BY NWOKOJI, OBINNA NDUBUISI PG/M.Sc./11/59748

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLLAPSE OF GADDAFI REGIME

NWOKOJI, OBINNA NDUBUISI

PG/M.Sc./11/59748

PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

NOVEMBER, 2012 TITLE PAGE

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLLAPSE OF GADDAFI REGIME

NWOKOJI, OBINNA NDUBUISI

PG/M.Sc./11/59748

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

NOVEMBER , 2012

APPROVAL PAGE

This project report “THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLLAPSE OF GADDAFI

REGIME” has been approved by the Department of Political Science, University of

Nigeria, Nsukka.

………………………………. ……………………… Prof. Jonah Onuoha P C Chukwu Supervisor Ag. Head of Department

……………………….. ………………….. Prof. C.O.T. Ugwu External Examiner Dean of Faculty

DEDICATION

To my parents Sir & Lady N. O. Nwokoji

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge the essential role played by my Supervisor, Prof. Jonah Onuoha an erudite scholar whose guidance and adequate supervision contributed immensely to the successful completion of this work. I acknowledge in a special way the support and contributions of my parents, Sir & Lady N.O. Nwokoji and my siblings: Chinwe and Chukwudike. It is my prayer that the good Lord will always bless you all. I appreciate the contributions of my lecturers and renowned scholars like: Prof. C.O.T. Ugwu, Dean Faculty of the Social Sciences University of Nigeria, Nsukka, P.C. Chukwu - Ag. Head, Department of Political Science, Dr. Ken Ifesinachi - Postgraduate Co-ordinator of our revered department, Dr. A.M. Okolie, Prof. Obasi Igwe and others. More so, I acknowledge the enormous support and encouragement by: Chief & Ugwudi I.O. Edozie, Mr. & Mrs. V.O Nwokoji, Sir & Lady O.O. Ubani and Mr. & Mrs. Onyebuchi Nwankwo. Thank you for being solidly behind me throughout this academic sojourn. I am very grateful. My friends and colleagues: Oji, Pedro, Dim, Cynthia, Tangwa, Ify, Uche, Ebere, Jane, Chinedu and Oghale, my roommate – Jeff, am so happy identifying with you all.

Errors, omissions, and exaggerations are entirely mine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page ------i

Approval Page ------ii

Dedication ------iii

Acknowledgement ------iv

Table of Contents ------v

List of Table ------vii

List of Figure ------viii

Abstract ------ix

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction ------1

1.2 Statement of Problems ------3

1.3 Objective of the Study ------4

1.4 Significance of the Study ------5

1.5 Literature Review ------5

1.6 Theoretical Framework ------24

1.7 Hypotheses ------28

1.8 Method of Data Collection ------28

1.9 Method of Data Analysis ------29

CHAPTER TWO 30

U.S. STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC INTEREST IN LIBYA

2.1 Human Rights Protection ------31

2.2 Democracy ------34

2.3 Strategic Interests ------35

2.4 Economic Interests ------37

CHAPTER THREE 43

U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS

3.1 U.S. Military and Financial Support ------43

3.2 U.S.-Led Military Operations - Operation Odyssey Dawn - - - 49

3.3 Arms Embargo, Sanctions and Freezing of Libyan Assets - - - 54

3.4 NATO – Operation Unified Protector, International Isolation and the Use of threat ------58

CHAPTER FOUR 68

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBYA AFTER GADDAFI

4.1 Economic Reforms ------70

4.2 Political Reforms ------77

CHAPTER FIVE 85

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary ------85

5.2 Conclusion ------88

5.3 Recommendations ------88

Appendix ------91

BIBLIOGRAPHY ------94

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Funds Spent by Foreign Powers on War in Libya - - - - 49

Table 2: U.S. Assets Involved in Operation Odyssey Dawn - - - - 53

Table 3: Coalition Sortie Rates ------54

Table 4: Coalition Assets as of 10 June 2011 ------60

Table 5: Summary of Libyan GNC Election Results, 2012 - - - - 82

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Recent Benchmark Oil Prices - - - - - 41

Figure 2: MENA Oil Data ------42

ABSTRACT

The uprising and revolt against authoritarian leaders in the Middle East and North Africa spearheaded and inspired protests among Libyans demanding for greater freedom which led to the collapse and overthrown of Gaddafi’s 42 year regime. The U.S. – NATO led military and humanitarian involvement and campaign gave much support to the rebel fighters and the NTC. This study x-rays the role(s) played by U.S in the Libyan revolution, and how it led to the demise of Gaddafi’s regime. To achieve the objective of this study, we raised the following research questions. Firstly, what motivated U.S. interest in the Libyan crisis. Secondly, to what extent did U.S involvement led to the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime? Finally, what has been the impact of the collapse of Gaddafi regime on the political economy of the Libyan state? This study will rely on qualitative method of data collection which involves the use of secondary sources of data, and adopts the political economy approach for its theoretical analysis. This gives primacy to material and economic condition as the main determinant of political and organizational process of a society. After much appraisal of the available data, the study reveals that; oil is the trophy of U.S – NATO led war on Libya, and that U.S involvement led to the ousting of Gaddafi’s regime. However, the regime change in Libya has brought participatory democracy and the end of authoritarian and tyrannical rule.

CHAPTER 1

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

On December 17, 2010 a disenfranchised 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire to protest the repression and corruption of the Tunisian government. This act of desperation cost the young man his life, ignited the passion and frustration of millions, and set into action a course of events that inevitably resulted in the overthrow of

Libyan tyrant Muammar Gaddafi. Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation inspired protests demanding greater freedom throughout the Middle East, which led many Libyans to organize and openly defy the iron fist of their despotic leader for the first time in 42 years. Over forty years ago, Muammar Gaddafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Blanchard

(2011) argues that it was these same principles that led the Opposition group to revolt against Gaddafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in

Libya for the past four decades. For protesting 42 years of oppression endured under the boot of Gaddafi’s regime, the Libyan people were attacked with helicopter gunships and extrajudicial killings by Libyan military forces and African mercenaries. The crisis reached a flashpoint in February 2011 when military attempts to suppress protests turned violent and sparked open rebellion against the brutality of Gaddafi’s regime. The rebellion surged toward Libya’s capital city of Tripoli, only to be repulsed by military air strikes and superior firepower. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Gaddafi’s overthrow sparked international outcry in

February and early March 2011. By mid-March, the rebellion was on the brink of defeat and begged the U.N. to establish a “no fly zone” over Libya to prevent the slaughter of

12 innocent civilians caught in the middle of what has become a civil war (Gannon, 2011).

The military intervention in Libya is one of the most remarkable military undertakings of the last twenty years. It was sanctioned with unusual speed and a wide-ranging mandate by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to avoid the feared bloodshed of civilians and anti-government rebels by Libya’s embattled leader Muammar Gaddafi’s forces (Alcaro, 2011).

In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 the U.S., U.K., France, Qatar,

U.A.E. and several other NATO partners began Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce a

“no fly zone” over Libyan airspace. Now the Libyan National Transitional Council is gaining international recognition as the sole legitimate authority of Libya while their rebellion is engaged in armed conflict to end Gaddafi’s 42-year rule and establish a democratic government in Libya.

International reactions, U.S., U.K., French, German, and Italian governments called for an end to Gaddafi’s regime as he indiscriminately murders Libyan civilians in the sole remaining western rebel city of Mistrata. According to Blanchard (2011), U.S president,

Barack Obama joined some leaders in asserting that Muammar Gaddafi must ultimately give up power. Contributions of 30 “military advisors” from France, Britain, and Italy, as well as U.S. drones and CIA assistance helped the Libyan rebels organize and renew their momentum in what appeared to be a stalemate. This crisis presented an unprecedented opportunity for a massive shift in U.S.-Libyan relations, away from a violent antagonistic past to one of cooperation that could lead to more stability in North Africa and the

Middle East. U.S. led NATO’s efforts in successfully deposing Gaddafi and establishing a democratic government in Libya will improve the United States relations in the Muslim world and a smile upon “The Obama Doctrine.”

Historically, U.S. - Libyan relations have ranged from cool to violent, therefore any scenario in which Gaddafi remains in power would not be too costly for the United States to bear. Additionally, the United States is beginning to financially cooperate with the

Transitional National Council, establishing a foundation for future business deals, thereby securing the only permanent interest the United States has in Libya – energy (Gannon,

2011).

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Major anti-government protests broke out in Libya on February 15 and have since intensified. The demonstrations are in opposition to the regime of Libya’s leader,

Muammar al Gaddafi, who has ruled the country for 42 years. The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (an umbrella organization of opposition groups headed by the

National Libyan Salvation Front (NLSF) and Internet-based organizers called for a “day of rage” to take place on February 17 (Blanchard, 2011). The unrest in Libya can be traced back to mid-January 2011, as part of the region-wide wave of popular protests— beginning in Tunisia in December 2010—against repression, political corruption, and poor and/or inequitable economic conditions. Although the Libyan government announced housing benefits and price controls, and released 110 members of the opposition Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in attempts to placate popular discontent, grievances persisted (Reuters, 2011). They were possibly fuelled by the other protests that took place throughout the region, particularly in Libya’s eastern neighbour Egypt, where the military took power from President Hosni Mubarak on February 11.

U.S and international reactions to events in Libya were pronounced. On February 18,

Reuters quoted President Barrack Obama as saying, “I am deeply concerned by reports of violence in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen. The United States condemns the use of violence

14 by governments against peaceful protesters in those countries and wherever else it may occur” (Colvin, 2011). The prospects for U.S. influence on developments in Libya are uncertain. There is currently no U.S. ambassador serving in Libya, and U.S.- Libya military ties are minimal, given that full diplomatic relations were restored only five years ago. Britain and France have reportedly suspended exports of security equipment to

Libya and Bahrain that could be used to suppress crowds (Agence France Presse, 2011).

The Wall Street Journal expressed concerns that because Libya is one of the world’s largest oil producers, the unrest could “rattle oil markets and the international petroleum industry” (Lewsley, 2011).

U.S.-led Operation Odyssey and NATO-led Operation Unified Protector gave the rebels a chance to consolidate their gains and organise a decisive offensive. The CIA as well as Special Forces element from several NATO countries assisted the rebels with intelligence, communications capabilities, operational planning, weapons training and even covert action.

From the overview, these research questions submit itself for investigation;

1. To what extent did economic and strategic interest motivate U.S in the Libyan

crisis?

2. To what extent did U.S involvement led to the collapse of Gaddafi

regime?

3. To what extent did the collapse of Gaddafi regime affect the political economy of

the Libyan state?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The broad objective of this study is to examine the linkage between U.S and the collapse of Gaddafi regime downplaying the relevance of oil. Thus, the study has been designed to achieve the following specific objectives:

1. To ascertain the opportunities for the United States in the Libyan crisis of 2011.

2. To demonstrate U.S involvement in the collapse of Gaddafi regime.

3. To understand the transformational change that has occurred in Libya after the

collapse of Gaddafi regime.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant in two ways. Academically, the findings of the study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge and will help illuminate on the role played by the United States to depose Gaddafi, especially, U.S. active participation with NATO in the Libyan Revolution. This study will reveal the hidden objectives and/or interests that drive nations to go to war. More so, to the scholars of International Relations, Middle

East and North Africa, researchers and academicians, this scientific research has great prospect of extending the frontiers of knowledge in the area of international relations and

Middle East studies in particular.

Practically, the contribution of this work in eliciting the area solution to the

Libyan revolution could help in bringing freedom and democracy to Libya, and positive attitude towards Westernization and western technology, national identity. In so doing, the study will contribute to the existing literature on Arab Spring, and 2011 Libyan revolution.

Finally, it will be very crucial to the understanding of crisis and crisis management and the aversion of armed confrontation, which are detrimental to global peace.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

The aim of this paper is to place a thematic focus on the role played by the United States in the collapse of Gaddafi regime, to elicit the cause of the Libyan revolution, and the great participation by NATO and UN through their resolutions. By adopting a thematic approach we will review on our already existing literatures based on the following themes;

• Brief history of Libya

• U.S strategic interest in Libya

• History of U.S – Libyan relations under Gaddafi

• Libyan revolution: Issues and Challenges

• The U.S and International responses to the crisis

BRIEF HISTORY OF LIBYA

According to Britannica (2009), The Socialist People’s Libyan Jamahiriya is an independent socialist state of North Africa. It is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on the north, Egypt on the east, The Sudan on the southeast, Niger and Chad on the south, and

Tunisia and Algeria on the west. It is largely composed of the Sahara, it covers an area of

678,400 square miles (1,757,000 square kilometres) and is one-fourth the size of the conterminous United States and almost twice the size of Egypt. The population is concentrated along the coast, where the de facto capital, Tripoli (Ṭar ābulus), and

Bangh āzī (Benghazi), the de jure capital, are located.

Before the discovery of oil in the 1950s, Libya was poor in natural resources and severely limited by the climatic conditions of the Sahara. The country was almost entirely dependent upon foreign aid and the import of commodities necessary for the maintenance of its economy. Petroleum dramatically changed this situation, and Libya became one of the richest countries of the Middle East and Africa. The government controls the economy and has attempted to develop agriculture and industry with the wealth derived from its huge oil revenues. It has also established a welfare state, which provides medical care and education.

Ottoman rule

Part of the Ottoman Empire from the early 16th century, Libya experienced autonomous rule (similar to that in Ottoman Algeria and Tunisia) under the Karamanli dynasty from

1711 to 1835. In the latter year the Ottomans took advantage of a dispute over the succession and local disorder to re-establish direct administration. For the next 77 years the area was administered by officials from the Ottoman capital of Constantinople

(modern Istanbul, Turkey) and shared in the limited modernization common to the rest of the empire. In Libya the most significant event of the period was the creation (1837) of the San ūsiyyah, which preached a puritanical form of Islam, giving the people instruction and material assistance and so creating in them an added sense of unity. The first San ūsī zāwiyah (monastery) in Libya was established in 1843 near the ruins of the ancient Greek colony of Cyrene in eastern Cyrenaica. The order spread principally in that province but also found adherents in the south. The Grand al-San ūsī, as the founder came to be called, moved his headquarters to the oasis of Al-Jaghb ūb near the Egyptian frontier, and in 1895 his son and successor, S īdī Mu ḥammad Idr īs al-Mahd ī, transferred it farther south into the

Sahara to the oasis group of Al-Kufrah. Though the Ottomans welcomed the order's

18 opposition to the spread of French influence northward from Chad and Tibesti, they regarded with suspicion the political influence it exerted within Cyrenaica. In 1908 the

Young Turk revolution gave a new impulse to reform; in 1911, however, the Italians, with banking and other interests in the country, launched an invasion of Libya.

The Ottomans sued for peace in 1912, but Italy found it more difficult to subdue the local population. Resistance to the Italian occupation continued throughout World War I

(1914–18). After the war Italy considered coming to terms with nationalist forces in

Tripolitania and with the San ūsiyyah, who were strong in Cyrenaica. These negotiations foundered, however, and the arrival of a strong governor, Giuseppe Volpi, in Libya and a

Fascist government in Italy (1922) inaugurated an Italian policy of thorough colonization.

The coastal areas of Tripolitania were subdued by 1923, but in Cyrenaica, San ūsī resistance led by ʿUmar al -Mukht ār was maintained until his capture and execution in

1931.

Italian colonization

In the 1920s and '30s the Italian government expended large sums on developing towns, roads, and agricultural colonies for Italian settlers. The most ambitious effort was the program of Italian immigration called “demographic colonization,” launched by the

Fascist leader Benito Mussolini in 1935. As a result of these efforts, some 150,000 Italian settlers were established in Libya (about 18 per cent of that country's total population) by the outbreak of World War II (1939–45).

These colonizing efforts and the resulting economic development of Libya were largely destroyed during the North Africa campaigns of 1940–43. Cyrenaica changed hands three times, and by the end of 1942 all of the Italian settlers had been withdrawn. Cyrenaica

19 largely reverted to pastoralism. Somewhat more of the economic and administrative development achieved by Italy survived in Tripolitania; however, Libya by 1945 was impoverished, under populated, and also divided into regions—Tripolitania and

Cyrenaica—of differing political, economic, and religious traditions (Britannica, 2009).

Independence

The future of Libya gave rise to long discussions after the war. In view of the contribution to the fighting made by a volunteer San ūsī force, the British foreign minister pledged in 1942 that the San ūsīs would not again be subjected to Italian rule. During the discussions, which lasted four years, suggestions included an Italian trusteeship, a United

Nations trusteeship, a Soviet mandate for Tripolitania, and various compromises. Finally, in November 1949, the UN General Assembly voted that Libya should become a united and independent kingdom no later than January 1, 1952.

A constitution creating a federal state with a separate parliament for each province was drawn up, and the pro-British head of the San ūsiyyah, S īdī Mu ḥammad Idr īs al-Mahd ī al-

San ūsī, was chosen king by a national assembly in 1950. On December 24, 1951, King

Idr īs I declared the country independent. Political parties were prohibited, and the king's authority was fundamental. Though not they San ūsīs, the Tripolitanians accepted the monarchy largely in order to profit from the British promise that the San ūsīs would not again be subjected to Italian rule. King Idr īs showed a marked preference for living in

Cyrenaica, where he built a new capital on the site of the San ūsī zāwiyah at Al-Bay ḍāʾ.

Though Libya joined the Arab League in 1953 and in 1956 refused British troops permission to land during the Suez Crisis, at that time the government in general adopted a pro-Western point of view in international affairs.

The Economy

Oil revenues are Libya's main source of income. During the 1980s, oil accounted for two- thirds of the national income and nearly 99% of export earnings, although it employed less than 10% of the labour force. The government exerts strong control over the economy. The petroleum industry was nationalized in the 1970s; state trade unions and industrial organizations run most other industries and utilities. To reduce the country's heavy dependence on oil, economic policy has emphasized agricultural and industrial development. Declining oil revenues during the 1980s, however, led to frequent revisions and delays in planned developments. In 1988, domestic reforms liberalized economic policy and encouraged private enterprise.

