insofar that from a physical (or II.782 = LS 53E) also cannot persist. Insofar as it is composed , 564. , 568. SVF II.870, part = LS 53G, part). 138 But if this is the 134 CEU eTD Collection establish that the that establish theirbreath would also change by inhalation and exhalation. However,for our purposes it is sufficient to the on identity its for Given object the III. that established inchapter believe that the impossibility either. accepted ofbe further principle cannot of qualifying a rejected existencethe positing the and solution this solutionway in system:it theStoic is theidea that identified of invirtue itshas be disposition(s) to is quiteIn what manifest follows I will show thatconsidering the what4.2. Qualities and dispositions of the I have for. beaccounted could itssee how qualification hard to ( 139 the description, adifferent seen under qualifying the function itsof Itis qualities. one how shouldquestionable however conceive qualitiesthe of material its despite constant its individuation Furthermore, hastobemadealso changes. a itsfor persistence account to material aspect and its between qualitative be introduced has to a distinction objects, material other to Similarly either. individuated be cannot it and persist are. objects material same asall exactit kindis tothe of changes Thus subject persons. time: chunks of air leaveand parts it andof airjoin leave the it air through of the exhalation. atmosphere, Being to so beit laterchanges inhaled its constituent by other parts all the pneuma I am not quite certain how the argument could be made for lifeless objects, such as stones, their breath their stones, as such objects, forlifeless be made could argument the how certain quite not Iam This being the case, we can proclaim that taken as a material object, the object, material a as taken that can proclaim we case, the being This ) is certainly a breath insofar as it is the breath and soul of the whole kosmos, but I am not sure whether As to the pneuma pneuma pneuma cannot ground identity also fora smallerclass of beings. pneuma . Since it is itself the active qualifying principle of the universe it is it universe the of principle qualifying active the itself is it Since . beingindividuated and identified invirtue of its I dispositions, as a material object. This being so, the account of identity and identity of theaccount so, being This object. material asa pneuma pneuma pneuma 48 ’s qualification cannot be accounted for in any disposed in disposed beway a certain would dependent Sǀ s ekhon is nothingis although object, butthe pneuma does not 139 CEU eTD Collection preserved, thus the soul could not account for the animal’s identity over time. 141 over identity be animal’s not the could for account not could soul impressions the the thus preserved, changing constantly is soul the Since it. on imprint their left having impressions Eric Lewis’s suggestion that the soul is individuated in virtue of its unique disposition same. the as a resultremain not of would the differentconcepts the exhalation and inhalation with because concepts, thus and ofmemories formation the for account cannot Stoics the that out points also Plutarch resistance, would go on, principle. in material itother Thisidentified and individuated objects of be a furtherterms should qualitative division the to similarly then ifitcorporeal, because were beincorporeal, has principle to of corporeal objects disposition.into a material and a qualitative component principle. Neither do we have any evidence that they would have thought of peculiarthe have thoughtof would have they anyevidenceprinciple. that Neither dowe for uniqueness the and persistenceof principles. most for qualification differentiations all of andaccountthings, the of of bodies and they reduce the structure itself to the bodies constituting the structure. available.is not Theyconceive of dispositions as being a matter of structural the positioning pneuma the of disposition for the accounting principle another Besides criticizing the criticizing Besides dispositions has also beenpointed out by Plutarch, in his critique of the Stoic theory of concept formation. 140 independent principle. Theymake it clearquite itthat is the principle, this ideais again First problematic. of doall,not sources reportof our any such the more than andpersistent unique andindividuate identify. Furthermore,the criterion identity of woulditself be its for identity dependent iton objectthe is supposed to individuation would be circular since what is supposed to be a principle individuationof and a cf, p. 42. The fact that dispositions of a body cannot remain the same with the change in the substrate of the Moreover, even if such existed there an itentity,had tobe incorporeal. Thequalifying But our sources do not report that the Stoics would have posited any thatincorporeal donotreport have sources But our such Stoicswould the posited the to As should bestructured. ad infinitum pneuma pneuma being individuated in individuated of beingvirtue existencethe of afurtherqualifying as the substrate of concepts for other reasons, on account of its insufficient of its on account reasons, other for of concepts substrate the as , leaving notthus an uswith could principleultimate that account 140 On Common conceptions But, we have seen that on the Stoic account such aprinciple such account Stoic the on that seen have we But, pneuma pneuma pneuma itself. That could only be the case if therewas case bethe could only That itself. 