Volume XXIV, No. 3 XXIV, Volume

Femme Fatale 2010 2010 Fatale Femme USAF L. Alfonso, Kristal Col Lt America in Education Civilian Language theHow Air Can Thrive Force Academia and Together Retired USAF, Conway, John Col Lorenz Leadership on Part 3 USAF R. Lorenz, Stephen Gen Control and Air Force Command Reenabling for Twenty-first-CenturyPartnerships USAF Breedlove, Philip Gen Lt USAF Tyler, Brian Maj Elephant the Whole Seeing a SuccessfulEnvisioning Light Attack Program for Airthe Force US USAF Pietrucha, W. Michael Col Lt Fall 2010 Fall

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Fall 2010 Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Stephen R. Lorenz http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Allen G. Peck Director, Air Force Research Institute Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired

Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj Darren K. Stanford http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Editor Capt Lori Katowich Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Tammi K. Long, Editorial Assistant Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, Air and Space Power Journal and other matters of national defense. The views and 155 N. Twining Street opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, e-mail: [email protected] Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air Visit Air and Space Power Journal online University, or other agencies or departments of the US at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil. government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. Fall 2010 Volume XXIV, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspectives

Lorenz on Leadership ❙ 5 Part 3 Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF

Reenabling Air Force Command and Control for Twenty-first-Century Partnerships ❙ 13 Lt Gen Philip Breedlove, USAF Maj Brian Tyler, USAF

From the Editor

Desert Shield and Desert Storm: 20 Years in Retrospect ❙ 16 Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Features

Seeing the Whole Elephant ❙ 42 Envisioning a Successful Light Attack Program for the US Air Force Lt Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF Writing from the perspective of an Airman in the year 2018, the author illustrates how the successful development of the OA­X, a notional light attack aircraft, mitigated today’s capability gap in using air­ power against counterinsurgency. He describes how the OA­X restored a healthy balance between high­ tech and medium­tech aircraft in the US inventory and played a pivotal global role in building partner­ ship capacity with other nations.

Femme Fatale 2010 ❙ 59 Lt Col Kristal L. Alfonso, USAF In an effort to explore whether current US laws and policies excluding women from combat remain valid or need to be amended, this article reviews three case studies that demonstrate the variety of ways women have participated in modern armed conflict. It includes proposals for encouraging the military and society to move forward with regard to debate over the role of women in combat. Civilian Language Education in America ❙ 74 How the Air Force and Academia Can Thrive Together Col John Conway, USAF, Retired Recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews suggest that language planners focus on preaccession lan­ guage education instead of teaching foreign languages to recruits and second­termers. Conse­ quently, the author examines efforts to expand preaccession language training, which continue to be hamstrung by lack of both direction and understanding of what this nation’s language edu­ cation system can provide.

Departments

17 ❙ Ricochets and Replies

20 ❙ Ira C. Eaker Award Winners

21 ❙ Views & Analyses Achieving a Credible Nuclear Deterrent ...... 21 Lt Col Samuel L. McNiel, USAF It’s Time to Fight Back: “Operationalizing” Network Defense ...... 29 Mr. Nicolas Adam Fraser Lt Col Robert J. Kaufman III, USAF, Retired Lt Col Mark R. Rydell, USAF, Retired Satellites and Remotely Piloted Aircraft: Two Remotely Operated Ships Passing in the Fight ...... 35 Col Keith W. Balts, USAF

89 ❙ Book Reviews In Hostile Skies: An American B-24 Pilot in World War II ...... 89 James M. Davis, edited by David L. Snead Reviewer: Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Retired Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea, and the Stars ...... 89 Steven J. Dick and Keith L. Cowing, eds. Reviewer: Capt Brent D. Ziarnick, USAFR The War Managers ...... 90 Douglas Kinnard Reviewer: Dr. John H. Barnhill The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It ...... 91 David M. Toczek Reviewer: Cdr Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Vol . 2, 1946–2006 ...... 92 Norman Polmar with Minoru Genda et al. Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired Astronautics: A Historical Perspective of Mankind’s Efforts to Conquer the Cosmos, Book 1, Dawn of the Space Age; Book 2, To the Moon and Towards the Future ...... 93 Ted Spitzmiller Reviewer: Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U .S . Civilan Personnel Capabilities ...... 94 Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine Reviewer: David J. Schepp, Seventh Air Force Historian

95 ❙ Mission Debrief Editorial Advisory Board

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason (Senior Executive Service and Colonel, USAF, Retired), Air Force Space Command Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Board of Reviewers

Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Dr. Tom Keaney Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland Johns Hopkins University Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Department of Homeland Security Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired Daphne, Alabama Burke, Virginia Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth US Army War College RAND Dr. Mark Clodfelter Mr. Douglas E. Lee National War College Air Force Space Command Dr. Conrad Crane Dr. Richard I. Lester Director, US Army Military History Institute Eaker Center for Professional Development Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Mr. Brent Marley Defense Attaché Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Air Force Research Institute (professor emeritus) Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF West Chicago, Illinois The Pentagon Dr. Daniel Mortensen Dr. Stephen Fought Air Force Research Institute USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Richard R. Muller Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Academy Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired Air University Westport Point, Massachusetts Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Col Mike Guillot, USAF, Retired Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Air Force Research Institute The Pentagon Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired Ohio State University Air Force Research Institute Dr. Amit Gupta Dr. Steve Rothstein USAF Air War College Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Grant T. Hammond Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Dean, NATO Defence College Naval War College Dr. Dale L. Hayden Dr. Barry Schneider Air Force Research Institute Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center Dr. Thomas Hughes Professor, USAF Air War College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Toffler Associates Air Force Research Institute Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired CyberSpace Operations Consulting LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Dr. Christopher H. Toner Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF University of St. Thomas The Pentagon Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Auburn University Navarre, Florida Dr. Harold R. Winton Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Air Command and Staff College

4 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

Lorenz on Leadership Part 3

Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF

n 1987 I first wrote out my thoughts on the years, hoping that readers would de­ leadership. The compilation included 13 velop their own set of principles. Iprinciples that Air University published in the summer of 2005 as part 1 of what be­ came the Lorenz on Leadership series.1 This Is a Family Business Later, in the spring of 2008, Air University published part 2, which included an addi­ Families are important—this goes with­ tional eight leadership principles.2 Over the out saying. When I say that this is a “family last few years, various experiences have business,” realize that the term family en­ highlighted yet another group that I present compasses more than just your immediate for your consideration. loved ones. In this case, it also includes our When I first wrote down these principles, extended Air Force family. I can’t tell you I certainly didn’t intend to prescribe an ap­ the countless times I’ve heard people thank proved way to think or lead. After all, none their “brothers and sisters in the Air Force of these tenets is unique. I took them from family.” Sometimes they do so at promotion other leaders who influenced me through or retirement ceremonies, but I’ve also

Fall 2010 | 5 heard the phrase at going­away parties and We can’t afford to let that happen—we must in daily conversations. always make time to tell our spouses how When we take time to reflect, we recog­ much we appreciate them. It takes only a nize that the bond we share with others in minute to let them know how much we the Air Force is stronger than that for most care. Maintaining the friendship, trust, and coworkers in the business world. This is es­ energy in a relationship is a full­time job. pecially true when we factor in the ties we It’s up to you to make it a fun job—for both create after remote tours, overseas assign­ you and your spouse. ments, and long combat deployments. You see, the term brothers and sisters in arms is no accident. As we live, train, sweat, and Successful Teams Are bleed together, these bonds grow so strong that the only language we have to describe Built on Trust our feelings for each other is the language Although the Air Force family helps sup­ of family—the Air Force family. port and steer us through our service, trust Building a strong Air Force family means is the foundation of our existence. This that all of us share a commitment to our trust is a two­way street—both within our fellow Airmen and treat them in ways that service and with the American public. reflect our commitment. We should all live When an Airman from security forces tells in a way that maximizes our ability to touch me that the base is secure, I know without a the lives of others. This means that we doubt that all is safe. Before flying, I always should have a healthy focus on others, not review the forms documenting mainte­ on ourselves. As motivational speaker Ken nance actions on that aircraft. The aircraft Blanchard once said, “Humility does not maintainer’s signature at the bottom of the mean you think less of yourself. It means forms is all I need to see to have complete you think of yourself less.”3 confidence in the safety of that airplane. I Now, I would most certainly be remiss if liken it to the cell phone commercial many I didn’t specifically mention our spouses. of you have probably seen. Although there These are the men and women who keep may be a single man or woman in front, he us strong and help us through the tears— or she speaks with the voice of thousands they are the foundation that enables each of standing behind. A successful team is one us to serve in the world’s greatest air force. that works together, enabled and empow­ Our lives need balance, and our spouses ered by trust. help provide that stability. I like to use the On our Air Force team, everyone’s ability analogy that such balance is similar to the to perform his or her function is what builds spokes of a bicycle wheel. You see, a bicycle trust and makes the machine run so smoothly. needs balanced spokes in order to provide a Ultimately, we all share the same goal—the smooth ride. Our lives are no different. I defense of our nation and its ideals. That’s think of the spokes as the different priori­ the common denominator, regardless of ties in our lives. If one of the spokes—like rank, where trust and mutual respect are the relationship with your spouse, the needs paramount. At every base, in every shop of your children, or your responsibilities at and office, Air Force leadership (officer, en­ work—gets slighted, the wheel no longer listed, and civilian) consistently sets the ex­ rolls the way it should. It might even stop ample. We are all role models and always rolling altogether. on the job. Our Airmen live up to these ex­ We must balance the spokes in our lives pectations every day. very deliberately and carefully. When we The trust that we share with the Ameri­ are balancing shortfalls and managing a can public is a different story. It is con­ limited amount of time, money, and man­ stantly under scrutiny—and for good rea­ power, our spouses are often shortchanged. son. Members of the American public

6 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

“trust” us with their sons and daughters— This means that we need to encourage and billions of dollars of their hard­earned dissenting opinions and negative feed­ money. That trust is built upon a founda­ back. We should ask open­ended ques­ tion of accountability. To be accountable is tions. What are we missing? How can we to be subject to the consequences of our do this better? What’s the downside? What choices. Whether we choose to do the right will other people say? thing—to act with integrity, service, and ex­ When our people answer, we must wel­ cellence—or not, we have to be prepared to come their inputs, even when those inputs accept the consequences. don’t cast our leadership in the best light. We are accountable for the choices we In the end, our time as leaders will be make in our personal lives. The vast majority judged by the quality of our decisions and of choices that get people in trouble involve the accomplishments of our people. The alcohol, sex, drugs, and/or money. Each year, personal price we pay in the short term for some of us make wrong choices in these areas creating candor in our organizations is well and are held accountable. If you know Air­ worth the long­term professional and insti­ men who are headed down a wrong path, tutional benefits of hearing the best ideas help them before they make a bad choice. and eradicating our blind spots. We are also accountable for the choices In order to encourage our people to voice we make as military professionals. We must their alternative ideas and criticisms, we adhere to the standards we learned from our have to be confident enough in our people first days in uniform. When Airmen cut cor­ to listen to negative feedback and dissent­ ners by failing to follow tech order guidance ing opinions, find the best way forward, and or by violating a flying directive, we must then lead in a positive direction. We all like hold them accountable. We must police each the “warm fuzzies” we get when people other because if we don’t, small lapses will agree with our ideas and give us positive lead to bigger ones, and the entire Air Force feedback. We naturally dislike the “cold family will eventually suffer. Overlooking a pricklies” that come when people disagree lapse is the same as condoning it. with us and point out our shortcomings. As When you assume responsibility for oth­ leaders, we have to be mature enough to ers as a supervisor or commander, it is im­ deal with criticism without punishing the portant to realize that you’ve taken a big leap source—the best leaders encourage frank in accountability. Simply put, you are ac­ feedback, especially when it is negative. countable for the choices your people make. As followers, we must work at creating That is why you must lead by example. Your candor as well. The leader must set the people need to see that you set high stan­ tone for open communication, but it is im­ dards and live according to those standards. portant that those of us who voice dissent­ You must also enforce standards within your ing opinions or give negative feedback do unit. You should correct deficiencies at the so in a way that will have the most effect. lowest level before they grow into something We can’t expect our leaders to be superhu­ bigger. Remember this: units with high stan­ man—this means we should speak in a way dards have high morale. It’s been that way that doesn’t turn them off immediately. throughout military history. We should also remember that the leader is ultimately responsible for the direction of the organization. If he or she decides to do Feedback Fuels Change something that you disagree with, voice your opinion—but be ready to accept the leader’s Trust and accountability rely on feed­ decision. As long as the boss’s decision isn’t back. We all have blind spots—areas where illegal or immoral, you should carry it out as we think things are better than they are. To though the idea were your own. That’s the correct these, we need to be aware of them. mark of a professional Airman.

Fall 2010 | 7 All Visions Require Resourcing orities. If they’ve done their homework, the project will be easy to move forward. If they As leaders, we must be prepared to face haven’t, assess the vision to determine if it many kinds of potential challenges, both should move ahead or if its time has passed. anticipated and unexpected. While work­ ing on the challenge, as a leader, you will be faced with balancing a limited amount Objective Leaders of time, money, and manpower. In order to allocate these critical resources opti­ Are Effective Leaders mally, leaders must develop visions for In essence, a leader develops a vision to their organizations. help guide decision making. Most decisions To realize a vision, several things need to are made without much thought—almost happen. First, you must align the vision instinctively, based on years of experience. with one of our core service functions. The Some, however, involve time and thought, closer to the core, the easier it will be to and they can affect other people. The pro­ gain support and, eventually, resourcing. cess of making these decisions is an art—it Next, take the vision and develop a strategy. defines who we are as leaders. Depending on your vision, the strategy may Saying this isn’t a stretch. As leaders, we involve acquisition, implementation, execu­ do things in order to create a desired ef­ tion, modification, or one of many other fect. Making the “best” decision hits at the elements. Let your strategy start at the 40 core of creating that effect; in turn, it is an percent solution, but then let it evolve to 80 essential aspect of being an effective percent and eventually to 98 percent. Real­ leader. Now, these aren’t decisions that in­ ize that the process is continual and that volve “right versus wrong”—or lying, cheat­ you will never get to 100 percent. ing, or stealing—we must never compro­ With the strategy in place, you can start mise our integrity. In fact, most of these socializing the vision. Socialization will also decisions involve “right versus right,” and help your vision progress and grow roots the decision may be different today than it through increased organizational support was yesterday. This is what can make and understanding. The support will help them so challenging. Let’s take a moment you champion the concept for resourcing. to look at the elements involved in making After all, your vision must have resourcing the “best” decision. in order to come true. Those resources will First and foremost, effective decisions go to winners, not to losers, so invest the require objectivity. The old adage “the more time and energy to be a winner. objective you are, the more effective you In life, and especially in the Air Force, are” has never been more accurate or appli­ priorities and personnel are always chang­ cable than it is today. It can be tempting to ing. Over time, your vision will need to view decisions as if you’re looking through adapt to the realities of change. It will re­ a small straw. Effective leaders must step quire even greater persistence and objectiv­ back and gain a much broader view; they ity. Giving your vision roots and aligning it must open their aperture. I’ve always advo­ with core functions will create something cated looking at issues and decisions from that can be handed off and sustained the viewpoint of your boss’s boss. This ap­ through change. The best ideas, sustained proach helps to open the aperture and by hard work, can be carried forward by maintain objectivity. any leader. In order to gain the broad, objective You may also find yourself joining an or­ view, leaders must work to gather a com­ ganization and accepting other people’s vi­ plete picture of the situation. Some call sion. In this situation, evaluate their vision this situational awareness; others call it a against current realities and resourcing pri­ 360­degree view of the issue. In either

8 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

case, that awareness involves considering time than we have to give. Through frus­ all of the variables that weigh into the deci­ trated, tired eyes we wonder where the sion, the competing interests involved in crisis came from in the first place. Even the decision, and the potential conse­ though we vow never to let it happen again, quences of the decision. The potential con­ deep down we know that it’s only a matter sequences must include possible second­ of time before the next one hits our organi­ and third­order consequences. Tough calls zation by surprise. like these can involve individuals, organi­ Such an outlook helped create an entire zations, and issues beyond those we might school of thought called “crisis manage­ initially consider. Weigh the consequences ment.” We have crisis action teams and against unit missions and organizational emergency response checklists—we even goals. Investigate how the decision will build entire plans describing how to deal move things forward in the near, mid, and effectively with the train that we never saw long term. This will provide the context for coming. These effects can be hard to absorb the decision and, although it involves a lot and typically leave “casualties” behind. of work, will result in the broadest view of Wouldn’t it be better to prepare for specific the entire process. contingencies and not rely on generic cri­ Lastly, tough decisions can be very emo­ sis­response checklists? Wouldn’t it be bet­ tional. Don’t let emotion play into the ter for the organization if a leader knew decision­making process. Emotion serves about the train long before it arrived? only to cloud the issue; it can potentially So, how does a leader get the schedule result in a decision that produces near­term for inbound trains? In many cases, just get­ happiness but fades quickly into mid­ and ting out of the office and talking to mem­ long­term unintended challenges. Leaders bers of an organization can help a leader must look at decisions from the outside, un­ identify potential issues and areas of risk. attached to the emotional influence from By the same token, if you are a member of within. They must rise above such distrac­ an organization and know of an upcoming tions in order to maintain their objectivity challenge, it is your responsibility to re­ and keep their organizations headed in the search and report it. “best” direction. Candor and objectivity alone will prob­ ably help catch 90 percent of the issues be­ fore they affect an organization. In order to Train Wrecks—How Can We reach 100 percent, a leader must work Prepare for an Impending Crisis? hard to avoid complacency. When things get “quiet” within an organization, it Unfortunately, it is the unanticipated cri­ doesn’t necessarily mean that everything sis that often derails organizations headed is being handled successfully. In fact, the in a good direction. I like to call those un­ hair on the back of every leader’s neck anticipated challenges “train whistles in the should start to stand up when things get distance.” In reality, it’s pretty easy to know quiet. After all, it probably means that the when trains are coming down the tracks. leader isn’t involved enough in the daily They are big, make lots of noise, and are operation of the unit and that the first two typically accompanied by warning lights elements, candor and objectivity, are being and bells. Trains usually run on a schedule, overlooked. This is the time to be even making it even easier to know when to step more aggressive about candor, information to the side or hop on board. flow, and objectivity. We rarely get the same notification from Leaders who work hard to enable candor, an impending crisis in the workplace. More remain objective, and discourage compla­ often, it appears, seemingly from out of cency have a unique opportunity to steer thin air, and immediately consumes more their organizations in the best direction

Fall 2010 | 9 when challenges or crises loom. As they ture levels of responsibility, it can be diffi­ identify the inbound trains, leaders can de­ cult to catch up on education adequately. cide whether to maneuver clear or hop on Never pass up the opportunity to further board. You see, each inbound train is an op­ your education. portunity. It is a chance to fight for new re­ Whereas education helps us prepare for sources—money and/or manpower—and to uncertainty, training programs are designed unify the team toward a common objective. to prepare for certainty. After all, it’s those Leaders should anticipate inbound trains as things we expect that fill our syllabi and les­ a means of improving their organizations. son books. We train for them over and over So then, what is the best way for a leader until recognizing and reacting to them be­ to guide people through change? There are come second nature. This is one reason that certainly many methods to do so, and each we use checklists so much in the Air Force. one depends on the type of change ex­ They help lead us accurately through chal­ pected. In all cases, however, the principles lenging times. that underlie the preparation for change are Through experience, our collective list of the same. Preparation builds confidence, “certainty” grows. It shapes the evolution of helps a leader’s organization be less fearful our training programs. You see, when we of approaching uncertainty, and ensures react to a challenge, we create a certain re­

Preparation builds confidence, helps a leader’s organization be less fearful of approaching uncertainty, and ensures that the organization is much more effective once change arrives.

that the organization is much more effec­ sult. Positive results reinforce the action— tive once change arrives. and make us more confident. Although the This is where education and training favorable result “trains” us to use the same come into play. We educate in order to pre­ response next time, it typically doesn’t pare for uncertainty. Education helps us teach us to handle anything other than ex­ understand why the change is necessary. It actly the same challenge. When we make also helps us objectively assess the environ­ mistakes or experience poor results, we ment and rationale necessitating the change. truly have an opportunity to learn. Even With objectivity, we can unemotionally as­ though it may not be as much fun to inves­ sess the benefits and drawbacks of the dif­ tigate our failures, we are more apt to assess ferent potential courses of action. Educa­ the challenge critically and develop other, tion is a never­ending self­improvement more successful, potential courses of action. process. The different levels occur at spe­ As a leader, you must ensure that your cific spots in our careers—opening doors people have the education necessary to pre­ and creating opportunities. Because the Air pare for uncertainty and the training to Force lines up education programs with fu­ guide them through certainty. As an indi­

10 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

vidual, you must aggressively pursue these nates are afraid to get decisions from any­ opportunities to further develop yourself as where but the top. At the same time, lead­ well. Such preparation will instill the confi­ ers must guard against exploiting the dence necessary to embrace change. availability of others, especially subordi­ nates. Such exploitation will reinforce an impression that decisions can come only In the End, from the top. People Are Still People Accessibility has also changed how we make ourselves available to others. Many Although leadership will always be about commanders like to say that they have an the people we lead, technology has changed “open door policy.” Don’t fool yourself into the way we do our jobs. Beyond the most thinking that issues will always walk noticeable and tangible aspects, like e­mail, through the open door. Leaders still need to PowerPoint, and cell phones, technology escape the electronic accessibility, namely has transformed the workplace in three e­mail, and seek human interaction. New main areas: collaboration, automation, and Airmen in the squadron aren’t going to personal accessibility. Collaboration in­ raise a concern by walking into a com­ cludes our ability to network, collect, and mander’s office, but they might if the com­ share information. Getting the right infor­ mander is able to interact in their work en­ mation to the right people when they need vironment. Leading by walking around will it isn’t always as easy as it sounds. After all, always be a principle of good leadership. accurate information is a key element in Each of us has reacted differently to the making objective decisions, and objectivity impact that technology has had on the is what keeps our organizations headed in workplace. In terms of dealing with tech­ the best direction. Today’s challenge, how­ nology, I like to think that there are three ever, is managing the sheer volume of avail­ kinds of people: pessimists, optimists, and able information. Technological advance­ realists. The technology pessimists resist ments will only make this challenge greater any change brought about by improved in years to come. By automation, I’m talking about tech­ technologies. Technology optimists jump at nology’s impact on the tasks we do each the earliest opportunity to implement any and every day. Historically, automation technological advancement. Technology re­ has been one of the enablers for doing alists, who represent the lion’s share of us “more with less.” Our most expensive asset all, accept that change is necessary and is our people. Technology gives us the ability work to integrate improvements, but they to leverage certain efficiencies by replac­ don’t continually search for and implement ing manpower with technology. Maintain­ emerging technology. ing the balance of technology and man­ Our organizations need all three tech­ power will only continue to be a daily nology types in order to run smoothly. It is leadership challenge. incumbent upon each of us to understand Lastly, accessibility applies to our ability what kind of technologist we—and those to contact anyone, anywhere, anytime with whom we work—are. This is simply through voice and data communication. another medium in which one size won’t fit There are two key aspects of accessibility: all. Leaders must adapt their style, depend­ how leaders make themselves available to ing on whom they deal with and the nature others and how you, as a leader, take advan­ of the task to be performed. The pessimist tage of the availability of others. It is impor­ might not “hear” the things communicated tant that commanders, while making them­ electronically. By the same token, resist the selves available at all hours of the day, don’t temptation to always communicate elec­ foster an environment in which subordi­ tronically with the optimist. Instead, push

Fall 2010 | 11 for the personal touch and realize that your the campground better than I found it and approach must be different for each person. to make a positive difference in people’s In essence, leadership is the challenge of lives. Working toward these goals—in con­ inspiring the people in an organization on a cert with the Air Force’s core values—helps goal­oriented journey. Technology enables us all to be servant­leaders, focusing on oth­ that journey, and we, as leaders, must suc­ ers rather than ourselves while accomplish­ cessfully manage both the benefits and det­ ing the mission.  riments of that evolution. Ultimately, lead­ ers are still responsible for themselves, their people, and the results of their units. Through leadership, they can make a differ­ ence, both in the lives of their people and Notes in the unit’s mission. 1. Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, “Lorenz on Lead­ ership,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Sum­ It’s Your Turn mer 2005): 5–9. 2. Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, “Lorenz on Leader­ In the end, a leader’s true mission is to ship: Part 2,” Air and Space Power Journal 22, no. 1 achieve a desired effect. As a result, I al­ (Spring 2008): 9–13. ways approach each new assignment or re­ 3. Quoted in Gregory K. Morris, In Pursuit of sponsibility with two main goals: to leave Leadership (Longwood, FL: Xulon Press, 2006), 206.

Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF General Lorenz (USAFA; MPA, University of Northern Colorado) is commander of Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Randolph AFB, Texas. He is respon­ sible for the recruiting, training, and education of Air Force personnel. The general attended undergraduate pilot training at Craig AFB, Alabama. Prior to assuming command of AETC, he served as commander of Air University. He has also com­ manded an air­refueling squadron, a geographically separated operations group, an air­refueling wing that won the 1994 Riverside Trophy for Best Wing in Fifteenth Air Force, and an air­mobility wing that won the 1995 Armstrong Trophy for Best Wing in Twenty­first Air Force. Additionally, he served as the commandant of cadets at the US Air Force Academy and as deputy assistant secretary for budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. A command pilot with 3,500 hours in 10 aircraft, General Lorenz is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the National War College.

12 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

Reenabling Air Force Command and Control for Twenty-first- Century Partnerships Lt Gen Philip Breedlove, USAF Maj Brian Tyler, USAF

t is time for Airmen to reenable the how best to command and control air, command and control (C2) of air opera­ space, and cyberspace forces for tomorrow’s Itions as part of a joint force in today’s joint fight. complex security environment. Earlier this This discussion involves two overarching year, the Joint Staff released the latest ver­ imperatives—joint trust and operational sion of Joint Publication (JP) 3­30, Command flexibility. With regard to the former, rela­ and Control for Joint Air Operations.1 Like all tionships between commanders are often doctrine, JP 3­30’s publication marks both more important than command relation­ an end and a beginning. The product is the ships. History offers multiple examples of culmination of a joint process by which Sol­ successful teamwork: Gen Robert E. Lee diers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines synthe­ and Gen Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” sized their experience and understanding of Jackson, Gen Omar Bradley and Maj Gen air and space C2 to provide future joint force Elwood “Pete” Quesada, Gen Norman commanders and staffs authoritative op­ Schwarzkopf and Lt Gen Charles “Chuck” tions. It codifies several important concepts, Horner, and Gen Tommy Franks and Lt Gen such as organizing with both theater and T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, among others. subtheater joint force air component com­ The personal relationships, frequent inter­ manders (JFACC), the role of air compo­ nent coordination elements, considerations action, and shared adversity of these great for the C2 of remotely piloted aircraft, and tandems (and their staffs) forged mutual the potential for assigning JFACCs responsi­ trust and respect. However we organize our bilities for space­coordinating authority. future air components and C2, we must in­ However, the publication of JP 3­30 also tentionally maximize contact between joint signals the start of its revision. Transforma­ commanders and joint planners to facilitate tion in the information age requires con­ the joint trust necessary to attain the time­ tinuous improvement, and our dynamic Air less principles of unity of (joint) command Force strives to maintain the leading edge and (joint) effort. Following Stonewall Jack­ in the domains of air, space, and cyber­ son’s fatal injury at the Battle of Chancel­ space. So, as today’s version of JP 3­30 lorsville in 1863, General Lee lamented that shapes how our joint forces command and he’d lost his right arm. Airmen succeed control current air operations, we challenge when they achieve that same level of rele­ our Airmen to renew the conversation on vance to their joint partners.

Fall 2010 | 13 Turning to operational flexibility, future Furthermore, our operational flexibility air components must capitalize upon the becomes even more vital as the US Army speed, range, and flexibility of air, space, and migrates to modular brigade combat teams cyber power in a responsive and reliable with assets previously controlled at the divi­ manner to meet a broad range of security sion level. Airspace control and area air de­ challenges. Introducing the Quadrennial De­ fense—already complex endeavors—be­ fense Review of 2010, Secretary of Defense come even more so when indirect fires; air Robert Gates said that “the United States defense; and intelligence, surveillance, and needs a broad portfolio of military capabili­ reconnaissance assets are decentralized. ties with maximum versatility across the Nonetheless, when the needs for respon­ widest possible spectrum of conflict.”2 siveness and asset assurance override the Assuming finite resources, our charge is advantages of mass and efficiency, JFACCs flexibility. The imperative of flexibility car­ must adapt or become irrelevant. ries a variety of implications for our force Finally, our discourse on future C2 should structure, force presentation, capabilities, also consider forthcoming developments in

With regard to C2, JFACCs, joint air operations centers, and entire theater air-ground systems must be capable of operations ranging from major contingencies through counterinsurgencies to humanitarian assistance.

missions, and processes. With regard to C2, cyberspace. In May 2010, the US Senate JFACCs, joint air operations centers, and confirmed Gen Keith Alexander as leader of entire theater air­ground systems must be US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Our capable of operations ranging from major Air Force has taken critical steps to support contingencies through counterinsurgencies the Department of Defense’s cyberspace to humanitarian assistance. This require­ efforts, including standing up Twenty­fourth ment calls for proficiency in both central­ Air Force as the service component to ized (strategic attack) and decentralized USCYBERCOM. As we work through the C2 (counterinsurgency) planning processes, of cyber capabilities, joint trust and opera­ and it demands effectiveness in both general­ tional flexibility remain pertinent. Central­ and direct­support relationships. Our joint ized C2 of cyber capabilities makes sense in and coalition partners recognize that no many circumstances. Conversely, we can also “one­size­fits­all” approach exists and that envision times when the synchronicity and JFACCs must be supple enough to com­ responsiveness of certain cyber effects within mand and control air, space, and cyber a joint operating area are so crucial to the power whenever and however required. campaign that devolution of specific authori­

14 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

ties is appropriate. Just as JFACCs can as­ is already time for another healthy and in­ sume responsibilities for space­coordinating trospective conversation on the future C2 of authority, so should they be able to offer air, space, and cyberspace power.  their joint force commanders the capability to assume responsibilities for cyberspace­ coordinating authority. The bridge into Fourteenth Air Force and the space commu­ nity offered by commanders of Air Force Notes forces, directors of space forces, and the 1. Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control contingent of space professionals resident for Joint Air Operations, 12 January 2010, http:// in our air and space operations centers cre­ www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_30.pdf. ates enormous value for the joint force. Can 2. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Defense a similar bridge link our joint commanders Budget / QDR Announcement” (speech, Arlington, with relevant cyber capabilities? VA, 1 February 2010), http://www.defense.gov/ JP 3­30 represents enormous progress in speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1416 (accessed 18 the maturation of the JFACC and C2. But it June 2010).

Lt Gen Philip Breedlove, USAF Lieutenant General Breedlove (BSCE, Georgia Institute of Technology; MS, Arizona State University; MS, National War College) is the deputy chief of staff for opera­ tions, plans, and requirements, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He is responsible to the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff for formulating policy supporting air, space, irregular warfare, counterproliferation, homeland security, weather, and cyber operations. As the Air Force’s operations deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he determines the operational requirements, capabilities, and training necessary to support national security objectives and military strategy. Prior to assuming his current position, he served as the commander, Third Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany. A command pilot with 3,500 flying hours, primarily in the F­16, General Breedlove has flown combat missions in Operation Joint Forge / Joint Guardian.

Maj Brian Tyler, USAF Major Tyler (USAFA; MPP, University of Maryland) is a student at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Prior to attending SAASS, he served as an Air Force Fellow / Strategic Policy Intern assigned to the Directorate of Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. Major Tyler previously conducted operational­level planning of information and cyberspace operations in Europe, Africa, and Afghani­ stan. He also led intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection and pro­ cessing, exploitation, and dissemination operations for numerous U­2 and RQ­1 missions over the Korean peninsula and Iraq, and served as a detachment com­ mander in the 67th Network Warfare Group, deputy director of intelligence for a combined joint special operations air component, and collection manager for Joint Task Force­Southwest Asia.

Fall 2010 | 15 From the Editor

Desert Shield and Desert Storm 20 Years in Retrospect

Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

n 1898 John Hay famously character­ with impunity. Coalition aircraft went “tank ized the Spanish­American War as a plinking” at night, using infrared sensors to “splendid little war.” On the 20th anni­ detect armored vehicles hidden in the sand versary of Desert Shield and Desert and then destroying them with guided IStorm, US Airmen might say the same bombs. Following weeks of air attacks, a about those two operations. blitzkrieg­style 100­hour ground offensive, An international response to Iraq’s inva­ lavishly backed with air and space power, sion of Kuwait in August 1990, Desert swept Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Desperate Shield was a buildup of coalition forces in Iraqi soldiers even surrendered to remotely the Persian Gulf region. For months the piloted aircraft (RPA) used by the US Navy prospect of what Iraqi dictator Saddam as spotters for its gunfire. Victory came Hussein threatened would become the swiftly and with few casualties. It was a “mother of all battles” worried Western lead­ good time to be an Airman. ers, who noted that the Iraqi military—one Twenty years later, it is still a good time of the world’s largest—boasted extensive to be an Airman, but many uncertainties Soviet­made weaponry and troops battle­ linger. Since Desert Storm, precision­guided hardened by an eight­year war against Iran. bombs and RPAs have become much more Flux in the international situation added to prevalent and advanced, yet the inter­ the uncertainties faced by US policy mak­ national situation remains highly turbulent. ers. The Berlin Wall had fallen the previous Now fighting a second war in Iraq, we con­ year. The Soviet Union appeared to be in front an array of regional powers and ter­ terminal decline but remained heavily rorist threats. US air and space power has armed. Airpower would play a major role in no equal during conventional combat, but any combat operation against Iraq, but the Airmen wrestle with how best to apply it in legacy of the Vietnam War gave US leaders counterinsurgency operations. “Splendid nagging doubts about airpower’s potential little wars” have been scarce of late, but effectiveness. pausing to reflect on how Airmen tri­ The concerns about airpower proved un­ umphed during Desert Shield and Desert founded. When Desert Storm began in Storm can inspire us to devise innovative January 1991, coalition airpower vindicated new ways to achieve our national goals itself in dramatic fashion as television view­ around the world. Air and Space Power ers around the world watched laser­guided Journal, the professional journal of the US bombs hit targets with seemingly unerring Air Force, is a forum for discussing the lat­ precision. Stealth aircraft slipped past Iraqi est means of applying air, space, and cyber radars to strike heavily defended facilities power. 

16 | Air & Space Power Journal Ricochets & Replies

We encourage you to e­mail your comments to us at [email protected]. We reserve the right to edit your remarks.