Libya's per capita income is the highest in Africa, but its population is relatively small. A shortage of labour has led to a large number of foreign workers—mostly from other

North African countries, western Africa, and the Middle East—in agriculture and industry.

Resources

Petroleum is Libya's most important mineral resource. First discovered in 1956 near the

Algerian border, it has since been located mainly in the Surt Basin. The major oil fields are Zal ṭan, Āmāl, and Inti ṣār A in the vicinity of Bangh āzī; the Dahra field is located near

Mi ṣrātah, and the Sarir field is near Darnah. Deposits have been located near Ghad āmis on the western border, Murzuq in the southwest, and the Al-Kufrah oasis in the southeast.

Exploration for new deposits has concentrated on the western region and offshore, where a large field was discovered northwest of Tripoli in 1988. Libya's proven oil reserves represent almost half of Africa's, or about 2 per cent of the worlds. Libyan crude oil is

21 low in sulphur content and therefore causes less corrosion and less pollution than most crude oils. The deposits are associated with natural gas.

The first pipeline was constructed from the Zal ṭan field to Mars ā al-Burayqah in 1961.

Since then additional lines have been built from Dahra to As-Sidrah and to Ra ʾs al-Un ūf, and other pipelines connect the Tobruk field to Mars ā al-Ḥar īqah and the Inti ṣār A field to Az-Zuwayt īnah. Refineries are located at Az-Zāwiyah, Mi ṣrātah, Ra ʾs al -Un ūf, and

Tobruk. A natural-gas pipeline runs parallel to the oil pipeline from Zal ṭan. The gas liquefaction plant at Mars ā al-Burayqah is the world's largest (Africa’s Year Book, 1977).

Libya is usually among the world's dozen largest producers of oil. Sales to Europe were enhanced by the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975. During the 1980s, however, production and revenues declined because of an increased supply of oil on the world market. Libya has concluded barter agreements with some European and African countries to exchange petroleum for goods and services. Only a small percentage of the

Libyan labour force is employed by the oil industry, along with a few thousand foreign workers.

Other mineral resources are limited. There are important deposits of natron (hydrated sodium carbonate) in the Fezzan and of potash in the Surt Desert near Mar ādah. The iron ore deposits at Sh āṭiʿ, although low in iron content, supply the iron-steel complex at

Mi ṣrātah. Marine salt is produced in Tripolitania, where there are also small deposits of gypsum, manganese, and lignite coal. Sulphur has been found in the Surt Desert, and there are scattered deposits of chalk, limestone, and marble that is quarried for the growing construction trade.

The arid climate supports few biological resources except for the grasslands of the

Akh ḍar Mountains and the Naf ūsah Plateau, which are valuable for grazing. There are no hydroelectric resources, and oil represents the only domestic means of producing electricity thermally.

Government

Libya is governed as a jamahiriya (“state of the masses”) under a constitution adopted in

1977 by the General People’s Congress (GPC), the national legislature established in

1976. The tenet behind this political arrangement is the Third Universal Theory, expounded by Muammar al-Qaddafi in his three-volume tract, The Green Book . This theory, which exhibits influences from socialism, Islamic political theory, and Libyan tribal practice, was designed as an alternative to both capitalist liberalism and communism. Although Qaddafi, who came to power in a military coup in 1969, is treated internationally as the Libyan head of state, he claims to have relinquished all formal power in favour of the GPC, retaining only an advisory role as the “Supreme Guide” of the Libyan revolution. In practice, however, he retains ultimate power. Delegates to the

General People’s Congress are chosen by local governments, known as Basic People’s

Congresses. Organizations known as Popular Committees are also important elements of the political scene, serving as vehicles to bring together political and policy interests outside the congresses, typically in workplaces (Microsoft Encarta, 2009).

Qaddafi's regime

Equally assertive in plans for Arab unity, Libya obtained at least the formal beginnings of unity with Egypt, The Sudan, and Tunisia, but these and other such plans failed as differences arose among the governments concerned. Qaddafi's Libya maintained a strong

23 interventionist orientation on the Palestine issue and in support of other guerrilla and revolutionary organizations in Africa and the Middle East, all of which provoked considerable antipathy from the established governments that were threatened by such groups. In July–August 1977 hostilities broke out between Libya and Egypt, and, as a result, many Egyptians working in Libya were obliged to return home. Indeed, in spite of expressed concern for Arab unity, the regime's relations with most Arab countries were poor. Qaddafi signed a treaty of union with Morocco's King Hassan II in August 1984, but Hassan abrogated the treaty in August 1986.

The regime, under Qaddafi's ideological guidance, continued to introduce innovations.

On March 2, 1977, the General People's Congress declared that Libya was to be known as the People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jam āhīriyyah (the latter term is a neologism meaning “government through the masses”). By 1981, however, a drop in the demand and price for oil on the world market was beginning to hamper Qaddafi's efforts to play a strong regional role. Ambitious efforts to radically change Libya's economy and society slowed, and there were signs of domestic discontent. Libyan opposition movements launched sporadic attacks against Qaddafi and his military supporters but met with arrest and execution.

Throughout the 1970s and '80s Libya engaged in intermittent warfare with Chad, largely over control of the mineral-rich Aozou strip situated near the border of the two states.

Libya was eventually bested by Chad's military, and diplomatic ties with Chad were restored in October 1988. In 1994 Libya withdrew its troops from the Aozou strip.

Relations with the United States deteriorated in the 1980s as the U.S. government protested Qaddafi's support for international terrorist groups and claimed Libya was producing chemical weapons. A series of retaliatory trade restrictions and military

24 skirmishes in the Gulf of Sidra culminated in a U.S. bombing raid on Tripoli and

Bangh āzī in April 1986. In 1996 the United States and the United Nations implemented a series of economic sanctions against Libya for its purported involvement in destroying a civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The willingness of Libya officials— after long denying culpability—to surrender suspects in the Scotland bombing and to compensate the families of the victims led to a lifting of UN sanctions in 2003. Later that year, Libya announced that it would stop producing chemical weapons; the United States responded by dropping most of its sanction.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST IN LIBYA

As it is rightly said, “the substructure determines the superstructure,” U.S strategic interest in Libya was on her rich low-sulphur oil. Libya as a major exporter of oil to

European markets and a haven for U.S oil companies found herself in a turmoil. The

Arab Spring in general and the Libyan uprising affected the flow of petroleum from the

Middle East and North African oil producing states. And the result was a global hike in the price of oil. In order to curtail the situation and avoid the further spread of revolution to neighbouring countries that will affect the free flow of oil from this region, the United

States being the world hegemon moved into action with the approval of the UN, and

NATO. The United States also have a strategic interest of regaining oil concessions in

Libya and a welcome-back of her oil companies.

However, the United States involvement in the 2011 Libyan revolution is seen as a humanitarian aid, to save the lives of Libyan citizens who were reported to be slaughtered by Gaddafi’s forces as a way of suppressing the protest against him. U.S –NATO led military raid and campaign and its Operation Odyssey Dawn and the policy of no-fly

25 zone that was implemented in Libya helped reduce tension, and in the end gave much support to the opposition fighting groups.

According to Chossudovsky (2011), another strategic interest of U.S in Libya was to oust

China. Strategically , U.S intervention in Libya is also seen as a way of limiting China’s participation in the Arab world and edging out China's National Petroleum Corp (CNPC).

HISTORY OF U.S. – LIBYAN RELATIONS UNDER GADDAFI

United States relations with Libya did not just start with the 2011 Libyan revolution. The U.S supported a U.N resolution establishing Libya’s independence from

Italy in 1951, yet relations between the two countries soured in 1972, after years of

Gaddafi’s rule. According to Blanchard (2011: 6), “in the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials cited the existence of training camps in Libya, and other support for a panoply of terrorist groups including the Abu Nadal Organisation, the Red Army faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General command (PFLP-GC), and the Irish Army.”

In affirmation, Gannon (2011) also posited that Gaddafi extended his vision of tribally- oriented Islamic socialism through the use of oil revenues to fund these violent Arab nationalist movements. Since taking power in 1969, Colonel Gaddafi has supported terrorists around the world to cause maximum harm to his opponent. Dubbed “mad dog” by former U.S. President – Roland Reagan, he orchestrated massacres and funded extremist organisations. As early as 1973, he agreed to ship arms and ammunition to IRA to attack British interest indirectly. According to Parry (2011), Gaddafi said “the bombs which are convulsing Britain and breaking its spirit are the bombs of Libyan people.” The death of PC Yvonne Fletcher when Libyan government officials fired from inside the country’s London embassy in 1984 was another deliberate act of violence. On April 5,

1986 Gaddafi ordered the bombing of La Belle, a West Berlin Nightclub to retaliate against American strikes on Libya and it is believed that he ordered the Lockerbie bombing which killed 270 people, including 189 U.S citizens in a part as a response to

America’s efforts to topple his regime. Gaddafi also ordered the bombing of UTA flight

772 to retaliate against France (Blanchard, 2011). The Libyan dictator admitted to sponsoring these acts of terror in 2008 when he agreed to compensate the victims

(Blanchard, 2011; Gannon, 2011; www.dailycaller.com/2011/03/18/a-triumphant- gaddafi-will-use-terror-to-retaliate-against-america-and-the-world.html/). The U.S government designated Libya a “state sponsor of terrorism” on December 29, 1972 after

Libya’s “funding, supporting, arming, harbouring, and encouraging terrorist organisations” (Gannon, 2011:3).

During the mid-1980s, Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya appeared to be involved in several terrorist attacks against the West, including explosion at the Rome and Vienna

Airports (Lewis, 2002). Early 1990s, the international community joined together in order to stop Libyan violence. In particular, three U.N Security Council resolutions (731, 748 and 883) demanded that Libya “cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups.” Libya was also ordered to demonstrate, “by concrete actions,” its renunciation of terrorism and to “cooperate fully in establishing responsibility” for the bombing of the U.S and French aircraft. However, in addition to U.N sanctions, the

United States imposed its own unilateral travel, trade and investment bans (Lewis, 2002).

UN sanctions were lifted on September 12, 2003, after Libya fulfilled all remaining

UNSCR requirements, including renunciation of terrorism, acceptance of responsibility for all actions of its officials, and payment of appropriate compensation to the victims’ families (www.wikipedia.org/libya-united-states-relations.html).

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced its intention to rid itself of WMD and

MTCR – class missile programs. Libya cooperated with the U.S., the U.K, the

International Atomic Energy Agency, and the prohibition of Chemical weapons towards these objectives Libya also signed the IAEA Additional Protocol and became a state party to the Chemical weapons Convention.

Blanchard and Zanotti (2011), Dunne (2004), St John (2006) posits that Gaddafi’s offers of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation following the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001 and his late 2003 decisions to dismantle Libya’s WMD and long range missile development programs marked further steps toward new relationships with the United States and the international Community.

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair welcomed the decision.

President Bush said in part:

Leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the United States and other free nations. With today’s announcement by its leader, Libya has begun the process of re-joining the community of nations. And Colonel Gaddafi knows the way forward. Libya should carry out the commitments announced today. Libya should also fully engage in the war against terror. As the Libyan government takes these essential steps and demonstrates its seriousness, its good faith will be returned. Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States… (St John, 2006:3)

In May 2010, Libya was elected to its first ever seat on the U.N Human Rights Council, which is a considerable diplomatic achievement for a country characterised by authoritarian, human rights abuses, and less than two decades removed from being considered foremost on the list of countries supporting terrorism ( Gannon, 2011).

Meyer (2011) is of the view that Gaddafi curtailed his support of terrorism to gain favour with the world community (and he was rewarded with a seat on the UN’s Human Rights

Council).

Muammar Gaddafi had a history of using terrorism to get even with his political enemies.

And if he had been alive and retained power, it is a good bet that he would have retaliated against America for their support of the Libyan opposition. No wonder Meyer (2011) advised in his article published by Daily Caller Opinion that the international community should help topple the tyrant – Muammar Gaddafi. In his words, he explains;

We must work with the international community to ensure that Gaddafi is deposed, because our [America] security and values depend on it. The recently passed UN resolution is a good place to start. Hopefully, it will also lead to the end of Gaddafi. Our direct security is at risk if Gaddafi is triumphant.

With this in mind, and the safety of the endangered people of Libya, the world’s obligation to stop mass murder and gross human rights violations, the emboldening message Gaddafi’s victory would send to other dictators, and the crippling effect it would have on opposition groups in countries such as Iran, the United States through NATO in their support with the Opposition rebels and the NTC (National Transitional Council) ousted Gaddafi from his forty-two years of reign.

Libya was recognised as an independent sovereign state by the United Nations in

1949, effective 2 nd January 1952. Its form of government was monarchical under King

Idris I. in order to improve its economic conditions, to encourage the inflow FDI and capital, and to ensure the exploitation and protection of its natural resources, Libya enacted Petroleum Law No 25 in 1955. The law established a framework for the exploration and production of petroleum with the Libyan kingdom. It provided a concessionary system for the exploitation of petroleum products, and established an autonomous Petroleum Commission which was entitled to grant relevant concession. In

1950, LIAMCO (Libyan American Oil Company), an American company, entered into a number of Concession Agreements with the Libyan government for the exploration and production of petroleum. After the Revolutionary Command Council headed by Colonel

Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the government of Idris I, LIAMCO was subjected to gradual measures, restricting rights granted in the Concession Agreements, ultimately resulting in complete nationalization of all LIAMCO’s physical assets and concession rights in Libya.

According to Oil and Gas Journal 2011 , Libya’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 43.7 billion barrels (ninth largest in the world). The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) manages oil production activity and negotiates exploration and production agreements with foreign companies. Most of Libya’s oil is exported to Italy, Germany, France, Spain and China. However, following the resumption of crude oil exports to the United States in June 2004, oil shipments to U.S. refineries have increased from 56,000 barrels per day in 2005 to an average of 102,000 barrels per day in 2008 (Blanchard, 2011). In 2009, the average declined slightly to 77,000 per day. According to Chossudovsky (2011:1),

“operation Libya” is part of the broader agenda in the Middle East and Central Asia which insists in gaining control and corporate ownership over more than 60% of the world’s reserves of oil and natural gas, including oil and gas pipeline routes.”

Chossudovsky (2011) opines that the planned invasion of Libya is a battle for oil, and that the invasion of Libya under a humanitarian mandate would serve the same corporate interests as the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. He asserts that;

The underlying objective is to take possession of Libya’s oil reserves, destabilise the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and eventually privatise the country’s oil industry, namely transfer the control and ownership of Libya’s oil wealth into foreign hands (Chossudovsky, 2011:2).

He concludes by saying, oil is the trophy of the U.S – NATO led war.

It is interesting to note that the 2011 Libyan revolution has paved way for America’s invasion into the energy – oil of Libya once again. According to Ohanwe (2011), states experiencing these eruptions [revolt] derive enormous support and assistance from the

U.S and the West (as cited in Ebaye et al , 2011). Ebaye (2011) asserts that the support is in a bid to achieve their objectives in the region irrespective of the domestic policies of such regimes.

LIBYAN UPRISING: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Libya under Gaddafi has borne traces of the Italian fascism that ruled the country in its colonial days: extravagance, dogmatism and brutality. In the name of his

“permanent revolution”, Gaddafi prohibited private ownership and retail trade, banned a free press, and subverted the civil service and the military leadership (Anderson, 2011).

The Libyan 2011 revolution began on 17 February 2011 as an uprising in the north-east of the country and in the Nafusa Mountains in the north-west, triggered by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as well as smaller local protests in Benghazi over the detention of a lawyer. Numerous factors led to the protests, including issues such as dictatorship, human rights violations, government corruptions, economic decline, unemployment, and extreme poverty. The demonstration was in opposition to the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, who has ruled the country for 42 years, and to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades.

According to Lacher (2012), two developments were decisive for the revolt to escalate into a revolution. The first was the regime’s violent response to the protests, and the second key development was the establishment of the NTC in Benghazi in early March.

In late August, anti-Gaddafi fighters captured Tripoli, scattering Gaddafi's government and marking the end of his 42 years of power. Many institutions of the government,

31 including Gaddafi and several top government officials, regrouped in Sirte, which

Gaddafi declared to be Libya's new capital. And on 20 October 2011, fighters under the aegis of the National Transitional Council seized Sirte, killing Gaddafi in the process.

U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS

The United States, the European Union, Russia, the Arab League, and the African union joined other international actors in condemning Gaddafi supporters’ violent attacks on civilians. According to Blanchard (2011), some parties, including the United States and the European Union called for Gaddafi to step down. Obama in a speech on the second day of the war explained; “America would like to see Gaddafi removed” (Fakeeh,

2011). The United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and other countries enacted their own targeted sanctions on Gaddafi and have limited financial transactions with Libya and arms shipments to the country. Gaddafi’s assets from his

American-based investments valued at US $30billion was blocked in the United States along with €1million in the United Kingdom, and €1million in Austria (Saif, 2011).

On February 22, the U.N Security Council (UNSC) released a press statement that

“condemned the violence and use of force against civilians, deplored the repression against peaceful demonstrators, and expressed deep regret at the deaths of hundreds of civilians.” Members of the council further called for an immediate end to the violence and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population, including through national dialogue” (UNSC department of Public Information, 2011). On February 26,

2011, the Security Council debated and unanimously adopted resolution 1970, which

• Establishes an arms embargo prohibiting weapons transfers to Libya, while providing for third party inspection of suspicious cargo and for consideration of possible exemptions by the Committee established by paragraph 24 of the resolution;

• Grants the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over crimes committed in

Libya on or after February 15, 2011;

• Imposes targeted financial and travel sanctions on Muammar al Gaddafi, certain family members, and some prominent supporters;

• Calls on member states to support humanitarian response efforts; and,

• Provides for further consideration of the situation in Libya, while not authorizing the use of military force by member states with regard to the situation in Libya.