49 disposed in a certain way would notbe any constantly changes, thus the memories and memories the thus changes, constantly 1084F-1085B This ofline thought proves wrong pneuma , e.g. a form , e.g.a defining howthe pneuma thatmakes for the pneuma in terms of terms in pneuma 141 and CEU eTD Collection identified and basedindividuated onthe qualities they have. be cannot andit objects for asaconsequence account cannot objects’ qualification thus principles do not exist in the framework of Stoic metaphysics. Stoic of framework in the exist not do principles cannot and beindividuated identified byincorporeal an causal because such principle, incorporealprinciple bein couldunderstanding. orquality possibly Thusthe their fundamental no so, being This role. causal a have can bodies only that conviction ontological theirThis is understandable,given quite evensuch apossibility. considerrefused to subsequent philosophers havingis andthe criticism and of there noevidence contemporaries the done of so, them for metaphysical itstheir But probably importance the theory. issue,given discussed crucial ( infinity, since that form would be from matter and form, andof the this one latterfirst form form, againand twowould matter components needfrom matter be wouldto and were be form. form identicalif For with the matter. compound from form. it and is of nor […] matter the from two; matter being not is further, form form there “For wouldagainst be a progression argumentation to of Aphrodisias’ Alexander Plotinus, and cf. II.376.), (=SVF qualification. its 6.I.29 for accounting principle incorporeal ofan positing the for require would These individuation. and identity of authors have issue alsosuggested the thatthe twofold(qualified and material)concerning nature of the not although doctrine, Stoic of the opponents several by 143 Inwood, In Metaphysics,” “Stoic Brunschwig, (Jacques GA. the by affected thus and corporeal are that qualities common from different 142 qualities. qualities asincorporeal De Anima17.15-18.10 Bruns A criticism concerning the corporeality (and the complex nature) of the active principle had been formulated been had principle active ofthe nature) complex the (and corporeality the concerning A criticism Cf. Brunschwig, who in his analysis of the Stoic answer to the GA suggests that peculiar qualities should be As a consequence the As aconsequence The Cambridge Companion, 143 translated andquoted by Kupreeva,“Qualities and Bodies,”316. ) rather suggests that they have not done so and that they have they that and so done not have they that suggests rather pneuma 142 Indeed iftheywould havedone so,they would have cannot be identified individuated cannot or onany accounts, 50 229). pneuma is problematic and Enneads pneuma , CEU eTD Collection that is itself a material object (the amaterial object is itself that a principle on for their existence depend and qualities arecorporeal those since Nevertheless, individuate materialtheir objectsbasedon qualities. they nature, and to attempt unstable itsidentity, individuation of tobe matter given andacriterion undefined refusea principle of account for identity the individuation and in of of virtue things their qualification. they Since for them impossible makesitto andmaterial matter constitution and of their concept power) ontological commitment to the corporeality of allConclusion existent things (i.e. things having causal of of anything material. identity on the be dependent cannot identity its itself and object material be a cannot principle certain qualities, this byreference to be except individuated, quality andthatthey cannot materialit. in theStoics ofhaving Since persist virtue canonly affirm objects that a persistent of modification some or objects, individual permeating principle active the of portion be the qualified invirtue ofbeing permeated by activethe principle, immanent this principle has to entities areunified Given and that for uniqueness. qualitative theiraccounts perceptible senseif of, oneimmanent positsapersistent and metaphysical inunique principle entities that uniqueness a function of missesqualification its point. identified bypositing afurther qualifying Butsuchafurtherprinciple. qualifying principle its material constitution. Thus, similarly to other material objects, it has to be individuated and individuable,and thusnot itis andalso its in identity unstable itdue to constantly changing in divisible isinfinitely it matter, like Just material. is it fire, and air of is composed it as insofar In my thesis I hope to have theStoics’ prior establishedtaken together, that In mythesisIhopeto However, as it is reported by our sources, the sources, by itisour as reported However, In chapter I, I have showed that the doctrine of peculiar qualities can only be made pneuma ), the whole project of making persistence and making persistence of project whole the ), 51 pneuma itself is corporeal and also, CEU eTD Collection unsatisfactory. be to proves indeed ascorporeal, principle active ofthe conceives that atheory concerned, is individuation butasfaridentity and of as latter, these preferences tothe only theoretical due is not philosophers Peripatetic and byPlatonist tothe Stoics attributed incoherence theoretical is the hereshow that to I haveWhat attempted philosophers. later and contemporaries by principles both of corporeality of the on doctrine the from attacks the apparent causes. of corporeality necessary the incorporeal, butthatis impossible in universe, Stoic the given causalthe of role andqualities account for individuation and identity, on the same account as the account same individuation the identity, on forand account cannot befound sinceit either would too be corporeal and assuch it would beinsufficient to The confusion thearound qualifying of role activethe principle ismanifest asitis 52 pneuma is. 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