BEDDOWN OPTIONS FOR AIR BEDDOWN OPTIONS FOR AIR NATIONAL GUARD C­27J AIRCRAFT NATIONAL GUARD C­27J AIRCRAFT: THE AUTHOR RESPONDS Mr. John Conway’s article “Beddown Options for Air National Guard C­27J Aircraft: Support­ The idea of transitioning the Air Guard and ing Domestic Response” (Summer 2010) Army Guard into Coast Guard–like organiza­ speaks to a bigger issue we could resolve with tions, separate from the Air Force and Army, a transformational organizational shift within merits serious consideration. However, one the Department of Defense (DOD) and the must remember that the Coast Guard has a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In unique peacetime mission (transitioning to the Navy only in wartime), while the Air a post–Cold War, post–11 September 2001, Guard and Army Guard—currently focused on post­Katrina environment, we should model overseas combat operations—play key roles in the Army / National Guard and Air Force / future war plans. To extract them from the Air National Guard pairings after the model of war­planning process and—as a direct conse­ the Navy / Coast Guard. By doing this, the quence—the budgetary process stemming National Guard and Air National Guard would from it would reduce their ability to acquire each elevate to the status of separate services and maintain equipment, coordinate training, but simultaneously move from the DOD to and seamlessly integrate into Air Force and the DHS. With this move, there would obvi­ Army structures in time of war. ously be a shift in roles and missions, which Although there must be more focus on mil­ would generate changes in force structure. itary support to civil authorities (MSCA), the However, within the Air Force, for example, Air Force and Army simply are not organized you could still leverage the concepts of Total to divest themselves of the National Guard in Force Integration to continue operating simi­ order to have the Guard support a still­evolv­ lar equipment (C­130s and remotely piloted ing mission (MSCA). aircraft come to mind) with the now­part­ Col John Conway, USAF, Retired nered DOD/DHS units. This move to the DHS Maxwell AFB, Alabama would leave the Army and Air Force with ac­ tive duty and reserves within the DOD (both THE ART OF PERSUASION of which are Title 10–funded components). It would also unite the National Guard, Air Na­ As someone who has worked as a journalist, tional Guard, and Coast Guard under the DHS proposal writer, and corporate communica­ for homeland security roles and missions such tions professional, I can only applaud Capt as augmenting border patrol and counternar­ Lori Katowich’s tips to contributing writers in cotics units; conducting search and rescue; “The Art of Persuasion” (Summer 2010). Her and handling oil spills, hurricanes, and other guidance is both elegant and universal—re­ move the publication­specific references and national disaster responses. The “guards” are the advice translates to anyone who wants to less encumbered with posse comitatus legal persuade. I’ve practiced the essence of these restrictions and are better suited for these tips as guidelines for more than 20 years and roles than the active duty forces, but the cur­ have found what she wrote to be valuable, ef­ rent organizational construct of keeping them fective, and, unfortunately, frequently ig­ as components (and not services) within the nored. I recommend this column as required DOD inhibits their ability to better serve in reading for every new contributor—or at least these roles. the ones I would agree with. Thank you. Lt Col John M. Fair, USAF Lance Martin Charleston AFB, South Carolina Waco, Texas

Fall 2010 | 17 SHOULD THE UNITED STATES MAIN­ this argument with MAD theory—as well as TAIN THE NUCLEAR TRIAD? addressed how the current US nuclear­ deterrence policy could be reshaped accord­ In his article “Should the United States Main­ ingly. Indeed, the fast­changing world is forc­ tain the Nuclear Triad?” (ASPJ­English, Sum­ ing people to take a new look at a number of mer 2010; ASPJ­Chinese, Spring 2010), Dr. political theories built on classic economics. Adam Lowther concludes that since the effec­ Analysts try to choose between physical hard tiveness of US deterrence and extended deter­ power or faith as the determinant of a nation’s rence continues to depend on a strong and behavior and relationship with other coun­ enduring nuclear triad, “weakening the nu­ tries. Consequently, when discussing nuclear clear triad is unwise” (ASPJ­English, p. 28). deterrence, one must keep in mind that many We understand that revisiting US deter­ people attribute the collapse of the Soviet rence policy is necessitated by changes in Union to the power of faith rather than that of the international environment. After the physical strength. Cold War, nontraditional security threats Zhang Xinjun emerged and became the focal point of US Tsinghua University, Beijing, China policy. Dr. Lowther acknowledges these envi­ ronmental changes yet has no intention of proposing adjustments to traditional deter­ Dr. Adam Lowther’s excellent article clearly rence theory. All he does is reinterpret the and concisely presents a solid explanation of old theory under the new environmental pa­ why our nuclear triad strategy was developed rameters and reach the same old conclusion. and why we need to maintain it to ensure the This prompts me to probe the foundation of continued security of the United States. I have traditional deterrence theory, which evolved been deeply concerned for a long time about in the 1960s to the point of mutual assured what is clearly a denuclearization shift in our destruction (MAD). Based on classic econom­ military strategy and do not understand why a ics, the theory presupposes independent en­ very serious debate about the dubious merits tities engaging in international relationships, of what is, essentially, disarmament is not be­ exercising rational self­restraint, and building ing heard. I am grateful to see Dr. Lowther and maintaining law and order by maximiz­ and Air and Space Power Journal bring the dis­ ing self­interest and game playing. Nourished cussion out into the open. by classic economics, the MAD theory gains Experience shows that whenever the cost its persuasive power. Meanwhile, however, and risk of engaging in “bad actions” are re­ the same theory appears very rigid in that it duced, the result is that more such actions are rejects changes in environmental parameters undertaken. That is why, for example, we that might affect the assumptions upon have ramped up security for air travel. Al­ which it is based. In other words, MAD the­ though the number of people who might want ory assumes that international relationships to hijack or destroy a plane has not changed, have been and remain dominated by the in­ increased security has significantly increased stinctive tendency of nation­state game play­ the cost and risk that prospective hijackers ers to defend their self­interests. Thus, it is now face, leading to far fewer actual hijacking not surprising that Dr. Lowther, though see­ attempts. ing the same environmental­parameter The nuclear triad has been an effective de­ changes as nuclear abolitionists, is not able terrent for decades, and the need for it has to provide a solution that addresses the im­ clearly not disappeared. In fact, one can easily pact of such changes. make the case that both the danger of an at­ Interestingly, Dr. Lowther also cites Francis tack on the United States and the number of Fukuyama’s famous argument that Western organizations desiring to undertake such an liberal democracy played a vital role in win­ attack have increased. ning the Cold War (ASPJ­English, p. 25). Read­ With this in mind, Dr. Lowther’s message ers would have benefited more had Dr. needs to reach as many of the American peo­ Lowther gone one step further and compared ple as possible so they can understand what is

18 | Air & Space Power Journal Ricochets & Replies

at stake and start asking our leaders why we A PERFECT STORM OVER are following such a very dangerous path. NUCLEAR WEAPONS Frank J. Hannaford In April 2009, Pres. Barack Obama Omaha, Nebraska announced that the United States would strive for “a world without nuclear weapons.”* This A CYBER PROVING GROUND announcement, viewed widely as a major change to US nuclear­deterrence policy, In addition to the excellent points laid out by received both support and opposition in the Lt Col Kristal Alfonso in “A Cyber Proving United States.. ��� iii ccc eee AAA ddd mmm RRR ooo bbb eee rrr ttt MMM ooo nnn rrr ooo eee ’’’ sss aaa rrr ­­­ Ground: The Search for Cyber Genius” (Spring ticle “A Perfect Storm over Nuclear Weapons” 2010), I would add two of my own. First, there (ASPJ­English, Fall 2009; ASPJ­Chinese, Winter is evidence that a large part of success comes 2009) expresses a clear objection to that policy. not from innate genius but simply from time According to tt hh ii ss aa rr tt ii cc ll ee ,, UUU SSS nnnnn uuuuu ccccc lllll eeeee aaaaa rrrrr ddddd eeeee ttttt eeeee rrrrr ­­­­­ spent doing a task. rence played a vital role during the Cold War For example, Malcolm Gladwell’s book Out­ and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet liers: The Story of Success (Little, Brown, 2008) Union.. HH ooo www eee vvv eee rrr ,,, aaa fff ttt eee rrr tttt wwww oooo dddd eeee cccc aaaa dddd eeee ssss oooo ffff uuuu nnnn aaaa nnnn ­­­­ posits the “10,000­hour rule”—that one of the nounced “nuclear freeze,” tt hh ee UUU SSS nnn uuu ccc lll eee aaa rrr aaa rrr sss eee ­­­ keys to success in any field is spending a large nal has gravely deteriorated. Meanwhile, global amount of time actively working in that field. efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation have Therefore, to truly develop and nurture cyber experienced repeated setbacks, with more geniuses, military personnel should be spend­ states joining the nuclear club and more non­ ing a lot more time in the cyber world than state actors seeking access to nuclear weapons. they currently do—10,000 hours is almost In this regard, the article is correct in raising three­and­a­half years’ worth of eight­hour our awareness about the reality of such threats. days. On the other hand, the United States still Second, given that developing cyber skills retains the most powerful nuclear capability in requires only a computer and access to the the world. People therefore have reason to Internet (which may be the ultimate “cyber wonder if the US nuclear­deterrent capability proving ground”) and that the United States is largely disproportionate to the real threat it has only a small fraction of the world’s popu­ faces today. Is it really necessary for the lation, it is highly unlikely that many of the United States to maintain and upgrade its future “cyber geniuses” will be Americans, massive nuclear arsenal? While the United due to simple demographics. States was adjusting its nuclear policy, the Brian Weeden world also saw the US military stepping up its Montreal, Canada conventional­deterrence capabilities in all do­ mains. The trial launch of the X­37B space plane is only the latest example. Thus, people IMPROVING COST­EFFECTIVENESS IN have more reasons to believe that “a world THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE without nuclear weapons,” as proposed by the I would like to thank Col Drew Miller for his current US president, is based on the United thought­provoking article “Improving Cost­ States’ efforts to further upgrade its overall Effectiveness in the Department of Defense” deterrence capacity and therefore represents (Spring 2010). The critical thinking and fo­ a higher level of strategy to cope with “a cused decision­making tools he describes are perfect storm over nuclear weapons.” important for any leader—not only when con­ Niu Yinjian sidering cost­effectiveness but also when mak­ Shanghai, China ing any critical decision. Col Lee A. Flint, USAF Osan AB, South Korea *Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 5 April 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks­By ­President­Barack­Obama­In­Prague­As­Delivered.

Fall 2010 | 19 Ira C. Eaker Award Winners for the top Air & Space Power Journal articles of the past year

First Place Second Place Third Place Lt Col Thomas G. Single Lt Col Lorinda A. Frederick Lt Col James Mackey “New Horizons: “Deterrence and Space-Based “Recent US and Chinese Coalition Space Operations” Missile Defense” Antisatellite Activities” (Summer 2010) (Fall 2009) (Fall 2009)

Congratulations to this year’s winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible through the generous support of the Air University Foundation. If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to Air and Space Power Journal via e-mail at [email protected]. All military personnel below the rank of colonel (O-6) or government civilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible. If ASPJ publishes your article, you will automatically be entered in the competition.

20 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

Achieving a Credible Nuclear Deterrent Lt Col Samuel L. McNiel, USAF*

magine trying to keep a 1957 Chevy this article examines the foundational na­ running in pristine condition—perhaps ture of nuclear weapons with regard to de­ Inot difficult for a classic­car aficionado, terrence strategy, our neglect of the nuclear but such a vehicle would not be practical weapons complex, the uncertain reliability for daily commuting. Gen Kevin Chilton, of the weapons stockpile, and, conse­ commander of US Strategic Command, quently, the diminished credibility of our points out that the B­61 warhead, designed deterrence. It concludes by showing that in the 1950s but still in the US nuclear designing and fielding a new weapon will arsenal, contains vacuum tubes—something correct these deficiencies and provide new he equates to maintaining a ’57 Chevy for military capabilities. everyday use.1 A credible deterrent requires adversaries to believe that (1) the instrument of deter­ Nuclear Weapons rence will deliver the level of destruction and the Complex claimed and (2) the entity wielding the in­ strument would actually employ it. The ab­ A basic understanding of nuclear weap­ sence of either belief destroys the deter­ ons—very complex mechanisms made up of rent’s credibility. Over the past two thousands of parts—will help inform a dis­ decades, both the reliability of US nuclear cussion of their industrial base.2 At the weapons and certainty about US political heart of a nuclear weapon resides the nu­ will to employ them have declined; there­ clear explosive package (NEP). All current fore, the credibility of US deterrence, ulti­ US weapons consist of two stages. The first mately guaranteed by nuclear weapons, has stage, or primary, works on the same prin­ also declined. Furthermore, the United ciple as the atomic bombs employed during States no longer maintains a sufficient in­ World War II. At the center of the primary dustrial base for these devices—the nuclear lies a “pit,” a hollow core of fissile material weapons complex—to support its nuclear (usually plutonium) surrounded by a chem­ deterrence strategy. This article argues that ical explosive. When the explosives deto­ America should restore the credibility of its nate, the resulting shockwave compresses nuclear deterrence by designing, testing, the pit, which becomes so dense that it cre­ producing, and fielding a new nuclear ates a runaway nuclear fission reaction. Be­ weapon, which would effectively revive a fore the pending nuclear explosion destroys viable nuclear weapons complex and dem­ the pit, a “boost gas” (a mixture of deute­ onstrate political resolve. rium and tritium) is injected into the pit to After offering a brief background on nu­ increase the fraction of plutonium that clear weapons and the weapons complex, undergoes fission, yielding greater energy

*A space and missile operations officer, the author currently attends the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at National Defense University.

Fall 2010 | 21 for use in the second stage. The harnessed ons, and (3) dissuading rivals from breaking portion of the primary’s energy then ignites treaties designed to control nuclear weap­ the second stage’s fusion fuel. Most of the ons and then engaging in an arms race. Ac­ energy yield from thermonuclear weapons cording to the Congressional Commission comes from the secondary.3 A nuclear war­ on the Strategic Posture of the United head includes the NEP along with support­ States, “In a basic sense, the principal func­ ing components.4 tion of nuclear weapons has not changed in A nuclear weapon, composed of a nu­ decades: deterrence. The United States has clear warhead and a set of supporting non­ the weapons in order to create the condi­ nuclear components, produces nuclear en­ tions in which they are never used.”9 ergy of a militarily significant yield.5 The Nuclear weapons remain a critical under­ components consist of weapon­specific pinning of US national security and defense items such as fuses, batteries, and reentry strategy, as noted Pres. Barack Obama, vehicles and bodies.6 All nine nuclear speaking in Prague in April 2009: “Make no weapon types currently in the US stockpile mistake: As long as these [nuclear] weapons were designed in the last century—some as exist, the United States will maintain a safe, far back as the 1950s but none more re­ secure and effective arsenal to deter any cently than the 1980s.7 adversary, and guarantee that defense to Eight government­owned, contractor­ our allies.”10 The Capstone Concept for Joint operated sites make up the nuclear weap­ Operations further amplifies this theme, ob­ ons complex: serving that US forces once again need to make strategic nuclear deterrence a focus Los Alamos National Laboratory . . . and Law­ area and that US failure to maintain its nu­ rence Livermore National Laboratory . . . clear capabilities could encourage potential which design [NEPs]; Sandia National Labora­ 11 tories . . . which designs nonnuclear compo­ adversaries. With regard to the role of nents; Y­12 Plant . . . which produces ura­ fielded forces, General Chilton said that the nium components and secondaries; Kansas nuclear mission remains US Strategic Com­ City Plant . . . which produces many of the mand’s top priority, voicing his belief in the nonnuclear components; Savannah River Site importance of maintaining a safe, reliable . . . which processes tritium from stockpiled nuclear stockpile until nuclear weapons are weapons to remove decay products; Pantex no longer a part of the country’s arsenal.12 Plant . . . which assembles and disassembles In addition to the classic deterrence goal nuclear weapons; and the Nevada Test Site, of preventing a massive nuclear attack which used to conduct nuclear tests but now against the United States, today’s nuclear conducts other weapons­related experiments 8 arsenal “should be designed to provide ro­ that do not produce a nuclear yield. bust deterrence in the most difficult of plau­ sible circumstances: during conventional war against a nuclear­armed adversary.”13 Nuclear Weapons Strategy Without an ability to back up threats with Remains Relevant force, deterrence is not credible. Ensuring the availability of nuclear capabilities that A credible deterrence, impossible with­ are militarily useful for all situations does out reliable nuclear weapons, advances US not make the United States more likely to interests in three ways: (1) underpinning use nuclear weapons; instead, it gives US national security by guaranteeing the US credibility to US deterrence.14 To remain an military’s ability to bring overwhelming effective deterrent against lesser nuclear force to bear against an adversary, (2) help­ powers, especially during conventional con­ ing prevent the proliferation of nuclear flict with a nuclear­armed enemy, the US weapons by removing the imperative for nuclear arsenal should give the president allies to develop their own nuclear weap­ options having the greatest probability of

22 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

destroying an adversary’s nuclear forces and the will to use it in defense of our al­ without causing excessive casualties—a re­ lies. If our allies cannot depend on us, quirement that may call for new, low­yield then they will be motivated to develop weapons. Moreover, Keir Lieber and Daryl their own nuclear weapons and the means Press write that “any nuclear arsenal to deliver them. Most of them are capable should also give U.S. leaders options they of doing that in a few years.”18 can stomach employing in these high­risk In addition to helping deter attacks crises. Without credible and effective op­ against the United States and its allies and tions for responding to attacks on allies or helping prevent nuclear proliferation, a U.S. forces, the United States will have dif­ credible nuclear deterrent also dissuades ficulty deterring such attacks. Unless the China and Russia from pursuing a nuclear United States maintains potent counter­ arms race with the United States. As long as force capabilities, U.S. adversaries may America can produce and field enough nu­ conclude—perhaps correctly—that the clear weapons to maintain strategic balance United States strategic position abroad with Russia, that country has no incentive rests largely on a bluff.”15 to break arms control agreements in an

Deterrence strategy is essential not only for helping to protect the United States from attack but also for assuring allies and partners.

Deterrence strategy is essential not only attempt to attain strategic supremacy. How­ for helping to protect the United States from ever, failure to do so could have a destabiliz­ attack but also for assuring allies and part­ ing effect, ignite a new nuclear arms race, ners. This assurance, stemming from a con­ and even tempt China to gain nuclear stra­ cept known as extended deterrence, elimi­ tegic balance with the United States.19 nates the need for allies and partners without nuclear arms to pursue weapons programs of their own.16 Many of those par­ Atrophy of the ties could launch successful programs and Nuclear Weapons Complex begin building their own nuclear arsenals within a few years if the United States fails Any strategy that relies on nuclear to meet their deterrence needs, thus trig­ weapons requires the existence of an in­ gering global waves of nuclear proliferation dustrial base—the nuclear weapons com­ contrary to US interests.17 Gen John Loh, plex—capable of meeting the strategy’s formerly the Air Force’s vice chief of staff, needs. Because the United States has un­ clearly articulates the importance of ex­ derfunded and neglected its complex for tended deterrence: “Extended deterrence two decades, the industrial base has atro­ provides our umbrella of deterrence for phied to a point that, unless we take cor­ others. . . . But that means we have to rective action soon, we may lose the ability maintain a credible, robust nuclear force to maintain or produce nuclear weapons. If

Fall 2010 | 23 that happens, we could regain it only Finally, the country is not producing top­ through great expenditure of time and level nuclear chemists to replenish the nu­ treasure. Melanie Kirkpatrick highlights clear workforce. In the early 1960s, US uni­ the severity of the problem: “Since the end versities granted up to 36 PhDs in nuclear of the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear weapons chemistry each year, but that number has program has suffered from neglect. War­ steadily declined.25 The American Physical heads are old. There’s been no new war­ Society, the world’s second­largest organiza­ head design since the 1980s, and the last tion of physicists, commented that “only a time one was tested was 1992, when the handful of U.S. university chemistry depart­ U.S. unilaterally stopped testing.”20 ments currently have professors with active Furthermore, the United States lacks the research programs in nuclear chemistry. . . . industrial capacity to manufacture nuclear Thus, advanced education in nuclear chem­ weapons at production levels. True, it istry education is all but extinct in the could produce a few by using laboratory United States.”26 assets, but that is not the same as serial The Obama administration’s proposed production. Finally, only a handful of engi­ budget for fiscal year (FY) 2011 includes neers and scientists still in the federal $11.2 billion for the NNSA, a 13.4 percent 27 work force have designed and tested nu­ increase from FY 2010’s appropriation. clear weapons—and all of them will retire Thomas D’Agostino, NNSA administrator, in a few years.21 said that more than $7 billion of the re­ At the component level, the United quested funds are for what NNSA terms States can no longer manufacture pits (the weapons activities, which include increased Rocky Flats plant, which produced pits, investments to begin to recapitalize some physical infrastructure and build a resource shut down in 1989) or produce tritium in 28 weapons­complex facilities. In 2002 the con­ base of human capital. Although such a gressionally mandated Panel to Assess the step is helpful, even the increase in funding Reliability, Safety, and Security of the for facilities will not allow the United States United States Nuclear Stockpile (the Foster to reestablish the production level for pits. Further, it will not address the basic issue of Panel) said that the National Nuclear Secu­ uncertainty regarding the stockpile’s reli­ rity Administration (NNSA) had only mixed ability—an issue inherent in an approach prospects of fulfilling its intended weapons that excludes full­scale testing of weapons. refurbishments, including the B­61 and As the Foster Panel reports, even though no W­76 weapons, due in part to the inability to one can predict exactly when it will occur, produce new pits.22 Even though the NNSA “at some point, the nuclear test pedigree for declared in 2004 that “restoring our capa­ a weapon will no longer be relevant.”29 bility to manufacture plutonium pits is an essential element of America’s nuclear de­ fense policy,” it delayed a decision to build Weapons Reliability, Political a new pit­manufacturing facility, leaving the United States without production­level Will, and Credible Deterrence capability.23 Critical to obtaining the de­ The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) signed yield, tritium has a decay rate of 5.5 and Life Extension Program (LEP) may percent per year, giving it the shortest shelf prove insufficient to ensure the reliability of life of a nuclear weapon’s components, but stockpiled weapons—and any doubt is too the US nuclear weapons complex has not much. The United States conducted 1,000 produced it since 1988, when the K reactor nuclear tests between 1945 and 1992.30 at the Savannah River Site shut down. Ten­ Since self­imposing a moratorium on test­ nessee Valley Authority reactors did resume ing, the country has relied on the science­ production in 2005, however.24 based SSP to certify the reliability of weap­

24 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

ons. That program, which “uses data from circuitry to digital circuitry.35 Under exist­ past nuclear tests, small­scale laboratory ing policies, this change—slated to take experiments, large­scale experimental facili­ place by 2017—will occur without testing ties, examination of warheads, and the like the complete nuclear weapon. Planning to better understand nuclear weapon sci­ on untested weapons to deter existential ence,” closely examines 11 stockpiled weap­ threats to the country or expecting lead­ ons of each type per year.31 ers of second­tier regional powers to be­ If the SSP discovers problems with a war­ lieve that such weapons will always work head, then the LEP attempts to fix them by as designed may be wishful thinking. remanufacturing needed parts. Most ex­ In addition to technical reliability, perts agree that this practice has been suf­ credible deterrence requires the political ficient to date and can probably continue will to supply resources for nuclear weap­ for the short term, but they debate its vi­ ons programs and to convince potential ability in the long term. According to a re­ enemies that we have no compunctions port by the Lawrence Livermore National about employing nuclear weapons if we Laboratory in 1987, “Exact replication, espe­ must. The current administration and Con­ cially of older systems, is impossible. . . . gress are continuing the decades­long trend Documentation has never been sufficiently of allowing the credibility of US nuclear de­ exact to ensure replication. . . . The most terrence to erode. In his Prague speech, important aspect of any product certifica­ President Obama said, tion is testing: it provides the data for valid certification.”32 In general, as the US nu­ So today, I state clearly and with conviction clear arsenal matured through years of de­ America’s commitment to seek the peace and velopment, weapons became smaller and security of a world without nuclear weapons. lighter so smaller delivery vehicles could . . . First, the United States will take concrete carry them; thus, a single missile could steps towards a world without nuclear weap­ carry more warheads, or a booster could ons. . . . We will reduce the role of nuclear carry warheads farther. This reduction in weapons in our national security. . . . size required very exotic engineering, de­ . . . My administration will immediately and scribed by Ambassador Linton Brooks, for­ aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the mer NNSA administrator, as “very close to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. performance cliffs.”33 Because of the need to make warheads as small and light as pos­ And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new sible, yet assure that they would not acci­ treaty that verifiably ends the production of dentally detonate, even in very harsh envi­ fissile materials intended for use in state nu­ ronments, the designs included very little clear weapons.36 performance margin. In the absence of test­ ing, Brooks feared that as the weapons aged Although administrations from across the beyond the time when engineers originally political spectrum have endorsed the dream thought the warheads would be retired, the of a world without nuclear weapons, none cumulative effect of changes from both the in recent history have so overtly stated aging of the weapons and the utilization of their intention to de­emphasize the role of remanufactured parts would induce increas­ these weapons in US national security.37 ing uncertainty about their reliability.34 Even though President Obama pledged to In the case of the B­61 warhead, the maintain a reliable nuclear­deterrent force, LEP has gone beyond just attempting to an adversary could interpret or misinterpret replace original parts with similar new his position in a way that would raise doubt parts. It will try to change the B­61— about US willingness to employ nuclear essentially the only air­delivered weapon weapons under any circumstances, thus di­ in the US arsenal—from utilizing analog minishing the credibility of US deterrence.

Fall 2010 | 25 Through the power of the budget, Con­ Libya, Syria, and Iraq had active programs, gress has also aided the demise of the nu­ curtailed only after intensive military and clear weapons complex and diminished the political efforts. No evidence suggests that credibility of the stockpile. In 2008 it cut off US restraint slowed other countries’ deter­ all funding for the Reliable Replacement mination to field nuclear weapons. More­ Warhead (RRW) (formally terminated by the over, as previously discussed, if US allies no president in March 2009) and ensured that longer believe that America’s doctrine of the NNSA did not proceed with its Complex extended deterrence rests on reliable capa­ bilities, they too may pursue nuclear weap­ 2030 program, which would have revitalized ons programs. The United States can best the nuclear weapons complex and posi­ 38 enhance its position on nonproliferation by tioned it to manufacture a new warhead. not engaging in proliferation activities and Even if Congress approves the president’s holding accountable all who expand nuclear 2011 budget request to increase NNSA fund­ weapons technology. Designing and testing ing, improve some infrastructure, and refur­ to maintain the US arsenal in no way ex­ bish Trident missile warheads and B­61 tends nuclear weapons, but those activities bombs, it has shown no willingness to com­ do deter countries that might try to gain mit strongly to nuclear deterrence by man­ strategic equivalency with the United States dating design of a new warhead, ensuring or threaten the use of nuclear weapons to

If US allies no longer believe that America’s doctrine of extended deterrence rests on reliable capabilities, they too may pursue nuclear weapons programs.

production­level infrastructure, or directing coerce it. Therefore, although well intended, new nuclear­yield testing of weapons. the political opposition to maintaining The strongest political opposition to de­ strong, credible nuclear deterrence actually signing a new nuclear weapon or testing makes proliferation more likely. existing weapons comes from those who believe that engaging in design and test ac­ tivities would increase the proliferation of Recommendations weapons and weaken US credibility on non­ The United States should design, test, proliferation. However, this position is in­ produce, and field a new nuclear weapon in consistent with historical events. Since the order to maintain a viable nuclear weapons United States unilaterally stopped nuclear complex and ensure the credibility of the testing in 1992, France, China, India, Paki­ deterrent force. New technologies and ma­ stan, and North Korea have tested nuclear terials allow for constructing a weapon with weapons, three of those countries having safer materials and antitampering technolo­ conducted their first tests. Currently Iran is gies. Further, lower­yield weapons would likely pursuing a nuclear weapons program. add military utility and avoid unacceptable

26 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

levels of collateral damage. Additionally, a United States. No technical reasons stand in penetrating version could hold deeply bur­ the way of launching this program immedi­ ied targets at risk, obviating the need for ately—political desire and the will to do so high­yield weapons. are all we need. Before termination of the RRW program, Congress directed the NNSA to have the JASON advisory group, a prestigious organi­ Conclusion zation of scientists who advise the govern­ Because of technological and fiscal reali­ ment on defense matters, conduct an ties, US deterrence depends upon nuclear independent peer review of the need for weapons. Until we find a highly reliable the RRW.39 According to that group, “To en­ way of defeating a nuclear attack on the sure the viability of its nuclear deterrent, United States and until advances in long­ the United States must initiate and invest in range strike enable a completely successful, the RRW program now—so there will be no disarming counterforce attack against any disconnect between today’s credible deter­ enemy’s nuclear forces, America must rely rent and the one required for the future.”40 on deterrence provided by robust nuclear The process of designing, testing, and capabilities. No other weapon systems offer producing a new weapon would revitalize the same level of assurance of US survival. the US industrial base for nuclear weapons, In a misguided attempt to create a safer ensure that technical and intellectual ca­ world, the United States allowed its ability pacity exists to validate the stockpile’s reli­ to support its nuclear deterrent strategy to ability, and restore the credibility of US nu­ atrophy, diminishing confidence in the reli­ clear deterrence. Additionally, it would ability of the weapons stockpile and in the signal to friends and allies the United political will to use those weapons if neces­ States’ resolve to uphold its commitments to sary. Thus, the ensuing damage to the extended deterrence, thus assuring them credibility of US nuclear deterrence in­ they do not need to pursue their own nu­ creases, not decreases, the probability of clear weapons programs. Finally, the pro­ using nuclear weapons. Designing, testing, cess will send a strong message to Russia and fielding a new nuclear weapon will and China that it is in their best interest to both revitalize the US nuclear weapons remain in the nuclear­weapons­control re­ complex and restore the credibility of  gimes and that they have nothing to gain by America’s deterrence. trying to attain nuclear supremacy over the Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC

Notes

1. Melanie Kirkpatrick, “Sounding the Nuclear 4. Government Accountability Office, “Nuclear Alarm,” Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2008, Weapons: Annual Assessment of the Safety, Perfor­ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122731227702749413 mance, and Reliability of the Nation’s Stockpile,” .html (accessed 24 April 2010). GAO­07­243R (Washington, DC: Government Account­ 2. Jonathan Medalia, The Reliable Replacement ability Office, 2 February 2007), 4, http://www.gao Warhead Program: Background and Current Develop­ .gov/new.items/d07243r.pdf (accessed 27 April 2010). ments, CRS Report RL 32929 (Washington, DC: Con­ 5. Ibid. gressional Research Service, 27 July 2009), 4, http:// 6. Ibid. opencrs.com/document/RL32929/2009­07­27/down 7. Ibid. load/1013/ (accessed 24 April 2010). 8. Medalia, Reliable Replacement Warhead Pro­ 3. Ibid., 45. gram, 45.

Fall 2010 | 27 9. William J. Perry et al., America’s Strategic Pos­ Readiness of the U.S. Nuclear Workforce for 21st Century ture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commis­ Challenges, June 2008, 12, http://www.aps.org/policy/ sion on the Strategic Posture of the United States reports/popa­reports/upload/Nuclear­Readiness (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace ­Report­FINAL­2.pdf (accessed 24 April 2010). Press, 2009), 20, http://media.usip.org/reports/ 26. Ibid. strat_posture_report.pdf, (accessed 24 April 2010). 27. Walter Pincus, “Obama Budget Seeks 13.4 10. “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Percent Increase for National Nuclear Security Ad­ Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,” 5 April ministration,” Washington Post, 3 February 2010, A3, 2009, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp­dyn/content/ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks article/2010/02/02/AR2010020203884.html (ac­ ­By­President­Barack­Obama­In­Prague­As­Delivered/ cessed 27 April 2010). (accessed 24 April 2010). 28. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 11. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Energy and Water Development, Hearing on Presi­ Joint Operations, version 3.0 (Washington, DC: De­ dent Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request for the Na­ partment of Defense, 15 January 2009), 30–31, tional Nuclear Security Administration, 111th Cong., http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/ 2nd sess., 10 March 2010. approved_ccjov3.pdf (accessed 24 April 2010). 29. Foster, FY 2001 Report of the Panel, 2. 12. MSgt Ben Gonzales, “STRATCOM Leader 30. Medalia, Reliable Replacement Warhead Pro­ Charts Nuclear Path for American Military,” Air gram, 12. Force News Agency, 23 September 2008, http://www 31. Ibid., 7. .af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123116467 (accessed 27 32. Ibid., 6. April 2010). 33. Ibid., 5. 13. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes 34. Ibid. The details lie beyond the scope of this We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign article, but some observers support placing a high Affairs 88, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 41. level of confidence in the SSP. In general, those who 14. Ibid., 49. support the assessments believe that because of the 15. Ibid., 51. quantity of past test data, advances in modeling and 16. Perry et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 20–21. simulation techniques, and huge strides in high­ 17. Ibid., 10. powered computing, we now have sufficient under­ 18. John Michael Loh, “Ensure Nuclear Deter­ standing to accurately model all the effects of aging rence by Developing New Bomber,” Omaha World­ on weapons. Herald, 7 December 2009, http://www.omaha.com/ 35. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on article/20091207/NEWS0802/712079997 (accessed 24 Energy and Water Development, Hearing on Presi­ April 2010). 19. Perry et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 21–22. dent Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request. 20. Kirkpatrick, “Sounding the Nuclear Alarm,” 1. 36. “Remarks by President Barack Obama.” 21. Ibid., 2. 37. Ibid. 22. John S. Foster Jr., chairman, FY 2001 Report 38. Medalia, Reliable Replacement Warhead Pro­ of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Secu­ gram, 1. rity of the United States Nuclear Stockpile (Washing­ 39. Ibid., 2. ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 March 40. Ibid., 3. In an exchange between Senator Di­ 2002), 4, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/ anne Feinstein and Administrator D’Agostino dur­ testing/fosterpnlrpt01.pdf (accessed 27 April 2010). ing a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Sub­ 23. National Nuclear Security Administration, committee on Energy and Water Development on “NNSA Delays Modern Pit Facility Environmental the president’s NNSA 2011 budget request on 10 Impact Statement and Selection of a Preferred Loca­ March 2010, Mr. D’Agostino acknowledged that in tion,” 28 January 2004, http://nnsa.energy.gov/ 2009 the JASON group said it believed that the life of news/print/1516.htm (accessed 24 April 2010). existing nuclear weapons could be extended well 24. Pam Sohn, “TVA Argues for Tritium Produc­ into the future. However, he also pointed out that “in tion at Sequoyah,” Chattanooga Times Free Press, 4 many cases we can’t make things the way we used to February 2010, http://www.timesfreepress.com/ make them 30, 40 years ago. We just don’t have the news/2010/feb/04/tva­argues­for­tritium­production people. We don’t have the processing techniques.” ­at­sequoyah/ (accessed 27 April 2010). See Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy 25. American Physical Society Panel on Public and Water Development, Hearing on President Affairs Committee on Energy and Environment, Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request.