On March 1, the U.N general Assembly, acting on the recommendation of the Human

Rights Council on February 25, considered the situation in Libya, and adopted, by consensus, a resolution suspending Libya from “the rights of the membership” on the

Human Rights Council” (Blanchard, 2011:13). Since Resolution 1970 did not authorise the use of force by member states with regard to the situation in Libya. U.N Security

Council adopted resolution 1973 on March 17 after the violence escalated. The

Resolution 1973 which:-

• Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

• Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the

Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory;

• Establishes a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians,

• Authorizes robust enforcement inspection measures for the arms embargo established by Resolution 1970, including measures to prevent the movement of mercenary forces to

Libya; and,

• Directs the U.N. Secretary General to convene an eight-person Panel of Experts to monitor the situation in Libya and implementation of Resolutions 1970 and 1973;

• Signals the Security Council’s determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to

Resolution 1970 “shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;”

• Calls on member states to enforce a ban on flights by any aircraft registered in the

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies; and,

• Expands targeted financial and travel sanctions on Libyan individuals and entities and extends sanction provisions to persons found to be violating the arms embargo established by Resolution 1970.

“International concern about the conflict in Libya was shared in many senses amplified within regional bodies such as the Arab League, and the African Union, of which Libya and its neighbours are members” (Blanchard, 2011:14). The Arab League states suspended Libya from meetings and also the U.N Resolution 1973. According to

Blanchard (2011) the Arab League incorporated with the Libyan opposition Interim

Transitional National Council (ITNC), and Qatar and UAE deployed six Mirage fighter aircraft respectively, six F-16, two C-17A for the no-fly zone and relief operations

(Blanchard, 2011).

Although African countries played minimal role, the African union condemned the use of violence against civilians in Libya and dispatched a fact-finding mission to investigate the crisis. Ethiopia, on March 25 issued a roadmap calling for “the protection

34 of civilians and the cessation of hostilities; humanitarian assistance to affected populations.

Like the United States, the European Union (EU) had pursued a policy of engagement with the Gaddafi government in recent years, and several EU member states re-established deep economic ties with Libya. European states have long been important consumers of Libyan oil and natural gas. This notwithstanding, Gaddafi’s use of violence on Libyan citizens led the EU to impose arms embargo and targeted sanctions on

Muammar Gaddafi, his family, some of his prominent supporters. The EU also expanded it to include visa ban and asset freezes, Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC), Libya’s

Investment Authority (LIA) and Libya’s Central Bank (Blanchard, 2011). Some EU

Member states such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Greece, Denmark, and Italy took active role in the military operations, while others, such as Germany declined to endorse military intervention. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said, “We won’t take part in any military operation and I not send German troops to Libya

“(Blanchard, 2011). On March 25, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy reiterated the joint European Union position by stating:

Gaddafi must go, and we want a political transition, led by the Libyans themselves, and based on a broad based political dialogue. We also stand ready to help a new Libya, both economically, and in building its new institutions. The humanitarian situation in Libya and at its borders remains a source of serious concern and that’s why we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance in Libya.

“On the humanitarian front, as of March 28, 2011 the EU acting through the European

Commission, and the EU member states had committed €75.8million ($106.4million ) in cash and in-kind donations to support the creation and maintenance of transit facilities, to provide relief to individuals, and to repatriate EU and third-party nationals”(Blanchard,

2011:17).

NATO assumed command and control of military operations in Libya. According to NATO Secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the goal of NATO’s Operation

Unified Protector (OUP) is to “protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack from the Gaddafi regime.” On the contrary, Ebaye et al is of the opinion that

NATO’s intervention is likened to a reactionary force which aims to subvert, clot-up or hijack the revolutionary momentum of the people towards structural change and to replace the autocratic regimes with a new form of dictatorship pliable to Western imperial hegemony.

From this overview, the unrest in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries which Libya is part of contributed to higher oil prices, causing some supply reductions and giving rise to worries that the unrest may spread to the regions larger energy producers. Going by the fact that most NATO Member states are consumers of

Libya’s oil, the Libyan revolt or protest created an opportunity for U.S and NATO to launch an attack on Gaddafi’s regime in the guise of using human rights as a pretext for war.

1.6 THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Onuoha (2008:32), “theories are lenses through which we see the world. It is a deliberate systematic body of knowledge that helps the scholar to speculate, but also interpret, describe, explain and predict global politics.” The theories of

International relations provide us with a choice of conceptual frameworks. By theoretical framework, we mean a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumption, postulations and principles of a theory in the description and analysis of a research problem (Obasi, 1999:43). In analysis, we will adopt the Marxian political economy approach as our theoretical framework in buttressing the views and literatures gathered so

36 for on the relationship between United States and the collapse of Gaddafi regime, how

Libyan protest or unrest culminated to civil war and/or revolution. The proponents despite Marx himself include; Paul Baran (1987), Claude Ake (1981), Robert Gilpin

(1987), Lenin (1975) and other known contributors to the theory. As lucidly presented by

Aja (1998), Marx (1977), Ake (1981), and Chikendu (2002), political economy approach attempts to show how the interplay of politics and economics affects reforms in societies and the global economic structure with which state and other economic entities contact and interact in world economic system.

Marxian political economy is a theory based on dialectical materialism or economic determinism in which the system of economic production determines the institutional and ideological structure of society (Wetter, 1963). Central to the political economy of imperialism and war is the assumption that all international issues are reducible to issues of economic gains rather than political power. It considers that all histories are history of class struggle between the ruling class and the opposing group, from which comes a new economic, political, and social system (Marx, 1977). Marx analysis contains a thesis; ruling class, and an antithesis; opposing group, which clash and produce a synthesis; a new economic, political, and social system (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1997).

Labour is the essence of material existence, hence, economic activity is man’s primary concern. In line with Aja (1998), the thrust of this perspective is on how the understanding of a society’s politics and culture depend primarily on the understanding of its economic structure as defined by the relations between employers of labour and the working class in the process of production. To Marx, every political system corresponds and reflects its kind of economic structure. Marx places emphasis and premium on the production base, i.e., the substructure. Thus, from the substructure, one easily understand the nature of internal relations, how a society organizes, manages and reproduces itself,

37 the causes of tension, conflicts or contradictions in any given society and the bearing or direction of social change.

The political economy approach lays emphasis on (a) the primacy of material conditions (b) the dynamic character of reality and (c) the relatedness of different elements of society (Ake, 1981:4). First the approach gives priority to economic factors as the bases for international relations among state. In other words, nations interact with one another in an effort to satisfy their economic needs. As a result, their interactions centered more or less on economic activities aimed at increasing productivity and political influence. Essentially, nations pay particular attention to their economic structures and those of other countries in their relations in view of chances of advancing their economic interests. The dynamic character of reality as the second principle of the political economy approach refuses to look at aspects of the world as simple entities or discrete elements, or as being static (Ake, 1981). It sees the world in terms of continuity and relatedness, and that this continuity is essentially complex and problematic, full of movement and dynamism resulting from contradictions which pervade the co-existence among states at the international system. It looks at society dialectically. Hence, political and economic relations in the society should not be seen in terms of simple harmonies and irreconcilable contrasts.

Thus, Marx believes that the primary cause of tension and other social dislocation in a society is economic factor. According to Aja (1998), if one understands the economic structure of a society, the relations between the people in production process, it is easier to understand the nature of politics, culture, national security, socio-psychological consciousness, ideological inclinations, etc. Karl Marx first employed the political economy approach for analysing and justifying the root causes of conflicts and contradictions in human societies.

Ranny (2004) regards the American economy as a citadel of capitalist ideas and therefore stands out as a country in which its degree of capitalism and economic enterprises operates for profits. Udoh (2006), presents the American political economy and dominant class in America under the pre-Bush as pro-business, pro-mercantilists with a strong central government that has kept faith in the traditional dominant class style of engineering the growth of economy which it exemplified in tax cuts, strong national defense and strong alliances with the ideally and powerful businessmen as their main base of support. This dominance is born out of a desire to control the access of those supplies of raw materials needed for capitalist imperialism.

Applying this postulation to our discourse, following the internal revolutions in

Libya, the U.S through the instrument of NATO is fashioning out a response to give her a strategic and economic grip of Libya. The U.S led NATO involvement and the collapse of Gaddafi was to maintain a stable price of oil due to the crisis that has engulfed the

Middle East and North African countries which are the major producer and exporter of oil and gas. The European countries are the major consumer of Libya’s oil, and NATO is a conglomerate of European countries. Libya is the ninth largest producer of oil in the world and the first in Africa. Italy alone receives about 35% of Libya’s crude oil export.

And it has been established that Libya has a large amount of reserved and untapped crude, which the America refer to be “under exploited”. Ousting Muammar Gaddafi who is seen to be a stumbling block to America’s strategic interest will create leverage for

America hegemonic tendency and control of Libyan oil.

From the corollary of the above, America and NATO’s economic interest which is

– oil is the main and strategic lead to the U.S involvement in the collapse of Gaddafi regime.

1.7 HYPOTHESES

• There is a positive relationship between strategic/economic interest and U.S-

NATO led war on Libya.

• There is a strong U.S military participation in the Libyan crisis.

• The collapse of Gaddafi regime has brought participatory democracy and

economic reforms.

1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Method of data collection specifies how the test of the hypothesis is going to be carried out (Ifesinachi, 2010). We relied heavily on qualitative method of data collection.

Qualitative method is very useful when the task is to find out, illuminate, interpret and extract valuable information so as to draw inference from the available evidence to reach a conclusion. Qualitative method, according to Nnabugwu (2006), is used to obtain in- depth information and concept or variable clarification so as to facilitate instrument designs.

Data of this study is based mainly on secondary sources. This is principally due to the nature of this study as well as the type of data required to test and validate our hypothesis.

And thus, entails making use of literatures written on Libyan revolution and/or civil war,

Arab spring, International reactions to the MENA conflicts; America’s role and interest in the crisis. Books, Articles, Journals, and Internet materials were equally helpful. The study also depended on institutional and official documents from U.S. Congress Research

Service (CRS), United Nations, and GlobalResearch.com.

We employed qualitative descriptive analysis to analyse the quantum of data generated in the course of this study.

1.9 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

In analysing our data we adopted the qualitative descriptive method of data analysis. According to Asika (1990) qualitative descriptive analysis is used to verbally summarize the information gathered in research. Through qualitative descriptive analysis, descriptive explanation is given to statistical data gathered in our research work, in order to establish the relationship between the variables under study. Thus, the use of this method of analysis is informed by the simplicity with which it summarizes, exposes and interprets relationships in a given data by a qualitative description or explanation to statistical information. Moreover tables and figure were used to enable us organize the information gathered in a concise and coherent manner.

CHAPTER 2

U.S. STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN LIBYA

The United States involvement in the 2011 Libyan revolution is seen as a humanitarian aid, to save the lives of Libyan citizens who were reported to be slaughtered by Gaddafi’s forces as a way of suppressing the protest against him. U.S –NATO led military raid and campaign and its Operation Odyssey Dawn and the policy of no-fly zone that was implemented in Libya helped reduce tension, and in the end gave much support to the opposition fighting groups.

However, the presence of China in Libya gives U.S so much worry. The fear of the communist China’s incursion in the MENA countries has intensified America’s interest and the need to maintain a hegemonic role in the region. The recent economic reforms and capitalist shift in Libya opens a window of opportunity for America’s FDI, the welcome-back of her oil companies in Libya, and a strategic positioning of America in

North Africa. Also, America’s expansionism will help suppress Libya’s support to

Palestine and Gaddafi’s recommendation of ‘Isratine’ – a fusion of Israel and Palestine as the only way to maintain peace in the Middle East.

Although Exum and Hosford (2011) argue that the Obama administration entered into the third American war of the 21 st century in a country where the United States has few real interests. Scholars like Ebaye et al (2011) , Saif (2011), and Boucek (2004) contrarily argue that the United States is playing a hegemonic role, and swapping democracy for business interests, and to maintain some strategic and economic interests respectively. In this chapter we will painstakingly highlight some of the reasons that motivated the United

States in the Libyan crisis. From our background study, they include human rights

42 protection; to install democracy; economic interests which involves protection of U.S oil companies – Conocophillips, Marathon oil corp., Hess corp., and Occidental petroleum corp. present in Libya; stability of oil price; and the strategic return to Wheelus Air base, etc.

2.1 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

The Libyan Revolt turned into revolution when the Gaddafi’s military forces started using coercion to quell the situation. The killing of peaceful civilian demonstrators in Benghazi raised international outcry. Most Libyan NGOs wrote to UN demanding the implementation of “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. According to Nazemroaya

(2011), the Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR) was actually pivotal to getting the

UN involved through its specific claims in Geneva. On February 21, 2011 the LLHR with some other NGOs sent letters to the President Obama, E.U High Representative –

Catherine Ashton, and the UN Secretary General – Ban-ki Moon demanding international action against Libya invoking the responsibility to protect doctrine (Nazemroaya, 2011).

The letter is as follows:

We, the undersigned non-governmental, human rights, and humanitarian organisations, urge you to mobilize the United Nations and the international community and take immediate action to halt the mass atrocities now being perpetrated by the Libyan government against its own people. The inexcusable silence cannot continue.

As you know, in the past several days, Colonel Moammar Gaddafi’s forces are estimated to have deliberately killed hundreds of peaceful protesters and innocent bystanders across the country. In the city of Benghazi alone, one doctor reported seeing at least 200 dead bodies. Witnesses report that a mixture of special commandos, foreign mercenaries and regime loyalists has attacked demonstrators with knives, assault rifles and heavy-calibre weapons…

There is no question here about the intent. The government media has published open threats, promising that the demonstrators would meet a “violent and thunderous response.”

Accordingly, the government of Libya is committing gross and systematic violations of the right to life as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Citizens seeking to exercise their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are being massacred by the governments…

Under the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, you have a clear and unambiguous responsibility to protect the people of Libya. The international community, through the United Nations, has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect the Libyan population. Because the Libyan national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their population from crimes against humanity, should peaceful means be inadequate, member states are obliged to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII.

In addition, we urge you to convene an emergency Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council, whose members have a duty, under UNGA Resolution 60/251, to address situations of gross and systematic violations of violations of human rights. The session should:

- Call for the General Assembly to suspend Libya’s Council membership, pursuant to Article 8 of resolution 60/251, which applies to member states that commit gross and systematic violations of human rights. - Strongly condemn, and demand an immediate end to, Libya’s massacre of its own citizens. - Dispatch immediately an international mission of independent experts to collective relevant facts and documents violations of international human rights laws and crimes against humanity, in order to end the impunity of the Libyan government. The mission should include an independent medical investigation into the deaths, and an investigation of the unlawful interference by the Libyan government with the access to and treatment of wounded. - Call on the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights and the Council’s relevant Special Procedures to closely monitor the situation and take action as needed. - Call on the Council to remain seized of the matter and address the Libyan situation at its upcoming 16 th regular session in March. - Member states and high officials of the United States have a responsibility to protect the people of Libya from what are preventable crimes. We urge you to use all available measures and levers to end atrocities throughout the country.

We urge you to send a clear message that, collectively, the international community, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council will

not be bystanders to these mass atrocities. The credibility of the United Nations – and many innocent lives is at stake (Nazemroaya, 2011:2-3).

Gannon (2011) also assert that the Libyan people were attacked with helicopter gunships and extrajudicial killings by Libyan military forces and African mercenaries.

With this heinous character and behaviour displayed by Muammar Gaddafi, America being the world hegemon and a strong force in the UNSC took the bull by the horns and led the UN and NATO to Libya.

The United States –led Operation Odyssey Dawn was the first defining action of what is considered “The Obama Doctrine” characterised by cooperation with international partners and the use of military force to secure humanitarian interests (Gannon, 2011).

The Operation Odyssey dawn achieved the goal of preventing Gaddafi from utilising his air power to inflict atrocities on Libyan civilians. The UNSCR 1973 Operation Odyssey

Dawn enforced “a no-fly zone” over Libya airspace to prevent the slaughter of innocent civilians caught in the middle of what became a civil war. The no-fly zone provisions of

Resolution 1973 ban “all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians” with the exception of humanitarian flights, evacuation flights, flights authorised for the protection of civilians, and other flights which are deemed necessary by states acting under the authorisation … to be for the benefit of the Libyan people (Blanchard, 2011).

The U.S. military’s newest combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) took the lead on Operation Odyssey Dawn, the initial U.S. contribution to a multilateral military effort to provide humanitarian relief, enforce a no-fly zone and arms embargo, and protect civilians in Libya in line with Resolution 1973. The civilian protection

45 provisions of Resolution 1973 authorised “all means necessary” to defend Libyan civilians and prevent a looming humanitarian catastrophe.

2.2 DEMOCRACY

The wave of protests going on in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries where citizens of these countries are protesting against their despotic governments and demanding for change, an end to authoritarian leadership, and full participation in the affairs of government. The Tunis and Egyptian revolution and its swift to democratic and participatory democracy, the Libyan crisis and the resultant killings of civilians by

Gaddafi’s forces paved way for America to support Opposition groups seeking a change of government – a democratic government. In one of Ronald Bruce St John articles

“Libya and the United States: The Next Steps, he highlighted on America’s interest to support a democratic change in Libya whenever it may occur. This was seen in George

W. Bush speech during Libya’s dismantling of their WMD. Toward the end of his remarks, President Bush commented on the opportunity to promote democracy in Libya.

“Should Libya pursue internal reform, America will be ready to help its people to build a more free and prosperous country” (St John, 2006:3).

According to Walker (2011:76), “the central motives for democratizing interventions may appear to have more to do with national security or geopolitical factors (e.g., intervention on behalf of political allies, or interventions to protect strategic resources) – many of which seem to have little in common with the desire to bring about the democratization of an autocratic government.” Democratizing interventions can be seen as a subset of military interventions. It is merely necessary that democracy is one intended goal of the operation. Installation of democracy can be an important policy objective within the intervention strategy.

The closest Obama came to clearly delineating the relationship between the US intervention and the Libyan revolution was when he said:

… America has an important strategic interest in preventing Gaddafi from overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful – yet fragile – transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power. The writ of the UN Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling its future credibility to uphold global peace and security. So while I will never minimize the costs involved in military action, I am convinced that a failure to act in Libya would have carried a far greater price for America.

Now, just as there are those who have argued against intervention in Libya, there are others who have suggested that we broaden our military mission beyond the task of protecting the Libyan people, and do whatever it takes to bring down Gaddafi and usher in a new government.