28 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

It’s Time to Fight Back “Operationalizing” Network Defense

Mr. Nicolas Adam Fraser Lt Col Robert J. Kaufman III, USAF, Retired Lt Col Mark R. Rydell, USAF, Retired*

he Air Force’s decision to stand up ing operations can ensure that mission­ Twenty­fourth Air Force under Air critical systems or even network paths re­ TForce Space Command creates an op­ main free of adversaries. The second portunity to scrutinize existing network construct, cyber engagement, is a collection warfare constructs with the goal of ensuring of responses specifically designed to affect that network warfare operations carry out an identified intruder. Current NetD con­ the Air Force’s stated mission: “to fly, fight, structs and cyber targeting enable cyber en­ and win . . . in air, space, and cyberspace.”1 gagement operations. Finally, we must Such a sweeping review would involve a closely coordinate both targeting and en­ significant number of organizations inside gagement operations with combatant com­ and outside the Air Force, encompassing mands (COCOM) and other national agency discussions of policy, funding priorities, operations. Both cyber targeting and cyber personnel, and cross­service coordination, engagement induce a robust contrast be­ to name a few. This article does not attempt tween maintenance of the network and de­ to address all of the complex issues sur­ fense of the network. Making such a dis­ rounding cyberspace operations; rather, it tinction and employing the proposed examines the most visible component of constructs should result in more effective cyberspace warfare—network defense NetD operations. (NetD). Since 1992 the Air Force has monitored its networks and responded to malicious Setting the Stage for Change network events. As the service has matured The Air Force has been discriminating in its ability to command and control its net­ its definitions of NetOps and NetD, the for­ works, some operational principles have mer providing “effective, efficient, secure, unintentionally blended NetD and network and reliable information network services operations (NetOps). This article proposes used in critical Department of Defense new operational constructs that will force a (DOD) and Air Force communications and healthy distinction between network war­ information processes” and the latter fare—particularly NetD—and NetOps. Cyber “employ[ing] . . . network­based capabilities targeting, the first proposed construct, em­ to defend friendly information resident in phasizes the need to proactively find, fix, or transiting through networks against ad­ track, and target an adversary. Cyber target­ versary efforts to destroy, disrupt, corrupt,

*All three authors work at the 688th Information Operations Wing at Lackland AFB, Texas, Mr. Fraser as chief of the Network Access Engineering Branch, Lieutenant Colonel Kaufman as deputy director of the 318th Information Operations Group, and Lieu­ tenant Colonel Rydell as a senior associate with Booz, Allen, and Hamilton. All served tours on the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team.

Fall 2010 | 29 or usurp it. NetD can be viewed as plan­ Principle 1: Detecting the Adversary ning, directing, and executing actions to Is Paramount prevent unauthorized activity in defense of Air Force information systems and net­ This principle, the foundation upon which works and for planning, directing, and ex­ we have built most traditional NetD, con­ ecuting responses to recover from un­ sumes the bulk of the Air Force’s NetD re­ authorized activity should it occur.”2 The sources. The service relies on real­time fact that the joint community does not have monitoring and emphasizes hardened net­ a term to describe what the Air Force calls work perimeters to detect enemy activity. NetOps means that it considers NetOps ei­ However, its motivation for doing so is of ther a subset of NetD or simply a mainte­ great importance. The Air Force wishes to nance function that does not warrant dis­ detect the intruder or attacker, not to take 3 cussion in a joint doctrine publication. Due action against him but to find and fix a se­ to the differences in joint and Air Force doc­ curity problem. The situation is analogous trine, we suggest simplified versions of to how a security forces member on flight­ NetD and NetOps so that the reader can im­ line patrol responds to a suspicious event. mediately recognize each operation’s re­ Upon seeing an intruder enter through a sponsibilities and priorities: hole in the fence, he or she shines his flash­ • network warfare operations / NetD: light on the hole and begins to fix it instead operations that seek to produce de­ of following and capturing the intruder. sired effects against an adversary tac­ Currently the Air Force makes no distinc­ tically, operationally, and strategi­ tion between sophisticated and non­ cally. These operations, which require sophisticated intrusions, treating all planning and intelligence support, breaches equally and responding in a way can be reactive or proactive. Most im­ portantly, NetD operations consider that protects and reestablishes the health of the discovery of an adversary not just the network. It does not focus on assuring a threat but an opportunity for opera­ that we can perform required missions and tional engagement. continue NetOps despite adversary attacks. Though important, detecting the adver­ • NetOps: operations in which the main­ sary is not the only way to protect a net­ tainer primarily acts upon the network work. Rapidly and regularly changing its to provide reliable and secure network configuration would also offer protection services. In reality an adversary who disrupts operations is no worse than a and would not require detection of the ad­ 4 hardware failure since the goal in­ versary to produce results. Additionally, volves maintaining availability and we do not advocate the end of detection performance requirements. Just as we efforts, something critical to NetD opera­ can replace hardware, so can we re­ tions as we define it, but the motivation build a compromised computer. behind detection efforts must change. Fi­ nally, we concede that our best perimeter We contend that the Air Force does not actually conduct NetD operations as de­ defenses and patch­management method­ fined above. We support this claim by ex­ ologies fail to deter or hinder sophisticated 5 amining two principles that lie at the core adversaries. Although these methodolo­ of the service’s current approach to NetD gies are useful, we must supplement our and that keep the Air Force reactive, thus current approach with one committed to weakening its ability to defend the net­ achieving effects against the adversary and work effectively. assuring mission success.

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Principle 2: NetD Operations Are Successful ing out the adversary on Air Force and DOD When a Compromised Computer Is No networks. The second would have the out­ Longer Compromised wardly focused mission of engaging him on those networks. Although both would work This principle relegates NetD operations to closely together (and with the established, a maintenance role within the Air Force, continuous network­monitoring mission), emphasizing network health at the expense they would be set apart by their commit­ of determining the enemy’s effect on ongo­ ment to planned missions or “sorties” ing or future missions. Furthermore, we linked to a commander’s operational needs rarely use a compromised computer to en­ and terminated upon completion of the gage the adversary. In addition to finding, mission. At strategic levels, proper policies analyzing, and fixing compromised comput­ need to endorse proactive NetD strategies ers, NetD operators must contest the adver­ sary, even on our own networks, conceiv­ such as targeting and engagement. Next, at ing of and executing defensive strategies the operational level, we must develop that affect him while assuring the integrity plans to address specific adversaries and of priority war­fighting missions. prescribe approved courses of action that Because of this principle, probably more allow network defenders to realize unity of than its companion, we should really define effort, mass, surprise, and timeliness in the current NetD as NetOps. When an intru­ cyberspace. Finally, at the tactical level, we sion occurs and we open an “incident,” must train and certify operators on NetD when do we close it? Not when an opera­ weapons that can compromise attacks or tion concludes but when we consider the thwart attempts to gain access to Air Force computer free of intruders and allow it to networks. These organizations and plans rejoin the network. Is that success? No. We will allow the Air Force to perform NetD op­ should measure success by combat effec­ erations that seek, engage, and act upon ad­ tiveness; consequently, we must take mea­ versaries in cyberspace. surements at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to determine if we are attain­ Cyber Targeting ing NetD objectives such as deterring the Clearly, enemies—specifically advanced, adversary from establishing or employing persistent ones—reside within the Air 6 offensive capabilities against US interests. Force network. Spearfishing attacks, which persuade users either to open a malicious attachment or click on a link to a mali­ A New Construct cious Web page, breach perimeter defenses We propose correcting these problems by without difficulty. The ease with which an establishing operational units (of yet unde­ adversary can gain access to DOD net­ termined sizes) charged with truly affecting works is outdone only by the ease with adversary operations that target Air Force which he can navigate and maneuver after and DOD networks. True, units in Twenty­ establishing “beachheads” within Air Force fourth Air Force (including the 688th Infor­ and DOD networks, both of which actions mation Operations Wing and the 67th Net­ offer entry to high­value information or work Warfare Wing) are responsible for systems. A proactive approach, cyber tar­ executing the Air Force’s cyber mission; geting can identify intruders on our net­ however, no units within Twenty­fourth Air works by using state­of­the­art NetD “weap­ Force now do what we suggest below. Our ons” not permanently located on the Air new paradigms will require reshaping exist­ Force network, along with typical perime­ ing units and, possibly, creating new ones. ter­security tools. We would conduct opera­ The first proposed organization would tions with a specific objective in mind, find have the inwardly focused mission of seek­ the adversary, and then influence, disrupt,

Fall 2010 | 31 or otherwise affect him. An operation inability of detection and protection efforts would not terminate until we have identi­ to defend the network properly. Instead it fied the adversary and subsequently veri­ takes a different approach, one not limited fied his absence, regardless of the termi­ to selection of a particular technology but nating factor. These operations also concerned with actions necessary to meet demand proper planning and execution defensive goals. To illustrate, during a foot­ because of the tremendous amount of le­ ball game, the offensive players attempt to gitimate data in cyberspace, within which reach the end zone, but the defense tries to the adversary hides to do his work. stop them. Football defenses attempt to keep the opposing team out of the end zone Cyber Engagement not only by employing defense in depth Defense has always involved delaying, dis­ (fielding a strong defensive line, lineback­ rupting, deterring, or denying enemy objec­ ers, and safeties) but also by using different tives. However, if we assume the impossi­ schemes to confuse the quarterback. For bility of completely stopping the adversary, example, one linebacker might rush the then we must consider ways to significantly quarterback while two others drop back in hinder or exploit his efforts. (By “exploit,” coverage—or the defensive coordinator we mean achieve second­ and third­order might call for an all­out blitz. Regardless of effects on his decision­making capacity.) the scheme, good coaches know they can­ Cyber engagement makes the conscious de­ not always prevent the offense from scor­ cision to use DOD networks as a path to the ing, but they can make its task difficult by adversary—a path for fulfilling defensive confusing the opposing players, especially goals.7 Upon discovering a compromised the quarterback. computer or network, NetD operators no With one eye on this analogy, we would longer would simply rebuild the system but have to say that the DOD currently plays would use intelligence and perhaps other defense without ever thinking about caus­ NetD weapons to identify the intruder. ing confusion amongst the offense. We don’t Next, depending on the level of attribution have different defensive schemes, nor do and existing operation plans (OPLAN), they we prepare plans for affecting the planning, would conduct tactical operations against execution, and, ultimately, the outcome of the adversary, utilizing the compromised an encounter with the enemy. Instead our computer or network as a launching point.8 defense stands at the network perimeter, For example, during an operation, the NetD and we hope no one gets by undetected. operator could intentionally pass inaccurate Cyber targeting and cyber engagement information to the enemy or manipulate exfiltrated data, rendering it untrustworthy. represent a significant paradigm shift in Regardless of the technique employed, the the way we conduct NetD operations. By operator would always try to introduce un­ factoring in the objectives of focused reliability, make intrusions more costly, or OPLANs, we can make NetD a stronger 10 influence the adversary’s actions. Conse­ form of fighting than network attack. In­ quently, operators must plan and coordi­ deed, the US Army has already noted this 11 nate these “response actions” with larger in more traditional defensive operations. COCOM or national­level strategies.9 Addi­ Furthermore, NetD can take a more active tionally, they must deconflict these kinds of role in network warfare while creating a operations from the day­to­day monitoring much­needed distinction between itself of network sensors. and NetOps. Finally, these new constructs As discussed above, cyber engagement support the president’s desire to go beyond covers a spectrum of operations, not simply criminal prosecution in responding appro­ network attack. Engagement assumes the priately to cyber attacks.12

32 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

A Simple Proposal mence engagement operations to affect or influence him. Planning and preparing for large­scale Two important points merit emphasis. military operations, such as the invasion of First, the adversary discovered during tar­ Iraq in 2003, require that COCOM OPLANs geting operations might be entirely differ­ be routed through each military service’s ent from the one addressed by the lead NetD organization, thereby allowing OPLAN—a possibility that makes cyber­ network defenders to implement measures space such a challenging domain to domi­ against enemy targeting of DOD networks nate. Second, targeting and engagement op­ and prevent any disruption of the OPLAN’s erations do not necessarily have to be execution. Requirements provided by the linked to a specific COCOM OPLAN. We can COCOMs usually address generic threats. perform proactive targeting operations as When operations commence, we usually long as we properly delineate and synchro­ take proactive steps such as blocking the ad­ nize them with other operations. We should dresses of hostile Internet protocols. consider performing engagement opera­ In these traditional situations, we treat tions every time we discover a network in­ the networks as a support element. That trusion, whether through traditional detec­ is, our networks need to function without tion techniques or targeting operations. disruption in order for our symmetric war­ fare capabilities to operate—analogous to saying that the fuel trucks need to function Conclusion so the F­16s can take off. It is difficult to According to the 67th Network Warfare contemplate fighting on US networks, but Wing, “The bottom line is that the Air NetD operations must take advantage of Force must transition from a detection­ access to enemy NetOps and respond by centric orientation to an active network decreasing the credibility of stolen infor­ kill chain approach which integrates pre­ mation, increasing the cost of an attack on vention, detection, response, and adver­ Air Force and DOD networks, or allowing sary engagement.”13 This vision cannot the United States to influence the adver­ come to fruition without organizing and sary’s perceptions prior to and during all tasking NetD operational units to change phases of conflict. their operational constructs from a reactive We propose the following as a way of approach (monitor, detect, and respond) to highlighting the utility of this new con­ one that, as recently described by Lt Gen struct, which truly thinks of NetD as a form William T. Lord, “seek[s] out threats and . . . of asymmetric warfare. Currently, each detect[s] and defeat[s] them instanta­ OPLAN has an appendix that addresses neously.”14 We cannot do this in isolation. NetD requirements. However, in addition to We need purposeful planning and coordina­ providing for preventive network protec­ tion with intelligence and national­level tion, future OPLANs should identify the agencies. Furthermore, the creation of US systems critical to performing traditional Cyber Command should help ensure that warfare operations (e.g., logistics networks, services act under the authority and direc­ command and control nodes, etc.). More­ tion of a COCOM. The cyber targeting and over, we should pinpoint high­threat adver­ cyber engagement constructs truly “opera­ saries so we can begin planning and coordi­ tionalize” NetD since they focus squarely on nating cyber engagement operations, and acting upon and affecting the adversary. In we should plan and execute targeting opera­ the future, we should pay comparable atten­ tions on mission­critical systems identified tion to mission assurance (i.e., continuing by the COCOM. However, this time if we operations despite enemy attacks), an area discover the adversary, we should com­ that prevents the complete separation of

Fall 2010 | 33 NetD and NetOps. However, we cannot ad­ fensive goals and deterring adversaries. To­ equately address it without planning and day, we are not, but by operationalizing very good intelligence. The DOD spends NetD and concentrating on affecting the $100 million every six months to defend the enemy, we can reverse this trend so that  .mil network.15 At some point, we must ask the Air Force can fight back. ourselves whether we are reaching our de­ Lackland AFB, Texas

Notes

1. Air Force Program Action Directive 07­08, 8. Attribution means the degree of confidence Phase One of the Implementation of the Secretary of with which we can identify the adversary. the Air Force Direction to Organize Air Force Cyber­ 9. John P. Stenbit, assistant secretary of defense space Forces, 19 December 2008, 8. for command, control, communications, and intel­ 2. Air Force Instruction 33­115, vol. 1, Network ligence, to secretaries of the military departments et Operations (NETOPS), 24 May 2006, 3, http://www al., memorandum, subject: Guidance for Computer .af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI33­115V1.pdf (ac­ Network Defense Response Actions, 26 February cessed 13 May 2010); and Air Force Doctrine Docu­ 2003, https://powhatan.iiie.disa.mil/cnd/cnd­ra ment 2­5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, ­matrixand­memo.pdf (accessed 14 May 2010). 20, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ 10. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. afdd2_5.pdf (accessed 13 May 2010). Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 3. Joint Publication 3­13, Information Operations, Princeton University Press, 1976), 84. 13 February 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ 11. Field Manual 3­01.7, Air Defense Artillery Bri­ new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (accessed 13 May 2010). gade Operations, 31 October 2000, 6­36, http://www 4. Spyros Antonatos et al., “Defending against .theblackvault.com/documents/fm3_01x7.pdf (ac­ Hitlist Worms Using Network Address Space Random­ cessed 14 May 2010). ization,” Computer Networks 51, no. 12 (22 August 12. White House, The National Strategy to Secure 2007): 3471–3490; and Dorene Kewley et al., “Dy­ Cyberspace (Washington, DC: White House, February namic Approaches to Thwart Adversary Intelligence 2003), http://www.us­cert.gov/reading_room/cyber Gathering,” in Proceedings of the DARPA [Defense Ad­ space_strategy.pdf (accessed 14 May 2010) . vanced Research Projects Agency] Information Surviv­ 13. 26th Network Operations Group, “NetD Con­ ability Conference and Exposition, vol. 1 (2001), 176. cept of Employment,” final draft, 14 December 2007, 2. 5. “Engaging the Adversary on Air Force Net­ 14. Chuck Paone, “General Calls for New Thinking works,” Information Assurance Technology Analysis on Cyberspace,” 12 May 2009, http://www.af.mil/ Center Report, TAT 04­25, DO 232, 5 March 2007, 1. news/story.asp?id=123148876 (accessed 8 April 2010). 6. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to distribution 15. William Jackson and Doug Beizer, “New DOD list, memorandum, subject: National Military Strategy Cyber Command Will Focus on the Dot­Mil Do­ for Cyberspace Operations (without enclosure), De­ main,” Government Computer News, 15 June 2009, cember 2006, 13, http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/ http://gcn.com/Articles/2009/06/15/Web­DOD ojcs/07­F­2105doc1.pdf (accessed 14 May 2010). ­cyber­command.aspx?p=1 (accessed 8 April 2010). 7. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 87.

34 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

Satellites and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Two Remotely Operated Ships Passing in the Fight

Col Keith W. Balts, USAF*

Don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes! —Col William Prescott Battle of Bunker (Breed’s) Hill, 1775

Combat identification for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) during time-sensitive targeting can be messy and may include inputs from the distributed common ground/surface system, the combined air and space operations center, the ground commander, and, of course, the UAS pilot. —Pilot of a remotely piloted aircraft Operation Enduring Freedom

dvances in technology allow modern the advantages in mind, the military has forces to fight battles at extreme dis­ already fielded many remotely operated tances, separating the shooter from systems or has them under development, theA target. Whereas Colonel Prescott deliv­ demonstrating an evolutionary trend to­ ered his famous directive in person and on ward more, not fewer, distributed opera­ the battlefield, the ground commander in tions. The RPA example above is a prolific Afghanistan communicates with the re­ one in the air domain; examples exist in motely piloted aircraft (RPA) unit in Nevada other physical domains as well. General while inputs stream in from the distributed Chilton has punctuated the growing reli­ common ground/surface system in Virginia ance on distributed operations for the space and the combined air and space operations and cyberspace domains, identifying them center in Qatar.1 Like RPA operations, space both as media “in which the United States operations are distinguished by vast geo­ can expect to be challenged.”3 In general, graphic separation between the ground and fourth­generation warfare theory also sup­ (space) vehicle segments. According to Gen ports this trend by suggesting that military Kevin Chilton, commander of US Strategic operations are more “likely to be widely dis­ Command, space operations are “absolutely persed and largely undefined.”4 global in nature and indifferent to physical In light of this relatively new trend, terrain or lines drawn on a map.”2 military leaders need to consider poten­ Forces able to distribute their operations tial second­order effects, uniquely associ­ geographically can gain advantages in force ated with distributed capabilities, that protection, economy of force, flexibility, may detract from the advantages that and system and personnel costs; however, these capabilities bring to the fight. Com­ such distribution also exposes them to paring space and RPA operations illumi­ unique vulnerabilities and challenges. With nates several of these effects. By leverag­

*The author is vice­commander of the 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg AFB, California.

Fall 2010 | 35 ing the experience gained from decades of Nevertheless, the crisscrossing evolu­ space operations, military leaders can tions of satellites and RPAs distinguish the translate applicable lessons learned from two. On the one hand, space operations be­ a relatively mature unmanned commu­ gan in a distributed mode but have grown nity to a comparatively young one. Many closer to the fight by deploying new sys­ of these lessons also apply to remotely tems and expertise into the theater of op­ operated capabilities in other domains. erations.6 RPA operations, on the other Why should we compare space and RPA hand, distribute key elements of traditional operations? Of all the terrestrially based air operations away from the theater. De­ remotely operated systems, RPAs currently spite their differences in capability and op­ make up the preponderance of those sys­ erating domain, space and RPA operations tems distributed across significant dis­ share enough characteristics to make them tances—that is, outside the immediate area worthy of comparison as examples of dis­ of responsibility. Operators of other re­ tributed operations. mote systems are in fairly close proximity to the vehicles they control, but those sys­ tems may grow more distributed over Background, Analysis, and time; thus, their communities could also Embedded Recommendations benefit from this discussion. Unlike the recent trends in air, land, and sea domains, With the space community’s more than historically, space operations have always five decades of experience in distributed been distributed (and remotely operated) operations, what lessons apply to the RPA due to the unique physical attributes of, community? The doctrine, organization, technical challenges peculiar to, and risks training, materiel, leadership and educa­ in the space domain. As Gen C. Robert tion, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) Kehler, commander of Air Force Space construct used by the Joint Capabilities In­ Command (AFSPC), remarked during a tegration and Development System, offers a visit last year to Creech AFB, Nevada, framework for comparison and analysis.7 A home of Air Force RPAs, “We understand DOTMLPF analysis of space operations re­ remote split operations in AFSPC. We have veals some recommendations that can help been operating UASs for many years. It’s remotely operated communities in other just that those UASs fly outside the atmo­ domains better prepare for future distrib­ sphere, and we fly things that are more uted operations. than 22,000 miles away. We do that with 5 remote split operations.” Military space Doctrine operations do involve several manned weapon systems, especially ground­based Despite the importance of doctrine to mili­ platforms performing space­related mis­ tary success, especially the effective em­ sions. Examples include launch vehicles, ployment of new technologies, military most space situational­awareness sensors, personnel have noticed a lack of an overall and space­control systems with a direct doctrine for RPAs.8 The uniqueness of physical, rather than a remote, connection these aircraft and other remotely operated to the weapon system; however, this article systems warrants specific guidance to ad­ addresses satellites because they represent dress shortfalls and differences in existing the preponderance of space operations and doctrine. are, in essence, remotely operated space Current command and control (C2) doc­ vehicles. Satellite system architectures trine posed significant challenges to space closely resemble RPA architectures since operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s both consist of control segments, vehicle as space capabilities became more inte­ segments, and the links connecting them. grated with traditional military operations.

36 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

Most of these hurdles concerned com­ organizational affiliation of the space per­ mand relationships, more specifically, the sonnel involved. best way to present space forces and com­ Initially, very few space­savvy person­ mand and control them during major mili­ nel existed outside of US Space Command tary operations. (USSPACECOM) to assist theater com­ Two nuances, unique to space operations manders in integrating these new capabili­ at the time, forced leaders in­theater and in ties.10 Similarly, theater expertise did not US­based space organizations to reexamine flow back into USSPACECOM to help ca­ existing C2 doctrine for establishing com­ reer space officers understand the environ­ mand relationships. First, space units can ment, requirements, and culture of tradi­ create effects within the traditional area of tional military operations. To remedy this operations without the need to fully deploy situation, in the mid­1990s USSPACECOM, or undergo a change of operational control AFSPC, and their equivalents from other (CHOP) to theater. Second, space capabili­ services began deploying space support ties can create effects across the entire area teams to theater organizations for plan­ of operations—even across multiple areas of ning, exercises, and real­world operations. responsibility simultaneously or within the The next step involved creating a perma­ same tactical timeframe (i.e., a single execu­ nent presence in major theater headquar­ tion cycle for satellite planning, similar to a ters using liaison officers—specifically, of­ single Global Hawk sortie). ficers working side by side with theater Traditional criteria for establishing com­ leadership but reporting to USSPACECOM mand relationships did not address these or its subordinates. Finally, the Air Force nuances, so conflict ensued between sup­ assigned space experts—mostly graduates ported and supporting commanders over from the space course at the US Air Force how best to resolve this doctrinal gap. After Weapons School—to major theater head­ years of experimentation, exercises, opera­ quarters, reporting directly to theater com­ tional experience, and heated exchanges, manders. This evolution from deployable the Air Force developed specific doctrinal teams to liaison officers to permanent­ criteria to help commanders establish the party experts was a key element in in­ appropriate command relationships, such creasing the effectiveness of space capa­ as operational control, tactical control, or a bilities as geographic theater commanders supporting affiliation.9 Using this doctrine gained more influence over space require­ 11 as a baseline, the RPA community should ments and integration. establish exact criteria for defining com­ While this evolution occurred at the ju­ mand relationships when units do not need nior­officer level, a similar one occurred at to fully deploy or when their weapon sys­ the senior level, although it lagged the ju­ tems can create simultaneous effects across nior­level process by several years. Senior traditional areas of operations. space officers served as liaison officers, de­ ployed, and then eventually became perma­ Organization nent members of theater headquarters as directors of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR), During the past two decades, space exper­ positions created to facilitate coordination, tise and organizations evolved within geo­ integration, and staffing activities in sup­ graphic commands in order to better inte­ port of space­integration efforts for the grate space capabilities into traditional combined force air component com­ military operations; advise senior theater mander.12 A critical milestone, establish­ leadership on space capabilities; and plan, ment of the DIRSPACEFOR position gave coordinate, and execute theater space op­ space operations a forum and voice in the­ erations. The speed and effectiveness of ater headquarters that junior officers could this evolution depended on the location and not always provide. It also enabled senior

Fall 2010 | 37 space leaders to gain direct experience in the weapon system, procedures, or real­ theater operations. world operations tempo. Policies and re­ RPA operations had their roots in theater quirements put in place by the space com­ operations, but the evolution of theater munity could serve as a baseline for RPA space organizations is noteworthy because units that must also train while they fight. it demonstrates a desired end state for ex­ Distributed operations offer a key train­ pertise in distributed operations. If the RPA ing benefit insofar as recorded data can community succumbs to the temptation to contribute to better debriefings of individ­ distribute too much expertise away from ual missions and help train other opera­ the theater, it could find itself in the same tors. Unfortunately, the exclusive use of situation as the space community in the this data can also lead operators to “drink early 1990s. By keeping sufficient junior­ their own bathwater” by learning the and senior­level RPA experts embedded wrong lessons in the absence of external within theater organizations, rather than perspectives from supporting or supported relying on liaisons, the RPA community will forces. Collaboration tools and opportuni­ ensure effective integration of current and ties to visit related locations in person can future capabilities. Although not examined generate these external perspectives. here, several organizational changes also oc­ Funding for site visits, key conferences, curred inside space organizations to better and select debriefings will help distributed support theater activities. operators improve their performance; in turn, those operators will educate forward Training units on the capabilities and limitations of Distributed operations carry with them the emerging weapon systems. In fact the first disadvantage of simultaneous authorities real benefits from the evolution of theater exercised over a single unit by both the “or­ space organizations came from educating ganize, train, and equip” chain of command theater commanders on space capabilities, of their military service and the operational which also led to increased credibility for chain of their combatant commands. When the space community. units do not CHOP into or out of a theater, commanders experience a dilemma in Materiel and Facilities unity of command in that they must fight a war while they train for it. Space operations Since satellites and RPAs differ widely due mitigate this disadvantage by establishing to the operational domains involved, mate­ recurring training requirements for line riel considerations worthy of comparison crews and real­world proficiency standards reside mainly in facilities associated with for training and evaluation personnel (as the control segment and communication well as unit leadership). Having to perform links. Despite tight cost constraints, require­ periodic real­world operations not only ments for control nodes should include ca­ keeps instructors and evaluators proficient, pacity for growth in both size and coordina­ but also enables them to help backfill line tion demands. The ability to surge crews so the crews can interrupt their efficiently beyond routine mission objec­ normal schedule rotation to fulfill monthly tives will enable operators to carry out in­ training and evaluation obligations. Major frequent but complex operations that neces­ system upgrades and procedural changes sitate crew augmentation, accommodate can also stress the steady­state manpower outreach opportunities without interfering levels needed to balance training require­ with operations (i.e., hosting tours for exter­ ments and real­world operations. Man­ nal organizations), and integrate unforeseen power needs must account for potential future capabilities. Expanding part of the surge capacity for major modifications to system without major redesign represents

38 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

another advantage of distributed systems tributed operations. Leaders of distributed over traditional manned systems. operations face two significant obstacles— The role of simulators in distributed op­ instilling a warrior ethos and motivating erations also enters into a discussion of the personnel who operate away from their materiel element. Control nodes for re­ “band of brothers” in the war zone. Some of motely operated systems depend heavily on this disconnectedness can even lead to post­ computers and data manipulation, making traumatic stress disorder among RPA crews their functionality easier to simulate than involved in lethal operations.13 Even though manned systems that operate in the physi­ space operations do not currently involve cal environment. Simulators for distributed lethality, motivated operators with a war­ operations can be incredibly realistic, espe­ fighter mentality are still critical to mission cially for weapon system displays that use success, especially personnel integrated di­ text and graphics versus live video or audio rectly with ongoing military operations. Ini­ feeds. Close synchronization of upgrades tially, the RPA community has the benefit between real­world systems and simulators of drawing its personnel from manned sys­ is paramount since both training and opera­ tems—these individuals bring their de­ tions occur simultaneously. ployed experience with them. The chal­ Finally, effective distributed operations lenge lies in sustaining that perspective in depend upon links to the outside world. their new community while educating the These links are important not only for ve­ next generation of operators who might hicle connectivity and situational aware­ not have the benefit of theater experience. ness but also for operators to feel connected Video teleconferencing, instant messaging, to the mission and the people they support and other electronic collaboration methods or who support them. Similarly, realistic can go only so far in creating and sustaining visualization tools and meaningful collabo­ a feeling of connectedness with other per­ ration capabilities can amplify contribu­ sonnel and weapon systems involved in the tions made by personnel operating outside operation beyond the immediate control the traditional area of operations. Three­ node. The experience is just “not as potent dimensional common operational pictures an emotion as being on the battlefield.”14 and training tools, along with live video Distributed operations may yield huge cost feeds, assist operators in comprehending savings and reduce risk, but to periodically the environment not physically present connect operators with the battlefield, com­ around them. Video teleconferencing, live manders should allocate funding and man­ chat, and ample travel opportunities can hours for trips to the theater and other dis­ also build and maintain professional rela­ tributed elements. Waiting three years for tionships for successful collaboration, allow­ new operators to take on a liaison or em­ ing operators to understand the nuances bedded RPA position in­theater is too late to and nonverbal communication behind the benefit the mission during their first opera­ inputs they receive. Protection of control tional tour. nodes and links should also occupy a high position on commanders’ lists of priorities Personnel since they often represent the most vulner­ able aspects of the weapon system. The military space community grew out of an engineering culture whose early space operators included either officers with tech­ Leadership and Education nical degrees or technically savvy contrac­ The crisscrossing evolutions of the space tors. In the 1990s, the Air Force transitioned and RPA communities also produce useful to nontechnical officers and eventually to comparisons for overcoming leadership and enlisted personnel as the mainstay of space education challenges associated with dis­ operations, at the same time keeping con­

Fall 2010 | 39 tractors involved to balance the loss of tech­ learned to other distributed operations, mili­ nical expertise. Although this move helped tary leaders can minimize negative second­ operationalize space capabilities and save order effects and thereby ensure mission money, the pendulum had swung too far, success. diluting experience at the junior and Lessons within each DOTMLPF element midcareer levels. The Air Force reacted by can prevent the repetition of mistakes when pushing for more technical, advanced de­ new domains open or when remotely oper­ grees and for specialization within the ca­ ated systems appear in the existing opera­ reer field to counter the degradation in tional environment. Distributed operations technical proficiency. Moreover, the conver­ stretch our current understanding of estab­ sion to enlisted personnel cost young officers lished domains, thus driving the need for early opportunities to gain this expertise as unique doctrine and organizational struc­ part of their professional development. It is tures. Furthermore, personnel policies, difficult to develop senior leaders in a com­ leadership development, and training pro­ munity that offers few opportunities to ac­ grams must adapt to incorporate nuances quire technical experience at a junior level. never before encountered in traditional (Approximately 75 percent of second­tour warfare—or at least not encountered to the space officers served as missileers in their extent revealed by modern distributed op­ first assignment.)15 erations. Finally, placing more emphasis on In summary, the RPA community should the design of control nodes, perhaps at the not abandon its origins even though tech­ expense of some vehicle prominence, will nology permits it to do so. Rapidly training allow leaders to leverage the most versatile new officer accessions or enlisted person­ and flexible segment of distributed weapon nel to operate RPAs may seem attractive, systems. but such policy changes should occur grad­ By taking a hard look at how space opera­ ually, allowing commanders to identify and tors approached these elements, military resolve second­ and third­order effects be­ leaders can improve the integration, evolu­ fore drastic corrections become necessary. tion, and mission contributions of newer distributed systems such as RPAs. As space operations evolve toward and RPAs evolve Conclusion away from their traditional operating envi­ Distributed operations offer unique ad­ ronments, they learn many lessons for vantages in warfare, but they can also in­ sharing—like two remotely operated ships  clude serious side effects. By examining passing in the fight. space operations and applying lessons Vandenberg AFB, California

Notes

1. National Park Service, “Bunker Hill Monu­ 3. Ibid., 6. ment,” http://www.nps.gov/bost/historyculture/ 4. William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of bhm.htm (accessed 22 September 2009); and Joseph War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Ga­ L. Campo, to the author, e­mail, 28 September 2009. zette 85, no. 11 (November 2001): 66. 2. Gen Kevin P. Chilton, “Cyberspace Leadership: 5. Military doctrine does not specifically define Towards New Culture, Conduct, and Capabilities,” remote split operations; rather, the term refers to op­ Air and Space Power Journal 23, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 5, erations described in this paragraph in which the http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ operator and platform are geographically separated apj09/fal09/fal09.pdf (accessed 21 May 2010). from each other. SSgt Alice Moore, “AFSPC Com­

40 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

mander Visits UAS Operations at Creech AFB,” 9. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2­2, Schriever Air Force Base, 25 March 2009, http:// Space Operations, 27 November 2006, 10–14, http:// www.schriever.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123141399 www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2.pdf (accessed 21 May 2010). (accessed 21 May 2010). 6. Maj Keith W. Balts, “The Next Evolution for 10. Today, USSPACECOM’s space­operations mis­ Theater Space Organizations: Specializing for sion resides in US Strategic Command. Space Control,” in Space Power Integration: Perspec­ 11. Balts, “Next Evolution,” 124. tives from Space Weapons Officers, ed. Lt Col Kendall 12. AFDD 2­2, Space Operations, 7. K. Brown (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 13. Scott Lindlaw, “UAV Operators Suffer War December 2006), 124, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ Stress,” Air Force Times, 8 August 2008, 1, http:// aul/aupress/Books/Brown/brown.pdf (accessed 21 www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/08/ap_remote May 2010). _stress_080708/ (accessed 9 January 2010). 7. Sean C. Sullivan, “Capabilities­Based Plan­ 14. Singer, Wired for War (see caption for third ning: Joint Capabilities Integration and Develop­ unnumbered plate in the photo gallery following ment System and the Functional Capabilities p. 308). Board,” course reading (Newport, RI: Naval War Col­ 15. US Air Force, “13S Career Paths, Deliberate lege, 20 August 2008), 4. Force Development,” briefing, AF/A3O­ST, January 8. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revo­ 2009, slide 21. lution and Conflict in the Twenty­first Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 210.