Of course, there is no question that Libya – and the world – will be better off with Gaddafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non-military means. But broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.

2.3 STRATEGIC INTEREST

There are some strategic reasons that motivated the United States to participate in the

Libyan crisis. A state is only guided by interests, and her foreign policy is driven by these interests. In the case of America’s intervention in Libya, these factors highlighted below spurred U.S interests in the Libyan crisis.

Gaddafi’s Arab-Israeli Intransigence

The Arab-Israeli conflict was another particularly pointed source of tension between the

United States and Gaddafi: Libya remained distinctly opposed to negotiation or reconciliation with Israel throughout the cold war era and the 1990s, promoting armed

47 struggle as the only viable means to end Israel’s occupation of territory it captured from neighbouring Arab states in 1967. At times, Gaddafi’s positions led to deep bilateral rifts between Libya and Egypt, particularly under Anwar Sadat, as well as confrontations with

PLO leader Yasir Arafat. Gaddafi and his security services provided support, training, and safe harbour for Palestinian terrorist groups until the late 1990s. After a temporary reconciliation with Arafat during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, Gaddafi returned to voicing complete opposition to the Oslo peace process and called for Arab leaders to avoid further recognition of or negotiation with Israel.

In recent years, Gaddafi publicly has maintained his opposition to Arab engagement with

Israel in the face of continued Israeli occupation and settlement activity. He also has called for a “one state solution” based on reconciliation between the Israeli and

Palestinian people within a single state, which he proposes be called “Isratine.” In a

January 2009 opinion editorial in the New York Times Gaddafi rejected the “tired rhetoric of partition and two-state solutions,” and argued that “the compromise is one state for all, an ‘Isratine’ that would allow the people in each party to feel that they live in all of the disputed land and they are not deprived of any one part of it.” Central to Gaddafi’s position is the proposal that Palestinian refugees be granted “the right of return for

Palestinian refugees to the homes their families left behind in 1948,” which is rejected by the Israeli government.

The rift has affected Israel position in the Arab world and America’s support. Gaddafi’s posture in the Arab world affected and reduced the relationship that exists between

America and the rest of the MENA countries. One of the strategic motives behind ousting

Gaddafi was to ameliorate the rift that exists between Arab countries and Israel and

America’s support to Israel. The separate state bid by Israel which Gaddafi openly condemned and recommended a merge of the two states. Isratine – to Gaddafi will be the

48 only remedial approach to this more or less intractable conflict that exists between

Palestine and Israel. Israel abruptly declined, rejecting the offer for a merged state –

Isratine.

From this overview, America being a strong ally of Israel and her major financer sees

Gaddafi as a threat, and ousting Gaddafi from the seat of power will reduce Israel enemies.

Expulsion of China from Libya

Strategically, U.S intervention in Libya is also seen as a way of limiting China’s participation in the Arab world, Libya in specific. China, Algeria and Germany did not support the military intervention by U.S.-led NATO military intervention in Libya.

Chinese government had infrastructural facilities going on in Libya and a crisis will destabilise the program. US-NATO intervention leading to the eventual formation of a

US puppet regime is also intent upon excluding China from the region and edging out

China's National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). More generally, China's presence in North

Africa is considered by Washington to constitute an intrusion. From a geopolitical standpoint, China is an encroachment. The military campaign directed against Libya is intent upon excluding China from North Africa. The Anglo-American oil giants including

British Petroleum which signed an exploration contract in 2007 with the Gaddafi government are among the potential "beneficiaries" of the proposed US-NATO military operation.

Losing out on Libya’s post-Gaddafi reconstruction is likely to constitute more than just a commercial loss for China. It puts China on the wrong side of history in a region in which three out of five countries – Egypt, Tunisia and Libya – have recently freed themselves from the yoke of an autocratic leader (Dorsey, 2011).

The Swiss financial guru Marc Faber said that this latest Western neo-imperial foray into

North Africa and the Middle-East had little to do with ‘democracy’ and more to do with controlling the oil reserves of the region as means to contain China. China imports roughly 85% of its oil from this region. “China had an estimated $18 billion in infrastructure-related construction contracts and imported 150,000 barrels a day of oil or three percent of total crude imports through Unipec, the trading arm of its state-owned oil giant Sinopec” (Dorsey, 2011:1). So, controlling this region means effectively being able to blackmail and choke China of these essential resources.

2.4 ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Positive relations with Libya offer the United States several important economic benefits.

First and foremost is access to the Libyan hydrocarbon market.

Libyan crude is highly sought after because of its high specific gravity and low sulphur content. This makes Libyan sweet crude especially lucrative in the production of "larger quantities of high-in-demand light fuels" and the corresponding low refining costs.

Furthermore, Libyan crude is valued for its relative closeness to European consumers, which currently receive about 95% of all Libyan exports. The European market is arguably the most attractive for both consumers and producer. Nonetheless, for an administration in Washington seeking to diversify its energy sources, Libyan sweet crude is appealing for a several reasons: it's plentiful, cheap to refine, and would likely take significantly less time to reach American markets compared to oil originating in the

Persian Gulf.

Libya's oil reserves are the largest in Africa and the ninth largest in the world. Libya possesses an estimated 44 billion barrels of oil underground. Historically the rate of extraction in Libya has been lower than average, prompting oil experts to view these large reserves as under-exploited. Libyan oil fields are under-developed compared to other countries like Saudi fields which are showing depletion. Statistically, in long-terms, it means there's more chance to extract oil from a new well in Libya, meaning more profits over the same investment. This kind of opportunity does not ring on the door bell of oil companies often. There's basically a much higher probability for oil companies to make a lot of money in Libya than anywhere else. While Libya managed to produce 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) under Gaddafi, production has come to a grinding halt since the rebel uprising (www.Oil-Price.net ).

Since the oil industry nationalization by Gaddafi 40 years ago, obtaining Libyan oil contracts was a matter of government diplomacy rather than private business. In a nutshell, whoever sucked up the most to Gaddafi with lavish gifts and would stroke his ego was allowed to dip in Libya's oil. Although Gaddafi was the convenient "one-stop oil shopping" point of contact to Libya oil, his erratic behaviour had many western powers wish for a better business partner, and so many saw an opportunity in supporting the uprising.

When NATO strikes started against Libyan military targets, the dictator, Gaddafi, threatened to annihilate the country's oil pipelines to put pressure on NATO. Call it curious coincidence or not, key oil ports, Es Sider, Ras Lanuf, Zueitina, Brega and

Tobruk, were the first to fall to rebels, rather than the political capitals. After all, crude oil plays a significant centrefold role in the events unfolding in Libya.

An invasion of Libya under a humanitarian mandate would serve the same corporate interests as the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. The underlying objective is to take possession of Libya's oil reserves, destabilize the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and eventually privatize the country's oil industry, namely transfer the control and ownership of Libya's oil wealth into foreign hands. The planned invasion of Libya is part of the broader "Battle for Oil" (Chossudovsky, 2011).

Libyan oil is a bonanza for the Anglo-American oil giants. While the market value of crude oil is currently well in excess of 100 dollars a barrel, the cost of Libyan oil is extremely low, as low as $1.00 a barrel. (Chossudovsky, 2011).

Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa. The objective of US-NATO interference is strategic: it consists in outright theft, in stealing the nation's oil wealth under the disguise of a humanitarian intervention. This military operation is intent upon establishing US hegemony in North Africa, a region historically dominated by France and to lesser extent by Italy and Spain.

With regard to Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, Washington's design is to weaken the political links of these countries to France and push for the installation of new political regimes which have a close rapport with the US. This weakening of France is part of a

US imperial design. It is a historical process which goes back to the wars in Indochina.

In 1986, former U.S. President Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order to all U.S. oil companies to withdraw from Libya. This led to an agreement between NOC and the U.S. oil companies to freeze previous agreements for three years, pending review.

On 20 September 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 12543, lifting most remaining U.S. sanctions against Libya and paving the way for U.S. oil companies

52 to try to secure contracts or revive previous contracts for tapping Libya’s oil reserves.

The Order also revoked any restrictions on importation of oil products refined in Libya, and unblocked certain assets (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waha_Oil_Company).

Currently, four U.S oil firms are waxing strong in Libya. Chevron, Occidental Petroleum,

Hess, Conoco Phillips, Marathon, all have concessions with the Libyan Waha oil corporation – one of the largest oil firms in Libya.

Furthermore, stability of oil price led U.S to Libya. The political unrest in the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) contributed to higher oil prices and added instability to energy markets. Higher oil prices can negatively impact the economies of oil importing countries. According to Ploch (2011:15), “oil prices have likewise been affected by recent instability in Libya.” The cost of oil is the primary determinant of gasoline prices and prices of other petroleum products; increased costs can be a burden on households and many businesses in America and Europe. Rising import costs for oil, natural gas and petroleum-based products can be a drag on economic growth by negatively affecting the trade balance.

According to Ratner and Nerurkar (2011:2), “the Brent crude oil price (a key international reference or benchmark) increased by nearly $20 per barrel from December

17, 2011, when protests started in Tunisia, to $113 per barrel on March 8, 2011, by which point unrest had spread through Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and elsewhere.” The unrest in the

Middle East and North Africa contributed to higher prices by causing some supply reductions and giving rise to worries that unrest may spread to the region’s larger energy producers.

Figure 1: Recent Benchmark Oil Prices Prices from December 16, 2010, through March 8, 2011

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm. Notes: WTI is the main U.S. benchmark for crude oil prices, while Brent is the main European benchmark price. The difference between WTI and Brent prices is attributed to other supply and demand issues besides the MENA unrest.

The MENA region includes some of the world’s largest oil exporting countries and most important shipping chokepoints. The region produces 29.1 million barrels per day

(Mb/d), a third of global oil supply, and its oil exports equal roughly 40% of the world’s oil trade (see Figure 2 below ).

Unrest in Egypt in January and February raised concerns of disruptions to oil and natural gas moving between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, highlighting transit risks.

Turmoil in Libya, a much bigger oil exporter than Egypt, and unrest in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain increased concern in oil markets. As of March 2, 2011, estimates for how much oil production has been shut down in Libya varied, ranging from 0.8 Mb/d to 1.2

Mb/d. (For context, Libya produced 1.8 Mb/d last year, and the global oil market is roughly 86 Mb/d.) Several U.S. companies are invested in Libya’s energy production, including ConocoPhillips, Hess, and Occidental Petroleum; they are minority partners in their joint ventures with the Libyan National Oil Company.

Figure 2. MENA Oil Data 2009 figures in millions of barrels a day (Mb/d) or share of global totals % of World % of Global Consumption Production Production Capacity Exports Oil trade

Saudi Arabia 2.4 9.8 11.6% 12.8 7.3 13.8%

Iran 1.7 4.2 4.9% 4.3 2.5 4.7%

UAE 0.5 2.8 3.3% 3.1 2.3 4.4%

Iraq 0.6 2.4 2.8% 2.4 1.8 3.3%

Kuwait 0.4 2.5 3.0% 2.8 2.1 4.0%

Algeria 0.3 2.1 2.5% 2.1 1.8 3.4%

*Libya 0.3 1.8 2.1% 1.8 1.5 2.9%

Qatar 0.1 1.2 1.4% 1.4 1.1 2.0%

Oman 0.1 0.8 1.0% 0.8 0.7 1.3%

Yemen 0.2 0.3 0.3% 0.3 0.1 0.2%

Syria 0.3 0.4 0.5% 0.4 0.1 0.2%

Other MENA 1.5 0.8 1.0% 0.8 a NA

MENA Total 8.4 29.1 34.5% 33.0 20.7 39.1%

World Total 84.4 84.4 100.0% 88.5 52.9 100.0%

Source: Ratner, M. and Nerurkar, M. (2011). Middle East and North Africa Unrest: Implications for Oil and Natural Gas Markets. Congressional Research Service. www.crs.gov Notes: italics denote members of the Organisation of the petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Production includes natural gas liquids. a. These countries are net importers with about 0.7 Mb/d coming from other countries.

U.S. economic motive for intervening in the Libyan crisis was to secure Libya’s oil, protect her oil companies and investments, stabilize the price of oil, and to maintain a steady flow of oil from Libya and from the Middle East and Arab region. Oil is the trophy of US NATO-led war in Libya.

From this backdrop, the U.S. military intervention in Libya was necessitated by these factors – humanitarian interests, economic and strategic interests.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE LIBYAN CRISIS

The United States played a pivotal role in the collapse of Gaddafi regime. The military manoeuvring, outwitting and outflanking of Gaddafi’s forces by NATO air-strikes, naval blockades were made possible by U.S fighter jets and naval ships, though other European nations contributed in munitions and assets for the success of the Operation Odyssey

Dawn and the maintenance of the UN resolution of no-fly zone. On the other hand, the

United States provided financial and military support to the rebel fighters and NTC, trained them, and to weaken the Gaddafi regime imposed embargoes and travel bans on prominent Libyan personnel’s, ceased Libya’s assets that were in America.

In order to avoid being seen as purely Western intervention, the U.S crucially insisted that it would only act if there was Arab support. And on March 12, 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States met to discuss the situation in Libya and endorsed on a consensus basis a request to the U.N. Security Council:

to take measures to impose a no-fly zone over the movement of Libyan military planes immediately, and to establish safe areas in the places exposed to shelling as preventive measures allowing to provide protection for the Libyan people and the residents in Libya from different nationalities, taking into account the regional sovereignty and integrity of neighbouring countries (Gertler, 2011:6).

The Arab League statement was welcomed by international observers who view regional support as a prerequisite for any direct intervention, including any multilateral military operation to impose a no-fly zone. The U.S. government referred to the decision as

“important.”

3.1 U.S. MILITARY AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT

The finalising of military preparations came as Gaddafi’s forces closed in on

Benghazi and warned that they would target all maritime traffic in the Mediterranean if they are targeted by foreign forces. In a statement broadcast on Libyan television – al

Arabiya, the defence ministry said: “any foreign military act against Libya will expose all air and maritime traffic in the Mediterranean Sea to danger and civilian and military

(facilities) will become targets of Libya’s counterattack” (www.guardian.co.uk/libya- crisis-britain-france-and-us-prepare-for-air-strikes-against-gaddafi.htm). “The

Mediterranean basin will face danger not just in the short-term, but also in the long- term.” Gaddafi warned Libyan rebels that his forces will invade Benghazi and show no mercy to fighters who resisted them. “No more fear, no more hesitation, the moment of truth has come,” the Libyan leader declared, as he warned Benghazi residents.

The United states began military operations against Libyan military target on

March 19, 2011 to “prevent A humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya” and for the purposes of preparing a no-fly zone.” The U.S President Obama stated that the “strikes will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope” and that their purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of UN Security Council resolution

1973.” U.S Senator John McCain who described the Libyan rebels as his ‘heroes’, pushed for the U.S to arm the Opposition as part of a drive to force Muammar Gaddafi from power, and has criticised America’s decision to take a back seat in the international military action against Libyan forces (www.guardian.co.uk).

The U.S military spent about $1 billion and played a far larger role in Libya than it has acknowledged, quietly implementing an emerging “covert intervention” strategy

58 that the Obama administration hopes will let America fight small wars with a barely detected footprint. The U.S government allocated an expected $25 million

(€15.15million) worth of “non-lethal” equipment to the rebel opposition

(www.guardian.co.uk). Officially, President Obama handed the lead role of ousting

Gaddafi to the European members of NATO. But behind the scenes, the U.S military played an indispensible role in the Libya campaign, deploying far more forces than the administration chose to advertise. And at NATO headquarters outside Brussels, the U.S government was intimately involved in all decisions about how the Libyan rebels should be supported as they rolled up control of cities and oil refineries and marched toward the capital, Tripoli (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/30/america-s-secret- libya-war-u-s-spent-1-billion-on-covert-ops-helping-nato.html).

The Libya campaign was a unique international effort: 15 European nations working with the U.S. and three Arab nations. The air offensive was launched from 29 airbases in six

European countries. But only six European nations joined with the U.S. and Canada to fly strikes against Gaddafi’s forces. The scale of the unpublicized U.S. role affirms hawks’ arguments: a divided NATO simply couldn’t have waged the war it did without extensive

American help. What the hawks underestimated was the U.S. ability to operate without publicity—in military lingo, beneath the radar.

According to NATO officials, these were the critical U.S. contributions during the six- month military campaign:

• An international naval force gathered off Libya. To lower the U.S. profile, the administration elected not to send a super carrier. Even so, the dozen U.S. warships on station were the biggest contingent in this armada. In the opening hours of the campaign,

59 an American submarine, the USS Florida, launched 100 cruise missiles against Libyan air defenses, crucially opening an entry corridor for the airstrikes that followed.

• U.S. tanker aircraft refuelled European aircraft on the great majority of missions against

Gaddafi’s forces. The Europeans have tanker aircraft, but not enough to support a 24/7 air offensive averaging, by NATO count, around 100 missions a day, some 50 of them strike sorties. The U.S. flew 30 of the 40 tankers.

• When the Europeans ran low on precision-attack munitions, the U.S. quietly resupplied them. (That explains why European air forces flying F-16s—those of Norway, Denmark,

Belgium—carried out a disproportionate share of the strikes in the early phase of the campaign. The U.S. had stocks of the munitions to resupply them. When Britain and

France, which fly European-built strike aircraft, also ran short, they couldn’t use U.S.- made bombs until they had made hurried modifications to their aircraft.)

• To target Gaddafi’s military, NATO largely relied on U.S. JSTARS surveillance aircraft, which, flying offshore, could track the movements of rival forces. When more detailed targeting information was needed—as in the battles for Misrata and other towns defended by Gaddafi’s troops—the U.S. flew Predator drones to relay a block-by-block picture.

• U.S. Air Force targeting specialists were in NATO’s Naples operational headquarters throughout the campaign. They oversaw the preparing of “target folders” for the strikes in

Tripoli against Gaddafi’s compound and the headquarters of his military and intelligence services. (Organizing precision strikes by high-speed jets is not a task for novices. The attack routes over Tripoli and the release times of bombs had to be precisely calibrated so

60 munitions released even a second late by a strike aircraft would have the best chance of avoiding civilian homes.)

• U.S. AWACS aircraft, high over the Mediterranean, handled much of the battle- management task, acting as air-traffic controllers on most of the strike missions. Again, the Europeans have AWACS, but not enough crews to handle an all-hours campaign lasting months.

• Eavesdropping by U.S. intelligence—some by aircraft, some by a listening post quietly established just outside Libya—gave NATO unparalleled knowledge of what Gaddafi’s military planned.

• All this was crucial in supporting the European effort. But U.S. involvement went way beyond that. In all, the U.S. had flown by late August more than 5,300 missions, by

Pentagon count. More than 1,200 of these were strike sorties against Libyan targets.

• The administration largely stuck to Obama’s decision that the U.S. would not put boots on the ground in Libya (although the CIA did have agents inside Tripoli). British and

French Special Forces were on the ground, training and organizing the insurgents—as were units from two Arab nations, Qatar and Jordan. But their communications relied on a satellite channel run by the U.S. And the U.S. also supplied other high-tech gear.

• When a desperate Gaddafi began to launch Scud missiles into towns held by the opposition, a U.S. guided-missile destroyer offshore negated his offensive by shooting down the Scuds.

On the account given by Wikipedia, the United States deployed a naval force of 11 ships, including the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge, the amphibious transport dock

USS Ponce, the guided-missile destroyers USS Barry and USS Stout, the nuclear attack submarines USS Providence and USS Scranton, the cruise missile submarine USS

Florida and the amphibious command ship USS Mount Whitney. Additionally, A-10 ground-attack aircraft, B-2 stealth bombers, AV-8B Harrier II jump-jets, EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft, and both F-15E and F-16 fighters were involved in action over

Libya. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft were stationed on Cyprus. On 18 March, two AC-

130Us arrived at RAF Mildenhall as well as additional tanker aircraft. On 24 March 2 E-

8Cs operated from Naval Station Rota Spain, which indicated an increase of ground attacks. An undisclosed number of CIA operatives were said to be in Libya to gather intelligence for airstrikes and make contacts with rebels. The US also used MQ-1

Predator UAVs to strike targets in Libya on 23 April

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_libya.html).

According to Obama, the U.S and its allies are prepared to act with urgency and to end violence against civilians in Libya. “The people of Libya must be protected,” “our consensus was strong, and our resolve is clear. The people of Libya must be protected, and in the absence of an immediate end to the violence against civilians our coalition is prepared to act, and to act with urgency” (www.cbsnews.com). In Libya, America is not acting alone. In fact, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the U.S military might not have acted at all, had it not been for the encouragement of the French, the British and members of the Arab League.

“we are supporting a mission through NATO that was very much very much initiated by European requests, joined by Arab requests. I think this is a watershed moment in international decision-making.”

President Obama argues that broad coalition adds legitimacy to the fight against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi – and also helps limit the price tag. Obama in a statement

62 regarding Libya, said; “we can’t stand idly by when a tyrant tells his people there will be no mercy. (In the military action there), we are part of a broad coalition, we are acting in the interests of the United States and the world” (www.cbsnews.com/crisis-in-libya-u.s- bombs-quaddafi’s-airfields.html).

Although Russia’s Foreign Ministry expressed regret over the decision by Western nations to undertake military operations in Libya. On the other hand, the Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People issued a declaration describing the situation in Libya as “intolerable”, and stating that the coalition was “determined to act collectively and resolutely” to support the UN Security Council Resolution 1973. According to Martins

(2011), the Summit paid tribute to the Libyan people, especially the Libyan NTC and others who have disassociated themselves from the Gaddafi regime and promised to be at their side “to help them realize their aspirations and build their future and institutions within a democratic framework”. “Our commitment is for the long term: we will not let

Col. Gaddafi and his regimes go on defying the will of the international community and scorning that of his people” (www.cbsnews.com/crisis-in-libya-u.s-bombs-quaddafi’s- airfields.html).

According to Gertler (2011), U.S and the coalition forces of NATO, NATO member states and coalition partners provided munitions and assets to support the rebel fighters and also financial support. The table below shows the funds spent by foreign powers on war in Libya.

Table I

Funds spent by Foreign Powers on War in Libya

Country Funds spent By

1. Canada $110 million CAD mid October 2011

2. France $813 million USD October 2011

3. Italy $1.24 billion USD June 2011

4. Turkey $300 million USD July 2011

5. United Kingdom $333M - $1,500m USD 31 October 2011

6. United States $1.3 billi on USD September 2011

Source: www.wikipedia.org [2011 Military Intervention in Libya]

3.2 U.S.-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS – OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN

Both Libyan and International states and organisations called for a no-fly zone over Libya in light of allegations that Muammar Gaddafi’s military had conducted airstrikes against Libya rebels in the Libyan civil war. Libyan Deputy Permanent

Representative to the UN – Ibrahim Dabbashi called “on the UN to impose a no-fly zone on all Tripoli to cut off all supplies of arms and mercenaries to the regime. On the same issue, British Prime Minister on 28 February proposed the idea of a no- fly zone to prevent Gaddafi from “airlifting mercenaries” and using his military aeroplanes and armoured helicopters against civilians. On March 1, 2011, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed non-binding Senate resolution S.RES 85 urging the UNSC to impose a Libyan no- fly zone and encouraging Gaddafi to step down (Gertler, 2011). According to Blanchard

(2011), the head of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) – Mustafa Abdul

Jalil, pleaded for the international community to move quickly to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, declaring that any delay would result in more casualties.

In response to the apparent violence by the government of Muammar Gaddafi during the

Libyan crisis, the United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 1970. Although the resolution did not authorize the use of force by member states with regard to the conflict in Libya or the enforcement of the arms embargo established by the resolution. As such, debate from February 26 through March 17 focused on the need for military intervention and the potential for further authorization from the Security Council.

On March 17, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which, among other steps, demands an immediate ceasefire, establishes a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo established by

Resolution 1970, and authorizes member states “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”

The no-fly zone provisions of the resolution ban “all flights in the airspace of the Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians” with the exception of humanitarian flights, evacuation flights, flights authorized for the protection of civilians, and “other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorization … to be for the benefit of the Libyan people.” Member states are authorized to act nationally or

“through regional organizations.” All authorized flights are to be coordinated with the

U.N. Secretary General and the Arab League Secretary General. The resolution calls on member states “to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing” the no-fly zone and civilian protection operations.

Operation Odyssey Dawn was the U.S code name for the U.S part of the international military operation in Libya to enforce UNSCR 1973 during the initial period of 19-31

March 2011, which continued afterwards under NATO command as Operation Unified

Protector. The initial operation implemented a no-fly zone that was proposed during the

Libya civil war to prevent government forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi from carrying out air attacks on Anti-Gaddafi forces. According to Taylor (2011) writing for the British

House of Commons, he opined that the goal of these initial operations was to prevent further attacks by regime forces on Libyan citizens and opposition groups, especially in and around Benghazi; and second, to degrade the regime’s capability to resist the no-fly zone [being] implemented under the United Nations resolutions. On 19 March 2011, several countries prepared to take immediate military action at a summit in Paris.

Operations commenced with a strike by French fighter jets, the U.S. and U.K. forces conducting strikes from ships and submarines via 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles and air assets bombing Gaddafi forces near Benghazi. The goal of the coalition forces had been to impose a no-fly zone and to destroy forces that threaten civilians and with the first priority being to weaken Gaddafi regimes air defences (Gertler 2011, Talyor 2011).

The U.S. initially had strategic command of the military intervention in Libya, coordinated missions between coalition members and set up Joint Task Force – Odyssey

Dawn (JTF – OD) through her USAFRICOM on the USS Mount Whitney for tactical command and control in the area of operations

(http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/operation_odyssey_dawn), but passed complete military command of the operation to NATO and took up a support role on 31 March 2011.

Taylor (2011) and Quartararo et al (2011) provided the same account, they argued that the U.S provided command and control and logistics, and launched electronic attacks on

Libyan defence systems.

Quartararo et al (2011) argues that the United States was reluctant to intervene in the

Libyan territory to protect Allied interests in Libya due to their ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. And from a political standpoint, U.S solo intervention in Libya could be perceived by some in the Muslim world community as another U.S. attack on Islam.

“Additionally, there were concerns expressed by several African nations that a unilateral move by the United States could be viewed as veiled imperialism. To address this and other concerns, the U.S. government attempted to form a coalition that included both

Arab Muslim and African nations to provide legitimacy for any military action against the Libyan government” (Quartararo, 2011:144).

According to Taylor (2011) the sortie rate between the U.S and coalition partner nations became more equitable over the period of operations; the Pentagon acknowledged that the U.S. continued to provide nearly 80% of all refuelling, almost 75% of aerial surveillance and 100% of all electronic warfare missions. In addition to the launch of

Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM), the Pentagon also revealed that by 28 March

2011, a further 600 precision guided munitions had also been expended (455 from the

U.S. and 147 from the coalition).

In the accompanying press briefing Pentagon officials also stated:

Gaddafi has virtually no air defence left to him and a diminishing ability to command and sustain his forces on the ground. His air force cannot fly, his warships are staying in port, his ammunition stores are being destroyed, communication towers are being toppled, and his command bunkers are being useless.

According to Admiral Mike Mullen, Libyan military capability had been degraded by as much as 25% as a result of Coalition operations (Taylor, 2011).

Below is a table of U.S. assets that were used in Operation Odyssey Dawn;

Table II

U.S. Assets Involved in Operation Odyssey Dawn

U.S. Air Force units participating in Operation Odyssey Dawn include:

1 B-2 stealth bombers from the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, MO 2 F-15Es from the 492nd Fighter Squadron and 494th Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath, Britain

3 F-16CJ defense-suppression aircraft from the 480th Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany

4 EC-130 Commando Solo psychological operations aircraft from the 193rd Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, Middletown, PA

5 KC-135s of the 100th Air Refuelling Wing at RAF Mildenhall, Britain and the 92nd Air Refuelling Wing, Fairchild AFB, WA 6 C-130Js from the 37th Airlift Squadron at Ramstein Air Base, Germany 7 A-10 attack fighters 8 AC-130 gunships U.S. Navy ships involved in Operation Odyssey Dawn include: 1 • Arle igh Burke -class guided -missile destroyers USS Stout (DDG 55) and USS Barry (DDG 52)

2 • Submarines USS Providence (SSN 719), USS Scranton (SSN 756) and USS Florida (SSGN 728)

3 Marine amphibious ships USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) and USS Ponce (LPD 15) 4 Com mand ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20)

Support ships Lewis and Clark, Robert E. Peary and Kanawha. Naval and Marine aviation assets include:

1 AV -8B Harrier fighters, CH -53 Super Stallion helicopters and MV -22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft aboard the Kearsarge and Ponce

2 KC -130J tanker aircraft flying from Sigonella Air Base, Italy

3 EA -18G Growler electronic attack aircraft of VAQ -132, based at Whidbey Island, WA and flying from Aviano Air Base, Italy. These aircraft were diverted from Iraq to support Operation Odyssey Dawn.

4 P-3 Orion sub -hunters and EP -3 Aries electronic attack aircraft Source; Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress Author; Jeremiah Gertler (2011) Pgs11-13

A Pentagon situation update for 28 March 2011 provided the following information on coalition sortie rates:

Table III Coalition sortie rates Partner U.S Last 24 Total Total Hours Sorties 619 983 178

Strike sorties 365 370 107

TLAM 7 192 6

Source: Taylor (2011). Military Operations in Libya

The United States played a pivotal role and participated greatly in command and control.

From the data collated and shown above, we will see a wide gap between U.S personal contributions to the operation in Libya from that of the Coalition joint efforts. Even after playing a support role, the U.S. provided the highest number of logistics, munitions, assets – both air and naval and financial aid to the war in Libya. Stephen Lendman (2011) called it “America’s war on Libya”.

3.3 ARMS EMBARGO, SANCTIONS AND FREEZING OF LIBYAN ASSETS

In order to weaken Gaddafi, the United Nations through resolution 1970 imposed arms embargo, asset freeze on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and travel ban on Gaddafi and his family, and some other prominent members in Libya (Gaddafi allies). Establishing these conditions would pave way for a genuine political transition – of which Gaddafi’s departure is a critical component. To bring about these objective, along with the international community, the United States responded to the crisis by developing, implementing, and monitoring sanctions and freezing billions in Government of Libya assets, building a broad international coalition focused on escalating diplomatic pressure

69 on Gaddafi and increasing his isolation, and initiating and sustaining political support for military operations. These sanctions are seen in paragraph 9, 15, 17 of the resolution which is as follows;

The Security Council;

“9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories

15. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

17. Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or individuals designated by the Committee.”

Pursuant to U.N resolution 1970 and its slight modifications in resolution 1973, the

United States imposed unilateral sanctions against Libya, including the freezing of all funds, financial assets and economic resources of Libya which were in U.S. JP Morgan

Chase, Citigroup, Carlyle group and U.S Equity but owned by the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya.

Even before the Council acted, President Obama issued a formal executive order freezing the American-held assets of Colonel Qaddafi, his children and family, and senior members of the Libyan government, closed the American Embassy in Tripoli and imposed unilateral sanctions. Washington froze $30 billion in Libyan assets

(www.huffingtonpost.com/blackberry/p.html?=829405).

The American sanctions also include travel bans against Colonel Qaddafi and senior members of his government, including a move to freeze all American-controlled portions of Libya’s sovereign wealth fund. Sanctions, once they go into effect, could have an impact on oil-rich Libya. According to an American diplomatic cable obtained by

WikiLeaks, a senior Libyan official told American diplomats in January 2010 that the

Libyan Investment Authority, which manages the country’s oil revenue, had $32 billion in cash, and that several American banks managed up to $500 million in each of those funds. The U.S government went after the money as part of the punitive sanctions.

“The government of Libya has claimed that it holds as much as $130 billion in reserves and its sovereign wealth fund reportedly holds more than $70 billion in foreign assets,” an Obama administration official said. The official said that “while we are aware of certain assets owned by the Libyan government in the U.S., there are likely additional funds that we are not aware of” (www.nytimes.com/U.S._imposes_ sanctions_ on_ libya_ in_ wake_ of _crackdown.html). According to Stuart Levey – the Undersecretary for

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the Treasury Department, he postulated the amount to be $32billion. According to him, “the executive order that President Obama signed blocked the assets of a few categories. It was Gaddafi, his sons that were named,

71 as well as the assets of the Government of Libya, which include the Central Bank, the

Sovereign Wealth Fund, the Libyan Investment Authority, and so on”

(www.npr.org/2011/03/24/134832749/Treasury-Department-Freezes-More-Libyan-

Assets-Than-Expected).

The European Union — whose members have strong trade ties with Libya — adopted its own sanctions, including an arms embargo. Italy suspended a nonaggression treaty with

Libya. Germany proposed suspending all Libyan financial transactions with European bank.

According to Watt (2011), the Privy Council approved an order in council freezing the assets of Gaddafi, his sons Saif al-Islam, Hannibal Muammar, Khamis Muammar, and

Mutassim, and his daughter Aisha Muammar. The Chancellor said: “I have today taken action to freeze the assets in the UK of Colonel Gaddafi and his family or those acting behalf so that they cannot be used against the interests of the Libyan people. This follows the UN Security Council resolution tabled by the UK and France. “I decided to implement this UN resolution in the UK as quickly as possible, before the financial market reopened. This is a strong message for the Libyan regime that violence against its own people is not acceptable.”

The order in council freezes “all funds, financial assets and economic resources owned or controlled by the listed individuals and entities, or by any one acting on their behalf or by entities controlled” by the named members of the Gaddafi family (see Apendix 1). The

City of London has been informed that ‘no funds or economic resources can be made available to listed persons or entities, or for their benefits

(www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/Feb/27/gaddafi-family-assets-frozen-queen).

Adetunji (2011) estimated that upto $100 billion Libyan assets have been frozen around the world. UK government impounded £1 billion worth of Libyan banknotes printed by

British currency printer De La Rue for delivery to the Gaddafi regime but where not delivered after the UN froze Libya’s assets. “The United Kingdom alone froze a total of

£12 billion worth of assets which Libya held in the UK, which includes the banknotes printed by De La Rue” (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/26/aug/Libyan-assets- banknotes-freeze-uk).

3.4 NATO – OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR, INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND THE USE OF THREAT.

Following the Gaddafi regime’s targeting of civilians in February 2011, NATO answered the United Nations’ call to the international community to protect the Libyan people. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO Allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP)

(www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.html).

Operation Unified Protector was an NATO operation enforcing UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 concerning the Libyan civil war and adopted on 26 February and 17 March

2011, respectively. The resolution condemned the “gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearance, torture and summary executions.” It also introduced active measures, including a no-fly zone, and authorized member states acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to use “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas. According to Gertler (2011) it was France and the United Kingdom (UK) that sponsored the UNSC

Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and pushed the European Union to quickly adopt sanctions

73 against the Gaddafi regime. NATO support was vital to the rebel victory over the forces loyal to Gaddafi.

In support of UNSCR 1970 and 1973, NATO then agreed to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya on 24 March 2011. The resolution banned all flights into Libyan airspace to protect civilian-populated areas from air attacks, with the exception of flights used for humanitarian and aid purposes. The Alliance took sole command and control of the international military effort for Libya on 31 March 2011. NATO air and sea assets began to take military actions to protect civilians and civilian populated areas.

Throughout the crisis, the Alliance consulted with the UN, the League of Arab States and other international partners.

NATO’s decision to undertake military action was based on three clear principles: a sound legal basis, strong regional support and a demonstrable need. By the end of March

2011, Operation Unified Protector had three distinct components;

∑ Enforcing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent the transfer of

arms, related materials and mercenaries to Libya.

∑ Enforcing a no-fly zone to prevent aircrafts from bombing civilian targets

∑ Conducting air and naval strikes against military forces involved in attack or

threatening to attack Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas

(www.arrc.nato.int/unified_protector.aspx,

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm).