Fall 2010 | 41 Seeing the Whole Elephant Envisioning a Successful Light Attack Program for the US Air Force

Lt Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF

Strategically, purchasing the OA­X in large numbers was probably one of the best things the Air Force ever did. It allowed us to balance our Air Force properly; project persistent airpower capabilities to places in the world that were previously very difficult to reach; started the construc­ tion of modern, combat­capable regional and national air forces where none had existed before; and provided a multirole capability that extended the life of fourth­generation fighters while we waited for the bugs to be worked out of the F­35 program. The current strength of the combat air forces comes from many sources today, but it is fair to conclude that without the OA­X, not only would the United States still be fighting the Long War in many more places, but the Air Force would have unnecessarily shed a great deal of capability in the past decade. —US Secretary of Defense Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 21 April 2018 cquisition of a capable, multirole, discussion platform agnostic, without fa­ light attack capability by the US Air voring any candidate. A Force (USAF) is not a foregone con­ clusion. Faced with budgetary pressures, diminishing resources, institutional resis­ The OA-X Aircraft tance, and acquisition-system challenges, For the sake of simplicity, one OA-X ex­ advocates of reestablishing a light attack ists, derived from an existing capability and capability have encountered substantial purchased off the shelf with relatively mi­ difficulty in encouraging the USAF to start nor modifications, mostly related to the in­ a credible program. Much of the work com­ stallation of sensors and communications. pleted thus far has involved advocating for Air Combat Command’s (ACC) OA-X En­ a capability, determining operational re­ abling Concept outlines its capabilities.1 A quirements, and defining the costs and two-seat, low-wing monoplane aircraft pow­ timelines for acquiring light attack capa­ ered by a single PT-6A turboprop delivering bilities exemplified by the notional “OA-X” approximately 1,600 shaft horsepower, the aircraft. This article does none of those OA-X can fly for three-and-a-half hours on things. In order to argue the vision effec­ internal fuel or five hours with two external tively, this discussion paints the complete fuel tanks. The aircraft includes appropriate picture—an idealized view of a complete radios, an option for data link (including OA-X program that the USAF aggressively variable message format, situational aware­ pursues, rapidly procures, and completes ness data link, or Link-16 capabilities), and by the end of this decade. Written from a an electro-optical/infrared sensor that can 2018 viewpoint, the article looks back on provide video via a ROVER-compatible data the success of the program. link.2 The OA-X can employ GBU-38 as well In this case, idealized does not mean as GBU-12 precision-guided munitions and entirely free of resource constraints. Al­ deliver tube-launched weapons and sensors. though the total fleet size remains unde­ It is also capable of accurate, computer- fined, it is considerably larger than the aided delivery of unguided Mk-81 and Mk-82 15-aircraft buy currently envisioned by bombs. AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles, 2.75­ Headquarters USAF. Notably, the OA-X re­ inch rockets (including precision-guided mains a complementary capability rather variants), and .50-caliber guns fill out the than a replacement for either legacy fight­ armament. Qualified aircrews can reload ers or the F-35; the increased fleet size re­ the rockets and guns in the field. The air­ flects the likelihood that the emerging de­ craft has a viable austere-airfield capability mand for this capability will likely prove that allows it to operate, combat loaded, far greater than anticipated. In order to from any airfield 3,000 feet long and capa­ present a story of a completed program in ble of accommodating a C-130. The hands­ a relatively short time, the article imposes on-throttle-and-stick cockpit, roughly equiva­ minimal constraints on acquisition and lent to that of any other fourth-generation basing; specifically, it assumes that the fighter, includes secure radios and data USAF can procure off-the-shelf aircraft to links, compatibility with night vision gog­ meet immediate needs and can base them gles, excellent air-to-ground visibility, and in locations that make the most sense. Be­ ejection seats capable of functioning at zero cause we have not selected a light attack airspeed and zero altitude. Chaff and flares aircraft, the use of OA-X here keeps the provide self-protection, just as lightweight

Fall 2010 | 43 Pietrucha armor protects the cockpit and engine. No­ requirements (mostly related to weapons tably, none of these capabilities requires a and communications). With strong support developmental effort; all of them come from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from other programs. Nellis AFB hosted a competitive flyoff It is equally significant to discuss what among a small pool of nondevelopmental the aircraft does not include. The OA-X can aircraft in the fall of 2010. Two contenders accommodate radar-warning gear, but only had potential, but only one reflected the aircraft based at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and in state of development required by the USAF; Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) have that equip­ consequently, the service signed a contract ment installed. The helmet-mounted cuing in the fall of 2010 that covered both the Af­ system and the Hellfire, Maverick, and ghan buy and the initial USAF purchase, AIM-9X missile capabilities were part of a with options for additional aircraft. spiral development plan—not an initial re­ quirement, as was a missile-warning sensor. Although the aircraft cannot transmit video Continental United States from the sensors beyond line-of-sight, it does have UHF satellite communications Following the success of phase two of and Iridium, but solely for voice. the Imminent Fury (IF) combat demon­ All of the aircraft can accommodate sig­ stration of 2010 in Afghanistan, the USAF nals intelligence sensors, but only limited conducted an aggressive campaign to intro­ numbers have them, the latter typically duce OA-Xs into service, following an ac­ celerated production and procurement tasked to support US Special Operations 4 Command (SOCOM). Some of them carry a schedule. ACC accepted the first OA-X de­ communications jammer externally for spe­ livery in early 2011 and declared initial op­ cial missions. erational capability with the first 12 air­ craft delivered at the end of the year. The first squadron stood up at Willow Grove Genesis Joint Reserve Base, Pennsylvania, follow­ ing the previously scheduled retirement of By 2010 the OA-X concept had been un­ the 111th Wing’s A-10 Thunderbolts. Use of der consideration within ACC for two years. an Air National Guard (ANG) base allowed Frustrated by the slow pace of events, the rapid stand-up of a field training unit secretary of defense began a strong push for (FTU) capability, and the choice of Willow a rapid-acquisition program following the Grove reflected the need to preserve the outcome of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense accumulated attack experience of the 111th Review. Buoyed by emerging demand from Wing. This OA-X squadron, although for­ overseas major commands, particularly mally designated a training unit, not only United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), provided training capacity for both USAF and under pressure to show some institu­ and Afghan pilots but also operationally tional commitment to irregular warfare, deployed two- and four-aircraft elements to Headquarters USAF began a rapid-acquisition support various operations overseas. In the program in late summer of 2010 and “piggy­ summer of 2012, the aircraft was in high backed” on the required delivery of 20 light demand on the air show circuit, which of­ attack aircraft to the Afghan National Army fered both cross-country flight experience Air Corps (ANAAC) by the fall of 2011.3 The (particularly important for the Afghan pi­ USAF requested both additional funding lots) and helped build public—and, there­ from Congress and the authority to repro­ fore, congressional—support. gram fiscal year 2010 funds to support im­ Mid-2012 saw completion of the Afghan mediate procurement of an off-the-shelf ca­ buy and delivery of three aircraft each pability, suitably modified to meet its month to the USAF, with an additional one

44 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant aircraft per month going to the ANZUS continental United States (CONUS): (1) the (Australia, New Zealand, United States Se­ need to maintain proximity to Army and curity Treaty) OA-X program, a combined Marine Corps training facilities and (2) the buy between Australia and New Zealand. presence of existing fighter wings, with the The ANAAC lost two aircraft to pilot error latter criterion more heavily weighted. For in 2012, both of them replaced from new the ANG, the criteria remained similar al­ production. The aircraft acceptance rate for though existing fighter wings containing the USAF eventually grew to six per month. units that had lost or would lose their attack After the Turkish assembly facility came capability received priority. Thus, of the 10 online in 2014, deliveries to overseas cus­ bases that currently operate OA-Xs, Battle tomers increased, with the USAF getting 50 Creek’s 110th Fighter Wing (FW) is the only percent or more of the total US production unit without close proximity to Army facili­ run of OA-Xs. Realizing that the AV-8B Har­ ties since planners made a priority of re­ rier fleet was retiring faster than anticipated taining expertise as the A-10s moved out and faced with a major delay in the vertical- (fig. 1). takeoff-and-landing variant of the F-35, the OA-Xs are assigned to four active duty Marine Corps started OA-X procurement in wings and a fifth integrated fighter group 2013, successfully resisting pressure to buy (active duty and Air Force Reserve) at Super Hornet aircraft that it did not want. Moody AFB, Georgia, although the latter is Today, eight years after the program be­ a group in name only for heritage reasons. gan in 2010, ACC operates OA-Xs in five The preponderance of Army units in the fighter squadrons, and the ANG has an ad­ Southeast gives that area heavy representa­ ditional five fighter squadrons similarly tion, with OA-X squadrons at Seymour equipped, including both FTUs. Air Force Johnson AFB, North Carolina; Shaw AFB, Special Operations Command (AFSOC) op­ South Carolina; and Moody. Nellis AFB op­ erates a single squadron. ACC embedded erates the 561st Fighter Squadron, again the squadrons within existing fighter wings to sole operational fighter unit there, as well avoid the necessity of standing up new as the OA-Xs assigned to the 422nd Test and wings with their associated infrastructure Evaluation Squadron and the Weapons and personnel. This method required only School. Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, houses minimal additions to base populations and the final active duty unit. One four-ship op­ reduced the need for more military con­ erational detachment, deployed at Reagan struction. The OA-X’s small physical size, National Airport since 2012, shares ramp limited logistical footprint, and easy main­ space with the Coast Guard, conducting tainability enabled existing facilities to ac­ routine training with federal agencies in a commodate it effectively. complex urban area defined by the flight- exclusion zone around Washington, DC, and occasionally supplementing the 113th Basing Fighter Wing at Joint Base Andrews, Mary­ land, for air defense alert. More cynical ob­ The 2005 base realignment and closure servers have also pointed out that the pres­ had a significant impact on ANG force ence of this detachment offers senior structure, realigning several fighter wings leaders in Congress and the Office of the and assigning several more to fly C-21s as a Secretary of Defense visible proof of the “bridge” mission until the C-27J arrived.5 USAF’s commitment to irregular warfare; Cuts to the C-27J program left several ANG orientation flights are rather common. flying units with no long-term mission and AFSOC operates its OA-X squadron at generated considerable enthusiasm for get­ Cannon AFB, New Mexico. The Marine ting OA-Xs on the ramp. Two factors moti­ Corps squadrons are at Yuma, Arizona, and vated basing strategy for the OA-X in the Cherry Point, North Carolina, while the Na-

Fall 2010 | 45 Pietrucha

Army / Marine Training Center ArmArmy Dy Division / Civision Corps Horps Headquareadquartt ersers Air NationalNaAir Guartional Guardd AFSOC

USAFUSAF Marine Corps

US NaUS Navv yy

Ft. Lewis, WA Ft. Drum, NY Mountain Home AFB, ID Battle Creek, MI Bradley, CT 366th FW 110th FW 103rd FW Naval Air Station Fallon, NV Willow Grove, PA 111th FW (FTU) Nellis AFB, NV 57th Wing Ft. Carson, CO Seymour Johnson AFB, NC Ft. Campbell, KY Ft. Irwin, CA Ft. Bragg, NC 4th FW National Training Center Cannon AFB, NM Ft. Riley, KS 27th Special Operations Wing MCAS Cherry Point Camp Pendleton, CA Camp LeJune, NC Ft. Stewart, GA 29 Palms, CA Shaw AFB, SC Air Ground Combat Center 20th FW

Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Ft. Hood, TX Moody AFB, GA Yuma, AZ Tucson, AZ 476th Fighter Group 162nd FW (FTU) Houston, TX Ft. Polk, LA 147th FW Joint Readiness and Training Center

Figure 1. CONUS basing of OA-X aircraft

vy’s sole squadron operates at Naval Air Sta­ tial cadre’s skill sets sharp. When the FTU tion Fallon, Nevada. Two OA­Xs are assigned opened at Willow Grove, two Colombian to the 85th Test and Evaluation Group at instructors, present from the beginning as Eglin AFB, Florida, mostly for testing and exchange officers, helped build an ex­ weapons­integration work. tremely successful formal relationship that has become both larger and multilateral. The rapid drawdown of ANG fighter Training and Crewing units produced an abundance of volunteer ANG pilots. Willow Grove had many pilots As expected, the OA­Xs were pressed into to choose from since a number of guards­ combat operations, virtually as soon as the men were willing to commute substantial USAF took delivery of the airframes, and distances for the opportunity to be on the the availability of experienced rated officers leading edge of a new program. The proximity became a hot issue due to the existing of Willow Grove to Philadelphia had an un­ shortage. The IF combat demonstration, expected side benefit—ANG pilots who shared with the Navy, gave the USAF an were current or furloughed commercial air­ initial cadre of three combat­experienced line pilots could easily commute into Phila­ crews by December 2010. Extension of the delphia International Airport from signifi­ combat demonstration sent another three cant distances. The instructor corps crews into the IF pipeline, a process that remained the bottleneck, but the IF crews, continued until the IF “detachment” be­ experienced ANG instructor pilots, and Co­ came a Navy attack squadron in 2012. An lombian instructors opened up the pipeline unofficial exchange program established much more quickly than anticipated. The with the Colombian Air Force kept the ini­ USAF benefited from advanced planning

46 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant between ACC and the National Guard Bu­ backseat, which requires a lower WSO-to­ reau, which had anticipated the need and airframe ratio. The side effect is that in identified necessary resources well before training, WSOs fly more sorties than pilots, the first aircraft arrived. a condition commonly referred to as the If volunteer pilots were abundant, weap­ “WSO bonus.” ons systems officers (WSO) were not—de­ The OA-X squadrons established at F-15E spite a number of enthusiastic volunteers— bases are unique in that a select number of because of the limited availability of crews dual-qualify in both the F-15E and the suitable candidates. The on-again, off-again OA-X. This program sought to provide a nature of Specialized Undergraduate Navi­ companion aircraft to mission-ready crews gator Training restricted the number of and allow them to meet sortie requirements available fighter WSOs, and the lack of a for proficiency while flying a less expensive two-seat fighter in the ANG left only very airplane. As a side benefit, it allowed the senior officers with F-4 Phantom time in F-15E wings to increase their ability to ab­ the 1990s as potential ANG candidates. sorb new aircrews. Although successful Thus, it fell to the active duty force and Air enough to continue, the program has not Force Reserve to supply fighter WSOs. To expanded to other aircraft types. Essentially, some extent, three concurrent efforts miti­ the F-15E crews have divided into two gated the acute shortage of WSOs: (1) a bands of capability within the squadrons. limited-period recall program from both the On the one hand, crews that fly the F-15E active Reserve and the participating Indi­ exclusively tend to become instructors vidual Ready Reserve, (2) a program to reas­ faster in that aircraft, and only those crews sign WSOs who were manning staff posi­ can maintain proficiency in certain weap­ tions CONUS-wide, and (3) a migration of ons, including the GBU-15, AGM-130, and fighter-experienced WSOs from remotely GBU-28. Crews qualified in both the OA-X piloted aircraft (RPA) squadrons. Under­ and the F-15E, on the other hand, have an standably, the last two programs received opportunity to accrue flying hours and ob­ more volunteers than the Air Force Person­ tain combat experience faster—an attractive nel Center was willing to reassign. The re­ prospect. The OA-X crews maintain profi­ sulting initial WSO force for the OA-X re­ ciency as forward air controllers (airborne) sembled the initial F-15E WSO cadre from (FAC[A]), which the F-15E Strike Eagles 20 years before—a few new lieutenants and could not support; the F-15Es’ FAC(A)­ a surplus of majors and lieutenant colonels qualified crews are all dual-qualified. who had called in every favor ever owed The 147th Fighter Wing at Ellington them to get into the airframe. AFSOC did Field, Texas, also maintains dual-qualified not suffer the same problem because it had aircrews—but in the MQ-9 Reaper (origi­ slightly differing requirements and only a nally the MQ-1 Predator) as well as the single squadron to fill; moreover, it used OA-X. Once again, this reflected acceptance both navigators and electronic warfare of­ of necessity rather than a planned option. ficers from its AC-130 gunships. That is, because an OA-X squadron was Making a virtue of necessity, ACC contin­ needed in close proximity to Fort Hood and ues to man the OA-X squadrons at a higher because the 147th had already lost its fight­ ratio for pilots than WSOs, even now that ers and transitioned to MQ-1s, OA-Xs were both pilot and navigator training has been brought in without giving up the RPAs. This running at full output since 2011. The offi­ move also resulted in an unusual mix of ca­ cial rationale for doing so is that OA-X units pabilities in that WSOs also serve as sensor employed in operations will often fly host- operators in the RPAs. The model did not nation personnel (aircrews and others), expand, however, since the rapid influx of joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC), OA-Xs reduced the number of fighter WSOs ground personnel, and even linguists in the available to RPA squadrons, and those

Fall 2010 | 47 Pietrucha heavily tasked units generally stayed too Afghanistan by C-17 and directly from busy to fly a companion aircraft. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) units, taking over the lion’s share of close air support (CAS) taskings. From that point Combat Operations on, even after we regained access to Manas, the OA-X always constituted at least 50 per­ After the success of IF, nobody was sur­ cent of the fighter fleet in Afghanistan. prised when OA-Xs participated in combat The OA-X rapidly became the preferred operations before the first squadron for­ aircraft for flying armed reconnaissance mally achieved initial operational capability. and overwatch missions. The aircraft’s en­ A four-ship became a permanent detach­ durance enabled OA-X elements to main­ ment at Kandahar Air Base (AB), Afghani­ tain two-ships overhead longer than legacy stan, in 2011, allowing the IF birds to re­ fighters. In a typical eight-hour period, both locate to various sites in support of special OA-X aircraft were available for six of those operations. Crews rotated in and out as nec­ hours, each having to refuel only once— essary while the OA-X remained in Afghani­ usually from a nearby forward arming and stan. Because of the ease of maintenance, refueling point. The fact that OA-X detach­ the aircraft rarely had to return to the ments would operate from either Army- or United States. Marine-owned FOBs for days at a time in Afghanistan operations relied on a hub­ support of ground operations gave aircrews and-spoke arrangement from Bagram AB direct exposure to the units they supported, and Kandahar AB. Although the main de­ raised the confidence level of participants, tachments occupied the asphalt-paved air­ and facilitated the detailed integration and fields, the OA-Xs made excellent use of planning necessary for a successful air- smaller airstrips, including the gravel strips ground team. Both Army and Marine com­ that compose the majority of airfields in manders and liaison officers would regularly Afghanistan. Aircraft commonly flew out­ fly in the backseat of the OA-X, providing and-back operations, launching from the valuable perspective for everyone involved. main operating base, flying a mission, land­ In a two-ship of OA-Xs, a single “rider” was ing at a forward base for refueling and lim­ considered the operational maximum. Such ited rearming, launching again with the a formation would typically have the rider same crew for a second sortie, and return­ in the wingman’s aircraft; the WSO in the ing to base at the end of the crew duty day. lead aircraft could laser-designate weapons For certain missions, especially FAC(A), air- for either aircraft, offsetting the impact of crews could land at the forward operating having an inexperienced rider. base (FOB) and perform the detailed face­ With regard to the deployment of OA-Xs, to-face coordination required by the sup­ one valid concern involved the difference ported ground commander. Typically, air- in response time between those aircraft and crews refueled and rearmed by using the the legacy fighters, due to airspeed consid­ linked .50-caliber ammunition and 2.75­ erations. OA-X basing strategies only partly inch rockets that are ubiquitous at Army- mitigated this concern, given the small controlled airfields.6 The fuel requirements number of those aircraft deployed and the of the OA-X—less than 5 percent those of fact that available bases outnumbered the the F-15E—enabled trucks to supply for­ OA-Xs. As the number of in-country aircraft ward bases. More than one OA-X got refu­ increased and their distribution became eled from 55-gallon drums with a hand more dispersed, response times eventually pump. When the United States lost permis­ equaled or beat those of jet fighters in the sion to operate tankers from Manas AB, areas closest to concentrations of major Kyrgyzstan, during lease-renewal negotia­ International Security Assistance Forces tions in 2015, additional OA-Xs deployed to (ISAF). From ground alert, OA-Xs quickly

48 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant became airborne, often taking off less than OA­Xs available. For once, SOF did not have five minutes after the crew touched the air­ first priority on an available aircraft because plane and beating the jets into the air. The daylight operations for general­purpose Afghans rapidly adopted this model for forces had priority; consequently, SOF their own CAS missions and effectively cov­ largely had to make do with gunships, leg­ ered the entire country with ground­alert acy fighters directly tasked to support them, aircraft based at Shindand, Kabul, and Kan­ and IF aircraft. This tug­of­war led directly dahar (fig. 2). to the stand­up of an AFSOC squadron and OA­Xs provided CAS, FAC(A), rescue es­ formation of the Navy’s single light attack cort, and armed reconnaissance missions squadron. for both general­purpose forces and special The introduction of similar OA­X squad­ operations forces (SOF). FAC(A) capabili­ rons from several nations, combined with ties, historically underutilized in Operation the Afghan acquisition, made the majority Enduring Freedom, became commonplace of fighter aircraft at Kandahar OA­Xs. One after the success of IF in 2010. As predicted, notable photo arranged by the Kandahar Air SOCOM placed a high demand on the few Expeditionary Wing features Colombian,

10 min., 480 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), fighter bases Kunduz (OAUZ) UZ) 10 min., 280 KIAS, C-130 bases ISAF (Federal al Republic epublic of Germany) y) Sheberghanghan Faizabad (OAFZ) (OASG)ASG)

Mazar I Sharif if (OAMS) ISAF MS) ISAF

Maimanaaimana (OAMN)MN) Bagram am Air Base ir Base Chakhcharan (OACC) Bamyan (OABN) HerHeraa t (t (OO AHR)AHR) Provincial New Zealand ISAF (Spain)ISAF (Spain) Jalalabad Reconstruction (PRT) Air Base Team (PRT) Kabul

ShindadShindand ((OOASDASD)) TTerereen (een (OOAATN)TN) FOB FOB ISAF (NetherISAF (Netherlands)lands) Salerno no CCamp Bastionamp Bastion FOB FOB ((OOAKB) ISAF/ (UK) AKB) ISAF/ UK Sharana ana

FFararahah ((OOAFR)AFR)

LashkLashkar Gar Gah/Bah/Bostost KK andaharandahar

Figure 2. Coverage of Afghanistan with ground-alert aircraft

Fall 2010 | 49 Pietrucha

Afghan, NATO, Royal Air Force (RAF), test mishap with a flare-sized jamming USAF, and US Marine Corps OA-Xs in front package on the Eglin AFB range led to the of the old control tower. The commonality local disruption of cell phone networks. of the aircraft made it easy to “drop in” on Though officially a mistake, the incident other OA-X locations for a full rearming; motivated the rapid prototyping of a capa­ instituting NATO Ample Train procedures bility that AFSOC eagerly adopted by pro­ for ISAF allowed load crews to put any curing specialized jamming kits. These available authorized munition on any OA-X.7 aircraft-powered units fit into the aircraft’s SOF had to accept a lower priority on existing ALE-47 magazines with only minor OA-Xs in Afghanistan, but that did not apply modifications, sacrificing eight flares out of in the rest of the world. The ability to load a a normal load of 60 in return for a jamming four-ship of OA-Xs into a C-17, fly to a desti­ package on both sides of the aircraft. OA-Xs nation, and reassemble the aircraft within have also led the Department of Defense in four hours of landing was a SOF dream. The adapting tube-launched weapons, sensors, Australian Special Air Service eagerly fol­ air-deployed RPAs, and even expendable lowed SOCOM’s example. As early as 2012, airborne communications relays. The low aircraft assigned to the FTU at Willow airspeed of the OA-X, compared to that of Grove would disappear for a week or two at high-performance aircraft, significantly re­ a time and then reappear weeks later in ser­ duces launch stresses for tube-launched viceable condition, smelling faintly of cord­ payloads and poses a much more surmount­ ite and low-quality fuel residue. The havoc able engineering challenge. Of note, tube pay­ this played on training schedules was par­ loads for the OA-X and MC-12 aircraft are tially offset by temporary utilization rates designed to be completely interchangeable. that would have shattered a legacy fighter No discussion of combat operations squadron; once again the maintainability would be complete without addressing sur­ of the aircraft and the hard work of the vivability. Early in the program, many ana­ ground crews paid dividends.8 The fact that lysts doubted the survivability of such a each squadron consisted of 24 aircraft also “low-performance” platform, yet these res­ helped them support simultaneous training ervations did not arise from a firm apprecia­ and deployments. tion of the threat. The A-10’s slow airspeed Operating attack aircraft in areas of the did not measurably increase the rate at world without 8,000-foot asphalt runways which it suffered hits from antiaircraft artil­ (and, consequently, with little possibility of lery in an environment where squad-level persistent support from USAF or US Navy aimed fire from small arms represented the fighters) characterized the OA-X’s support of primary threat. In most cases, small-arms unconventional warfare. Special operations hits on OA-Xs were a result of making mul­ support produced several innovations later tiple passes from a predictable attack axis, adopted by the OA-X squadrons. The use of precisely mirroring the previous combat linguists and a signals-intelligence package, experience of other attack platforms. Small- pioneered by the Ellington Field ANG unit arms damage is uncommon enough that in partnership with the Army Reserve in many air forces have removed the armor Houston, was readily adopted by AFSOC from cockpit walls to save weight, but most and the OA-X unit at Shaw AFB, which had of them retain the armored cockpit floors ready access to the Defense Language Insti­ and engine protection. tute at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. As a The aircraft has proven very difficult to result, the Ellington Field ANG unit became hit with man-portable air defense systems, the preferred ANG squadron for AFSOC and and no OA-X—tactically flown with an op­ improved the retention of linguists in the erational missile-warning system and flares Houston Army Reserve. Unanticipated ca­ remaining—has been hit by an infrared mis­ pabilities came to light after an unfortunate sile. The prop wash tends to diffuse the air­

50 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant craft’s exhaust plume rapidly, and its slow able, modular, interoperable capabilities of speed limits the heating of the airframe’s the OA-X, the Baltic OA-X is a “sport” ver­ leading edge, greatly reducing the opportu­ sion without precision air-to-ground capa­ nity for infrared-guided missiles to lock bility; however, it comes equipped with onto the OA-X from a position forward of guns, AIM-9Ms, an infrared sensor, and the aircraft. Link-16. This selected set of capabilities both tailored the aircraft to unique needs and reduced the overall program cost by Fleet Growth: several million US dollars per airframe over Overseas Major Commands the life of the program. A relative latecomer to the OA-X pro­ USAFE, which had made an early pitch gram, PACAF may well have been inspired to get the first four OA-X squadrons, had to by the South Korean KA-1s, fielded as settle for the third and sixth, although both FAC(A)-capable observation aircraft. PACAF were 24-aircraft squadrons rather than the currently operates three 18-aircraft squad- 12-aircraft units that European Command rons—two in Korea (at Osan AB and Kunsan had requested. The need to establish a AB) and one at Eielson AFB, Alaska. All stateside FTU, the drawdown of the ANG PACAF aircraft have ALR-69 radar-warning fighter force, and the urgent demand for the gear installed, primarily due to the nature OA-X in Afghanistan prompted command­ of the North Korean air defense threat. De­ ers to give the CONUS buildup high priority. Nevertheless, USAFE reactivated the 495th spite initial doubts about the OA-X’s surviv­ Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath in ability over North Korea, planners rapidly 2012 and the 480th Fighter Squadron at integrated the aircraft into war plans after Spangdahlem AB, Germany, in late 2013. realizing that every combat sortie flown by Taking a cue from the ANZUS binational an OA-X over South Korea freed a jet air­ purchase, USAFE encouraged the formation craft to go north. PACAF units have turned of two additional squadrons in Europe, the the annual Cobra Gold exercise into a vir­ first a NATO attack squadron modeled after tual OA-X convention since the exercise the alliance’s successful Airborne Warning regularly attracts OA-Xs from throughout and Control System and C-17 squadrons. the region; even Korea-based OA-X squad­ Having recently reentered the NATO com­ rons spend a significant amount of time mand structure, France offered to host the traveling to other countries in the Pacific squadron at an air base near Nice on the region to build aviation partnerships. Mediterranean coast, which proved irresist­ ible to the NATO staff at Brussels and en­ sured that the unit would never lack for vol­ Other Services and Agencies unteers. The unit has seen extensive combat experience supporting the ISAF in As previously mentioned, both the US Afghanistan and maintains a close relation­ Navy and Marine Corps operate the OA-X. ship with the Nigerian, Moroccan, and The Navy’s aircraft, located in a single land- Egyptian OA-X squadrons. based squadron at Naval Air Station Fallon, The second European multinational support its special warfare units. Direct suc­ squadron took much longer to form, not cessors of the IF birds, these aircraft have reaching initial operational capability until the specialized equipment required for 2017. This unit, a cooperative effort among their direct-support role. The Navy has ex­ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, is actually pressed no interest in expanding this capa­ oriented towards training, surveillance, and bility to carrier aviation. (The OA-X design air policing rather than ground attack. Tak­ did not include an arresting hook, folding ing advantage of the transferrable, afford- wings, or catapult gear.)

Fall 2010 | 51 Pietrucha

The Marine Corps operates four OA-X tended to locate semisubmersibles. The squadrons—two each at Marine Corps Air CBP’s consolidation from six interceptor Stations Yuma and Cherry Point. The lat­ aircraft types to one yielded considerable ter’s aircraft are equipped with the same capability gains as well as cost savings in jamming package as the AFSOC squadron operations and logistics. The Davis- and benefit from a close relationship with Monthan aircraft share maintenance facili­ the three remaining Marine EA-6B Prowler ties with the ANG unit there. squadrons in North Carolina. Marine Corps OA-X aircraft operate as part of the Marine air-ground task force, much like the remain­ Foreign Users ing F/A-18s. Two items make the Marine OA-Xs unique: (1) a wing-mounted probe­ The USAF is the main user of the OA-X. and-drogue air-refueling system as well as The most significant foreign user is the buddy-refueling capability salvaged from Royal Australian Air Force (in partnership the A-4 Skyhawk and (2) their status as the with the Royal New Zealand Air Force), fol­ only OA-Xs to operate from ships at sea, al­ lowed closely by Colombia and Pakistan. A beit in a very limited fashion. Stored disas­ number of air arms operate a single squad­ sembled, OA-Xs embarked for shipboard use ron although squadron size varies: Afghani­ are assembled only for one-time flights off stan, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Hun­ Wasp-class and America-class amphibious gary, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Thailand, carriers for transfer ashore. This capability the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Ma­ gives the task force quick access to land- laysia, Nigeria, Croatia, and the Baltic states based airpower and increases the number all operate customized variants of the USAF of aircraft available. OA-Xs are assembled OA-X. Honduras and El Salvador each fly below decks, carried by elevator to the flight six aircraft, procured under the Regional deck, and launch in a lightweight configura­ Aircraft Modification Program, and deliver­ tion (one pilot, a partial fuel load, and no ies for Guatemala and Nicaragua are immi­ weapons or ammunition) for recovery at a nent. As of 2018, procurement efforts for land base, where they enter combat service. light attack aircraft are under way in Oman, Additionally, the Customs and Border Algeria, Sri Lanka, Portugal (which will give Patrol (CBP) branch of the Department of up some of its F-16s for them), and Viet­ Homeland Security employs a squadron of nam. All told, over 800 aircraft are in ser­ OA-Xs split between Davis-Monthan AFB, vice or on order in over 20 nations—a far Arizona, and Homestead Air Reserve Base, cry from the 15-aircraft buy initially con­ Florida. Primarily purchased to support templated back in 2010. counternarcotics efforts along the Mexican The USAF was not the first air force to border and California coast, as well as in embrace turboprop-driven light attack. Air the Caribbean, these aircraft are flown by forces throughout South America in par­ federal agents, who are not constrained by ticular had operated similar aircraft for the military’s posse comitatus restrictions years before the OA-X program began. Af­ and can interdict drug-trafficking aircraft ghanistan’s need for a light attack aircraft and vessels headed for the United States. paralleled the USAF effort and was closely Like the Baltic aircraft they inspired, the tied to it. After the success of IF, the USAF CBP variants fly with guns and gas only, embarked on an ambitious program to pro­ gaining longer endurance than the more cure an initial 200 aircraft, spiking both heavily armed versions. CBP aircraft fea­ interest and demand. Needing a replace­ ture the additional communications neces­ ment for its PC-9 trainers, Australia jumped sary for successful operations with a wide at the chance to get a combat-capable air­ variety of civil and military users, and craft that also could fill training roles and some have wake-disturbance sensors in­ followed the USAF lead immediately, edg­

52 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant ing out the Marine Corps as the second of their live-ordnance training drops on Tur­ major customer. key’s Konya training range, located within Consequently, the Australians became convenient flying distance for the OA-X. the first foreign customer, along with the Rounding out the decade were Indonesia Royal New Zealand Air Force, with an and Malaysia, which combined their pro­ ANZUS-focused program that satisfied New curement programs; the Philippines, which Zealand’s need to reestablish an attack ca­ received its program from US stocks when pability, missing since the retirement of its the Islamist insurgency problem spiked af­ A-4s earlier in the century. ter the elections of 2015; and Honduras, NATO interest followed the USAFE Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, introduction, led by the United Kingdom. which received or will receive OA-Xs under The British Ministry of Defence, always on Air Forces Southern’s Regional Aircraft the lookout for cost-cutting options yet un­ Modification Program. Fueled by oil wealth, der pressure for underresourcing the Brit­ Nigeria remains the only sub-Saharan air ish effort in Afghanistan, traded a large force to complete a purchase, yet on-and-off OA-X squadron for the equivalent number negotiations with six other African air of F.3 and GR.4 Tornados and a handful of forces continue. Africa has proven a very RAF-gained Sea Harriers. This move al­ tough market for the United States, Brazil, lowed the RAF to keep the same force and China, mostly because of the very lim­ structure and number of personnel while ited military budgets of most of the conti­ reducing operations and maintenance nent; South Africa’s effort to sell its own costs by 90 percent, compared to operations light attack aircraft has been equally unsuc­ and costs for older aircraft. RAF OA-Xs cessful. Many observers believe that the have been a common sight in Helmand sale to Nigeria went through only because Province, Afghanistan, as well as in north­ of the example of the French-hosted NATO ern Wales. RAF instructors proved invalu­ squadron in Nice. able during the Hungarian buy after Hun­ gary returned its leased Griffin fighters to Sweden, and provided the initial cadre for Building Partnerships the long-awaited Baltic purchase. Turkey followed the United Kingdom, Although this discussion focuses on the even though both programs began simulta­ USAF program, one cannot overstate the neously. Following a model utilized with its OA-X’s importance in building partnerships. F-16 and rotary-wing fleet, Turkey held out In the 1970s, the USAF used surplus aircraft for local assembly of the aircraft and subse­ to build client air forces around the world. quently supplied them to Jordan and Leba­ Many air forces, particularly in Asia and non. Turkey will likely become the second- South America, received both their airlift largest OA-X user, after the United States. and combat capabilities from surplus USAF Not limited to ANZUS and NATO, the aircraft. C-130s, C-123s, C-119s, and even search for a light attack capability extended C-7s rounded out the airlift fleet, while to Morocco, Pakistan, and Singapore, which OV-10s, O-1s, O-2s, A-37s, A-1s, and F-5s pro­ faced unique security challenges that put a vided attack and observation capabilities. premium on endurance, flexibility, and The Navy contributed A-1, A-4, and A-7 air­ ease of operations. The Lebanese, lacking a craft. Some Marine OV-10s found their way fixed-wing attack capability since the 1970s, outside the United States as late as the early were thrilled to purchase a combat system 1990s. By 2000, US sources of those aircraft that even the Israelis could not consider models were depleted, leaving only expen­ threatening; Jordan followed suit for similar sive, complex combat aircraft available for reasons. Lebanese and Turkish ties are par­ export (F-18, F-16, and F-15E), and even ticularly close, the Lebanese conducting all F-16s rapidly became unaffordable because

Fall 2010 | 53 Pietrucha of the standardization effort established by an air force that had become focused on the manufacturer. Surplus F-16As stored in technology rather than utility. the Arizona desert required $30 to $50 mil­ In late 2010, when the USAF announced lion in upgrade work apiece, making them it would procure both light attack and light as expensive as new aircraft. Because the mobility aircraft for its own use, we broke United States could offer no options to air that pattern, and foreign air forces began to forces that could not afford to buy or oper­ look seriously at what the USAF was doing. ate the F-16, it lost an opportunity for suc­ For small air forces worldwide, the opportu­ cessful engagement—a gap filled by Russia, nity to engage with the United States and China, and Brazil. In Africa, China had capitalize on the USAF’s training infrastruc­ traded aircraft for mineral, oil, and fishing ture and tactical knowledge acted as a pow­ rights, which should have given it an advan­ erful incentive. Afghanistan’s purchase ac­ tage in aircraft sales, but poor support, cus­ tually preceded the USAF buy, a sequence tomer dissatisfaction, and the fact that it that caused no end of annoyance among could offer only a 1956 Soviet-based design ACC staff members who viewed themselves as a primary trainer/light attack aircraft as originators of the program and elder denied China the edge. Prospective custom­ members of what came to be called the ers considered the Hongdu/Yakovlev L-7 “light attack priesthood.”