On March 23, NATO launched a maritime operation to enforce the arms embargo against the Libyan regime. Naval vessels and aircraft participating in the operation were charged with monitoring the Central Mediterranean off the Libyan coast and, if necessary,

74 interdicting any vessels suspected of carrying illegal arms or mercenaries in violation of the arms embargo. As a last resort, NATO vessels were empowered to use force in fulfilling their mission.

In order to ensure informed debate on this particular conflict, the Defence and Military

Analysis Programme of the IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] has compiled the following list of those air and naval assets known to have been used or made available for use in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. According to Boyd

(2011) they are as follows;

Table IV.

COALITION ASSETS AS OF 10 JUNE 2011

BELGIUM

Naval assets

• BNS Narcis (MCMV: M 923)

Air assets

° 6 F-16AM Fighting Falcon (FTR: Araxos, GRC)

BULGARIA

Naval assets

• BS Drazki (FFGM: F 41)

CANADA

Naval assets

• HMCS Charlottetown (FFGHM: FFH 339)

Air assets

• 7 CF -18 Hornet (FGA: Trapani, ITA) • 2 CC-150T (TKR: Trapani, ITA) • 2 CP-140 Aurora (ASW: Sigonella, ITA)

FRANCE

Naval assets

• FS Amethyste (SSN: S 605) • FS Charles de Gaulle (CVN: R 91) with:

10 Rafale M (FGA)/6 Super Etendard Modernisé (FGA)/2 E-2C Hawkeye (AEW&C)

FS Jean Bart (DDGHM: D 615)

• FS Jean de Vienne (DDGHM; D 643) • FS Courbet (FFGHM: F 712) • FS LV Le Hénaff (FSG: F 789) • FS Tonnere (LHD: L 9014) with:

2 AS-665 Tiger (ATK HEL)/10 SA-342M Gazelle (MRH HEL)

• FS Marne (AORH: A 630)

Air assets

• 7 Rafale B/C (FGA: Solenzara, FRA) • 3 Mirage F-1CR (ISR: Solenzara, FRA) • 5 Rafale B/C (FGA: St Dizier, FRA) • 7 C-135FR (TKR: Istres-Le Tubé, FRA)

GREECE

Naval assets

• HS Hydra (FFGHM: F 452)

ITALY

Naval assets

• ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi (CVS: C 551) with

6 AV -8B Harrier II (FGA)

• ITS Euro (FFGHM: F 575)

Air assets

• 7 Tornado ECR (FGA: Trapani, ITA) • 5 Tornado IDS (FGA: Trapani, ITA) • 8 Typhoon (FTR: Trapani, ITA) • 4 F-16 Fighting Falcon (FGA, Trapani, ITA) • 1 KC-767A (TKR, Practica di Mare, ITA) • 1 KC-130J (TKR, Trapani ITA)

JORDAN

Air assets

• 6 F-16AM Fighting Falcon (FTR: Aviano, ITA)

NATO

Air assets

• 3 E-3A Sentry (AEW&C: Trapani, ITA)

NETHERLANDS

Naval assets

• HNLMS Haarlem (MCMV: M 853)

Air assets

• 6 F-16AM Fighting Falcon (FTR: Decimomannu, ITA) • 1 KDC-10 (TKR: Decimomannu, ITA)

NORWAY

Air assets

• 6 F-16AM Fighting Falcon (FTR: Souda Bay, GRC)

QATAR

Air assets

• 6 Mirage 2000-5EDA (FGA: Souda Bay, GRC)

ROMANIA

Naval assets

• ROS Regele Ferdinand (DDH: F 221)

SPAIN

Naval assets

• SPS Mistral (SSK: S 73) • SPS Méndez Núñez (DDGHM: F 104)

Air assets

• 4 F/A-18 Hornet (FGA: Decimomannu, ITA) • 1 B-707 (TKR: Decimomannu, ITA) • 1 CN-235 (MP: Decimomannu, ITA)

SWEDEN

Air assets

• 8 Gripen (FGA: Sigonella, ITA) • 1 Tp-84 (TKR, Sigonella, ITA)

TURKEY

Air assets

• 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon (FGA: Sigonella, ITA) • 1 KC-135 (TKR: Sigonella, ITA)

Naval assets

• TCG Sakarya (SSK: S 354) • TCG Yavuz (FFGHM: F 240) • TCG Yildirim (FFGHM: F 243)

• TCG Kemalreis (FFGHM: F 247) • TCG Gök ҫaeda (FFGHM: F 494) • TCG Akar (AORH: A 580)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Air assets

• 5 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon (FGA: Decimomannu, ITA) • 6 Mirage 2000-9DAD (FGA: Decimomannu, ITA)

UNITED KINGDOM

Naval assets

• HMS Triumph (SSN with SLCM: S 93) • HMS Liverpool (DDGHM: D 92) • HMS Sutherland (FFGHM: F 81) • HMS Brocklesby (MCMV: M 33) • HMS Ocean (LPH: L 12) with

4 AH-64D Apache (ATK HEL)

Air assets

• 4 VC-10 (TKR: Akrotiri, CYP) • 1 E-3D Sentry (AEW&C: Akrotiri, CYP) • 2 Sentinel R1 (ISR: Akrotiri, CYP) • 1 Nimrod R1 (ELINT: Akrotiri, CYP) • 12 Tornado GR4 (FGA: Gioia del Colle, ITA) • 6 Typhoon (FGA: Gioia del Colle, ITA) • 2 E-3D Sentry (AEW&C: Trapani, ITA) • 2 VC-10 (TKR: Trapani ITA)

UNITED STATES

Naval Assets

• USS Mahan (DDGHM: DDG 72)

Air assets

• 6 F -16CJ Fighting Falcon (FG A: Aviano, ITA) • 5 EA-18G Growler (EW: Aviano, ITA) • 1 EC-130H Compass Call (EW: Souda Bay, GRC) • 1 EC-130J Commando Solo (EW: Souda Bay, GRC) • 2 RC-135 Rivet Joint (ELINT: Souda Bay, GRC) • 1 EP-3E Aries II (ELINT: Sigonella, ITA) • 1 P-3C Orion (ASW: Sigonella, ITA) • 1 E8-C (ISR: Rota, ESP) • 1 U-2 (ISR: Akrotiri, CYP) • 2 E-3B/C Sentry (AEW&C: Rota, ESP) • 22 KC-135 (TKR: Morón, ESP) • ε8-10 MQ-1 Predator UAV (CISR: Sigonella ITA) • 1 RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV (ISR: Sigonella, ITA)

Additional United States strike assets in theatre as of 18 April 2011

UNITED STATES

Naval assets

• USS Monterey (CGHM: CG 61) • USS Barry (DDGM: DDG 52) • USS Stout (DDGM: DDG 55) • USS Roosevelt (DDGHM: DDG 80) • USS Bataan (LHD: LHD 5) with

6 AV-8B Harrier II (FGA)/4 AH-1W Cobra (ATK HEL)

• USS Ponce (LPD: LPD 15) • USS Mesa Verde (LPD: LPD 19) • USS Whidbey Island (LSD: LSD 41) • UNSN Kanawha (AO: T-AO 196) • USNS Laramie (AO: T-AO 203) • USNS Robert E. Peary (AFSH: T-AKE 5)

Air assets

• 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon (FGA: Aviano, ITA)

The coalition operations under NATO’s “Operation Unified Protector” command and control after the U.S handed over control to NATO dealt a heavy blow on Gaddafi, his military forces, and fostered to the early victory of the opposition rebel group fighters and

80 the NTC. In as much as the coalition operation was manned by NATO, the United States played the most strategic role, released the highest number of air and naval assets, and provided funds and logistics.

American allies and the United Nations also moved to isolate Libya diplomatically. A senior United Nations official said that the world should intervene to stop the bloodshed in Libya. In Geneva, United Nations Human Rights Council voted unanimously to suspend Libya’s membership, but not before a junior delegate of the

Libyan mission announced that he and his colleagues had resigned after deciding to side with the Libyan people. The gesture drew a standing ovation and a handshake from the

United States ambassador, Eileen Donahoe.

Administration officials said that getting the people around Colonel Qaddafi to abandon him is a key part of the American and international strategy to isolate him.

Administration officials say they are supporting a British proposal to try to bring before a war crimes tribunal Colonel Qaddafi and those who support or enable his violent crackdown.

“It’s hard to do, but the point is to encourage the remaining supporters of Qaddafi to peel off,” said Robert Malley, the Middle East and North Africa program director at the

International Crisis Group. “If you want to accelerate his demise, you send the message that those who do not participate in the violence might not be prosecuted for their association with the regime.”

Analysts said that going after the assets of Colonel Qaddafi’s aides would probably be more effective than going after those held by the leader himself, given that he is engaged in an all-or-nothing defense of his rule.

As a result of this, a number of senior military officials defected to the opposition, including General Abdul Fatah Younis, General al-Barani Ashkal, Major General

Suleiman Mahmoud, Brigadier General Musa'ed Ghaidan Al Mansouri, Brigadier

General Hassan Ibrahim Al Qarawi and Brigadier General Dawood Issa Al Qafsi. Two

Libyan Air Force colonels each flew their Mirage F1 fighter jets to Malta and requested asylum, after being ordered to carry out airstrikes against civilian protesters in Benghazi.

Colonel Nuretin Hurala, the commander of the Benghazi Naval Base also defected along with senior naval officials (www.wikipedia.org/wiki/libyan_civil_war.htm). At the same time, a number of senior Libyan public officials either renounced the Gaddafi government or resigned from their positions. Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil and

Interior Minister Major General Abdul Fatah Younis both defected to the opposition. Oil

Minister Shukri Ghanem and Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa fled Libya, with the latter defecting to the UK. Libyan Prosecutor General Abdul-Rahman al-Abbar resigned his position and joined the opposition.

The staff of a number of diplomatic missions of Libya have either resigned or condemned the actions of the Gaddafi government. The ambassadors to the Arab League, European

Union and United Nations have either resigned or stated that they no longer support the government. The ambassadors to Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, France, India,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Portugal, Sweden, and the U.S. also renounced the Gaddafi government or formally resigned (www.wikipedia.org/wiki/libyan_civil_war.htm).

From the overview above, we have understood that there is a strong military participation by the United States in Libya. U.S provided the highest number of military capability, logistics and electronic gadgets and initially had the command and control of

Operation Odyssey Dawn which implemented the UN resolution of a no-fly zone. The

82 travel ban, asset freeze and the threat issued by ICC (International Criminal Court) were also strategies employed by the United States to subdue and depose the Gaddafi regime, and defect Gaddafi allies.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBYA AFTER GADDAFI

INTRODUCTION

Libya’s economy is largely dependent on the hydrocarbons sector, which in 2007 accounted for more than 71% of nominal GDP, more than 97 % of exports and 90% of government revenues. Libya is Africa’s second largest crude oil producer and its proven reserves are the largest in Africa. It is also the third largest external supplier of oil to the

EU (10 % of EU’s oil imports) and its fifth largest external supplier of gas (Vandewalle,

2008). In view of a modest population estimated at about 6 million persons, hydrocarbon wealth has made Libya, on a per capita basis, one of richest countries in Africa. The discovery of oil and its considerable exploitation since independence transformed the

Libyan economy. In a short time Libya moved from a poor North African state to one of the richest countries in the world. Libya is one of the biggest petroleum producers in

Africa. Libya is a leading member of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OAPEC), and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

(Africa Year Book and Who’s Who, 1977).

Libya’s civil war hugely disrupted the economy by cutting oil output, the primary source of revenue, to virtually zero. As a result, the economy contracted 41.8% in 2011 but as oil production recovers, it should expand to 20.1% in 2012 as reconstruction deepens, followed by a gain of 9.5% in 2013 (www.africaeconomicoutlook.com).

Politically, Libya during the reign of Gaddafi experienced an authoritarian rule.

Gaddafi was the sole administrator of the country and made all declarations, laws and decisions concerning the running, welfare and progress of the Libyan Jamahiriya.

According to Blanchard and Zanotti (2011) Muammar al Gaddafi and his regime carried out drastic and frequent reorganisations of Libyan political and economic life in line with his “Third Universal Theory” in early 1970s. The theory which blends pan-Arab, Islamic, and socialist values, is enshrined in Gaddafi’s three volume Green Book. The redistribution of land and wealth, the allocation of fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political institutions reshaped Libya’s social landscape in line with Gaddafi’s principles. These trends also helped Gaddafi and his supporters maintain political control.

Blanchard (2012) argues that Gaddafi purposely undermined state institutions, including the military, and manipulated tribal, regional, and political groups to maintain power.

Libya has a record of high social inequality, high rates of youth unemployment and regional economic disparities, not to mention years of poor governance and corruption.

Libya’s future depends on the ability of the interim government, headed by the National

Transitional Council (NTC), to guarantee political stability and encourage thorough reform of the economy. The transition period may prove to be as complex and challenging for Libyans and their international counterparts as the 2011 conflict.

Overcoming the legacy of Gaddafi’s rule and the effects of the fighting are now the principal challenges for the Libyan people, the Transitional National Council (TNC), and the international community. As the transition unfolds, Libyans are facing key questions about basic terms for transitional justice, a new constitutional order, political participation, and Libyan foreign policy. Security challenges, significant investment needs, and vigorous political debates are now emerging. A transition plan based on the

TNC-issued interim charter of August 2011 called for national elections to be held in

June 2012 for a 200 member constituent assembly that will in turn appoint an interim cabinet and a committee to draft a new constitution. If the constitution is adopted in a

85 national referendum, then a new round of elections is to be held by mid-2013, bringing a nearly two-year transition process to a close. TNC officials are working with Libyan citizens to deliver services; assess reconstruction needs; and begin to reform ministries, public utilities, and security forces.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2009, 2016, 2017, 2022, and 2040 provide the framework for international assistance for Libya’s transition and sanctions against

Gaddafi-era officials and entities. On March 12, 2012, the United Nations (U.N.) Security

Council extended the mandate of the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for one year in order to assist the transitional authorities with security and administrative challenges. The resolutions also set conditions for the sale of arms and training to the

Libyan government and partially lift the U.N. mandated asset freeze for certain purposes.

The U.S. Treasury Department has issued licenses that authorize the release of over $30 billion in formerly blocked assets belonging to Libyan entities (Blanchard, 2012).

This chapter will take a detailed look at the transition programmes in Libya after

Gaddafi’s regime was deposed, the economic reforms (in areas of oil production, UNSCR

2009 that urged world powers to unfreeze Libya’s assets in their custody to help in humanitarian aids, and infrastructural development in war affected areas in Libya), political reforms both in Libya parliamentary elections (electoral reform), and the GNC’s role in maintaining political stability after the demise of Gaddafi.

4.1 ECONOMIC REFORMS

The economy of Libya is centrally planned. It depends primarily upon revenues from the petroleum sector, which contributes practically all export earnings and over half of GDP.

The oil revenues and a small population have given Libya the highest nominal per capita

GDP in Africa since 2000; Libya has recorded growth rates with an estimated 10.6%

86 growth of GDP in 2010. According to statistics, Libya had a GDP of $80.442 billion

(2010), $36,874 billion (2011) and a projection of $79.691 billion in 2012

(www.wikipedia.org/wiki/economy_of_libya.html).

Libya’s economy, previously known for impressive levels of growth driven by its oil and gas industry, was seriously disrupted by the 2011 civil war. In addition to the impact that the freezing of the country’s assets had on liquidity, the economy was disrupted by the shutdown in oil production and exports, as well as the decline of productivity resulting from the loss of human capital and the destruction of infrastructure.

Unfreezing Libya’s Assets

During the Libyan 2011 revolution, the United Nations imposed arms embargo, asset freeze, and international isolation on Libyan Jamahiriya to weaken Gaddafi, his forces and allies. These strategies proved effective. But considering the transition to democracy that is going on in Libya, the UNSC under Resolution 2009 of 2011 unfroze all Libya assets, and also requested countries in possession of Libya’s assets to return it to the

Libyan state, removed the arms embargo, the no-fly zone and ban of flights. These enactments can be seen in paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16 and 20 of UNSCR 2009. In pursuant of this resolution, the United States lifted key sanctions on Libya’s government, freeing more than $30 billion in assets frozen since February 2011 uprising that ended with the death of Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The action was taken in coordination with the UNSC which unfroze assets of the central bank, and the Libyan Foreign Bank.

According to Rubenfeld (2011) Libya is now undertaking a transition to democracy and these measures will allow the Libyan government to access most of its worldwide holding and will help the new government oversee the country’s transition and reconstruction.

The UK on their own part has released £12 billion in Libyan assets including £1 billion

87 worth of Libyan Dinar in their possession (www.telegraph.com/uk-to-unfreeze-12billion- in-libyan-assets.html). Mahmoud Jibril said the frozen assets must be released for the success of the new government to be established after the Gaddafi regime, and to ensure that the Libyan state continues to function.

According to Kirkup (2011) Libya’s worldwide assets is estimated to be $110 billion

(£65 billion), and the United Nations froze $1.5 billion Libyan assets which they have released to the nascent Libyan government.

Blanchard (2012) opines that during the 2011 Libyan crisis the United States and others froze tens of billions of dollars in Libyan state assets, and the Obama Administration placed targeted sanctions on Libyan oil companies and other entities in support of

Executive Order 13566 and U.N. Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973. The TNC has identified up to $170 billion in Libyan assets that were blocked worldwide and it has sought access to those funds over the last twelve months. U.N. Security Council

Resolution 2009 reiterated the Security Council’s intent to ensure that frozen assets are made available as soon as possible to and for the benefit of the Libyan people and established a number of conditions and mechanisms to regulate the return of assets. The

U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued general licenses that authorize new transactions with Libyan state entities and maintain the asset freeze established under Executive Order 13566 on named individuals and a handful of state entities. In December 2011 the Obama Administration unblocked over

$30 billion of roughly $37 billion in frozen Libyan assets, building on a previous transfer of $1.5 billion in assets for the benefit of the Libyan people and the TNC.

All these unfrozen assets is believed to help the Transitional National Council reshape the economy of Libya, and plan on reconstruction, provide humanitarian services

88 and rebuild the Libyan Jamahiriya. The Libyan annual GDP is about $90 billion, so a

$170 billion cash infusion could go a long way toward helping Libya rebuild.

Libya’s Oil Production, Exports, and Revenue

Libya’s oil production and export infrastructure survived the revolution relatively unscathed, although some facility damage, the departure of large numbers of labourers and skilled technicians and the lack of maintenance during the conflict were expected to limit the speed with which production and exports would be restarted. However, efforts to restore operations have proceeded rapidly. Prior to the conflict, Libya was exporting 1.3 million barrels of oil per day; in February 2012, Libyan officials reported that production was roughly 1.4 million barrels per day. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has projected that Libyan output could return to pre-conflict levels by the end of 2012, but this target may be reached by mid-year. The importance of oil exports for Libya cannot be overstated, as the IMF reported in February 2011 that over 90% of state revenue came from the hydrocarbon sector in 2010.

Prior to the rebel victory, the U.S. Treasury Department had issued a Statement of

Licensing Policy allowing U.S. persons to request from OFAC “specific authorization to trade in hydrocarbon fuel ( i.e. , oil, gas, and petroleum products) ... to the extent that such hydrocarbon - fuel is exported under the auspices of the Transitional National Council of

Libya.” The license further allowed U.S. persons to request permission “to engage in transactions related to the production of oil, gas, and petroleum products in areas controlled by the Transitional National Council of Libya.” More recently released licences removed restrictions on transactions with Libyan oil firms.

The overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime has cost Libya’s economy dearly. Forecasts for 2011 are that GDP has declined by 28 per cent, industry by 45 per cent, and exports by 82 per

89 cent. Before the conflict, Libya produced 1.6 million barrels of oil per day (bpd), generating some 80-85 per cent of Libya’s GDP. During the conflict, production was slashed by 90 per cent, hence 2011’s dismal figures. With fighting now over and political stability returning, Libya’s economic recovery is predicted to be as rapid as the 8-month war was calamitous. For the next two years, GDP is expected to improve at 14 per cent year on year; industry at 45 per cent in 2012, and another 16 per cent in 2013; and exports at 164 per cent in 2012, another 70 per cent in 2013, and still another 20 per cent in 2014

(www.majalla.com/eng/2011/11/artcle55227804). It is hardly controversial to suggest that the engine of Libya’s economic recovery will be oil and gas, and that growth in this sector will plateau after two or three years of rapid growth. But if the energy sector will remain as vital to Libya’s economy after the conflict as during the Gaddafi era, it need not be business as usual. Libya’s new government has a historic opportunity to reform how business is done in Libya, to change the culture of commissions and kick-backs, promote fair competition, and ensure business transparency to match political accountability. The size and importance of the oil and gas sector makes it a natural focus for this task.

Certainly oil is a priority for the new government. Actually, oil never really stopped being a priority and both Gaddafi and rebel forces carefully avoided damaging Libya’s oil infrastructure during the eight-month war. Since fighting stopped, Libyans have been cleaning tanks, turbines, and pipes, sourcing tools and parts, cannibalising equipment, patching tanks, and gradually starting oil flowing again. By mid-November, production had already increased to 600,000 bpd and is expected to reach 800,000 bpd by the end of the year, all so far without foreign assistance. Addressing the London conference by video link, Tripoli businessman Sami Zaptia suggested production might even reach 1

90 million bpd by year-end. To put this in context, 80 per cent of current production is in the

Sirte Basin, and Ghadames, Mursuq and Kufra basins are all operating significantly under capacity; current reserves are estimated at 46 billion barrels of oil and around 54 trillion cubic feet of gas; and 60-70 per cent of Libya is unexplored, according to Libyan business consultant Tarek Alwan. And as Zaptia reminded his audience, Libya is

Europe’s closest source of oil.

Oil production and exports account for the majority of Libya’s GDP, approximately 70%.

However, during the crisis, as foreign oil companies evacuated staff and facilities were attacked by the warring parties, production and exports came to a complete standstill between April and August 2011. As a result, Libya’s economy contracted 41.8% in 2011 compared to growth of 2.9% in 2010 (www.africaneconomicoutlook.com).

Nevertheless, as the security situation improves and reconstruction takes hold, the revival of the oil sector and of the economy as a whole seems increasingly promising. Real GDP growth is projected at 20.1% for 2012 and 9.5% for 2013. OPEC has maintained Libya’s official oil production quota at 1.47 million barrels per day and foreign oil companies have begun to return to the country. These include France’s Total, Italy’s ENI, Spain’s

Repsol and Occidental of the United States. Reflecting the commitment of foreign companies to return to pre-crisis levels of production, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company

(Agoco) has ramped up output at the Sarir filed to 160 000 b/d and has begun pumping oil to the Tobruk terminal. ENI has committed USD 35 billion to double its Libyan oil and gas production by 2021. According to The Economist, the economy is starting to bounce back. Oil production, now 350,000 barrels a day (b/d), is reviving faster than expected. None of Libya's main wells was badly damaged, says Nuri Berruien, the new chairman of the National Oil Company (NOC). That should rise to 1m b/d within four or

91 five months, he says, reaching pre-war levels of 1.6m late next year. If, as he predicts, exports hit 400,000 b/d “within two weeks”, as the Sharara field in the south-west and others come back on stream, some $40m a day should soon accrue to the state. Italy's Eni,

France's Total and the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, which is part of the NOC, are already producing again, and Libya's biggest refinery, at Zawiya, is back in action.

Following the return of these companies, oil output reached 840,000 b/d in November

2011, leading the National Oil Corporation to claim that pre-crisis production levels could be reached by the end of 2012. Though OPEC’s estimates have been equally positive, it should be noted that Libya’s oil output had been stagnating prior to the conflict, suggesting that the pace of recovery in the industry could face setbacks.

According to a number of oil industry analysts, Libya’s fields are old and production from some wells may not be possible due to the damage done to the facilities by the shutdown between April and August .

Prior to the overthrow of the Gaddafi government, attempts had been made on numerous occasions to overhaul the economy. These efforts however always met with opposition from those whose interests would be compromised by the reforms. The transitional government has recognised the importance of creating conditions that are more transparent and which support the integration of the economy into the global market.

Given Libya’s consistently poor performance on business environment surveys, the ability of the government to pursue genuine reform will determine the rate at which foreign investment returns. One of the important reforms that the NTC has taken includes the re-establishment of the oil ministry. The Gaddafi government abolished the oil ministry in 2006 and left the management of the industry to the National Oil Corporation

(NOC). The new ministry will be responsible for national oil policy, while the NOC will

92 retain its role in the commercial side of the industry. These efforts should make important strides in reducing the kinds of arbitrary decisions, sudden reversals of policy and lack of transparency that troubled the industry under the former government. Both the new Oil

Minister, Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, and the head of the National Oil Corporation, Nouri

Berouin, have indicated their intention to facilitate greater openness.

In their efforts to increase transparency, and conscious of the fact that their positions are temporary given the transitional mandate of the government, both the NOC and the new

Oil Ministry have agreed that all previous oil contracts will be respected, although those suspected of corrupt activities in the past will be investigated. The NTC has established a committee to investigate corruption in the oil sector with the aim of improving transparency in the industry.

Beyond reform efforts in the oil sector, policy for 2012 will focus on the reconstruction of the economy with the goal of rendering the economic system more business friendly.

However, the chairman of the transitional governing body has expressed the aim of creating a more Sharia compliant economy. Although it is unclear to what extent the interim government is willing and able to do this, it is expected that the government will pursue efforts to make the financial services industry more compatible with Islamic banking practices, namely through the abolition of interest rates in favour of other remuneration mechanisms.

As a result of the perceived risks created by the conflict, foreign direct investment is expected to decline for 2011-2012. Yet there is potential for the non-oil sector to grow during the reconstruction of the country. Infrastructure programmes will support the construction, utilities, communication, transport and financial sectors. Lucrative

93 infrastructure projects will likely attract foreign companies. Contracts associated with the reconstruction effort over the next 10 years have been estimated to be worth USD 240 billion which will be financed by the country’s oil revenues.

4.2 POLITICAL REFORM

The 42 year reign of Muammar Gaddafi was characterised with dictatorial and authoritarian rule. According to Blanchard (2011) there was no press freedom, and political participation, no political parties and no civil organisations, aside the state controlled National Trade Unions Federation all forms of trade union organisation were non-existent under Gaddafi. Political parties and all opposition groups were banned under law No 71 of 1972. The Gaddafi government dealt harshly with opposition leaders and groups over the last four decades, establishing special “people’s courts” and

“revolutionary committees” to enforce ideological and political discipline and punish violators and dissidents. During Gaddafi’s era, the closest thing to democracy were elections held for local bodies called the “people’s committees.” The people’s committee was just a forum to impose or rubber-stamp authoritarian leaders or regime candidates who are Gaddafi allies on the people. Citizens of Libya see the recent parliamentary elections as the only time they have freely exercised their franchise without being threatened, monitored and terrorised.

In a country that moved from colonialism to monarchy to dictatorship, democracy is a phenomenon, and Libyans are slowly learning the ropes – some would say too slowly.

October 20, 2011 marked a milestone in Libyan history with the capture and death of

Muammar Gaddafi. A year later, Libyans still long for security, but they have managed a democratic transition.

Formation of Civil Societies and Organisations

One of the most visible effects of last year’s February 17 Revolution in Libya was the dynamic formation of hundreds of civil society organisations. Across the country, ordinary men and women created groups to help the wounded, deliver food to the revolutionary fighters, lobby the new Government for change and raise the awareness of their fellow citizens about democracy and human rights. This same sense of civic engagement and enthusiasm was once again on display during the 7 July elections –

Libya’s first for over 42 years – when 11,344 civil society activists registered with the

Higher National Election Commission to be domestic election observers.

Electoral Reform International Service (ERIS) is a civil organisation that was funded by the British government to provide training and support for Libyan election observers. The two Libyan citizen observer organisations were, first, the Libyan Association for

Electoral Observation, which was founded by Libyan women who had travelled to observe the Tunisian elections and wanted to do the same in Libya. On polling day they fielded 686 observers across the country, and their work was complimented by international observers from the Carter Centre for being “one of the two largest and most active networks”. Their director, Nesreen al-Galhoud, explained that “our participation added value to the process. Having independent observers to watch the procedures increased Libyans’ trust that the elections would not be manipulated”

(www.ukinlibya.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-libya/eris-supporting-libyan- domestic-election-observers.htm).

The second organisation was Abshir, an NGO formed by former revolutionary fighters.

They deployed 183 observers on Election Day, all of whom had fought with the revolutionary brigades during the conflict. Abshir’s Executive Director, Surur Bin

Mousa, explained that “having fought to liberate Libya, we felt we had a duty to continue and step forward to do something to ensure the rights of Libyan people were respected.

With this training, we have been able to move from the battlefield where so many of our comrades died to the new battlefield of politics and democratic elections. We are proud to act as observers to ensure the principles we fought for are respected through transparent, fair and democratic elections”. Both organisations grew under ERIS’s support.

Formation of Political Parties

Political parties were banned in Libya from 1972 until the collapse of the Gaddafi government, and all elections were nonpartisan under law. However, during the revolution, the NTC made the introduction of multiparty democracy a cornerstone of its agenda. In the parliamentary election, a total of 374 party lists registered to contest the 80 party list seats, together with 2,639 candidates for the 120 constituency seats in 69 constituencies.

According to Manfreda (2012), 559 women registered for party seats (44%) and 88 women registered for individual seats (3%). The participation of women in the parliamentary positions is created by the new electoral law that was drafted on 28-29

January 2012 which ensured women’s quota in the independent candidate’s seats. The four major parties that that dominated the election are the National Front Party, the

Justice and Construction Party, the National or Homeland Party and the National Forces

Alliance. The National Front Party is linked to the National Front for the Salvation of

Libya (NFSL), a former anti-Gaddafi resistance group formed in the 1980s. It is led by

Mohamed el-Magariaf, an intellectual based in Eastern Libya. The Justice and

Construction Party is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. The

Homeland Party is an Islamist party as well, led by the Islamic cleric Ali al-Sallabi and

Abdelhakim Belhadj, the former emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The

National Forces Alliance is a liberal umbrella coalition around ex-interim prime minister

Mahmoud Jibril, who himself did not run for a seat in the GNC

(www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan_Public_National_Conference_election,_2012.htm).

According to electoral rules, “political parties competed for only 80 out of 200 seats in the GNC (General National Congress), with the rest of the seats reserved for independent candidates. This makes the formation of the government a more complicated negotiating process” (Manfreda, 2012:2).

Below is a list of political parties that participated the in the General National Congress

(GNC) election;

List of parties with seats in the General National Congress

• National Forces Alliance • Justice and Construction Party • National Front • Wadi Al-Hayah Party • Union for Homeland • National Centrist Party

List of parties without seats in the General National Congress

• Democratic Party • Homeland Party • Party of Reform and Development • Libyan Constitutional Union • Libyan Amazigh Congress • Alhaq and Democracy Party of Benghazi • Libyan National Congress Party • New Libya Party • National Unity of Libya Party • Freedom and Development Party of Libya • The Patriotic Reform Party • National Solidarity Party • The Libyan National Party • Umma Party

• Justice and Democracy Party of Libya • Libya Future Party • Libyan Center Party • National Democratic Assembly for Justice and Progress • Libya Development Party • Libyan Universal Party • National Democratic Alliance • New National Congress Party • Tawasul Party • Libyan National Democratic Party for Justice and Development • Libya Our Home and Tribe Party • Libyan Liberation Party • Libya for All Party • Unity Movement • Democratic Youth Party • National Democratic Assembly • Wefaq Party • Libyan National Democratic Assemblage • Ansar Al Horria • Libyan Unionist Party

Parliamentary Elections

Ten months after the overthrow of the old Gaddafi regime the Libyan people participated in their first bona fide national election in almost half a century on 7 July 2012. Electing representatives from over 3,000 candidates to the 200 member strong General National

Congress (GNC), a body charged with the task of appointing a new government and drafting a new constitution. Out of the 200 members 80 were representatives of political parties elected under a system of proportional representation whilst the remaining 120 were independent candidates elected from single member constituencies. In the election itself about 1.6 million voters out of a registered electorate of about 3 million took part

(http://www.socialistresistance.org/3834/libya-after-the-elections).

Table V.

Summary of Libyan General National Congress election results, 2012

Parties Votes % Seats

National Forces Alliance 714,769 48.14% 39

Justice and Construction 152,441 10.27% 17

National Front 60,592 4.08% 3

Union for the Homeland 66,772 4.50% 2

National Centrist Party 59,417 4.00% 2

Wadi Al-Hayah Party 6,947 0.47% 2

Moderate Ummah Assembly 21,825 1.47% 1

Authenticity and Renewal 18,745 1.26% 1

National Party For Development and 17,158 1.16% 1 Welfare

Al-Hekma (Wisdom) Party 17,129 1.15% 1

Authenticity and Progress 13,679 0.92% 1

Libyan National Democratic Party 13,092 0.88% 1

National Parties Alliance 12,735 0.86% 1

Ar-Resalah (The Message) 7,860 0.53% 1

Centrist Youth Party 7,319 0.49% 1

Libya Al-'Amal (Libya – The Hope) 6,093 0.41% 1

Labaika National Party 3,472 0.23% 1

Libyan Party for Liberty and Development 2,691 0.18% 1

Arrakeeza (The Foundation) 1,525 0.10% 1

Nation and Prosperity 1,400 0.09% 1

National Party of Wadi ash-Shati 1,355 0.09% 1

Al-Watan (Homeland Party) 51,292 3.45% 0

Independents 226,415 15.25% 120

Valid votes 1,484,723 84.13% –

Invalid/blank votes 280,117 15.87% –

Total (turnout 61.58%) 1,764,840 100% 200

Registered voters 2,865,937

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Source: www.wikipedia/org/wiki/Libyan_Public_National_Conference_election,_2012.htm

With the now Libyan Republic in a democratic transition and able to conduct a free and fair elections of which there was a mass turn out of registered voters (62%) and its economy at a good pace to development with the unfreezing of Libyan assets held by some super power countries, with the welcome-back of foreign oil refineries and the current exploration of Libyan oil. It is projected that the GDP of Libya will rise to

$79.691 billion, her GDP growth at 76.3%, GDP per capita at $12,059 and inflation to drop to 1.9% in 2012. By these statistics, the political economy of Libya is at the verge of recovery after the 9 months civil war and/or revolution.

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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

This research work elucidated the role(s) played by the United States in deposing Gaddafi from his 42 year dictatorial and authoritarian rule, and the subsequent death of Muammar

Gaddafi. Through the UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 that mandated member states to take all necessary measures in protecting the live of the Libyan people that were being brutalised by the regime army of Gaddafi, the United States found a lee-way into penetrating Libya in the guise of humanitarian aid. Although, quite alright, the Libyan people needed international assistance to out-manoeuvre and subdue the regime forces, but that notwithstanding, no conflict is ever prompted by one factor alone, and it is evident that many other considerations, including oil, played a major role in Obama’s decision to lead in the attack against Libyan Gaddafi government. The Arab spring generated chaos around the Middle East and North Africa and its attendant effect was felt by the world in general. The cost of petroleum went on a hike. From the data we have provided in the work, it shows a sudden shift in the demand for gold as oil flow was being hampered by this regional crisis which Libya was in. In order to maintain the stability of oil and control the further spread of crisis to other oil-producing neighbouring states, the United States acting as the world hegemon took the bull by the horns and led

NATO to Libya. Economy is the very strategic interest that was protected in the U.S- led

NATO war on Libya. Just like Chossudovsky (2011) righty pointed out, “the trophy was oil.”

More so, in other to achieve these interests – strategic, humanitarian aid, economic and many more, the United States through Operation Odyssey Dawn took the command and control, and maintained UN policy of no-fly zone, asset freeze and arms embargo on

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Libya. From the records provided thus far, the United States provided the highest number of munitions, donated the largest amount of funds, provided the best logistics and trained the Libyan rebels as well. Although in order not to see it as America’s war on Libya, which definitely it was, the U.S relinquished command and control to NATO.