In late 2010, when the USAF announced it would procure both light attack and light mobility aircraft for its own use, . . . foreign air forces began to look seriously at what the USAF was doing.

(Yak-152), which started flying in 2009, infe­ The Afghans took delivery of the first six rior to a US-designed OA-X. of 20 OA-Xs in 2011, briefly giving them the Other nations often resent what they world’s largest OA-X fleet. In reality, Afghan perceive as a paternalistic US attitude with pilots (with USAF instructors in the back) respect to its domestically manufactured flew the first of these aircraft purely as aircraft that the USAF does not operate. trainers. The follow-on aircraft arrived fully For example, foreign customers rejected combat capable and leased back to the the ill-fated F-20 Tigershark, an aircraft USAF for a year to build the experience level of US crews while the Afghans strug­ “not good enough” for the United States to gled to train enough pilots to build a credible buy. Originally, the USAF had decided to air force. This US-Afghan partnership buy 15 OA-X aircraft for the undefined pur­ turned out to be a tactical advantage in pose of “building partnership capacity some respects, especially during support of (BPC),” a proposal that would have left it Afghan Army units in the field. The Afghan with a niche capability of very limited OA-X, with its mixed USAF and ANAAC utility and no outside interest. We avoided crews reflecting two different military cul­ that outcome only by an unrelenting effort tures and featuring proficiency in two lan­ to explain, in detail, the OA-X’s benefits to guages, eventually became an effective

54 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant battle field coordinator. Though not always facing an airpower deficit. The relative ease trusted to deliver ordnance close to ISAF of deploying a four-ship of OA-Xs for an ex­ troops, ANAAC aircrews became such an ercise, a demonstration, or a special mis­ excellent battlefield interface that the Af­ sion meant that USAF presence could be­ ghan Army did not share NATO’s reluctance come more prevalent, particularly in Africa, to employ ordnance under “danger close” thus providing a face-to-face training oppor­ conditions. Later, when the USAF employed tunity and offering a highly visible show of larger numbers of OA-Xs, all deployed US support. In 2015 several Islamic insur­ squadrons in Afghanistan (not tasked to gent groups saw an opportunity in the tur­ SOCOM) were assigned an Afghan pilot or moil following the chaotic Philippine presi­ two (limited by supply, not demand), spe­ dential election, and the Philippine cifically as a result of the Afghan experi­ government’s lack of investment in the air ence. This gave the USAF squadrons “or­ force throughout the preceding three de­ ganic” local knowledge and language skills cades left the armed forces woefully short as well as a built-in interface with the of airpower. Accordingly, the United States ANAAC. In turn, the Afghan pilots highly transferred 12 relatively new OA-X air- desired the opportunity to improve their craft—along with munitions, spares, and a English language and flying skills. Many training system—directly from USAF stocks; experts think the crossflow between USAF moreover, in combination with Australia, and ANAAC crews initiated the rapid pro­ New Zealand, and Singapore (which pro­ fessionalization evident among Afghan at­ vided pilots), the aircraft granted the Phil­ tack aviators. ippines an instant combat capability that The Afghan model was hardly unique. first neutralized the insurgents’ ability to Both foreign and deployed USAF squadrons move via maritime pathways and later took full advantage of the two seats to train provided CAS for Philippine Army forces. partner-nation personnel and employ a va­ Although the Philippine operation was riety of capabilities in operations. Having much smaller in scale than Nickel Grass, foreign “observers” on board surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft had long been a many observers compared it to that 1973 staple of US operations, particularly in Co­ airlift because it demonstrated US com­ lombia, and the OA-X expanded the enve­ mitment to Philippine security (without a lope to include foreign aircrews. Even in US presence) and may have given a criti­ cal boost to the pro-US candidate in the countries that did not welcome the pres­ 9 ence of a US advisor, squadrons eagerly ac­ subsequent runoff election. cepted advice from crews who had flown At the tactical level, the OA-X enabled directly with US forces. In effect, rather effective training of partner-nation JTACs. than just examples, the USAF squadrons be­ The OA-X’s ability to facilitate CAS training came mentors and de facto weapons school affordably and regularly has benefited even instructors for many a foreign officer. The allied countries that do not possess them. two USAF FTUs, both of them necessary to Both in NATO and particularly in Africa, handle the joint and combined training certain nations have effectively trained ter­ load, owe their continued existence to the minal attack controllers without actually investment made by the United States in having very much airpower of their own. training foreign OA-X crews. This has proven effective in combat opera­ Of course, foreign countries did not need tions in Afghanistan, where OA-X crews re­ to possess an OA-X to benefit from efforts at sponding to a request for CAS will often en­ building partnerships. Indeed, possession counter ISAF JTACs who trained with the and employment of the OA-X by the USAF OA-X—a capability that host countries could became a key aspect of a partnership- not have maintained, given the low avail­ building strategy for a number of countries ability of legacy fighter aircraft.

Fall 2010 | 55 Pietrucha

Second-Order Effects well over 100,000 hours of drug interdiction, maritime patrol, border security, postevent A complete list of second-order effects reconnaissance, search and rescue, and gained by OA-X operators is too extensive to even air-intercept sorties. In fact, an ANG chronicle here. The OA-X, particularly in OA-X operating in support of Joint Inter­ concert with light airlift aircraft, provides agency Task Force-South gets credit for the several air forces a wide array of capabili­ largest single bust of a drug-carrying avia­ ties with a small number of airframes. In tion asset. addition, acquisition of these aircraft Planners understood early that the OA-X spurred local aviation development since would help fill holes in JTAC training for most countries wanted to free themselves the USAF. In 2011 neither the CONUS nor from outside support requirements as soon USAFE had enough fixed-wing sorties avail­ as possible. Nigerian OA-X crews have able to train the existing JTAC force, a prob­ proven particularly entrepreneurial, using lem forecast to worsen as that force ex­ their aircraft for express-delivery services panded and as fifth-generation fighters, during training sorties, either landing or with their staggering operations and main­ using a locally developed, parachute- tenance costs, came online. The addition of retarded cargo pod. The Nigerian squadron 10 stateside OA-X squadrons largely ended also supports an African JTAC school, and this resource mismatch—current training the maintenance crews were instrumental problems arise more from scheduling diffi­ in setting up a flourishing refurbishment culties for Army units in Colorado, Kansas, center for the Pratt and Whitney PT-6A en­ Kentucky, and Hawaii than from a lack of gine that powers the aircraft. overall capacity. For the USAF, the second-order effects If any secondary effect by itself qualified were significant. The increase in the num­ as a tremendous advantage, it turned out to ber of available cockpits enlarged the over­ be the business aspect, although this ele­ all size of the fighter/attack fleet (which ment of the OA-X program gained surpris­ had been steadily shrinking since just after ingly little attention once the program be­ Operation Desert Storm), allowing both pi­ gan. In view of the operating costs per lot and navigator training to run at full ca­ flying hour (in fiscal year 2010) of the F-16 pacity and ensuring that the shortage of (over $7,500), A-10 (about $5,000), F-15E rated staff officers would not last forever. It (about $16,000), and B-1 (about $33,000), we also had the little-recognized effect of creat­ must consider the OA-X’s operating cost of ing a generation of aircrews much more at­ $1,575 per flying hour a bargain.10 Similarly, tuned to and expert in the application of the fuel consumption per flying hour of the airpower in irregular warfare—a class of aircraft is less than 5 percent that of fast aviators underrepresented since the Viet­ jets. For instance, the 26,000 pounds of fuel nam War. used by a Lakenheath F-15E for a 1.8-hour The presence of OA-Xs in the ANG suc­ training sortie will yield 60 hours of flight ceeded in preserving thousands of hours of time for an OA-X with a partial combat load. attack and fighter flying experience that we True, the USAF had to spend money to save otherwise would have lost, and in creating a money, but it was equally true that if one strategic reserve of aircrews. After all, it is ignored the differences between procure­ much easier (and faster) to upgrade an ment and operations funds, the OA-X pro­ OA-X pilot to fly the F-35 than to upgrade a gram paid for itself—in combat flying hours student fresh out of pilot training. The ben­ alone—before the last of the USAF purchase efits of the OA-X squadrons to individual US rolled off the production line.11 Adding to states went beyond simple job creation (or the savings, OA-Xs required no tanker sup­ preservation) by including homeland secu­ port (except for the Marine Corps birds, rity and defense roles. OA-Xs have flown which rely on that service’s KC-130 tankers)

56 | Air & Space Power Journal Seeing the Whole Elephant and became the first USAF fighter aircraft to capabilities and affordable medium-technology use the C-17 and C-5 rather than the tanker capabilities to the USAF at a time when the fleet for intertheater deployment. twin pressures of a continued drive towards Finally, similarly equipped air forces, a fifth-generation force and combat opera­ both with and without formal coordination tions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere with the United States, generated a second­ placed a severe strain on the USAF. Often ary effect for America with respect to build­ ing partnerships. Partner nations conducted derided as a “low tech” or “low utility” plat­ their own BPC efforts using the OA-X, often form in the run-up to the acquisition pro­ engaging where the United States could not. gram, the OA-X turned out to be neither, The presence of aircrews and aircraft from although it remained surprisingly close to Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand did the original goal of “low cost.” In addition to not garner comment in the Philippines in obvious benefits to the USAF, the attractive­ 2015, whereas US presence would certainly ness of a US-flown OA-X allowed construc­ have caused an uproar. Those same three tion of what Secretary of Defense Robert countries also proved instrumental in the Gates described in 2008 as the “100-wing Air stand-up of both the Indonesian and Malay­ Force,” representing the combined efforts of sian OA-X squadrons. The New Zealand 12 OA-Xs travel widely, sometimes under a US many air arms worldwide. Although the fund established specifically for the pur­ nature of the 100-wing Air Force extends far pose, because the presence of Royal New beyond a single, multirole aircraft, the OA-X Zealand Air Force trainers has not disturbed has done its part. Today, in 2018, OA-Xs rep­ even the most alarmist Pacific basin coun­ resent 36 squadrons’ worth of the 100 tries. Similarly, Turkish instructors were wings, a substantial impact that 10 years involved in Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon, ago existed only on paper.  and the NATO squadron at Nice (which sometimes acts like a French Foreign Le­ gion unit despite its NATO connection) re­ mains closely engaged in Nigeria and Morocco. The presence of a common, trans­ Author’s note. The total USAF OA-X fleet ferrable, affordable, modular, interoperable postulated here is larger than the 200 currently combat aircraft allowed our partners to necessary to support one sustained, deployed build their own partnerships worldwide, a operation (in Afghanistan) while maintaining trend that shows no signs of abating. capability to build partnership capacity effec­ tively in other locations worldwide. Similarly, the notional OA-Xs fill a great many more Conclusion roles and fly in many more locations than any Acquisition of the OA-X in large numbers “BPC-only” construct would allow. The OA-X’s restored a mix of expensive high-technology African potential remains largely unexplored.

Notes

1. Air Combat Command, OA-X Enabling Concept video enhanced receiver (ROVER) is compatible (Langley AFB, VA: HQ ACC/A3F, 23 December 2008). with the Army’s one system remote video terminal 2. A short-range, point-to-point link that enables (OSRVT). delivery of video from an airborne electro-optical/ 3. “Light Air Support (LAS) Aircraft,” solicitation infrared sensor to a ground unit, the remote optical no. FA8615-10-R-ZZ01, Department of the Air Force,

Fall 2010 | 57 Pietrucha

Air Force Materiel Command, Aeronautical Systems large US cargo plane to draw attention during day­ Center, https://www.fbo.gov/index?id=01768f9fe488 light. An 18,000­pound fuel download from a C­17 5f2dbd7f7b4cc11aa4ec (accessed 19 March 2010). typically supports 40 flying hours for the OA­X. 4. Imminent Fury, phase two, is a planned com­ 9. During Operation Nickel Grass, the United bat demonstration of the EMB­314 Super Tucano States resupplied the Israel Defense Forces with aircraft as a surrogate light attack aircraft in Af­ modern fighter aircraft to offset heavy losses in the ghanistan. The program, which will involve USAF, 1973 Yom Kippur War. The USAF transferred aircraft, Marine Corps, and Navy crews, will last for at least including 36 F­4Es, directly to Israeli Air Force (IAF) six months, starting in the summer of 2010. stocks. Featuring USAF camouflage, these aircraft 5. See Department of Defense, Base Closure and flew in combat with freshly painted IAF insignia. Realignment Report, vol. 1, pt. 2 of 2, Detailed Recom­ 10. See Table A15­1, “Aircraft Reimbursement mendations (Washington, DC: Department of De­ Rates” [(per flying hour), fiscal year 2010], in Air fense, May 2005), http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/ Force Instruction 65­503, USAF Cost and Planning Vol_I_Part_2_DOD_BRAC.pdf (accessed 6 May 2010). Factors, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/ 6. The introduction of laser­guided rockets gave AFI65­503.pdf (accessed 6 May 2010). Rough esti­ precision capability even to aircraft that had mates of operating costs for the OA­X come from dropped their precision­guided munitions and up­ open sources on costs for the AT­6B and EMB­314 loaded additional munitions at rearming and refuel­ Super Tucano (A.29). Program experience from the ing points in forward areas. Army helicopter crews often grumbled about the higher priority for these IF aircraft indicates that an operating cost of $1,575 munitions enjoyed by the OA­X. per hour is a high estimate. 7. A NATO exercise program, Ample Train allows 11. This statement is based on the price of $1.44 one nation’s aircraft to refuel and rearm from an­ per gallon at $60 per barrel at the end of June 2009. other nation’s air bases. Ground crews are trained in HQ AFMC/FMB, https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/ refueling operations, weapons safety and loading, CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO­FM­BD­11 (accessed 6 and cross­servicing for multiple NATO fighter types. May 2010). During the summer of 2008, we were The program began operating long before the disso­ paying $4.07 per gallon. lution of the Warsaw Pact. 12. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (re­ 8. A single C­17 would often fly to remote areas, marks to Air War College, Maxwell­Gunter AFB, AL, land, off­load shelters, fuel bladders, fuel, and ord­ 21 April 2008), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/ nance, and then depart the same night, leaving no speech.aspx?speechid=1231 (accessed 6 May 2010).

Lt Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF Lieutenant Colonel Pietrucha (BA, Pennsylvania State University; MA, American Military University) is an irregular warfare operations officer attached to Head­ quarters Air Combat Command/A3D, Langley AFB, Virginia. Commissioned through the AFROTC program in 1988, he has served at Spangdahlem AB, Ger­ many; Nellis AFB, Nevada (twice); RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom; and the Pentagon. As an electronic warfare officer in the F­4G Wild Weasel and later the F­15E, he has amassed 156 combat missions over 10 combat deployments, with two additional combat deployments on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

58 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010* Lt Col Kristal L. Alfonso, USAF

According to Tolstoy, war and women are things that don’t go together—they exist apart. But when I witnessed all the atrocities of 1941, the death of my friends and relatives, peaceful civilians, I wanted to liberate my people from the enemy. I want you to underline in red that it was the cherished dream of the girls to liberate the land, but none of us wanted to fight—to kill. —Capt Mariya Dolina 125th Guards Bomber Regiment Hero of the Soviet Union

omen have always participated in armed conflict, most of- ten as active supporters of the armies they followed. Some women, usually the wives of soldiers, served as nurses, laundresses,W cooks, and seamstresses. Others chose active participa- tion in battle, including the famed Mary Hays McCauly, who earned the moniker “Molly Pitcher” during the Battle of Monmouth in 1778 when she provided medical care and pitchers of water to Continental Army members fighting the British. After shrapnel struck her husband, McCauly took up his position as a gunner so that the artillery crew could continue to fight. Gen George Washington rewarded her bravery by making her a noncom- missioned officer.1 The story of Molly Pitcher symbolizes the realities of women and war, which has always affected them to some capacity, despite civilized society’s best attempts to pro- tect the gentler sex from war’s brutality. Yet, regardless of Molly Pitcher’s successes on the battlefield, Ameri- can culture has traditionally deni- grated female participation in war. In most cultures, even to- day, the idea of a woman en- gaged in combat operations is anathema. His- tory, therefore, has either completely dismissed female contributions and participation in armed conflicts or relegated their involvement to scan- dalous supporting roles, such as prostitutes or pillow-friendly spies.

*This article is derived from the author’s longer work Femme Fatale: An Examination of the Role of Women in Combat and the Policy Implications for Future American Military Opera­ tions, Drew Paper no. 5 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2009).

Fall 2010 | 59 Alfonso

In an effort to explore whether current US The Russian Civil War presented women laws and policies excluding women from further opportunities for involvement in combat remain valid or need amending, this combat operations. The Workers’ and Peas­ article reviews three case studies that dem­ ants’ Air Fleet, for example, which desper­ onstrate the variety of ways women have ately sought pilots to fight against the White participated in modern armed conflict. The anti-Bolsheviks, did not object to the use of first one examines the experiences of World women in combat roles. Marxist ideology War II female Soviet pilots in their more tra­ promoted equality among the sexes. The ditional involvement in armed conflict. The struggle of women in a patriarchal society second analyzes the asymmetric aspects of paralleled that of workers against capital­ female participation during conflict, focusing ism; leaders of the communist revolution specifically on terrorist activities. The final found willing supporters and participants case study presents American females’ expe­ among the disenfranchised half of the pop­ rience in the All Volunteer Force, emphasiz­ ulation. Communist leaders propagated the ing their performance in combat operations belief that once the revolution succeeded, since such participation began in the 1990s. “men and women naturally would become The article concludes by proposing how equals; there could be no gender discrimi­ the US military and society should move nation in a socialist state.”4 forward in the debate over the role of women Under Bolshevik leadership, Russian in combat. Despite the best attempts by women gained what few other females had: critics to argue that society should protect equality. Previously the provisional govern­ women from the violence of war, in reality, ment had granted women equality under the women in the All Volunteer Force structure law, equipping them with improved educa­ currently engage in combat. tional and professional opportunities.5 The The three case studies offer evidence Bolsheviks championed the theory that Marx­ that women have participated and always ist socialism would resolve all societal difficul­ will participate in combat. Moreover, their ties, equating the establishment of a socialist successful contributions have made a differ­ government with the creation of a utopian ence. To deny citizens the right to fight for society in which men accepted “women in their country based solely on gender re­ combat as a matter of course, without sexist mains blatant discrimination. The United resistance or pious welcome speeches.”6 States should once again assume a world- Later, Soviet educational opportunities leadership role with regard to equality, live afforded women in the 1920s and 1930s al­ up to the rhetoric of its principles, and dem­ lowed a number of them to receive flying onstrate the civic parity of women and men. training, mostly through aero clubs although a select few took military training. Soviet women recorded several civilian aerial Soviet Female Fliers achievements, including the nonstop flight of World War II of the Rodina.7 Crewed by three females, this aircraft broke the women’s international re­ Over the centuries, Russian culture has cord for flight over a straight-line distance, embraced and even glorified the female establishing a new nonstop standard of just warrior ethos.2 Although the role of these over 26 hours.8 Further, Maj Marina Raskova, polianitsy or warrior heroines diminished navigator on the Rodina, survived alone for as more stringent patriarchal cultures 10 days in the subarctic forests of Russia on a emerged, legends of female fighters re­ couple of candy bars and wild berries follow­ mained a part of Russian culture.3 Evi­ ing her bailout prior to the aircraft’s emer­ dently, whenever the motherland came gency landing. She immediately became a under threat of invading forces, women hero in the Soviet Union, and Stalin himself stood to fight alongside Russian men. propagated her heroic image.

60 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010

Hitler Invades the Soviet Union ment, and it was a surprise to him to learn about us after the war. Even now very few Despite the popularity of the Rodina’s fe­ men can believe that women crews could fly male military officers, when Hitler initiated the dive bomber.”13 Until recently, Western Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet military reactions were even further dismissive. included very few women.9 Although no According to Kazimiera Cottam, Western government regulation specifically denied females acceptance into the military, Soviet scholars tended to regard female Soviet com­ military leadership discouraged them from batants merely as part of Soviet propaganda, volunteering for active military service and noting that accounts of “female success in the military [were] often dismissed as anec­ often turned volunteers away. Instead, So­ 14 viet leaders encouraged women volunteers dotal, propaganda-type stories.” The Soviet to join paramilitary groups in order to re­ government and military did little to dispel ceive various types of military training, in­ such assumptions. Although Russia has a cluding flight training. Sponsored by the rich history of women successfully serving Soviet Komsomol (a communist youth orga­ in combat, its modern armed forces repre­ nization), Soviet women maintained higher sent a more conservative approach to levels of fitness through military-related women in combat, similar to the Soviet expe­ sports; received weapons training, including rience during and following World War II. sport sharpshooting; and even flight training.10 During the 1990s, half of the conscripts in In response to Germany’s invasion of the the Russian Army were women, many of Soviet Union in June 1941, Raskova sought to them serving in combat positions—including 15 tap this wealth of fighting potential among machine gunners. The performance of these female Soviets, using her influence with female combat troops bodes ill for future in­ Stalin and the Defense Ministry to persuade clusion of Russian women in combat. Accord­ them to press forward with female aviation ing to Gen Vladimir Konstantinov of the Gen­ units. Women, particularly instructor pilots, eral Staff’s Organizational-Mobilization Main inundated Raskova with requests to join her Directorate, “In 1999 all female contract sol­ units or asked how they could “put their skills diers of the Leningrad Military District 138th to use in the service of their country—more and 200th permanent readiness motor-rifle particularly, how they could get to the front, brigades refused to go to fight with their units preferably in an airforce [sic] unit.”11 Stalin fi­ in the second Chechen campaign, causing nally agreed to establish the 122nd Composite immense problems in refitting the units with Air Group, comprised of three all-female men.”16 The Defense Ministry reports that the units: the 586th Fighter Regiment, 587th current percentage of female recruits is hold­ Bomber Regiment, and 588th Air Regiment.12 ing steady at 24 percent and that in future operations, the ministry will exclude women 17 The Result from combat operations. Despite attempts to highlight the contribu­ tions of women during the war, the Soviet Shahidas in a Brave New World public and military apparently knew very little about the female combatants. Maj Most Americans associate the current Marta Meritus of the 125th regiment de­ overseas contingency operations with con­ scribed a reunion for veterans following the flict between Western secular ideals and war: “The commander of the front, under radicalized Islamic traditions. The American whom we fought during the war, asked why press and media continue to reinforce this we had been asked to this reception and who notion. Terrorism serves as a tool for op­ we were. We had to explain that we were the pressed peoples and groups seeking political pilots and the mechanics of the 125th regi­ upheaval, but state actors also often resort to ment. He had thought it to be a male regi- terrorism to control their populations. In the

Fall 2010 | 61 Alfonso modern era, both the oppressed and the op­ Instead of winning the hearts and minds pressors have used terrorism without mercy of half the targeted populations in unstable and without limitation. areas in the world, Western attempts at liber­ ating women from their traditional cultures Societal Expectations in the have repeated the results seen in French- Modern Age of Terrorism controlled Algeria. Women have turned away from Western ideals of freedom to seek Encouraged by news reports, Americans fur­ justice for fellow Muslim or tribal members. ther assume that Islam seeks to relegate As Bernard Lewis observes, “One of the most women to subservient roles and that most noticeable consequences of Islamic revival Muslim women would resist this subjuga­ has been the return, by women though not tion, if able, as American women did during by men, to full traditional attire.”23 Further, their suffrage and equal rights movements. Lewis explains, Muslims have traditionally These assumptions are misguided. In the tra­ believed that “the converse of tyranny was ditions of the three major religions (Judaism, not freedom but justice.”24 Christianity, and Islam) stemming from the The return to traditional dress is not the Middle East, a woman remains subservient only way in which Muslim women cur­ to the man of the household. In contrast to rently demonstrate their dedication to cul­ male children, nonbelievers, and slaves, all ture, religion, and society. Increasingly, of whom can rise above their initial positions women from across the Muslim spectrum of inferiority through age, acceptance of wish to join the fight against perceived faith, and emancipation, women remain “ir­ Western oppression. Within the Palestinian redeemably fixed in [their] inferiority.”18 territories, female combatant units have re­ The veil has come to symbolize this cently begun to form. In 2002 four young struggle between the traditions of Islam and women conducted suicide-bombing mis­ modern Western ideals. Attempts by the sions against the Israeli military and civil­ French government to remove the veil from ians. These shahidas (female martyrs) be­ Algerian women during Algeria’s war for in­ came role models for Palestinian women dependence actually resulted (in addition to who seek the release of their communities other, more gruesome tactics such as rape) from Israeli control. In 2005 the first all- in women joining the Algerian resistance female unit formed under the military wing movement. In ceremonies across Algeria, of Hamas—Izz al-Din Al-Qassam (derived French military and colonial leaders encour­ from the name of a famous Palestinian reli­ aged women to unveil themselves in front of gious leader who resisted the British rule of crowds of their fellow Algerians and Mus­ Palestine and founded the Black Hand).25 lims.19 Steps taken by the French military to The impetus for women to join modern emancipate Algerian women from cultural resistance movements and sacrifice their and societal traditions revealed two ironies. lives for their community parallels the mo­ First, the French strategists demonstrated tivations of female Soviet fighters in World their ignorance of Algerian culture: prior to War II. Modern female resistance fighters their initiatives, most Algerian women did seek primarily to contribute to the defense not wear the veil.20 Second, the act of unveil­ of their national identity or tribes while ing represented the release of Algerian bringing honor and security to their fami­ women from male oppression, but French lies. Similarly, modern female insurgents soldiers raped them as a means of coercing increasingly participate in combat opera­ obedience and acceptance of French rule by tions as well as in more traditional support­ all Algerians.21 After the colonial govern­ ing roles. The use of women in suicide op­ ment instituted its program to lift the veils of erations by conservative Islamic groups has Algerian women in 1958, they began to don initiated a new phase in insurgent struggles veils in defiance of the French authorities.22 worldwide. In the Israeli-Palestinian con­

62 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010 flict, Palestinians have used women to send a traditional Chechen code of honor,” which Israelis a deadly message: “Terrorism is not inspires them to “exact retribution for the just a fringe phenomenon. Terrorists are sake of honor” against the Russian occupying not just strange young men whispering in presence in Chechnya.30 For the same rea­ dark rooms. Terrorists are high-school stu­ sons their men challenge the occupation of dents, terrorists are women—and terrorists their homeland by the Russians, Chechen are all around you.”26 women have demonstrated, with deadly con­ sequences, their dedication to fighting for Chechen Black Widows: their people and culture. Honor Is All That Remains In 2003 Chechen rebel commander Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi explained why women Chechen rebels have certainly exploited the account for 60 percent of Chechen suicide tactical advantage of women combatants. bombers: “These women, particularly the Most Americans, if they are aware of the wives of the mujahedin who are martyred, conflict between Chechnya and Russia at are being threatened in their homes; their all, assume that the Chechens are simply honour and everything are being threatened. another terrorist group motivated by a radi­ They do not accept being humiliated and liv­ cal form of Islam. The tragic events of the ing under occupation.”31 Moreover, they are school massacre in Beslan and the occupa­ not the only women in the modern era who tion of the Moscow theater by Chechen reb­ have suffered personal tragedies and then els as reported by Western media outlets 27 turned to terrorism; resistance fighters in Sri encourage this perception. More recently, Lanka have channeled their grief and anger reports of attacks by two female Chechen into weapons against their government. rebels on the Moscow Red Arrow under­ ground train further highlight the infatua­ Tamil Black Tigresses: tion with terrorists’ religious views. A report Hindu Honor with a Nationalist Twist from the British paper Daily Mail empha­ sizes the religious affiliation of suspected The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka (LTTE), that terrorists yet makes no mention of other country’s minority Hindu population, sought underlying causes for rebels turning to ter­ the establishment of an independent Tamil rorist actions.28 The article accentuates the state, free from involvement of the majority religious affiliation of the suspected bomb­ Buddhist population (Sinhala). LTTE actively ers, claiming that the women were likely recruits women, advocating their use in op­ “Muslim women radicalized by the situation erations to secure political objectives. Such in the North Caucasus” and that they were action brings considerable honor to the part of the “Shahidka” movement, a term woman and her family; in turn, Tamil deriving from the Arabic word shahid.29 society reveres the “Black Tigresses” as News reporting and comments from Rus­ saints since they are willing to die for their sian officials continue to focus on the reli­ people. Acceptance of women in the Tamil gion of the rebels rather than the political insurgency even led to innovations in terror­ situation that precipitated this terror move­ ist operations. LTTE developed the first sui­ ment. Naturally, this perspective can encour­ cide belt, for example, designing it for female age the reader to assume that this group is use since it makes the wearer look pregnant, merely another radical Muslim terrorist or­ allowing the insurgent to pass through secu­ ganization. This assumption is incorrect and rity checkpoints with ease.32 fails to acknowledge the key motivating fac­ Thenmuli Rajaratnam—the first female tor for Chechen rebels, including female Tamil Tiger suicide bomber, later honored fighters: the cultural importance of personal as a saint by LTTE, and known as Dhanu— honor. Chechen “Black Widows” or female detonated a bomb, killing 16 bystanders suicide bombers adhere to the “rules of Adat, during her assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

Fall 2010 | 63 Alfonso

According to most sources (and supported away, where they received treatment on by LTTE propagandists), Dhanu’s motiva­ site before a helicopter evacuated them. tions for her action stemmed from her gang That Army medic, SPC Monica Lin rape at the hands of Indian soldiers sent by Brown, received the Silver Star in March Gandhi to Sri Lanka to suppress the Tamil 2008 for her actions; ironically, Army regu­ separatist movement.33 lations prohibit her from serving in a front­ In the case of Dhanu, the accepted expla­ line combat role. The reality of combat op­ nation of her actions began when occupy­ erations has forced the Army to ignore ing Indian forces slaughtered her family those regulations since both Afghanistan and raped her.34 In Tamil culture, such and Iraq present cultural challenges de­ women see martyrdom for their people as manding the presence of female Soldiers. In their only option. According to Robert Pape, both locations, they “are often tasked to “Some of the female suicide bombers in Sri work in all-male combat units—not only for Lanka are believed to be victims of rape at their skills but also for the culturally sensi­ the hands of Sinhalese or Indian soldiers, a tive role of providing medical treatment for local women, as well as searching them and stigma that destroys their prospects for otherwise interacting with them.”39 The re­ marriage and rules out procreation. . . . ‘Act­ strictions remain despite the Army’s recog­ ing as a human bomb’ . . . is an understood nition that Specialist Brown’s “bravery, un­ and accepted offering for a woman who will 35 selfish action and medical aid rendered never be a mother.” Not only does suicide under fire saved the lives of her comrades bombing release a woman and her family and represents the finest traditions of hero­ from the stigma of rape, but also it gives a ism in combat.”40 The 19-year-old Brown woman unable to produce children a means became the second woman since World War to mother her society. In the Tamil culture, II to receive the Silver Star, the nation’s “Tamil mothers make great sacrifices for third-highest medal for valor. their sons on a daily basis; feeding them Brown’s actions in combat directly contra­ before themselves or the girl children, serv­ dicted the policies of her commander in ing them and so on.”36 For a woman who chief, Pres. George W. Bush, who announced cannot contribute to society in this fashion, in a 2005 press conference that he would not fighting against her people’s enemies may authorize women to serve in ground combat often seem the only option. units although he accepted the roles of women on combat surface ships and in air­ craft.41 Although President Bush forbade The American Experience women from serving in the infantry, artillery, armor units, and all special operations forces, In the remote eastern Paktia province of he did not order them out of combat-support Afghanistan, a roadside bomb exploded units and duties, such as medics, since such a through a four-vehicle convoy of Humvees directive would hamper the military’s perfor­ in April 2007, wounding five Soldiers. The mance in Iraq and Afghanistan.42 medic assigned to the convoy rushed to pro­ Therefore, women carried on in their tect the victims from insurgent gunfire “as support duties and continued to excel in mortars fell less than 100 yards away.”37 Af­ combat environments, with the exception ter the convoy held off the attackers, the of Specialist Brown. Within a week of the medic told the Associated Press that she firefight that earned her the Silver Star, the “did not really think about anything except Army chose to withdraw Brown from the for getting the guys to a safer location and field since, as she put it, “her presence as ‘a getting them taken care of and getting them female in a combat arms unit’ had attracted out of there.”38 The medic moved the attention.”43 This reaction by the Army ap­ wounded to a safer location over 500 yards pears dubious.

64 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010

Discrepancies between policy and com­ bomber aircraft, the number of female com­ bat realities in regard to Specialist Brown’s bat pilots remains small. As of 2008, only 70 case were not the first incident to highlight women fly fighter aircraft.49 That number the shortcomings of current policies on reflects about a 50 percent increase of the 47 women in combat. Ironically, in the same who flew fighters in 2002.50 year that President Bush issued his policy One female fighter pilot in this new gen­ on women in combat, Sgt Leigh Ann Hester eration, Maj Melissa “Shock” May, who flies from the Kentucky National Guard came the F-16, recently received the Distin­ under fire during an ambush of her unit in guished Flying Cross for a combat mission Iraq, an event that eventually led to her over Baghdad. During that mission, May nomination for a Silver Star. Thus, she be­ and her four-ship formation took out Soviet- came the first woman to receive this medal made mobile surface-to-air missiles to allow in the current conflict. the Army to continue its movement into As a member of the 617th Military Police the city by enabling US air superiority.51 Company, Hester and her squad were es­ One wingman who took fire had to drop his corting a supply convoy when Iraqi insur­ external fuel tanks in order to evade an in­ gents attacked. During the middle of the coming Roland missile. May described the fight, she “led her team through the ‘kill scenario in an interview with the Air Force zone’ and into a flanking position, where Times: “There we were, in the weather and she assaulted a trench line with grenades getting shot at. . . . And, after dropping his and M203 grenade-launcher rounds.”44 Hes­ tanks, he [her wingman] was low on gas.”52 ter went on to clear two trenches of insur­ In reality, women do serve in combat de­ gents, killing three of them with her rifle. spite the best attempts of some pundits to Rather than reveling in becoming the first restrict or completely deny them the oppor­ woman since World War II to win the Silver tunities to do so. The All Volunteer Force Star, Sergeant Hester simply took pride in depends on the skills and professionalism “the duties I performed that day as a sol­ of women, who make up nearly 15 percent 45 dier.” She attributed her response under of the force. Military leaders across the ser­ fire to the training she received, claiming vices recognize the crucial roles that that she reacted as any Soldier should: “It’s women play in successful mission accom­ your life or theirs. . . . You’ve got a job to plishment. Even though they have proven do—protecting yourself and your fellow themselves capable of handling the rigors of 46 comrades.” According to the Washington various combat roles, and even though se­ Post, the awarding of Hester’s Silver Star nior military leaders acknowledge the ne­ “underscores the growing role in combat of cessity of female participation, there re­ U.S. female troops in Iraq’s guerrilla war, mains strong political opposition to the where tens of thousands of American issue of women in combat. women have served, 36 have been killed and 285 wounded.”47 Unlike the Army, whose female members The Way Backward must enter either the aviation arm or the military police for combat opportunities, the Although the US military currently uti­ Air Force has allowed and even encouraged lizes female Soldiers in Iraq and Afghani­ women to volunteer for combat positions.48 stan to gather intelligence through conver­ After Secretary of Defense Les Aspin opened sations with local women and to assist in up combat aircraft to women in 1993, they policing female suspects, these same Soldiers slowly began to enter the male-dominated are explicitly restricted from assignment to world of combat fighters and bombers. De­ combat positions.53 In 2005, legislation intro­ spite Air Force encouragement and recruit­ duced in the House of Representatives ment efforts to coax women into fighter and sought to increase restrictions on female

Fall 2010 | 65 Alfonso participation in the war on terror by prohib­ send its mothers and daughters into harm’s iting women from serving in forward sup­ way.58 This final argument also uses the is­ port companies.54 In a paper responding to sue of sex to suggest that captured female the outcry over the proposed amendment, combatants will certainly become victims of supporters stated that “there is no military rape or sexual brutality and therefore or demographic reason, however, why should avoid exposure to such risks. America must expose young women, many For example, Mitchell’s second book on of them mothers, to direct ground combat.”55 the subject, Women in the Military: Flirting The Center for Military Readiness (CMR) with Disaster, highlights the Navy Tailhook goes even further in its objections to women scandal, the controversies over the Air in combat, proclaiming that the discussion Force’s Lt Kelly Flinn, and the sexual- involves not only the exposure of young assault scandal at Aberdeen Proving mothers to the violence of combat but also Ground.59 Interestingly, Mitchell either ig­ the effectiveness of a gender-integrated nores or has no knowledge of scientific fighting force. The CMR espouses that the studies of female physical standards and realities of physical capabilities, unit disci­ cases of successful combat-unit integrations pline, ability to deploy, and unit cohesion in the Air Force that occurred between pub­ trump calls for equal civic opportunities.56 lication of his two books.60 The center claims to support the right of Most notably absent from his follow-up women to serve but only in jobs that do not analysis is the US Army Research Institute of involve direct ground combat. Environmental Medicine’s 1997 study of how In his scathing criticism of women serv­ female Soldiers responded to a physical fit­ ing in the military (Weak Link: The Femini­ ness regimen designed to improve their per­ zation of the American Military [1989]) and formance of specified tasks associated with his follow-up (Women in the Military: Flirt­ assigned duties, such as heavy lifting and ing with Disaster [1998]), Brian Mitchell long-distance marches with 75-pound back­ pushes the debate beyond serving in com­ packs.61 Following the prescribed Army time bat to serving in the military altogether. He constraints for physical fitness programs, the bases his conclusions on the fact that study revealed that appropriate training women do not adhere to the expectations of vastly improved female Soldiers’ perfor­ typical male combatants, using evidence mance. The training regimen—which repli­ from the service academies and recent sex­ cated the actual work the women would do ual-assault scandals to drive home his point: instead of emphasizing the typical push­ “There are two kinds of cadets and midship­ ups, sit-ups, and long-distance-running pro­ men at today’s federal service academies. grams—concluded that 78 percent of the par­ One is male: aggressive, strong, daring, and ticipants could meet the Army’s minimum destined for combat; the other is female: requirements for “very heavy” jobs, up from none of the above.”57 the prestudy level of 24 percent.62 At the heart of the debate over women in The results of the study suggest that with combat remain three basic propositions. proper training, women can perform physi­ First, female physical capabilities, including cally demanding duties despite their per­ pregnancy issues, obviously differ from ceived physical inferiority. Furthermore, the men’s and thus affect overall unit effective­ female stature offers benefits that exceed ness. Second, critics argue that the presence those of males. For example, the smaller of women hinders unit cohesion by limiting bone structure of a female mechanic enables male bonding and creating disciplinary her to reach areas within an aircraft engine challenges due to the supposed sexually that an average man cannot access.63 charged nature of coed units. Finally, many This study also highlights an important people assert that a civilized society based aspect of military readiness, the gender is­ on Judeo-Christian morality should not sue aside. Traditionally, prescribed physical

66 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010 standards for military jobs have had little to male or female, as it is.”67 As long as do with the actual work at hand.64 A perfect women are protected from organized vio­ example is the obstacle course present at lence, social values remain intact. As Sena­ most military installations. Most military tor James Webb implied in a 1979 opinion jobs do not require a service member to piece and as the CMR currently suggests, jump up and over a wall, but a barrier of allowing women to serve in the military this type remains a common element of all condones and even encourages violence the services’ obstacle courses. perpetrated against them. Less documented evidence exists for di­ Furthermore, none of the critics ad­ rectly disproving the two other arguments dresses the social acceptability and nobil­ readily cited by opponents of allowing ity of men engaging in organized violence women in combat and in the military. The against other men. Generally, each oppo­ contention concerning the effect of women nent of including women in combat and in on unit cohesion and discipline clearly falls the military implies that violence perpetu­ under the responsibility of unit leadership, ated by men against other men remains an at either the squad or service level. Prior to acceptable societal norm. Their arguments the integration of women into the military, consist of two simple explanations: (1) it is unit cohesion and the good order and disci­ acceptable for men to engage in violence pline of a unit challenged its leadership.65 against other men but not for women to To make a persuasive argument, opponents engage in or become victims of violence, had to frame the debate in terms of nega­ and (2) society values its female members tives associated with integrating women more highly since they deserve protection into military units. Thus, the concentration from violence. on physical standards, unit cohesion, disci­ Again, this aspect of their argument ap­ pline, and mission effectiveness repre­ pears untenable. From a different perspec­ sented a shifting of the “debate from the tive, it seems that American society places grounds of belief to that of practical ef­ the safety of its female citizens above that fects.”66 Critics of allowing women in com­ of its male citizens, thus discriminating bat and in the military essentially chose to against the latter. Moreover, a closer ex­ ignore the ramifications and challenges as­ amination of opponents’ arguments reveals sociated with homogeneous groups in favor a lack of respect for half of the American of trying to prove that the presence of population since they suggest that men women created more problems within mili­ serving in the military need to behave in­ tary organizations. appropriately in order to bond, develop Truly, for these critics the debate most their violent tendencies, and become effec­ often rests on the notion that the nation’s tive combatants. political leaders cannot morally allow and If Mitchell’s argument holds and civilian condone organized violence against the leadership removes the 15 percent of female segment of the population. This women currently serving in the Army, argument also appears difficult to prove would combat effectiveness diminish? In a since it derives from subjective views of RAND study of the assignment of Army morality. On the one hand, it is acceptable women during recent operations in Iraq to allow women to serve in traditional fe­ and Afghanistan, individuals in the field tes­ male roles in the military since those do tified that “there simply were not enough not directly involve them in violence. In personnel to do the job without women.”68 testimony to a 1992 presidential commis­ Moreover, which option would do more sion, Mitchell states that “women are des­ damage to the fabric of American society: perately needed as military doctors and full inclusion of women into the military nurses, for the very reason that the mili­ based on physical capabilities, or revocation tary cannot get enough doctors and nurses, of laws that have allowed them to serve for

Fall 2010 | 67 Alfonso almost a generation? Finally, has the inte­ crew tanks. A fuel tanker is not a glamorous gration of women into combat roles truly target, but it is a lucrative one, particularly impeded combat effectiveness? The final if it is resupplying tanks or Bradley fighting assessment remains unclear; thus far, how­ vehicles.”72 Although the Air Force contin­ ever, women have proven formidable com­ ues to lead the services in terms of integra­ batants, whether participating in official or tion, specific career fields such as special unofficial capacities. operations remain closed to women. Women can fly close air support missions to assist Realities of the All Volunteer Force in special operations forces on the ground and Overseas Contingency Operations risk being shot down and captured by the enemy; however, they cannot serve in those As the number of women in the military ground units. increases, commanders recognize that with­ Over the three decades since the integra­ out their service in a variety of roles, units tion of women into the armed forces, orga­ would struggle or even fail at their assigned nizational decisions, cultural shifts and evo­ missions. Since the Gulf War, military lead­ lutions, and the performance of women ership has recognized that the “United have contributed to a convoluted organiza­ States [can] no longer fight a major war or tional schema or thought process that now 69 campaign without women.” Detractors pervades the US military: Policies exclude counter that this reliance on women in women from combat, yet they have per­ critical roles directly results from services’ formed well in combat; since operational decision to assign women to those roles. needs sometimes dictate the use of women Current hostilities confronting the in these traditional combat roles, the armed United States present no clear delineation forces will merely temporarily attach them between front and rear lines. Rosemarie to those restricted roles. Skaine, an expert on gender issues in the Solaro explains how this organizational military, suggests “that the old front line no schema, instituted in the early years of the longer exists because present day conflicts All Volunteer Force and in effect today, are peacekeeping tasks and that modern demonstrates “the lineal ancestor of the weaponry is more technologically operated present pretense that women in Iraq and than in the past.”70 Current Department of Afghanistan are not assigned to combat Defense, Army, and Marine Corps policies units, only attached” (emphasis in origi­ continue to restrict women from direct nal).73 The armed services have always ac­ ground-combat roles, yet support positions cepted the possibility that women may be­ such as those in the military police, supply, come involved in combat yet have willingly and intelligence have placed women into chosen to deny them opportunities to serve Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s “fluid lines of con­ in official, direct ground-combat positions. flict” and “challeng[e] traditional ideas about In reality, however, women do perform du­ what constitutes a ‘combat’ position.”71 ties in direct ground combat. Paul Wolfowitz, Moreover, the notion that exclusion poli­ former deputy secretary of defense, clearly cies protect women from the dangers of recognizes the truth about the environment combat directly conflicts with the realities in which the integrated US military oper­ of insurgencies or irregular wars presently ates: “As we consider the issue of woman- ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. The dis­ power in the service today it’s not just a parity is most evident in the Army’s use of matter of women being entitled to serve women. Erin Solaro, a proponent of open­ this country. It is a simple fact that we ing up combat roles to women, describes could not operate our military services how, “in our current war, for example, fe­ without women. And as skill levels essen­ male soldiers drive fuel tankers all over tial to our missions continue to increase, it Iraq. They are not, however, allowed to will be even more essential that we draw

68 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010 from all our citizens, that we draw from the chief of staff, challenged a proposed con­ largest pool of talent available.”74 gressional amendment in 2005 that would have further restricted women’s combat The Solution: roles simply because such a reversal would Selection Based on Capabilities, Not Gender hamstring Army operations around the world by closing 21,925 slots currently open Along with the apparent evolution of Amer­ to female Soldiers.78 ican society’s perception of women serving For the American military, much of the in combat, one sees evidence of a cultural emphasis has shifted away from the inabili­ shift. In the two current wars, women have ties of its members to the capabilities they died in the line of duty and in combat op­ bring to the fight. In the case of female Sol­ erations with no outcry from the American diers on patrol in Iraq, their gender has al­ public. Contrary to the opinion that the lowed the military to engage and interact spectacle of bringing women home in body with half of the Iraqi population without bags would trigger enormous public outcry, violating cultural taboos and restrictions, there is “little evidence that the [American] thus facilitating greater human intelligence, public is somehow less willing to tolerate threat assessment, and access to the people 75 their suffering than that of men.” The only often responsible for rearing the next gen­ public outcries have come primarily from eration of Iraqi citizens. If followed to the antiwar critics who use the death of any letter, current policies would deny the mili­ service member to draw attention to their tary these opportunities. political position. Critics suggest that Gen Norman Fears that placing women in combat po­ Schwarzkopf condemned women to minor sitions would precipitate declines in the support roles in the military when he de­ military’s combat effectiveness have not clared, “Decisions on what roles women been realized. The fact remains that influ­ should play in war must be based on mili­ ences other than women’s involvement— tary standards, not women’s rights.”79 such as technological advances in commu­ Schwarzkopf’s assessment actually sup­ nications—have created greater changes in ports the idea that capability, not gender the military.76 Similarly, dependence on the should enable or preclude an American All Volunteer Force has also induced the from serving in combat. Furthermore, military to adapt to the realities of women “the situation and ‘the rules’ have making up an increasing percentage of the changed but our modern military has not services. Since “the country’s ability to adapted itself to this new world”; refusal maintain an all-volunteer army has been by opponents to acknowledge the realities considered to depend on the effective use of the performance of women in combat of the female labor force,” military leaders roles only hinders the debate.80 To ensure who deride a return to the conscripted force appropriate policies on combat forces, the have had to find a way to exploit the capa­ military must practice honest and objec­ bilities of women.77 tive assessment. Not all attempts have been successful, as Once capabilities rather than gender Solaro suggests. However, just as the inte­ drive assignment decisions, all other issues gration of black Soldiers took time to over­ associated with integrating women would come organizational biases and obstacles, so become typical leadership challenges. is the integration of women into combat Should members of an integrated unit, for roles slowly moving forward. Senior Army example, engage in inappropriate relation­ leaders acknowledge the contributions of ships, unit leadership must address these female Soldiers in the counterinsurgencies situations and mete out appropriate punish­ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many Army lead­ ment for violations under the Uniform Code ers, including Gen Gordon Sullivan, former of Military Justice.

Fall 2010 | 69 Alfonso

Conclusion roles found current policy “not actionable” since it was “crafted for a linear battlefield” The real catch was to have a female that depended on notions of “forward and medic out there because of the cultural well forward [that] were generally acknowl­ edged to be almost meaningless in the [cur­ sensitivities and the flexibility that gave 83 commanders. It is absolutely not about rent] Iraqi theater.” If America’s current gender in terms of how they [women] enemies, undoubtedly more conservative will do. about the role of women in their societies, acknowledge the efficacy of female combat­ —Maj Paul Narowski ants in their operations, political leaders 73rd Cavalry Regiment must recognize what military leaders have Overseas contingency operations have accepted as fact. Women can contribute rekindled debate over the assignment of successfully to combat operations and re­ American women to combat positions, re­ main ready to do so. vealing that the regulations governing the American female warriors face strong role of women in combat are “vague, ill de­ criticism from pundits who desire a return fined, and based on an outmoded concept to an all-male combat force. Like their sis­ of wars with clear front lines that rarely ex­ ters who fought for the Soviet Union, ist in today’s counterinsurgencies.”81 De­ American women serve a nation that propa­ spite the realities of the current conflicts, gates notions of equality yet continues to the debate over the role of women in com­ discriminate, based on gender. When Presi­ bat will never cease as long as political lead­ dent Bush “forcefully backed the Army’s ers continue to relegate women to inferior [combat exclusion] restrictions” and pro­ roles in American society. claimed a policy of “no women in combat,” By acknowledging the vital role women he reinforced the notion that American play in armed conflicts, the political leader­ women are not the equals of American ship of the United States can shape Ameri­ men.84 Such proclamations further inhibit can culture to recognize that women can the abilities of women to integrate fully and and do engage in violence for and against reinforce perceptions that they are incapa­ the state. When Americans can culturally ble of effectively serving in combat roles. accept this fact, troops fighting the current Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan di­ wars will be better prepared to face female rectly contradict the arguments put forth by insurgents in the future. Ultimately, such critics of using women in combat. Females insurgents share similar motivations and have proven that they are formidable fight­ strive for the same universal objectives as ers who can engage in direct ground com­ military women and their predecessors in bat. Combat units such as Private Brown’s the resistance: they fight to give their chil­ have accepted women as equal members, dren a safe future. Brown’s unit considering her “one of the Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan guys, mixing it up, clearing rooms, doing Worker’s Party, explains that modern fe­ everything that anybody else was doing,” male resistance fighters and suicide bomb­ and wanting to keep her as its medic.85 Re­ ers are “fully aware of being free women cently, George Casey, the Army chief of with an important message to pass on and staff, testified to lawmakers that combat- who could be examples to all women the exclusion policies needed review “in light of world over.”82 Furthermore, tactics em­ how women have served in the two wars.”86 ployed by terrorist organizations and insur­ This announcement came after the Navy gencies, including the use of female com­ rescinded its policy banning women from batants, have rendered combat-exclusion serving on submarines. Apparently, a move policies pointless. A recent RAND study of to lift all bans and use capabilities-based the Army’s assignment of women to combat standards to determine fitness for duty in

70 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010 any position enjoys strong support, al­ American armed forces. These wars have though conservative opposition continues also highlighted the need for policy makers to paint a picture of mothers going off to to reconsider combat-exclusion rules that war. However, John Nagl, retired Army lieu­ currently govern US combat operations. tenant colonel and president of the Center Women have always been subjected to the for New American Security, assessed that in violence of war. It is now time for the light of the 220,000 women who have United States to encourage and empower fought in both wars and the 120 who have American women to serve in combat roles paid the ultimate price, we should “simply recogniz[e] a truth that’s already been writ­ if they meet physical requirements deter­ ten in blood and sweat on the battlefield.”87 mined by the specific role—not some arbi­ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have trary physical standard. Policy leaders forced the United States to reevaluate a should rescind current combat-exclusion number of foreign and domestic policies as policies and welcome American women as well as the organizational structures of civic equals. 

Notes

1. US Field Artillery Association, “The Story of 8. Pennington, “Wings, Women and War,” 25. Molly Pitcher,” http://www.batteryb.com/molly 9. Ibid., 31. _pitcher.html. 10. Cottam, Women in War and Resistance, xix. 2. Despite the propaganda that the all-female 11. Noggle, Dance with Death, 7. units provided Soviet leaders, few Western and Rus­ 12. Ibid. sian academics have conducted extensive research 13. Ibid., 137. into this aspect of Soviet history. Further, until the 14. Kazimiera Janina Cottam and Galina Mar­ fall of the Soviet Union, Western historians had lim­ kova, Soviet Airwomen in Combat in World War II ited access to official documentation, and what little (Manhattan, KS: Military Affairs/Aerospace Histo­ that exists is written in Russian. Thus, the majority rian, 1983), xii. of this research has depended on the efforts of three 15. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russian Military: After women: Reina Pennington, Kazimiera Janina Cottam, Ivanov,” Perspective 17, no. 3 (May–June 2007), and Anne Noggle. In the course of my research, I http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol17/felgenhauer2.html. came across contradictions in unit designations, 16. Ibid. spelling of names, and translations of interviews 17. Ibid. and speeches. I have done my best to provide the 18. Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History most accepted interpretations of the data provided. of the Last 2,000 Years (New York: Scribner, 1995), 206. 3. Reina Pennington, “Wings, Women and War: 19. Marnia Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Em­ Soviet Women’s Military Aviation Regiments in the pire: From Algiers to Baghdad (Princeton, NJ: Princ­ Great Patriotic War” (master’s thesis, University of eton University Press, 2008), 151. South Carolina, 1993), 3. 20. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 8. 21. Ibid., 150. 5. Kazimiera Janina Cottam, Women in War and 22. Ibid., 151. Resistance: Selected Biographies of Soviet Women Sol­ 23. Lewis, Middle East, 318. diers (Nepean, ON: New Military Pub., 1998), xviii. 24. Ibid. 6. Pennington, “Wings, Women and War,” 9. 25. Kai Adler, “The Women of Hamas: ‘Islam Pro­ 7. Anne Noggle, A Dance with Death: Soviet Air- tects Us,’” Qantara.de, 26 January 2006, http://www women in World War II, 1st ed. (College Station, TX: .qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/ Texas A&M University Press, 1994), 6. _nr-391/i.html.

Fall 2010 | 71 Alfonso

26. Anne Applebaum, “Girl Suicide Bombers,” Slate, .com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/16/ 2 April 2002, http://www.slate.com/?id=2063954. AR2005061601551.html. 27. For an example of this kind of reporting, see 48. Rebecca Grant, “The Quiet Pioneers,” Air Caroline Wyatt, “Moscow Siege Leaves Dark Memo­ Force Magazine 85, no. 12 (December 2002): 34–38, ries,” BBC News, 16 December 2002, http://news.bbc http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Magazine .co.uk/2/hi/europe/2565585.stm. Archive/Documents/2002/December%202002/ 28. Mail Foreign Service, “Hunt for ‘Black 1202pioneer.pdf. Widow’ Terror Gang after Female Suicide Bombers 49. SrA Justin Weaver, “Meet the Air Force’s First Kill at Least 38 in Bomb Attacks on Moscow Trains,” Female African-American Fighter Pilot,” US Air 29 March 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ Forces in Europe, 21 March 2008, http://www.usafe worldnews/article-1261502/Female-suicide-bombers .af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123091118. -Moscow-kill-30-attacks-tube-trains.html. 50. Grant, “Quiet Pioneers.” 29. Ibid. 51. Patrick Winn, “Female Airmen Deadly in 30. Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Iraq, Afghanistan,” Air Force Times, 13 January 2008, Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/12/ Princeton University Press, 2004), 150. airforce_deadly_women_071229w/. 31. Robert Anthony Pape, Dying to Win: The Stra­ 52. Ibid. tegic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 1st ed. (New York: 53. Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire, 16. Random House, 2005), 32. 54. Despite objections from senior Army leader­ 32. Rosemarie Skaine, Female Suicide Bombers ship and female service members, the legislation (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006), 51. forced the Army to renew its commitment to ban 33. Pape, Dying to Win, 229. women from ground-combat roles, as in the infan­ 34. Ibid., 230. try and field artillery. 35. Ibid. 55. Center for Military Readiness, “The Hunter/ 36. Arjuna Gunawardena, “Female Black Tigers: McHugh Amendment to H.R. 1815: Codification of A New Breed of Cat?” in Female Suicide Bombers: DoD Regulations Re: Women in Land Combat,” 23 Dying for Equality? [JCSS Memorandum no. 84], ed. May 2005, 3, http://cmrlink.org/CMRNotes/Hunter Yoram Schweitzer (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strate­ -McHugh%20FAQ’s%20052305.pdf. gic Studies, Tel Aviv University, August 2006), 84. 56. Center for Military Readiness, “Women in 37. Associated Press, “Female Texas Teen to Re­ Combat: Frequently Asked Questions,” 22 November ceive Silver Star,” CBS News, 9 March 2008, http:// 2004, http://www.cmrlink.org/WomenInCombat www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/09/terror/ .asp?DocID=237. main3920151.shtml. 57. Brian Mitchell, Weak Link: The Feminization 38. Ibid. 39. Ann Scott Tyson, “Woman Gains Silver Star— of the American Military (Washington, DC: Regnery and Removal from Combat: Case Shows Contradic­ Gateway, 1989), 86. tions of Army Rules,” Washington Post, 1 May 2008, 58. Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies, article/2008/04/30/AR2008043003415.html. Cass Military Studies (London: Routledge, 2006), 89. 40. Associated Press, “Female Texas Teen to Re­ 59. Lt Kelly Flinn, the first female B-52 pilot, ceive Silver Star.” created controversy by having an affair with an en­ 41. Erin Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire: What listed woman’s husband. For more information, see You Should Know about Women in the Military (Em­ “Times Topics: Kelly J. Flinn,” New York Times, http:// eryville, CA: Seal Press, 2006), 141. topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 42. Ibid. people/f/kelly_j_flinn/index.html. In 1996 Aber­ 43. Tyson, “Woman Gains Silver Star.” deen Proving Ground had a series of incidents in­ 44. Sgt Sara Wood, “Female Soldier Receives Sil­ volving sexual harassment, assault, and rape, which ver Star in Iraq,” Army.mil, 17 June 2005, http:// led to the convictions of several Army officers and www.army.mil/-news/2005/06/17/1645-female noncommissioned officers. -soldier-receives-silver-star-in-iraq. 60. In 1992 a presidential commission examined 45. Ibid. the role of women in military service, addressing a 46. Ibid. variety of subjects, including combat exclusion. The 47. Ann Scott Tyson, “Soldier Earns Silver Star 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of for Her Role in Defeating Ambush,” Washington Women in the Armed Forces recommended that Post, 17 June 2005, http://www.washingtonpost women continue to be banned from combat posi­

72 | Air & Space Power Journal Femme Fatale 2010 tions; however, a number of commission members 71. Holly Yeager, “Soldiering Ahead,” Wilson publicly dissented. Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 56, http:// 61. Everett Harman et al., Effects of a Specifically wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay Designed Physical Conditioning Program on the Load &essay_id=261679. Carriage and Lifting Performance of Female Soldiers 72. Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire, 164. (Natick, MA: US Army Research Institute of Envi­ 73. Ibid., 162. ronmental Medicine, US Army Medical Research 74. Carolyn B. Maloney, The Downgrading of and Materiel Command, 1997), ix, http://handle DACOWITS: How President Bush Has Failed America’s .dtic.mil/100.2/ADA333437. Women in Uniform (Washington, DC: US House of 62. Ibid., 1. Representatives, 2004), 1. 63. Lorry M. Fenner and Marie E. deYoung, 75. Yeager, “Soldiering Ahead,” 56. Women in Combat: Civic Duty or Military Liability? 76. Ibid., 57. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 77. Carreiras, Gender and the Military, 84. 2001), 10. 78. Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire, 232. 79. Presidential Commission on the Assignment 64. Ibid., 7. of Women in the Armed Forces, “Section II—Alter­ 65. Laura L. Miller and John Allen Williams, “Do native Views: The Case against Women in Combat: Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Under­ Executive Summary” (Washington, DC: The Com­ mine Combat Effectiveness?” in Soldiers and Civil­ mission, 1992), 46, http://cmrlink.org/CMRNotes/ ians: The Civil­Military Gap and American National PCAWAF­AV.pdf. Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn 80. M. C. Devilbiss, Women and Military Service: (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and A History, Analysis, and Overview of Key Issues (Max­ International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of well AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1990), 62, http:// Government, Harvard University, 2001), 389. www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/B­44/mcd 66. Ibid., 388. _women.pdf. 67. Brian Mitchell, Women in the Military: Flirt­ 81. Tyson, “Woman Gains Silver Star.” ing with Disaster (Washington, DC: Regnery Publish­ 82. Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon, 155. ing, 1998), 350. 83. Tyson, “Woman Gains Silver Star.” 68. Margaret C. Harrell et al., Assessing the As­ 84. Ibid. signment Policy for Army Women (Santa Monica, CA: 85. Ibid. RAND Corporation, 2007), 54, http://www.rand.org/ 86. Dan De Luce, “Wars Force US Military to Re­ pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG590­1.pdf. view Ban on Women in Combat,” Agence France­ 69. Solaro, Women in the Line of Fire, 165. Presse, 27 February 2010, http://www.google.com/ 70. Rosemarie Skaine, Women at War: Gender hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gCawP28SAr_a­XX Issues of Americans in Combat (Jefferson, NC: McFar­ 1k8Bpk8YpsIUQ. land & Company, 1999), 25. 87. Ibid.

Lt Col Kristal L. Alfonso, USAF Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso (BA, North Carolina State University; MAAS, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College; MS, Troy University) is currently assigned to the 566th Intelligence Squadron at Buckley AFB, Colorado. At the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), she received the Commandant’s Award for Best SAASS Thesis on Leadership and Ethics for “Femme Fatale: An Examination of the Role of Women in Combat and the Policy Implications for Future American Military Operations,” her master’s thesis. A former aircraft maintenance officer and KC­135R pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso has also served on the faculty at the United States Air Force Academy and most recently as a defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute. A frequent con­ tributor to Air University’s online journal The Wright Stuff, Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso recently published “A Cyber Proving Ground: The Search for Cyber Ge­ nius” in the Spring 2010 issue of Air and Space Power Journal.