However, the war came and Gaddafi and his forces were defeated, and on October 20

2011 Gaddafi was murdered. A problem came on how to move the country forward in a post-Gaddafi era. The National Transitional Council (NTC) the body that controlled the opposition and rebel group that fought for the freedom of Libya from the tight hands of

Gaddafi took the leadership mantle and is recognised internationally as the representative of the Libyan Republic. Since the demise of Gaddafi, Libya has been able to conduct parliamentary elections of which 64% of the registered voters (population) participated.

This is a sign of democracy. The transitional National Council conducted the elections and has elected the General National Congress (GNC) to oversee the affairs the Libyan state and to further provide a working constitution for Libya. On the economic front, those assets that were frozen around the world which totalled $110 billion are gradually being returned to the new Libyan government and oil exploration is now in full force.

This projects Libyan economy to move from a GDP of $36.874 billion in 2011 to

$79.691 billion in 2012; GDP per capita of $12,059; and the GDP growth at 76.3%.

In this work, emphasis was on the United States and the collapse of Gaddafi regime. Three research questions were raised, thus;

• To what extent did economic and strategic interests motivate U.S in the

Libyan crisis?

• To what extent did U.S involvement led to the collapse of Gaddafi regime?

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• To what extent did the collapse of Gaddafi regime affect the political

economy of the Libyan state?

To be able to answer these questions, three (3) hypotheses were postulated that:-

• There is a positive relationship between economic interest and U.S- NATO led

war on Libya.

• There is a strong U.S military participation in the Libyan crisis.

• The collapse of Gaddafi regime has brought participatory democracy, political

and economic reforms.

The work was subdivided into five (5) chapters. Chapter one (1) focused on historical background, introductory and methodological issues. It unveiled the issues and challenges in this research work. Chapter two (2) which was on U.S strategic and economic interests in Libya focused on some of the major issues that led the United

States to get involved in the Libyan revolution. In chapter three (3) we x-rayed U.S military participation in the Libyan crisis. This chapter showcased an in-depth military, financial and logistics provisions made by U.S in the crisis. And in chapter four (4) we were able to understand the political economy of Libya before and after the demise of

Muammar Gaddafi, the level of development and how Libyans now respond to the post-

Gaddafi administration. And finally, we summarized, concluded and provided recommendations in chapter five (5). Political economy theory was used as the framework of analysis for the study. At the end of the study it was discovered that it was the sole involvement of U.S in the Libyan crisis that helped oust despotic and tyrannical

Gaddafi from his 42 year reign.

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5.2 CONCLUSION

“All that we asked for was freedom. We were not free. We were restricted at all levels and it was impossible for us to express ourselves. Everything was in the name of Muammar Gaddafi. We wish for a better future in Libya, to have democracy and the right to vote, for freedom of expression and for press, because we did not previously have the freedom of the press. Libya was closed and nobody knows anything about it, so we wish to have free press and for human rights to be respected for both men and women” – (An interview with Haifa in a PressTV documentary on women in Libya).

In sum, the collapse of Gaddafi regime has brought transitional democracy and freedom in Libya. On July 7, parliamentary elections were conducted and Libyans freely participated and voted for their representatives in the 200-member General National

Congress (GNC) tasked with writing a new constitution and forming a government, an interim legislative body that replaced the National Transition Council, a transitional government established during the 2011 uprising against Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi, political parties sprang up and civil societies and organisations are now operating in

Libya, and by 2013 the Prime Minister and his cabinet will draft a new constitution. We also assert that it was the influence of United States that helped the Libyan rebels and the

NTC to conquer Gaddafi and his allied forces, and at the same time pointing out that humanitarian aid created an opportunity for the United States to exert her national interest in Libya.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Other than the division between secularists and Islamists the major political fault line in Libya today is between are those who support a centralised state and those who

105 support a federal state or even ultimately the breakup of the Libyan state. All these differences though are within a thoroughly bourgeois perspective. All the major political forces in post Gaddafi Libya support a neoliberal perspective in varying degrees. The hopes of the Libyan masses having been raised by the overthrow of Gaddafi may well find themselves quickly dashed by a neoliberal government working hand in glove with the western imperialist powers. The danger in this respect is that Islamist forces could fill the political vacuum to emerge as a major oppositional force and a serious contender for governmental power. But this is by no means a foregone conclusion if the Libyan working class is able to politically develop and intervene as an organised force. So, for an independent Libya, the country or its leaders should avoid being used as a puppet by the western imperialist powers.

There is a collapse of the central authority of Libya. The collapse has worsened as cities, towns, regions, militias and tribes all act on their own, setting up their independent power centres. Al – Rahal, a former army officer leads a movement to declare virtual autonomy in eastern Libya. Dozens of well-armed militia groups operating across the vast country have slipped well out of the control of the nascent government in Tripoli, making the country ever more fractured as well as dangerous to ordinary Libyans attempting to adjust to the end of Muammar Gaddafi's 41-year dictatorship. Indeed, Libya now has the potential to be an immensely heartening example for the entire Arab world. If a country that has been largely more a clan- and tribe-based society than a cohesive nation, and which was run by a ruthless dictator, can now put aside those ancient differences that also plague the wider Arab world and make the transition to a democratic, inclusive nation, it would be stellar model.

Much work lies ahead to accomplish and build on what has been accomplished. This requires all Libyans, political leaders and civil society to join hands to chart the future of

106 their country. At this moment of peaceful (though not so peaceful), democratic transition to new authorities, Libyans can take huge pride in what has been accomplished. Leaders need more than GDP and other traditional economic metrics to run their countries.

To that end, we put up some remedial suggestions that will help guide Libya in their road to democracy. The National Transitional Council should have its task cut out: ensure that there are no reprisals against Gaddafi loyalists and clan members; proceed with the establishment of political parties and civil societies, build plural, democratic institution and seek wider national reconciliation, dissolve and disarm militias that are not under state control. Furthermore, for Libya to be autonomous of imperial powers they should not only entrench genuine democracy but also ensure good governance. This will make her citizens to speak out against any undue external influence. Lastly, economic transformation must be comprehensive and paired with similarly far reaching political change including transparency, rule of law and protection of individual rights, as these where the major pitfalls associated with the Gaddafi regime.

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APPENDIX 1 LIBYA: UNSCR PROPOSED DESIGNATIONS

Travel ban 1. Al-Baghdadi, Dr Abdulqader Mohammed Passport number: B010574. Date of birth: 01/07/1950. Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators.

2. Dibri, Abdulqader Yusef Date of birth: 1946. Place of birth: Houn, Libya. Head of Muammar Qadhafi’s personal security. Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents.

3. Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar Director, External Security Organisation. Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency.

4. Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis Date of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Jalo, Libya. Defence Minister. Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces.

5. Matuq, Matuq Mohammed Date of birth: 1956. Place of birth: Khoms. Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence.

6. Qadhaf Al-dam, Sayyid Mohammed Date of birth: 1948. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya. Cousin of Muammar Qadhafi. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.

7. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

8. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar Passport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20/09/1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

9. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar

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Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

10. Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar Date of birth: 1970. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

11. Qadhafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Date of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya. Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.

12. Qadhafi, Mutassim Date of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

13. Qadhafi, Saadi Passport number: 014797. Date of birth: 25/05/1973. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

14. Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab Date of birth: 1982. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

15. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25/06/1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.

16. Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah Date of birth: 1949. Place of birth: Sudan. Director Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bombing of UTA flight. Brother-in-law of Muammar Qadhafi.

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Annex II Asset freeze 1. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

2. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar Passport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20/09/1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

3. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar Date of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

4. Qadhafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Date of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya. Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.

5. Qadhafi, Mutassim Date of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

6. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25/06/1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya. Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.

Annex III Entities 1. Central Bank of Libya

2. Libyan Investment Authority

3. Libyan Foreign Bank

4. Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio

5. Libyan National Oil Corporation

culled from UNSC Resolutions 1970 & 1973……

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Ake, C. (1981). Political Economy of Africa, London: Longman

Anderson, L. (1986). The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830- 1980. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Dougherty, J.E and Pfaltagraff, Jr. R. L. (1997). Contending theories of international relations: A comprehensive survey. New York: Addison Wesley Longman pub.

El Kikhia, M.O. (1997). Libya’s Qadhafi . Gainesville: University Press of Florida

Gilpin, R. (1987). The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press

Lenin, V.I. (1975). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Peking: Foreign Language Press

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1977). Manifesto of the Communist Party , Moscow: Progress Publisher

Obasi, I.N. (1999). Research Methodology in Political Science, Enugu: Academic Publishing Company

Onuoha, J. (2008). Beyond Diplomacy: Contemporary Issues in International Relations, Nsukka: Great AP Express Publishers Ltd

St. John, R.B (2002). Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press,

St. John, R.B (2008). Libya: from Colony to Independence, Oxford: Oneworld Publications

Vandewalle, D. (2006). A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Vandewalle, D. (2008). Libya since 1969: Qadhafi’s Revolution Revisited, Palgrave: Macmillan publishers

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Wetter, G.A. (1963). Dialectical Materialism: A historical and systematic survey of philosophy in the Soviet Union , New York: Praeger.

BOOK CHAPTERS

Lacher, W. (2012). The Libyan Revolution: old Elites and New Political Forces. In Muriel Asseburg (Eds.), Protest, Revolt and Regime change in the Arab World: Actors, Challenges, Implications and Policy options. Berlin: SWP Research Paper

Sharp, P. (2005). Revolutionary States, Outlaws Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy. In Jan Melissen (Eds.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Powers in International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Alterman, J.B. (2006). Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case. Middle East Quarterly

Anderson, L. (2011). Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Foreign Affairs May/June

Boucek, C. (2004). Libya’s Return to the Fold? Strategic Insights, 3 (3)

Chossudovsky, M. (2011). “Operation Libya”and the Battle for Oil: Redrawing the Map of Africa. Global Research.

Ebaye, S.E.N, Enor, F.N, Chime, J. (2011). NATO and the Libyan crisis: A Looming Case of neo-dictatorship. American Journal of Contemporary Research, 1(2)

Exum, A.M. and Hosford, Z.M. (2011). Forging a Libya Strategy: Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Centre for American Security policy Brief.

Gause, F.G.(2011). Why Middle East Missed the Arab Spring, the Myth of Authoritarian Stability. Foreign Affairs 90 (4) July/August

Lewis, W. H. (2002). The War on Terrorism: The Libya Case. The Atlantic Council of the United States Bulletin, 13 (2)

Lewsley, K. (2011). Human rights groups say dozens here died in Libya. Wall Street journal

Quartararo, J., Rosenolt, M., and Randy, W. (20110. Libya’s Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control, Prism 3( 2)

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Rubenfeld, S. (2011). U.S. Lifts Most of Libyan Sanctions, Frees $30 Billion. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from www.blogs.wsj.com/corruption- currents/2011/12/us-lifts-most-libyan-sanctions-frees-30-billion December 19.

St John, R.B. (2006). Libya and the United States: The Next Steps The Atlantic Council of the United States, Issue Brief. Retrieved from hawk.ethz.ch/.../Files/.../060328-Libya_Issue_Brief.pdf

Walker, S. (2011). Does Forced Democratization Work? Taiwan Journal of Democracy 7(1)

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Alberts, T. (2011, November 24). Oil Sector Reform in Libya. The Majalla Magazine .

Anderson, S. (2003, January 19). The Makeover. New York Magazine

Charbonneau, L (2011, August 22). U.S asks UN to unfreeze $1.5 billion Libyan assets. Reuters

Colvin, R. (2011, February 18). U.S alarmed by Bahrain violence, appeals to govts. Reuters.

Libya: A Year after Gaddafi. (2012, October24). Aljazeera. Retrieved from www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/10/2012102410223887 86159.htm

Libya Revolution: Messy politics, Perky economics. (2011, October 8). The Economist

Libya sets up $24bln fund for housing. (2011, January 27) Reuters.

London halts exports of security gear to Bahrain, Libya. (2011, February 18) Agence France Presse.

Schalchi, H. and Gumuchian, M.L. (2012, October 22). Instability grips Libya a year after Gaddafi’s fall. Reuters

Sherwood, H (2011, April 22). Libya crisis: US involvement deepens with deployment of Predator drones. The Guardian. Retrieved from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/22/libya-crisis-us-involvement- deepens-predators

Udoh, E (2006, October 31). The problem with Nigeria Politics. The Guardian Newspaper

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Africa Development Bank (2011). Libya: Post-War Challenges. Economic Brief. Retrieved from www.afdb.org

Blanchard, C. M. (2011). Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service.

Blanchard, C.M. (2012). Libya: Transition and U.S Policy. Congressional Research Services

Blanchard, C.M. and Zanotti, J. (2011). Libya: Background and U.S Relations, Congressional Research Service.

Gertler, J. (2011). Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Services

Gertler, J. et al (2011). No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal Considerations for Congress. Congressional Research Services

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. “NATO and Libya.” Retrieved from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm

Ploch, L. (2011). African Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the role of the U.S. Military in Africa. Congressional Research Services

Ratner, M. and Nururkar, N. (2011). Middle East and North Africa Unrest: Implications for Oil and Natural Gas Markets. Congressional Research Services

U.S Energy Information Administration. Retrieved from www.eia.dre.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. Retrieved from www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Retrieved from www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009. Retrieved from www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm

Taylor, C. (2011). Military Operations in Libya. House of Commons Library. October 24

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Ifesinachi, K. (2010). Method of Political Inquiry: A handbook. Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

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ENCYCLOPAEDIA ARTCLES

Africa Year Book and Who’s Who (1977). Libya, London: Africa Journal limited

Buru, M. M., Fowler, G.L., Brown, L.C., Barbour, N. (2003). North Africa: Libya. In The Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 24. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc

INTERNET MATERIALS

Alcaro, R. (2011). Opting for the Second Best in Libya? Instituto Affari Internazionali. www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1109.pdf Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Barry, J. (2011). America’s Secret Libya War, The Daily Beast. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/30/america-s-secret-libya-war-u-s-spent- 1-billion-on-covert-ops-helping-nato.html August 30. Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Bechert, R. (2011). Problem solved? What next for Libya after Gaddafi’s death? www.socialistworld.net October, 30. Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Boyd, H. (2011). Operation Unified Protector – Allied assets deployed to Libya http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/operation-odyssey-dawn-ellamy-harmattan- mobile/ Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Cooper, H. and Landler, M. (2011). U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Libya in Wake of Crackdown, www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/26diplomacy.html Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Crisis in Libya: U.S. bombs Qaddafi’s airfields, CBS News http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20044969-503543/crisis-in-libya-u-s- bombs-qaddafis-airfields.htm Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Dorsey, J.M. (2011) Winners and losers in Libya: Werstern Companies Win, Chinese Lose. Middle East Online. http://www.middleeastonline.com/english/?id=47946 August 06. Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Electoral Reform International Service – Supporting Libyan domestic election observers. http://ukinlibya.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-libya/what-is-uk-doing-to-help- libya/eris-supporting-libyan-domestic-election-observers Retrieved on September 6, 2012

Fakeeh, R. (2011). American Policies: Debating National Interests www.boell.de/downloads/Perspectives_02-36_Raed_Fakeeh.pdf Retrieved on August 24, 2012

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Gannon, M. (2011). Opportunities for the United States in the Libyan crisis of 2011 and Beyond. www.iwp.edu/doclib/20110521_yvmerd.pdf Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Horsley, S. (2011). U.S. Intervention in Libya: A Noble Use of Force? www.npr.org/2011/03/134927059/u-s-intervention-in-libya-a-noble-use-of-force Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Kirkup, J. (2011). U.K to unfreeze £12 billion in Libyan Assets. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8726082/UK-to- unfreeze-12billion-in-Libyan-assets.htm Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Lendman, S. (2011). America’s War on Libya www.dissidentvoice.org/2011/03/americas-war-on-libya/ March 6. Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Libya – African Economic Outlook. www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-africa/libya Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Manfreda, P. (2012) Parliamentary elections in Libya 2012: Islamists lose http://middleeast.about.com/b/2012/07/23/parliamentary-elections-in-libya-islamists- lose.htm July 23. Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Margolis, J. (2011). Unfreezing Libya’s Money www.theworld.org/2011/08/unfreezing- libya-money-assets/ Retrieved on October 09, 2012

Meyers, D. (2011). A triumphant Gaddafi will use terrorism to retaliate against America and the world. www.dailycaller.com Retrieved on October 09, 2012

Nazemroaya, M.D (2011). Libya and the Bid Lie: Using Human Rights Organisations to Launch Wars. www.globalresearch.ca September, 11. Retrieved on October 09, 2012

Neufville, R. (2011). America’s War in Libya www.bigthink.com/politeia/americas-war- in-libya Retrieved on October 09, 2012

Ohanwe, A.C. (2011). Arab uprising: How the cold war manure and watered it (Printer friendly email) April 22. Retrieved on August 24, 2012

Operation Unified Protector: NATO Official Hompage. www.arrc.nato.int/unified_protector.aspx Retrieved on October 09, 2012

Parry, T. (2011). Libya: Colonel Gaddafi supported terror around the world. www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/libya-colonel-gaddafi-supported- terror-149208 23 August, 2011. Retrieved on September 15, 2012

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Saif, I. (2011). Arab Leaders and western Countries: Swapping Democracy forBusiness Interests. www.boell.de/downloads/perspectives_02-16_ibrahim_Saif.pdf Retrieved on August 08, 2012

Treasury: $30 Billion in Libyan Assets frozen www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/libya-assets-frozen_n_829405.html Retrieved on September 15, 2012

Wikipedia: Libyan Civil War. http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/libyan_civil_war.htm Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia: Operation Odyssey Dawn. http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/operation_odyssey_dawn.htm Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia: Waha Oil Company. http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waha_Oil_Company.htm Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia; 2011 military intervention in Libya http://www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_libya Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia; Economy of Libya. http://www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Libya Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia; Libya – United States relations http://www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya_United_States_relations Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia; Libyan General National Congress, 2012. http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/libyan_general_national_congress_2011.htm Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia; Operation Unified Protector. http://www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unified_Protector Retrieved on October 31, 2012

Wikipedia; Politics of Libya. http://www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Libya Retrieved on October 31, 2012

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