Fall 2010 | 73 Civilian Language Education in America How the Air Force and Academia Can Thrive Together

Col John Conway, USAF, Retired

Higher education is primarily a long-term supplier of general and specialized talent for government and other sectors. It is an aquifer not a spigot. While it can respond quickly for “comet” needs of government, its strength is in maintaining “a constellation” of resources. —Nancy L. Ruther Yale University

he Quadrennial Defense Review of the officer corps. However, a lack of both (QDR) of 2006 first proposed that De­ direction for and understanding of what this Tpartment of Defense (DOD) lan­ nation’s language education system can guage planners focus on preaccession lan­ provide continues to hamstring efforts to guage education instead of spending time expand preaccession language training. and treasure to teach foreign languages to We are still feeling the effects of changes recruits and second­termers, a proposal in foreign language education in America echoed in the QDR of 2010.1 Since “preac­ that occurred in the World War I era. The cession language education” almost always decades prior to that war saw robust enroll­ connotes formal college and university ment in foreign language courses, in both coursework, it appears that the last two high schools and colleges, reflecting the QDRs seek to strengthen the linguistic skills country’s strong immigrant heritage.2 The

74 | Air & Space Power Journal study of German had acquired “prestige” ing them in English. Thus, the teaching of status as America’s public schools embraced foreign languages became “un-American” Germany’s model of instruction. Many people or “unpatriotic.”10 Learning another lan­ considered German the language of the edu­ guage exposed students to other cultures cated person; consequently, it comprised and thus divided their loyalties, as ex­ about 24 percent of all language instruction pressed by a Nebraska statute of that era: in public high schools in 1915.3 Only the “To allow the children of foreigners, who traditional study of Latin boasted a higher had emigrated here, to be taught from early enrollment (37.3 percent). Moreover, one- childhood the language of the country of third of all US universities required appli­ their parents was to rear them with that cants to have studied German or French for language as their mother tongue. It was to two to four years, and fully 85 percent de­ educate them so that they must always manded that prospective students pass a think in that language, and, as a conse­ foreign language competency test prior to quence, naturally inculcate in them the matriculation.4 ideas and sentiments foreign to the best in­ Upon America’s entry into the war in terests of this country.”11 1917, German virtually disappeared from It took no less than a Supreme Court every high school curriculum in a wave of ruling in 1923 to overturn such laws.12 By anti-German sentiment, attracting less than then the damage was done, however. For­ 2 percent of all language students.5 Enroll­ eign language education in the elementary ment in French and Spanish rose, but nei­ grades virtually disappeared for the next ther reached German’s earlier numbers. four decades; initial language education Latin remained strong, but the decline in was relegated to high schools; and the rise German offerings prompted some students of isolationism in America kept the study simply not to take a foreign language at all.6 of foreign languages on the ragged edge of With German marginalized, French became patriotism.13 the new prestige language, in time morph­ Thus, this country had truncated a basic ing into language instruction only for indi­ tenet of language education theory—that viduals seeking postsecondary education.7 mastery of a foreign language took a long This trend became codified in the college time and should begin early. In 1940 a na­ preparatory track as a requirement for tional report on what high schools should higher education—to the virtual exclusion teach recommended the elimination of for­ of the vocational track. Consequently, en­ eign language instruction, among other sub­ rollment in foreign language, once nearly jects, because the “overly academic” cur­ universal across the American educational riculum in high schools caused too many spectrum, continued to diminish in the de­ students to fail.14 cades after World War I.8 Today that legacy continues. The No But a more ominous trend emerged: by Child Left Behind Act of 2001 emphasizes 1920, 22 states had prohibited the teaching the testing of students in reading and of foreign languages, some of them outlaw­ mathematics to the exclusion of many other ing any such instruction below eighth subjects, including foreign languages.15 grade.9 Underpinning this linguistic xeno­ Panelists at a Senate subcommittee hearing phobia—fueled initially by anti-German on federal foreign language strategy in 2007 feelings during World War I—was the idea specifically criticized the act, noting that that citizens could neither understand nor such standardized testing impeded the addi­ appreciate American ideals without learn­ tion of foreign language instruction to cur-

Fall 2010 | 75 Conway riculums. “Foreign languages are being left over 17 million college students nation­ out due to No Child Left Behind,” one of wide) suggests some continuing apathy on them bluntly declared.16 A recent survey the part of the students, colleges, or both.22 by the Center for Applied Linguistics re­ Most colleges do not require a foreign lan­ ported that this legislation has negatively guage for graduation; in fact, many doctoral affected approximately one-third of public programs require no language, much less elementary and secondary schools with demonstrated proficiency in two languages language programs, adding that it has di­ for graduation.23 Of the four-year institu­ verted resources from foreign language in­ tions that responded to the Modern Lan­ struction to “accountable” courses in math­ guage Association’s (MLA) survey in 2006, ematics and reading.17 7.8 percent reported teaching no language courses at all.24 Moreover, most of these college language Language Study as a Sequence students enroll at the introductory level (first and second year), less than 20 percent Why should the Air Force care about for­ of them going any further.25 Given the gulf eign language courses taught in elementary in language study between high school and schools and high schools? A study con­ college and the paucity of language stu­ ducted in 2002 points to elementary-level dents advancing beyond the basic four se­ foreign language education as the “se­ mesters of college, it is painfully obvious quence starting point” for studying a second that college language instruction offers no language in nearly every country except the easy solution to the Air Force’s needs. United States, which tries to produce com­ petent students of foreign languages in the unrealistically short span of two to four A Brief Quantitative Assessment years of high school or two to four semes­ ters of college.18 The study’s author echoes of Language Education what many other linguistic scholars pro­ How well does college-level language pose: acquiring any proficiency in a second instruction prepare individuals to meet the language requires an extended sequence of military’s needs? Does a correlation exist study. In short, the sooner one begins lan­ between classroom hours and DOD test guage studies, the better. scores? On the one hand, some scholars Former White House chief of staff (and claim that no formula can accurately de­ current director of the Central Intelligence termine the length of time necessary to Agency) Leon Panetta has described our attain various levels of language profi­ current system of instruction in foreign lan­ ciency because of the unquantifiable na­ guages as “discontinuous,” with “consider­ ture of motivation and aptitude. On the able slippage” in language study between other hand, various other language authori­ high school and college.19 In 2000—the most ties have attempted to quantify the above- recent year for which data on language en­ mentioned correlation. rollment in secondary schools are avail­ The International Language Roundtable able—approximately 5.9 million students (ILR) defines a listening/reading level of took language classes in high school.20 Two 1/1 as “elementary proficiency.” In the lis­ years later, only about 1.4 million students tening category, level 1 denotes compre­ took them in college.21 hension of utterances that meet basic needs One explanation—that many high school for survival, courtesy, and travel. A score of students don’t attend college—would ac­ 1 in reading indicates sufficient comprehen­ count for some of this disparity. However, sion to read simple connected sentences.26 the enrollment in 2006 of only 1.58 million The International Center for Language college students in language courses (of Studies calculates that 150 hours of class­

76 | Air & Space Power Journal Civilian Language Education in America room instruction can produce a score of 1/1 guage Institute (DLI) or Foreign Service In­ in the Romance and Germanic languages, stitute, students would probably have to considered the easiest to master.27 At the take more classroom hours to attain the other end of the scale, Arabic, Mandarin same results on the Defense Language Pro­ Chinese, Japanese, and Korean—some of ficiency Test.29 According to an interview the most difficult languages for English with the DLI’s acting chancellor in 2005, speakers to learn—demand more than twice the institute’s French students “burn that figure (350), equivalent to nearly eight through a typical college French textbook in semesters of college instruction (assuming about six weeks.”30 Lastly, the number of that four semesters of a college language hours devoted to reaching proficiency rises course equate to about 180 hours of class­ exponentially, not linearly—a fact that sub­ room instruction).28 In most colleges and stantially affects those who wish to increase universities, eight semesters would cer­ their language skills but have limited time tainly qualify a student for a minor concen­ for language study. Basic language acquisi­ tration in a language. (See table 1 for the tion requires considerable time, and upper– ILR’s breakdown of hours required for vari­ level study even more, creating a problem ous levels of proficiency. Note that any in any Air Force work setting not directly level beyond 3 calls for immersion studies tied to language proficiency. For example, in that language’s native setting. In other medical personnel who participate in the words, classroom instruction will carry a International Health Service’s language pro­ student only so far.) gram would have to take increasingly more Furthermore, because college instruction time away from clinical work (and their in languages usually occurs at a relatively continuing education requirements as leisurely pace and is not as intense and medical professionals) to score higher on goal-directed as classes at the Defense Lan­ the Defense Language Proficiency Test.

Table 1. Classroom hours required for proficiency levels by language difficulty

ILR Levels from S/L/Ra 0 to: S/L/R 1 S/L/R 2 S/L/R 3 S/L/R 4 Romance and Germanic Languages (French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Romanian, b German, Afrikaans, Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, 150 hours 400 hours 650 hours Swedish) Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, Korean 350 hours 1,100 hours 2,200 hours b

All Others b (e.g., East European, African, and Asian Languages) 250 hours 600 hours 1,100 hours

Adapted from International Center for Language Studies, “Classroom Hours to Achieve Proficiency Levels by Language Difficulty,” International Center for Language Studies, Washington, DC, http://www.icls.com/FLD/ILRlevels.htm.

Note: Reaching these goals assumes that the student will supplement every five hours of classroom study with a minimum of two to three hours of preparation. This table, an adaptation of the expected levels of speaking proficiency for various lengths of training according to the US State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, is intended to meet the needs of private-sector students. These equations vary slightly: the Foreign Service Institute estimates that students will need 575–600 hours of its classroom instruction in the Romance languages to reach level 3/3. See Mary Ellen O’Connell and Janet L. Norwood, eds., International Education and Foreign Languages: Keys to Securing America’s Future (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007), 45. For the most difficult languages (Chinese, Arabic, etc.), the Foreign Service Institute mandates that students spend the second year of their 88-week course in the target country. a S = speaking proficiency, L = listening proficiency, R = reading proficiency b Generally, classroom instruction cannot attain level 4 because such proficiency demands extensive use of language in a native setting.

Fall 2010 | 77 Conway

Such a time-management problem could ceive AFROTC scholarships have soared re­ force an Airman to choose between profes­ cently—an impressive number of such stu­ sional duties and the pursuit of improved dents could merit these awards.34 In language skills. addition, senior ROTC cadets are taking ad­ vantage of a provision in the National De­ fense Authorization Act of 2009 that autho­ Producing Officers Proficient in rizes a bonus for completing coursework in a number of foreign languages, even if their Foreign Languages studies do not lead to a degree.35 The Air As the QDRs of 2006 and 2010 point out, Force anticipates that the numbers of par­ the military should emphasize preaccession ticipants in the program will grow to nearly language training to meet most of its needs 1,000 in the 2010–11 academic year.36 instead of relying on postaccession lan­ However, as noted above, the American guage study.31 The intensive training nature educational system has its own problems of the first year of an officer’s career, featur­ providing what the Air Force needs: about ing Undergraduate Pilot Training, Under­ half of the US colleges and universities that graduate Navigator Training, or a host of host AFROTC detachments offer only other technical courses, seriously inhibits French, German, and Spanish (the “Big language training after commissioning. Three”), and 15 percent of those campuses One must also address a broader issue. have no language programs at all.37 If the With few exceptions, line officers in the US Air Force truly desires preaccession instruc­ Air Force receive their commissions via tion in the rest of the languages of the three distinct routes: the US Air Force world, it will either have to place AFROTC Academy (USAFA), Officer Training School detachments at civilian institutions that of­ (OTS), and Air Force Reserve Officer Train­ fer them or push for curriculum changes at ing Corps (AFROTC). Although each pro­ existing AFROTC locations.38 duces some language-capable members, Section 529 of Public Law 111-288 (which each has its own language drawbacks. places into law the National Defense Autho­ Given the finite number of USAFA gradu­ rization Act for Fiscal Year 2010) takes this ates each year, only a few will have ma­ concept a step further, authorizing the sec­ jored or minored in foreign languages. retary of defense “to establish language Moreover, even though the academy has training centers at accredited universities, increased its language offerings, they can­ senior military colleges, or other similar not possibly match the number found on institutions of higher education” to acceler­ civilian campuses across America (approxi­ ate “foundational expertise in critical and mately 219 in 2006).32 strategic languages.” It authorizes a sweep­ At this writing, OTS admits only techni­ ing language education program tied to the cal majors—engineers, biologists, and the nation’s colleges and available for all mili­ like—so language majors who wait until af­ tary and civilian members of the DOD. The ter graduation for commissioning cannot law also pays particular attention to incor­ pursue this route.33 Native-speaker candi­ porating these programs into ROTC.39 Al­ dates for OTS more often reflect a happy though it is too early to determine the im­ circumstance than targeted recruitment; plementation of this law, it does highlight hence, only a small number of Air Force the important role that colleges and univer­ officers with native language ability obtain sities will play in language education. their commissions through OTS. However, despite any wholesale push for Consequently, America’s colleges and less commonly taught language (LCTL) universities represent the greatest “aquifer” classes for AFROTC cadets, the differences of foreign language studies in the country. between academia’s language goals and Opportunities for language majors to re­ those of the military are striking. The con­

78 | Air & Space Power Journal Civilian Language Education in America cept of knowledge for knowledge’s sake sets should be integral to the study of litera­ academia apart from the DLI or even the ture.”44 Even though this traditional ap­ USAFA insofar as universities have no proach remains in the best tradition of the mandate to produce two dozen Dari lin­ liberal arts, one MLA committee does ad­ guists in six months. Rather, in academe, it dress the need to develop courses in trans­ is enough to explore Dari as a language. lation and interpretation, citing a great “un­ Colleges and universities have no impera­ met demand.”45 tive to create Urdu linguists at the 3/3 level, Congress has recommended targeting teaching any course in the Urdu language ROTC language and culture grants toward almost by happenstance and assuming that the largest “feeder schools, particularly the it should rather than must be offered. five senior military colleges,” to develop Even if colleges offer niche language programs in critical languages.46 However, courses, they face the continuing issue of these five—the Citadel, Virginia Military funding them. According to Dr. Gilbert Institute, North Georgia College and State Merkx, vice-provost for international affairs University, Norwich University, and Texas at Duke University, the language edifice at A&M University—have varied lists of lan­ America’s colleges is “pretty impressive but guage offerings beyond the Big Three, courses nonetheless fragile.” He believes that many in Arabic and Chinese being the most com­ of the LCTL courses might possibly “disap­ mon. Virginia Military Institute and Texas pear” unless sustained by federal funds.40 A&M offer the most advanced classes, but Moreover, the military now emphasizes all five adhere to the same literature-centric speaking another language instead of just approach that characterizes language study reading and listening to it.41 A strong speak­ at the postsecondary level.47 ing requirement, however, runs contrary to A defining factor regarding the difference the traditional academic approach to lan­ between the academic and directed ap­ guage study, which emphasizes grammar proaches to language training involves the and literature, particularly in the founda­ relatively leisurely pace of the former and tional courses. Admittedly, schools offer the intensity of the latter. The DLI turns out classes in conversation, but they occur later Arabic linguists in a year or so, equivalent in the academic process and build on ac­ to a four-year college curriculum with sum­ quired grammar and vocabulary skills. One mers off or maybe one overseas immersion. finds this approach across all of academia: Many language experts believe that any­ a heavy literary focus in foreign language thing less than majoring in a language studies instead of a flexible, student- won’t produce an adequate linguist.48 42 oriented set of courses. Some people view Finally, language majors have few in­ this situation as a clash between the “instru­ centives to become officers in the Air mentalist” approach used by “freestanding Force. The service offers no officer Air language schools” to meet their students’ Force Specialty Codes for linguists, transla­ needs and the college/university foreign tors, or the like, and no real opportunities language department’s “constitutive” ap­ for them to serve. AFROTC currently does proach, which focuses on the relationship not require a foreign language for commis­ between cultural and literary traditions, sioning, and officers have few opportuni­ cognitive structures, and cultural knowl­ 43 ties to use language skills immediately edge. An MLA white paper published in upon commissioning.49 2009 further emphasizes the constitutive approach: “language and literature need to remain at the center of what departments Language Enrollments of English and languages other than English do. . . . The role of literature needs to be Language enrollments continue to rise emphasized. . . . The study of language in both two- and four-year colleges, up al-

Fall 2010 | 79 Conway most 13 percent between 2002 and 2006 of responsibility. American Sign Language (table 2). The raw numbers for 2006 (1.58 has no practical military use at all.51 million students enrolled) represent real Some explanations and caveats to the to­ growth of 160 percent over enrollments in tals in this table are in order. These data re­ 1960 (608,749). However, the 2006 num­ flect raw numbers and do not indicate bers represent only 8.9 percent of total col­ whether students take more than one lan­ lege and university enrollments of 17.65 guage course at a time, which would lower million. That ratio is roughly half of the the aggregate totals. If one excludes two- 1960 ratio of 16.1 percent.50 year colleges from the data, introductory Spanish, the language most widely taught language classes account for over 78 per­ in college since 1970, boasted 822,985 stu­ cent (approximately 915,000) of these en­ rollments, with advanced classes making up dents in 2006, eclipsing the total enrollment the remaining 22 percent (approximately of all other languages combined (approxi­ 255,000), for a ratio of 7:2.52 mately 755,000), a trend that has persisted Moreover, these data do not identify the since 1995. French is a distant second number of classes in conversation, presum­ (206,426), and German third (94,264). Sur­ ably in the advanced-class category. Since prisingly, the fourth most widely taught 198,598 of the enrollments in advanced language in American colleges and univer­ classes are in Spanish, French, and German sities, with 78,829 enrollments, is American (198,598 of a total of 255,105 advanced en­ Sign Language. These four make up over 76 rollments—nearly 78 percent), it suggests percent of all college language enrollments that colleges and universities teach rela­ for 2006. However, Spanish, German, and tively few other languages above the intro­ French are considered abundant in the Air ductory level.53 Force, although one can make a case for Nevertheless, one sees an increasing needing French in Africa Command’s area trend toward students earning degrees in

Table 2. Fall 2002 and 2006 language course enrollments in US institutions of higher education (languages in descending order of 2006 totals)

2002 2006 % Change Spanish 746,267 822,985 10.3 French 201,979 206,426 2.2 German 91,100 94,264 3.5 American Sign Language 60,781 78,829 29.7 Italian 63,899 78,368 22.6 Japanese 52,238 66,605 27.5 Chinese 34,153 51,582 51.0 Latin 29,841 32,191 7.9 Russian 23,921 24,845 3.9 Arabic 10,584 23,974 126.5 Greek, Ancient 20,376 22,849 12.1 Hebrew, Biblical 14,183 14,140 –0.3 Portuguese 8,385 10,267 22.4 Hebrew, Modern 8,619 9,612 11.5 Korean 5,211 7,145 37.1 Other languages 25,716 33,728 31.2 Total 1,397,253 1,577,810 12.9

Reprinted from Nelly Furman, David Goldberg, and Natalia Lusin, Enrollments in Languages other than English in United States Institutions of Higher Education, Fall 2006 (New York: Modern Language Association, 13 November 2007), 13, table 1a, http://www.mla.org/pdf/06enrollmentsurvey_final.pdf.

80 | Air & Space Power Journal Civilian Language Education in America other languages. According to graduation coursework in an LCTL one year but not the data compiled by the National Center for next; textbooks may not be readily available; Education Statistics, US colleges and univer­ and the quality of instruction may vary sities awarded 17,866 bachelor’s degrees in widely.58 Though commonly thought diffi­ foreign languages and literatures in 2007–8, cult to learn, LCTLs run the gamut from no almost 72 percent of them in Spanish (9,278), more problematic than French or Spanish French (2,432), and German (1,085).54 This (languages such as Portuguese and Swahili) still leaves a substantial cohort of 5,071 stu­ to extremely difficult (Chinese, Japanese, dents with bachelor’s degrees in other lan­ Korean, and Arabic).59 Not surprisingly, the guages (including 289 in Chinese and an­ Air Force and the other services have great other 57 in Arabic), possibly representing a interest in drawing many LCTLs from the fertile source of recruitment.55 aquifer of academia.

The Rise of Less Commonly A “Social Demand Theory” of Taught Languages Language Education Other than Biblical Hebrew, enrollments Perhaps in America one really doesn’t in the rest of the top 15 languages show sus­ perceive a lack of speakers of foreign lan­ tained growth and, happily, the Air Force guages so much as lack of a formal de­ needs most of them. Among those lan­ mand for them—a view described as a “so­ guages, Arabic (Modern Standard) and Chi­ cial demand model.” Such a model nese (Mandarin) have seen the greatest in­ involves a gap between the need (in this creases in the number of students (126 case, language experts in numerous, al­ percent and 51 percent, respectively) since beit less commonly taught, languages) 2002 and in the number of institutions of­ and the actual product (language majors fering classes.56 in Spanish, French, and German—all of Both of these languages fall into that lin­ them abundant in the Air Force, as men­ guistic grouping commonly referred to as tioned previously).60 To portray the social LCTLs. Although the phrase “less com­ demand model accurately, its disciples monly taught languages” seems self- point out the necessity of detailed infor­ explanatory, the concept itself requires mation on the need. That is, if you don’t some clarification. In reality, LCTLs include know exactly what you need, you can’t all languages other than the Big Three. demand it. Therefore, in the absence of Some, such as Igbo, are used by small popu­ specific demand, you get what’s available. lation groups. Most of the others suffer from Despite a DOD-wide review of the de­ the paucity of courses available throughout partment’s language requirements, little has academe—something particularly true of emerged that amounts to a clear call for of­ African languages such as Hausa and fering specific languages in academia. The Yoruba, as well as tongues from the Pacific substantial rise in college enrollments in Rim such as Malay and Indonesian.57 Arabic and Chinese, as noted above, is en­ Instruction in these and many other couraging, but the interest in Arabic most LCTLs is available across the country but likely stems from the events of 11 Septem­ usually only at larger universities, some of ber 2001 and from military activity in Iraq. which have formal centers for such lan­ Increases in Chinese enrollment may pro­ guages. Classes are generally small and in ceed from the realization that China will some cases taught not by permanent faculty become a near-peer competitor in the com­ members but by native speakers in the ing decades or, perhaps, from a second- United States on Fulbright scholarships. generation Chinese-American population Characteristically, universities may offer that seeks to better understand and appreci-

Fall 2010 | 81 Conway ate its ethnic heritage. These reasons seem system. For example, it is no coincidence much more likely explanations than a clar­ that most two-year colleges teaching Man­ ion call from the DOD. On the other hand, darin Chinese are on the US West Coast. the simultaneous, substantial rise in the One must note, however, that, given the number of students taking American Sign small number of students and the scarcity Language, and with nearly the same inten­ of instructors, specific course offerings at sity, fits neither pattern. Unless and until a two-year colleges may wax and wane. clear connection exists between the specific Nevertheless, the available courses can of­ language needs of the DOD and the lan­ fer a practical, affordable way to identify guage aquifer that is America’s colleges and potential linguists with the right skills and universities, both will pursue divergent aptitudes, thus reducing training time and paths, crossing only by happenstance. costs. To illustrate, the Air Force could re­ cruit junior college graduates with four se­ mesters of a desired language into its senior The Junior College Solution ROTC programs at four-year universities to complete their degrees as language majors. Among the most ravenous consumers of Clearly, Air Force recruiters as well as raw talent in America, college football AFROTC detachment “coaches” should pur­ coaches project their needs—an outside sue this avenue. linebacker here, a punter there—years in advance of the prospects’ playing days, cull the best qualified from the high school Final Observations ranks, and then pursue them with a zeal that often runs afoul of good sense as well The DLI’s Foreign Language Center rou­ as National Collegiate Athletic Association tinely produces competent linguists in dif­ rules. Not surprisingly, these master re­ ficult languages, but one cannot expect it to cruiters often find proven—emphasis on the provide all of the languages for all of the word proven—talent within the ranks of ju­ services all of the time. Civilian language nior colleges. Although these players lack education in America can serve as an addi­ four years of playing eligibility, they have tional source of talented linguists for the US two more years of experience than high Air Force and its sister services. school seniors, and coaches can carefully AFROTC is already making inroads into select them to fill a particular need. If col­ foreign language curricula insofar as it re­ lege football coaches can recruit the best cruits and compensates majors in specific players from junior colleges, so can language languages. However, because this is not a managers of the Air Force and AFROTC re­ requirements-driven, proactive approach cruit the best language students. between AFROTC and university language The nation’s two-year colleges have seen departments, it lacks focus at the collegiate strong growth in language courses during administrative level. the past decade, especially in Chinese, Ara­ The DOD’s process for determining its bic, and Japanese.61 Granted, two years of language requirements remains incomplete, instruction does not yield proficiency, espe­ and the part available lacks service-specific cially in the more difficult languages such granularity. This vacuum has led the Air as Arabic and Chinese, but it is a start. More Force to believe it has few specific language importantly, such enrollment demonstrates requirements, but that belief may prove in­ the student’s interest and intent. Simple on­ correct, causing the service to fall behind in line research can identify colleges that language emphasis. This attitude also over­ teach languages of interest to the DOD, looks the joint nature of modern military many of them located near communities of operations as well as the deployment of native speakers that feed into the school over 10,000 Airmen in joint expeditionary

82 | Air & Space Power Journal Civilian Language Education in America training billets every year—essentially should regard the acquisition of fluency in a “boots on the ground” assignments with foreign language as a “technical” major. their Army and Marine counterparts. If we Following this same theme, critical lan­ fight alongside these Soldiers and Marines, guage skills must become a recruiting pri­ who value language training, then shouldn’t ority. Even in the face of this “newfound” we value it as well? And what of the grow­ desire for linguistic competency in officers, ing demand to speak the language, not just the strong need for enlisted language spe­ read and understand it? How will we train cialists continues unabated.63 Although that and test this skill? aspect of the issue falls outside the scope of Finally, in light of the current emphasis this article, recruiting for this cohort must on preaccession language training, what do also become a priority. we do with all of these officers who have Following the Army’s successes in this newly acquired, very fragile language area, the Air Force Recruiting Service skills? Do we acknowledge their hard work should explore America’s many foreign- with a bonus for proficiency in a foreign language-speaking communities to target language? Do we have assignments that specific languages.64 An easy and accurate take advantage of their skills? On a much tool, the MLA language map pinpoints more practical level, do we acknowledge those areas of potential recruits.65 How­ their linguistic capabilities and sustain ever, recruiters should be advised that them throughout a career? most of these “heritage speakers” will need additional training in order to become mili­ tarily effective. Where Do We Go From Here? The Air Force should take the lead in im­ Recommendations plementing new congressional legislation to establish language research centers at col­ Although the following recommenda­ leges and universities. In selecting suitable tions for improving language skills in the sites, it should look at colleges that host Air Force by using America’s colleges and AFROTC detachments and those near Air universities apply to our service, they have Force bases. Additionally, the Air Force equal relevance to our sister services and to could build on the curricula at many col­ the DOD. leges’ existing critical language centers to First, the Air Force should lift its em­ meet its language needs. For example, Texas bargo on nontechnical majors, allowing col­ A&M University—one of the five “military lege graduates who majored in languages to colleges” highlighted in a congressional attend OTS. Many college students and study and in the 2010 QDR—not only has an graduates choose a military career only af­ outstanding corps of cadets but also a large, ter testing the civilian job market. Accord­ diverse faculty and student body. Its ca­ ing to a study commissioned by the MLA, pacity for growth and diversity lends itself government service does not appear as a to such an undertaking. “job category” in a national survey of col­ We should also use the social demand lege graduates whose first bachelor’s degree theory for discussing curriculum develop­ is in foreign languages. Although it may be ment with college and university language buried in the 6.3 percent listed as “other oc­ departments, stressing the need for making cupations,” government service of any available more introductory conversational type—including the military—does not ap­ courses to the entire AFROTC corps of ca­ pear as a career of choice for the vast ma­ dets as a method of encouraging language jority of language graduates.62 If the prohibi­ education throughout the corps. To add le­ tion of nontechnical majors appears to verage, AFROTC detachments should team violate OTS policy, then the Air Force with the other ROTC programs on campus

Fall 2010 | 83 Conway to present a consolidated statement of need schools, enrollment in any language—even for specific language classes. Latin—would be a plus. At the high school level, we should en­ To complete this sequence, the Air Force courage Air Force Junior ROTC (AFJROTC) should encourage its language professionals cadets to enroll in available language pro­ who wish to teach to become AFJROTC in­ grams, a move that would cost the Air Force structors or—better still—return to school nothing, help extend the sequence of lan­ and become language teachers under the guage education down to the high school DOD’s “Troops to Teachers” program. To level, increase the “demand” for language show the military utility of languages, we courses in secondary education (not a bad should encourage those who have “been there and done that” to become mentors thing), and help instill a sense of the and role models. Finally, but most impor­ “global” nature of the Air Force in AFJROTC tantly, we cannot allow the current DOD cadets. Such high school programs could and Air Force emphasis on foreign language also promote competition for senior ROTC education to fade from view, as it has so language scholarships across a wider base many times before. of students. Other incentives within By definition, attaining language profi­ AFJROTC could include language competi­ ciency is a long sequence, best begun early tions among schools (similar to drill compe­ and continued unabated throughout the edu­ titions) and the awarding of ribbons for stu­ cational system—a fact particularly true of dents with exceptional grades in foreign the more difficult (to Western students) lan­ languages.66 Given the narrow range of lan­ guages that the DOD desires. We must keep guages available in most American high the language aquifer flowing. 

Notes

1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washing­ 3. Jamie B. Draper and June H. Hicks, Foreign ton, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), Language Enrollments in Public Secondary Schools, 17, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf; and Fall 2000, American Council on the Teaching of For­ Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: eign Languages, US Department of Education Grant Department of Defense, February 2010), 54, http:// no. PO17A000017-01, May 2002, [5], table 1, http:// www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of www.actfl.org/files/public/Enroll2000.pdf. Although %2029JAN10%201600.pdf. 73 percent of high school students studied a foreign 2. Paul Simon, The Tongue-Tied American: Con­ language in 1915, that ratio would fall to 43.8 per­ fronting the Foreign Language Crisis (New York: Con­ cent by 2000. In 1915 Spanish comprised only 2.7 tinuum Press, 1980), 3. Mr. Simon is a former US percent of total enrollments in high school, a ratio senator. See also Deborah M. Herman, “ ‘Our Patri­ that would rise to 30.2 percent by 2000. Ibid., 1, 5. otic Duty’: Insights from Professional History, 1890– 4. Simon, Tongue-Tied American, 3. 1920,” in The Future of Foreign Language Education in 5. Iowa had the dubious distinction of being the the United States, ed. Terry A. Osborn (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 2002), 12, table 1.1, “Public High first state to ban the speaking of German in public: School Students Studying Foreign Language.” In in churches, on trains, and even on the telephone. 1900 “at least 600,000 elementary students [were re­ See Herman, “ ‘Our Patriotic Duty,’ ” 11. ceiving] some part of their education in German.” 6. Ibid., 12. “Timeline: The Bilingual Education Controversy,” in 7. Ibid., 17. School: The Story of American Public Education, 2001, 8. Enrollments hit their all-time low in 1948 Public Broadcasting System, http://www.pbs.org/ (21.7 percent) but have since enjoyed a slow but kcet/publicschool/roots_in_history/bilingual steady rise. Draper and Hicks, Foreign Language En­ _timeline2.html. rollments, [5], table 1.

84 | Air & Space Power Journal Civilian Language Education in America

9. “This prohibition did not extend to the ‘An- time for math and reading.” Campbell, “Fixes ‘No cient or dead’ languages—Latin, Greek, Hebrew.” Child’ Needs.” Elizabeth Mertz, Language and Mind: A Whorfian 17. Nancy C. Rhodes and Ingrid Pufahl, Foreign Folk Theory in United States Language Law, Sociolin- Language Teaching in U.S. Schools: Results of a Na­ guistics Working Paper no. 93 (Austin, TX: South- tional Survey (Washington, DC: Center for Applied west Educational Development Laboratory, July Linguistics, November 2009), “Executive Summary,” 1982), http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/540/ 6, http://www.cal.org/flsurvey. theory/mertz1.html. 18. Herman, “‘Our Patriotic Duty,’” 18. 10. Herman, “‘Our Patriotic Duty,’” 12. 19. Leon E. Panetta, “Foreign Language Educa- 11. An Act Related to the Teaching of Foreign Lan­ tion: If ‘Scandalous’ in the 20th Century, What Will guages in the State of Nebraska, 9 April 1919, quoted It Be in the 21st Century?” Stanford University Con- in Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923), ference Paper, n.d., 5, https://www.stanford.edu/ decided 4 June 1923, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dept/lc/language/about/conferencepapers/panetta dissenting. paper.pdf. 12. Even then, the court’s ruling was predicated 20. Draper and Hicks, Foreign Language Enroll­ on the 14th Amendment (i.e., “No state . . . shall ments, [6], table 2. deprive any person of life, liberty or property with- 21. Nelly Furman, David Goldberg, and Natalia out the due process of law”) rather than the 1st Lusin, Enrollments in Languages other than English Amendment (freedom of speech, etc.). Ironically, a in United States Institutions of Higher Education, Fall survey by the US Department of Education in 2000 2006 (New York: Modern Language Association, 13 showed zero Nebraska seventh and eighth graders November 2007), 13, tables 1a and 1b, http://www enrolled in foreign language classes, against a na- .mla.org/pdf/06enrollmentsurvey_final.pdf. These numbers represent all modern languages and in- tional average of 14.69 percent. However, the same clude Latin and “Greek, Ancient.” survey showed Nebraska leading the nation in the 22. Ibid. percentage of high schoolers enrolled in language 23. MLA Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Lan- studies (78.49). Draper and Hicks, Foreign Language guages, Foreign Languages and Higher Education: Enrollments, [6], table 2. New Structures for a Changed World (New York: Mod- 13. Numerous studies in the 1920s concluded ern Language Association, May 2007), 5, http:// that bilingual education was harmful to children. www.mla.org/foreign_languages_an. Most of these studies targeted socioeconomically 24. Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in disadvantaged children, testing them in their weak- Languages other than English, 2. Moreover, 9.1 per- est language—English. See Harold F. Schiffman, Lin­ cent of the nation’s two-year colleges offered no for- guistic Culture and Language Policy (London: Rout- eign language classes. Ibid. ledge, 1996), 315. 25. Panetta, “Foreign Language Education,”5; and 14. Dr. Ray Clifford, chancellor, Defense Lan- Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in Lan­ guage Institute—Foreign Language Center (remarks guages other than English, 4. at the National Briefing on Language and National 26. “Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) Pro- Security, National Press Club, Washington, DC, 16 ficiency Levels,” http://www.icls.com/FLD/ILR.pdf. January 2002), http://www.nflc.org/policy_and 27. International Center for Language Studies, _strategy/language_and_national_security/nflc “Classroom Hours to Achieve Proficiency Levels by _briefing_january_2002/full_transcript. Language Difficulty,” International Center for Lan- 15. James Campbell, “The Fixes ‘No Child’ guage Studies, Washington, DC, http://www.icls Needs,” Baltimore Sun, 6 December 2006, http:// .com/FLD/ILRlevels.htm. Generally speaking, these articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-12-06/news/ ILR levels measure linguistic proficiency via the 0912070036_1_minority-students-state-takeover Defense Language Proficiency Test. -yearly-progress. 28. Margaret E. Malone et al., “Attaining Higher 16. “Impediments to U.S. Push on Languages,” Levels of Proficiency: Challenges for Foreign Lan- Inside Higher Ed, 26 January 2007, http://www guage Education in the United States” (Washington, .insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/26/languages. DC: Center for Applied Linguistics, 2005), http:// The Baltimore Sun reported on a survey by the Cen- www.cal.org/resources/digest/attain.html. ter on Education Policy which revealed that “71 per- 29. According to an interview with the DLI’s cent of the nation’s 15,000 school districts had re- commander, “graduates of a six-month Spanish duced the hours of instructional time [in] . . . other course at DLI will typically speak better than a gradu- subjects [including foreign languages] to make more ating Spanish major at a four-year university.” Tim

Fall 2010 | 85 Conway

Kilbride, “Language Emerges as Element of National .cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id= Security,” American Forces Press Service, 31 March 7ce18437-63be-44ea-8f56-87ebbbdc186d. 2009, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle 38. The University of Minnesota’s Center for .aspx?id=53726. Advanced Research on Language Acquisition is an 30. Katherine McIntire Peters, “At a Loss for outstanding resource for determining where lan­ Words,” Government Executive, 15 June 2005, http:// guages are taught and a good starting place to re­ www.govexec.com/features/0605-15/0605-15s3.htm. search the issue. Center for Advanced Research on 31. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006, 79. Language Acquisition (CARLA), University of Min­ “We will continue our emphasis on enhancing these nesota, http://carla.umn.edu/. For details of schools skills in general purpose force officers during pre- and language offerings, see also a listing of the 15 accession training.” Quadrennial Defense Review Re­ national foreign language resource centers. “Foreign port, 2010, 54. Language Resource Centers,” Michigan State Univer­ 32. Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in sity, http://nflrc.msu.edu/index-1.php. Languages other than English, 5. In addition to the 39. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal top 15 listed in the table, the MLA reported 204 less Year 2010, Public Law 111-288, 111th Cong., 1st sess. commonly taught languages offered at America’s (7 October 2009), sec. 529, pars. (a), (b) (4), http:// colleges and universities. frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname 33. OTS can add or subtract from its acceptance =111_cong_reports&docid=f:hr288.111.pdf. demographic, based on the needs of the Air Force. 40. Dr. Gilbert Merkx, “National Briefing on Lan­ 34. See “In-College Scholarships,” US Air Force guage and National Security” (remarks at the Na­ ROTC, http://www.afrotc.com/scholarships/in tional Press Club, Washington, DC, 16 January 2002), http://www.nflc.org/policy_and_strategy/ -college/foreign-language-majors/. language_and_national_security/nflc_briefing 35. “Foreign Language Incentive Pay For Precom­ _january_2002/full_transcript. missioning Programs,” 37 USC, chap. 5, sec. 316a. 41. Briefing, Iris Bulls, deputy director, Defense 36. “Air Force Officials Developing Cross-Culturally Language Office, subject: Distance Learning: Pre­ Competent Officer,” Air Force News Service, 11 De­ paring the 21st Century Total Force, 15 March 2007. cember 2009, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id This observation was based on early returns from =123181940. the combatant commanders’ language require­ 37. Briefing, AFROTC, subject: In Contact—Incor­ ments survey. porating Language Training and Cultural/Regional 42. Gaylord George Candler, “Linguistic Diglossia Education into Officer Force Development Plans, and Parochialism in American Public Administra­ August 2005, slide: “Military-Affiliated Collegiate tion: The Missing Half of Guerreiro Ramos’s Foreign Language Programs.” This is a DOD-wide Redução Sociológica,” Administrative Theory and problem as well as an Air Force problem. Under­ Praxis 28, no. 4 (2006): 553. secretary of Defense Michael Dominguez points out 43. MLA Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Lan­ that 1,321 colleges host ROTC detachments (of all guages, Foreign Languages and Higher Education, 2. services) and that 1,148 of them have foreign lan­ 44. Modern Language Association, Report to the guage programs. However, he also states that the vast Teagle Foundation on the Undergraduate Major in majority of them rarely teach more than Spanish, Language and Literature (New York: Modern Lan­ French, and German; less than 40 percent teach Chi­ guage Association, February 2009), 3, 6, http://www nese or Arabic; and less than 10 percent teach Farsi. .mla.org/pdf/2008_mla_whitepaper.pdf. Though admittedly an improvement over the per­ 45. MLA Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Lan­ centages reported for AFROTC-affiliated schools in guages, Foreign Languages and Higher Education, 9. 2005, these are still low for the languages that the 46. House, Building Language Skills and Cultural Air Force needs. Senate, Statement of the Honorable Competencies in the Military: DOD’s Challenge in To­ Michael L. Dominguez, Principal Deputy Under Secre­ day’s Educational Environment, Report of the US tary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), before the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Ser­ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Govern­ vices, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, mental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Govern­ 110th Cong., 2d sess., November 2008, Committee ment Management, the Federal Workforce, and the Print 110-12, 36–37, http://armedservices.house.gov/ District of Columbia, “Lost in Translation: A Review of pdfs/Reports/LanguageCultureReportNov08.pdf. the Federal Government’s Efforts to Develop a Foreign 47. See “Department of European and Classical Language Strategy,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., 25 January Languages and Cultures,” Texas A&M University, 2007, 8, 9, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index http://euro.tamu.edu/; “Modern Languages and

86 | Air & Space Power Journal Civilian Language Education in America

Cultures,” Virginia Military Institute, http://www Education Statistics, 2009, National Center for Educa­ .vmi.edu/show.aspx?tid=37083&id=100; “Under­ tion Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/ graduate Programs,” Norwich University, http:// digest/d09/tables/dt09_308.asp?referrer=list; and www.norwich.edu/academics/undergrad.html; “Ma­ “Table 309. Degrees in French, German, Italian, and jors and Minors,” Citadel, http://www.citadel.edu/ Spanish conferred by degree-granting institutions, main/academics/majorsminors.html; and “Aca­ by level of degree: selected years, 1949–50 through demic Majors,” North Georgia College and State 2007–08,” idem. In the same year, colleges and uni­ University, http://www.ngcsu.edu/LandingPages/ versities also awarded 2,650 master’s degrees (1,522 Default.aspx?id=4373. in the Big Three) and 773 doctorates (346 in the Big 48. Stephanie van Reigersberg, “National Brief­ Three). See tables 308 and 309. ing on Language and National Security” (remarks at 55. “Table 310. Degrees in Arabic, Chinese, Korean, the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 16 January and Russian conferred by degree-granting institu­ 2002), http://www.nflc.org/policy_and_strategy/ tions, by level of degree: 1969–70 through 2007–08,” language_and_national_security/nflc_briefing Digest of Education Statistics, 2009, National Center _january_2002/full_transcript. Even so, a 2008 MLA for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/ report observed that even “four-year language ma­ digest/d09/tables/dt09_310.asp?referrer=list. jors often graduate with disappointingly low levels 56. Four hundred sixty-six institutions offered of linguistic ability.” MLA Ad Hoc Committee on Arabic in 2006, up from 264 in 2002. Six hundred Foreign Languages, Foreign Languages and Higher sixty-one offered instruction in Chinese in 2006, up Education, 7. Everette Jordan of the Department of from 543 in 2002. Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Defense takes this argument even further, believing Enrollments in Languages other than English, 3. that even a language major needs an additional 57. Timothy Reagan, “Toward a Political Economy three to five years to gain the experience level of the Less Commonly Taught Languages in Ameri­ needed to perform his job. Everette Jordan, “Na­ can Public Schools,” in The Future of Foreign Lan­ tional Briefing on Language and National Security” guage Education in the United States, 125. Reagan has (remarks at the National Press Club, Washington, created a hierarchy of LCTLs based not on linguistic DC, 16 January 2002), http://www.nflc.org/policy factors but on the likelihood that they will be taught _and_strategy/language_and_national_security/ in public school. They include the following: nflc_briefing_january_2002/full_transcript. 49. Briefing, Air Force Manpower and Personnel Level 1: Commonly Taught Languages (French, Center, Randolph AFB, TX, spring 2005, subject: In­ German, Spanish) telligence Careers, slide: “Save Languages for a Sec­ Level 2: Most Commonly Taught LCTLs (Arabic, ond Tour.” Chinese, Japanese, and Russian) 50. Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in Languages other than English, 18, table 4. Level 3: Rarely Taught LCTLs (Portuguese, Ital­ 51. Classes in American Sign Language have had ian, Norwegian, etc.) a meteoric rise, from less than 0.1 percent of total enrollments in 1990 to 5 percent in 2006. Furman, Level 4: Never/Virtually Never Taught LCTLs (all Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in Languages other African languages; most Asian and Oceanic lan­ than English, 3. For the purposes of this study, we guages) must discount this language because it probably Level 5: Nonlanguages (American Sign Language, does not have applications outside the United States. Esperanto) According to the Deaf Resource Library, no univer­ sal sign language exists. See Karen Nakamura, See ibid., 130–32. “About American Sign Language,” Deaf Resource 58. Ibid., 131. Library, http://www.deaflibrary.org/asl.html. 59. “Less Commonly Taught Languages,” Depart­ 52. Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in ment of Classical and Modern Languages and Litera­ Languages other than English, 21, table 7b. tures, Texas Tech University, http://www.depts.ttu 53. For Arabic the introductory to advanced ratio .edu/classic_modern/undrgrad/lctl/lctl.php. is 7:1; for Chinese, 7:2. These ratios are surprisingly 60. Mary Ellen O’Connell and Janet L. Norwood, strong, but Korean surpasses them at 3:1. Ibid. eds., International Education and Foreign Languages: 54. “Table 308. Degrees in modern foreign lan­ Keys to Securing America’s Future (Washington, DC: guages and literatures conferred by degree-granting National Academies Press, 2007), 37. The authors institutions, by level of degree and sex of student: tend to focus on teaching vacancies to the exclusion selected years 1949–50 through 2007–08,” Digest of of any real military application.

Fall 2010 | 87 Conway

61. Furman, Goldberg, and Lusin, Enrollments in of Mrs. Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Languages other than English, 16, table 2b. In 1980 Defense for Plans and the Department of Defense Se­ one-fifth of junior colleges offered no foreign lan- nior Language Authority, before the House Armed Ser­ guage courses. Simon, Tongue­Tied American, 3. vices Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and In­ 62. Modern Language Association, Report to the vestigations, 110th Cong., 2d sess., 10 September 2008, Teagle Foundation, 32. The Air Force might profit- http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/test ably recruit at elementary and secondary schools, McGinn080910.pdf. According to its latest posture where many (about 25 percent) language majors are statement, the Army plans to expand this program employed. The same survey identifies 2.2 percent of beyond the Central Command area of responsibility those graduating with a bachelor’s degree in a for- into Pacific Command and Africa Command. “Army eign language as employed in “food preparation and Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS),” services.” Ibid. The State Department’s Stephanie 2010 Army Posture Statement, https://secureweb2 van Reigersberg may have pinpointed the reason .hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/ that more language majors don’t enter government 2010/information_papers/Army_Culture_and service in any capacity, much less the armed ser- _Foreign_Language_Strategy_(ACFLS).asp. vices: money. “Language knowledge is not rewarded 65. “The Modern Language Association Lan- financially at all,” she contends. “How do you con- guage Map: A Map of Languages in the United vince people . . . who can go and work in [an] inter- States,” Modern Language Association, http://www national banking environment to work for govern- .mla.org/map_main. ment if the government wants them to be GS-9s?” 66. The Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Van Reigersberg, “National Briefing on Language Reconnaissance Agency’s annual “Sensor Olympics” and National Security.” language competition would be an excellent re- 63. Newfound is a relative term. One can trace source for establishing such a program. For a review calls for linguistic skills in officers back almost 50 of the original program, “Comfy Olympics,” by its years. “Officer Foreign Language Study,” a Headquar- innovator, see Maj Gen Doyle E. Larson, USAF, Re- ters USAF/AFPDP report of November 1962, cites a tired, “ESC Commander Starts Comfy Olympics,” letter of 24 August 1961 about officers’ language Spokesman Magazine, December 2004, http://find training which announced the goal that “all Air articles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QUY/is_2004_Dec/ Force officers be proficient in at least one foreign ai_n15622859/?tag=content;col1. For a more cur- language” (p. 21). rent view of information about Sensor Olympics, see 64. Since 2003 the Army has actively recruited 1st Lt Karoline Scott, “Sensor Olympics XXIX Honors native speakers (primarily Arabic) through its 09L AF ISR Agency’s Enlisted Airmen,” Air Force ISR Interpreter/Translator Program. According to Gail Agency Public Affairs, 10 November 2008, http:// McGinn, the DOD’s senior language authority, it is a www.afisr.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123123472. “particularly successful program.” House, Statement

Col John Conway, USAF, Retired Colonel Conway (BA, MA, University of Alabama) is a military defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He served as an intelli­ gence officer with major assignments at Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the National Security Agency. He was the senior intelligence officer at Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), Robins AFB, Georgia, and held several wing and squadron intelligence assignments, including a combat tour with the II Direct Air Support Center in Pleiku Province, Republic of Vietnam. For his last active duty assignment, he was the chief, Counterdrug Support Division, Headquarters AFRC. Following active duty, Colonel Conway was a systems engineering and technical assistance contrac­ tor to the U­2 Directorate at Robins AFB and a civilian adviser to the Gordon Re­ gional Security Operations Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia, following 11 September 2001. He is a frequent contributor to Air and Space Power Journal and Air Univer­ sity’s The Wright Stuff.

88 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

left only an orange burst of flame and a cloud of debris where a bomber once flew. A second theme covers the physically demanding nature of flying a bomber in combat day after day and the toll it takes on the aircrew. The mystery of war, which makes us ponder why some men live and some die, comprises the third and final theme. Among the library and bookstore shelves filled with autobiographies of World War II air- crew members, In Hostile Skies stands out as a true gem. Davis’s writing style brings readers into the cockpit of his B-24 and holds them there until it safely lands back in England after an- other harrowing mission. More than just an “I was there” story, the book provides a clear In Hostile Skies: An American B­24 Pilot in understanding of the day-to-day stresses, hopes, World War II by James M. Davis. Edited by and lives of B-24 pilots. Moreover, its detailed David L. Snead. University of North Texas description of bomber-pilot training offers a Press (http://www.unt.edu/untpress), P.O. valuable look into an area of AAF history often Box 311336, Denton, Texas 76203-1336, 2006, glossed over. Even in training, the risks were 256 pages, $27.95 (hardcover), ISBN real, and Airmen lost their lives. 1574412094; 2007, 256 pages, $14.95 (soft- Intent on preserving Lieutenant Davis’s original cover), ISBN 1574412396. text, David Snead provides subtle editing support Day after day, “ordinary” men performed extra- throughout in the form of documentation and mi- ordinarily heroic deeds and faced certain death as nor clarifications that facilitate the reader’s under- members of Eighth Air Force’s bomber crews over standing. He thus increases the value of the text by Nazi-occupied Europe. One of these men, James verifying its accuracy while maintaining the origi- “Jim” Davis, from Texas, recounts his experiences nal flow of this engaging, easy-to-read book. in the book In Hostile Skies: An American B­24 Pilot Humble in its approach, In Hostile Skies is a in World War II, edited by David Snead. superb selection for anyone who wants an in- Lieutenant Davis recounts his wartime experi- depth look at experiences of the pilots and air- ences, from his early years on a ranch in central crew members aboard Eighth Air Force’s B-24 Texas during the Depression, including his first bombers during World War II. exposure to airplanes; through his training and Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Retired quest to become a pilot; to his combat experi- Ruston, Louisiana ences. Ultimately, he would fly 24 combat sorties before his unit, the 489th Bomb Group, returned Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea, and the to the United States for conversion to the B-29. Stars, NASA SP-2005-4701, edited by Steven J. Financially unable to go to college and pursue Dick and Keith L. Cowing. National Aeronau- his dream of becoming an Army Air Forces tics and Space Administration, Office of Exter- (AAF) pilot, Davis had to pass an aviation-cadet nal Relations, NASA History Division (http:// training exam to begin his flying career. Doing so www.nasa.gov), Washington, DC, 2004, 304 on his second attempt, he was accepted into a pages, $44.00 (hardcover). Available free from program that condensed the first two years of http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4701/riskand college into roughly two months. After initial exploration.pdf. pilot training, Davis took a series of advanced courses, culminating in deployment to the Euro- After the loss of the shuttle Columbia, NASA pean theater and combat operations. found itself on the defensive as critics began to The book includes several themes, the first of claim that the potential benefits of space explora- which addresses the great risks faced by Eighth tion did not justify the danger involved. As part of Air Force aircrews, not only in combat but also NASA’s response, in September 2004 during the in training. Repeatedly, Lieutenant Davis tells NASA Administrator’s Symposium at the Naval Post- stories of how aircrew members met violent deaths graduate School, Monterey, California, it brought as a result of training accidents or action in com- together some of the most famous ocean explorers, bat, the latter often the result of a direct hit that mountaineers, cavers, astronauts, and scientists to

Fall 2010 | 89 talk about the risks and rewards of exploring fron- to support a few self-chosen explorers’ exploits— tiers. Among the speakers were Apollo 13 com- and is stupid if it doesn’t. It’s much easier to mander James Lovell, ocean researcher Sylvia have this opinion if the person happens to be Earle, movie director James Cameron, and many someone waiting for a spot on the next shuttle other astronauts and scientists. This book records launch rather than a worker worrying about cov- the transcribed proceedings of that conference. ering his or her mortgage after paying taxes. Readers may select from over 25 speeches, That this collection is a transcript of a sympo- along with transcripts of question-and-answer sium offers both advantages and disadvantages sessions. Throughout the book, one finds very to the reader. Selections are often only a few interesting anecdotes and some compelling in- pages in length and can be read easily and sights into risk during exploration activities that quickly. Also, the speakers cover a great many are instructive to today’s air and space profes- different subjects that offer something worth- sional. James Lovell explains the danger of “risk while to almost any reader. Unfortunately, even [as] overkill” (p. 12) regarding his experiences on though the book spans a wide breadth, the indi- the lesser-known Gemini 7 mission. Polar explora- vidual speeches do not contain significant depth. tion expert Jack Stuster describes the difficulty of The 10- or 20-minute speeches, which comprise scheduling everything (allowing no flexibility) on the bulk of the book, are necessarily limited in exploration missions: it’s impossible to meet all of the detail that readers may desire. the objectives, and attempting to do so will only Overall, Risk and Exploration is an appealing se- irritate the crew. Other useful tidbits include an lection to anyone interested in exploration as well overview of the three phases of exploration opera- as the politics and risk involved—or, indeed, anyone tions, the supremacy of logistics to any endeavor, who likes to read about the exploits of mountain- and a rationale for choosing mission members. eers, astronauts, and deep-sea explorers. However, Scattered among the pages are many such nug- the book is short on depth, and some of the speak- gets of wisdom from today’s foremost explorers. ers have a tendency to preach. The prospective Less interesting are the myriad explanations reader must determine if it merits an expedition. for why the taxpayer should fund the government’s Capt Brent D. Ziarnick, USAFR exploration efforts. Platitudes such as a need to Spaceport America, New Mexico “look over the next hill” (p. 233) or “over the next horizon” (p. 102) abound. They also ring hollow The War Managers, 30th anniversary edition, after the first few readings, as people blessed to by Douglas Kinnard. Naval Institute Press experience some of the most incredible adven- (http://www.usni.org/navalinstitutepress/ tures of all time (on the back of the taxpayer) index.asp), 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Mary- lament that average folks will not fork over more land 21402-5034, 2007, 228 pages, $19.95 (soft- money so that an astronaut who has flown in cover), ISBN 9781591144373. space can also fly to Mars, or an aquanaut can go another 1,000 feet deeper. Even in the short time between the US with- This is a fundamental flaw of both the sympo- drawal from Vietnam and the fall of the South to sium and the book. Often, risk is not the reason Northern forces, attempts to understand what that exploration missions never get out of the went wrong had already begun. Among the more planning stage: it is money. Exploration is ex- notable examinations of the way the war un- pensive, and the exploration of the earth, sea, and folded was Brig Gen Douglas Kinnard’s 1974 sur- stars conducted by most of the speakers in this vey of US general officers who served in Viet- book has no underlying relevance to the eco- nam, the findings of which are the basis for The nomic or material well-being of society. Mostly, War Managers. Now reissued in paperback by they cite “science” as the reason for their actions, the Naval Institute Press, the work deserves ex- which to a lay reader seems a thin cover to ask amination by all who would lead forces into war. for a blank check to have fun doing something a The author retired in 1970 as a brigadier general regular person has no chance of experiencing. after a final tour as chief of staff to a major com- With the notable exception of Dr. Harrison mand in Vietnam. The work rests on a question- Schmitt, who lauds private exploration and the naire he sent to all 173 generals active in the US use of space resources; James Cameron, who effort there, 70 percent of whom responded. Not funds his own endeavors; and some others, the surprising in hindsight, the results are remarkably contributors to this tome tend to suggest that on target, given the nearness to the event. Most dis- society at large (through government) has a duty maying is the finding that the generals overwhelm-

90 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

ingly agree that they had little grasp of their pur- 1970s, nonreflective of the military of the era, has pose and that their troops had even less. The war given way to diversity in the current officer corps, was not so much mishandled—most of the ques- including the generals—diversity that matches tions about military aspects elicited reasonably fa- that of the enlisted men and women. vorable responses—as it was micromanaged and Readers will find The War Managers acces- directionless. Even the caliber of the forces went sible and easy to navigate—almost hard to put unchallenged, an assessment that soon gave way to down. Granted, it is a snapshot of another time, the hollow force and a long, expensive effort to re- but insofar as it dispels the myth that leaders are build a military capable of avoiding the catastrophic of one mind and voice, it is both timeless and collapse that the late-war Army suffered. timely. The 30th anniversary edition adds little Chapters deal with war aims, conduct of the to the original, but the new preface does offer a war, advisory and pacification efforts, composi- nice touch to an interesting book. tion of the American force, ending of the war, Dr. John H. Barnhill and the survey. Within these headings lie sec- Houston, Texas tions on strategy and tactics, rules of engage- ment, command and control, mobilization of the The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did reserves, relations with the media, the Vietnam- Everything but Learn from It by David M. ese military, and more. The work also contains a Toczek. Naval Institute Press (http://www short section on the implications of this narrow .usni.org/navalinstitutepress/index.asp), 291 study for a broader world. Appendices include Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034, the questionnaire, along with a breakout of re- 2007, 224 pages, $19.95 (softcover), ISBN sults; a statistical analysis designed to determine 1591148537. whether the author confirmed his hypotheses; and a listing of all commanding generals be- Situated southwest of Saigon, the hamlet of Ap tween 1965 and 1972. The short preface to the Bac in Tien Giang province is the site of a single- new edition contains a sampling of reactions day encounter between a regiment of the People’s that the original volume generated. Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) (North Vietnam) Kinnard does not merely reproduce the survey and a division of the Army of the Republic of findings although the work contains the complete Vietnam (ARVN) (South Vietnam) and its Ameri- questionnaire and tabulated results for each an- can advisors on 2 January 1963. The battle ended swer. He also provides a good political and mili- in an allied defeat because of the PLAF’s ability to tary narrative of the war itself—an overview that counter the firepower of armored personnel carri- holds up reasonably well in competition with ers and helicopters fielded in the operation. The works generated by the subsequent 30 years of fact that political factors constrained the ARVN’s additional research and analysis on the topic. leadership also contributed to the outcome. Moreover, for a study of the failure in Vietnam, it First published in 2001, 38 years after the op- has the virtue of being relatively short. Kinnard eration, The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam is surely places the questionnaire answers squarely into the definitive account of the fight. US Army ma- context, fleshing out the percentages with perti- jor David Toczek, a professor of history at the US nent remarks from the generals who chose to go Military Academy (West Point), provides the beyond the simple multiple-choice answer. reader an operational, historical narrative and As an interesting sidelight, Kinnard’s profile of tactical analysis of the battle. Divided into five the generals is quite revealing. All of them be- chapters, arranged chronologically, the book in- longed to the same generation, born between cludes a foreword by Gen William B. Rosson, for- 1910 and 1926. Most, but not all, graduated from mer deputy commander of US Military Assis- college—about half from the US Military Academy tance Command, Vietnam. The first two at West Point. Almost all were married, averaging chapters are notable, the author providing his- 25 years in the service. And, naturally, they were torical background of the US Military Assistance all white, male, and predominantly Protestant. Advisory Group, Indochina; the Vietnamese Na- About half had qualified for airborne duty, 60 per- tional Army; and the PLAF. Here, Toczek de- cent having infantry backgrounds. Service in Viet- scribes both the organizational and historical nam earned a promotion for each of them. Given development, as well as political factors influ- the marked similarity of backgrounds, their diver- encing the two opposing forces, and details the gences on the nature of the war are remarkable. operational aspects (air mobility) in the ARVN More remarkable is how the homogeneity of the and the role of the advisory system. Moreover,

Fall 2010 | 91 he thoroughly discusses the strategic and politi- tice. The vast amount of military might contained cal framework from which the PLAF waged war. in this one ship, let alone its size, is simply stagger- Focusing on the battle itself, the third chapter ing. It is only appropriate that an author with a addresses the preparations, strategic planning, reputation as impressive as that of the aircraft car- cooperation, frustrations, shortcomings, and de- rier take on the task of revising and updating the cision making under fire on both sides, followed previous edition of this book. After reading Aircraft in chapter four by an account of reactions to the Carriers, I can say that Norman Polmar was the battle’s aftermath by the senior officers and advi- right man for the job. An internationally known sory group involved. The penultimate chapter specialist in naval, aviation, and technical intelli- also considers the PLAF’s notion of the battle as gence issues, with over 40 books to his credit and its victory as well as media articles and releases service as a consultant or adviser to three secretar- that followed. ies of the Navy and two chiefs of naval operations, Rather than treating the battle as a small-scale Polmar comes well prepared for the task. encounter, the fifth chapter offers the author’s con- I found this book a very interesting coffee-table- clusion about the defeat at Ap Bac, placing it in the sized historical reference with insightful analysis larger context of the Vietnam conflict. He notes woven into the text. Like the ship, this soup-to-nuts that the battle provided a window that could have compilation of aircraft carrier information is beyond changed America’s policy or plan for the war. This paperback edition from Naval Institute “big.” Polmar has clearly done his research and per- Press coincides with the 45th anniversary of the forms yeoman’s work, bringing relevance to each battle. Major Toczek highlights not only its out- phase of carrier operations he discusses. He ends come and effect on the conflict in general, but most of the chapters with a summary that captures also the essence of the lessons learned that have the major points in a few concise paragraphs. relevance to contemporary issues concerning The author’s narrative begins just after World national-security decision making and counter- War II ends, when US leadership begins to de- insurgency—factors of interest to currently serv- bate the future of the aircraft carrier in light of ing officers and personnel, especially those de- atomic (and, later, nuclear) weapons, the jet age, ployed in counterinsurgency operations and and, eventually, space technology. Polmar de- advisory roles. Extraordinarily researched and scribes this ongoing debate over relevancy well written, the book includes an extensive pic- through Korea and Vietnam, well into the Reagan torial account of key persons during the period, presidency. Not surprisingly, each time a crisis notes for each chapter, appendices, a substantial flares up, the American leadership first asks, bibliography, and an index. “Where are the carriers?” The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam will make a Especially interesting are the chapters on foreign valuable addition to the libraries of all officers; navies’ carrier investments and ventures, including senior noncommissioned officers; ambassadors; an entire section on the Falklands War, which sum- diplomats; historians; professors; defense, air, marizes very well the British experience with expe- and naval attachés; and enthusiasts of leadership ditionary war in the late twentieth century. Also and counterinsurgency warfare. It is a com- insightful was the extended chapter on the Soviet mendable contribution and significant addition Navy during the tenure of the Soviet Union. to the literature of the Vietnam War. The second volume of Aircraft Carriers is a Cdr Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard magnificent piece of research. The chapters guide Manila, Philippines readers through naval history by putting the air- craft carrier into context with the crises of the Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Avia­ times. As a historical text, this is a good read, with tion and Its Influence on World Events, the tables and pictures providing color commen- Vol. 2, 1946–2006, rev. ed., by Norman Polmar tary that accompanies the text. The summaries in collaboration with Minoru Genda et al. offer a concise wrap-up of the chapters, leading Potomac Books (http://www.potomac the reader smoothly into the following chapter. In booksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, all, I highly recommend this book to Airmen—if Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2008, 560 pages, for no other reason than to gain a professional $39.96 (hardcover), ISBN 1574886657. awareness of our flying brethren in the Navy. Few ships are as awe inspiring as the aircraft Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired carrier. To say “it’s big” does not do the carrier jus- Scott AFB, Illinois

92 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

Astronautics: A Historical Perspective of his apparent misunderstanding of Newton’s third Mankind’s Efforts to Conquer the Cosmos, law of motion: for every action, there is an equal Book 1, Dawn of the Space Age; Book 2, To and opposite reaction. He explains that “the action- the Moon and Towards the Future by Ted reaction of the exhaust gases was pushing against Spitzmiller. Apogee Books/Collectors Guide the inside of the rocket motor to provide the pro- Publishing (http://www.apogeebooks.com), pulsive force” (p. 19). Toward the end of book 2, 1440 Graham’s Lane, Unit no. 2, Burlington, Spitzmiller perpetuates this inaccuracy when he Ontario L7S 1W3, Canada, 2006, 232 pages, says that “expanding combustion” in a ramjet en- $24.95 (softcover), ISBN 9781-894959-63-6; gine “‘pushes’ (Newton’s third law) against the 2007, 336 pages, $25.95 (softcover), ISBN 978- ‘wall’ of incoming air to provide thrust” (p. 472) 1-894959-66-7. and, again, that a spacecraft powered by a mass driver would have “to have a significant quantity of The tally for publications in Apogee Books’ some material to react against” (p. 473). Space Series now amounts to several dozen, in- Historical accuracy also suffers in these vol- cluding Ted Spitzmiller’s two-volume set titled umes. Spitzmiller describes the Guggenheim Astronautics. To celebrate the 50th anniversary of Aeronautical Laboratory’s successful solid- Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, propellant jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) experimen- Spitzmiller has attempted to synthesize a con- tation under Air Corps contract in 1941, explain- cise, encyclopedic history of rocketry and space- ing that “it would be two more years before a flight. In 39 chapters, each one designed to give liquid-propellant rocket engine, constructed by readers “a relatively complete understanding of a the Aerojet General Corporation, was tested in a special interest area without the need to ferret Consolidated Aircraft Co. flying boat on San Diego information from multiple chapters” (p. 9), he Bay” (p. 33). He never mentions that the liquid- chronicles humankind’s exploration of space propellant JATO units resulted from US Navy from Copernicus in the early sixteenth century experimentation led by Robert C. Truax and to exotic new forms of spacecraft propulsion for Robert H. Goddard. Similarly, he acknowledges interplanetary voyages in the twenty-first cen- the contribution of the Army Air Forces and tury. The chapters in book 1 cover individual Project RAND in early 1946, which studied the pioneers, early rocket societies, Peenemünde feasibility of an Earth-circling spaceship, without and the V-2, rocket planes, planning for an Earth once mentioning the manned spacecraft pro- satellite, military spy satellites, harnessing liquid posal by US Navy lieutenant Robert Haviland hydrogen, piloted spaceflight, planetary explora- and Cdr Harvey Hall in August 1945 or the Na- tion, and more. Chapters in book 2 include the vy’s subsequent establishment in October 1945 race to the moon, the space shuttle, space sta- of a Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of tions, expendable booster development, the Space Rocketry. As for the history of military search for extraterrestrial life, deep-space mis- communication satellites, Spitzmiller credits the sions, and competitive partnering in space. US Army Signal Corps, explaining that “Courier Spitzmiller eschews primary documentation, was a prototype for a more advanced military except for a few memoirs, and relies almost exclu- satellite communications project known as Ad­ sively on biographies, histories, and Web sites as vent which placed much larger satellites in geo- source material. He characterizes his sources as synchronous orbits several years later” (p. 155). typically sacrificing scope and presenting an over- Apparently, he does not understand that the Ar- whelming level of technical detail. Consequently, my’s Advent program failed and, consequently, he seeks in Astronautics “to simplify and clarify that the Air Force launched the world’s first dedi- technology, politics, and events to make them cated military communication satellite—opera- easier to comprehend” (p. 9). His goal is com- tionally known as the Initial Defense Satellite mendable and, grammatically and stylistically, he Communications System—in 1968. Other mis- achieves it. The word picture he paints of Russia’s statements, incomplete explanations, or over- Sputnik launch will grip most readers, and his sights occur throughout Astronautics. telling of the Apollo 13 saga will captivate them. These volumes might disappoint readers, even Unfortunately, in an attempt to significantly those with only a basic knowledge of space history, broaden the scope of his narrative, Spitzmiller too because blatant errors in spelling mar the narrative often sacrifices scientific, technical, and historical from beginning to end. From “mils” instead of accuracy or completeness. The most surprising “miles” (p. 37) to “essentailly” instead of “essentially” example of scientific inaccuracy in Astronautics is (p. 408), the errors detract from the quality of Spitz-

Fall 2010 | 93 miller’s presentation. Furthermore, seeing “Maxime create a so-called A-Team in Iraq, a team com- Faggot” instead of “Maxime Faget” (p. 335), “Neal prised of first-rate talent and experience. Armstrong” instead of “Neil Armstrong” (p. 348), The authors see a variety of problems at the “Robinson Caruso” instead of “Robinson Crusoe” (p. root of the failure to field such a team. One funda- 476), and “Caiden, Martin” instead of “Caidin, Mar- mental issue lies in the stereotypically slow speed tin” (p. 481, bibliography) might prompt readers to of the federal government to hire civilian employ- question how much attention the author, or his ees, both from within its ranks (internal appli- copy editor, paid to factual details. cants) and from outside the federal pool (external As much as one might try to focus on positive applicants). However, institutional inertia vis-à-vis attributes and overlook shortfalls in Astronautics, civilian hiring does not act as the sole villain. They obstacles ranging from typographical errors to cite a number of other interrelated problems, in- substantive inaccuracies tend to obscure the bril- cluding differences in compensation from agency liance of Spitzmiller’s narrative style. Perhaps a to agency, home agencies blocking deployments of reprinted version—with errors corrected, inaccu- their employees to support their own operations, racies clarified, and oversights covered—might unwillingness or reluctance (on the part of both render these volumes worthy of consideration the employee and the home agency) to have em- for classroom use or a prominent place on col- ployees deploy for extended periods of time, and lectors’ bookshelves. the difficulty of finding employees to fill particular Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant niche positions demanding expertise as well as a Peterson AFB, Colorado suitable background in language and culture. There lies a way ahead. The authors see sev- eral possibilities for better results in future opera- Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: tions, while acknowledging the frustration of try- Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capa­ ing to slice through the proverbial red tape. One bilities by Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, suggestion with possible merit concerns creation Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine. of a by-name civilian reserve—a pool of employ- RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org/ ees sortable by skills and expertise. Administered publications/index.html), 1776 Main Street, within the US State Department, since it would P.O . Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407- likely serve as the lead agency for SSTR opera- 2138, 2008, 130 pages, $29.00 (softcover), tions, the list would stand as a ready supply of ISBN 0833041371. Available free from http:// willing participants to fill needed vacancies. The www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/ authors also surmise that centralizing the admin- RAND_MG580.pdf. istration of deployed civilians within one agency could generate more enthusiasm for deployment How should the US government handle civilian insofar as it could possibly create equities in com- staffing for reconstruction operations? The authors pensation and reduce cross-agency idiosyncrasies. seek to answer this question in light of US involve- Finally, promoting deployment as a positive ca- ment in contingency operations in the recent past, reer step could likely attract more and better tal- utilizing the example of the Coalition Provisional ent. Although the authors don’t see any one step Authority (CPA) in Iraq. Two of the book’s authors, as a magic bullet, they predict that institutional who served as members of the CPA, draw on per- change could foster improvement. sonal experience in their assessments and recom- Overall, Stabilization and Reconstruction Staff­ mendations. In light of their experience and re- ing has fairly narrow utility. It serves neither as search, the authors do not believe that the US a primer on civilian staffing in any sense of the government’s current human-resources infra- structure enables effective civilian staffing. word nor as any kind of assessment of opera- Composing this work as part of a RAND Cor- tions in the global war on terror, from either a poration research project, the authors seek to military or civil standpoint. Readers will find this analyze how civilian staffing has occurred in the work useful if they are interested in research past as well as develop a road map for more ef- within the civil service. Though readable, it is fective staffing in future stability, security, tran- brief and written from a fairly technical human- sition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. resources perspective. They contend that the methods used for civilian David J. Schepp, Seventh Air Force Historian staffing proved less than effective and did not Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea

94 | Air & Space Power Journal Mission Debrief

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Volume XXIV, No. 3 XXIV, Volume

Femme Fatale 2010 Fatale Femme USAF L. Alfonso, Kristal Col Lt America in Education Civilian Language theHow Air Can Thrive Force Academia and Together Retired USAF, Conway, John Col Lorenz Leadership on Part 3 USAF R. Lorenz, Stephen Gen Control and Air Force Command Reenabling for Twenty-first-CenturyPartnerships USAF Breedlove, Philip Gen Lt USAF Tyler, Brian Maj Elephant the Whole Seeing a SuccessfulEnvisioning Light Attack Program for Airthe Force US USAF Pietrucha, W. Michael Col Lt Fall 2010 Fall

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Fall 2010